The acendancy of France 1598-1715

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Title: The acendancy of France 1598-1715
Author: Wakeman, Henry Offley
Language: English
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*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The acendancy of France 1598-1715" ***
1598-1715 ***

PERIODS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY

PERIOD V., 1598–1715.

_In Eight Volumes. Crown 8vo. With Maps._

=PERIODS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY=

General Editor--ARTHUR HASSALL, M.A.,
Student of Christ Church, Oxford.

The object of this series is to present in separate Volumes a
comprehensive and trustworthy account of the general development
of European History, and to deal fully and carefully with the more
prominent events in each century.

The Volumes will embody the results of the latest investigations, and
will contain references to and notes upon original and other sources of
information.

It is believed that no such attempt to place the History of Europe in
a comprehensive, detailed, and readable form before the English Public
has yet been made, and it is hoped that the Series will form a valuable
continuous History of Mediæval and Modern Europe.

=Period I.--The Dark Ages.= A.D. 476–918. By C. W. C. OMAN, M.A.,
Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. 7_s._ 6_d._

=Period II.--The Empire and the Papacy.= A.D. 918–1272. By T. F. TOUT,
M.A., Professor of History at Victoria University, Manchester.

=Period III.--The Close of the Middle Ages.= A.D. 1272–1494. By R.
LODGE, M.A., Professor of History at the University of Glasgow.

=Period IV.--Europe in the 16th Century.= A.D. 1494–1598. By A. H.
JOHNSON, M.A., Historical Lecturer to Merton, Trinity, and University
Colleges, Oxford. 7_s._ 6_d._

=Period V.--The Ascendancy of France.= A.D. 1598–1715. By H. O.
WAKEMAN, M.A., Fellow of All Souls College, and Tutor of Keble College,
Oxford. 6_s._

=Period VI.--The Balance of Power.= A.D. 1715–1789. By A. HASSALL,
M.A., Student of Christ Church, Oxford. 6_s._

=Period VII.--Revolutionary Europe.= A.D. 1789–1815. By H. MORSE
STEPHENS, M.A., Professor of History at Cornell University, Ithaca,
U.S.A. 6_s._

=Period VIII.--Modern Europe.= A.D. 1815–1878. By G. W. PROTHERO, Litt.
D., Professor of History at the University of Edinburgh.

THE ASCENDANCY
OF FRANCE

1598–1715

HENRY OFFLEY WAKEMAN, M.A.

FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE

TUTOR OF KEBLE COLLEGE, OXFORD

AUTHOR OF ‘AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND’

_PERIOD V_

SECOND EDITION

London

RIVINGTON, PERCIVAL AND CO.

1897

[_All rights reserved._]

PREFACE

I have not attempted in the following pages to write the history of
Europe in the seventeenth century in detail. The chronicle of events
can be found without difficulty in many other works. I have therefore
endeavoured as far as possible to fix attention upon those events only
which had permanent results, and upon those persons only whose life
and character profoundly influenced those results. Other events and
other persons I have merely referred to in passing, or left out of
account altogether, such as for instance the history of Portugal and
the Papacy, the internal affairs of Spain, Italy, and Russia. Following
out this line of thought I have naturally found in the development
of France the central fact of the period which gives unity to the
whole. Round that development, and in relation to it, most of the
other nations of Europe fall into their appropriate positions, and
play their parts in the drama of the world’s progress. Such a method
of reading the history of a complicated period may, of course, be open
to objection from the point of view of absolute historical truth. The
effort to give unity to a period of history may easily fall into the
inaccuracy of exaggeration. The picture may become a caricature, or
so strong a light may be shed on one part as to throw the rest into
disproportionate gloom. It would be presumptuous in me to claim that
I have avoided such dangers. All that I can say is, that they have
been present to my mind continually as I was writing, and that I
have been emboldened to face them both by the fact that the history
of the seventeenth century lends itself in a very marked way to such
a treatment, and by the conviction that it is far more important to
the training of the human mind, and the true interests of historical
truth that a beginner should learn the place which a period occupies
in the story of the world than have an accurate knowledge of the
smaller details of its history. To know the meaning and results of
the Counter-Reformation is some education, to know the official and
personal names of the Popes none at all.

With regard to the spelling of names I have endeavoured to follow what
I humbly conceive to be the only reasonable and consistent rule, that
of custom. It seems to me to be as pedantic to write Henri, Karl,
or Friedrich, as it is admitted to be to write Wien or Napoli, and
inconsistent on any theory except that of the law of custom to write
anything else. But with regard to some names, custom permits more than
one form of spelling. It is as customary to write Trier as Trêves, or
Mainz as Mayence. These cases mainly arise with reference to names of
places which are situated on border lands, and are spelt sometimes
according to one language, and sometimes according to another. In these
cases I have followed the language of the nation which was dominant in
the period of which I treat, and accordingly write Alsace, Lorraine,
Basel, Köln, Saluzzo, etc. The use of an historical atlas is presumed
throughout.

H. O. W.

ALL SOULS COLLEGE, OXFORD.
_March, 1894._

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. EUROPE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, 1

II. FRANCE UNDER HENRY IV., 14

III. THE COUNTER-REFORMATION AND RELIGIOUS TROUBLES IN GERMANY, 39

IV. THE BEGINNING OF THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR, 53

V. THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR FROM THE PEACE OF LÜBECK TO THE
PEACE OF PRAGUE, 78

VI. THE AGGRANDISEMENT OF FRANCE, 106

VII. FRANCE UNDER RICHELIEU AND MAZARIN, 133

VIII. NORTHERN EUROPE TO THE TREATY OF OLIVA, 166

IX. LOUIS XIV. AND COLBERT, 185

X. LOUIS XIV. AND THE UNITED PROVINCES, 207

XI. LOUIS XIV. AND WILLIAM III., 235

XII. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE, 266

XIII. THE NORTHERN NATIONS FROM THE TREATY OF OLIVA TO THE
PEACE OF UTRECHT, 290

XIV. THE PARTITION TREATIES AND THE GRAND ALLIANCE, 312

XV. THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION AND THE DEATH OF
LOUIS XIV., 342

MAPS

NO.

1. Acquisitions of territory by France during the
period, _To face page_ 25

2. Germany according to the peace of Westphalia,
showing the march of Gustavus Adolphus,
1630–1632, _To face page_ 124

3. The countries of the Upper Rhine and Danube, showing the PAGE
march of Turenne, 1675, and of Marlborough, 1704, 241

4. Northern Italy, illustrating the campaigns of Prince
Eugene 1701–1706, 343

5. The Netherlands, illustrating the campaigns of Condé,
Turenne and Marlborough, 348

GENEALOGICAL TABLES

1. The Sovereigns of Europe during the century, 376

2. The House of Bourbon, 378

3. The Cleves-Jülich succession, 380

4. The Spanish Succession, 381

INDEX 383

CHAPTER I

EUROPE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Importance of the century--France at the beginning of the
century--The States-General, the Parlement de Paris, Religious
Toleration--Germany--The Emperor, the Imperial Courts, the
Diet--Disunion of Germany--England--Spain--Italy.

[Sidenote: =Importance of the Seventeenth Century.=]

The seventeenth century is the period when Europe, shattered in its
political and religious ideas by the Reformation, reconstructed its
political system upon the principle of territorialism under the rule
of absolute monarchs. It opens with Henry IV., it closes with
Peter the Great. It reaches its climax in Louis XIV. and the
Great Elector. It is therefore the century in which the principal
European States took the form, and acquired the position in Europe,
which they have held more or less up to the present time. A century,
in which France takes the lead in European affairs, and enters on a
course of embittered rivalry with Germany, in which England assumes a
position of first importance in the affairs of Europe, in which the
Emperor, ousted from all effective control over German politics, finds
the true centre of his power on the Danube, in which Prussia becomes
the dominant state in north Germany, in which Russia begins to drive
in the Turkish outposts on the Pruth and the Euxine--a century, in
short, which saw the birth of the Franco-German Question and of the
Eastern Question--cannot be said to be deficient in modern interest.
The map of Europe at the close of the seventeenth shows the same great
divisions as it does at the close of the nineteenth century, with the
notable exception of Italy. Prussia and Russia have grown bigger,
France and Turkey have grown smaller, the Empire has become definitely
Austrian, but in all its main divisions the political map of Europe
is practically unchanged. The states which were formed in the general
reconstruction of Europe after the religious wars of the sixteenth
century are the states of which modern Europe is now composed. Great
nations are apt to change their forms of internal government much
more often than they do their political boundaries and influence; but
it is a remarkable thing that, with the great exception of France,
the principal European states possess at the present time not only
a similar political position, but a similar form of government to
that which they possessed at the close of the seventeenth century. In
spite of the wave of revolutionary principles, which flowed out from
France over Europe at the end of the eighteenth century, the principal
states of Europe at the present time are in all essentials absolute
monarchies, and these monarchies are as absolute now as they were
then, with the two exceptions of Italy, which did not then exist, and
France, which is now a Republic, but has been everything in turn and
nothing long. The formation of the modern European states system is
therefore the main element of continuous interest and importance in the
history of the seventeenth century, that is to say, the acquisition
by the chief European states of the boundaries, which they have since
substantially retained, the adoption by them of the form of government
to which they have since adhered, and the assumption by them,
relatively to the other states, of a position and influence in the
affairs of Europe which they have since enjoyed. The sixteenth century
saw the final dismemberment of medieval Europe, the seventeenth saw its
reconstruction in the modern form in which we know it now.

[Sidenote: =The condition of France, 1598.=]

Of the European nations which were profoundly affected by the
Reformation, France was the first to emerge from the conflict.
French Calvinism differed from the south German type by being more
distinctly political in its objects, and the leaders of the French
Catholics, especially the ambitious chiefs of the house of Guise, had
quite as keen a desire for their own aggrandisement as they had for
the supremacy of their religion. The religious wars in France soon
became mainly faction fights among the nobles for political objects
in which personal rivalry was embittered by religious division, and
all honest and law-abiding citizens--that sturdy middle-class element
which has always formed the backbone of the French nation--soon longed
for the strong hand which should at any rate keep faction quiet. The
authority of the Crown had ever been in France the sole guarantee of
order and of progress. Under the weak princes of the House of Valois
that guarantee ceased to exist. Shifty, irresolute, inconstant, they
preferred the arts of the intriguer to the policy of the statesman, the
poniard of the assassin to the sword of the soldier, and when Henry
III., the murderer of the Duke of Guise, in his turn fell
murdered by the dagger of the monk Clément, France drew a long sigh of
relief. Like England after Bosworth Field, France after Ivry was ready
to throw herself at the feet of a conqueror who was strong enough to
ensure peace and suppress faction. The House of Bourbon ascended the
French throne upon the same unwritten conditions as the House of Tudor
ascended the English throne. It was to rule because it knew how to
rule, and the conditions of its rule were to be internal peace, and
national consolidation.

[Sidenote: =The States-General.=]

But the task before the first Bourbon was far more difficult than
that which absorbed all the energies of the first Tudor. He had no
machinery to his hand which he could use to veil the arbitrariness
of his action, or to guide public opinion. Parliament in England had
often been the terror of a weak king. The Tudors soon made it the
tool of a strong king. In France Henry had to rely openly upon the
powers of the Crown and upon military force. It is true that the
States-General still existed, though they were seldom summoned, but
their constitution and traditions rendered them unfit to play the
part of an English Parliament. They met in three houses representing
the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commonalty, the latter house, the
Tiers-Etat as it was called, being usually about as large as the other
two put together; but instead of there being a political division
running through the three estates of those for the policy of the Crown
and those against it, as was usually the case in England, the tendency
in France always was for the two privileged houses to coalesce against
the Tiers-Etat. The Crown had therefore only to balance one against
the other, and leave them to entangle themselves in mutual rivalries
in order to gain the victory. In the long history of the English
Parliament it is very rare to find serious questions raised between
the two houses. Nobles and Commons have as a rule acted together for
weal or for woe in attacking or supporting the policy of the Crown.
The unity of Parliament has been its most significant feature. In
France it has been quite otherwise. Mutual jealousy and social rivalry
played their part with such effect that they destroyed the political
usefulness of the States-General. Unable to act together they could not
extort from the Crown either the power over the purse, or the right
of legislation, which were the two effective checks upon the king’s
prerogative exercised by the English Parliament. All that they could do
was to present a list of grievances and ask for a remedy. They had no
power whatever of compelling a favourable answer, much less of giving
effect to it. The procedure was for each Estate to draw up its own
list (_cahier_) of those matters which it wished to press upon
the attention of the Crown. When the lists were completed they were
formally presented to the king and a formal answer of acceptance or
rejection was expected from him, but as the Estates separated directly
the answer was given, the Crown was apt not to be over prompt in
fulfilling its promises.

[Sidenote: =The Parlement de Paris.=]

As a constitutional check upon misgovernment the States-General in
France were therefore of little use. That function, as far as it was
discharged at all, had by accident devolved upon the Parlement de
Paris. The Parlement was in its origin nothing more than a court of
law which sat at Paris to administer justice between the king and his
subjects, and between subject and subject. In course of time it grew
into a corporation of lawyers and judges, not altogether unlike our
Inns of Court in England amalgamated into one, having just that kind
of political influence which a close and learned corporation, whose
business it was to make by judicial decision a great deal of the law of
the country, could not fail to have. In one point indeed the Parlement
had almost established a definite right. As the highest court of the
realm its duty was to register the edicts of the king, a duty which
was easily turned into a right to refuse to register them if it so
willed. Thus the Parlement claimed an indirect veto upon the royal
legislation. It is true that the king could always override the refusal
of the Parlement to register an edict by coming in person to its
session and holding what was called a _lit de justice_; but this
was a proceeding which involved a good deal of inconvenience, and was
not unlikely to excite tumults; it would not therefore be resorted to
except on critical occasions. [Sidenote: =Position of the Crown.=]
So completely had the constitution of France become in its structure
despotic, that there was absolutely no constitutional means of
exercising control over the king’s will than this very doubtful right
of the Parlement de Paris to refuse to register the king’s edict. And
if there was no constitutional check upon the king’s will, there was
also no machinery which the king could utilise in order to associate
himself with his people in the task of government. He stood on a
pedestal by himself in terrible isolation surrounded by his courtiers,
faced by the nobility, backed by his army, unable to know his people’s
wants, and unable to help them to know their own.

[Sidenote: =Religious toleration.=]

But this was not all. Henry IV. had to encounter open enmity abroad,
and give an earnest of religious peace at home, as well as to crush
civil dissensions. It was not till his conversion to Catholicism drew
the teeth of Spain, and proved to the majority of his subjects that
he desired above all things to be a national and not a party king,
that he can be said really to have reigned. The peace of Vervins,
concluded in 1598, marked the issue of France from the throes of her
Reformation wars. Her religious struggle was over. Calvinism had
made its great effort to win religious and political ascendency in
France, and had failed. France was to remain a Catholic country, and
the bull of absolution granted to Henry IV. by Pope Clement VIII. in
1595 duly emphasised the return of the Most Christian King into the
pale of Catholic obedience. But if Calvinism had failed, neither had
Papalism wholly won the day. Catholic, France had determined to be,
but she was far from assuming as yet the mantle of the champion of
rigid orthodoxy just laid down by Philip II. [Sidenote: =The Edict of
Nantes.=] The same year which saw the death of Philip II. and the real
beginning of the reign of Henry IV. saw also the promulgation of the
Edict of Nantes with its announcement of the new policy of liberty of
conscience. By this famous edict religious toleration and political
recognition was accorded to the French Calvinists. They were to be
allowed to worship as they pleased, provided they paid tithes to the
Church, and observed religious festivals like other Frenchmen. They
were to receive a grant from the State in return. They were to be
equally eligible with Catholics for all public offices. They were to
be represented in the Parlements, and were to have exclusive political
control for eight years over certain towns in the south and west of
France, of which the most important were Nismes, Montauban, and La
Rochelle. Thus they obtained not merely toleration as a religious
body, and part endowment by the State, but also recognition in certain
places as a political organisation. The political settlement was
evidently but a palliative, the religious settlement was a cure. No
country as patriotic as France, no government as strong as an absolute
monarchy could tolerate longer than was necessary an _imperium in
imperio_ under the control of a religious sect. But the toleration
of Calvinism in a country professedly Catholic was a solution of the
religious question thoroughly acceptable to the genius of the French
nation. It enabled France at once to fix her whole attention upon the
absorbing business of political aggrandisement. It excused her somewhat
for not thinking it obligatory to play a purely Catholic rôle in the
pursuit of that aggrandisement. The first of those nations of Europe,
which had been seriously affected by the Reformation, to arrive at
a satisfactory solution of the problem of religious division, she
was able to set an example to Europe of a policy entirely outside
religious considerations. Under a king who had conformed, but had not
been converted, France, pacified, but not yet united, was ready to mix
herself up in the web of political intrigue and religious rivalry in
which Germany was helplessly struggling, with the simple if selfish
object of using the misfortunes of her neighbours for her own advantage.

[Sidenote: =Germany: The Emperor.=]

The state of Germany was indeed pitiable. The Empire had become but
the shadow of a great name. The successor of Augustus had nothing in
common with his prototype but his title. Roman Emperor he might be in
the language of ceremony, punctiliously might the imperial hierarchy
of dignity be ordered according to the solemnities of the Golden Bull,
but all the world knew that in spite of this wealth of tradition and
of prescription, the Emperor could wield little more power in German
politics than that which he derived from his hereditary dominions.
The archduke of Austria must indeed be a figure in Germany under any
circumstances, still more so if he happened to be also king of Hungary
and king of Bohemia; but if the electors set the Imperial Crown at his
feet and hailed him as Cæsar, though much was thereby added to his
dignity and something to his legal rights, not one whit accrued to
him of effective force. It is true that his legal position as head
and judge over the princes accrued to him, not so much because he was
emperor and the representative of Augustus and Charles the Great, as
because he was German king and the successor of Henry the Fowler and
Otto the Great. Nevertheless, the fact, from whatever quarter derived,
that the German constitution gave to the Emperor the lordship over the
other princes and the right of deciding disputes which arose between
them, made him the only possible centre of German unity.

[Sidenote: =The Imperial Courts.=]

That right was exercised through a court (the _Reichskammergericht_)
the members of which were mainly nominated by the princes themselves.
For the purpose of ensuring the enforcement of its decrees, Germany was
divided into circles, in which the princes and the representatives of
the cities who were members of the diet met, and if necessary, raised
troops to give effect to the sentences pronounced. Since the beginning
of the Reformation, however, there had been a difficulty in getting
this machinery to work owing to the religions dissensions, and the
Emperor had begun the practice of referring imperial questions which
had arisen to the Imperial or Aulic Council (_Reichshofrath_), which
was entirely nominated by him and under his influence.

[Sidenote: =The Diet.=]

In all important matters of administrative policy the Emperors, since
the middle of the fifteenth century, had been obliged to consult the
Diet, but the Diet was in no sense a representative assembly of the
classes of which the nation was composed, as were the Parliament of
England and the States-General of France, but was merely a feudal
assembly of the chief feudal vassals of the Empire. It was, in fact,
a congress of petty sovereigns gathered under their suzerain. It was
divided into three houses. The first consisted of six of the seven
electors, three ecclesiastical, _i.e._ the archbishops of Köln, Mainz,
and Trier, and three lay, the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg
and the elector-palatine, for the fourth lay elector the king of
Bohemia only appeared for an imperial election. The second was the
House of Princes, the third that of the free Imperial Cities, but
it was considered so inferior to the other houses that it was only
permitted to discuss matters which had already received their assent.
It is obvious that in an assembly so constituted the only interest
powerfully represented was that of the princes, and the only influence
likely to be exercised by it was in favour of that desire for complete
independence, which was natural to a body of rulers who already enjoyed
most of the prerogatives of sovereignty. [Sidenote: =German desire for
unity.=] For there had ever been two divergent streams of tendency
in German politics. Deep in the German heart lay a vague sense of
nationality and patriotism, a dim desire that Germany should be one.
This sentiment naturally centred round the Emperor as the visible
head of German unity. If Germans ever were to be politically one, it
could only be under the Emperor. There was no other possible head
among the seething mass of jarring interests known geographically as
Germany. The other tendency had sprung from the strong love of local
independence characteristic of the Teutonic race. [Sidenote: =Desire
for sovereignty among the Princes.=] Naturally each petty duke or
prince tried to become as independent of outside authority as he could,
and in the pursuit of this policy he found himself greatly aided by
that spirit of local seclusion, which ever seeks to find its centre
of patriotism in the side eddies of provincial life, rather than in
the broad stream of the national existence. The Emperors of the House
of Habsburg had fully recognised these facts, and, since the days of
Maximilian I., had set themselves resolutely to the task of rebuilding
the imperial authority, and making the imperial institutions the true
and only centre of German unity. They might have succeeded, had it not
been for two events, the concurrent effect of which was completely to
shatter the half begun work. [Sidenote: =Effect of the Reformation.=]
The first was the Reformation, the second was the long rivalry with
France. The Reformation cut Germany rudely at first into two afterwards
into three pieces. Lutheranism, which absorbed nearly all northern
Germany between the Main and the Baltic, drew its strength especially
from the support of the north German princes. Luther himself effected
a closer alliance with the princes and the nobles than he did with the
people. It was to them he appealed for protection in the days of his
earlier struggles, on them that he trustfully leaned in the later days
of his power. Naturally, therefore, Lutheranism gave a strong impulse
and sanction to the desire, which the northern princes uniformly
felt, to assert their independence of a Catholic emperor. Calvinism,
spreading from republican Switzerland down the upper valley of the
Rhine into the heart of Germany, had a no less fatal influence upon the
centralising policy of the Emperors. Subversive in its tendencies and
impatient of recognised authority, it intensified the spirit of dislike
to autocratic institutions. [Sidenote: =Effect of the rivalry with
France.=] Still, in spite of the terrible disruption of Germany caused
by the Reformation, a sovereign so powerful and so cautious as Charles
V. might have been able to weather the storm, without suffering any
loss of prerogative or influence, had it not been for the constant and
paramount necessity laid upon him of counteracting the machinations of
an enemy ever wakeful and absolutely unscrupulous. As long as Francis
I. lived Charles V. was never able seriously to apply himself to German
affairs. When he was dead it was too late. The religious divisions
of Germany had taken definite political shape, and were inspired
with definite political ambitions. The Emperor had ceased to be the
acknowledged political head of Germany. He had sunk into the inferior
position of becoming merely the chief of one political and religious
party.

[Sidenote: =Consequent disunion of Germany.=]

In this way the desire for political independence from the authority
of the Emperor went hand in hand with the achievement of religious
independence from the authority of the Church. The Emperors who
followed Charles V. in the latter years of the sixteenth century,
Ferdinand I., Maximilian II., and Rudolf II., so far from being able
in the least to extend their prerogative in Germany, were barely able
to retain what shreds of it yet remained. But towards the close of
the century the onward and destructive march of Lutheranism and of
Calvinism stopped. The Reformation spent itself as a living force. It
had reached its utmost limits and slowly the tide began to turn. The
Counter-Reformation, with the spiritual exercises of S. Ignatius in one
hand and the sword in the other, went forth to win back half Germany
to the faith. When the peace of Vervins set France free, Germany was
at her weakest. Jarring interests, political dissensions, religious
hatreds were rife through the length and breadth of that unhappy land.
The Lutheran princes of the north had succeeded in throwing off the
leadership of the Emperor without themselves producing either a leader
or a policy. The Calvinist princes of the Rhineland, exasperated
by the advance of the Counter-Reformation, were ready to throw all
Germany into the crucible and rashly strike for a supremacy which
they had not strength to win. In Bohemia men remembered with fierce
glee the stubborn waggon fortresses of the unconquerable Ziska, and
the concessions wrung from reluctant Pope and Emperor by the success
of a rebellion. Meanwhile in Bavaria and the hereditary dominions
of the House of Austria, by steady governmental pressure backed by
the devotion and talent of the Society of Jesus, Protestantism was
being gradually rooted out and swept away by the advancing tide of
the Counter-Reformation. Yet the Emperor himself was incapable of
directing the policy of his own party. A melancholy recluse given to
astrology and fond of morbid religious exercises, Rudolf II. was the
last man fitted to lead a crusade. He could not even inspire respect,
much less command allegiance. Never certainly was a country in a more
pitiable plight. Torn from end to end by religious dissension, pierced
through and through by personal and provincial rivalries, without a
single public man on either side sufficiently respected to command
obedience, without unity of political or religious ideal even among the
Protestants, without that last hope of expiring patriotism, the power
of union in the face of the foreign aggressor, Germany at the close of
the sixteenth century lay extended at the feet of her jealous rival, a
helpless prey, whenever it pleased him to spring and put an end to her
miseries.

[Sidenote: =England.=]

England, unlike France and Germany, had as yet escaped the necessity
of making the sword the arbiter of religion, but she had not wholly
settled her religious difficulties. Elizabeth, masterful in all things,
had imposed upon the Church and the nation a solution of the religious
question which was still upon its trial. The experiment of a Church,
historically organised and doctrinally Catholic, but in hostility to
the Pope, was hitherto unknown in the West, though common enough in
the East; and it is not surprising that it soon found itself attacked
from both sides by Roman Catholics and Protestants at once. During
the reign of Elizabeth the personality of the Queen and the success
of her policy, especially as the champion and leader of the national
opposition to Spain which culminated in the defeat of the Armada in
1588, kept the disturbing elements in check. On the accession in
1603 of a prince who with some insight into statesmanship was wholly
deficient in the faculty of governing, those elements rapidly gathered
strength. When serious constitutional questions between the king and
the Parliament were added to the religious complications, England soon
became too much absorbed in her own internal affairs to be able to
speak with authority in European politics. For fifty years after the
accession of the House of Stuart, England became merely a diplomatic
voice in Europe to which nations courteously listened but paid no
attention.

[Sidenote: =Spain.=]

While England was failing to secure her newly won honours, Spain
was trading upon a past reputation. Never was the retribution of an
impossible policy so quick in coming. The transition from Philip II. to
Philip III. is the transition from a first-rate to a third-rate power,
and that without the shock of a great defeat. Enervated by a proud
laziness, drained by a world-wide ambition, ruined by a false economy,
depleted by a fatal fanaticism, Spain was already falling fast into the
slough from which she is only just beginning now to emerge. Yet she was
still a great power, great in her traditions, great in her well-trained
infantry, great through her monopoly of the American trade. Had she
but produced men instead of puppets for kings, and statesmen instead of
favourites for ministers, she would quickly have recovered something
of her ancient glory. Even under Philip III. she was always a power
with which men had to reckon, and in strict family alliance with the
House of Habsburg formed the kernel of the Catholic interest in Europe.
By her possessions in the Netherlands, in Franche Comté and in the
Pyrenees, she presented the most serious obstacle to the territorial
aggrandisement of France.

[Sidenote: =Italy.=]

Patriotism was the very air the Spaniard breathed. In Italy it was a
vice, for an Italian had no country for which to live or to die. Italy,
since France and Spain had quarrelled over the division of its carcase,
had ceased to be anything but a name. In the south, the Spanish House
had made good its hold on Naples, in central Italy the States of the
Church were thrust in like a great wedge to separate north and south.
The north was still the battle-field between the rival powers. Venice
lay entrenched along the eastern coast and commanded the mouth of the
Brenner Pass, too formidable as yet to be attacked, too independent to
be won, by either side. In the middle of the rich plain of Lombardy
was the Milanese, which belonged to Spain, and was held by Austrian or
Spanish troops, who kept up a precarious communication with Austria
through the Valtelline and Tirol, or with Spain through the friendly
republic of Genoa. To the west of the Milanese came Piedmont and
Savoy, the duke of which from his geographical position was usually
obliged to be on good terms with France, but respected the obligation
no longer than necessary. Italy thus torn and divided was always ready
to produce, whenever it was wanted, a crop of international questions
of the greatest nicety for her neighbours to quarrel over, and, as the
century advanced, she seemed more and more to find her appropriate
function to lie in providing the necessary pawns for the game of
diplomatic chess characteristic of the new European states’ system.

CHAPTER II

FRANCE UNDER HENRY IV.

Difficulties of Henry IV.--Henry IV. and Sully--Economical
policy of Sully--His financial reforms--French taxation in
the seventeenth century--Policy of Henry IV. towards the
nobles--His foreign policy--Acquisition of Bresse and Bugey--The
Cleves-Jülich question--Death of Henry IV.--Regency of Marie de
Medicis--Mismanagement of affairs--The States-General of 1614--The
Huguenot rising--Entry of Richelieu into the ministry.

[Sidenote: =Difficulties of Henry IV. 1596.=]

‘Now I am king!’ cried Henry IV. when he received the submission of the
last of the Leaguers. He was right, for it was only then that he was
able to turn his attention to the true business of a king, the good
government of his people. The evils under which France groaned were
mainly threefold: the selfishness and factiousness of the nobility,
the religious dissensions, and the shameful financial mismanagement.
As long as civil and foreign war was desolating the country, no steps
could be taken to deal with these dangers, but directly the submission
of the League and the absolution of Henry had produced internal quiet,
and the treaty of Vervins restored external peace, Henry found his
hands free to strike at the root of the evil. Twenty days before the
treaty was signed the publication of the Edict of Nantes found the true
solution of the religious difficulty. It secured to the Calvinists
the freedom of conscience for which they had nominally fought, to the
Catholics the religious ascendency which their numbers and traditions
entitled them to demand. Nor could the most zealous of Leaguers refuse
to recognise the justice of a compromise which the Pope himself had
sanctioned. The dangers which threatened France from the factiousness
of the nobility and the disorder of the finances did not admit of so
simple a remedy. They required long years of patient, watchful and firm
government, and Henry IV. was not able in the time allotted him to do
more than make a beginning and set an example. For this purpose he
called to his intimate counsels his old comrade in arms, the duke of
Sully, whom he had known and valued since childhood. The whole internal
administration of the country was confided to him under the king, and
the title of Superintendant of the Finances, which was conferred on him
in 1598, gave him special authority in that department.

[Sidenote: =Henry IV. and Sully.=]

For the twelve remaining years of the reign of Henry these two men
were continuously and inseparably engaged upon the great work of the
rehabilitation of the affairs of France. The very contrast between them
in temperament and talents served to bind them the closer together and
fit them for their joint work. Henry himself was a true Gascon, frank,
open-hearted, open-minded, genial, generous, and perhaps boastful.
Sully was severe, harsh, cold and reserved. With Henry pleasure, even
dissipation, had ever held a foremost place. Unhappy in his marriage
he had solaced himself with many mistresses and a large family of
bastards, and even after he became king the recklessness of his
expenditure, and the extravagance of his orgies occasioned scandal
even in pleasure-loving Paris. Sully, on the other hand, was morose
in manner and thrifty even to meanness in private life. Avaricious,
incorruptible, indefatigable, intensely jealous of his authority,
and proud of his services, he found his pleasure in the rooting out
of abuse and his triumph in the overthrow of the evil-doer. Henry
inspired love and loyalty in his people, Sully won their respect and
their hatred. Yet neither was complete without the other. To Henry,
gay, chivalrous and manly, human nature was a book more easily read,
a tool more deftly used. His mind was more inventive, his heart more
expansive, his conceptions far wider and deeper in their scope. In a
word, he was a statesman, while Sully was an administrator, and France
required the services of both. While Henry’s clear genius cut the knot
of the religious question, and seized unerringly the moment to throw
France boldly on to the track of her political greatness, Sully’s
honest watchfulness was laying the foundations of economical resource,
and purifying the streams of administrative policy, which alone could
enable France to make the sacrifices necessary for the attainment of
her political future.

[Sidenote: =Encouragement of agriculture.=]

The characteristic bent of Sully’s mind is most evident in his
economical measures. He looked upon France as an essentially
agricultural country, and he believed further that an agricultural
population was a far more trustworthy support to the Crown than one
engaged in industrial pursuits. Consequently he devoted all his efforts
to the development of agriculture. France was to be the great producer
of food for Europe. By the draining of the marshes, and the careful
management of the forest-land, large tracts hitherto unproductive were
brought under cultivation, and the country soon began to supply food
products more than sufficient for her own wants. The removal of all
export-duties on corn enabled her to sell this surplus to less favoured
nations at considerable profit, without rendering herself dependent
upon others for any prime necessity of national existence. In this
Sully showed himself a true exponent of the economical ideas of the
seventeenth century. At a period when Europe was torn with religious
and political dissensions, when France especially was preparing to
launch herself upon a career of aggrandisement, which was to evoke
a hundred years of war, it seemed all important to politicians that
a country should not be dependent upon any other for the chief
necessities of life. It was not so much a principle of economical
policy as a necessity of national safety which drove nations to make
themselves as self-supporting as possible in days of almost universal
war. They encouraged only such manufactures as were required by their
own people, they prohibited the importation of foreign food products by
high import-duties, they kept gold and silver as much as possible in
the country, chiefly in order that the government might have ready to
hand the means of waging war. It has been too much the fashion to look
at the protective system of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
from the economical side alone. Its foundations are laid far more in
the interests of prudent national policy than in those of a false
economy, though it is true that hardly any statesman of the time fully
realised how false the economy was. Sully certainly was no exception to
the general rule. While encouraging agriculture as much as possible he
deliberately depreciated manufactures, imposed duties on manufactured
articles, prohibited the exportation of gold and silver, and did all
in his power to hinder the establishment of new industries. Here the
greater statesmanship of the king corrected the prejudices of the
minister. [Sidenote: =Partial encouragement of manufactures.=]
Henry at once perceived the political as well as the economical value
of an industrial population and of national industries, encouraged
the nascent silk manufactures of Lyons and Nismes, and the glass
and pottery works of Paris and Nevers, promoted the construction of
roads, and of the first of the great canals of France, that between
the Loire and the Seine. In the department of foreign affairs, where
the influence of Sully was less powerful, his efforts were even
more observable. He renewed the extremely important capitulations
with Turkey, which were the solid fruit of the alliance of Francis
I. with the Sultan, and thus retained for France a predominant
voice at the court of Constantinople and the larger share of the trade
with that port. He made favourable treaties of commerce with England
and Holland, which helped to encourage the exportation of French wines,
and promoted the colonisation of Canada, where Champlain founded Quebec
in 1608.

[Sidenote: =Financial reform.=]

The greatest debt which France owed to Sully was the reform of the
financial administration. It is a singular thing that a nation which
has shown itself in other departments of administration so persistent
in its adherence to fixed principles, should have been content to
manage the important department of finance at haphazard. From the
time that France became a nation, to the time of the Revolution, she
produced but four great finance ministers, Suger, Sully, Colbert, and
Turgot, and of them the two most important, Sully and Colbert, were
not so much great financiers as honest and sensible administrators.
The business of Sully was to produce order out of chaos, to defeat
corruption, to govern justly. He made no attempt to reorganise the
finances of France, to introduce a new and better system of taxation,
still less did he venture to interfere with privileges which rendered
anything like a just incidence of taxation impossible. Nor indeed would
he have wished to do so if he had dared. On the contrary he accepted
the system as he found it, and contented himself with enforcing its
proper observance. The only important novelty which he introduced
was the tax known as the _paulette_, by which the judicial and
financial officials were permitted to hand on their offices to their
heirs on payment of the tax. This was in fact to create a caste of
hereditary officials, and to add yet one more to the many privileged
classes of France.

[Sidenote: =French Revenue, the Taille.=]

The revenue of the country was chiefly drawn from four sources known as
the _Taille_, the _Gabelle_, the _Aides_, and the _Douanes_. Of these,
the _taille_ was the most lucrative, and was originally a direct tax
upon property. But in course of time its mode of assessment became
varied in different parts of France. In the _pays d’election_, or those
provinces which originally appertained to the monarchy of France, such
as Normandy, Touraine, the Isle de France, etc., the _taille_ was still
a property tax and was levied upon each man personally according to a
computation of what he was worth; but in the _pays d’état_, or those
provinces which had been annexed to the crown of France in more recent
times, many of which had on annexation secured fiscal privileges which
they had been accustomed to enjoy--such as Burgundy, Guienne, Provence,
etc.--it was levied only upon land and was in fact a land tax and not a
property tax. In the _pays d’élection_ the nobles, in the _pays d’état_
the _terres nobles_, i.e. the lands which were or once had been in
the possession of the nobility, were free from _taille_, and so were
the lands of the Church, which paid their tenths (_décimes_) instead.
In itself there was nothing unjust about the _taille_, excepting the
fact that as, owing to the exemptions, it fell almost entirely on
the classes which had no political power, the temptation to increase
it abnormally was a very strong one to a needy finance minister who
was anxious not to make powerful enemies. But the real evil of the
tax lay in the method of its assessment and collection in the _pays
d’election_. The gross sum to be raised from each province was fixed
by the government, and a contract made with a capitalist on the best
terms available for the letting to him of the sole right of raising
that sum from that particular province. The _Intendant_, the financial
agent for the province, then proceeded to assess the total sum to be
raised upon the different parishes, and the farmer general in his turn
farmed out the raising of these smaller sums to subordinate agents of
his own. Finally the inhabitants of each parish elected a committee to
levy the parochial quota upon individuals. Nothing could well exceed
the wastefulness and injustice of such a system. Every parish which had
made or could make interest with the _Intendant_, every inhabitant who
had interest with the assessment committee got the quota reduced at the
expense of less fortunate neighbours. Each farmer and sub-farmer wrung
the most he could out of an unfortunate peasantry, and was protected
by a government which had already received all that was due to it of
the tax. The only nominal check upon the farmers was the supervision
of their accounts by the _chambre des comptes_, but that was a mere
farce, as no attempt was made to ensure the accuracy of the registers
upon which they worked. A system by which it mattered not a _sou_ to
the government to see that the tax was fairly levied, while it was to
the direct interest of the officials to take care that it was unfairly
levied, stands selfcondemned, but it was a system which was universal
throughout France. By farming out the different branches of the revenue
to harpies who fattened on the misery of the people, the government
shirked the difficulty of having to deal with venal servants of its
own, and reaped the benefit of a sure though diminished income at the
price of abdicating one of the chief functions of government, and
subjecting the innocent tax-payers to the worst form of governmental
tyranny, a taxation both capricious and corrupt. When Sully turned his
attention to the abuses of the system, it is said that the people were
paying 200 millions of francs in taxes while the government received
only 50 millions!

[Sidenote: =The Gabelle.=]

If the _taille_ was the most lucrative tax, the _Gabelle_ or
salt tax was the most oppressive. Salt was a government monopoly farmed
out to capitalists in the usual way, but the special grievance with
regard to the tax did not lie in the fact that it was a monopoly, or
that the quality of the government salt was bad, but in the assessment
of the tax. The government laid down by decree the amount of salt which
every Frenchman was supposed to require, or at any rate had to buy,
and each household was assessed therefore at a sum representing the
amount of salt legally consumable by the number of persons of whom it
was composed. There is something ludicrous in the idea of a paternal
government dictating to its children the amount of salt which is good
for them, but there was little of a joke in it to the over-burdened
French peasant, who was compelled to pay an extortionate sum for a
far larger amount of an inferior commodity than he could possibly use
or dispose of. The door was thus thrown open wide to corruption and
to smuggling--those two ogres which ever prey upon a faulty fiscal
system--but the abuse not only lasted until the Revolution but grew in
intensity with increasing civilisation. In 1781, eight years before
the Revolution broke out, it was calculated that it cost 18 million
_livres_ a year to bring the treasury a revenue of 72 million
_livres_ from the _gabelle_; in other words, that a fourth
of the produce of the tax was spent in collecting it, while the yearly
convictions for smuggling amounted to between three and four thousand.

[Sidenote: =The Aides and Douanes.=]

The _Aides_ and the _Douanes_, which answered roughly to
the modern excise and customs duties, were not open to such obvious
objections, but they too played their part in helping to discourage
trade and impoverish the people. Each province, almost each district
of France, had its own internal customs, and levied a toll which
was nearly prohibitive on the circulation of wealth. Each branch
of indirect taxation was farmed out, and gave rise to a needy host
of agents, inspectors, and tax-gatherers, who looked to make their
fortune out of the necessities of the tax-payers. But this was not
all. Besides the taxes authorised by government and paid directly or
through farmers to the national exchequer, there were, when Sully
took charge of the finances, many other payments of a most oppressive
nature exacted from the people, which were in fact part of the terrible
legacy of the long civil wars. [Sidenote: =Military requisitions and
charges upon revenue.=]Governors of provinces and commandants of
garrisons levied what they considered necessary for the maintenance of
the troops, without any authorisation from the treasury, and without
rendering any account of the sums so raised. Many of the nobles whose
assistance or whose neutrality Henry had found it prudent to buy,
received their gratifications in the form of charges upon the revenue
arising from certain districts, and, as there was no check exercised by
the government over the amounts raised, they frequently levied upon the
wretched people three or four times the sum originally due.

[Sidenote: =Administrative measures of Sully.=]

A system so badly conceived and so iniquitously administered as this
was calculated both to impoverish the people and to dry up the sources
of wealth. Sully did not attempt to deal with the larger problem
except by encouraging agriculture and permitting the free exportation
of corn, but he applied himself diligently to the humbler task of
reforming the financial administration. In this he kept two principles
steadily in view, to insist rigorously that the levy of all sums on
the people should be definitely authorised by the government, and to
enforce a proper system of audit of the national finances. Thus he
obliged the military governors to apply to the treasury for the pay of
their troops, he abolished a crowd of useless and expensive financial
agents and forced them to refund their ill-gotten gains, he caused the
assessment registers to be verified and corrected, and swept away at a
blow a number of false claims for exemption which had been corruptly
admitted. By such measures he soon succeeded in restoring order to
the finances. In twelve years of rigorous and just administration
he relieved the French people from paying unauthorised and illegal
taxation, and this saved them more than 120 millions of francs
annually, he remitted to them more than 20 millions of arrears, paid
off or cancelled 330 millions of debt, provided the necessary resources
for the maintenance of a large army, and an expensive court, and stored
up in the cellars of the Bastille a treasure of 30 millions against
unforeseen contingencies. Well may France look upon him and his master
as the joint founders of her national greatness.

[Sidenote: =Relations between the Crown and the Nobles.=]

The restoration of order after thirty years of civil war was a task
far more difficult and no less necessary than the purification of the
financial system. In France the Crown had ever been the champion of
order and centralisation, the nobles the representatives of disorder
and local independence. In England the nobles were a class singled out
from their fellow-countrymen by greater responsibilities, in France
they formed a caste distinguished from the inferior people by special
privileges. Their tendency therefore naturally was to magnify those
privileges, and to intensify the distinctions which separated them both
from the king and the Commonalty, to assert rights of their own rather
than assist in vindicating the rights of others. Nothing is more
significant in the history of England than the fact that throughout
the constitutional struggles of the medieval period the nobles as a
whole were anxious to make common cause with the people and content
to share their victory with them. Parliament, the representative of
the nation in its three estates, thus became by their common action
the depositary and the safeguard of the national liberty. In France
on the other hand the nobles are ever found fighting for their own
class interests. Fenced round by their own privileges, regardless of
the common weal, they aspired to an independence which could not but
be destructive of national life. The people learned to look to the
Crown as their protector from the licence of the nobles, to welcome its
increasing power as representing greater security of life and property.
A centralised and absolute Crown might possibly be a curse in the
future, a decentralised and independent nobility was beyond question a
curse evident and imminent in the present. And so the States-General,
the representative of France in her three estates, was permitted to
sink into oblivion by a Crown which would have no rival, and a nation
which preferred the maintenance of its class jealousies to that union
of classes which could alone secure liberty.

[Sidenote: =Policy of Henry IV. towards the nobles.=]

The religious wars had afforded a great opportunity to the nobles of
asserting their independence. Many of them had embraced Calvinism,
and so gained for their disintegrating aspirations a religious
sanction and a political ideal. It is said that by the Edict of
Nantes Calvinistic worship was legalised in 3500 castles. Faction is
ever strong when the Crown is weak, and Henry IV. had to
buy the doubtful allegiance of many of the smaller nobles by sheer
bribery, before he could establish himself upon the throne. But no
sooner had he made his position secure than the nobles found that
they had a master. They might be courtiers but not politicians. Henry
deliberately intrusted the affairs of government to men of business
of inferior rank, dependent on himself, and jealous of the nobles.
Rigid inquiry was made into the privileges claimed by the nobles, and
those which could not be substantiated were rescinded. The institution
of the _paulette_ was intended to create a noblesse of the
robe as a counterpoise to the noblesse of the sword. Duelling, that
much-loved privilege of a gentleman, was absolutely forbidden, and
the issue of letters of pardon to those who killed their adversary in
a duel stopped. The nobles, accustomed to the licence of civil war,
soon grew restive under the strong hand of Henry. [Sidenote: =The
conspiracy of Biron, 1602.=] The maréchal de Biron, on the part of
the Catholics, and the duc de Bouillon, the leader of the Huguenots,
permitted themselves to enter into relations with Savoy and Spain, and
to talk somewhat vaguely of a partition of France, in a way which was
incompatible with loyalty to the king. When Henry struck he struck
hard. The thirty-two wounds which Biron had received in the service
of France failed to obtain his pardon. In 1602 he was executed, and
his death gave the signal for the beginning of that war of revenge on
the part of the Crown against the nobles, which was carried on with
such relentless severity by Richelieu, and did not cease until the
triumph of the Crown was assured under Louis XIV. The duc
de Bouillon escaped to Germany, the comte d’Auvergne was imprisoned,
the duc d’Epernon, frightened into submission, was pardoned. Perhaps
Henry himself hardly dared to touch the former companion of Henry
III., the governor of half France, and the proudest of all her
proud nobility. Four years afterwards the vengeance of Henry was still
awake though all the excitement and danger had long ago quieted down.
In 1606 he travelled through the disaffected districts of the south and
south-west accompanied by an army, destroyed several castles belonging
to the nobles, and put to death, after sentences by special tribunals,
those who had taken a prominent part in the late troubles.

[Illustration: MAP SHOWING THE TERRITORIAL GAINS OF FRANCE IN THE
17th CENTURY.]

But it was in the sphere of foreign affairs that the genius of Henry
IV. fully displayed itself. For many years France had played
a sorry part in European politics. If Francis I. had done
something to preserve Europe from falling under the yoke of Charles
V., men also remembered that he was the perjured of Madrid,
the abettor and the ally of the Turk. [Sidenote: =Foreign policy of
Henry IV.=] Since his death France had fallen lower and lower in
the scale of nations, until under the stress of the religious wars she
seemed to bid fair to become another Italy, a plaything tossed to and
fro among the nations of Europe. It was the stubbornness of the Dutch,
and the craft of Elizabeth, not the patriotism of Frenchmen, which had
saved France from the yoke of Philip II. in that terrible
time. After the peace of Vervins Henry had to restore the national
prestige, and regain the national influence which had died almost
to nothing. [Sidenote: =The indefensible frontier of France.=]
The great danger to France lay from the pressure exercised upon an
indefensible frontier on all sides by the Austro-Spanish power. While
Spain held Roussillon, Franche-Comté, and the Netherlands, and could
reckon on the vassalage of Savoy, while the passes of the Vosges were
in the hands of the Empire, the Austro-Spanish House held the gates
of France. France could not breathe with the hand of her enemy on her
throat. But the strength of a chain is that of its weakest link, and
Henry’s eagle eye soon detected the weak place in the circle of iron
which bound him. It lay in north Italy, the old battle-field of France
and Spain. The Milanese was a rich open country, depending for its
protection from attack upon its fortresses and its rivers. It was a
fief of the Empire in the possession of Spain, and its communications
with Spain by sea through the friendly port of Genoa were more easy
than with Germany, through the tedious and often difficult mountain
paths which connected the Valtelline with the Brenner pass and the
valley of the Inn. It lay therefore invitingly open to attack from the
mountains of Savoy on the west, and those of the Grisons on the north,
and if once it fell into the hands of France, not only would the chain
which bound her be broken, but a terrible counterblow would be dealt to
the influence of the Austro-Spanish House in Europe, for through Milan
ran the road by which Spain could best open communications in safety
with south Germany and Franche-Comté. If that way was blocked, the only
route possible for the troops and treasure of Spain was the long sea
voyage by the Bay of Biscay and the English Channel to Antwerp and the
Spanish Netherlands, a route fraught with peril from the storms which
rage round Cape Finisterre, and from the English and French privateers
which swarmed in the narrow seas.

[Sidenote: =Importance of Savoy.=]

In Italy, therefore, lay the opportunity of France, and Savoy held
the key of the position. The duchy of Savoy, which still extended as
far as the Rhone, and disputed with the king of France for the rule
over Provence and Dauphiné, had been gradually pushed by its more
powerful neighbour more and more towards Italy. Its duke had quite
lately established himself in his capital of Turin at the foot of the
mountain, and his ambition was to become an Italian prince. But though
Piedmont and not Savoy had become the centre of his power, the border
land of Savoy and not the Italian land of Piedmont became necessarily
the centre of his policy. Situated on the mountains between France
and the Milanese, Savoy held the gates both of France and of Imperial
Italy. Through her mountain passes could pour, when she gave the word,
the troops of France into the fertile plains of Lombardy, or those of
the Habsburgs into the valley of the Rhone. A position so decisive
and so dangerous rendered a consistent policy impossible. Courted
by both parties, her opportunity lay in playing off one against the
other as long as possible, but her safety necessitated the choice of
the stronger for her ally in the end. A misreading of the political
barometer at a critical moment would mean nothing less than national
extinction. From the time that the rivalry between France and the
Austro-Spanish power began to develop itself in Italy, the dukes of
Savoy had been compelled to follow this tortuous policy. During the
Italian expeditions of Charles VIII. and Louis XII. they were on
the side of victorious France, but in the war between Francis I. and
Charles V. Savoy veered to the side of the Emperor. Punished for this
by the occupation of his country by French troops for twenty-five
years, the duke was reinstated in his dominions at the peace of
Cateau-Cambrésis (1559), subject to the continued occupation by France
of six fortresses, including Susa and Pinerolo, which commanded the
gates of important passes through the Alps. In the troubles which
afflicted France under the later Valois kings, Charles Emmanuel of
Savoy succeeded in obtaining possession of Saluzzo; and although it
was provided in the treaty of Vervins that he should restore it, the
provision remained a dead letter. This gave Henry IV. the opportunity
he desired of recalling Savoy to the French alliance. In 1600, after
the death of Gabrielle d’Estrées, he had procured a divorce from his
first wife Marguerite de Valois, and had strengthened his influence
in Italy by his marriage with Marie de Médicis, the daughter of the
grand-duke of Tuscany. [Sidenote: =Cession of Bresse and Bugey to
France.=] In the same year he marched upon Savoy and quickly overran
it, but in January 1601 agreed to a treaty with the young duke Charles
Emmanuel, who had succeeded Emmanuel Philibert in 1580, by which
Saluzzo was left in the hands of Savoy, but France obtained instead
the two small duchies of Bresse and Bugey. By this treaty Savoy was
brought back into alliance with France at the price of the surrender of
a distant possession, which, in the hands of France, could not but be
considered a standing menace and a cause of hostility by the court of
Turin.

Thus Henry IV. laid the foundations of the policy afterwards so
successfully pursued in Italy by Richelieu. In fact, to both of these
great statesmen the end to be attained was the same. The abasement
of the Austro-Spanish House in the interests of France was the
beginning and end of their foreign policy. But Henry had not the same
opportunities of putting his designs into execution which were enjoyed
by his successor. [Sidenote: =Attack upon the Austro-Spanish House.=]
It is difficult to say how far the Great Design attributed to Henry
in the _Memoirs of Sully_ was ever more than a dream. [Sidenote: =The
Great Design.=] Statesmen have often sought relief from the _ennui_
engendered by the pettiness of diplomatic routine in the delightful
task of building political castles in the air, and it is likely enough
that Henry, in his more imaginative moments, conceived of a Europe in
which religious wars should cease and national dissensions rest, at
the bidding of an arbitration court which represented a confederacy of
free states, and was the mouthpiece of a law of religious toleration.
It is not less likely that his shrewd genius also foresaw that in a
Europe whose unity depended on political confederacy, whose peace was
secured by religious toleration, there would be no room for the Holy
Roman Empire or for the monarchy of Spain. The destruction of the
Austro-Spanish House was a condition precedent to the success of the
Great Design. If Henry ever intended seriously to try to combine those
who represented the political forces of Protestantism in a confederacy
against Spain and the Empire, based on a recognition of the three
religions, he must have abandoned the attempt as hopeless on the death
of Elizabeth in 1603.

[Sidenote: =The Cleves-Jülich question.=]

A few years later, however, an opportunity presented itself of dealing
a blow at the Austro-Spanish House in a less original but equally
effective way. In 1609 John William,[1] duke of Cleves, Jülich, and
Berg died without children, and the right of succession was claimed by
two princes. John Sigismund, the elector of Brandenburg, whose wife
was the child of the eldest daughter of William the Rich, brother and
predecessor of the last duke, rested his wife’s claim partly on his
descent from the elder branch, and partly on a will made by William the
Rich in which he gave the descendants of the elder daughter preference
over those of the younger. The count palatine of Neuburg had married
a younger daughter of William the Rich, who claimed the inheritance
as being the nearest of kin. The eldest sister of John William being
dead, she made over her claim to her son Wolfgang William. The question
was therefore mainly the old one of the eldest by descent against
the nearest of kin, and was eminently one for the imperial courts to
decide. But the matter was complicated by religious considerations.
The three duchies lay along the course of the lower Rhine from the
frontiers of the United Provinces nearly to Andernach, enclosing within
their embraces a considerable part of the archbishopric of Köln. The
population was Catholic but both the claimants were Lutherans, and on
the principle of _cujus regio ejus religio_, laid down by the
religious peace of Augsburg, if the duchies passed into Lutheran hands,
there was a strong probability that they would before long not only
become Lutheran themselves, but drag the vacillating archbishopric
of Köln with them. The Emperor, Rudolf, in order to guard against
this danger, at once claimed the right of administering the duchies
until the question of the succession was settled, and sent an army
to occupy Jülich. But if the Catholics could not permit the duchies
to fall into Lutheran hands, still less could Protestant or French
interests see unmoved the imperial armies encamped on the borders of
the United Provinces, in close proximity to the frontiers of France
and the Spanish Netherlands. An imperial army on the lower Rhine was
a menace alike to north German Protestantism, to the hardly won Dutch
independence, and to English and French jealousy.

[Sidenote: =League under Henry IV. against the Emperor, 1610.=]

Henry IV. seized the opportunity. He at once declared himself the
protector of the rights of the elector of Brandenburg and the count of
Neuburg, and put himself at the head of an alliance of the enemies of
the Austro-Spanish House. England, the United Provinces, the German
Protestant Union, Venice and Savoy responded to his call. Three French
armies were set on foot, one was directed to the Pyrenees, the second
under Lesdiguières was to co-operate with Savoy and Venice in the
conquest of the Milanese, while the third, under the command of the
king himself, attacked Jülich and occupied the duchies in conjunction
with the Dutch and English contingents and the German Protestants. It
seemed as if the death-knell of the Austro-Spanish power had sounded.
Rudolf II., ignorant of politics and half-crazed in intellect, was
implicated in serious quarrels with his unwilling subjects of Bohemia
and Hungary. In Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, Ferdinand, the nephew
of the Emperor, was, with the help of the Jesuits, waging an ardent
and determined war against the Calvinism which threatened to take a
strong root even in the hereditary dominions of the Habsburgs. Wanting
in money, wanting in leadership, wanting in unity, the power of Austria
had no troops on which it could depend, no subjects which it could
trust. Nor was Spain in much better plight. Exhausted by the ambition
of Philip II., misgoverned by a weak king and an incapable minister,
she had chosen this very time gratuitously to deal a serious blow
to her own prosperity by expelling from her borders the Moriscoes,
the most laborious and intelligent of her working population. It was
clear that she could do little more to help the cause than to defend
her own frontiers, and hold the Milanese against the attacks of the
allies. The forces of the Catholic League, the resources of Maximilian
of Bavaria, and the genius of his general Tilly, were in fact all
that Catholicism and the Austro-Spanish power had to rely upon in the
death duel in which she had almost by inadvertence engaged herself.
[Sidenote: =Assassination of Henry IV.=] Help came from a quarter the
least expected. A terrible crime struck France with tragic suddenness
to her knees and saved the House of Austria. As Henry IV. passed
through the streets of Paris to visit his minister Sully, but two days
before the date fixed for his departure for the campaign, a fanatic
named Ravaillac plunged a dagger into his heart. With Henry IV. died
the combination of which he was the head and soul, and the capture
of Jülich from the imperialists by Maurice of Nassau, aided by a
small English contingent, was the only step taken in the direction of
realising the Great Design of the first of the Bourbons.

[Sidenote: =Marie de Medicis declared Regent.=]

The dagger of Ravaillac not only saved the Austro-Spanish House but
plunged France into fifteen years of misery and dishonour. The young
king Louis XIII. was but nine years old and a regency was
inevitable. The duc d’Épernon was the only man who showed the necessary
energy and presence of mind to deal with the crisis which had so
suddenly arisen. Surrounding the palace and the Hôtel de Ville with
his own troops and those of the other nobles on whom he could rely, he
entered the chamber where the Parlement was assembled, and demanded
that they should at once recognise the queen-mother as regent. Pointing
significantly to his sword he said: ‘This sword is as yet in its
scabbard, but if the queen is not declared regent before this assembly
separates, I foresee that it will have to be drawn. That which can be
done to-day without danger cannot be done to-morrow without difficulty
and bloodshed.’ There were many in the Parlement who were not sorry
to see that body thus suddenly raised into the unaccustomed position
of the arbiter of the government of France. There were many more who
found the arguments of Épernon too powerful to be resisted, and Marie
was without further question recognised by a decree of the Parlement
as regent of the kingdom during the minority of the king, and invested
with the full powers of the crown. A Council of Regency was at once
formed from among the leaders of the nobility, and thus fell in a
moment the whole structure of government which Henry IV. and
Sully had laboured so hard to erect. The nobles resumed their place at
the head of affairs. Sully, who alone might have had influence enough
to stop this disastrous counter-revolution, lost his courage, thought
only of securing his own safety, and after a few ineffectual protests
retired into private life. The treasure which he had so painfully
amassed was squandered among the nobles to buy their adherence to the
new government. [Sidenote: =Reversal of the policy of Henry IV.=]
The regent, devoted in her inmost heart to Spain, and dreading the
risk of foreign war, hastened to disband the larger part of the troops
which Henry IV. had collected, and to set on foot secret
negotiations with the court of Spain. After the capture of Jülich, on
September 1st, 1610, by which all danger of Imperial aggression in the
lower Rhineland was taken away, she openly announced her intention
to withdraw altogether from the war, and to ally herself with Spain
through the double marriage of her daughter Elizabeth to the heir to
the Spanish crown, and of Anne of Austria, the eldest daughter of
Philip III., to the young king of France. Six months after
the murder of Henry IV. his whole policy at home and abroad
had been reversed. The great combination against the House of Austria
fell to pieces when France retired. The German Protestants and the
Dutch made their peace with the Emperor by the truce of Willstedt,
signed in October 1610. The duke of Savoy, betrayed by France, had to
make his peace as best he could with Spain, and the key of Italy was
once more thrown away. At home, disorder corruption and anarchy raised
their heads again, and the selfish and factious nobility tore France
in pieces in a struggle in which their desire for places and money was
hardly disguised by a thin veneer of political ambition.

[Sidenote: =Influence of the maréchal d’Ancre.=]

For seven years Marie held the reins of government. She was a vain,
irritable, and intriguing woman with little of the talent for rule
hereditary in her family, and much of the dependence upon stronger
natures characteristic of her sex. They were years of discord and
disgrace. The real rulers of France were the Italian adventurers
Leonora Galigai and her husband, whom the weakness of Marie actually
raised to the dignity of a marshal of France, although he had never
seen a shot fired in earnest. The nobles were justly enraged at the
prostitution of an office, which they considered one of the chief
prizes of their order, and bitterly jealous of the influence of a
parvenu like the maréchal d’Ancre. Twice they rose in rebellion under
the leadership of the worthless prince de Condé,[2] but d’Ancre and
Marie knew well the sop to throw to that Cerberus. A quarter of a
million of livres purchased the treaty of Ste. Menehould on May 15th,
1614, and six million that of Loudun in May 1616, and the Regent and
her minister quietly pursued their policy unmoved by demands for
reform which died in the presence of gold. The feeble ray of dying
constitutionalism alone sheds a pale gleam of interest over the dreary
years. Partly in the hopes of strengthening her own position, partly
to take a cry, always dangerous, out of the mouth of Condé, Marie de
Médicis consented to summon once more the States-General of France and
ask their advice upon the grievances of the kingdom.

The melancholy interest which surrounds a deathbed attaches to this the
last meeting of the States-General of monarchical France. [Sidenote:
=Meeting of the States-General, 1614.=] The Estates assembled at
Paris on the 14th of October 1614, according to their three orders.
There appeared 140 representatives of the clergy, 132 of the noblesse,
192 of the Tiers État, but these last were not in any real sense
representatives of the commonalty of France. The name of a merchant or
a farmer or a small landowner does not appear among them. They were
for the most part of the official and professional classes, officers
of the petty districts into which France was divided, financial and
municipal officers, with a sprinkling of lawyers and citizens, and they
at once assumed the rôle which their composition marked out for them,
and organised themselves as the official order in opposition to the
other orders of the clergy and the noblesse. [Sidenote: =Quarrels
between the orders.=] From the beginning the jealousy of the three
orders among themselves, and the fatal determination of the Tiers
État to defend the privileges of their own official class against
the nobles, instead of urging the grievances of the country upon the
Crown, rendered the possibility of obtaining any real check upon the
Crown absolutely hopeless. The nobles not unnaturally looked with
jealous eyes on the gradual formation of an hereditary privileged class
of officials, by means of the purchase of offices and the right of
transmission secured by the _paulette_, which could not fail to
grow in a little time into a second noblesse, and they directed their
efforts mainly to procuring the abolition of purchase in the civil
services. The Tiers État on their side, numbering as they did but
comparatively few of the privileged ‘exempt’ among their ranks, fixed
their eyes on the inordinate pensions enjoyed by the great nobles, and
demanded the abolition of the pension list and the reduction of the
_taille_. This was to hit the nobles in their weakest place, and
the contention between the two orders became so keen that the court
had to interfere and bring about a reconciliation. Hardly however
had the Tiers État finished their controversy with the nobles, than
they became involved in a quarrel with the clergy. The magistracy,
especially the lawyers, were strongly Gallican in their views of
ecclesiastical government, that is, they maintained the right of the
national authorities to govern the Church in France in all matters
which were not directly spiritual in their nature, and repudiated
interference from the Pope. Especially they disliked the Jesuits,
and wished to avoid the recognition of the decrees of the Council of
Trent, which had not as yet been formally accepted by France. The
Tiers État accordingly drew up an article in their _cahier_,
or list of grievances, which, under the form of asserting the right
divine of the French kings, and denouncing the crime of regicide,
impliedly denied the right of the popes to depose kings and absolve
subjects from their allegiance. At once the whole question between
the Gallicans and the Ultramontanes was raised, and for more than a
month no other matter was discussed among the Estates. The nobles
sided with the clergy, and agreed with them on twenty-four articles
representing their common views, among which the recognition of the
decrees of Trent and the maintenance of the authority of the Holy See
assumed an equal place of importance with the union of Navarre and
Béarn to France, and the abolition of the _paulette_ and the
purchase system. The Parlement supported the Tiers Etat, and by its
interference introduced one more cause of dissension. Finally, the
court had again to interfere and order the Tiers Etat to omit the
objectionable article from their _cahier_. [Sidenote: =Reforms
brought about by the States-General.=] Yet in spite of these
suicidal quarrels, which proved the unfitness of the States-General to
undertake constitutional responsibilities, their meeting was not wholly
useless. Differing on almost all other questions, the three orders were
agreed upon an attack upon the financial administration. Jeannin, the
finance minister, was, in spite of the efforts of the court, forced
to produce accounts, which, when produced, showed clearly enough that
none had been kept which were fit for production. The consent of the
Crown was obtained to a considerable reduction of the pension list,
the suppression of the _paulette_, and the erection of a special
court to control the finances. Endowed with no legislative power, all
that the Estates could do in the way of ameliorating the government
was to make representations and extort promises, and this they did as
effectively as circumstances permitted in the most important department
of administration. If it must be allowed that they did much to destroy
their own influence and render themselves ridiculous by their jealousy
and quarrelsomeness, it must also be remembered that no king ever dared
to summon them again until monarchy was tottering to its fall.

[Sidenote: =Fall of the maréchal d’Ancre. Ministry of Luynes,
1617.=]

Louis was declared of age just before the meeting of the States-General
in 1614, when he had reached his fourteenth year. In 1616 the hated
double marriage with Spain was celebrated, and Marie’s triumph was
complete. It was short-lived--Louis himself shared the universal
hatred felt for the maréchal d’Ancre. Urged on by his friend and
fellow-sportsman the count de Luynes, he determined to take the
government into his own hands. A third rising of the nobles at the
beginning of 1617 professed as its object the saving of the king
from the hands of a foreigner. Only the queen-mother supported her
favourite, but she was powerless against her son. As the maréchal
entered the Louvre on the 25th of April 1617, he was ordered in the
king’s name to surrender his sword. On his refusal the guard fired
and he fell dead. His wife was not long in following him. Condemned
on an absurd charge of sorcery, she was executed shortly after. The
queen-mother was obliged to retire to Blois, and Louis, seeing his
oppressors so successfully disposed of, felt that at last he was king.
He was mistaken. He had only exchanged one master for another. Luynes,
who succeeded to the power formerly exercised by the maréchal d’Ancre,
soon proved neither more capable or honest in administration, nor more
agreeable to the nobles. The queen-mother never ceased her intrigues to
regain her power, intrigues which became daily more dangerous as they
were directed by the unseen hand of Richelieu. In 1619 the old duke of
Epernon, in 1620 the dukes of Mayenne and Vendôme, in alliance with the
Huguenots under Rohan and La Tremouille, rose in her favour, and Louis
and his favourite found themselves obliged to come to an arrangement
with her.

[Sidenote: =Rising of the Huguenots, 1620.=]

But no sooner had the treaty of Angoulême, made in February 1619,
and confirmed in 1620, restored harmony between Louis and his mother
and the nobles, than the Huguenots, who wished to take advantage
of the troubles of the court in order to increase their political
independence, threw all the south of France into a blaze. Frightened
by the forced restoration of Catholicism in Béarn in 1620, they struck
boldly for independence, dreamed of a Huguenot republic in the south
of France, and were content to see the dismemberment of the nation,
if by it they could satisfy their personal ambition. Wherever the
eye turned among the various interests of which France was composed,
whether upon Luynes and the courtiers, upon the queen-mother and her
rival court, upon Condé and the nobles, upon Rohan and the Huguenots,
the same picture of self-seeking ambition and personal aims was
everywhere presented. Each one for himself and no one for the country
was the motto of all among the leaders of France with two exceptions.
The king himself and Richelieu the young bishop of Luçon, at that
time in disgrace with his patroness Marie de Médicis, were the only
ones in whose breasts the love of France burned with a pure and
unsullied flame, and the hour had not yet struck which was to bind
them together in a common work for the common weal. Meanwhile the
crisis was a serious one, and Louis set himself manfully to meet it.
The clash of arms, and the threat of danger, always brought out the
stronger parts of his nature. He confirmed the Edict of Nantes, then
at the head of a large army, after quieting the north, he marched
towards the great Huguenot stronghold of La Rochelle and captured
S. Jean d’Angely in spite of the efforts of Soubise. Leaving the
due d’Epernon to form the siege of La Rochelle, he directed all his
energies to the capture of Montauban, the great Huguenot stronghold of
the south, while Montmorency subdued the Cevennes. For three months
the stout city resisted all the ill-directed efforts of the royal
army, and in November 1621 the king sullenly withdrew the remnants of
his perishing troops. The death of Luynes from a fever caught in camp
did much to make peace possible, and the victory of Louis and Condé
over Soubise in the marches of Rie in April 1622 brought it near. The
Huguenots had come to see that without foreign assistance their cause
was hopeless. The duc de Bouillon remained immovable in the north.
Lesdiguières, the old Huguenot leader, became a Catholic and received
the bâton of Constable. La Force, the heroic defender of Montauban,
accepted the rank of marshal of France and a gift of 200,000 crowns.
Rohan alone remained steadfast, but he too was forced to accept the
inevitable, when it became clear that Montpellier, the last Huguenot
fortress of the south, must surrender. [Sidenote: =The peace of
Montpellier, 1622. Entry of Richelieu into the Ministry.=] The
peace of Montpellier, signed on the 19th October 1622, marks the first
great step taken by the Crown towards the destruction of the Huguenots
as a political organisation. By it religious toleration was secured
to them, but they were forbidden to hold political assemblies of any
kind whatever. All fortifications recently raised by them were to be
demolished, and La Rochelle and Montauban were to be for the future
the only guaranteed towns. The victory of France over the Huguenots
had results far more extended than appeared upon the surface. The
restoration of civil order in the country naturally led to an attempt
to restore personal harmony at court, and under the auspices of La
Vieuville, who now exercised the chief influence in the ministry, a
settlement of the questions still at issue between the king and his
mother was effected. One of the conditions of this settlement was the
entry of Richelieu into the royal council. From that day a new era
dawned for France.

CHAPTER III

THE COUNTER-REFORMATION AND RELIGIOUS TROUBLES IN GERMANY

Causes of the Counter-Reformation--The weakness of Protestantism--The
revival in the Church--The influence of the Jesuits--Beginning of
the Counter-Reformation in Poland, in Germany, in the Austrian
dominions--Questions still unsettled in Germany, the position
of the Calvinists, the secularised lands, the ecclesiastical
reservation--Dangerous position of the Calvinists of the
Rhineland--The troubles of Donauwörth--Formation of the Calvinist
Union and the Catholic League--Constitutional difficulties between the
Emperor and the Bohemians--Revolt of the Bohemian Protestants--The
throwing from the windows.

[Sidenote: =Causes of the Counter-Reformation.=]

The reaction against Protestantism in Europe began to make itself
felt in the concluding years of the sixteenth century. Like all great
movements in the religious, as in the political, sphere, it owed its
existence to many complex causes. To some extent racial distinctions
asserted themselves. The Romance-speaking nations and the Sclavonic
peoples, roughly speaking, after a moment of hesitation declared
plainly against Protestantism. To a larger extent political reasons
dictated the attitude of governments, and governments were able to do
much towards defining the religion of their subjects. The determined
stand made by Spain in defence of Catholicism was greatly affected
by the ambition of Philip II. to make himself master of Europe. The
effective opposition to the domination of Spain offered by Elizabeth
was far more due to zeal for the independence and commercial prosperity
of England than to differences of faith. The final resolve of France to
remain distinctly Catholic was, as we have seen, due to the fact that
she prized her unity before everything, and the Huguenots were the
party of disruption.

[Sidenote: =Inherent weakness of Protestantism.=]

But after making all allowance for the influence of other
considerations, the reasons which determined the course of events
remained always religious. Protestantism was at the first the
expression of a great moral revolution. The religious and moral
nature of man rose in rebellion against a distorted faith, and an
immoral system which seemed incapable of reform. Based mainly on a
negative theology, it was at its strongest as long as its work was
almost wholly destructive. The overthrow of moral abuse, the attack
on wrongly defined faith was easy to men inspired with the zeal of a
crusade on behalf of truth. But when it, in its turn, was called upon
by the necessities of controversy to attempt to construct a system of
its own, to lay down principles, to explain truth, its weakness became
evident. Quickly divided into the two great schools named after Luther
and Calvin, in hopeless and virulent antagonism, it was soon seen that
in each division the tendency was still further to define and still
further to divide. Confession followed confession in the hopeless
attempt to arrive at unity through the expression of self-evident,
perfect, truth in human language. The only result was greater division.
Lutheranism, to avoid the danger of disruption, took refuge under the
wing of the State, and as it became more and more merely the moral
department of governments, it lost more and more its powers over
mankind. From the middle of the sixteenth century its progress began
to cease, and when progress stops in a religious movement, reaction
begins. Calvinism showed more vitality. It was more aggressive and
lent itself as readily to the aid of those opposed to governmental
centralisation, as Lutheranism did to the assistance of the governments
themselves. Its stern creed, with its strong tendency to fanaticism
and bigotry, produced a type of character always concentrated and
effective, and often lofty and severe. It was seen at its best when
combined with the spirit of patriotism and liberty in the Dutch and
the Swiss, at its worst when degraded into a pretext for selfishness
and faction in France and in Germany. At one time it looked as if it
was going to carry everything before it. Firmly rooted in Scotland,
Switzerland, the upper Rhineland, and among the Dutch, it was rapidly
winning over to its flag England, France, and Hungary, was making
rapid strides in the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria,
and had even made good its footing in north Italy and Spain. But like
Lutheranism it was more fitted to attack than to defend, to win than to
consolidate, and gradually the tide began to ebb. The long and bitter
struggle in the Netherlands ended in a division of territory. The seven
northern provinces became independent and remained Calvinist, in spite
of the utmost efforts of Philip II., but south and west of
the Scheldt the country adhered to Spain and Catholicism. England in
her national expression of religion, under the guidance of Elizabeth,
definitely refused to become Calvinistic, though many Englishmen
became Calvinists. France, as we have seen, having to choose between
Calvinism and unity, not only chose to remain Catholic and united, but
set herself deliberately to root out the political influence of the
Huguenot organisation.

[Sidenote: =Religious revival in the Church.=]

But after all, it was not the inherent weakness of Protestantism,
either in its philosophical, religious, or political aspects, which
finally put an end to its progress, and turned back the tide. It
was the greatly increased strength of Catholicism. The power of
Protestantism lay, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, in its
protest against wicked lives and a degraded system. By the end of the
century that protest was no longer needed, and no longer effective. The
Church, which had refused to reform itself after the horrors of the
great schism under the pressure of the councils of Constance and Basel,
and had answered the trumpet call of Savonarola with an excommunication
at the hands of Alexander VI., had at length been forced into
reform by the success of Protestantism. The Council of Trent left its
mark upon the Roman Church in two special ways. By the establishment
of the seminaries, and the enforcement of residence, it reformed
the clergy and taught them to be the teachers of the people. By the
acknowledgment of Papal supremacy it centralised the organisation of
the Roman Church, as an army is centralised under the absolute command
of its leader, to whom unquestioning obedience is due. From that time
the Pope has exercised influence over a smaller area of Europe than
before the Reformation, but with far greater power of compelling
obedience among his own adherents. The institution of new religious
orders, and the remarkable revival of the religious life in the Roman
Church in the century following the Reformation, is perhaps the proof
rather than the cause of the renewal of personal piety and the spirit
of self-sacrifice, but the foundation of the Society of Jesus marks
a turning-point in the religious history of the world. [Sidenote:
=Influence of the Jesuits.=] Ignatius Loyola was a soldier
before he was a priest, and his Society was a military organisation
for religious purposes. The conquest of heresy and infidelity was its
object, obedience and renunciation of personality were to it the first
of virtues. A Jesuit, who was thoroughly imbued with the principles
of his order, lost his individuality and became but a part of a great
machine. He lived, moved, felt, thought, but in his Society and for it
alone. Trained on one system, directed by the will of one man, bound
by its constitution to implicit obedience to the Pope, the Society
of Jesus, as it spread over the whole world in the ardour and pure
enthusiasm of its earlier years, formed a power in the hands of the
Papacy, which, from the intense concentration of its government, and
the immense diffusion of its activity, has never been equalled in the
world’s history. In Europe, where Protestantism was the great enemy to
be overthrown, it seized with characteristic dexterity upon education
as its chief work.

[Sidenote: =Their educational work.=]

Protestantism, though born of the Renaissance, had done little to
satisfy the demands for increased knowledge which the growing spirit
of free inquiry was making so loudly. It had trained some scholars,
it had done little for general education. The Jesuits seized the
opportunity. They offered to the world the best education attainable
free of cost, and before long they had far distanced all competitors.
The value of this to the Church in countries where Protestantism was
powerful but not dominant can hardly be exaggerated. It was a guarantee
that the rising intelligence of the country should be trained in the
most uncompromising school of churchmanship. No Catholic power found
itself able to dispense with their support. Even in France where
Calvinism was strong, under a king whose religion was always tempered
by policy, the Jesuits managed to make good their footing in spite
of the most virulent and active opposition of the Sorbonne. To the
rulers of Bavaria and Austria, who were sincerely anxious for the
rooting out of Protestantism, they were simply invaluable. Thus by
the end of the century the tables had become completely turned. Zeal,
devotion, learning, self-sacrifice, religious enthusiasm, were now on
the side of the Church. Superior in organisation, superior in religious
effort, superior in concentration, the Church presented a united and
effective front to her enemies, and was prepared, when the opportunity
should come, to initiate a crusade by the help of the Jesuits against
Protestantism in Europe, while a new world was being won for her across
the ocean by their missionary efforts.

The opportunity was not long in coming. In the concluding years of
the sixteenth century men attained to power in central Europe, whose
youth had been trained under the influences of the Catholic revival.
Already by the efforts of Philip II. and S. Carlo Borromeo,
with the assistance of the Inquisition, the movement in favour of
Protestantism in Spain and Italy had been crushed, and heresy driven
back behind the Alps and the Pyrenees. In 1587 Sigismund, the son of
John of Sweden and Catherine Jagellon, was elected to the throne of
Poland. [Sidenote: =The Counter-Reformation in Poland.=] Sigismund
was a staunch Catholic, and owed his election to the efforts of the
Catholics. He at once set himself to restore Poland to Catholicism.
He used the royal patronage, which was extremely extensive in Poland,
in favour of Catholics only. He called the Jesuits to his assistance,
supported them with money, and encouraged the sons of the nobility to
attend their schools. In disputed questions as to the right to the
ecclesiastical buildings he used the influence of the crown in favour
of the Catholics, and was so successful in this, that it is said that
Dantzig was the only town of importance in Poland where the Protestants
retained the use of the parish church. Thus in a few years the whole of
the official classes became Catholic; while large country districts,
especially in Livonia and Lithuania, were won back to the old faith by
the efforts of the Jesuit missionaries. [Sidenote: =In Germany.=]
In Germany recourse was had to still stronger measures, for in virtue
of the principle of the religious peace of Augsburg of 1555 it was
held that every ruler had the right of dictating the religion of his
subjects. Accordingly at Christmas 1595, the bishop of Bamberg issued
an edict banishing from the diocese all who refused to receive the
Eucharist according to the Catholic rite. Emboldened by his success,
the bishop of Paderborn followed his example a few years afterwards,
and established and endowed a Jesuit college in his cathedral city.
In the first years of the new century the electors von Bicken and
Schweikard of Mainz, Ernest and Ferdinand of Köln and Lothaire of
Trier, partly by governmental pressure, partly by personal influence,
restored Catholicism permanently in the three archbishoprics of the
Rhine. [Sidenote: =In Styria.=] But it was in south Germany that
the greatest results were obtained. In 1596 Ferdinand, the cousin
of the emperor Rudolf II., came of age, and succeeded to
the duchies of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, formerly held by his
father the archduke Charles. Ferdinand was a man of resolute will and
deep religious convictions, which had been developed by his Jesuit
teachers into something little short of fanaticism. He looked upon
the restoration of Catholicism as the special work of his life, and
kneeling before the shrine of Loretto the year after his accession,
he solemnly swore to eradicate Protestantism from his hereditary
dominions. He did not sleep upon his promise. In 1598 edicts were
issued ordering all Protestant ministers to leave the country within
fourteen days. In the following year commissions were sent through the
country to enforce the edicts. The Protestant churches were thrown
down, the pastors ejected, and the inhabitants compelled to conform to
Catholicism. [Sidenote: =In Austria and Moravia.=] The Emperor,
seeing his cousin’s success, followed in his footsteps, and from 1599
to 1603 similar commissions were issued for Upper and Lower Austria,
and the Protestant ministers were driven out. Not content with this,
Rudolf proceeded to follow a similar policy in his other dominions.
In 1602 he suppressed the meetings of the Moravian brethren in
Bohemia and Moravia, and gave armed assistance to the efforts of the
Hungarian bishops to convert their Protestant flocks. [Sidenote: =In
Bavaria.=] Meanwhile by the exertions of William, duke of Bavaria,
and his son Maximilian, who came to the throne on the abdication of
his father in 1696, powerfully assisted by the great Jesuit college at
Ingolstadt, Catholicism had completely won the upper hand in Bavaria.

The beginning of the seventeenth century therefore saw the reaction
in favour of the Church in full flood tide of prosperity. At its head
stood a pope, Paul V. (Borghese), who, if somewhat deficient
in the grandeur of mind of Sixtus V., and the fervour of
piety which distinguished Pius V., yielded to none of his
predecessors, not even to Hildebrand himself, in the lofty conception
he had formed of the nature and prerogatives of his office, and in
the determination to make them respected. In Philip III. of
Spain, Maximilian of Bavaria, Ferdinand of Styria, and Sigismund of
Poland, he had lieutenants who had made the restoration and increase
of Catholicism the first object of their policy. Already their efforts
had been crowned with success in Poland and in south Germany, and the
influence of the movement had made itself felt all over the debatable
land subject to the Empire, which was not as yet definitely attached
to one side or the other. Even the imperial institutions themselves
were affected by its progress, and men noticed that the decisions of
the imperial courts of appeal were biassed by the religious opinions
of the judges and of the Emperor. [Sidenote: =Questions regarding
the peace of Augsburg.=] This was all the more important as it
happened that these particular courts were at that time being called
upon to decide a most interesting political question. The peace of
Augsburg, concluded in 1555, which attempted to establish peace between
the Church and the Lutherans in Germany, had left three problems
unsolved, which were certain sooner or later to be decided by the
sword, if no peaceful compromise could be arrived at in the meantime.
[Sidenote: =1. Position of the Calvinists.=] In the first place it
only applied to the Lutherans, for at the time of its conclusion the
Protestant princes of the Empire were all Lutherans, and they merely
thought of securing their own interests. Calvinism therefore had no
rights whatever in the Empire, and had still to win its recognition
from the law. [Sidenote: =2. The secularised lands.=] Secondly,
it had been laid down by the peace that the Church should no longer
have any rights over Church property lying within the territories of
Lutheran princes, which had been secularised by them or applied by them
to Lutheran purposes, before 1552; but differences had since arisen
between the two parties as to the bearing of this provision upon lands
secularised subsequently to 1552. It was argued by the Catholics,
that the very fact that lands secularised before 1552 were expressly
exempted from all the claims of the Church, clearly implied that lands
secularised after 1552 were not subject to that exemption, and had
therefore been taken from the Church illegally and ought to be at once
restored. The Lutherans, on the other hand, maintained that the treaty
intended to lay down a general rule, which was to apply to all lands
secularised under similar circumstances, and the date only referred to
the convention of Passau, which led to the religious peace, and was not
meant to create two different classes of secularised lands. Following
out this somewhat broad construction of the peace, large quantities of
Church land had been secularised since 1552 by Lutheran and even by
Calvinist princes, and used by them as a very convenient endowment for
younger sons and other relations. [Sidenote: =3. The Ecclesiastical
Reservation.=] A further difficulty arose with regard to what was
called the Ecclesiastical Reservation. It frequently happened, during
the earlier years of the Reformation, that a bishop or abbot, who was
a territorial prince in right of his bishopric or abbacy,--of which
there were a great number in Germany--became a Lutheran. In order to
preserve the rights of the Church in such a case, it was provided by
the peace of Augsburg, that a bishop or abbot who became a Lutheran
should at once vacate his dignity. But the Protestants maintained that
this Ecclesiastical Reservation, as it was called, was only intended
to apply to cases where a bishop or abbot, who had been elected by
a Catholic Chapter as a Catholic, became a Protestant, and did not
affect those cases where a Chapter which had itself become Protestant
elected a Protestant to be their bishop or abbot. In virtue of this
contention, eight of the great bishoprics of north Germany and many
abbacies throughout the country became practically secularised. The
Protestant bishop or abbot made no pretence to ecclesiastical position
or functions. He was merely a territorial prince who enjoyed the title
of bishop, or sometimes administrator, instead of that of duke or
landgrave, but his right to his title and his lands had never been
admitted by the imperial courts or the Diet.

As long as the tide was flowing in the direction of Protestantism the
Protestant view of these matters naturally prevailed, as being that
of the stronger party, and the Catholics had to content themselves
with protests. [Sidenote: =Danger of the Rhineland Calvinists.=]
But with the advent of the Counter-Reformation things became very
different. The division in the Protestant party was so envenomed,
that no Lutheran would stir a finger to claim the privileges of the
religious peace for Calvinists. The Catholics had now powerful friends
to back them in demanding back the secularised lands. It was almost
certain if the question could be brought before the imperial courts
that the decision would be in their favour. The Calvinists of the upper
Rhineland therefore found themselves in a dangerous position. Situated
between the Spanish power on the one side and Bavaria on the other,
without a shadow of legal claim to the protection of the religious
peace of Augsburg, without the chance of deriving any assistance from
the Lutheran princes of the north, they were in danger of being the
next victims of the Emperor and Maximilian, just flushed with their
triumph over heresy at home. [Sidenote: =The troubles of Donauwörth,
1607.=] A little incident showed how real the danger was. In 1607,
at Donauwörth, a free city on the Danube, in which the Protestants were
in a large majority, a Catholic procession was insulted and a religious
quarrel excited. The matter was at once brought to the notice of the
Imperial (Aulic) Council, a body entirely composed of nominees of the
Emperor. The ban of the Empire was pronounced against Donauwörth, and
Maximilian of Bavaria appointed to carry it out. He at once occupied
the town with his troops, but not content with establishing order and
taking security for the payment of his army, he proceeded to eject the
Protestants from the churches and restore the Catholic worship, on the
plea that the establishment of Protestantism there had been illegal,
and was not protected by the peace of Augsburg. The immediate result
of this action on the part of Maximilian, which was looked upon by the
Protestants as a distinct and indefensible act of aggression, was to
bring about the organisation of the two parties in two rival camps.
Christian of Anhalt, one of those sanguine and turbulent spirits,
whose advent to the leadership of affairs is a sure presage of war and
dissension, seized the opportunity to bind together the Protestant
states of the Rhineland in 1608 into a Union for self-defence, which,
when once formed, he hoped to be able to lead to the attack against
the House of Austria. [Sidenote: =Formation of the Calvinist Union,
1608.=] In the next year the Union was joined by the important free
cities of Strasburg, Nuremberg, and Ulm. The Elector Palatine was
acknowledged as its head, and Christian of Anhalt and the Margrave of
Baden-Durlach appointed its generals, and German Calvinism thus stood
ready to defend its interests to the death against the encroachments
of the Counter-Reformation. Nor were the Catholics far behind in their
preparations for war. [Sidenote: =Formation of the Catholic League,
1609.=]In 1609 the Catholic League was formed among the Catholic
bishops of south Germany, under the leadership of Maximilian of
Bavaria, to defend Catholic interests. The Pope gave it his approval
and Spain promised assistance. With the long head of Maximilian to
direct its policy, with his long purse to provide the sinews of war,
with his trained army under Tilly to fight its battles, and with
Spain and the Pope to fall back upon, the Catholic League bid fair to
distance its rival in the game for leadership in South Germany, which
was being played.

[Sidenote: =Weakness of the Emperor.=]

But just at this moment occurred two events which rapidly swung the
balance to the opposite side. The disputed succession to Cleves and
Jülich--followed as it was by the intervention of the Emperor and the
occupation of Jülich on his behalf, while the elector of Brandenburg
and the count palatine of Neuburg made themselves joint masters of
Cleves--brought about, as we have seen, a most formidable combination
of Protestant powers under the leadership of France, to overthrow the
House of Austria and put a stop to the progress of Catholicism in
Germany. At the very moment when he was thus threatened by foreign
attack, the unfortunate Rudolf found himself at the mercy of his own
revolted subjects. Already in 1606 his brother Matthias had taken
advantage of the unpopularity caused by the forcible restoration of
Catholicism in Austria and Hungary, especially among the nobility,
to put himself at the head of a combination of the estates of those
countries, in order to win for himself the sovereignty over them at
the price of granting religious toleration. The revolt was completely
successful. [Sidenote: =Religious toleration in Austria and
Bohemia, 1608–1609.=] In 1608 Rudolf made over to his brother the
government of Austria and Hungary, and Matthias, in his turn, appointed
a Protestant to be palatine in Hungary, and guaranteed the free
exercise of their religion, public and private, to all his subjects.
The Emperor was thus left with Bohemia and Moravia alone faithful
to him, but the Bohemians were no less quick than the Austrians had
been to see the profit that might be made out of the weakness of
their king. In 1609 the Bohemian estates extorted from him the Royal
Charter (_Majestätsbrief_) as the price of their loyalty, by
which freedom of conscience was secured to all who belonged to certain
specified creeds, and freedom of worship granted on all Crown lands;
but on private estates, and in towns, the consent of the landowner
and the town authorities was made necessary to the erection of any
church or the establishment of any religious worship. An arrangement
so one-sided as this, by which the king was obliged to grant freedom
of worship, while his subjects were not, was thoroughly unpractical.
Difficulties at once broke out about its interpretation, which ended in
1611 in the deposition of Rudolf, and the recognition of Matthias as
king of Bohemia. [Sidenote: =Death of Rudolf. Accession of Matthias,
1612.=] In 1612 Rudolf died and Matthias was elected emperor. The
change was in favour of peace. The death of Henry IV. in
1610, and the consequent withdrawal of France and England from the
combination against the House of Austria, made the Union less ready to
follow the fiery counsels of Christian of Anhalt. The Cleves-Jülich
question remained in abeyance after the imperial troops had been
expelled from Jülich, but was somewhat further complicated by the
conversion of the count palatine of Neuburg to Catholicism, and of the
elector of Brandenburg to Calvinism. [Sidenote: =Settlement of the
Cleves-Jülich question, 1614.=] Eventually by the treaty of Xanten
in 1614, subsequently modified in 1630, a division of the duchies
between the two claimants was agreed upon, by which the elector of
Brandenburg acquired Cleves, the Mark and Ravensberg, while Jülich,
Berg, and Ravenstein fell to the house of Neuburg. For eight years
Germany, freed from the impending horror of a desolating war, enjoyed
a truce; but still in Bohemia were to be heard murmurs that the Royal
Charter was not observed by Matthias, still flowed steadily and surely
the stream of the Counter-Reformation, and Maximilian of Bavaria
reinforced his army and amassed treasure, awaiting the day when the
sword, and the sword alone, should decide the religious question in
Germany.

[Sidenote: =The succession of Ferdinand to Austria, Hungary and
Bohemia recognised.=]

The truce was broken by the Emperor himself. Matthias was an old man
without children. His brothers, who were but little younger than
himself, were like him childless, and all the hopes of the Austrian
House were centred upon Ferdinand of Styria as the only Habsburg who
had an heir to succeed him. It became therefore the cardinal point
of the policy of the Emperor, during his later years, to secure the
succession of Ferdinand to the various dominions of the Austrian House
in Germany, and, if possible, his eventual election to the Empire. The
succession to the hereditary dominions of the Habsburgs only required
the consent of the senior members of the family and the approval of
Spain, and presented but little difficulty; but that to the crowns of
Hungary and Bohemia was a different matter altogether, as the crown
in both kingdoms was elective. By mingled address and assurance the
policy of Matthias triumphed for the time. The estates of Hungary duly
elected Ferdinand to be the successor of Matthias, and he was crowned
at Pressburg without a murmur of opposition being heard. In Bohemia
courage won the day. The estates were suddenly called together in
1617, and required to acknowledge Ferdinand as the lawful successor to
Matthias by hereditary right, and evidence was brought to show that
they had in former times acknowledged that the crown of Bohemia was
rightfully hereditary. Taken by surprise and subjected to pressure
from the court the estates acquiesced in this new assumption. No
leader appeared to question or refute the imperial case. Ferdinand
was recognised and crowned as hereditary king of Bohemia, and at his
coronation swore to observe the Royal Charter. But no sooner was
Ferdinand seated on the throne than the Bohemian Protestant nobility
began to realise what had been done. They had not only assisted in
placing the most determined enemy of their religion over them, but,
by setting aside the elective character of their monarchy, they
had dealt the greatest possible blow to their own importance. The
discontent found an able leader in count Henry of Thurn, who, like
another Christian of Anhalt, was not a man to let scruples stand in
the way of his determination to effect the dethronement of Ferdinand,
and the overthrow of the House of Austria. [Sidenote: =Revolt of the
Protestants in Bohemia. The ‘throwing from the window,’ 1618.=] A
meeting of the Protestant members of the estates was summoned, and a
petition to the Emperor agreed upon. On the reply proving unfavourable,
Thurn, at the head of a body of nobles, forced his way into the palace
at Prague on May 23d, 1618, and seizing the two regents of the kingdom,
Martinitz and Slavata, who were accused of being the real authors of
the obnoxious reply, threw them with their secretary Fabricius out of
the window in old Bohemian fashion. They fell sheer seventy feet into
the ditch below, but strange to say not one of them lost his life.
Thurn hoped by this deed of violence to render peace between Austria
and Bohemia impossible. He little thought that he had given the signal
for a war which was to desolate his country and all Germany for thirty
years, and throw them back in the race of civilisation for a century.

CHAPTER IV

THE BEGINNING OF THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR

Character of the Bohemian Revolution--Help sent by Savoy
and the Silesians--Accession of Ferdinand of Styria--Revolt
in Austria--Ferdinand elected Emperor, deposed as King of
Bohemia--Acceptance by Frederick, Elector Palatine, of the Crown
of Bohemia--Alienation of England and the Lutheran Princes from
Frederick--Bavaria, Spain, and Saxony support Ferdinand--Battle of
the White Mountain--Settlement of Bohemia and Silesia--Conquest
of the Palatinate--The Electorate transferred to Bavaria--The war
spreads to the north--Interference of England and Denmark--Wallenstein
raises an army for the Emperor--His character and views--Campaigns
of 1626–1627--Defeat of Denmark--Peace of Lübeck--Edict of
Restitution--New questions raised by the success of Wallenstein and
the issue of the Edict.

[Sidenote: =Character of the Bohemian Revolution.=]

It is probable that when count Thurn and his companions threw the
regents out of the window at Prague, they only intended to snap the
cord which bound Bohemia and the House of Austria together, and
pictured to themselves as the result of their rash act an independent
Protestant Bohemia, ruled by themselves and their brother nobles
under the nominal sovereignty of a puppet king of their own choosing.
At first it seemed as if they were right. Germany was inclined to
let king and rebellious subjects fight out the battle by themselves.
John George of Saxony and Maximilian of Bavaria refused to interfere.
Spain promised aid but did not send it. Matthias and Ferdinand had
but fourteen thousand men under Bucquoi, a Spanish general who had
served with distinction in the Netherlands, upon whom to rely. Behind
that army lay an empty treasury and a discontented people. If the
Bohemian revolution had had in it anything of the spirit of calm
and disinterested patriotism, capable of making all sacrifices, and
determined to face all consequences, which was characteristic of the
Swiss and the Dutch revolutions, the knell of the House of Austria must
have sounded. But it was not so. The unconquerable spirit was with
Ferdinand. A mean desire to make other people bear the burdens, while
they enjoyed the fruits, of successful rebellion marked the conduct
of the Bohemian leaders. A body of directors, thirty in number, was
formed under the guidance of Ruppa, the ablest and most honourable
of the insurgents. A diet was held to carry on the affairs of the
country while Thurn took command of the army. Orders were given to
raise troops, but the question at once arose who was to pay for them?
The first suggestion was that the towns should have that honour, but
the towns not unnaturally refused the heroic rôle of self-sacrifice
so thoughtfully proposed to them by the nobles. Fresh taxes were
then voted, but no one even attempted to raise them. On the news of
the advance of Bucquoi towards Budweis, a Catholic town which still
remained true to the Emperor, a panic seized the directors and the
diet. A general levy of the male population was ordered, the raising
of the taxes already voted was proposed, but rather than face so
disagreeable a question the members of the diet slunk quietly home. It
was like schoolboys playing at rebellion. Some of the levies made their
appearance in the camp of Thurn, but there were no arms to put into
their hands, no officers to train them, no money to pay them. It is not
thus that successful revolutions are made. The Bohemian nobles were but
a faction, fighting for licence and for power under the sacred names of
liberty, of patriotism, and of religion. They must have met the fitting
reward of their selfishness and their arrogance at the hands of Bucquoi
and his fourteen thousand half-starved and badly paid troops, had it
not been for the timely interference of other powers.

Charles Emmanuel of Savoy had not abandoned his enmity to the
Austro-Spanish House because he had been obliged to make his
peace with Spain after the death of Henry IV. [Sidenote:
=Interference of Charles Emmanuel of Savoy.=] Of a restless and
ambitious nature, but by no means devoid of natural prudence, no sooner
did he hear of the revolution in Bohemia than he determined to do all
in his power to assist it, provided he could do so secretly. With this
object he opened negotiations with Frederick V., Elector
Palatine. Frederick had succeeded to the electorate on the death of his
father in 1610. Young, handsome, enthusiastic, he was readily attracted
by the difficulties of an undertaking, without having sufficient mental
power to surmount them. In politics he was a pupil of Christian of
Anhalt, in religion a zealous Calvinist, and he looked upon himself,
and was looked upon by others, as the natural leader of the German
Calvinists, and the determined foe of the House of Austria and the
Counter-Reformation. His political opinions had lately become of more
importance to the world, through his marriage with the beautiful
Elizabeth, the daughter of James I. of England. It was known
that James was bent upon an alliance with Spain, and desired nothing
less than to be mixed up in an European war. Still it was equally
certain that he had by no means resigned the position of ally and
defender of Protestantism, which he had inherited from his predecessor;
and that there was a large and influential party in England, who looked
upon the marriage with the Elector as a guarantee of a more decided
Protestant policy.

Frederick had been the first German prince to congratulate the
Bohemians on their rebellion, and offer them assistance. In July 1618
he sent a confidential agent to Prague to report upon the state of
affairs, and to assure the directors of the support of the Protestant
Union, should Spain or Bavaria send help to the Emperor. It was at this
juncture that Charles Emmanuel appeared upon the scene, and offered
through the Elector Palatine to send Mansfeld with two thousand men at
once to the assistance of the Bohemians, if it could be made to appear
that the troops were sent by the Elector himself. Frederick at once
agreed. [Sidenote: =Mansfeld sent to assist the Bohemians.=] The
real truth was known only to the Elector Palatine, Christian of Anhalt,
and the margrave of Anspach, and when Mansfeld arrived at the scene of
war in September 1618, and formed the siege of Pilsen, all the world
believed that he was acting on behalf of Frederick, and many concluded
that the Elector would not have dared to take so serious a step, unless
he had reason to reckon on the support of England. The relief was
well-timed, but the arrangement was not very creditable to any of the
parties concerned, for Mansfeld, though an able soldier, was one of
that class of military adventurers ever bred in times of war to be the
bane and scourge of the helpless and inoffensive people. To put such a
man in command, at the beginning of a national struggle, was to stamp
it at once as a war of brutality and plunder. [Sidenote: =Further
assistance sent from Silesia.=] His arrival, however, at Pilsen
changed the face of affairs. The Silesians hearing the action, as they
thought, of the Elector Palatine resolved to interfere, and sent three
thousand men to the assistance of the Bohemians. Bucquoi in the face of
these reinforcements, not only checked his advance on Prague, but was
soon obliged to fall back to Budweis, where he was besieged by Thurn.
On the 21st of November Pilsen surrendered to Mansfeld, and by the end
of the year Budweis with its beleaguered garrison was all that was left
to the Emperor of his Bohemian kingdom and army.

[Sidenote: =Death of Matthias. Accession of Ferdinand, 1619.=]

The year 1619 opened still more darkly for the House of Austria. The
worn-out Emperor sank at last into his grave on the 20th of March, and
men felt that with the accession of Ferdinand the time for compromise
had passed. If they wanted to win the day, they must strike quickly
before he could rally to his aid the unwieldy forces of the Empire
and of Spain. Negotiations which had been begun at Eger were at once
stopped. The diets of Silesia Moravia and Lusatia openly joined the
Bohemian cause, and arranged with Bohemia the contingent which they
should each provide for the common army, and the proportion of votes
which they were to have in the election of a new Bohemian king.
[Sidenote: =Revolt in Austria.=] The estates of Upper and Lower
Austria, who were mainly Protestant, adopted the cause of the Bohemians
as their own, voted men for the war, seized and administered the
archducal estates, and summoned Thurn and the Bohemian army to their
aid. Nothing loth Thurn, leaving Hohenlohe to watch Bucquoi, swooped
down upon Vienna hoping to end the war and secure the success of the
revolution by a brilliant _coup de main_. On June 2d, Ferdinand,
defenceless, harassed, hopeless, had consented to give audience to
a deputation of the estates, who were to urge upon him, as the only
chance of deliverance, the recognition of the Bohemian revolution,
and the establishment in Austria of a separately organised Protestant
government. None knew better than Ferdinand himself that if he refused
those terms the gates of Vienna would be opened to Thurn and his army.
That very night might find him a prisoner in the hands of his greatest
foe. Yet at this crisis of his life, and of the fate of Europe, he
never faltered. ‘If it be God’s will,’ he said, ‘let me perish in the
struggle.’ He was ready to perish, not an inch would he yield. The
deputation became excited. They pressed round him clamorously. Eagerly
they urged, imperiously they demanded the acceptance of their terms.
One deputy had actually, it is said, his hand upon the archduke’s
person, when suddenly there rang through the hall a trumpet blast,
and the streets were alive with the confused noise which heralds the
arrival of soldiers. It was a regiment of loyal cavalry, the vanguard
of reinforcements ordered up from the country by Ferdinand.

The crisis was over. The deputation dispersed abashed and afraid for
their own safety. The very next day Thurn arrived before the gates
of the city, and found them shut, and the walls manned. He had not
resources for a siege, and retired back again across the frontier as
quick as he had come. He was only just in time, Bucquoi had at last
received reinforcements from the Spanish Netherlands, and leaving part
of his army to watch Hohenlohe at Budweis suddenly fell upon Mansfeld,
who was marching to join Hohenlohe at Zablat, and completely destroyed
his army. The siege of Budweis was at once raised, and Bucquoi advanced
into south Bohemia driving Hohenlohe before him, until he was suddenly
recalled to defend Pressburg and Vienna from the advance of Bethlen
Gabor, Prince of Transylvania, who had just declared for the Bohemians.
Among those who distinguished themselves at the battle of Zablat was a
Bohemian noble, who commanded one of the Walloon regiments of cavalry,
count Albert von Waldstein.

[Sidenote: =Ferdinand elected Emperor, 1619.=]

Hardly had Ferdinand escaped from the attack of his enemies at Vienna,
than he had to betake himself to Frankfort to support his interests at
the approaching imperial election. At first sight there seemed little
doubt of his success, as he was certain of the three ecclesiastical
votes, which, with his own vote as king of Bohemia, would give him the
majority. But the elector of Saxony took a formal objection to the
exercise by Ferdinand of the Bohemian vote, until the settlement of the
Bohemian question had made it clear that the Crown was rightfully his,
and all felt that it would not be safe to proceed to an election until
so formidable a legal point had been decided. The way therefore was
still open to the Calvinist representatives, the Elector Palatine and
the margrave of Brandenburg, by clever management to avoid the election
of Ferdinand, if they could not actually secure that of their own
nominee. If they had at once supported with their whole strength the
policy of John George, they would have at least postponed the election
of Ferdinand indefinitely, and united the Protestant interest. But the
Elector Palatine, led by Christian of Anhalt, could not bring himself
to play second fiddle to the elector of Saxony. They wished themselves
to be emperor-makers. Christian of Anhalt had gone a weary journey to
Turin to try and make terms with Charles Emmanuel of Savoy. Maximilian
of Bavaria was sounded, but gave a definite refusal, and so it happened
that when the electoral diet met on the 20th of July, the Calvinists
were without a candidate and without a policy. John George, nettled at
seeing his own policy contemptuously set aside and nothing put in its
place, shrank from intrusting the institutions of the Empire to such
rash and incapable hands. He instructed his representative to withdraw
his objection to the vote of Ferdinand for Bohemia, and to record his
own vote in his favour. Frederick and the elector of Brandenburg,
seeing that a majority was now obtained irrespective of Ferdinand’s
own vote, made a virtue of necessity. On the 28th of August Ferdinand
was unanimously elected, and all that Christian and Frederick had
achieved by their notable policy was to attach John George firmly to
the Emperor’s side.

[Sidenote: =Deposition of Ferdinand as king of Bohemia by the
revolutionary party. Election of Frederick Elector Palatine.=]

The evil consequences of this suicidal step were quickly seen. Ten
days before Ferdinand was elected at Frankfort he had been solemnly
deposed at Prague. On the 27th of August the Elector Palatine was
elected king of Bohemia in his place, and was called upon to decide
whether or not he would accept the Crown. The decision was a momentous
one. No longer could the question be treated merely as one between the
House of Austria and one of its dependencies, if the struggle against
Ferdinand was to be headed by the leader of the Calvinists and an
elector of the Empire. German interests of the greatest magnitude were
involved. In such a quarrel the welfare of Germany was no less at stake
than that of Austria or of Bohemia. [Sidenote: =Importance of the
crisis.=] If Frederick and the Calvinists successfully established
themselves in Bohemia, the balance of power at present existing among
the princes of the Empire and the two divisions of the Protestant
world would be rudely shaken, and the traditional leadership of the
German Protestants would pass from Dresden to Heidelberg. Men were not
prepared to see Christian of Anhalt the dictator of Germany, or Geneva
victorious over Rome and Wittenberg alike. On the other hand, was it
likely that Maximilian of Bavaria and the ecclesiastical princes would
stand tamely by while the champion of their religion was dispossessed
of his territories and his power scattered to the winds? Nor did the
danger end there. Spain had already sent money and troops to the aid
of Ferdinand,--would she be deterred by the prospect of the English
marriage alliance, so strenuously urged upon her by James I.,
from throwing her whole weight into the struggle, when it once became
clear that the war was a war of religion as much as a war of politics?
Would the Pope hesitate to preach a crusade against the aggression of
Frederick, and prepare a second St. Bartholomew for the Calvinists of
Germany? And if the Catholic powers banded themselves together against
the Elector, and determined to risk all rather than suffer the tide
of the Counter-Reformation to be forced back, could James I.
himself be so deaf to natural affection, so unmindful of the traditions
of England, so careless of English opinion, as to refuse to draw the
sword to save his son-in-law and Protestantism from ruin at the hands
of Spain and the Pope? Sober men asked themselves these questions.
Before their frightened eyes rose the spectre of a religious war which
should desolate not merely Germany but Europe. They applied themselves
earnestly but unavailingly to make Frederick understand the gravity
of the situation. His own mother and councillors, the ambassador of
France, even the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, urged him to decline the
tempting offer. Only Christian of Anhalt and his followers shut their
eyes to the inevitable and forced him on. [Sidenote: =Acceptance
of the Crown of Bohemia by Frederick.=] Frederick himself wished
to delay his answer until he could find out from England if his
father-in-law would support him, but delay would not suit the Bohemians
or Christian of Anhalt. Urged on by his own vanity and his leader’s
ambition, he plunged blindly into the abyss which opened out before
him. On the 25th of September 1619, he formally notified his acceptance
to the Bohemian diet, and on the 4th of November was crowned with great
state in the cathedral of Prague.

[Sidenote: =Alienation of England and the Lutheran Princes.=]

The evil consequences which had been threatened at once made their
appearance. James I. had never approved of the Bohemian revolution,
but he had endeavoured to make use of it in order to mediate
between Catholics and Protestants in Germany and establish peace.
His son-in-law’s rash act destroyed at once what little chance of
success James might have had. But there was worse still behind. It
was bad enough that Frederick should have dared to act on his own
responsibility, before James had had sufficient time to decide from
a study of the Bohemian constitution whether the Bohemian revolution
was legally justifiable or not. It was worse still that he should have
taken a step which might alarm the susceptibilities of Spain, and
endanger the success of the negotiations for a marriage between the
prince of Wales and the infanta Maria of Spain, upon which James had
set his whole heart. James at once repudiated all complicity with his
son-in-law’s conduct, and was fretfully indignant with him for having
by it injured his own pet scheme for Europe. If all hope of assistance
from England was gone, still less chance was there of aid from Savoy,
or from the Lutheran princes of Germany. The Protestant Union only
agreed to defend the Elector’s hereditary dominions, in case they
were attacked while he was occupied in Bohemia. Frederick had to face
the coming struggle with his own resources. Even Bethlen Gabor, the
drunken but able prince of Transylvania, who had taken advantage of
Ferdinand’s weakness to advance to the gates of Vienna, pillaging as
he went, deserted the cause of the Bohemians when he found he could
obtain no money from them. On the 17th of January 1620 he made a treaty
with the Emperor, by which he was secured in the sovereignty over the
larger part of Christian Hungary. Ferdinand on the other hand had no
difficulty in obtaining allies, when once it had been recognised how
great a menace to German institutions was implied in the action of the
Elector Palatine. [Sidenote: =Alliance between Ferdinand, the League,
Spain and the Pope.=] Maximilian of Bavaria took the lead. Stipulating
as his reward the electoral hat which was to be torn from the head of
Frederick, and the right of occupying upper Austria as security for
his expenses, he placed his army and the resources of the League at
Ferdinand’s disposal. In March 1620, under his auspices, a meeting of
the League was arranged with the elector of Saxony at Mülhausen, and
an agreement arrived at by which the League undertook not to attempt
to recover the lands of the Protestant bishops and administrators in
north Germany, as long as they continued loyal to the Emperor. This
arrangement, though no solution of the question of the ecclesiastical
lands, secured at any rate for the time the neutrality of Saxony and
the Lutheran princes. The Pope sent money to swell the resources of the
League, and Philip of Spain agreed to march troops from the Netherlands
to attack the Palatinate.

[Sidenote: =The war national and religious.=]

The campaign of 1620 opened, therefore, under very different
circumstances from those of 1619. The war had already become a German
war. With the certainty of the intervention of Spain and the Pope,
with the possibility of that of England, it threatened to assume an
European character. With the League on the one side and the Union on
the other, it was a war of creeds. [Sidenote: =Importance of Bavaria.
Policy of Maximilian.=] From a military as well as a political point
of view, the accession of Maximilian of Bavaria to the cause of the
Emperor made all the difference. Weak in health, and unpleasing in
appearance, he concealed under an insignificant exterior an iron
will and a faultless judgment. He alone among his contemporaries
in Germany had the statesman’s faculty of knowing exactly what was
possible. He never struck except to succeed. He never ventured without
being sure of his ground. Succeeding to an impoverished exchequer,
and a territory disjointed in extent and divided in religion, he had
set before himself as the objects of his policy, the supremacy of
Catholicism, the consolidation of his dominions, and the acquisition
of the electoral dignity. By thrift and good management he had amassed
considerable treasure, and had carefully trained a powerful army, which
he had intrusted to the command of the Walloon Tilly, who had the
reputation of being the greatest general of the day. His opportunity
was now come, and he threw himself zealously into the war of ambition
and religion with the proud consciousness that he was the real leader
of the Catholic cause and the saviour of the House of Austria. In
June the toils began to close round the ill-fated Frederick. Philip
III., convinced through Gondomar’s diplomacy that James I. would not
break his neutrality even though the Palatinate was invaded, sent the
necessary orders to Spinola, and by August the Spanish army was at
Mainz. At the end of June, Tilly crossed the frontier into Austria,
effected a junction with Bucquoi, and advanced slowly into Bohemia,
capturing the towns as he went, and driving the enemy back upon Prague.
On November 8th, he came in sight of the city, and found Christian
of Anhalt and the Bohemian army drawn up on the White Mountain just
outside the walls. [Sidenote: =Battle of the White Mountain, 1620.=]
Regardless of Bucquoi’s desire for delay, Tilly insisted on an
immediate attack. Frederick was inside the city when the attack began.
Hurrying out to put himself at the head of his troops, he found he was
already too late. The army was flying in panic from the face of Tilly’s
veterans. Frederick himself was hurried away in the crowd. His own
dominions were already in the possession of the Spaniards. An outcast
and a fugitive, he fled for his life through Germany, and rested not
till he found an asylum with Maurice of Nassau at the Hague. He will
only be a winter-king, the Jesuits had sneeringly said, when the
summer comes he will melt away. The prophecy was fulfilled almost to
the letter, save that it was not the heat of summer but the floods of
autumn which swept him to his destruction.

The victory of the White Mountain marks the end of the attempt of
Protestantism to establish its supremacy in Bohemia. Ferdinand at
once sent for the Royal Charter and tore it up with his own hands.
[Sidenote: =Suppression of Protestantism in Bohemia.=] The leaders
of the revolution were executed, and their lands confiscated. Frederick
was placed under the ban of the Empire, and his lands and titles
declared to be forfeited. The Protestant clergy were for the most part
banished, and a heavy war indemnity exacted from the rebels whose lives
and possessions were spared. A new race of landowners, Catholic and
German, became the possessors of the confiscated lands, and by their
means Catholic worship was gradually restored throughout the country
districts. Jesuit colleges were planted in the chief towns to complete
by persuasion what force had begun, and before another generation had
passed away Bohemia was definitely ranged among the Catholic countries
of Europe. Only Silesia and Lusatia succeeded in retaining something
of their old rights and much of their old religion. The war against
these allies of Bohemia had fallen to the lot of John George of Saxony,
and when the battle of the White Mountain had made it plain that they
must treat for peace, they did not find the Lutheran leader a hard
taskmaster. [Sidenote: =Toleration granted to Silesia, 1621.=] On
his own responsibility, he concluded peace with the Silesian estates by
an instrument known as the Accord on January 21st, 1621, by which they
recognised Ferdinand as their duly elected and crowned king and supreme
duke, and agreed to pay a fine of 300,000 florins on condition that
their political and religious liberties were respected. Ferdinand when
he heard of this was naturally very angry at the mention of the words
‘elected king,’ but found it prudent to accept the treaty rather than
affront the elector of Saxony.

[Sidenote: =Continued success of Ferdinand and Maximilian,
1621–1622.=]

By the beginning of 1621, Ferdinand and Maximilian found their policy
completely crowned with success. The Bohemian revolution was crushed,
the lower Palatinate was in the hands of the Spaniards, Frederick
had been declared to have forfeited his electoral dignity, the
Counter-Reformation was victorious in Austria, Moravia, and Bohemia.
In April 1621 the Protestant Union itself was dissolved. Yet there
were rocks ahead which would require very careful seamanship to avoid.
The Spanish court was indignant at the idea of the transference of the
Palatine Electorate to Bavaria. James of England was so moved by the
seizure of his son-in-law’s hereditary dominions, that he authorised
the enlistment of Englishmen under Vere to defend the lower Palatinate
against Spinola, and made its restoration to Frederick the central
point of the long negotiations he was carrying on with Spain for a
family alliance. The truce of Antwerp between the Spaniards and the
Dutch had just come to an end by lapse of time, and Maurice of Nassau
was minded to place his unrivalled military talents in the scale
against the House of Austria. The German princes of the Rhineland were
frightened at the success of the League, and were looking out for
allies even beyond the limits of Germany. But at present no one stirred
except the margrave of Baden-Durlach and Christian of Brunswick, both
of whom held large estates which had been secularised since the peace
of Augsburg, and were consequently in danger from the success of the
Counter-Reformation. Christian, besides being Protestant bishop of
Halberstadt, was a military adventurer of the knight-errant pattern.
He liked fighting for its own sake and loved still better to surround
it with a halo of romance. Fired by a glance from the beautiful eyes
of the queen of Bohemia, and wearing her glove on his helmet, he
posed before the world as the chivalrous protector and avenger of
beauty in misfortune. The new allies of Frederick did not avail him
much. In October 1621, Mansfeld had to abandon the upper Palatinate
and take refuge across the Rhine in Alsace. In the summer of 1622, in
conjunction with the margrave of Baden and Christian of Brunswick, he
advanced to the recovery of the lower Palatinate, but Tilly crushed
the margrave at Wimpfen on the Neckar on May 6th, and Christian at
Höcht on the Main on the 20th of June. Christian and Mansfeld with the
remnants of their armies had to retire across the Rhine into Lorraine,
where they lived at free quarters upon the wretched inhabitants.
On September 16th Heidelberg surrendered to Tilly, and on November
8th Mannheim followed the example of the capital, and by the end of
the year Frankenthal was the only city in his hereditary dominions
which still belonged to the unfortunate Elector. Deprived of his land
and his resources, he was now obliged to deprive himself of his own
remaining army, and formally dismissed from his service Christian of
Brunswick and Mansfeld on finding himself without authority over them
and yet looked upon by Europe as responsible for their crimes. Fortune
had still one more blow in reserve. [Sidenote: =Transference of
the Electorate from Frederick to Maximilian, 1623.=] On February
13th, 1623, Ferdinand, having succeeded in pacifying the opposition
of the elector of Saxony and the Spaniards, solemnly transferred the
electorate to Maximilian of Bavaria for his life at the meeting of
the diet at Regensburg, and gave him the administration of the upper
Palatinate as additional security for the expenses of the war.

[Sidenote: =Extension of the war to Northern Germany, 1623–1624.=]

The transference of the electorate to Maximilian of Bavaria fitly marks
the close of the first act of the great drama of the Thirty Years’
War, namely, that signalised by the Bohemian Revolution, for he was
the person to whom the success achieved was due. His army had won the
victories, his head had directed the policy, his purse had paid the
soldiers--could he only now have enforced a peace upon a reasonable
basis, he would have stood forth before the world as the greatest
statesman in Germany, and the saviour of the House of Austria. The
difficulties in the way were serious. The Dutch, since the expiration
of the truce of Antwerp, had been at open war with the Spaniards, and
at the beginning of 1623, being hard pressed by Spinola, summoned the
brigand bands of Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick to their aid.
Insensibly the war was beginning to affect the north German princes.
Many of them felt that if the Emperor succeeded in crushing the bishop
of Halberstadt, other Protestant bishoprics might prove too tempting
a prey to be resisted, and rallied to the standard of Christian. The
lower Saxon circle, animated by similar fears, actually began to arm.
With these dangers looming in the distance, it was impossible for the
League to lay down its arms. Even the crushing defeat inflicted by
Tilly upon Christian of Brunswick at Stadtlohn in the bishopric of
Münster in August 1623 was not a sufficient guarantee of peace, whilst
Mansfeld was still at large; and so the war simmered on through 1623
and 1624, and the opportunity for a satisfactory peace in which German
interests alone should be consulted passed away never to return.

[Sidenote: =Interference of England, 1624.=]

Ere the first day of 1625 had dawned it was too late. Germany was
already the prey of foreign intervention, but it was as yet the
intervention of foreigners who had distinct interests in Germany. James
of England had at last been forced to acknowledge the hopelessness
of trying to settle the affairs of Europe after his own wishes, by
means of an alliance with Spain. The rash visit of prince Charles and
Buckingham to Madrid in 1623 had at length opened their eyes to the
fact, which all the rest of the world had understood long ago, that
Spain only valued the negotiations for the proposed alliance as a means
of preventing James from drawing his sword in the German quarrel,
and the alliance itself as a stepping-stone to the eventual recovery
of England to the obedience of the Pope. Angry at the discovery, the
prince and the favourite pushed the old and timid king unwillingly into
war. In 1624 English envoys hurried between the courts of Sweden and
Denmark and the princes of the lower Saxon circle, eager to negotiate
a general alliance to win back the Palatinate. James himself received
Mansfeld graciously in London, permitted him to enlist 20,000 men for
the war in the Palatinate, and obtained permission from Louis of France
for the army to march through France to its destination. The English
dockyards resounded with preparations for a great maritime expedition
against the ports of Spain and the treasure ships from the Indies. In
March 1625, James died, and Charles and Buckingham, no longer hampered
by an old man’s caution, threw themselves into the German war with a
lightness of heart and want of foresight worthy of Frederick himself.
Christian IV. of Denmark was the victim who fell into the trap
which was so innocently but unerringly laid. [Sidenote: =Interference
of Denmark, 1625.=] He, like other Lutheran princes, had watched
with nervous anxiety the spread of the war into northern Germany,
and had winced under the blow dealt to the Lutheran cause by the
establishment of Catholicism by Ferdinand and Maximilian in Bohemia and
the upper Palatinate. He was nearly concerned too in the question of
the ecclesiastical lands, for he had secured for one of his sons the
Protestant bishopric of Verden and the succession to that of Bremen.
[Sidenote: =Alliance of England, Denmark, and part of north Germany
against the Emperor and Spain, 1625.=] So when the offer came from
England to pay him £30,000 a month, in addition to the sending of the
naval expedition against the coasts of Spain, Christian felt that
religion and interest combined to urge him to action. In May 1625, a
treaty was made on those terms between Charles I. of England,
Christian of Denmark, and the lower Saxon circle, and the first
instalment of the English subsidy was duly paid.

Ill-success dogged their well-meant efforts from the first. In the
previous year, Louis had at the last moment found reasons to recall
his verbal permission to Mansfeld to cross the soil of France, and the
troops had been sent instead into the Low Countries, where, unpaid and
unprovided with necessaries, they fell victims to disease. The naval
expedition, which, under Wimbledon’s leadership, arrived at Cadiz in
the October of 1625, achieved nothing but disaster and contempt.
In England quarrels broke out between Charles and his Parliaments,
which effectually prevented the payment of the promised subsidies to
Christian IV. [Sidenote: =Difficulties of Ferdinand.=] Nevertheless the
united forces of Mansfeld, Christian of Brunswick, and Christian of
Denmark, ill provided as they were, far outnumbered the army of Tilly
and the League, and it was clear to Ferdinand and Maximilian that with
discontent seething in Silesia, Bohemia, and Austria, with Bethlen
Gabor again threatening the frontiers of Hungary, and the Danish forces
invading upper Germany, it was absolutely essential to place another
army in the field. Yet where was it to come from? The Emperor could not
stoop to employ a brigand army paid by plunder like that of Mansfeld,
but the resources of Maximilian and the League were strained to the
utmost. Spain, threatened alike by England and France, could spare
nothing, and Ferdinand’s treasury was as usual empty.

[Sidenote: =Wallenstein.=]

It was in this crisis that a man stepped forward to the help of
Ferdinand, who is in some ways the most interesting figure of the
Thirty Years’ War. Albert von Waldstein, or Wallenstein, was the
younger son of an illustrious Bohemian family of Sclavonic blood.
Educated partly by the Moravian Brethren and partly by the Jesuits,
he never surrendered himself dogmatically to either creed, but out of
the mysticism of both constructed for himself a religion, which, not
unlike that of Napoleon afterwards, chiefly expressed itself in an
unfailing belief in his own star. Thus removed somewhat apart from the
controversies of the day, he was able to see more clearly through the
mists which darkened the eyes of ordinary politicians. Statesmanship
as well as interest and tradition led him to devote himself to the
cause of the Emperor, as the one stable element in Germany among the
disintegrating influences of rival religions and personal jealousies.
True patriotism made common cause with ambition to urge him to risk
much to keep the foreigner out of Germany. Common sense allied with
dogmatic indifference made him see more clearly than others, that in
toleration for all creeds lay the only possibility of civil unity. But
statesman and patriot though he was in his conception of the real needs
of Germany and the necessity of resisting foreign interference, his
statesmanship and his patriotism were never allowed to free themselves
from the trammels of an overmastering ambition. In the settlement of
Germany, it was he who was to dictate the terms. In the ousting of
the foreigner and the crushing of the factions, it was he who was to
receive the lion’s share of the spoil. He was an imperialist, but only
on condition of military independence. He was a patriot, but only on
condition of being also a dictator. As long as the stream of his own
policy and personal aggrandisement flowed in the same channel with
that of the Emperor and his allies, all would be well. But should they
diverge, Germany could no more contain a Ferdinand and a Wallenstein,
than France could afterwards contain a Directory and a Napoleon.

[Sidenote: =Character of Wallenstein’s army.=]

Such difficulties were, however, in the womb of the future. For the
present Ferdinand required a disciplined army and a capable general,
and had not the means to provide himself with either. Wallenstein
offered to raise 20,000 men without putting any additional strain on
the treasury of the Empire, provided he might be allowed to support
them by requisitions on the country in which they were quartered. As
with Napoleon, war was to support war, not by the unlicensed waste
and brutal plunder of a Mansfeld, but by orderly and methodical
requisitions couched in the form of law. The Emperor accepted the
conditions, though he well knew that the constitution of the Empire
gave him no authority to levy requisitions. Directly the standard of
Wallenstein was raised men flocked to it from all sides. Soldiers of
fortune, peasants ruined by the war, younger sons who had to make
their own way in the world, adventurers of all religions, and all
nationalities, hastened to serve under a leader who had already carved
for himself by his sword and his wits a colossal fortune out of the
spoils of the Bohemian revolution. In the autumn of 1625, he found
himself at the head of an army of 50,000 men, whose only bond of union
was their allegiance to himself, and he advanced into the dioceses of
Magdeburg and Halberstadt and spent the winter there in training his
forces for the coming struggle.

[Sidenote: =The campaign of 1626.=]

The plan of campaign arranged by the king of Denmark and his allies was
a simple one. Christian himself, with his own troops and those paid
by the English subsidies, was to advance up the Weser against Tilly
and the army of the League, thus securing the bishoprics of Bremen and
Verden, and driving the enemy, as it was hoped, out of Halberstadt back
to the line of the Main. Meanwhile Mansfeld was to operate against
Wallenstein on the Elbe, push him back into Bohemia, and force him
either to let go his hold upon the upper Palatinate, or lay Vienna open
to a combined attack from the army of Mansfeld and that of Bethlen
Gabor, who was again stirring on the side of Hungary. The plan,
however, was better conceived than executed. No subsidies arrived from
England, and Mansfeld had to begin his attack without the co-operation
of Christian. Wallenstein awaited him withdrawn behind the line of the
Elbe, having carefully fortified the bridge of Dessau, which was the
key of his position. On April 25th, Mansfeld dashed himself in vain
against the fortifications of the bridge, and Wallenstein, seizing
the moment when the enemy, thrown into confusion by the repulse, was
retiring in some disorder, took the offensive, and by a brilliant
counter-attack turned the repulse into a complete rout.

Foiled in his attempt to force Wallenstein’s position on the Elbe by
a front attack, Mansfeld now determined to turn it, and by making a
long flank march through discontented Silesia, to effect a junction
with Bethlen Gabor in Hungary, and advance upon Vienna from the east.
The plan was not creditable to Mansfeld’s military genius. A long
flank march, in the presence of a victorious force acting on interior
lines, is one of the most hazardous operations in war; and with an army
of soldiers of fortune dependent on plunder for their support, and
ignorant of discipline, was doomed to certain failure. Wallenstein,
leaving 8000 men to co-operate with Tilly against Christian, contented
himself with moving slowly after Mansfeld on an interior circle
covering Vienna, and finally entrenched himself at Gran on the Danube,
about half-way between Pesth and Pressburg, where he awaited the
combined attack. Mansfeld did not dare to risk another bridge of Dessau
with his attenuated and dispirited force, recruited though it was by
the half barbarous levies of the Transylvanian prince, while Bethlen
himself saw that he could gain more by negotiation than by war. A
truce was quickly made by which Mansfeld was obliged to leave Hungary.
[Sidenote: =Death of Mansfeld, 1626.=] Ill in mind and body, the
indefatigable adventurer attempted to make his way across the mountains
to Italy in the depth of winter, in the hope of stirring up the
Republic of Venice to greater exertions, but as he struggled on through
Bosnia, death overtook him on the 30th of November. Thus suddenly
disappeared from the scene one who by his military talents had been the
chief obstacle to the success of the imperialists, and by his total
want of morality and patriotism had been the greatest foe to the peace
of Germany. His removal unfortunately came too late. The dragon’s teeth
which he had sown produced a crop of military adventurers all over the
soil of Germany as reckless and as able as himself, and already round
the carcase of prostrate Germany were gathering the foreign powers,
who did not scruple to use such auxiliaries for their own selfish
purposes. For the moment the death of Mansfeld made the restoration of
peace between the Emperor and Bethlen Gabor more easy, and on the 28th
of December the treaty of Pressburg was signed by which Bethlen was to
retain the sovereignty over the thirteen counties of Hungary, and the
army of Mansfeld was disbanded.

[Sidenote: =Battle of Lutter.=]

Meanwhile the forces of the League had achieved a still greater success
on the Weser. Christian IV. could not complete his armament
without the English subsidies, but no money came, or could come, from
England, where Charles I. was quarrelling with one Parliament
after another. Tilly accordingly advanced slowly down the Weser and
captured Minden and Göttingen. After the defeat of Mansfeld at Dessau,
he was further reinforced by 8000 men from Wallenstein’s army, and
Christian felt that if he was to assume the offensive at all, there
was no time to be lost. Accordingly in August he hastily advanced into
Thuringia, hoping to throw himself upon Tilly and crush him before
the imperialist forces arrived, but he was too late. The junction
was effected on the 22d of August, and Christian finding himself in
the presence of superior numbers retreated. Tilly at once followed,
overtook the Danish army on the 26th of August at Lutter, just as it
was about to plunge into a narrow defile, and inflicted upon them a
severe defeat. Christian, leaving 8000 men and all his artillery on the
field of battle, and 2000 prisoners in the enemies’ hands, retired into
Holstein and Mecklenberg, while Tilly overran the duchy of Brunswick
and quartered his men for the winter along the lower Elbe, and an
imperialist detachment occupied the mark of Brandenburg.

[Sidenote: =Further successes of Tilly and Wallenstein.=]

In the next year the tide of victory rolled on. Wallenstein, now made
duke of Friedland, marched into Silesia with irresistible forces, and
sent fifty standards to Vienna as evidence of his conquest. Then,
joining hands with Tilly on the lower Elbe, the united armies poured
into Holstein, and overran Denmark until stopped by the sea, and forced
the unfortunate Christian to take refuge in the islands. In February
1628, Ferdinand, following the precedent of the Elector Palatine,
put the dukes of Mecklenberg to the ban for the assistance they had
given to Christian, declared their lands forfeited, and authorised
Wallenstein to occupy and administer them in pledge for the expenses
incurred. Sweeping over the country the imperial general seized upon
the ports of Wismar and Rostock, obliged the duke of Pomerania to put
the long coast line of his duchy under the care of the imperial troops,
and was only checked in his career of conquest in March 1628 by the
marshes and the fortifications of Stralsund. [Sidenote: =Siege of
Stralsund, 1628.=] For five long months the imperialist army lay
before the city, attempting the almost impossible feat of the capture
of a defended city open to the sea by an attack from the land side
only, for none knew better than Wallenstein himself the importance of
the issue. All the southern coast of the Baltic from Dantzig to Lübeck,
except Stralsund, owned his authority. Across the water lay the only
foe he had now to fear. Sovereignty over the Baltic as well as over the
Baltic provinces was necessary to him if he was to be safe from the
attacks of Sweden. To further this policy, he had already obtained from
the Emperor the title of admiral of the Baltic, and he was negotiating
with the Hanse towns to provide him with a fleet, which should make
the title something of a reality. As long as Stralsund afforded to the
enemy an open door into the heart of Germany, the first steps necessary
to gain that sovereignty were not complete. Nor was that all. Hitherto
the opposition to the Emperor in Germany had been led by furious
partisans like Christian of Anhalt, military adventurers like Mansfeld
and Christian of Brunswick, or self-seeking politicians like Christian
of Denmark and the other holders of the ecclesiastical lands. The
German people and the cities of Germany had, as a rule, kept themselves
aloof from the struggle, or extended their sympathies to the Emperor as
the representative of order. But the siege of Stralsund showed that new
forces were coming into play. It was the citizens, not their leaders,
who insisted on fighting to the last gasp. The independent spirit of
civic liberty was determined not to submit to a military dictatorship.
The religious spirit of staunch Protestantism was determined not to
make terms with the victorious Counter-Reformation. When Wallenstein,
foiled and exasperated, drew off his army on August 3d from before the
walls of Stralsund, he at least understood that among the cities of
Germany there were those who would throw themselves into the arms of
the foreigner, and risk all they had, rather than submit to military
government and religious persecution. Nor was Stralsund alone in its
victory. Glückstadt proved to Tilly as difficult a morsel to digest as
Stralsund had been to Wallenstein, and in January 1629 he was forced
to raise the siege. Matters had now reached a deadlock. Christian
could not venture on the mainland and his enemies could not reach him
at sea. [Sidenote: =The peace of Lübeck, 1629.=] Wallenstein saw
the importance of bringing the Danish war to an end before Sweden
appeared on the scene, and opened negotiations for peace. In May the
treaty of Lübeck was signed. Christian surrendered all his claims upon
the ecclesiastical lands in Germany and received back his hereditary
dominions.

[Sidenote: =Causes of the Imperialist success.=]

Ten years had elapsed since the fatal day when the revolted Bohemian
diet elected Frederick, Elector Palatine, to the throne of Bohemia, and
the margrave of Anspach had exultingly cried, ‘Now we have the means of
upsetting the world.’ In those ten years the German world had indeed
been upset but not in the sense of the margrave’s prophecy. It was the
very fact that in their attack upon the House of Austria the Calvinists
were attempting to upset the world of Germany, were attempting to
revolutionise German institutions, and were not in any way representing
the rights of Protestantism, or the independence of the German princes,
that deprived them of support in Germany outside their own body.
Cautious and shrewd rulers like John George of Saxony looked upon them
as the party of anarchy, and upon the Emperor as the representative
of order. The recklessness with which Frederick and his advisers let
Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick loose upon the unoffending people,
and outraged the sacred name of religion with burning homesteads and
tortured peasants, lost them the respect of every right-thinking
man. Men felt that to revolutionise Germany and to plunder Germans
was not the way to defend the cause of Protestantism, and welcomed
the successes of Maximilian and the League in Bohemia, and even in
the Palatinate, as securities for the restoration of order upon the
traditional lines.

[Sidenote: =Change brought about by Wallenstein and his army.=]

But since then a great change had taken place. The advent of
Wallenstein upon the scene, with his personal army and transcendent
military talents, brought new forces into play. Germany found itself
threatened by the rule of the sword. Ferdinand found at his back a
power capable of enforcing his will upon Germany, and, if need be,
of superintending the reconciliation of German Protestantism to the
Church. After the peace of Lübeck, who was to say him nay if he boldly
entered upon a policy of Catholic aggression? The Protestant sympathies
of his Austrian subjects had been drowned in blood. In Bohemia and
Moravia, under their new Catholic landowners, Protestantism was
suppressed, and all Protestants had been banished by the Reforming
Commissions issued under the new constitution in 1627. Silesia had
lately felt the heavy hand of Wallenstein and was in no condition to
rebel. The upper Palatinate and part of the lower, lately made over
to Maximilian, were already being rapidly converted to Catholicism.
Secure then in his own dominions and sure of Maximilian’s support,
what opposition was he likely to receive in Germany? The smaller
princes of north Germany had been for the most part implicated in the
Danish war, and their lands were in the occupation of the armies of
the Emperor and of the League. John George of Saxony, the elector of
Brandenburg, and the duke of Pomerania, were not likely at such a time
to forfeit the protection of the agreement of Mülhausen, which had
been faithfully observed on both sides hitherto. Possibly a few free
cities, such as Magdeburg and Hamburg, might object, and the king of
Sweden across the water might interfere, but no great end was ever
achieved without running some risk. In 1627 the Catholic electors and
the duke of Bavaria had urged upon Ferdinand that the time was now
come to assert the rights of the Church under the peace of Augsburg,
and Ferdinand was too strongly himself in favour of the policy to
say that they were wrong. On March 29th, 1629, he issued the Edict of
Restitution, restoring to the Church all the land secularised since the
peace of Augsburg was signed. [Sidenote: =The Edict of Restitution,
1629.=] At one stroke the archbishoprics of Magdeburg and Bremen,
the bishoprics of Minden, Verden, Halberstadt, Lübeck, Ratzeburg,
Misnia, Merseburg, Naumburg, Brandenburg, Havelberg, Lebus and Camin,
and about one hundred and twenty smaller foundations were taken away
from their Protestant bishops and administrators, and restored to the
Church. Never was greater mistake made. To resume lands in the name of
the law, which had been from fifty to eighty years in the undisputed
possession of Protestant holders, was in itself a straining of the
letter of the law in violation of its spirit, which only intensified
the sense of wrong brought about by the confiscation. In itself it
armed the public opinion of all Germany against the Emperor. It roused
the ardent Protestants to frenzy. But to do it in dependence on mere
brute force was political suicide. Without the armies of Tilly and
Wallenstein the Edict of Restitution was a dead letter, with them it
was a military revolution. By it the Emperor stood out to the world
as the author of a religious and political revolution, the success
of which depended entirely upon military despotism, and was without
any moral basis whatever. Germany would not be revolutionised by such
measures as these.

CHAPTER V

THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR FROM THE PEACE OF
LÜBECK TO THE PEACE OF PRAGUE

Difference between Wallenstein and the Emperor--Opposition of
the League to Wallenstein--Dismissal of Wallenstein--Critical
state of Protestantism in Germany--Condition of Sweden--Policy of
Gustavus Adolphus--His wars with Denmark, Russia, and Poland--His
interference in Germany and Alliance with France--The Campaign
of 1631 and sack of Magdeburg--Alliance between Saxony and
Sweden--Battle of Breitenfeld--Military successes and political
difficulties of Gustavus--Wallenstein appointed dictator--Gustavus
baffled by Wallenstein at Nuremburg--Battle of Lützen--The League of
Heilbronn--The murder of Wallenstein--The battle of Nördlingen--The
Peace of Prague--Policy of John George of Saxony.

[Sidenote: =Difference of policy between Wallenstein and
Ferdinand.=]

The recklessness with which Ferdinand had undertaken to revolutionise
Germany soon made itself apparent. To crush the political opposition
of Denmark and the lower Saxon circle, he had had to call to his aid
Wallenstein and his personal army. To carry out the far more difficult
task of transferring from Protestants to Catholics large districts
of north Germany, which had been for eighty or ninety years in the
hands of Protestants, and of forcibly converting to his own religion
thousands of Protestant Germans, he had but the same force upon which
to rely. It was idle to think that the Edict of Restitution could be
carried out without the help of soldiers. It was certain that Tilly and
the troops of the League would not suffice to enforce the Edict and
resist the threatened advance of Sweden. To whom could the Emperor turn
except to Wallenstein and his 60,000 men? Yet it was just here that he
was least sure of his ground. Wallenstein himself strongly disapproved
of the policy of the Edict. It ran counter to the principle of
religious equality upon which he had organised his own power. His army
was the only place in Europe where Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists
met on equal terms and served loyally one with another as comrades.
To put an army organised on such a basis to the work of ousting
Protestant clergy and superintending conversions would split it to its
very foundations. More than that. It was no mere caprice which had led
Wallenstein to make religious equality the basis of the organisation of
his army. He believed strongly that it was the only possible basis for
the reorganisation of Germany, and he looked forward to the time when,
as dictator of Germany, he might at the head of an irresistible force
impose upon the fanatics of both sides the boons of peace and religious
toleration. For the first time in his career his own convictions and
his own ambition led away from the policy and interests of his suzerain.

[Sidenote: =Opposition of the League to Wallenstein.=]

Just at this time the leaders of the League were becoming on their
side very much dissatisfied with Wallenstein. They disliked his
opinions. They feared his ambition. They distrusted his loyalty. His
system of supporting his army by requisitions, though venial enough
when exercised at the expense of the Protestant enemy, became sheer
plunder when Catholics were the victims. During the winters 1626–27
and 1628–29, his drums had been beating continuously in all the chief
towns of Germany, and not unnaturally it appeared intolerable that the
Emperor’s own general should be even more oppressive to his friends
than to his enemies.

[Sidenote: =The Diet of Regensburg, 1630.=]

The opposition came to a head at the diet held at Regensburg in July
1630. The lead was taken by Maximilian of Bavaria. Father Joseph,
Richelieu’s accomplished diplomatist, laboured indefatigably and
successfully in fomenting the discontent, and Ferdinand soon found
that he had to choose between Wallenstein and the League. There was
no middle course possible. He must part with one or the other. To a
man of lofty soul, high ambition, and bold courage, there was much to
attract in the prospect held out by Wallenstein. If Ferdinand could
only make up his mind to risk all in order to gain all, throw himself
without reserve into Wallenstein’s arms, and at the head of 100,000
men impose upon Germany a new constitution, in which the imperial
power should be established upon the ruin of that of the princes, a
new era would dawn for the Emperor, the supremacy of the House of
Austria in Europe would be assured. But a policy such as this was too
revolutionary and too venturesome for a conscientious and commonplace
nature like that of Ferdinand. It certainly involved the overthrow
of the traditional relations between the Emperor and the princes. It
certainly necessitated the withdrawal of the Edict of Restitution. It
might not improbably make the Emperor the slave of his too successful
general instead of the lord of the world. It was not given to Ferdinand
to drive the horses of the Sun. For him there was no alternative. He
was nothing if not traditionally legal. [Sidenote: =Dismissal of
Wallenstein, 1630.=] Wallenstein was the disturber of precedent and
law, and Wallenstein must be sacrificed. A few weeks after Gustavus
Adolphus had landed on the coast of Pomerania, Ferdinand, at the
bidding of the Catholic powers of Germany, dismissed the only general
capable of withstanding the Protestant champion.

[Sidenote: =Critical state of Protestantism in Germany.=]

With the coming of Gustavus Adolphus the war was lifted for a while
into a higher region of politics. It became ennobled by higher
motives and a greater policy. Hitherto what nobility of motive had
been discoverable was all on the Catholic side. The maintenance of
the authority of the Emperor and the institutions of the Empire,
the establishment of the authority of the Church, in the teeth of a
factious and reckless nobility, were at least nobler objects to fight
for than the winning of a crown, or the command of an army, or the
right to provide for younger sons out of secularised church lands.
But the victories of Tilly and Wallenstein and the issue of the Edict
of Restitution had brought a great change. With Christian of Denmark
beaten to his knees, with the troops of the League and the Emperor
in occupation of north Germany, with Wallenstein, admiral of the
Baltic and duke of Mecklenberg, in possession of the Baltic coast and
harbours, the questions at stake were no longer the maintenance of the
authority of the Emperor, but the independence of the north German
princes, and the sovereignty of the Baltic. By the publication of the
Edict of Restitution, not merely were the secularised lands endangered,
but Protestantism itself in north Germany was threatened.

[Sidenote: =Objects of Gustavus Adolphus.=]

The Thirty Years’ War is the last of the great wars of religion, and
the first of the great wars of politics. In Gustavus Adolphus, the
hero of the war, both aspects are united. When he landed in Pomerania
in July 1630, he came distinctly as the champion of Protestantism, to
save German Protestantism from being overwhelmed by brute force; but
he came no less distinctly as the national king of Sweden, to defend
and establish that supremacy over the Baltic sea and the Baltic coast,
which was essential to the prosperity and existence of his country.
It was a defensive war that he came to wage, a war in defence of his
religion and in defence of his kingdom, though it necessarily took from
the circumstances of the case an aggressive form. Between the policy
of Gustavus in 1630 and that of Richelieu in 1635 there is the whole
difference between patriotism and aggrandisement.

[Sidenote: =Condition of Sweden.=]

No one who looked attentively at Sweden at the beginning of the
seventeenth century would for a moment have anticipated the fortune
which in fact was about to attend her. Poor in material resources,
sadly deficient in roads and means of communication, sparsely
populated, frost-bound for half the year, cut off almost wholly by her
old conqueror Denmark from the ocean, she seemed to be doomed to be
pressed out of existence by her more fortunately placed neighbours.
From this fate she was saved by one of the most remarkable races of
kings of whom history makes mention. [Sidenote: =The monarchy.=]
From Gustavus Vasa, the emancipator of Sweden from the tyranny of the
Danes, who ascended the throne in 1523, to Charles XII., the
terror and pride of Europe, who lost his life in 1718, there was not
one sovereign of the House of Vasa who did not in some ways show the
marks of fine and original genius. Well may the historian of Sweden
exclaim, ‘The history of Sweden is the history of her kings,’ for in
few countries have national characteristics and national development
been so intimately bound up with the monarchy. [Sidenote: =The
Lutheran Church.=] Gustavus Vasa achieved the independence of
Sweden, and established his new monarchy on the ruins of the Church.
Seizing with the eye of a statesman the close affinity between
Lutheranism and state power, he introduced the Reformation into Sweden
as a political measure, enriching the Crown and purchasing the support
of the nobles by the confiscation of the Church lands. From that time
Sweden had two enemies to contend against, the hostility of Denmark,
and the power of the nobility; to which, under John III.,
the husband of Catherine Jagellon, the heiress of the Jagellon kings
of Poland, a third was added, namely the Counter-Reformation. At the
beginning of the seventeenth century this last was the most pressing
danger, for Sigismund, the son of John III. and Catherine
Jagellon, was an ardent Catholic. [Sidenote: =Attempt of Sigismund
to restore Catholicism, 1592–1604.=] He had become king of Poland
by election in 1587, and had done much to re-establish Catholicism
in that country before he succeeded by inheritance to the crown of
Sweden in 1592. On his attempting a similar policy in Sweden he found
himself at once opposed by the self-interest of the nobility, who held
so large a share of the Church lands, and by a spirit of nationality
among the people, who resented the interference of Poles and Italians
with a sturdy independence, which reminds us of the hatred of the
medieval English for all ‘outlandish’ people. These feelings found a
representative in Charles, the youngest son of Gustavus Vasa, and uncle
of Sigismund, who after a brief contest expelled his nephew from Sweden
and seated himself on the throne in his stead in 1604.

[Sidenote: =Reign of Charles IX., 1604–1611.=]

This dynastic revolution strengthened Sweden by making her religion the
symbol and the test of her liberty. Lutheranism became the political as
well as the religious faith of the country. It weakened her by adding
another to the number of her hereditary foes. If Denmark could not
forget that she had once been the ruler of Sweden, neither could Poland
forget, at any rate during the life of Sigismund, that her king had by
law no less right to rule at Stockholm than at Warsaw. If, however,
Charles IX. increased the external he diminished the internal
difficulties of his country. Nobles and king had united together
against foreign influence, and when raised to the throne, Charles
succeeded by his wise administration in making the bond still closer
and was able to hand on to his son, the young Gustavus Adolphus, the
government of a united and prosperous nation. Nevertheless, patriotic
and religious as Sweden was on the accession of Gustavus Adolphus
in 1611, she had not yet passed through that crisis common to the
infancy of nations, when extension of territory and influence becomes
essential to the preservation of national-life. Since she had become
an independent nation her mineral wealth had been much developed by
her kings. Education and civilisation had made great strides. Since
she had become Protestant, she had naturally been drawn into political
and commercial relations with the English and the Dutch, who were
rapidly establishing their commercial supremacy in the northern seas,
and especially in the Baltic, on the ruins of the Hansa. [Sidenote:
=Weakness of Sweden.=] But as yet Denmark held the southern
provinces of the Swedish peninsula. Only in one place, at the mouth of
the river Gota, where the fortress of Elfsborg stood and the houses
and wharves of Gottenburg were beginning to rise, did Sweden touch the
outer sea. For all practical purposes her trade was a purely Baltic
trade, and could only reach the outside world by the permission, and
subject to the regulations, of Denmark, who held the Sound and imposed
tolls on all ships which passed through.

[Sidenote: =Policy of Gustavus Adolphus.=]

Within the confines of the Baltic itself the position of Sweden was by
no means assured. The coast line which she held was large, but only
because it included the inhospitable and semi-barbarous Finland. She
had not a city, not even Stockholm, which could vie in riches or in
trade with Lübeck or with Dantzig. Since the days of Ivan the Terrible,
Russia had made her appearance in the north as a power which must be
reckoned with, and threatened to claim her share of the Baltic. In
the ‘troublous times’ which preceded the rise of the Romanoff dynasty
Sweden saw her opportunity, and under Eric and Charles IX.
had stretched across the sea, and made good her hold over the first
of her Baltic provinces in Esthonia and Livonia; but situated as they
were between hostile Poland and semi-hostile Russia, they could not be
looked upon in any other light than that of an outpost to be withdrawn
or reinforced as occasion might serve. Exceedingly precarious therefore
was the position of the young monarchy. A combined attack by its three
enemies must at any moment destroy it. Steady hostile pressure under
the forms of peace might gradually stifle it. Sweden could not be
safe until she had obtained supremacy in the Baltic, she could not be
prosperous until she had gained free access to the ocean, she could
not be dominant in the north until she had secured her supremacy over
the Baltic by the acquisition of a substantial foothold on its eastern
coast. These were the three main objects of Swedish national policy
steadily pursued by Gustavus Adolphus, and after his death by his
friend and chancellor Oxenstjerna. They necessitated an aggressive
policy. To sit still was to die. The martial instincts and the youth of
the king combined with motives of policy to urge him to a bold course,
and the nation well understanding the nature of the crisis seconded him
nobly.

[Sidenote: =War with Denmark, 1611–1613.=]

Denmark was the foe upon whom Gustavus was called to whet his virgin
steel. Taking advantage of the confusion caused by the minority of the
new king, Christian IV. had seized upon Elfsborg and Calmar
early in 1611. Directly Gustavus had been pronounced of age he marched
to recover the fortresses, and learned his first lesson in the art of
war in a year of frontier hostilities, which were ended through the
mediation of James I. by the peace of Knarod in January 1613.
By this treaty Calmar was at once restored to the Swedes, and Elfsborg
covenanted to be restored on the payment of a million dollars, which
were duly raised and paid in two years. Relieved from all present
anxiety from the side of Denmark, Gustavus at once turned his attention
to the growing power of Russia, now gathering itself together under
Michael Romanoff. [Sidenote: =War with Russia, 1614–1617.=] In
1614 he invaded Ingria, and spent three years in desultory fighting, in
which he was uniformly victorious in battle, and slowly occupied the
country. Again England, who had trade relations with Russia, offered
her mediation, and by the treaty of Stolbova, signed in February 1617,
Sweden obtained from Russia the cession of Ingria and Carelia, thus
gaining a continuous coast line on the Baltic from Calmar to Riga, and
shutting Russia from the sea altogether. ‘The enemy,’ said Gustavus
triumphantly, ‘cannot launch a boat upon the Baltic without our
permission.’

[Sidenote: =War with Poland, 1617–1629.=]

Hardly was the peace of Stolbova signed, than an invasion of Swedish
Livonia by Sigismund of Poland forced Gustavus to enter upon his third
war. Poland was a much more difficult nut to crack than Russia had
been, for behind Sigismund lay the forces of the Counter-Reformation,
but from various circumstances neither side could press the war with
vigour. Two armistices (from 1618–1621 and from 1622–1625) interrupted
its lethargic course, and enabled Sweden to recruit her failing
energies, and her king to perfect the improvements in military tactics
for which he is famous. In 1625 he resumed the war in earnest, and
crossing the Dwina overran and occupied Courland, pushing the Polish
generals back into Lithuania. But neither Riga nor any of the Courland
towns gave him what he most wanted, a place of first-rate importance,
which he might make the centre of his operations; so in the next year
he directed his attack on Dantzig, although it involved the violation
of the neutrality of his brother-in-law, George William of Brandenburg.
Dantzig was a town strongly fortified on the land side. The Swedish
fleet was too weak to enforce the attempted blockade by sea. Hence,
like Stralsund and La Rochelle, until cut off from the sea it was
impregnable. For four weary years Gustavus attempted unsuccessfully to
reduce it. Eventually in 1629, when the affairs in Germany rendered it
essential for him to have his hands free, he consented to make peace
without gaining the desired end. Yet the Polish war was not thrown
away. By the treaty of Stuhmsdorf, Sweden gained the whole of Livonia,
and some places in Prussia, and by the training both of himself and of
his army in the four Polish campaigns, he had unconsciously made Sweden
one of the most formidable military powers of the day.

[Sidenote: =Negotiations between England and Gustavus in 1624.=]

While the Thirty Years’ War was in progress, the eyes both of Catholics
and Protestants in Germany had often been turned towards Gustavus in
fear and in hope. He himself looked forward with eagerness to the day
when his assistance might be necessary, for he longed to cross swords
with Tilly and the imperial generals, but it was eagerness tempered
with prudence. He would enter into the war at his own time, and on his
own terms, or not at all. In 1624 he was asked by England to formulate
those terms, and he laid down three conditions as indispensable, that
he should have the sole military management of the war, that England
should provide the money for 17,000 men, and pay the subsidies for
five months in advance, that he should be protected from attack from
Denmark, while at war in Germany, and have two ports made over to him
to secure his communications. Unlike Christian of Denmark, he would
not be content with fair promises, but insisted on performance before
he would move. The terms were too onerous for acceptance at that
time, but the fate of Christian proved their wisdom and necessity.
The defeat of the Danes, and the establishment of Wallenstein on the
Baltic coast, brought the danger nearer home. What chance was there
for Sweden to obtain supremacy over the Baltic with Mecklenberg and
Pomerania in the hands of the imperial admiral? Clearly she would have
to fight for her independence, let alone her religion, if Wallenstein
was suffered to make himself duke of Mecklenberg. Gustavus recognised
the necessity at once. [Sidenote: =Alliance between Sweden and
Denmark, 1628.=] In April 1628 he made an alliance with his old
enemy Christian IV. of Denmark, by which all foreign ships,
except those of the Dutch were excluded from the Baltic. In the summer
of the same year, he sent 2000 men under Alexander Leslie to defend
Stralsund against Wallenstein. [Sidenote: =Landing of Gustavus in
Germany, 1630.=]In September 1629 he put an end to the Polish war
by the treaty of Stuhmsdorf, and on the 24th of June 1630 he landed on
the island of Usedom, at the head of an army of 13,000 men, which was
raised to 40,000 before the end of the year.

[Sidenote: =Measures of Gustavus.=]

Gustavus timed his invasion with great judgment. The diet of Regensburg
was still sitting, and the army of Wallenstein was demoralised by
the approaching sacrifice of its chief. Hardly a month after the
landing of the Swedish king that sacrifice was consummated, a large
part of Wallenstein’s army was disbanded, and the rest put under the
command of Tilly, who was becoming in his old age extremely dilatory
in his movements. Gustavus accordingly found himself for six months
practically unopposed, and he at once employed the time in establishing
for himself a strong basis of operations on the Baltic and in the
enlistment of fresh troops. In January of the next year came a most
welcome assistance. Richelieu had long fixed his eyes upon Gustavus,
as one of the most formidable weapons capable of being used against the
House of Austria, and he desired to put it into the armoury of France.
Negotiations had been opened with this object in the spring of the year
but had failed. [Sidenote: =Alliance between Gustavus and Richelieu,
1631.=] He had found Gustavus more stubborn than he had expected,
and quickly realised that if he wanted the king of Sweden’s help he
could have it only on the king of Sweden’s terms. Gracefully submitting
to the inevitable, on January 23rd 1631 he concluded with Gustavus
the treaty of Bärwalde, by which he undertook to supply the king with
200,000 dollars for six years, on condition that Gustavus maintained
an army of 36,000 men, promised to respect the imperial constitution,
observed neutrality towards Bavaria and the League as far as they
observed it towards him, and left the Catholic religion untouched in
those districts where he found it established. The alliance of the
foreigner was the only voluntary aid which the liberator of Germany
could obtain. [Sidenote: =Jealousy of Gustavus in Germany.=]
The old duke Boguslav of Pomerania was as submissive in the hands
of Gustavus as he had been in the hands of Wallenstein, but it was
helplessness not friendship which put his resources at the disposal of
the invader. John George of Saxony and George William of Brandenburg
steadily refused to break their neutrality, or take one step in
the direction of the dismemberment of the Empire. In March a great
gathering of Protestants was held at Leipzig to consider the situation.
They agreed to raise troops for their own defence in case they were
attacked. They assured the Emperor of their continued loyalty, if only
he would withdraw the Edict of Restitution. They said not one word
about assistance to the foreigner.

[Sidenote: =The campaign of 1631.=]

German patriotic feeling was against Gustavus. It was clear that he
would have to make his way by the sword, and the sword alone. At
the end of March the campaign began. Tilly suddenly dashed at Neu
Brandenburg, captured it on March 29th, and destroyed its garrison of
2000 Swedes, thus thrusting himself in between Gustavus in Pomerania
and Horn in Mecklenburg. Gustavus saw the danger. By forced marches
he succeeded in circumventing Tilly and effecting his junction with
Horn, and the old marshal sullenly retreated to the Elbe, where he
formed the siege of Magdeburg, which had of its own accord declared
against the Emperor, and asked for a Swedish garrison. Meanwhile
Gustavus had marched to the Oder, and captured the important fortress
of Frankfort, which was garrisoned by the imperialists. From there he
designed to move to the relief of Magdeburg, now hard pressed by Tilly
and Pappenheim. Every motive of honour and policy impelled him to
ensure its safety. But unforeseen obstacles presented themselves. In
order to march to Magdeburg, it was necessary to cross the territories
of Brandenburg and Saxony, and neither of the electors would for a
moment think of permitting an act which might seem to the Emperor a
violation of their neutrality. While Magdeburg was in its death throes
fruitless negotiations continued. Both the electors remained stubbornly
immovable. At last in desperation Gustavus appeared at Berlin with a
more potent argument at his back in the shape of an army, and forced
the unwilling George William to throw open to him the fortress of
Spandau. But it was too late. Saxony had still to be dealt with, and
while Saxony was deliberating Magdeburg fell. [Sidenote: =Fall of
Magdeburg.=] On May 20th, Pappenheim stormed the town. Amid the
confusion of the assault the houses caught fire. The imperialist
soldiers, maddened by victory and plunder, lost all self-control, and
amid the roar of the flames and the crash of falling houses ensued a
scene of carnage, of outrage, and of horror, at which Europe stood
aghast. By the next morning the cathedral alone showed gaunt against
the sky, amid a mass of blackened ruins, to say where Magdeburg once
had been.

The sack of Magdeburg is one of the darkest spots on the page of
history. For many years it has been allowed to stain the reputation of
the veteran Tilly, unjustly, for he was far away at the time, but upon
Gustavus must rightly rest some part of the fearful responsibility.
[Sidenote: =Responsibility of Gustavus.=] Magdeburg had risen
against the Emperor trusting in him. He had sent one of his own
officers to lead the defence. He knew to what desperate straits the
town was reduced, and though he could not have anticipated the actual
horrors of the sack, he knew well enough what the storming of a town by
soldiers of fortune meant in those brutal days. Yet for two critical
months he allowed his march to be checked, and his honour compromised,
by the mulish stubbornness of the two electors, who had no force at
their command sufficient to resist his advance, had he nobly acted upon
the necessity which knows no law. It is just possible that by such an
action he might have driven the electors to throw themselves into the
arms of the Emperor, but it is not likely. Gustavus had not hesitated
in 1626 to seize Pillau by force from the elector of Brandenburg, when
he wanted a basis of operations against Dantzig. In this very campaign,
when too late, he had to use force to gain possession of Spandau,
yet the elector was not moved from his neutrality by either of these
high-handed acts. Surely the least which Magdeburg might fairly ask
of him in her distress was not to be more scrupulous about violating
neutrality for her safety than he had been for his own advantage.

[Sidenote: =Retreat of Gustavus.=]

From a military point of view the loss of Magdeburg was a crushing
blow. The incipient movements in favour of Gustavus, which had begun to
show themselves among the Protestant towns, at once ceased. No German
princes except William of Hesse-Cassel and Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar
joined him. As Gustavus slowly fell back down the Elbe, and entrenched
himself at Werben, he must have felt that all the imperialist leaders
had to do was to leave him alone, and his power would melt away
of itself. But to leave things alone was just what Ferdinand and
Maximilian in the flush of their anticipated victory could not do. In
April peace had been signed at Cherasco between Ferdinand and France,
and the Italian army of the Emperor had now crossed the Alps and
reinforced Tilly. Forty thousand men followed his standard, and in the
hope of quelling all opposition and ending the war at a blow, orders
were sent to the marshal to procure the dismissal of the Saxon
troops, and then to march against the Swedes. [Sidenote: =Invasion
of Saxony by Tilly.=] But John George unexpectedly resented this
interference with his independence. He refused to dismiss his troops.
Tilly immediately occupied Merseburg and Leipzig and began harrying the
country. The sight of his burning villages, and the invasion of his
cherished independence, roused the sluggish elector at last. He sent
messengers post haste to Gustavus offering his alliance and demanding
his help. By one fatal blunder Ferdinand had done more to destroy his
own cause, than all his foes together had hitherto succeeded in doing.
He had driven Saxony over to the enemy. [Sidenote: =Alliance between
Saxony and Sweden.=] It was not so much the material resources
which the elector possessed, which made his friendship so important to
Gustavus, as the position which he held in Germany. Drunken, sluggish,
obstinate, irresolute as he was, men recognised in him a strenuous
loyalty to the constitution of the Empire as it then existed, a hearty
dread of revolutionary proposals, and a certain political shrewdness.
It was these qualities, quite as much as his hereditary position
as the leader of the Lutheran party, which had hitherto determined
the attitude of the north German princes both towards Frederick and
Christian of Denmark. That he should now join his forces to the Swedes
meant that to him the foreigner and the invader appeared less of a
revolutionary than the legal head of the Empire himself.

[Sidenote: =The battle of Breitenfeld.=]

Gustavus did not let the grass grow under his feet. He set out at once
for Saxony with the elector of Brandenburg, effected a junction with
the Saxon army, and marching towards Leipsig met the army of Tilly
drawn up in battle array on the field of Breitenfeld on September
17th, 1631. Tilly marshalled his men to the number of 32,000 in
one long line of battle along rising ground overlooking the little
stream of the Loderbach. In the centre were posted as usual the
solid squares of pikemen flanked by musketeers, which formed the
main battle according to the tactics of the Spanish school. On the
right wing was Furstenberg with the horse of the Italian army, while
the left was guarded by the fiery Pappenheim and his famous cavalry.
Between the wings and the centre were placed the heavy guns, probably
between thirty and forty in number. Tilly himself on his well-known
white horse put himself among his Walloon fellow-countrymen in the
centre. The arrangement adopted by Gustavus was somewhat different.
The army was drawn up in two lines, with a reserve of cavalry behind
each line, and a final reserve also of cavalry behind the centre of
the whole army. The extreme left opposed to Furstenberg was occupied
by the Saxon troops under the elector in person. On the right of the
Saxons, and in touch with the Swedish centre, was Horn with the Swedish
cavalry. Gustavus himself took command of the right wing, opposed to
Pappenheim, with the rest of the cavalry; but between each division
of cavalry on both wings in the first line was a detachment of two
hundred musketeers. The infantry occupied the centre, marshalled in
very much smaller squares than those of Tilly, and having a much
greater proportion of musketeers to pikemen, while in front of each
regiment was the light or field artillery. The heavier guns, in all
about one hundred, under the command of Torstenson, were placed in the
left centre. In numbers Gustavus was decidedly superior. His own army
amounted to some 26,000 men while the Saxons could not be less than
15,000. His guns, too, though not so heavy as those of Tilly, were far
more numerous, and could fire three shots to one of the imperialists.
The wind and the ground favoured Tilly. The battle began with an
artillery duel in which the quick-firing Swedish pieces wrought fearful
havoc among the dense masses of the imperialist army. Yet the stubborn
old marshal remained immovable amid the hail of the balls. Pappenheim,
younger and less disciplined, lost patience. Without orders he suddenly
launched his cavalry on the Swedish right, but Gustavus was ready for
him. The musketeers received him with a volley which made him reel, and
Baner at the head of the reserve cavalry, and Gustavus himself with the
right wing, dashed upon him at the moment and drove him fairly off the
field. Meanwhile on the extreme imperialist right Furstenberg in his
turn threw himself upon the Saxons, drove back their cavalry first on
to their guns and then on to their infantry, until the whole mass in
wild confusion broke and ran, carrying the elector with them to Duben,
and even to Eilenburg, pursued by the victorious imperialists. Tilly
saw his opportunity, and ordered his centre to advance to take Horn in
the flank left exposed by the flying Saxons, but the well-disciplined
and mobile Swedes falling back a little formed a new front on their
old flank and defended themselves vigorously. In making this flank
movement Tilly had necessarily left his artillery undefended, and
Gustavus, checking his pursuit of Pappenheim, wheeled back his cavalry,
and sweeping the position originally occupied by Tilly from left to
right, captured the guns and turned them against their own masters,
while he himself with his horsemen swooped down upon Tilly’s rear.
Caught between Horn’s foot in front and Gustavus’s cavalry in the rear,
with their own guns directing a plunging fire into their flanks, the
imperialist infantry proved themselves worthy of their reputation. They
fought like heroes, but the longer they fought the more hopeless became
the struggle, the more decisive the defeat. When the autumn sun went
down on the field of blood, but six hundred men remained in disciplined
array to make a ring round their veteran leader and carry him in safety
from the field. The imperialist army was entirely destroyed as a
fighting force. About 10,000 men were left on the field of battle, as
many more were taken prisoners, and according to the custom of the time
took service with the victors. One hundred and six standards and all
the guns remained to grace the conqueror’s triumph. Tilly retreated
on the Weser, gathering up the fragments of his defeated army as he
went, but he found no rest there. Pressed back by the advance of the
victorious Swedes to the Danube and even across the Danube, he did not
dare to make head against Gustavus again until the following spring.

[Sidenote: =March of Gustavus to the Main.=]

The victory of Breitenfeld placed all north Germany at the feet of the
Swedish king. Perceiving at a glance that even a successful attack
upon Vienna would not end the war, and recognising that his first
duty was to the troubled Protestants of the centre and of the south,
Gustavus marched straight into the heart of Germany on the Main and
the Rhine, disregarding the characteristic suggestions of Wallenstein
that they should divide Germany between them at the expense of the
Emperor and the Catholic party. On October 10th he occupied Würtzburg.
The 18th of November saw him at Frankfort on the Main, the old capital
of Germany. He spent Christmas Day at Mainz, and there in the fair
and rich Rhineland he rested his tired troops, while in the north
Tott was completing the reduction of the Mecklenberg coast line, and
the Protestant administrators who had been ousted under the Edict of
Restitution were being replaced. No one, however, knew better than
Gustavus on what slender foundations his power rested. Richelieu was
already beginning to think that his ally was becoming too powerful.
Louis XIII., it was said, had been heard to mutter ‘It is time
to put a limit to the progress of this Goth.’ Force, far more than
inclination or policy, had brought him the Saxon alliance, and force
might easily break the bond which it had forged. Tilly was mustering
new forces beyond the Danube, and at any moment a general of reputation
might stamp his feet and produce an army of soldiers of fortune on his
flank or in his rear. Even the Protestants could not be trusted should
misfortune come. Except at Nuremberg and a few other places, which had
felt the hand of the oppressor, there was no enthusiasm in Germany for
the Protestant Liberator. Two things were necessary to secure the
fruits of the victory which he had won. [Sidenote: =His schemes for a
general Protestant alliance under Sweden.=] He must crush the enemy
before he had time to recover from the blow of Breitenfeld, and he must
gain a basis of military operations and political influence by uniting
the Protestant states in a firm league under his leadership. With Tilly
destroyed, and the _Corpus Evangelicorum_ formed, and trusty
Swedish captains placed in occupation of the ecclesiastical lands of
central Germany, then and not till then might Gustavus consider his
work secure.

[Sidenote: =Advance upon the Danube to Munich, 1632.=]

The first thing was to crush military opposition. At the end of March
the Swedes were again in the field. On the 31st Gustavus entered
Nuremberg in triumph and received an enthusiastic welcome. On April
5th he captured Donauwörth, on the 14th he found Tilly entrenched
behind the Lech, forced the passage of the river, stormed the enemies’
position, and drove back the old marshal to Ingolstadt wounded to
death. Bavaria was at his feet. Side by side with the Elector Palatine
he rode into Munich on the 7th of May. There was now no enemy left to
be dealt with except the Emperor, and the dominions of the Hapsburgs
were still in far too disorganised a state to be able to offer much
opposition. Even the Saxons had marched unopposed into Bohemia, and
when Gustavus was celebrating his triumph with the winter-king at
Munich, John George, who had done more than any one else to oust
Frederick from Bohemia, was keeping high festival himself at Prague.

[Sidenote: =Wallenstein appealed to by the Emperor.=]

It was not for long. There was but one man in all wide Europe who
could save Ferdinand from the storm just breaking upon his head, for
there was but one capable of drawing to himself and binding together
into an organised army the soldiers of fortune who were scattered all
over the civilised world. In December, Eggenberg, Ferdinand’s most
trusted counsellor, had been sent to Wallenstein to ask him to forgive
the past and strike one more blow for the defence of the House of
Austria. Wallenstein eagerly seized the opportunity, for circumstances
had played singularly into his hand. The victories of Gustavus had
drawn the teeth of Maximilian and the League. The necessities of the
Emperor must force him to agree to whatever terms were demanded. The
long wished for moment had arrived when he at the head of an army,
wholly his own, owing no allegiance to the Emperor, might become the
dictator of Germany, and, ousting from her soil all foreigners except
himself, might impose peace upon Germany on the basis of religious
toleration. [Sidenote: =His terms.=] The terms which he exacted
from the Emperor forbid any doubt as to his intentions. No army was
to be allowed in the Empire except under his command, he alone was
to have the right of pardoning offenders and confiscating lands.
[Sidenote: =Appointed dictator.=] The Edict of Restitution was to
be withdrawn. In other words, he was to be the military and political
dictator of Germany. The terms were accepted, his standard raised.
From Italy, Scotland, Ireland, as well as from every part of Germany,
flocked to him men eager for distinction and more eager for plunder,
without distinction of nationality and without distinction of religion.
In May 1632, his organisation was completed. [Sidenote: =His plan
of campaign.=] Falling suddenly upon the Saxons at Prague he drove
them headlong out of Bohemia, then turning swiftly to the left directed
his main army upon the rich and Protestant Nuremberg, while Pappenheim
scoured the Rhine country at the head of his horse. Gustavus saw the
crisis, threw himself into Nuremberg and fortified it, then, summoning
to his assistance his outlying detachments, offered Wallenstein battle
in the hope of crushing this new enemy by another Breitenfeld. But
Wallenstein had made up his mind to show Gustavus quite another sort of
warfare. He knew the great difficulties which the Swedes experienced in
conducting their operations in a country, largely hostile, at such a
distance from their base. He knew also the value of his own superiority
in light cavalry in provisioning his own army, and in hampering the
commissariat of the Swedes. He did not trust the discipline of his own
recent levies on the battle-field, and so, forming a huge entrenched
camp on an eminence overlooking the plain on which Nuremberg stands, he
prepared to force Gustavus away by sheer starvation.

[Sidenote: =The camp at Nuremberg.=]

At the end of June the camp was finished, and the duel between the two
greatest soldiers of the day began. But it was not only a duel between
soldiers, it was also a duel between rival policies. The crisis of
the fate of the Empire was being then decided. On the one side was
military dictatorship and religious toleration in connection with
the traditional institutions of the Empire, on the other Protestant
supremacy and political federation under the leadership of the
foreigner. Stubbornly the question was fought out, not by arms but
by endurance, but day by day it became clearer that Wallenstein had
calculated rightly, and that Gustavus must starve the first. By the
beginning of September the strain was growing intolerable, discipline
was becoming relaxed, and the king felt that he must stake all on one
last attack. On September 3d he led his army against Wallenstein’s
entrenchments, but in vain. After heroic efforts he had to retire
baffled. [Sidenote: =Retreat of Gustavus.=] A few days afterwards
he marched out of Nuremberg, leaving the best part of his army dead
before the ramparts of the Alte Veste, or dying in the hospitals
of the town. [Sidenote: =Invasion of Saxony by Wallenstein.=]
Wallenstein, following out determinedly the plan he had laid down for
himself, never attempted to pursue, but turning north into Saxony
prepared somewhat leisurely to choose a position between the Elbe and
the Saale, where he might entrench himself for the winter, and apply
the gentle pressure of his marauding and requisitioning bands to the
ever-vacillating will of John George, and detach him from the Swedish
alliance. Gustavus had in the previous year lost Magdeburg by a want of
decision. He was not going to lose Saxony in the same way. Summoning
Oxenstjerna and Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar to his aid, he flew through
Thuringia as quick as he could go, and seized Erfurt and Naumberg
before Wallenstein quite realised what had happened. It was now the
beginning of November, the weather had suddenly turned piercingly cold,
and Wallenstein, making up his mind that Gustavus would not pursue his
operations further that winter, prepared to entrench himself between
Merseburg and Torgau, and gave permission to Pappenheim to return to
the Rhineland capturing Halle as he went. It was a great blunder.
Gustavus dashed forwards on Wallenstein’s main army to crush it before
the mistake could be repaired. Wallenstein finding a battle inevitable
sent messenger after messenger to bring Pappenheim back, and hastily
throwing up some field entrenchments and deepening the ditches which
intersected the plain, awaited the onslaught of the Swedish king at
Lützen on the 16th of November.

[Sidenote: =Battle of Lützen, 1632.=]

As at Breitenfeld the Swedes were drawn up in two lines, and the
imperialists only in one, but Wallenstein, unlike Tilly, seems to have
interspersed bodies of musketeers among the troops of the cavalry, and
posted a strong reserve behind his centre. The battle began as usual
with the artillery in the early morning, then, as the autumn mist
cleared away, the Swedes advanced to the attack about ten o’clock.
There was no room for generalship. It was hard hand-to-hand fighting.
For two hours the battle swayed backwards and forwards, the hardest
of the fighting being on the Swedish right, where the king himself
was engaged with Piccolomini’s black cuirassiers. Bit by bit the
Swedes were gaining ground, when Wallenstein bringing up his reserves
directed a terrible charge upon the Swedish centre, and forced it back
with fearful loss, especially among the officers. [Sidenote: =Death
of Gustavus.=]Gustavus, at the head of such horsemen as he could
muster, flew to the rescue, and as he made his way through the mist
which had gathered again for a few moments in the hollow, found himself
unexpectedly in the middle of a troop of the enemy’s cavalry. A shot
broke his left arm, another pierced his back, and he fell heavily to
the ground, where he was soon despatched by a bullet through the head.
His white horse, riderless and bloodstained, tore on through the enemy
into the Swedish ranks and announced the loss of their leader. Bernhard
of Saxe-Weimar took the command, and rallying the army with the cry
of vengeance, renewed the charge with an enthusiasm which carried
all before it. Just then Pappenheim and his cavalry appeared on the
right flank of the Swedes, and the battle again settled down to hard
hand-to-hand fighting for three hours more. Pappenheim himself fell
dead in the first charge, but his men, like their enemies, fought on
the more fiercely to avenge the fall of their captain. At last as the
darkness fell the Swedes nerved themselves for a supreme effort, and
drove the imperialists from their entrenchments just as the leading
columns of Pappenheim’s infantry appeared upon the field.

[Sidenote: =Results of his death.=]

The honours of the battle were with the Swedes, its fruits were with
Wallenstein. As regards mere numbers the Swedish loss was probably
heavier than that of the imperialists, and their army more weakened as
a fighting force. But if Gustavus had been the only man killed on that
side, his death would have more than counterbalanced the whole of the
imperialist losses, for not only was he the general and the king, not
only was the one man capable of uniting the forces of Protestantism,
the one who could successfully cope both with the ambition of Richelieu
and the fanaticism of Ferdinand, but he was also the only man still in
power in Germany who ennobled the struggle with a distinct moral ideal.
Whether Protestants in Germany had sufficient powers of cohesion and
strength of conviction to follow a common policy, whether Sweden, even
under Gustavus, could have become sufficiently German in interests and
sympathies to command the allegiance of Germans, may be doubtful; but
at any rate it was a policy worth trying, it was a policy based on the
moral and political needs of the people, and not upon the personal
ambition of the successful general. If it failed it would fail only
because Protestantism in Germany had not the qualities necessary to
make it succeed. But when Gustavus Adolphus died on the field of Lützen
all moral and religious ideal died too out of the Thirty Years’ War.
On the one side was the personal ambition of a military dictator, on
the other the national ambition of a foreign aggressor, and the very
followers and companions of the noble Gustavus himself soon sank to be
little more than ‘condottiere’ bent only upon gorging themselves and
their country out of the spoils of helpless Germany.

[Sidenote: =The lead taken by Oxenstjerna.=]

On the death of Gustavus the supreme direction of Swedish affairs
passed into the hands of Oxenstjerna, whose one object was to carry
out the policy of his dead friend and king; but Oxenstjerna was no
general, and being without the supreme authority which Gustavus
wielded, had often to persuade where he would have commanded. His first
step showed the change which had taken place. Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar,
like other military adventurers, required his reward before he would
venture his life further in the cause, and a duchy had to be carved
for him out of the bishoprics of Bamberg and Würtzburg. It was the
first confiscation of Catholic lands by the Protestant forces, the
first forcible subjection of a Catholic population to a Protestant
ruler. However justifiable it might be as an act of retaliation for the
Edict of Restitution, it was but too evident a proof of the increasing
tendency to consider the interests of the German people as of no value
in comparison with the political and military necessities of their
so-called saviours. [Sidenote: =The League of Heilbronn, 1633.=]
Sure of the assistance of Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, Oxenstjerna was
enabled to unite the circles of Swabia Franconia and the upper and
lower Rhine to Sweden by an offensive and defensive league, which was
signed at Heilbronn in April 1633. Bernhard took command of the forces
raised by the circles, and prepared in conjunction with the Swedish
army to resume the attack on Vienna.

The supreme word on military affairs for the moment lay not with
Bernhard or with Oxenstjerna but with Wallenstein. [Sidenote:
=Schemes of Wallenstein.=] The death of Gustavus left him, as he
well knew, without a rival in Germany, and retiring slowly from Lützen
behind the mountains of Bohemia, he surrendered himself to the illusion
that he could now dictate peace to Germany on his own terms. Secure, as
he thought, of the support of his army, contemptuous of the politics
both of Ferdinand and of Oxenstjerna, he prepared to enforce his own
conditions of peace upon the Emperor and upon the Swedes alike. The
Edict of Restitution was to be withdrawn, the Swedes to be compensated
by some places on the Baltic coast, while he himself, the peacemaker,
would exchange the duchy of Mecklenberg for the Rhenish Palatinate,
or possibly the crown of Bohemia. During the summer of 1633 he was
pressing these terms upon Oxenstjerna and upon John George. In June
he had almost obtained the consent of the latter, but Oxenstjerna,
cautious and hostile, would not trust him. Couriers went quick and
often between the two, and rumours of treachery were beginning to be
heard behind Wallenstein’s back, not merely at Vienna, but, a far
more serious thing, in the camp. The more they were canvassed the
more did Wallenstein’s proposals seem hateful to important interests
in Europe. [Sidenote: =Opposition of the Jesuits, the Spaniards and
the army.=] The Jesuits and the Catholics were not willing to give
up so soon the policy of the Edict of Restitution. The Spaniards and
the French would risk anything rather than see Wallenstein lord of the
Palatinate. Conservative statesmen and the loyal soldiers resented the
attempt to impose terms on the unwilling Emperor by the brute force
of an army nominally his own. The soldiers of fortune, especially the
officers, did not want an end put to a war which had been so lucrative
and promised to be more lucrative still. In January 1634, the Spaniards
were plying the Emperor with accusations, and demanding the dismissal
of Wallenstein, just as Maximilian and the League had done four years
ago. Wallenstein contented himself with binding his officers closer to
him by an oath. Sure of their support he could face the world. But in
the beginning of February his support began to give way underneath him.
Piccolomini, Gallas and Aldringer deserted him, and Ferdinand boldly
threw himself into the arms of the Spaniards. [Sidenote: =Dismissal
and murder of Wallenstein, 1634.=] He dismissed Wallenstein from his
command, branded him as a traitor, released his army from its obedience
to him, and put a price upon his head. The breach was complete but
still Wallenstein did not quail. Summoning the colonels to meet him
at Pilsen he obtained from them on February 20th an undertaking to
stand by him against his enemies, and moved to Eger to meet Bernhard
of Saxe-Weimar, in the hope of inducing the Swedes to make common
cause with him, and oblige the Emperor to accept the peace. There
also came four soldiers of fortune, two Irishmen and two Scots, who,
finding in the declaration issued by the Emperor a warrant for their
own dark plots, like Fitzurse and his companions five centuries before,
determined to take upon themselves the responsibility of ridding their
master of too powerful a servant. At nightfall on the 25th of February,
Wallenstein’s chief supporters were invited to a banquet and there
murdered. Devereux, an Irish captain, reeking from the butchery, made
his way to the general’s quarters, and struck him down to the ground as
he arose from his bed alarmed at the noise. So perished Wallenstein in
the height of his fame and power, and with him perished the last chance
of keeping the foreigner out of Germany.

At first the star of Ferdinand seemed to shine the brighter in spite of
the dark shade cast by the murder of Wallenstein. [Sidenote: =Battle
of Nördlingen, 1634.=] The army placed under the orders of the
young Ferdinand, king of Hungary, captured Regensburg in July, stormed
Donauwörth, and laid siege to Nördlingen. There the king was joined by
the cardinal-infant, Ferdinand of Spain, who was on his way to assume
the government of the Netherlands, at the head of 15,000 men. In spite
of inferior numbers Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, ever sanguine and ever
impetuous, prevailed on the wary Horn, who commanded the Swedes, to
risk a battle; but the evening of the 6th of September 1634 saw him a
fugitive, and Horn a prisoner with 16,000 men _hors de combat_.
The battle of Nördlingen was one of the decisive battles of the war.
Just as Breitenfeld had made the conquest of north Germany by the
Emperor and the success of the Edict of Restitution impossible, so
did Nördlingen render the conquest of south Germany by Protestantism
impossible. The Catholic bishoprics were recovered, Bernhard’s duchy
of Franconia vanished, and the line of the Main became once more the
boundary between the religions.

[Sidenote: =Peace of Prague, 1635.=]

In May 1635, the negotiations for peace which had been going on so long
with Saxony were brought to a happy conclusion, and a treaty embodying
the terms agreed upon was duly signed at Prague between John George and
the Emperor. The question of the ecclesiastical lands was settled by
taking the year 1627 as the test year. Whatever belonged to Protestants
at that time was to remain Protestant, whatever was then Catholic was
to be Catholic still. This arrangement secured nearly all the northern
bishoprics to Protestantism. Lusatia was to be made over to Saxony, and
Lutheranism in Silesia guaranteed by the Emperor. Lutheranism was still
to remain the only privileged form of Protestantism. These conditions
were intended to form a basis for a general peace. It was hoped that
other states would accept them, and so gradually put an end to the war.
To some extent the anticipation was realised. A considerable number of
the cities and smaller states of north Germany accepted the treaty of
Prague, but that it would ever form a satisfactory basis for a general
peace was impossible, as long as it provided no security whatever for
the Calvinists, and did not attempt to deal with the dangers of foreign
intervention.

By the treaty of Prague Saxony ranged itself once more upon the side
of the Emperor. It is easy to sneer at the want of public spirit
and the narrowness of aim which marked the policy of John George
throughout this difficult time. [Sidenote: =Policy of John George
of Saxony.=] Yet it will be found by an attentive observer that
from first to last there was a singular consistency in his action,
which sprang not from weakness of will or sluggishness of temperament,
but from settled principles of policy from which he never budged. In
imperial politics John George was a conservative, in ecclesiastical
matters a Lutheran, and he remained steadily, even stubbornly,
consistent to those two conceptions. As a conservative and a Lutheran
he hated the destructive policy of Christian of Anhalt and Frederick
Elector Palatine, and consequently secured to Ferdinand his election
to the Empire, and actually supported him in arms against his revolted
subjects. When Frederick threw himself into the arms of Mansfeld,
when his co-religionists in the north began to feel alarmed, when
Christian of Denmark determined to fight for his religion and his son’s
bishoprics, John George remained sturdily, obstinately, neutral; for
he believed that it was better to run some risk of aggression on the
part of the Emperor than to throw all the institutions of the Empire
into the crucible. The Edict of Restitution was the first thing that
shook him, but even that would not have weighed against the danger
of allowing the foreigner a footing in Germany, had not the Emperor
actually had recourse to violence. If John George had to break his
neutrality, if he was obliged to have a hand in the work of destruction
of Germany, if conservatism was no longer possible, then he would
rather join a Gustavus than a Wallenstein or a Tilly. But he never felt
happy in that alliance. His sense of the desolation of the country, of
the destruction of war, was too great for him ever willingly to remain
long under arms. When the Emperor had been beaten back, when the Edict
of Restitution had become an impossibility, when Wallenstein was dead,
and France beginning to interfere actively in the affairs of Germany,
it was time for John George once more to range himself side by side
with the Emperor, for once more the Emperor had become the champion of
German institutions against revolution. The treaty of Prague represents
no high ideals of policy. It shows that the great religious ideals with
which the war began are over. No longer do men believe that they are
fighting for the Church or for Protestantism, for the highest interests
of nations and of souls. Seventeen years of war have disabused them
of that illusion. But next to religion among the ennobling influences
of life comes that of patriotism, and John George retiring from
alliance with the foreigner, as the Swede and the Frenchman prepare
to put Germany on the rack for thirteen more weary years for their
own aggrandisement, is a figure which shows at any rate something of
patriotism and of policy, among the heartless dissensions of ambitious
brigand chiefs.

CHAPTER VI

THE AGGRANDISEMENT OF FRANCE

Foreign policy of Richelieu--Territorial aggrandisement--Questions of
the Valtelline and the Mantuan Succession--Intrigues of Richelieu in
Germany--Interference of France in the Thirty Years’ War--Alteration
of the character of the war--Unsuccessful operations of
France--Conquest of Alsace--Revolt of Portugal and Catalonia--Position
of France at the death of Richelieu--Policy of Mazarin--Battle
of Rocroy--Conquest of the Upper Rhineland--Campaign of
Turenne--Negotiations for peace--The peace of Westphalia--The solution
of the religious difficulty--The beginning of modern Europe--Permanent
advance of France--Desperate condition of Spain--Outbreak of the
Fronde--Alliance of Mazarin and Cromwell--The peace of the Pyrenees.

[Sidenote: =Foreign policy of Richelieu.=]

When Richelieu in 1624 took the reins of government into his hands in
France, the Thirty Years’ War was just about to envelope the whole of
Germany in its fell embraces. The princes of the lower Saxon circle
had begun to arm, the king of Denmark was about to take the lead of
the Protestant forces, England had already taken active steps for
the recovery of the Palatinate, and the reduction of the power of
Spain. There was every probability that the whole energies of the
Austro-Spanish House would be absorbed in the affairs of Germany for
many years. The necessity of Spain and the Empire was ever in the
seventeenth century the opportunity of France, and Richelieu realised
by a flash of genius that the hour had arrived, which was to make or
mar the influence of France in the world. Three things were necessary
to the establishment of French supremacy in Europe, national unity,
monarchical centralisation, and the extension and security of the
frontiers. To attain these three objects, Richelieu devoted his life,
and he was sensible enough to see that complete success in foreign
affairs must do much to render success in the other two inevitable. If
the crown of France by military and diplomatic conquest could push back
the French frontier towards the Rhine, the Scheldt, and the Pyrenees,
it need have little to fear from its internal foes. So Richelieu took
up again the threads of policy, which had dropped from the lifeless
hands of Henry IV., and directed all his energies to the
resumption of the attack upon the Empire and upon Spain. But there was
this difference between the two men. Henry IV. had dreamed of
establishing the peace and good order of the world upon the ruin of the
Habsburgs. Richelieu cherished no such illusions. Nakedly and avowedly
he sought but the supremacy of France.

[Sidenote: =Its character.=]

Richelieu stands out upon the canvas of history as the first of that
long line of statesmen who were actuated by purely selfish national
interests. Unaffected by moral ideals, such as did so much to disguise
the personal ambitions of the wars of the Middle Ages, uninfluenced
by the religious motives, which often ennobled, even though they
intensified, the ruthlessness of the wars of the sixteenth century,
the rulers of the eighteenth and the latter half of the seventeenth
centuries made war upon each other purely in the interests of their
crowns and of themselves. Personal glory, territorial aggrandisement,
commercial advantage were the motives which led to the great wars
of Europe from the peace of Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna.
Before the fierceness of those appetites the rights of nations, of
races, even of humanity itself weighed not a feather in the balance.
Germans must lose their speech and their fatherland, that France may
push her boundaries to the Rhine. Poland must be wiped out of the map
of Europe, that Prussia and Russia may be bigger and greater. Even
African negroes must be torn from their homes, and sold as chattels in
the market-places of the West, that the pockets of Englishmen and of
English colonists might swell with gold. And if amid the dark scene
of selfishness and rapacity there shines at times the nobler light
which hallows the wars of liberty against the oppression of Louis
XIV. and Napoleon, yet the shadows deepen as they gather
round the career of Frederick the Great, and the closing acts of the
Napoleonic drama at Vienna, and the historian has sadly to acknowledge
that in them are to be found the characteristic scenes of eighteenth
century diplomacy and war. It is the triumph of Macchiavellianism on
the large scale in international politics. It is the adaptation to the
affairs of nations of Hobbes’s description of the natural man. _Homo
homini lupus._ Everything is permissible to a sovereign which tends
to the security and greatness of his power, and nations are to one
another as wild beasts. Man in his personal relations is civilised
Christian and refined. Nations in their ordinary intercourse with one
another are punctilious, courtly and even deferential, but when once
selfish aggrandisement is possible, it becomes allowable. The thin
veneer of civilisation and of consideration is rudely broken through,
and nation stands out against nation in open and barbarous hostility on
the principle of the old moss-trooper’s rule, that they shall win who
have the power and they shall keep who can.

[Sidenote: =Territorial aggrandisement necessary to France.=]

From the point of view of the needs of the French monarchy, there
was no doubt that Richelieu was right in urging France to a policy
of territorial aggrandisement. She was better able to pursue it than
were her neighbours, for she was sufficiently free from religious
difficulties to be able to throw her sword into the Protestant or the
Catholic scale as her interests might suggest. She had more to gain
from such a policy than any other nation in Europe, for almost on all
sides her land frontiers were a source of weakness. In the south the
Spanish provinces of Cerdagne and Roussillon lay on the French side of
the central ridge of the Pyrenees, and gave easy access to the Spanish
armies into rich and disaffected Languedoc. The Italian frontier was
in the keeping of the duke of Savoy, who, as long as he preserved his
independence, was as likely to admit Spanish and imperialist troops
into the valley of the Rhone, as French troops into the plain of
Lombardy. To the east and to the north-east the frontier was still more
insecure. Following roughly the streams of the Saone, the Meuse and
the Somme, it brought the Empire and Spain dangerously near to Paris,
especially as the intervening country was not easily defensible. It is
true that on the eastern side a considerable access of strength had
been gained by the occupation of the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul and
Verdun in 1552, which secured to France the important fortress of Metz,
but they were not yet formally annexed to the crown of France, but only
administered by French officials. A glance at the map will therefore
show that the danger from Spain was considerable, and that, until she
had succeeded in breaking the chain which bound her almost from the
Pyrenees to the Straits of Dover, France could not make full use of her
unrivalled geographical position.

[Sidenote: =Question of the Valtelline, 1622.=]

Such were the influences which impelled Richelieu to make the
rectification of the frontier of France on the side of the Netherlands,
the Rhine, and the Pyrenees, the first object of his foreign policy;
and to launch France on that career of conquest and aggrandisement at
the expense of the House of Habsburg, which has been from his time
almost to the present day the central feature of European politics.
From the battle of Nördlingen to the battle of Solferino, there has
hardly been a great war in Europe in which the armies of France and
of the House of Austria have not been arrayed against each other as
enemies. Spain was the first foe to be dealt with, for Spain was the
most dangerous to neglect, and the easiest to attack. The Spaniards
who garrisoned the Milanese had, in 1622, seized upon the valley of
the Valtelline, and occupied it by force, in order to secure their
communications with the Empire; and had even obliged Chur, the chief
town of the League of the Grisons, to receive an imperial garrison.
This was undoubtedly an act of aggression on their part, and gave
Richelieu the opportunity of striking a deadly blow at his enemy. The
Valtelline is a broad and rich valley which runs in a north-easterly
direction into the heart of the Rhaetian Alps from the top of the Lake
of Como. About half-way up the valley a mountain pass, practicable for
the passage of troops, leads to the east into the valley of the Adige a
little north of Trent, from which by the well-frequented Brenner Pass
communication with Innsbrück and south Germany was easy and safe. This
was the only route which was certain to be available for the passage
of troops and stores from the Empire to Milan, as the other mountain
passes, which led direct from Tirol and Carinthia into Italy, opened
into the territory of the republic of Venice, and Venice was usually
not inclined to welcome the arrival of imperial troops. Provided,
however, that the passage of the Valtelline was secured, the rest of
the way was safe, as it lay through imperial territory. Hence the
command of the Valtelline was absolutely essential to the maintenance
of the power of the Habsburgs in Italy, but the valley itself was
politically subject to the League of the Grisons, which as long ago as
1509 had come under the protection of France. So then, when Spain moved
troops into the Valtelline, built a fortress in the valley, and obliged
the Grisons to admit an imperial garrison at Chur, Louis XIII.
as the protector of the Grisons had the right to interfere.

[Sidenote: =Its recovery for the Grisons, 1626.=]

Richelieu took his measures promptly. In 1624 he helped to bring about
a marriage alliance between Charles prince of Wales and Henrietta
Maria, the sister of Louis XIII., by which he hoped to gain the
assistance of England against Spain on the sea and in the Netherlands,
while he struck at the Valtelline. An army of the mountaineers of the
Grisons under French leadership drove the imperial troops from Chur,
and the papal troops from the Valtelline, where they had replaced the
Spaniards. Lesdiguières, at the head of a French force, marched to the
assistance of Savoy against Genoa. But just at that time the Huguenots
of La Rochelle flew to arms, and Richelieu, afraid of finding himself
involved at once in war at home and abroad, came to terms with Spain at
the treaty of Monzon, concluded in March 1626, by which the Valtelline
was to remain under the control of the Grisons.

[Sidenote: =The Mantuan succession, 1627.=]

For the next three years the whole energies of Richelieu and of
France were engaged in the reduction of La Rochelle, and in the war
with England, which followed hard upon, and indeed sprung out of,
the marriage treaty of 1624. In 1629 he was once more at liberty to
turn his attention to Italian affairs. In 1627 the duke of Mantua and
Montferrat had died. His nearest heir was a Frenchman, the duke of
Nevers. But the Emperor, at the instigation of Spain, not wishing to
have a French prince so near the Milanese, determined to sequester the
territory on the pretext of a disputed succession. Spanish troops at
once overran both Mantua and Montferrat, and driving the duke of Nevers
into Casale besieged him there. The Italian princes, however, were not
inclined to submit without protest to this exercise by the Emperor
of obsolete and doubtful rights. The Pope (Urban VIII.),
who was strongly French in sympathy, combined with Venice to ask the
assistance of France, and in January 1629 Louis and Richelieu crossed
the Mont Genèvre at the head of a large army, captured Susa, relieved
Casale, and forced the duke of Savoy to make peace. Again, however,
a rebellion of the Huguenots obliged Louis to draw back in the hour
of victory (March 1629), and in the summer of that year fresh troops,
set free by the imperialist successes in Germany, invaded Italy under
Spinola and formed the sieges of Mantua and Casale. In spite of the
most strenuous efforts of Louis himself, who crossed the Alps at the
head of the French armies in the winter of 1629–30, the combined
forces of Spain and the Empire were too strong to be dislodged from
Mantua or Montferrat. [Sidenote: =Peace of Cherasco, 1631.=] But
the invasion of Germany by Gustavus Adolphus, promoted by France and
even by the Pope, made the Emperor anxious for peace, and through the
diplomatic skill of the papal agent, Giulio Mazzarini--afterwards to
become so celebrated in French history--a truce was arranged, which
afterwards ripened into the definitive peace of Cherasco (April 26th,
1631). By this treaty the duke of Nevers was invested with the duchy,
and the fortresses were restored on both sides, except Pinerolo, which
was still held by the French.

So ended the first great effort made by Richelieu against the House of
Habsburg. Like most of his plans it was better conceived than executed,
but it must be remembered that in carrying it out, he was sorely
hampered by opposition to his authority at home both from the Huguenots
and from the nobles. His Italian policy must not be considered by
itself. It is part of a great whole. While he was openly attacking the
imperial forces in Italy, his diplomacy was undermining the imperialist
power in Germany, and if in 1631 he thought it best to rest content
with the reduction of Savoy, and the acquisition of a passage through
the Alps, it was because at that particular moment he could best effect
his purpose by shifting his method from direct to indirect hostility,
and the scene from Italy to Germany.

[Sidenote: =Intrigues of Richelieu in Germany, 1630.=]

Already he had endeavoured to keep the flame of opposition to Spain
alive by granting subsidies to the Dutch, and directing Mansfeld’s army
in 1624 to the Netherlands. In July 1630, he sent his most trusted
agent the famous Capuchin, Father Joseph, to the meeting of the diet of
Regensburg, where he laboured with notable skill and success to bring
about the dismissal of Wallenstein, and to pave the way for detaching
Maximilian of Bavaria and the League from their close alliance with
the Emperor and Spain. In the autumn of the year before, another
well-trained diplomatist, Charnacé, had travelled as far as Dantzig to
offer the mediation of France in the quarrel between Sweden and Poland,
and so removed one of the obstacles which made Gustavus Adolphus
hesitate to take part in the German War. At that time Richelieu seems
to have thought that he could use Gustavus merely as a fighting tool,
and by offering him French money and a French alliance could make him
fight the battles of France against the Emperor. But he was quickly
undeceived. Gustavus definitely refused to allow his political or
military independence to be impaired. He was quite willing that France
should interfere openly in the war, if she chose to do so, provided
she would limit her operations to the left bank of the Rhine; but he
would not tolerate for a moment any interference with his own command.
The utmost that Richelieu could obtain from him by the treaty of
Bärwalde in 1631, in return for French gold, was the promise to observe
friendship or neutrality towards Bavaria and the League, so far as they
would observe them towards him. Nor was this promise of much avail, for
when, after the battle of Breitenfeld, Gustavus determined to march
upon central and southern Germany instead of on Vienna, all hope of
detaching Bavaria from the Emperor had to be laid aside.

[Sidenote: =Open interference in Germany, 1632–1634.=]

As long as Gustavus Adolphus lived there was but little room for
Richelieu in German politics. Had he survived a few years longer, it
is not improbable that the world would have seen an alliance of the
Moderates in Germany, under the leadership of Richelieu, supported
possibly by both Maximilian and Wallenstein, against the Emperor and
the king of Sweden. But the death of Gustavus quickly put the decisive
voice in German affairs into the possession of France. Already in
1632 French troops had appeared upon the Rhine, and garrisoned the
new fortress of Ehrenbreitstein at the invitation of the elector of
Trier. In the same year Richelieu became a party to the League of
Heilbronn, and so secured the right to interfere in German affairs. In
1633 a French army entered the old German territory of Lorraine and
captured its capital Nancy, owing to the incessant intrigues against
the all-powerful cardinal of which the duke had been guilty. The battle
of Nördlingen in 1634 put Protestant Germany at the feet of Richelieu.
The soil of Germany, harried and plundered, could with difficulty
sustain the armies which devastated it. Sweden, poor and exhausted,
could make no sacrifices. England was too much occupied with pecuniary
difficulties at home to be able to send assistance to Germany.
[Sidenote: =Declaration of war against Spain, 1635.=] France was
the only power both able and willing to provide the sinews of war. She
became the protector and director of the League of Heilbronn, took
Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar and his army into her pay, claimed from the
Swedes the custody of the fortresses held by them in Alsace, and on
19th May 1635 formally declared war against Spain.

[Sidenote: =The character of the war altered by French interference.=]

From that moment the character of the Thirty Years’ War profoundly
alters. It is no longer a war of religion, to set limits to the
progress of the Counter-Reformation or to save Catholicism or
Protestantism from extinction. It is no longer a war of institutions,
to maintain the authority of the Emperor or to preserve the sovereign
rights of the princes. It is no longer a war of property, to resist the
undoing of the territorial settlement of 1555. It is no longer a war
for the re-settlement of Germany upon a new basis by military force.
German interests no longer have a place in this terrible war waged
for the destruction of Germany on German soil. Primarily, it is a war
between the House of Bourbon and the House of Habsburg, to break the
power of Spain and increase that of France, through the acquisition by
the latter of Alsace and Lorraine. Secondarily, it is a war between the
Swedes and the Empire, to gain for the former out of German soil an
adequate compensation for the money which they had spent and the blood
which they had shed. Two points of interest alone remain in tracing the
melancholy story of the weary years, the gradual development of the
power of France, and the brilliant achievements of skilful generalship.

The entrance of France into the war did not at first check the tide
of imperialist success. Richelieu overestimated the resources and
the military strength of France. [Sidenote: =Unsuccessful campaigns
on the frontiers of France, 1635–1637.=] He put into the field no
less than four armies, amounting in the aggregate to 120,000 men;
but unaccustomed to war, ill disciplined, ill fed, ill paid, and
badly commanded, they were no match for the veterans of Spain and the
Emperor. It was the first time that the new monarchy in France had made
war upon a grand scale, and it had to buy its experience. The campaigns
of the years 1635, 1636, and 1637 told a story of almost unrelieved
failure. In Italy the French armies just managed to hold their own.
In Alsace and the Netherlands they were everywhere out-generalled
and beaten back. In 1636, a Spanish army actually invaded France and
threatened Paris. Had it not been for the skilful generalship of
Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar in the Rhineland, and the signal success which
attended the efforts of the Swedish army, it is not at all improbable
that the Emperor would have been able to impose upon all Germany the
conditions of the peace of Prague, and by procuring the retirement
of the Swedes have narrowed the issues involved to the simple one
of a national war between France and Austro-Spain. Already Bavaria
and Catholic Germany, as well as Saxony, Brandenburg and nearly all
the Lutheran powers, had accepted the treaty. Oxenstjerna and the
Swedes had refused after protracted negotiations, only because the
Emperor and John George would not hear of making over to them an inch
of German soil. On their side they would not be content merely with
a money indemnity. Saxony and Brandenburg accordingly joined their
forces to those of the Emperor and determined to drive the Swedes back
across the sea to their own country. [Sidenote: =Success of Baner
in Germany, Battle of Wittstock, 1636.=] It was a critical moment.
Had the Saxons pressed on vigorously after the final rupture of the
negotiations in the autumn of 1635, they could hardly have failed to
have crushed Baner the Swedish general at Magdeburg with their superior
forces, but the opportunity was allowed to slip. Baner withdrew in
safety to the north, and was there strongly reinforced. He now had
under his orders an army sufficient to cope with his enemies, and after
some marching and countermarching succeeded in throwing himself upon
the Saxons and imperialists at Wittstock on the Mecklenberg frontier
of Brandenburg on October 4th 1636, before the Brandenburgers could
come to their assistance. The victory was one of the most complete
won by the Swedes during the whole war. The elector’s army was almost
annihilated, and Baner became as paramount in northern Germany as the
imperialists were upon the Rhine until the following autumn when he was
again driven back into Pomerania.

It is noticeable that both in diplomacy and war Richelieu improved his
position year by year. Gradually he learned how to win campaigns, as
he had learned gradually how to rule France. In the last four years
of his life, he gathered the fruits for which he had so patiently
laboured in the previous years. [Sidenote: =Capture of Breisach by
Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, 1638.=] In 1638 Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar
succeeded in making himself master of the upper Rhineland, and having
defeated the imperialists at Rheinfelden occupied Freiburg in Breisgau,
and on December 19th captured the important fortress of Breisach.
Richelieu when he heard the news hurried to the bedside of his dying
friend the Capuchin Joseph, ‘_Courage, père Joseph_,’ he cried,
‘_Breisach est à nous_,’ and with this characteristic viaticum
to console and strengthen him in his last agony, the wily diplomatist
passed from this world of intrigue, of which for the last ten years
his subtle brain had been the master and the mainspring. [Sidenote:
=Death of Bernhard. His army put under French command.=] In July
of the next year Bernhard himself died, and his army, together with
the conquests which it had made, passed directly under the command of
the French. French governors ruled in the Alsatian towns, and from
that time the annexation of Alsace to the French monarchy became one
of the recognised objects of the policy of the Bourbons. The success
of Richelieu did not stop with the land. Ever since the fatal day,
when the capture of a few French ships by the Huguenot Soubise in the
port of Blavet had sent the proud cardinal on his knees to England
and the Dutch to borrow ships to use against the revolted Rochellois,
Richelieu had devoted special care to the formation of a navy. In 1639
for the first time a French fleet appeared in the Channel, ready to
cope with the huge galleons of Spain, and to cut the bond which united
her to the Netherlands. France was now to play the same game at the
expense of Spain which had been played by Elizabeth of England in the
century before. But the time had not yet come when France was to wrest
from Spain the command of the sea. [Sidenote: =Defeat of the Spanish
Fleet in the Downs, 1639.=] The Spaniards succeeded in escaping
the French fleet, but only to fall into the hands of their allies the
Dutch. Sorely bestead by their quick-sailing antagonists, they took
refuge in the Downs under the neutral flag of England, but even there
the Dutch admiral pursued them, burned some of their ships, captured
others, and forced the remnant to seek the friendly shelter of Dunkirk.
From that time the passage of the Channel was closed to a Spanish fleet
as long as Spain was at war with the Dutch or the French. [Sidenote:
=Revolt of Portugal and Catalonia, 1640.=] In the next year still
more serious misfortunes awaited the crown of Spain. Portugal assisted
by French subsidies successfully reasserted its independence, and
re-established its monarchy under the House of Braganza in December
1640, while earlier in the year the revolt of the high spirited
Catalans effectually saved France from all danger of invasion from the
south and opened her path to Roussillon, while in Italy the French
flag was successfully planted on the walls of Turin. The two following
years served to make good the ground thus won, and when Richelieu died
in December 1642, he had the satisfaction of feeling that he had got
his hand upon the throat of his huge antagonist and was choking her.
With French armies strongly encamped on the Rhine and the plain of
Piedmont, with French governors established in Alsace and Lorraine,
with Roussillon and Cerdagne and the passes of Savoy in the possession
of France, she had indeed acquired a frontier which not only preserved
her from all danger of sudden invasion, but enabled her to strike a
swift and deadly blow at her enemies, before they could have time to
concentrate their forces against her. [Sidenote: =Improved position
of France at the death of Richelieu, 1642.=] Richelieu in his
eighteen years of power had given France concentration, unity, and
a scientific frontier. Seated between the two seas, bounded by the
Pyrenees the Alps and the Vosges, with her hand upon the Rhine and the
Scheldt, France was prepared to strike for the supremacy of Europe.

[Sidenote: =Richelieu’s policy continued by Mazarin.=]

The direction of the policy of France passed on the death of the
stern and uncompromising Richelieu into the hands of the supple and
intriguing Mazarin, but the change made no difference to the conduct
of foreign affairs. Louis XIII. followed his great minister
quickly to the grave, and during the minority of his young son, Louis
XIV., Anne of Austria, the queen-mother, who was entirely
devoted to Mazarin, became regent, and the policy of aggrandisement
at the expense of the Austro-Spanish House was vigorously carried on.
Within a few months of the accession of the young king, his reign was
graced by the most splendid success which had attended the arms of
France since the capture of Calais by the duke of Guise. Don Francisco
Mello, who had succeeded the cardinal-infant in the government of
the Netherlands in December 1641, thought to take advantage of the
weakness caused by the change of rulers in France; and sent the
count of Fuentes at the head of all the available troops which he
could muster, across the frontier. Mazarin, following his habitual
policy of trying to attract the princes of the blood to his side,
intrusted the command of the French army to the young duc d’Enghien,
the eldest son of the prince of Condé, who found the Spaniards on the
19th of May 1643 strongly posted among the marshes which surround
the little fortress of Rocroy. Condé, to give him the name by which
he is best known, though he never in the course of a long training
in war developed any of the higher qualities of a general, had that
magnetic personal power over his men which is all-important on the
battle-field. [Sidenote: =Destruction of the military power of Spain
at Rocroy, 1643.=] They would follow him anywhere. The _furia
francese_, which had been often remarked upon in the Italian wars of
the sixteenth century, had been but the mad rush of an undisciplined
mob, like the rush of African dervishes. Condé was the first great
leader to utilise this power among disciplined troops, and to make
the peculiar _élan_ of the French charge into one of the most
decisive tactics of the battle-field. Ever since the days of the great
captain, Gonsalvo da Cordova, the Spanish infantry had been the finest
in the world. The solid mass of pikemen, wedged close together in a
fortress-like formation, by their stubborn endurance could resist all
cavalry attack, and by sheer weight bear down all opposition. But if
once the mass became disorganised, it could never reform. Once break
the ‘hedgehog’ of pikes, and the day was won. Gustavus Adolphus had
shown at Breitenfeld how the superiority of artillery and musketry fire
might open lanes in these mighty masses, into which the heavy cavalry
might throw themselves, and overcome weight by weight in the shock of
hand-to-hand conflict. Condé at Rocroy illustrated a similar principle
by his mobile and disciplined infantry. Plunging a deadly fire into the
dense immovable masses of the Spaniards, he waited for the moment when
the falling men began to create confusion in the ranks, then against
their front, and into their flanks he poured the lithe and well-trained
infantry with irresistible effect. It was the story of the Armada and
the English ships retold on land. The huge masses could do nothing
against their swarming antagonists. Taken flank, front, and rear,
they could not alter their formation, they could not adapt themselves
to this new kind of warfare, they would not break and run, there was
nothing left but to die. There is something inexpressibly pathetic in
the figure of the old count of Fuentes, seated on his chair in the
middle of the fast diminishing square of his choicest troops, for the
gout would not permit him even to stand, calmly and patiently awaiting
inevitable death, as the defending ranks became thinner and thinner,
without the thought of surrender, without the power even of striking
a blow in self-defence, the type of his country, and his country’s
greatness, which was passing away with the shouts of victory which
hailed the young conqueror of Rocroy.

[Sidenote: =Conquest of the Upper Rhineland by the French,
1644–1645.=]

The victory of Rocroy made France the first military power of Europe,
but it was on the Rhine and not in the Netherlands that she put forth
all her energies. During the remaining years of the war, the chief
struggle was for the possession of the upper Rhineland. France wished
to secure her hold over Alsace by occupying both banks of the great
river, and making herself permanently mistress of the fortresses of
Breisach and Philipsburg. The Emperor and Maximilian fought stubbornly,
the one to save the Breisgau, one of the oldest possessions of the
House of Habsburg, from falling into the hand of the enemy, the other
to defend the frontiers of Bavaria from insult and plunder. In the
cautious Mercy, and the dashing Werth, they obtained the services of
generals not unfit to be matched with Condé and Turenne. At Freiburg
in Breisgau for three days the impetuous Condé dashed himself in vain
against the intrenchments of Mercy in August 1644, neglecting the wiser
counsel of Turenne, who showed how easily a flank march through the
mountains in the rear must compel the Bavarian general to retire. Just
a year afterwards, on August 3d, 1645, Condé won a Pyrrhic victory at
Nördlingen by his reckless and irresistible attack, but at too great
an expenditure of life to permit him to make use of it, although the
Imperialists were sore beset at the time, and Vienna itself threatened
by the Swedes under Torstenson.

The honour of giving the final determination to the war belongs to
Turenne. In 1646 he found himself for the first time at the head of
an adequate force, and his own master, and he at once determined to
put a stop to the ruinous system of frittering away advantages by
acting on two different centres. [Sidenote: =Campaign of Turenne and
Wrangel, 1646–1647.=] By combining his army with that of the Swedes,
he saw that he could oppose an overwhelming force to the enemy, and
end the war at a blow. Having procured the assent of Wrangel to his
plan, who had replaced Torstenson in command of the Swedes, Turenne
crossed the Rhine at Wesel, below Köln, and effected his junction with
Wrangel on the Main. Slipping cleverly between the archduke Leopold
William and the Bavarians, who sought to bar their passage, the united
armies marched straight upon the Danube, seized Donauwörth, and spread
themselves over the rich plain of Bavaria, plundering and burning up
to the gates of Munich, and even penetrating as far as Bregenz in the
Vorarlberg. Maximilian in despair deserted the Emperor, and signed a
separate truce with the allies in May 1647. He did not keep it long.
Stung in conscience, and afraid of after all losing the electoral hat,
which he had risked so much to win, he again joined the Emperor in
September of the same year. Terrible was the retribution which awaited
him. Turenne and Wrangel returned into Bavaria with an army swollen
with campfollowers to the number of 127,000. Beating the elector’s
troops at Zusmarshausen on May 17th, 1648, they fastened like locusts
on the land, and soon reduced it to the state of desolation in which
the rest of Germany lay. Maximilian summoned Wallenstein’s old general
Piccolomini to his aid, and prepared to strike one more blow for house
and home, but before the armies met, the welcome news came that peace
had been signed on the 24th of October at Münster, and the Thirty
Years’ War was at an end.

[Sidenote: =Negotiations for peace, 1642.=]

For some years the desire for peace had been getting stronger and
stronger. In Germany it was felt that the main obstacles to peace
had passed away with the chief actors in the struggle. Ferdinand II.
had died in the year 1637, and his son Ferdinand III. was not bound
in conscience or in policy to the Edict of Restitution. The Elector
Palatine, Frederick V., had preceded him in 1632. Christian of Anhalt,
Christian of Brunswick, Wallenstein, Gustavus Adolphus, and Bethlen
Gabor had long passed away, and the policies which they had represented
had taken other forms. There was no German question left seriously
difficult of solution. The real obstacles of peace were the ambition
of France, and the determination of Oxenstjerna to carve a territory
for the Swedes out of the Baltic provinces of Germany. But they could
not prevent the beginning of negotiations, though they could do much to
hinder their progress, and in 1642 it was agreed that representatives
should meet in Westphalia, at the towns of Münster and Osnabrück, to
discuss the preliminaries of a treaty. [Sidenote: =Congress of Münster
and Osnabrück.=] So many were the obstructions thrown in the way that
it was not till 1644 that the congress actually met. At Münster, which
was the meeting-place of the Catholic powers, there appeared under
the presidency of the papal nuncio (Chigi) and the ambassador of
Venice--the two mediating powers--the representatives of the Empire, of
France, of Spain, of the Catholic electors, and the Catholic princes of
the Empire. At Osnabrück were gathered the representatives of Sweden,
of the Protestant electors, and the Protestant princes and cities of
the Empire, together with envoys of France, which was thus represented
at both places. It was one thing to get the representatives to meet,
it was quite another to get them to set to work. The proposal of an
armistice during the negotiations had been definitely refused, and
consequently it became to the interest of each of the chief combatants
in turn to delay or promote the conclusion of peace as the fortune of
war shifted from one side to the other. Questions of precedence and
etiquette, always dear to the diplomatic mind, raised themselves in
plenty from the side of France or Spain or Sweden, whenever things
seemed to be going too quick. Months accordingly passed away and no
progress was made.

[Sidenote: =Separate treaties made by Brandenburg, Saxony, and
Bavaria.=]

The German princes, who saw their lands devastated, their villages
burned, their towns depopulated, their subjects obliged to turn
soldiers or brigands, or, where that was impossible, driven to stave
off the pangs of hunger by eating grass and roots, and even human
flesh, in order that France might annex Alsace, or Sweden seize
Pomerania, soon lost all faith in the tortuous dealings of the
diplomatists in Westphalia, and began to shift for themselves. On the
24th of July 1642, the young elector of Brandenburg, Frederick William,
made a separate treaty of neutrality with the Swedes, which practically
withdrew Brandenburg from the area of the war. On the 31st of August
1645, John George of Saxony followed the example of Brandenburg but on
far worse terms. In 1647, as we have seen, even Maximilian of Bavaria
was induced under stress of the invasion of Turenne to conclude for
a short time a separate truce. These acts showed how passionately
Germany longed for peace, but its actual conclusion was due to the
pressure exercised upon the Emperor and Maximilian by the successes
of Turenne, and upon Oxenstjerna and the Swedes by their young queen.
[Sidenote: =Interference of Christina of Sweden in favour of
peace.=] Christina, the daughter of Gustavus Adolphus, had come of
age in the year 1644, and had at once begun to show that masterful
spirit and commanding ability which were to make her one of the most
interesting characters of the century. Partly from a real desire to end
the barbarities of the war, partly from the necessities of her crown,
she at once applied herself to bring the Westphalian negotiations to
a successful issue, sent a special embassy to the court of Paris, and
insisted, sorely against the old chancellor’s will, upon accepting in
behalf of Sweden far less than had hitherto been demanded.

[Sidenote: =The peace of Westphalia, 1648.=]

By the peace of Westphalia, signed at last on the 24th of October 1648,
exactly thirty years and five months since the regents were thrown out
of the window at Prague, the religious difficulty in Germany was met
by the extension to the Calvinists of all the rights enjoyed by the
Lutherans under the religious peace. [Sidenote: =1. Solution of the
religious questions.=] The first day of the year 1624 was taken as
the test day by which the question of the ecclesiastical lands was to
be settled. All that was in Catholic hands on that day was to remain
Catholic, all that was in Protestant hands was to remain Protestant.
Roughly speaking the line thus laid down was the line which answered
to the facts. It preserved the bishoprics of the south, which were
avowedly Catholic, to the Catholics; and the secularised lands of the
north, such as Bremen and Verden, Halberstadt and Magdeburg, where
the Protestants were in a large majority, to Protestantism; and it
secured to Catholicism the victories of the Counter-Reformation in the
hereditary dominions of Austria, in Bohemia, in Bavaria, and in the
upper Palatinate. Finally, the treaty provided for the equal division
of the two interests in the imperial court of justice. There was little
difficulty in thus finding a satisfactory solution of the questions
connected with religion, which had been at the beginning of the war so
grave and alarming. [Sidenote: =2. Territorial compensation.=]
Both sides had by the process of time become aware that they could
not destroy the other, and had learned, if they did not admit, the
necessity of toleration. The serious problems for solution were those
connected with compensation. Eventually, however, the following
arrangements were agreed to.

[Illustration: MAP SHOWING THE MARCH OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, AND
THE TERRITORIAL CHANGES EFFECTED BY THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA.]

1. Maximilian of Bavaria retained the electorate, which was made
hereditary in his family, and was permitted to add the upper Palatinate
to his duchy of Bavaria.

2. A new electorate was created for Charles Lewis, the eldest son of
Frederick, Elector Palatine, and the lower Palatinate was restored to
him.

3. Sweden received western Pomerania, including the mouth of the Oder,
and the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, which gave her a commanding
strategical and commercial position on the German rivers, and the right
of being represented in the German Diet.

4. Brandenburg was compensated for her loss of western Pomerania by
the addition of the bishoprics of Halberstadt, Camin, Minden, and the
greater part of Magdeburg, to her dominions; and by the confirmation
of her inheritance in eastern Pomerania. In addition to this, she now
obtained control over the duchies of Cleves, Mark and Ravensberg, which
had been apportioned to her by the treaty of Xanten in 1614, but during
the war had been occupied by the rival armies of the Spaniards and the
Dutch.

5. France obtained possession of Austrian Alsace, including Breisach,
and the right to garrison Philipsburg; but the free city of Strasburg
was expressly reserved to the Empire. The three bishoprics of Metz,
Toul and Verdun were formally annexed to the crown of France, while in
Italy she received the fortress of Pinerolo.

6. Saxony retained Lusatia, and acquired part of the diocese of
Magdeburg, and the independence of the Dutch and the Swiss was finally
acknowledged.

[Sidenote: =The Peace, a solution of the religious difficulty.=]

The peace of Westphalia, like the war to which it put an end, marks
the close of one epoch and the beginning of another. It closes the
long chapter of the religious troubles in Germany, which grew out of
the Reformation of the sixteenth century, and it did so in the most
satisfactory manner possible, not by laying down any great principle of
religious toleration or religious domination, but simply by recognising
accomplished facts. Calvinism had worked its way to an equal position
with Lutheranism among the religious forces of Germany, and that
fact was accordingly recognised. The supremacy of each prince in his
own dominions over the religious as well as the political conduct
of his people had been recognised by the peace of Augsburg in 1555,
and been uniformly acted upon by Catholic and Protestant alike ever
since. It was now definitely, if tacitly admitted, and possible evils
guarded against by drawing the territorial line between Catholicism
and Protestantism as nearly as possible to coincide with the actual
difference of belief. It was still possible for a Protestant prince
in the north to oppress his Catholic subjects, it was still possible
for a Catholic prince of the south to banish all Protestants from
his dominions, but the question henceforth was but a local one, a
matter solely between the prince and his subjects, which imposed upon
Protestants and Catholics elsewhere in Germany no greater duty and gave
them no more right to interfere, than did the revocation of the Edict
of Nantes by Louis XIV. in France. Such a solution may not
have been from the point of view of morals the best conceivable. It was
under the circumstances of the time the best possible. To modern ideas
it may seem that the negotiators of Westphalia lost a great opportunity
of forcing into the unwilling hands of Germany the priceless boon of
religious toleration. Had they attempted to do so, they would only have
kept alive the spirit of religious animosity, and given to political
ambition the right again to shelter itself under the claims of religion
and renew the flame of war. By making the question wholly one between
prince and people, they ensured that all the conservative forces of
human nature, the forces that make against novelty, disturbance, and
revolution, the forces which impel men and governments so powerfully to
take the line of the least resistance, should be enlisted on the side
of religious peace. If the door was still left open to an archbishop of
Salzburg to banish all Protestants from his dominions, the paucity of
such instances of oppression after the peace of Westphalia, is alone
sufficient proof of the truce in religious affairs which it practically
brought about; while the danger of a hundred such acts of tyranny
cannot weigh as a feather in the balance against the unspeakable horror
of a renewal of the war.

[Sidenote: =The Peace the beginning of modern Europe.=]

The peace of Westphalia is also the beginning of a new era. It marks
the formation of the modern European states system. In Germany itself
the central fact registered by the peace is the final disintegration of
the Empire. The machinery it is true was still left intact. There was
an Emperor and a diet, electors and an imperial court of justice, but
all reality had passed away from them as a governing power in Germany.
The German people were governed by the German princes, who had all
the rights of sovereignty. They could coin money, make war, organise
armies, and send representatives to other courts. [Sidenote: =1. The
Empire becomes Austrian.=] The central authority was reduced to a
minimum, and if the Emperor was still a power in Germany, it was not
because he was Emperor, but because he was archduke of Austria and
many other German duchies, king of Bohemia, and king of Hungary. The
effect is at once visible in the policy of the House of Austria. The
Emperor still maintained his interests in Germany and on the Rhine,
still he stood forward as the champion of Germany to prevent France
from dominating over Europe, still from time to time he waged war to
check the growing power of Prussia, to develop schemes of commercial
enterprise in the Netherlands, but nevertheless, irresistibly, in spite
of tradition, and of association, his real attention became fixed more
and more irrevocably on the east and on the south. His policy in fact
in its heart of hearts ceased to be imperial or even German and became
purely Austrian. He sought compensation on the Danube for his losses on
the Rhine. He sacrificed much for a hold over Italy, which should give
to his impoverished and land-locked country the riches of the plain of
Lombardy and ports on the Adriatic. Insensibly and steadily he pushed
his territorial frontier more and more to the east and south, while
Brandenburg actuated by similar forces was pushing hers to the west and
to the north.

[Sidenote: =2. Sovereignty of the German princes.=]

Set free from even the shadow of imperial centralisation, Germany was
enabled to follow unimpeded her own laws of development. In central
Germany the spirit of disintegration, and the fearful desolation caused
by the war conquered all desire for unity. Almost to the present
day it has remained a heap of undistinguished and undistinguishable
atoms. [Sidenote: =3. Growth of Brandenburg and Bavaria.=] But in
north Germany, the natural tendency of small states to coalesce with
larger states began to show itself, and Brandenburg at once started
on that career of conquest and aggrandisement which has brought her
in our own day to the headship of Europe, while Bavaria, in alliance
with France, bid with some success against the House of Austria for
the leadership of south Germany, which since 1866 she has practically
attained. Thus, with regard to the internal politics of Germany, the
peace of Westphalia set in motion the forces, which, by ousting the
Emperor from predominance in Germany, throwing the energies of the
House of Austria towards Italy and the lower Danube, and enabling the
House of Hohenzollern to strike for the leadership of north Germany
and the command of the Rhine, have during the last two hundred years
permanently affected the balance of power in Europe and the condition
of the German people.

[Sidenote: =4. Diminished influence of the Papacy.=]

Outside the boundaries of Germany, the treaties of Westphalia mark no
less a change in the relations of the great powers of Europe. It is
the last time that the Pope appears as the mediator of the peace of
nations. His refusal to sanction the treaties was simply set on one
side by Catholic and Protestant powers alike, and from that time his
influence in the international politics of Europe ceased. [Sidenote:
=5. Transitory character of Swedish greatness.=] France and
Sweden are the two nations who have most right to claim the peace of
Westphalia as marking an epoch in their national history. With Sweden
it is the high-water mark of her European influence. The treaties
recognised her as one of the great powers of Europe, and secured to
her the supremacy of the Baltic, and the right to claim the allegiance
of north Germany, if she could win it. But the task proved beyond
her capacity, and she slowly shrank before the advancing power of
Brandenburg and of Russia, until before a hundred years had passed it
had become abundantly clear that with regard to Sweden the peace did
not mark the permanent inclusion of a new power among the great nations
of Europe.

[Sidenote: =6. Permanent advance of France.=]

With France the case was quite different. The peace is but one step on
the long road of territorial aggrandisement on which she had definitely
entered at the bidding of Richelieu and Mazarin. She became by the
war the first military power in Europe. By the peace she was planted
securely upon the Rhine and acquired not merely a scientific frontier
for offence and defence in the virgin fortress of Metz, the mountains
of the Vosges, and the strongholds of Breisach and Philipsburg, but an
incentive to future exertion, and a spur to criminal ambition, in the
desire to make her hold upon the Rhine but the beginning of a vaster
scheme of conquest. The _damnosa hereditas_ of the Rhine frontier
for France, sanctioned in part by the peace of Westphalia, has been the
chief disturbing element in European politics for nearly two centuries
and a half, and the malignancy of its poison shows even now no signs
of abatement. The great questions, which have agitated Europe during
the years which have elapsed since the Thirty Years’ War, have mainly
centred round the rivalry of Russia and of Austria for the command of
the Danube and the inheritance of the Turk, and the rivalry of France
and Germany for the possession of the Rhine. The great settlements of
European affairs, which have taken place since that time at Utrecht,
at Vienna, at Paris, and at Berlin, have been but the hatching of the
fully developed chicks from the eggs laid in Westphalia in 1648.

[Sidenote: =Desperate condition of Spain, 1648.=]

Spain was not included in the peace of Westphalia. The war between
her and France still continued for twelve years more, though at the
time the peace was signed at Münster it seemed as if the unwieldy
monarchy was on the brink of dissolution. Portugal had asserted its
independence, Catalonia assisted by a French army was in full revolt.
Roussillon and Cerdagne were in French hands. Flanders and the port of
Dunkirk had fallen under the spell of the conqueror of Rocroy. In 1646
a naval battle off the coast of Tuscany made the French for the first
time masters of the Mediterranean. Finally in 1648 Naples revolted
at the bidding of a fisherman named Masaniello, and, had Mazarin
shown a little more vigour and decision, might have been entirely
lost to the Spanish monarchy. Freed from the necessity of exertion on
the side of the Rhine, Mazarin had but to press his victories home
in the Netherlands and Catalonia to force Spain to a dishonourable
peace. [Sidenote: =Spain saved by the outbreak of the Fronde,
1648.=] But suddenly all these advantages were lost, and the tables
completely turned, by the grotesque outbreak of personal ambition, and
constitutional factiousness, known as the Fronde. For six years the
nobles and the citizens of Paris played at revolution, in order to
wrest power out of the hands of Mazarin and transfer it to their own.
Maddened by the spirit of faction, they did not hesitate to call in the
enemy and join themselves to Spain, if thereby they could wreak their
vengeance on the hated minister. Even Turenne and Condé were found
at different times leading armies against France. But in the end the
cleverness of the minister, the stubbornness of the queen-mother, and
the influence of the royal authority prevailed; and in 1653 Mazarin
returned from his second exile to take up again the reins of government
which he held until his death.

[Sidenote: =Weakness of France after the Fronde, 1653.=]

How different were the circumstances under which he again resumed
the war against Spain! The resources of France had been squandered,
the armies of France had become demoralised, the authority of the
government weakened, while Spain had profited by the difficulties
of her enemy to recover the Netherlands and Catalonia, and, through
the treason of Condé, was enabled to place one of the best generals
of the day at the head of her armies. In 1653 he invaded France and
threatened Paris, but was foiled by the superior strategy of Turenne,
and obliged to retreat. In the three following years France slowly won
back the frontier towns of the Netherlands. It was clear that neither
side was able to inflict upon the other such a defeat as would end the
war. [Sidenote: =Alliance between Mazarin and Cromwell, 1657.=] So in
1656 Mazarin, cardinal and absolutist though he was, sought for the
alliance of Cromwell, the Protestant hero of the English revolution.
Cromwell looked upon Spain with the eyes of Elizabeth, and saw in her
but the chief supporter of Popery in Europe, and the chief obstacle
to English trade. An agreement was soon arrived at by which 6000 of
Cromwell’s soldiers, probably the best in Europe, were put at the
disposal of Mazarin. In 1657 a change was quickly perceived in the war.
Turenne, with the assistance of his new allies, defeated the Spaniards
at the battle of the Dunes, captured Mardyke and Dunkirk, which was
handed over to England, and overran the country almost up to Brussels
in June 1658. This blow determined the Spanish government to treat
for peace. Conferences were held between the ambassadors of the two
countries on the Bidassoa during 1659, and on November 7th the peace
of the Pyrenees was signed. [Sidenote: =The Peace of the Pyrenees,
1659.=] By it France acquired Artois, Roussillon, and Cerdagne, and the
towns of Thionville, Landreçies, and Avesnes. She agreed to restore the
duke of Lorraine to his duchy, on condition that the fortifications of
Nancy were destroyed, and the armies of France allowed free passage
through the country. Condé was pardoned and restored to his property
and dignities. Finally the alliance was cemented by the marriage of
Louis XIV. to Maria Theresa, the daughter of Philip IV., who on her
marriage renounced on the part of herself and her children all claim
to the throne of Spain, on receipt of a dowry of 500,000 crowns. This
dowry was never paid, and in consequence it became a question whether
the renunciation was of any effect at all.

[Sidenote: =Commanding position of France, 1660.=]

The peace of the Pyrenees is the complement of that of Westphalia.
It marks the completion of the scientific frontier of France to the
south. The primary work of Richelieu had been accomplished. On the
south, on the south-east, and on the east, France was now possessed of
a frontier not merely defensible, but equally available for offence
or defence. Through the passes of the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the
Vosges, her armies could pour at a moment’s notice into the valleys of
the Ebro, the Po, and the Rhine. Only to the north was the frontier
still unmarked by natural boundaries. The annexation of Artois removed
the danger some few miles farther away from Paris, but that was all.
So grew up on the side of the Netherlands a desire for the Scheldt and
the Demer as the natural boundaries of France to the north, analogous
to the passion so fondly cherished by all French statesmen with regard
to the Rhine to the east. The politics of the future were coloured and
affected by the rivalry of the French and the Dutch on the Scheldt, as
by the rivalry of the French and the Germans on the Rhine. Among the
fondest dreams of French statesmen, second only to the acquisition of
the Rhine, has been the annexation of the Netherlands as a legitimate
object of French ambition, and it may be questioned whether any policy
has cost France more blood and treasure than that which has turned some
of the fairest and richest districts of the world into the cockpit of
Europe. To Spain the peace of the Pyrenees is a great epoch. The peace
of Vervins marked her failure, the peace of the Pyrenees marked her
fall. She had once bid for supremacy over Europe and had failed. She
had then entered the lists as the equal and rival of France and had
been beaten. France issued from the contest victorious both by land
and sea, and could condescend to take her former rival into protection
and partnership. After the peace of the Pyrenees, France and Spain
from being deadly rivals tended to become more and more the closest
of friends, until the time came when, owing to the provisions of the
peace, France stretched out its hands to absorb its mighty neighbour,
and the family compacts of the Bourbons dominated the politics of the
world.

CHAPTER VII

FRANCE UNDER RICHELIEU AND MAZARIN

Character of Richelieu--The principles of his government--Defects
of his policy--Character of Louis XIII.--Position and
organisation of the Huguenots--The rising of 1625--Edicts against
the nobles--Conspiracy of Vendôme--War with England--Siege
of La Rochelle--Destruction of the political power of the
Huguenots--Administrative reforms--The Day of Dupes--Rising of
Montmorency--Conspiracy of Cinq Mars--Centralising policy of
Richelieu--The regency of 1643--Character of Mazarin--Outbreak of the
Fronde--Constitutional claims of the Parlement--Unpopularity of the
prime ministership--Weakness of the Parlement--The lead taken by the
nobles--Factiousness of the movement--Flight of Mazarin--The Fronde in
the provinces--End of the Fronde--Last years of Mazarin.

[Sidenote: =Character of Richelieu.=]

The well-known portrait of Richelieu in the gallery of the Louvre shows
us the features of a man who under the outside of an aristocratic calm
conceals a highly nervous and anxious temperament. There is not a trace
of brutality, not a suggestion of coarseness, in the finely moulded
features. At the first glance there seems almost a want of power in
the delicate oval of the pale and attenuated face. Here is no Henry
VIII. to trample on the laws alike of God and man in order
to satisfy the demands of an imperious will, and rivet the chains
of slavery on a panic-stricken people. Here is no Cromwell to march
ruthlessly to his goal, over the constitution of his country, through
the blood of his king, in the fervid enthusiasm of a divine mission.
Here surely is no Napoleon to treat in callous selfishness human life
and national faith as nothing in comparison to military glory and
personal ambition. Yet the charges against Richelieu writ large on
the page of history are precisely those which his portrait repudiates.
Indiscriminate severity, ruthless barbarity, inordinate ambition,
personal tyranny, such are the accusations levelled against him as
a statesman and as a man. He is depicted as one who governed, and
who preferred to govern, by terrorism and espionage, who struck down
remorselessly and indiscriminately all who dared to oppose him, who
established the ascendency of a gaoler over the weaker nature of the
miserable king, who made France drink deep of the intoxicating potion
of military glory in order that she might not feel the ever tightening
chains of civil slavery. Even those who applaud his patriotism, and
recognise him as the author of the greatness of France admit the
charges of ruthlessness and barbarity made against his government by
apologising for them.

[Sidenote: =Principles of his government.=]

The home policy of Richelieu, less perhaps than that of any other
statesman, admits of palliatives and excuses. It is etched sharply
on the plate of history in white and black. There are no neutral
tints. He took for his motto that of the Romans of old, _Parcere
subjectis et debellare superbos_, and if ever such a principle
is admissible in human affairs it was admissible in France in the
days of Richelieu. But it is clear the principle must be pronounced
justifiable, not merely excusable, before the muse of history can
smooth over the harsh black lines of the portrait which she has been
accustomed to draw. A statesman may in the course of difficult affairs
be betrayed into the commission of a great crime, as was Theodoric in
his participation in the murder of Odoacer, and his character may yet
stand out from among men noble and true, though his name must go down
to posterity linked with a thousand virtues and one crime. But the
conduct of a ruler, who deliberately from first to last acts upon an
immoral principle of government, and steadily carries it out through
his whole career, admits of no palliation. He may blunder perhaps into
a noble and patriotic action as did Napoleon in the restoration of
Christianity in France, but that cannot affect the general severity of
the condemnation. So it is with Richelieu. We cannot pick and choose
among his actions, admit that in one execution he was right, in another
he was wrong. We cannot plead that a policy of terrorism is criminal,
but in his particular case there was much to diminish the guilt. He
will have none of such compromises and such excuses. Deliberately,
unhesitatingly, in his lifetime he chose a policy stern, terrific,
pitiless, and he carried it out relentlessly but not revengefully. Men
accuse him of never sparing even the dupe and the fool, they do not
accuse him of destroying the innocent. Not like Henry VIII.
did he ever put men to death because they might at some future time
prove seditious. Not like Charles II. did he permit innocent
lives to be sworn away wholesale rather than face the danger of a
popular tumult. No, all who suffered under him were legally guilty,
but nearly all who were legally guilty suffered. It was a terrible
policy--the extermination of the evil-doer, the establishment of the
structure of firm government in the blood of its enemies,--but it is
the policy which Richelieu adopted and defended in his lifetime, and
for which for two centuries and a half he has stood at the bar of
public opinion, pleading, as every line in his portrait shows, not
palliation, not excuse, but the calm conviction of a man who knows that
he is in the right.

[Sidenote: =Their justification.=]

There are times in the history of nations as in the history of
individual man, when the only possibility of safety and health lies
in the rigorous application of the knife. Such a state of disease
the body politic had reached in France, as it seemed to Richelieu,
in the seventeenth century. The poison of separation and anarchy had
been imbedded too deep in the system by the civil wars of the last
century, for the ordinary remedies of steady and firm government to
have any effect. As long as the Huguenots were forming themselves
into a political organisation in rivalry to the government of France,
and as long as the nobles were bent upon making all government
impossible in order that they might personally profit from the evils
of anarchy, there was a cancer eating into the heart of France which
made national death inevitable. The only hope of saving life lay in
the unsparing excision of the malignant tissue. If only one fibre was
left it would soon become a fresh root of the fell disease. For it
must be remembered that Richelieu had to deal with a nation which had
no power of defending itself against the evils which threatened to
destroy it. There was too little cohesion among the various provinces
seignories and towns, of which France was made up, to admit of any
united action. Excepting so far as the royal authority made itself
felt, the administration of the country districts was still feudal,
in the hands of the seigneurs and their officers, and that of the
towns was aristocratic, in the hands of the richer citizens and their
officers. The whole of the local administration was thus absorbed by
the aristocracy and the official classes. Intensely jealous both of
the king above them and of the people below them, they were still too
divided in rank and too narrow in sympathies to take the direction
of affairs into their own hands. When they met together as in the
States-General of 1614 they disclosed the most deep-seated rivalries.
The days of the political triumphs of their natural leaders, the great
nobles, had been the darkest and most miserable which France had ever
experienced. Incapable of good they were potent only for evil. Their
privileges, their authority, their prestige barred the way of the
simplest administrative reforms. Equal administration of justice,
equal taxation, free circulation of commodities within the country
were impossible as long as the seigneurs held their special fiscal and
judicial powers in their own districts. From classes whose one idea of
government was the maintenance of personal and class privilege nothing
could be hoped. They formed an impenetrable barrier of obscurantism
in the way of good government. Interested in the maintenance, not in
the suppression, of abuse, they kept the people down with one hand in
misery and degradation, while with the other they sought to terrify the
king into tutelage. Duller eyes than those of Richelieu might easily
have seen that with such an enemy there was no middle course possible.
Feudalism as a political power must be stamped out or it would kill
France.

[Sidenote: =Limitations of his policy.=]

If Richelieu had lived three centuries earlier or a century later he
might have endeavoured, as Edward I. or Burke would have
endeavoured, to plant the roots of his new government deep in the
affections of the people by enshrining it in permanent institutions.
A wise and thoughtful statesmanship, which, in destroying the power
of feudalism utterly, could have replaced it by an alliance of the
powers of the Crown and of the people, would have been indeed an
unique blessing not only for France but for Europe. Institutions which
could have brought into mutual contact the interests of the peasant,
the bourgeois, and the roturier, and could have combined them with
the interests of the Crown, would soon have given a quick-witted
people like the French what they most wanted--political education. An
aristocracy as capable and as generous as the French noblesse would not
long have sulked like Achilles in his tent, but would soon have been
found in its proper place as the leader of the people, claiming the
privilege of the post of danger by the right of truest worth. But a
policy such as this was possible only for one who combined sympathy for
the people with rare political foresight. Richelieu possessed neither,
and was born in an age unfavourable to both. A clear sharp eye to the
present and immediate future, indomitable courage, quick decision,
inflexible will, such were the gifts he brought to the service of
France. For her service he used them without a thought for any one
else. He gave her national unity. He secured for her religious peace.
He centralised all the forces of the nation under the Crown. He made
that Crown the chief among the powers of Europe. He planted the seeds
of a colonial empire, and nourished the budding germs of artistic and
literary excellence. But he effected no financial or judicial reform.
He stirred not a finger to relieve the social burdens of the people. He
even increased their misery and would not listen to their complaints.
Everything for the people and nothing by the people has been taken as
the motto of beneficent despotism. Richelieu cannot lay claim even to
that. For France collectively he had an intense and vivid love. For her
greatness he willingly spent himself. For the French people considered
as social units, as individuals, or as classes, he cared not an atom.
He struck to the earth the political power of the nobles, because as
long as it existed France could neither be great nor united. He never
attempted to interfere with one of their social privileges, though
it was by those that they made the lives of the bulk of the French
peasants hideous and miserable. As a benefactor of the French people
he is as infinitely below Sully and Colbert as he is above them in
statesmanship. A wretched financier, an incapable administrator, prompt
to demand the obedience of the people whom he governed, and careless
of their happiness, without one spark of sympathy, without one touch
of weakness, Richelieu stands before us as the embodiment of intellect
and of will. His business was with _la haute politique_. That
he understood. To that he devoted all his energies. In that he shone
supreme. With unerring quickness of intellectual judgment he singled
out at once the true obstacles to the greatness of France. He found
them in the national disintegration brought about by the civil wars,
and largely fostered by the Huguenots, and in the anarchical tendencies
of the higher nobility. With true political insight he saw that with
a professional army at his back and the sentiments of loyalty and
national unity to support him, there was nothing which could stop the
ultimate victory of the Crown, save the weakness of the Crown itself.
For some years the struggle was intense, but his indomitable will in
the end gained the day. When he had once won the confidence of the
cautious and suspicious king the contest was practically over, and he
was free to turn his attention almost wholly to foreign affairs. By a
policy eminently skilful, if morally unjustifiable, he contrived to
hide the scars of civil dissension by the lustre of military glory,
and to provide a more congenial and patriotic sphere for the energies
of a nobility whom he had deprived of political influence, by summoning
them to win for France the victories which were to make her king the
leader of Europe.

[Sidenote: =Character of Louis XIII.=]

The greatness of the reign of Louis XIII. begins with the
ministry of Richelieu, and the death of the king followed so close
upon the death of the minister that the fame of the master has become
wholly overshadowed by the greatness of the servant. When Richelieu
was on the stage there was indeed but little room for any one else.
Yet it does not appear on closer inspection, that Louis was either the
personal or political nonentity which he has often been described.
His character was indeed singularly unlike that of his father or
his son, and in so many respects different from the ordinary French
type, that perhaps French historians have done him but scant justice.
His temperament was cold, heavy, and passionless, his mind slow and
reserved, but tenacious, and at times obstinate. A man of few friends
and no intimates, hardly if at all susceptible to the influence of
women, without strong desires or ambitions, without many interests, yet
one who kept a shrewd and watchful eye upon the world. Very cautious
and patient in making up his mind, suspicious of all but a very few,
when his decision was taken he acted firmly, boldly, straightforwardly,
and never went back. Strangely enough his real interests were in the
more strenuous affairs of out-door life. Like James I. he
was passionately fond of hunting, unlike him he was almost more fond
of war. No mean soldier himself, he was a very good judge of military
capacity in others, and was never so well and never so happy as when
on campaign. Many of the officers who did so much to establish the
credit of the French armies at the beginning of the next reign, like
Fabert, owed their promotion to the skilled eye and firm friendship of
Louis XIII. His relations with his mother Marie de Medici and
his great minister show him to have been a man of more than ordinary
tact. It was by no means easy to keep the peace between the two, when
Marie believed herself to have been basely deserted, and Richelieu had
not a friend at court save the king himself. It was still less easy to
maintain the minister against the incessant and malevolent attacks of
his enemies, and yet preserve the independence of action and reserve
of judgment necessary to prevent the king from degenerating into
the partisan. But in this he succeeded remarkably well. He trusted
Richelieu far more sincerely than Richelieu trusted him, and it is
interesting to notice in their correspondence at critical moments,
that it is the king who becomes more calm, more collected, more
dignified, as the intensity of the crisis increases, while Richelieu
is torn by doubts and hesitations and seems overwhelmed by anxieties
and fear. But in reality Richelieu never had any good reason to doubt
the friendship or support of the king. Louis had the gift, rare in men
in his position, of knowing when to act and when to remain quiet. He
never suffered his minister to forget that he was a minister and not
a king. Richelieu never assumed so large a part of the functions of
royalty as did Buckingham in England. He was a Wolsey, not a _maire
du palais_. But on the other hand Louis had the sense to see that
if a king is fortunate enough to have a Richelieu for his minister he
must give him a free hand. He held the scales of justice even between
his minister and his court, he suffered no mean motives of jealousy to
detract from the fulness of his confidence, and he was content to be
classed by posterity among the makers of the French monarchy, because
he had had the fortune to be the maker and master of the greatest of
French ministers.

[Sidenote: =Position of the Huguenots, 1622.=]

The peace of Montpellier, concluded between Louis and the revolted
Huguenots in October 1622, was one of those treaties which are not so
much a conclusion of a struggle as a preliminary to its recommencement.
It left the questions at issue not merely unsolved but intensified.
Huguenotism, always quite as much a political as a religious movement,
had derived its aspirations and drawn much of its strength from the
desire of independence arising from the jealousy of the king of Paris,
which was characteristic of the south of France, and from the jealousy
of the French crown, which was characteristic of the French nobility.
It was among the towns of the south of France and among the smaller
nobility--the country seigneurs--that it spread with the greatest
rapidity. Its strongly self-centred and individualistic creed fell in
naturally with their passionate love for their privileges and their
intense dread of the central government. Ever since the Huguenots
became a power in the land, the tendency of their policy had been
towards independence, all the more significant because it came about
without any defined cry for separation. Aided by the weakness of the
crown Huguenot towns, such as La Rochelle, Montauban and Nismes, during
the civil troubles became self-governing communities independent of
the French government, and had been practically recognised as such
by various treaties during the wars, and by the Edict of Nantes.
[Sidenote: =Their organisation.=] Huguenot organisations under the
name of ‘circles’ parcelled France out into districts under regular
officers for the purposes of defence and offence from end to end. In
many parts of the country this organisation consisted merely upon
paper, but in the north where the influence of the duke of Bouillon
was great, and over large districts of the south it was a dangerous
and menacing reality. In the strong words attributed to Richelieu, the
Huguenots shared the government of France with the king. In the revolt
of 1621, although the leaders probably never intended to do more than
frighten the Crown and secure their own political position, many of
the rank and file were openly fighting for independence. To the Crown
therefore it had become essential to crush the power of the Huguenots
if it wished to be supreme over France. To the Huguenots it was no
less essential to conquer the Crown if they wished to secure their
independence.

In such a state of affairs the treaty of Montpellier was obviously but
a breathing space in the combat. Both sides saw that at that moment
neither of them could win a decisive victory, and both were content
to wait for a more favourable opportunity. [Sidenote: =Rising of
the Huguenots, 1625.=] That opportunity seemed to have come to the
hot-headed Soubise, the brother of Rohan and the head of the circle
of La Rochelle in 1625. The new minister was hardly yet settled in
his saddle. It was no secret that he was surrounded by enemies of all
kinds, from the king’s brother Gaston of Orléans down to the pages of
the royal household. He had just engaged the forces of France in the
question of the Valtelline, and had incurred the enmity of the more
strenuous of the Catholic party by making war upon the soldiers of the
Pope. Surely a rising of the Huguenot organisations at such a moment
could not fail to be successful at least in overturning the rash and
unpopular minister. Since Richelieu had been in power he had been
diligently forming a nucleus of a royal navy, and at the beginning of
1625 the six vessels of war, which were the outcome of his efforts,
were gathered in the little port of Blavet in Brittany. Soubise by an
act of happy daring seized the whole of them on the 17th of January
1625, and, establishing himself on the islands of Rhé and Oléron,
prepared, now that he was undisputed master of the sea, to defy any
attack which the royal forces might direct against the walls of La
Rochelle. But Richelieu was not so easy out-generalled. He at once
withdrew from the affairs of Italy, procured ships from Holland and
England, after long and tortuous negotiations in which he completely
outwitted Buckingham, and manning them with French sailors inflicted a
crushing defeat upon Soubise in September 1626, and forced him to take
refuge in England. The crisis had been, however, sufficiently acute
to show Richelieu that it was not safe to undertake responsibilities
abroad as long as his enemies at home were so watchful and unsubdued.
He must establish his authority on a firm basis in France, before
he could run the risk again of having to deal with foreign war and
internal revolts together. On the 5th of February he put an end to the
Huguenot rising by renewing the terms of the treaty of Montpellier. In
March the treaty of Monzon relieved him for the moment of all danger
from the side of Spain, and he felt that the time had then arrived when
he might safely proceed to strike the first blow at the power of the
nobles.

[Sidenote: =Edicts against duelling and private castles, 1626.=]

In the summer of 1626 two edicts were issued in pursuit of this
policy. By the first all duelling was declared punishable by death.
By the second the destruction of all fortified places not situated on
the frontier was ordered. These two laws struck at two of the most
cherished privileges of the nobles and the greatest dangers of the
state. The right of an independent tribunal of arms, by which all
personal questions arising in their own order should be adjudicated,
was one incompatible with civilised and authoritative government. The
fortified town and the fortified castle formed the natural home of
both sedition and oppression, and Richelieu, in determining to sweep
them away in France, was merely taking a course which all restorers
of order in all countries had felt themselves obliged to take. Like
Henry II. of England he found that fortresses in the hands of
a territorial nobility were inconsistent with the power of the Crown.
But the nobles were not going to submit to legislation of this sort
without attempting a counter stroke. [Sidenote: =Suppression of the
conspiracy of Vendôme and Chalais, 1626.=] Gaston of Orléans, the
king’s brother, with the duc de Vendôme the son of Henry IV.
and Gabrielle d’Estrées, the comte de Soissons another prince of the
House of Bourbon, the duchesse de Chevreuse a friend of the queen and
a born _intrigante_ and tireless enemy of the cardinal, became
the leaders of a plot to depose the king, to assassinate Richelieu,
and put Gaston on the throne. It was soon discovered. Gaston to save
his own life basely surrendered his friends and associates to the
ruthless mercy of Richelieu. The comte de Chalais suffered for him on
the scaffold, another of his associates, Ornano, in prison. The duc de
Vendôme, the duc de la Valette son of the old duc d’Epernon, Madame
de Chevreuse, the comte de Soissons were all banished, and Richelieu
rid himself at one blow of the most dangerous of his enemies. The
nobles were astonished at his audacity. They could not believe that
any one would dare so to treat the noblest of their order, but in the
following year they received a lesson which startled them still more.
[Sidenote: =Execution of Montmorency-Bouteville, 1627.=] The comte
de Montmorency-Bouteville, one of the famous family of Montmorency
and a noted duellist, fought a duel in open day in the midst of
Paris in disregard of the royal edict. Richelieu had him immediately
arrested and put to death on the scaffold on the 21st of June 1627. The
execution of one of the noblest of French subjects, for the exercise
of one of the commonest and most cherished privileges of the French
nobility, showed them more clearly than anything else had yet done,
that the minister at the head of the government was determined to be
their master.

[Sidenote: =War with England, 1627.=]

Hardly had Richelieu emerged in triumph from his first contest with
the nobles, than he found himself involved in an unnecessary war with
England and the Huguenots. The treaty between France and England on
the occasion of the marriage between Henrietta Maria and Charles
I. contained provisions which were absolutely certain to
lead to mutual recriminations sooner or later. Charles had promised
publicly to permit his wife to keep her French household, and have
complete control over the education of the children till they were
thirteen years of age. Privately he had bound himself to tolerate Roman
Catholicism in England. But he very soon found that, in the excited
and unreasonable temper of the English people, it was impossible for
him even to pardon Roman priests condemned under the penal laws.
Neither in the interests of his domestic life could he permit a band
of mischief-making women to alienate from him the affections of his
child-wife. In both these matters he found himself compelled to break
his word. Louis on his side set at naught his own verbal promise to
permit Mansfeld and the English contingent to march across France to
attack the Palatinate, and so in the eyes of the English court became
largely responsible for the terrible misfortunes of the year 1626 in
Germany. When Richelieu in further pursuance of the treaty had demanded
from Charles a loan of ships to use against Soubise and the revolted
Huguenots, Buckingham had set his wits against those of Richelieu to
avoid carrying out his obligation in fact, while he outwardly professed
to be eager to do so, and even condescended to the trick of organising
a sham mutiny on board the fleet. But in the end he was outwitted, and
the spectacle of English ships in the French fleet, which defeated
Soubise and the Huguenots, so exasperated the Protestant party in
the English Parliament, that Buckingham from motives of self-defence
as well as from those of wounded pride declared war against France
in order to shift the odium from himself to Richelieu, and to pose
before the world as the champion of the Protestant cause. [Sidenote:
=Siege of La Rochelle, 1627.=] In July 1627 Buckingham, at the
head of a large but ill-appointed fleet, appeared before La Rochelle,
and occupying the island of Rhé besieged the fort of S. Martin. The
Rochellois much against their will felt compelled to make common cause
with the English, and the Huguenots in the south of France seized the
opportunity once more to rise into revolt under Rohan. Richelieu found
himself again threatened by a formidable combination of foreign and
domestic enemies, and determined this time to have recourse to no half
measures. In November Buckingham was obliged to withdraw from before
the unconquered S. Martin and sail back to England for reinforcements.
Richelieu himself formed the siege of La Rochelle. Recognising at once
the impossibility of capturing a city open to the sea and surrounded
by marshes by attack on the land side only, he began the gigantic
work of building a mole right across the mouth of the harbour. Thus
he hoped to cut off the city wholly from the possibility of relief
from the sea, while the rigid lines of circumvallation drawn round the
town prevented any attempt at introducing provisions from the land
side. For five months the weary work went on. It was a race against
time. All depended on the question whether the mole could be finished
before the English fleet reappeared. Day and night in spite of many
blunders and some misfortunes the huge mass slowly grew. The two wings
approached nearer to each other, garnished with towers and palisades
and batteries, until by the end of April 1628 the aperture between
the two was small enough to be closed by a bridge of boats made into
floating batteries, and fastened together by stout iron chains and
defended by wooden stockades. It was hardly finished when the English
fleet was sighted. For fifteen days the English hurled themselves
with renewed and despairing vigour against the fortifications, but
without success. On the 18th of May they sailed home and left La
Rochelle to starve. [Sidenote: =Capture of La Rochelle, 1628.=]
Victory was now but a question of time. Early in October the English
fleet reappeared, but did not even dare to face the now impregnable
defences of the besiegers. On the 28th the heroic Guiton worn out by
famine accepted the inevitable. La Rochelle surrendered to the royal
forces, its municipal privileges were abolished, its fortifications
destroyed, its government placed in the hands of royal officials.
Liberty of conscience was guaranteed to the citizens, but all vestige
of independent authority was absolutely taken away.

[Sidenote: =Pacification of the south, 1629.=]

After the capture of La Rochelle it was a comparatively easy matter
to crush out the rebellion in the south. Early in 1629 the king put
himself at the head of his army, marched into Languedoc and the
district of the Cevennes, capturing the towns and destroying the
castles. Rohan and the Huguenot leaders finding they could get no
material assistance from Spain were obliged to submit. By the peace
of Alais concluded in June 1629 the Huguenots ceased to retain any
political power in France. Their guaranteed towns were handed over to
the royal government, their fortresses were razed, their organisation
was destroyed, their right of meeting was taken away, but their liberty
of worship remained unimpaired.

The peace of Alais marks the end of the first act of the great
drama which was being played by Richelieu in the history of France,
the completion of the first, if not the most difficult, of the
tasks to which he had devoted himself. [Sidenote: =Destruction of
the political power of the Huguenots.=] By it the policy of the
Edict of Nantes was carried to a legitimate conclusion. Religious
peace was ensured by the recognition of religious division, while
the danger that religious division should impair the national unity
was effectually removed. It was a policy of national unity not of
national uniformity. Richelieu did not care that all Frenchmen should
be made outwardly to profess the same religious or political creed,
should wear outwardly the same religious or political dress, as long
as they were whole-hearted in the service of the Crown, as long as
their liberty was not a weakness to the state. That it could not fail
to be a source not merely of weakness, but of serious danger, to the
state, as long as it was based upon political privilege and defended
by political organisation, had already been abundantly proved in the
course of the reign of Louis XIII. Every time that France had
been threatened by the hostility of her neighbours, whether of Spain
or England, a rising of the Huguenots had turned a serious foreign
war into an acute national crisis. Every time that the Huguenots
had risen in revolt they had allied themselves with the national
enemies. Twice already had Richelieu’s plans for the development of
France been thwarted by the determination of the Huguenots to prefer
their independence to their patriotism, and to look upon the foreign
entanglements of the government merely as their opportunity. When a
powerful political organisation deliberately sets itself to profit
by the dangers of the nation, and to pursue its own interests to the
detriment of those of the nation, it must either crush the government
or be crushed by it. Richelieu enlisted the whole forces of the state
in the campaign against the Huguenots, because he saw clearly that
as long as their religious privileges were based on the possession
of political power, the political exigencies of their position, and
the fancied necessities as well as the inherent tendencies of their
religion, must make them the enemies of France. The destruction of La
Rochelle and the peace of Alais changed them at once from a formidable
political party into a harmless religious sect. They ceased to be a
danger to the state through their want of patriotism and desire for
independence. They became a strength to France through their frugality,
their manual skill, and their morality. Grateful for religious
toleration and satisfied with it, in less than a generation they were
found among the staunchest supporters of the monarchy, and effectually
proved their gratitude by never stirring a finger to increase the
embarrassments of the Crown in the perilous days of the _Fronde_.

[Sidenote: =Administrative reforms.=]

By the end of the year 1629 Richelieu might well look back with pride
at the success which had attended his efforts to establish the unity
of the nation by consolidating its forces under the power of the
Crown. He had crushed a plot of the most formidable of his enemies at
court. He had established his ascendency over the mind if not over the
affections of the king. He had purified the financial administration
so that a larger proportion of the taxes found their way into the
treasury. He had put down a dangerous right of private war on a small
scale under the guise of duelling. He had destroyed the castles and
fortresses over large districts of France, notably in Brittany and the
southern provinces. He had laid the foundation of the French navy. He
had destroyed the political power and organisation of the Huguenots.
But there was still much to be done. As long as the administration
of the country and the raising and control of the army were in the
hands or under the direction of the territorial nobility, all that
he had hitherto accomplished was dependent upon his own precarious
life and the still more precarious favour of the king. A successful
court intrigue might destroy the whole structure at a blow, and throw
France back into the slough of anarchy and peculation from which he
had raised her. To obviate this danger he applied himself during the
rest of his life, as far as internal politics were concerned, to two
special objects, the establishment of a bureaucracy--a civil service
under the direct control of the Crown--and the organisation of the army
upon a professional basis. In carrying out this latter object he had
to proceed very carefully, partly owing to financial considerations,
and partly to the necessity he felt for providing in the army a sphere
of activity for the nobility, whose political and administrative power
he was taking away; and it was not till the time of Louvois that the
French army became thoroughly professional. But the active and open
warfare in which France became engaged after 1635, as well as the
growing importance of the infantry, enabled him to do much in the way
of raising and organising infantry regiments directly by the Crown,
without the interposition of any noble as colonel, and of appointing
and promoting officers such as Fabert and Catinat, who did not belong
to the noble class. For many years the nobles considered it below their
dignity to serve in infantry regiments, a fortunate prejudice which
made it easier for the government to get direct control over that
important department of the army.

[Sidenote: =Illness of Louis XIII., 1630.=]

The year 1630 saw a vivid illustration of the danger to which the new
system of government was exposed from the possible success of a court
intrigue or the death of the invalid king. On his way back from the
army in Italy to Paris, Louis was taken suddenly ill at Lyons with
dysentery. For some days he hung between life and death. On the 22d of
September all hope was given up. Gaston hurried to Paris to secure the
government. The queen and the queen-mother made arrangements for the
arrest of the cardinal, while Richelieu himself, seeing the labours
of his life at an end, prepared to fly. But the king’s constitution,
much more vigorous than historians have supposed, triumphed not only
over the disease but over the physicians. In spite of having been
bled seven times in one week he still retained strength enough to
rally, and Richelieu remained for the moment safe. His enemies had
to alter their plans. [Sidenote: =The day of Dupes, 1630.=]
Determined not to be baulked of their prey the queen-mother and the
queen organised a plot against the minister, which was joined by the
two Marillacs, Bassompierre, and Orléans. On the 11th of November
Marie in the presence of the king poured forth a torrent of furious
invective against Madame de Combalet the niece of the cardinal. On
Richelieu’s entrance the storm was directed against him. Accusing him
of treason and perfidy, she demanded from Louis his instant dismissal,
and called upon the king to choose between his minister and her. For
some hours Louis was in great doubt, and the fate of Richelieu hung
in the balance. He even signed an order intrusting the command of
the army to the maréchal de Marillac. All the courtiers thought the
reign of Richelieu was over. Worn out and sick at heart, the king,
to free himself from fresh importunities, retired to his hunting-box
at Versailles; but once away from the pressure of the courtiers his
good sense and patriotism reasserted their power, and he determined to
support his minister even against his wife and his mother. Sending for
Richelieu privately to join him at Versailles, he put himself entirely
into his hands, and the Day of Dupes was over. The vengeance of the
outraged minister was terrific. Gaston of Orléans fled to Lorraine,
Marie to the Spaniards at Brussels, the maréchal de Marillac was
executed, his brother the chancellor died soon afterwards in exile,
Bassompierre was imprisoned, the duchesses of Elboeuf, and Ornano
banished, and the household of the queen filled with the cardinal’s
nominees.

[Sidenote: =Rising of Orléans and Montmorency, 1632.=]

But exile increased rather than appeased their hatred of their
conqueror. Gaston of Orléans, who had married the sister of the duke of
Lorraine strongly against the wishes of Louis, who would not recognise
the marriage, organised a fresh plot against the cardinal in 1632.
To bring about the ruin of his hated enemy, he did not scruple to
ally himself with the enemies of his country. A combined force of
Lorrainers and Spaniards was to invade France from the north-east,
while the maréchal de Montmorency, the governor of Languedoc, raised
the south. But Richelieu’s good fortune did not desert him. The Swedes
defeated the Spanish force on the Rhine, before it had even reached
the frontiers of France. Lorraine, instead of France, had to bear the
brunt of invasion, and 25,000 men under Louis himself quickly overran
the country, and brought it permanently under French administration,
although it was not formally united to the French monarchy till a
century later. Meanwhile, Gaston of Orléans, at the head of a few
thousand horsemen, had made his way to Montmorency in Languedoc,
endeavouring to raise the country as he went against the iniquities
of the minister. Not a man stirred. France had begun to realise that,
harsh and oppressive as the government of Richelieu might be, it was
far more just and far more tolerable than that of the nobles. In
Languedoc Montmorency had succeeded in collecting a small army through
his own personal popularity and the support of the estates, but the
people refused to move, and he was powerless in the face of Schomberg
and the royal troops. At Castlenaudary, on the 1st of September
1632, he was defeated and captured. On the 30th of October the last
representative of the most illustrious of the great territorial nobles
of France bowed his head before absolute monarchy on the scaffold.

[Sidenote: =Suppression of the enemies of Richelieu.=]

A fresh proscription instigated by the implacable justice of the
cardinal decimated Languedoc. The estates were dispersed, many of the
nobility and gentry executed or sent to the galleys, five bishops
deposed, the castles and fortifications of the towns destroyed. The
hateful and miserable author of all this misery, Gaston himself,
alone escaped. Protected by his birth and his readiness to betray
his friends, he was permitted to take refuge in Brussels. There, in
conjunction with the queen-mother and the Spaniards, he renewed his
plots against France and the cardinal. But Richelieu now felt himself
so thoroughly the master both of the nobles and of the nation, that
Gaston was more dangerous to him as an open enemy than he would be
as the leader of the disaffected at home. The promise of the king’s
favour, and renewed gifts to himself and his friends, soon induced
him to betray the queen-mother and his hosts. In October 1634 he left
his wife and his mother, was formally reconciled to the king and the
cardinal, and retired into private life at his castle of Blois. Marie
took refuge with her daughter in London, and Richelieu, freed for the
time from all anxiety as to revolts and court intrigues, was enabled
to turn his whole attention to the aggrandisement of France. In the
following year, 1635, he entered openly into the Thirty Years’ War.

[Sidenote: =Conspiracy of Cinq-Mars, 1642.=]

Once more but a few months before his death had Richelieu to defend
himself against a court intrigue, but it was one which had its roots
far more in personal ambition than in serious political rivalry.
Cinq-Mars, the son of the marquis d’Effiat, the superintendent of
finance, chafing under the stern and all-pervading masterfulness of the
cardinal, abused his position of intimacy with the king, to try and
poison his mind against his minister, who at that time was thought to
be dying. Gaston, that veteran intriguer, and the duc de Bouillon the
lord of the feudal dependency of Sedan, gave some political importance
to the intrigue by lending it their countenance. The system of
espionage established by Richelieu was far too good to permit intrigues
of that sort to pass unnoticed. Still neither Richelieu nor the king
interfered until they received proof that Cinq-Mars was actually
in communication with the national enemy, the Spaniards. Then they
struck, and as usual struck hard. The duc de Bouillon was compelled to
surrender Sedan to France. Cinq-Mars and his friend de Thou perished
on the scaffold, the last of a long list of victims, including five
dukes, four counts, and a marshal of France, who were sacrificed by the
pitiless cardinal to the genius of his country.

[Sidenote: =Centralising policy of Richelieu.=]

It is easy to fix the eyes so intently upon the destructive side of
Richelieu’s war with the nobles as to forget that in his sight it was
by far the least important part of his work. The execution of traitors
and peculators, the banishment of conspirators and _intrigantes_,
were necessary steps towards the abolition of their political power,
not the satisfaction of private vengeance. As with the Huguenots,
so with the nobles, he did not wish to root them out, but to make
them powerless for evil. As long as they enjoyed in right of their
birth political power, based upon personal privilege and territorial
possessions, so long would they refuse absolutely to render themselves
amenable to the new institution of the prime-ministership, and would be
always in danger of preferring the interests of their order to those of
the state. When once they had been deprived of territorial power, they
would naturally become the foremost servants of that Crown of which
they had before been the rivals. They would be eager to serve, where
before they had been determined to rule. Throughout the government
of Richelieu the work of centralisation goes steadily on. A powerful
structure of royal government is gradually built up, and the abortive
plots, and the subsequent executions, mark the chafings of those who
felt that power was slipping steadily away from them, and by a sure
instinct directed their efforts against the man who was identified with
the system which they hated. The destruction of the feudal castles,
the development of the professional army, the substitution of royal
administrative officers for those of the territorial nobles in Brittany
and Languedoc, after the rebellions of Vendôme and Montmorency,
the administration by the Crown directly through its own officials
of the Huguenot towns, after the peace of Alais, and of Lorraine
and Sedan after their conquest, the establishment of a royal post
throughout the kingdom, were all steps in the direction of undermining
the political power of the nobles. [Sidenote: =Appointment of
Intendants, 1637.=] Finally in 1637 came the greatest blow of all.
For many years Richelieu had been in the habit of appointing royal
commissioners, under the name of Intendants, to take cognisance of
certain matters of local administration, usually of a judicial nature.
In 1637 by a royal edict, he appointed Intendants in each province,
and placed in their hands the whole financial, judicial and police
administration. The effect of this was to concentrate powers, which
had hitherto been enjoyed by the territorial nobility and the local
administrative bodies, wholly in the hands of officials appointed
by the minister and responsible to him alone. It created in fact a
permanent civil service of professional men of the middle class,
entirely dependent upon the royal favour, and thus did much to foster
the growth of absolute power, and to give stability to the government,
while checking the separatist tendencies of the local authorities.

[Sidenote: =The Regency of 1643.=]

The value of the administrative system organised by Richelieu soon
became evident, when in the year 1643 France found herself once
more threatened by the minority of the king and the weakness of a
regency. The great cardinal maintained after his death the social
and political order to the preservation of which he had devoted his
life. The strength of the bureaucracy and the memory of the government
of Richelieu alone preserved the authority of the monarchy amid the
follies and the treasons of the _Fronde_. Richelieu himself died
on the 4th of December 1642, and Louis followed him to the grave on
the 14th of May 1643, leaving the crown to his infant son only four
and a half years old. It was an anxious crisis for France. Louis
XIII. in his distrust of his wife, Anne of Austria, whose
influence had been from the time of her marriage uniformly exercised
against the policy of the king and Richelieu, had endeavoured to
control her exercise of political power after his death by nominating
in his will a council of state, without whose advice she was powerless
to act. But Anne, whose character developed with her responsibilities,
would have none of such restrictions. Going to the Parlement de
Paris she asked them boldly to annul the will of her husband in the
interests of herself and her son. The Parlement were by no means loth
to add to their political privileges that of pronouncing a decisive
word on the government of France. Without hesitation in their own
interests they cancelled the will of the late king, suppressed the
council of regency, and handed over the government of the country to
Anne absolutely. It was an ominous thing that so soon after the death
of Richelieu personal interests should again come to the front. But
fortunately for France among those personal interests one was quickly
seen to predominate over all others, which ensured the continuation
of the policy of the great cardinal. [Sidenote: =Mazarin appointed
chief minister.=] Ever since the death of the Père Joseph, Richelieu
had intrusted the details of his foreign policy to the management of
the astute Italian Giulio Mazzarini, who attracted his notice in the
negotiations with the Pope in 1628, entered the service of France at
his request in 1639, was rewarded with a cardinal’s hat in 1641, and
was recommended to Louis by Richelieu as his successor in the prime
ministership on his deathbed in 1642. By his cleverness, tact, and
the gracefulness of his manners, Mazarin succeeded in making a deep
impression upon the fastidious and loveless Anne of Austria. Surrounded
by interested and selfish nobles, anxiously solicitous for the welfare
of her son, she felt the necessity of a stronger arm on which to lean,
and a sympathetic heart to which she might cling, and she chose Mazarin
as the person whom she could intrust with the confidences of her
womanly nature. Whether they were eventually secretly married or not is
one of the unsolved problems of history, but that during the rest of
their lives they were united by the strongest bonds of mutual affection
and respect is beyond a doubt. To the astonishment of all who were not
in the secret, Anne signalised her assumption of power by confirming
Mazarin in the position of chief minister to which he had been
designated by Richelieu, by continuing the foreign and domestic policy
of the great cardinal, and by exiling afresh the dukes of Vendôme
Mercoeur and Guise and the duchess of Chevreuse who were already
portioning out the vengeance they would take on the cardinalists.

[Sidenote: =Character of Mazarin.=]

Cardinal Mazarin was a very different character from his great
predecessor. He was altogether of meaner mould. Richelieu was a man
of original genius, who had made for himself his own position in the
world, and had been the architect of his own fame. Mazarin would never
have emerged from the ruck of mankind had not Richelieu led the way
and given him a task to perform. It was his business to maintain,
carry on, develop, that of Richelieu to create and establish. Soft and
conciliatory in manner, graceful in address, tactful and considerate
in business, deferential without being obsequious in conversation, he
disarmed his opponents instead of conquering them, he persuaded instead
of frightening them. Management not action was his strong point,
finesse and diplomacy not the scaffold and the sword his weapons. An
absolute master of dissimulation, he crept catlike through life, the
outward picture of trustful innocence, concealing a callous heart and
poisoned claws. It was a character as hateful to the open-hearted
Frenchman as to the honest Englishman, and even if it had not been
disfigured by the grossest avarice, could never have made itself
tolerable to either. Italian to the backbone in his suppleness of
character, his love of finesse, his courtly manners, his advancement
of his relations, his art collections of rare books and sculptures, in
the meanness of his avarice and in the prodigality of his display, he
was looked upon by the French nobles and the bulk of the French people
as a foreigner, who, having by unworthy arts made himself the master of
the affections of a silly woman, a foreigner like himself, had fastened
like a leech upon France and was sucking its lifeblood with insatiable
voracity. Nothing can exceed the virulence of the hatred with which
Mazarin was regarded. Not even the triumphs of the Thirty Years’ War
and the peace of Westphalia, not even the battle of Rocroy and the
intoxicating cup of glory which he offered to France could save him
from the indiscriminating and loathsome abuse showered on him by that
strange outburst of patriotism and selfishness, liberty and frivolity,
known as the Fronde, of which hatred to him was the chief factor.

[Sidenote: =Outbreak of the Fronde.=]

Ever since the dissolution of the Estates General of 1614, the
Parlement de Paris had been growing in political importance. The
hereditary nature of the offices of its members, the increased
consideration shown to the classes from which they sprang by Richelieu
in his war against the nobility, the double appeal to them in 1610
and 1643 to settle the government of France had all done much to
persuade them of their power. The success of the rebellions against
the royal authority in Spain and in England no doubt stimulated their
desire to strike a blow for themselves and for liberty. An ill-advised
imposition of an _octroi_ duty upon all commodities entering
Paris, issued in January 1648, gave them the opportunity of playing the
part of constitutional leaders. The Parlement refused to register the
edict. The court on this brought the boy-king down to the Parlement,
and in a _lit de justice_ the registration was effected.
[Sidenote: =Constitutional claims of the Parlement, 1648.=] But
the absurdity of trying to settle a grave constitutional question by
the intervention of a boy of nine years old was too patent even for
lawyers to swallow, and on the 16th of January the Parlement solemnly
pronounced the registration illegal and invalid. A compromise was
arrived at with regard to the particular question at issue, but the
Parlement, so far from surrendering its political claims, appointed a
committee consisting of representatives of its three chambers to take
the reform of the state into consideration. On the 29th of June this
representative committee called the Chambre de S. Louis issued its
programme. [Sidenote: =Its programme of reform.=]It demanded the
suppression of the Intendants, the reduction of the _taille_ by a
quarter, that every one arrested by order of the government should be
brought before a magistrate within twenty-four hours of his arrest,
and that the Parlement should have control over taxation. Here were the
germs of a constitutional reform, which, if it could have been carried
out, might have saved France from the worst evils of despotism without
seriously impairing the royal authority. The establishment of a check
on the financial administration, and of the principle of Habeas Corpus,
even though lodged in an unrepresentative body like the Parlement,
would have at least saved France from the collapse of the next century,
and might have been the beginning of true constitutional life. But it
was not to be. Mazarin appeared to yield to the storm, issued some of
the decrees asked for, and waited his opportunity. The news of Condé’s
victory at Lens seemed to be the opportunity he desired. [Sidenote:
=Arrest and release of Broussel.=] Under cover of a Te Deum sung
in Nôtre Dame for the victory, Broussel the leader of the agitation
against the court was arrested and put into prison. When this became
known all Paris was seized with uncontrollable excitement. The long
suppressed hatred of Mazarin burst out in fury. Barricades were raised.
The citizens were armed and the Parlement accompanied by a furious
and enthusiastic crowd marched in a body to demand the release of
Broussel. The court was again obliged to yield, and Broussel was set
at liberty, but as before Mazarin only drew back in the hope of making
his final spring more effective. The peace of Westphalia would shortly
put a disciplined army at his disposal, and then the position of the
government would be impregnable. Paris might rage as much as it liked,
but the days had gone by when the caprice of Paris decided the fortunes
of France. Never was politician more mistaken. On the 13th of September
the court withdrew to Ruel to free itself from the constant danger of
tumults. Paris was immediately in an uproar. [Sidenote: =Acceptance
of the reforms by the court, 1648.=] Persuaded by the clever and
unscrupulous Gondi, bishop-coadjutor of Paris, a man who had nothing
ecclesiastical about him except his title, Condé the military hero of
the hour declared for the Parlement, and the court once more following
the favourite policy of Mazarin had to procrastinate. It returned to
Paris, and on the 24th of October 1648 published an edict accepting and
enforcing the whole of the demands of the Chambre de S. Louis.

[Sidenote: =Unpopularity of the prime-ministership.=]

Thus far the struggle had been in its main aspects constitutional.
The Parlement de Paris, aided by the populace of the city, and taking
advantage of the unpopularity of Mazarin, was endeavouring to curb
the caprice of an irresponsible prime minister by assuming to itself
control over the finances, and obtaining for all Frenchmen security
against arbitrary arrest. Men felt vaguely that the constitution of
France had altered in a way contrary to their interests of recent
years. It was one thing to acknowledge the personal authority of the
king as supreme, when it had to be exercised largely through local
governors who were practically independent, and was from its very
nature subject to the limitations which necessarily followed from the
different characters of the supreme rulers. It was quite another thing
to acknowledge that that personal supremacy could be delegated, and
to be required to pay the same implicit obedience to a prime minister
ruling through a bureaucracy of his own nominees when the king himself
was a minor. The pressure of despotic rule had hitherto been little
felt in France by the noble or the professional classes. They did not
object to acknowledge and obey the will of a Henry IV., while a Henry
III. hardly presumed to ask them to do so. It was quite a different
thing when they were called upon to pay implicit reverence to a Mazarin
following a Richelieu, when Louis XIII. seemed a _fainéant_ and Louis
XIV. was a boy. And behind the actual revolt against the irresponsible
will of the minister lay the old rivalry between local authority and
centralised administration. All local authorities whether of the
governors or of the estates or of the Parlements had suffered under
the centralising hand of Richelieu. In many cases they had been rooted
out. France was becoming a _tabula rasa_, on which the hand of the
king, or, worse still, of the minister, was alone visible. [Sidenote:
=Importance of the reforms.=] So the Parlement de Paris felt, when
it embarked on the struggle with the Crown, that it had behind it
not merely the turbulence of a great city, or the bastard enthusiasm
produced by professional agitators, but also a mass of thoughtful
public opinion, traditions which lay deep in French history, and the
political instincts of a growing nation. The example of England was
sufficient to show that if it could, by whatever machinery, put an
effectual check on the power of arbitrary taxation and the power of
arbitrary imprisonment enjoyed by the government, it would have planted
a seed from which the tree of liberty would assuredly spring. Of the
four chief points of the charter of reform wrung from the Crown in
October 1648, two, the reduction of the _taille_ and the abolition of
the Intendants, were merely passing remedies for special grievances
of the time; the other two, the control over taxation and the Habeas
Corpus, enunciated principles of government for the future, which if
they could have been enforced, would have infallibly altered the whole
history of France.

[Sidenote: =Weakness of the Parlement.=]

Unfortunately the Parlement itself was a body wholly unfit to lead a
constitutional struggle. A close corporation of magistrates without
representative character, without legislative or political rights,
without traditions to which to appeal, without force on which to rely,
was ludicrously unfit to stand forth as the champion of national
interests against a Crown, which at that very moment had assumed the
headship of European politics. Its ally the city of Paris was more
unfit still. The close-fisted _bourgeoisie_, anxious for its
privileges, and trembling for its money-bags, the turbulent populace
of the streets intoxicated with its own importance, a small knot of
interested agitators like Gondi, a larger body of selfish aristocrats
and frivolous women, half fools, half knaves, like the duke of Beaufort
and the duchesse de Longueville, were not the stuff of which successful
constitutional revolutions are made. As a natural result the movement
began at once to deteriorate. Hatred of Mazarin was a common factor
between the constitutionalists of the Parlement, the populace of the
streets, and princes of the blood-royal and the nobility. [Sidenote:
=The lead taken by the nobility and the populace.=] To gain the
support necessary to meet the forces of the Crown, the Parlement had to
rely on the city and to appeal to the nobles. The latter eagerly joined
the movement in order to recover their old political influence and to
oust the hated minister. They cared not a sou for the Parlement. In
their heart of hearts they hated and they dreaded the _noblesse de la
robe_ and their constitutional ambitions. They wanted back the old
days of private anarchy and public plunder. They loathed the very idea
of constitutional reform and common right. From the moment that the
nobles took the direction of the movement it loses its constitutional
character, it becomes only the last and the basest act in the long
drama of the struggle between the nobles and the royal authority, it
has for its direct and most unmistakable object, not the amelioration
of a down-trodden people, but the overthrow of an unpopular minister.

[Sidenote: =Factiousness of the movement.=]

From this point then the _Fronde_ loses its chief interest and
its story may be briefly told. Seeing the weakness of the court, the
nobles flocked to take the leadership of the movement out of the hands
of the Parlement and Gondi. The prince de Conti, the duc de Bouillon,
the duc de Beaufort the popular _roi des halles_, the due de
Longueville and his intriguing fascinating wife, all rushed to Paris.
Even Turenne, the patriot and the incorruptible, was for the moment
seduced by the duchesse de Longueville to draw his sword against the
court. Mazarin however succeeded in detaching Condé from the side of
the rebellion. On the 6th of January 1649 the court fled secretly to
S. Germain, and nominating Condé to the command of its army prepared
to bring Paris to its senses by open war. But for the time both sides
shrunk from so terrible an alternative, and through the intervention
of Molé, the president of one of the chambers of the Parlement and a
man of unblemished integrity, the peace of Ruel was arranged on the
1st of April 1649 on the basis of the _status quo_. [Sidenote:
=The Peace of Ruel, 1649.=] For nearly a year quiet was restored,
but it was a peace only in name, the intrigues, the libels, and the
agitation continued as before. Condé in particular made himself
odious to every one by the insolence of his pride and the theatrical
ebullitions of his passionate nature. Even the patience of Mazarin
became exhausted, and on the 18th of January 1650 he astonished France
by suddenly committing Condé Conti and Longueville to prison. It was a
gross blunder. [Sidenote: =Imprisonment of the princes, 1650.=]
The imprisonment of the princes gave his enemies what they most wanted,
a common rallying cry, while the arbitrary character of the proceeding
disgusted moderate men. The feeling became general that France would
never gain peace as long as Mazarin remained at the head of affairs.
The provinces of Normandy Guienne and Burgundy declared against the
court, and the _Fronde_ recommenced with a definite programme of
the release of the princes and the banishment of Mazarin. [Sidenote:
=The risings in the provinces.=] Like so many other risings
against royal authority, it took the outward form of a rising in the
true interests of the Crown to rid it of a bad and incapable minister.
The revolts were put down in Normandy and Burgundy without difficulty,
in Guienne by the capture of Bordeaux after a protracted siege by the
queen-mother and the young king in person, but the flame continued to
spread. Paris declared against the court. The duc d’Orléans joined the
movement. Turenne invaded France at the head of a Spanish army, but was
defeated by Duplessis near Rethel on the 17th of December. Mazarin,
ever timid, determined to yield. [Sidenote: =Flight of Mazarin,
1651.=] In January 1651 he left France secretly, having ordered the
release of the princes, and betook himself to Brühl in the electorate
of Köln from whence he still directed affairs by correspondence with
the queen-mother and the ministers, Lionne Letellier and Servien. On
the news of the retirement of Mazarin, the _Fronde_ was beside
itself with joy, the Parlement passed a decree of banishment against
him, and sold his library and works of art. Paris treated the court as
its prisoners, and received the princes in triumph on their return from
prison in February 1651. But Condé soon made himself more intolerable
to the leaders of the _Fronde_ by his rapacity and violence than
he had been before to Mazarin; and Anne by a clever move was able to
detach the _Frondeurs_ from him and drive him into open rebellion
against the young king who had just been declared of age.

[Sidenote: =The movement a struggle between the nobles and the
Crown.=]

The quarrel now openly appeared in its true light of a struggle between
the nobles and the king. Condé, supported by Nemours, Le Rochefoucauld,
La Tremouille and others of the nobles, raised the south in revolt.
Anne and the king on their side put three armies in the field. Turenne
came back to his allegiance, and Mazarin returned from his self-imposed
exile and joined the court at Poitiers on the 28th of February 1652.
For eight months civil war raged and France lay at the mercy of
rival armies, while the foreign enemy took advantage of her misery
to advance his frontiers in the north-east. It looked as if the very
policy which Richelieu and Mazarin had carried out so ruthlessly at
the expense of Germany was about to recoil on the head of France. But
no sooner were the two sides definitely arrayed against each other
as the party of Condé and the nobility against the party of Mazarin
and the royalists, than it was seen that though Paris would fight to
the death against Mazarin, France would not fight against the king.
Condé found no adequate support in the country. Foiled by the superior
military genius of Turenne near Blenau in April, he was defeated at
the Faubourg S. Antoine in July, and must have been utterly destroyed,
had not the energy and enthusiasm of Mademoiselle, the daughter of
Gaston of Orléans, persuaded the citizens of Paris to admit him and
his beaten army within the walls. [Sidenote: =Quarrel between Condé
and Paris.=] But Paris had no love for Condé. It simply cherished
an undying hatred for Mazarin, and a supreme conviction of its own
importance. It was the only force in France still opposed to the
court, and Mazarin found himself in consequence the only obstacle to
peace. By a voluntary retirement to Sedan in August 1652, he built
a bridge by which the Parisians could return to their allegiance to
the king without compromising their opposition to the minister. They
eagerly availed themselves of it. Condé, finding himself deserted on
all sides, openly joined the enemies of France, and carried on for
eight years more a foreign war against his country as the leader of
the armies of Spain. [Sidenote: =Flight of Condé, and the end of
the Fronde, 1652.=] On the 21st of October Louis entered Paris at
the head of his army and the _Fronde_ was at an end. From that
moment the royal authority shone out pre-eminent over all the forces
of the country until the Revolution. Constitutionalism as well as
privilege, local feeling as well as legal right lay helpless before
the all-mastering Crown. The leaders of the _Fronde_ were exiled,
many of its supporters put to death on various pretexts, none of them
admitted even to the shadow of political power. The Parlement were
forbidden to deal either directly or indirectly with the affairs of
state. For a century it became but the registration office of the royal
edicts and the channel of the royal justice, while the nobles, deprived
of all political power and sadly weakened in local influence, accepted
the service of a splendid court in willing exchange for the precarious
dignity of half-independent feudatories.

[Sidenote: =Return of Mazarin to power.=]

When the triumph of the court was assured, Mazarin emerged from his
retirement and again took up the reins of government. For the nine
years that were left to him of life and power, he strove to repair
the havoc wrought by the _Fronde_ in his private fortune and his
public policy. His best efforts were directed to the maintenance of
the war with Spain, which with the help of England was brought to such
a successful issue by the peace of the Pyrenees in 1660. In domestic
affairs he paid little attention to anything except the amassing of
a prodigious fortune in the management of which Colbert received his
first lessons of finance. He had none of Richelieu’s love for the
greatness of France. He did nothing for her arts, her literature, or
her sciences. He cared even less than Richelieu for the welfare and
happiness of the people. His financial administration was corrupt
to the core; offices were sold, revenue anticipated, state property
alienated for the personal advantage of the cardinal. Had it not been
that he was soon succeeded by the best finance minister that France
ever produced, the world would not so lightly have passed over the
fact that Mazarin on his death in March 1661 bequeathed to Louis
XIV., not merely absolute power at home and the leadership of
Europe abroad, but a home administration at once so oppressive and so
corrupt, that had it lasted but a few years longer, France could hardly
have escaped hopeless bankruptcy and irretrievable ruin.

CHAPTER VIII

NORTHERN EUROPE TO THE TREATY OF OLIVA

Character and policy of Oxenstjerna--The Form of Government--War
between Sweden and Denmark--Treaty of Brömsebro--Christina
of Sweden--Her character and ability--Frederick William of
Brandenburg--His character and political aims--The question of
Pomerania--Condition of his dominions at his accession--His
withdrawal from the Thirty Years’ War--Acquisition of east
Pomerania--Establishment of his personal authority--His intrigues
against Charles X. of Sweden--Acknowledgment of Swedish
suzerainty--He joins Charles X. against Poland--Obtains
independence by the treaties of Labiau and Wehlau--Death of Charles
X.--The pacification of the north.

[Sidenote: =Position of Sweden, 1632.=]

While the great powers of Europe were battling for the Rhine and
the Pyrenees, the smaller nations of the north were struggling for
the command of the Baltic. It was a contest in which Denmark played
the part of the Empire, the traditional but feeble possessor of
rightful authority, while Sweden, like another France, strong in her
new-found national unity, was impelled by her geographical position
to claim a freedom which could not fail to end in leadership.
When Gustavus Adolphus fell on the field of Lützen in 1632 he had
succeeded in winning for his country supremacy on the Baltic and a
foothold on German soil; but his life had been too short, his career
too meteor-like for him to have had time to consolidate by his
statesmanship what he had won by his genius. [Sidenote: =Character
and policy of Oxenstjerna.=] That task was left to his friend and
confidant, Axel Oxenstjerna, during the minority of the young Christina
who was only four and a half years old when her father died. The man
was well fitted to the task. Cautious, deliberate, and cold-blooded,
complete master of his emotions, he was a man of fixed ideas and
tenacious policy. Nothing moved him, nothing changed him. Twice only
in a long and anxious life did he know what it was to be sleepless,
once after the battle of Lützen, once after the battle of Nördlingen.
Patriotism in him took bodily form in the House of Vasa and Gustavus
Adolphus. During the life of the king his whole energies were devoted
to carrying out his master’s wishes, after his death to the completion
of his master’s policy. In the Thirty Years’ War, as we have seen, he
was the most strenuous and uncompromising enemy of peace. The miseries
of Germany, the dangerous ambition of France, even the deterioration
of his own country, were as nothing to him compared with the duty of
obtaining for Sweden all that Gustavus might fairly have claimed.
It required the personal intervention of the young queen herself to
prevent her minister from ruining the country in order to preserve its
dignity. At home his chief work was to place on a permanent basis the
alliance of the crown with the official nobility, which it had been the
special object of Gustavus Adolphus to create as a counterpoise to the
influence of the hereditary nobility and the clergy.

[Sidenote: =The Form of Government, 1634.=]

In the Form of Government adopted in 1634, Sweden received from
Oxenstjerna’s hands the first of modern written constitutions. By it
Lutheranism in the form of the Confession of Augsburg was imposed upon
the sovereign and all his subjects. Government was vested in the king,
advised by a senate of twenty members chosen by him from the nobility,
to whom were added five _ex officio_ members being the great
officers of state, _i.e._ the steward, the marshal, the treasurer,
the chancellor and the admiral. The whole direction of affairs during
the illness or minority of the king was placed in their hands, subject
only to the provision that all laws passed, privileges conferred, and
alienation of crown lands effected during the incapacity of the king
must receive his subsequent ratification. Other provisions of a less
important nature regulated the administration of justice, but in all of
them the same care for securing the supremacy of the noble and official
class is everywhere observable. In fact, the result of the Form of
Government was to place the chief direction of affairs in Sweden for
nearly fifty years in the hands of a narrow aristocratic clique of
official families. During the minority of Christina, no less than three
out of the five great officers of state were members of the Oxenstjerna
family alone. [Sidenote: =The government a narrow oligarchy.=]
The policy of the regency was conceived in the interests of the
nobility. They profited by the continuance of the war in Germany, for
to them fell the high commands in the army, and the opportunities of
amassing wealth by plunder and confiscation. They profited equally by
the necessities of the Crown at home, for they became the possessors
either by purchase or grant of large tracts of crown lands made over to
them by the government, partly to secure their loyalty and partly to
relieve its embarrassments. But what was meat to the nobles was poison
to the peasantry. The people soon found that the court noble or the
successful general was a far harder master to serve than ever the Crown
had been. The long-continued war raised the taxes, checked the growth
of manufactures, and drained the country of its best peasant blood,
only to return to it a body of brigand soldiers ruined in morals and
incapable of honest industry. Had it lasted but a few years longer, it
is by no means improbable that Oxenstjerna would have found that he
had purchased a foreign empire at the cost of a domestic revolution.
The quick intelligence of Christina, brought up as she was in Sweden,
while the Chancellor was forced to spend a large part of his time in
Germany, appreciated the danger; and this, quite as much as her natural
humanity, prompted her to put an end to a war, which had ceased to have
a serious political object, and was being waged in the interests of a
class and in honour of a memory.

In the war with Denmark which broke out in 1643 the narrow but
unflinching patriotism of Oxenstjerna showed itself to better
advantage. [Sidenote: =War with Denmark, 1643.=] Free passage
through the Sound and the Belts for Swedish ships was as much a
commercial necessity for the development of Swedish trade, as free
passage through the passes of Savoy was a military necessity for the
aggrandisement of France. But Denmark seated astride of the islands,
with one foot on Halland and the other on Jutland, by merely raising
the dues payable for the passage of ships, could crush the nascent
trade at its birth. In doing so it had to reckon not merely with Sweden
but with the more important maritime countries of Holland and England
who carried on with Sweden, through the Sound, a prosperous and growing
trade in skins, fur and copper, and were therefore keenly interested in
the question of the Sound tolls. But in 1639, seeing England involved
in domestic trouble, and Holland fully occupied in the ceaseless
struggle with Spain, Christian IV. thought the opportunity had
come for vigorous action. He raised the tolls on the Sound, attempted
to take the lead in German affairs by putting himself forward as
mediator in the negotiations for peace, and in July 1640 directly
insulted the government of Sweden by openly assisting the queen-mother,
Maria Eleonora of Brandenburg to escape from the dignified seclusion
in which she was kept. For the moment Oxenstjerna had to temporise,
for the affairs of Germany absorbed his whole energies, but two years
later the opportunity came. Torstenson was suddenly directed upon
Holstein without any declaration of war, and in conjunction with Horn
quickly overran the whole of the mainland. Christian taken by surprise
had to betake himself to his islands and his ships. There he fought
like a hero, holding his own manfully for two summers against the
combined efforts of Swedish fleets and Dutch sailors. [Sidenote: =The
treaty of Brömsebro, 1645.=] But the odds were too many for him,
and after a severe defeat in October 1644 he found himself obliged to
sue for peace. The next year, in August 1645, the treaty of Brömsebro
was negotiated through the mediation of France between Christian and
Oxenstjerna. [Sidenote: =Acquisition of Halland and freedom from the
Sound dues.=] By it Sweden was entirely relieved from the payments
of tolls on the Sound and the Belts, and acquired the province of
Halland on terms which practically involved its annexation. However
questionable on the score of public faith its beginning may have been,
there is no doubt that this was one of the most important and useful
wars waged by Sweden in the seventeenth century. At very little expense
to herself, she completed the work of national consolidation by making
Denmark retire across the natural frontier of the sea, and secured for
the future the free and unhampered development of her commerce. Both
of them were acquisitions essential for her national well-being, and
when once gained were gained for all time. The more showy rewards of
the peace of Westphalia on the contrary, though they mark the zenith of
the political glory of Oxenstjerna, were in no way the best gifts which
Sweden received at his hands. They contained in themselves the fruit of
future contests. Like the battles of Creci and Poitiers and the peace
of Bretigni, the battles of Breitenfeld and Wittstock and the peace of
Westphalia covered the conqueror with military glory at the cost of a
hundred years of war.

[Sidenote: =Christina of Sweden.=]

In this long drama of dull warfare, the reign of Christina is a short
but picturesque interlude. Alone among Swedes and almost alone among
sovereigns, she loved to live a life of culture among men of culture.
She was not a student, but a master of classical literature, not the
patron of men of letters, but herself a member of the sacred band.
It is therefore easy to exaggerate the importance of her reign as an
epoch in the civilisation of her country. The learning and the culture
which gathered round Christina at Stockholm fixed no roots in the
country, answered to no demand even in the university. It was a pure
exotic, called into existence by the strange accident that Sweden
had a cultured queen. It died on her abdication. It was personal and
artificial not national and spontaneous, as unlike the great outburst
of English literature under Elizabeth with which it has sometimes been
compared, as the bouquet of the theatre to the flowers of the Alps.
The men of letters themselves formed, it is to be feared, an unwelcome
and unpopular element in the half barbaric court. To the rough nobles
they were but a côterie of the queen’s friends, a clique with whom she
liked to live, a sort of superior race of pet animals which Sweden had
to feed and maintain in order to please the queen. But the very fact
that some of the most intellectual minds of the day were content to
endure the cold and discomforts of Swedish simplicity, and the hardly
concealed dislike of a barbarous and homely people, rather than lose
the distinction of being numbered among the friends of Christina, is
no mean tribute to her character and her mind. To be with her, to be
received into her friendship, to listen to her conversation, to take
part in her studies, this was the attraction which made Stockholm for
the moment the Athens of the north.

[Sidenote: =Character of Christina.=]

Christina is one of those few sovereigns who have made history by sheer
force of personal character. In the whole range of the seventeenth
century, there is no crowned head who can pretend to equality with
her in the rare gifts of originality and distinction. A sworn foe
to conventionality in all forms, with a mind uncompromisingly
logical, she went straight to the root of a matter, to the horror
of diplomatists and courtiers. The salient point of her character
is her straightforwardness. There was nothing artificial about her
and singularly little which was not original. She formed her own
conceptions of policy, of religion, of culture, of manners. She adhered
to them at all costs. She carried them out unhesitatingly. When one
of them came into collision with another, instantly she surrendered
the less to the greater. She abdicated the crown of Sweden because
she was convinced that she ought to become a Roman Catholic. She
procured the recognition of Charles Gustavus as her successor because
she was determined not to marry. At the age of eighteen she forced
the all-powerful Chancellor into making a peace which he loathed.
Ten years later, after her abdication, she murdered her steward
Monaleschi through a wilfully mistaken view of her sovereign rights.
Throughout her life she was the same,--clear-minded, self-willed, of
keen decision and petulant temper, warmhearted and true to those she
loved, malicious to those she disliked, a hater of humbug, a despiser
of conventionality, cynical in speech, generous in action, prodigal
with money, avaricious of fame, hating and hated by women, always
attractive to men. In truth Christina was one of nature’s mistakes.
She was intended for a man. Masculine in intellect, masculine in will,
masculine in bodily endurance, masculine in the roughness of her
sensibilities, she showed her sex mainly in her dislike of women. She
knew herself to be a man, and resented bitterly the freak of nature
which had clothed her with a woman’s form. She dressed like a man, rode
like a man, at times swore like a man, and confessed that one of her
greatest desires was to see a battle. No noble at the Swedish court
could tire her when hunting, or could surpass her presence of mind in
the hour of danger. She knew not what fear was, she was never seen
in tears. Yet there was something feminine in her love of intrigue,
her passion for notoriety, her want of shame. At the French court
she busied herself in making mischief between the young king and his
mother by encouraging his infatuation for Marie Mancini. She delighted
in shocking the etiquette of the royal circle by the freedom of her
conversation and the unconventionality of her attitudes, and she went
out of her way to outrage all sense of propriety by choosing the famous
courtesan Ninon de L’Enclos as the only Frenchwoman to whom she would
be decently civil. When a queen demeans herself thus, she must expect
to make enemies, and Christina had only herself to thank if she was
afterwards denied permission to visit the French court at Paris, and
found among French women her most persistent detractors.

Abdications among sovereigns are so rare that the attention of
historians has been naturally attracted by the picturesqueness of that
of Christina to the detriment of her real title to fame. [Sidenote:
=Her political ability.=] In the ten years of her rule over Sweden
she conducted a great war to a glorious end, she established her
authority by sheer ascendency of character over a narrow and jealous
oligarchy, she settled a most difficult constitutional question, that
of the devolution of the Crown, in the best way for the nation, by
her own firmness of will. She made herself beloved by her people, and
easily suppressed the conspiracy of Messenius in spite of its wide
ramifications among the democracy. She made Stockholm for the time
the most learned and cultured court of Europe. Above all when her own
religious convictions forced her into antagonism with the constitution
of her country, she never hesitated to prefer the interests of her
country to her own dignity. She recognised from the first that in
the seventeenth century it was impossible for Sweden to permit her
sovereign to be of any religion except that of Luther, and when she had
made up her mind to become a Roman Catholic she accepted the inevitable
and abdicated her throne. There are few sovereigns who can claim to
have done more for their country by activity or by renunciation than
Christina. Her abdication was right and unavoidable. The mistake she
made lay in not carrying it far enough. She ought to have retired into
private life, but this was too great a self-denial for so active a
mind and so vigorous a personality. She ceased to be queen of Sweden,
but she determined still to be queen. She maintained royal state, she
claimed royal rights, she plunged into intrigue, she interfered in
politics, she tried to dominate over literature and taste. Deprived of
all right to express, and shorn of all power to enforce, her wishes,
she soon sank into becoming the common bore of Europe, and found
herself politely relegated to her palace at Rome, where she became one
of the sights of the city and the leader of a fashionable and artistic
côterie.

While Christina was witching the northern world by the vigour and charm
of her personality, Brandenburg under the cautious and unscrupulous
Frederick William was slowly winning its way to predominance in north
Germany. [Sidenote: =Frederick William of Brandenburg.=] No two
persons could well be more different than the queen and the elector,
whom at one time a marriage project of Gustavus Adolphus had attempted
to unite in a most unequal yoke. Christina, worldly though she might
be in her love of mischief-making and petulance of disposition, was
essentially a woman of noble character and lofty aspirations. She lived
amongst great thoughts and high ideals. Frederick William grovelled
upon the earth, and cherished its mire and its dirt if only he could
possess himself of one acre the more of it. A true Hohenzollern in
his absolute identification of his country with his own crown, he
never rose above the pure selfishness of patriotism. Not one spark
of generosity illuminated his policy, not one grain of idealism
coloured his ambition, no sentiment of moral right ever interfered
with his judgment, no fear of future retribution arrested his action.
Mean-minded, false, and unscrupulous, he was the first sovereign
to display the principles of seventeenth century Machiavellianism,
stripped of their cloak of Italian refinement, in all the hideous
brutality of German coarseness. Yet the political world was not
the worse for the rule of the Great Elector. Putting all questions
of right and wrong on one side, the success achieved by Frederick
William was in the direction of progress. [Sidenote: =Ultimate aim
of his policy.=] The Thirty Years’ War left Germany shattered into
fragments as if by the stroke of a giant’s hammer, at a time when
all Europe was drawing itself together and coalescing into powerful
states. Had that disintegration continued, had no one come forward to
establish a power in northern Europe, which might at any rate form a
nucleus round which the floating atoms of northern Germany and northern
Protestantism might gather, central Europe must have fallen a prey to
French ambition or Russian barbarism. Events have shown clearly enough,
that neither Sweden, nor England, nor the United Provinces, could have
saved Europe from such a catastrophe, had there not been in northern
Germany itself a power, centralised in government and military in
spirit, which could unfurl the flag of German nationality. To found
such a power was the work of the Great Elector’s life, and before his
death the results had made themselves visible in European politics.
He it is who is the real founder of the state of Prussia. Cradled in
the horrors of the Thirty Years’ War, nourished by the falseness and
the tyranny of Frederick William, ushered into manhood by the cynical
ambition of Frederick the Great, she has yet become in her steady
protest against French domination one of the chief bulwarks of European
order, in her assertion of German unity the centre of the noblest of
German aspirations.

[Sidenote: =Rivalry between Brandenburg and Sweden in the Thirty
Years’ War.=]

When Frederick William succeeded his father in the electorate of
Brandenburg in 1640 no one would have predicted that from that desolate
discredited and divided state was to arise the hope of Germany. The
policy of neutrality in the earlier years of the war, adopted not
without a certain amount of shrewdness by George William in conjunction
with his friend John George of Saxony, had broken down under the menace
of the guns of Gustavus Adolphus and the invasion of Tilly. But the
league between the Swedes and the elector could never be anything more
than hollow, unless the former were prepared to surrender the rights of
a conqueror over Pomerania. George William was the acknowledged heir of
the old duke Boguslav. Pomerania, with its extensive seaboard, was just
what Brandenburg wanted for her national development, and the Elector
had been accustomed to look upon it as his own. The landing of Gustavus
Adolphus changed the whole face of affairs in a moment. Pomerania
became just as important to the Swedes as a basis of communication
with Sweden and the Baltic, as it was to Brandenburg as a step in her
aggrandisement. Why should the Swedes, who had saved the country from
the hands of Wallenstein, surrender it tamely to George William who had
not stirred one finger of his own free will on behalf of the Protestant
cause? Naturally enough the Swedes stuck obstinately to their rights
of conquest. Never would Oxenstjerna yield to the technical claims of
Brandenburg, what Gustavus Adolphus had wrested from the enemy by force
of arms. Never would Brandenburg abate her just and legal demands in
the face of a selfish and brutal conqueror. So as time went on Sweden
became far more the national enemy of Brandenburg than the Emperor had
ever been. The unfortunate mark, lying as it did on the straight road
between Bohemia and the Baltic, was harried alternately by the armies
of both sides as the fortune of war ebbed and flowed. In 1635 George
William accepted the treaty of Prague, but that gave no respite to his
unlucky domain. In 1638, unable to find sustenance in the impoverished
mark, he removed his court to Königsberg in east Prussia, where he died
worn out with misery and failure in 1640, leaving his son Frederick
William at the age of twenty the possessor of little land and many
claims.

[Sidenote: =Brandenburg at the accession of Frederick William,
1640.=]

The territories owned by Frederick William on his accession were
divided into three quite separate districts.[3] The old possessions
of the house of Hohenzollern in north Europe consisted of the mark of
Brandenburg, subdivided for administrative purposes into the old mark,
the middle mark and the new mark, which they had ruled as margraves and
as electors since the beginning of the fifteenth century. [Sidenote:
=The mark of Brandenburg.=] This country, purely German, was like
other German states part of the Empire, subject to the legal authority
of the Emperor and had its own diet with vague powers of counsel and
control over the elector in local affairs. [Sidenote: =The duchy of
East Prussia.=] On the east of the Vistula, altogether outside of
the limits of the Empire, was the duchy of east Prussia, which had
become the hereditary possession of the Hohenzollerns by one of the
accidents of the Reformation. The country belonged to the Order of the
Teutonic Knights, and was subject to the suzerainty of Poland, but
in 1525 the Knights accepted the Lutheran Reformation, dissolved the
Order, and formed their territory into a duchy hereditary in the house
of the grand master of the time, count Albert of Hohenzollern. At the
beginning of the seventeenth century his line became merged in that of
the Brandenburg branch of the family, and the elector of Brandenburg
became also duke of east Prussia. Here, as in the mark, the existence
of a diet in which sat both nobles and burghers formed a constitutional
check on the will of the ruler, a check all the more effective because
of the reluctance with which the people of east Prussia and their
feudal suzerain the king of Poland had acknowledged the rights of the
Brandenburg branch to the duchy. But the territorial claims of the
young elector did not stop with the German mark of Brandenburg, the
Polish duchy of east Prussia, and the succession to the German duchy of
Pomerania. [Sidenote: =Duchy of Cleves.=] Within the limits of the
Empire, stretching along both banks of the Rhine, in the neighbourhood
of Köln, lay the duchies of Cleves, Jülich, Berg and Mark, to which the
elector of Brandenburg and the count of Neuburg had put in claims as we
have seen in 1609 and thereby very nearly precipitated the great war.
By the treaty of Xanten, concluded in 1614 and practically renewed in
1630, the disputed territory was divided between the claimants, and the
duchies of Cleves Mark and Ravensberg fell to the share of Brandenburg.
During the war, however, Brandenburg was unable to make its power
recognised over its new domains. The country was for some time the
battle-ground of the Spaniards and the Dutch. As the tide of war rolled
away from the lower Rhine it was occupied and practically administered
by the Dutch, and when peace was restored Frederick William found
himself obliged to assert what was to all intents and purposes a new
sovereignty.

[Sidenote: =Aims of Frederick William.=]

Bearing in mind the scattered character of the Brandenburg possessions,
a glance at the map is sufficient to show how geographical
considerations dictated to the young elector his policy, and inspired
his territorial ambitions. If only he could make good his claims on
Pomerania, or at least on the eastern part of it, there would be
nothing but the strip of west Prussia along the banks of the Vistula
to separate his German dominions from his duchy of east Prussia. A
successful war, or a lucky diplomatic stroke, might raise him at once
into the position of the greatest power in the north. Side by side
with the territorial dream went as was natural in a prince of the
seventeenth century a dynastic ambition. Already events had made his
dependence upon the Emperor almost nominal, the same success which won
him west Prussia and united his dominions would also free him from his
feudal vassalage to Poland. Once thoroughly independent of foreign
authority he could turn his attention to his own subjects, and on the
ruins of the effete and discredited diets raise, like Richelieu in
France, a highly centralised military sovereignty in which the crown
should be all in all. Such was the policy laid down for himself and
his house by the Great Elector, and adhered to unflinchingly by his
descendants ever since. Centralisation of the government, military
rule, constant territorial aggrandisement have been the characteristics
of the Prussian monarchy, and have ended in making out of the
disjointed and turbulent dominions of Frederick William, a united and
peaceful kingdom, which stretches from Russia to Belgium, and embraces
in its ample folds the valleys of the Rhine, the Elbe, the Oder and the
Vistula.

[Sidenote: =Unavoidable hostility of Sweden and Poland.=]

Directly in the way of the realisation of the least of these designs,
as the Great Elector well knew, lay the hostile powers of Sweden and of
Poland. He could not touch Pomerania without encountering the bitter
jealousy of Sweden, he could not advance an inch towards the union of
east Prussia and Brandenburg without first destroying the integrity
of Poland. Over the prostrate bodies of these formidable neighbours
lay the only road to his territorial ambition. It was a road beset
with difficulties. What chance could the barren ravaged and disunited
Brandenburg have in an unequal contest with Sweden, at that time
admittedly the first military power in northern Europe? How could the
half-starved German peasant withstand the onslaught of the brave though
undisciplined masses of Polish cavalry? Frederick William knew that he
must wait for a favourable opportunity, and spent the time in anxious
preparation. His first care was to transfer the conduct of affairs in
the mark from the hands of his father’s minister, Schwartzenburg, who
was devoted to the Emperor, to his own, and to reorganise the army
under himself. In this he was aided by the death of Schwartzenburg
in 1641, and the subsequent revolt of his son and the discontented
officers. [Sidenote: =Establishment of his personal authority in
Brandenburg and East Prussia, 1641.=] Having thus got at his back a
force upon which he could depend he openly broke with the Emperor, and
with the full approbation of the diet entered into negotiations with
the Swedes for a treaty of neutrality. Then turning his attention to
the duchy of east Prussia, where the estates were trying to establish
their superiority over him, with a diplomatic skill rarely found in a
man of twenty, he succeeded in sowing dissensions between the nobles
and the representatives of the towns, who took the lead in opposing
his authority. By winning the former over to his side he was able to
procure the recognition of his rule from John Casimir, king of Poland,
in spite of the protest of the towns, and thus to enter legally upon
his sovereignty. [Sidenote: =His withdrawal from the Thirty Years’
War, 1643.=] In 1643 the treaty with Sweden was successfully
concluded, and for the rest of the war Brandenburg was practically free
from the ravages of the rival armies. The breathing space thus gained
was devoted by Frederick William to the reorganisation of the finances
and the training of the army, and Brandenburg was in consequence
enabled to assert her claims to consideration in the negotiations at
Münster and Osnabrück with a force which would have appeared incredible
in the days of George William. [Sidenote: =Gains of Brandenburg at
the peace of Westphalia, 1648.=] When the peace of Westphalia was
finally settled it was found that Brandenburg was given the right of
annexing the secularised bishoprics of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, Minden
and Camin, and the duchy of eastern Pomerania. [Sidenote: =Occupation
of Eastern Pomerania, 1653.=] But the larger part of the lands were
at the time of the conclusion of peace in the military occupation of
the Swedes, and they were not at all disposed to evacuate them, until
they had been paid the indemnity for their expenses which had been
secured to them by the peace. Finally however, after much negotiation
and many delays, the patience and skill of the Great Elector prevailed
over all obstacles, and the year 1653 saw the back of the last Swedish
soldier in retreat from eastern Pomerania.

[Sidenote: =Position of Brandenburg, 1653.=]

The year 1653 closes the first chapter of the story of the
aggrandisement of Brandenburg. The territory of the elector now
stretched in a compact mass across north Germany from Halberstadt to
the Baltic. It comprised parts of the fertile valleys of the Elbe,
the Havel and the Oder with their industrious populations, as well
as the important coast line of eastern Pomerania with its numerous
harbours. Detached from the central mass lay the duchy of east Prussia
beyond the Vistula and the scattered districts of Cleves and Mark upon
the Rhine and of Ravensberg and Minden upon the Weser. Inferior in
prestige and military power to Sweden, inferior in extent to Poland,
Brandenburg nevertheless emerged from the Thirty Years’ War stronger,
both actually and relatively, than she was when the struggle began.
There was no German power in north Germany her equal in strength,
and no power in north Europe her superior in government. Since he
had come to the throne Frederick William had steadily followed the
policy of centralising the administration under himself and crushing
the independent rights of the diets. In Brandenburg itself, where the
advantages of centralisation under so able and keen-sighted a ruler
were quickly seen, the opposition was never formidable, and in 1653,
the very year of the annexation of eastern Pomerania, the ancient diet
went quietly into perpetual sleep for want of being summoned. In east
Prussia and in Cleves the work was far more difficult, and the Elector
had to content himself for a time with crushing all serious opposition
by the employment of Brandenburg soldiers to keep order, a proceeding
which although illegal was extremely effective.

In 1655 occurred an event which called forth all the Great Elector’s
powers of statesmanship. The old hostility between Poland and Sweden,
the two most dangerous neighbours of Brandenburg, suddenly flamed out
again. John Casimir, king of Poland, refused to acknowledge Charles
Gustavus, who had succeeded to the Swedish throne on the abdication
of Christina. [Sidenote: =War between Sweden and Poland, 1655.=]
Charles, who had been brought up in the school of the Thirty Years’ War
and was no mean soldier, determined to avenge the insult, and demanded
from the Great Elector the right of passage through eastern Pomerania
into Poland, in order to avoid the difficult task of the siege of the
sea fortress of Dantzig, which had cost Gustavus Adolphus many weary
hours some twenty-five years before. Frederick William was not in a
position to resist, and after making a few demonstrations to cover
appearances, gave the required permission. The Swedes, using Pomerania
as their basis of operations, poured across Brandenburg into Poland,
defeated John Casimir, drove him back on Cracow and then returned
leisurely into west Prussia to form the siege of Dantzig. The Great
Elector now thought he saw his opportunity. [Sidenote: =Unsuccessful
intrigue of Frederick William against Sweden.=]The Poles were
beaten not conquered. Denmark was ever ready to strike a blow at her
old enemy across the Baltic. Charles X. was fully occupied
round Dantzig. A well-planned alliance and a well-timed stroke might
bring Sweden to her knees and win his own independence of Poland. But
Charles was too quick for him. [Sidenote: =Acknowledgment of Swedish
suzerainty over East Prussia, 1656.=] Hearing of the negotiations in
the middle of the winter of 1655–56 he at once broke up his camp and
marched into east Prussia on Königsberg. Frederick William had to make
his peace as best he could. By the treaty of Königsberg, developed by
the treaty of Marienbad, concluded in June 1656, Brandenburg was forced
to acknowledge the suzerainty of Sweden over east Prussia, instead
of that of Poland, to grant to the Swedes free passage through the
country, and to provide a contingent to serve under Swedish orders in
the Polish war.

[Sidenote: =War with Poland, 1656.=]

It was a bitter lesson to the Great Elector, but ever patient and
ever trustful of his own diplomatic skill, he continued his policy
and awaited a more favourable opportunity, but for the present he had
to submit to the inevitable. The Brandenburg contingent marched with
Charles X. and the Swedish army to Warsaw, and did their
share in the winning of the great three days’ battle in July 1656,
which placed Poland at the feet of the Swedes. But the victory of
Charles X. was, as is so often the case, the beginning of his
difficulties. It was always easy to defeat a Polish army, it was almost
impossible to reduce the country to submission. The intrigues of the
Great Elector began to bear fruit. [Sidenote: =Coalition against
Sweden.=] While Charles was planning the pursuit of John Casimir
into the recesses of the forests of Galicia, the king of Denmark was
preparing to invade Sweden itself, the Russians declared war, and a
horde of Tartars and Lithuanians poured into east Prussia. Charles
X. found himself in the middle of a hostile country, with
a doubtful ally, surrounded by a host of enemies. Frederick William
insisted on an immediate return to defend east Prussia from the
invaders. Charles could not resist so plausible a demand. [Sidenote:
=Treaty of Labiau. Ackowledgment of the independence of East Prussia
by Sweden, 1656.=] With a heavy heart he retired from the scene of
his victory into west Prussia, where he took ship for Denmark, having
first done what he could to retain Frederick William in his enforced
alliance by recognising the independence of east Prussia in the treaty
of Labiau, signed in November 1656. Directly his back was turned,
the Great Elector threw off the mask, and offered his friendship and
assistance to John Casimir, if only he would follow the example of
Sweden, and release east Prussia from all claims of feudal vassalage.
[Sidenote: =Treaty of Wehlau. Acknowledgment of the independence
of East Prussia by Poland, 1657.=] As long as he obtained his
independence, Frederick William did not trouble about the honesty
of the transaction. John Casimir accepted the terms. By the treaty
of Wehlau, concluded in September 1657, the Great Elector cynically
reversed the treaty of Labiau, made only ten months before, became the
ally of Poland and the enemy of Sweden, and received as the reward of
his dissimulation, the recognition of the independence of east Prussia
by his legitimate suzerain.

The anger of Charles X. when he heard of it knew no bounds.
Thirsting for revenge he nerved himself to attempt the feats of a hero.
[Sidenote: =Attack upon Denmark by Sweden, 1657.=] In the depth
of the winter of 1657–58, he suddenly marched his army of 20,000 men
across the ice of the Belts upon Denmark, and captured the islands of
Fünen and Zealand on his way without ships, crossing it is said some
runlets of open water by bridges. Denmark, paralysed with astonishment
hastened to make peace, and Charles directed his army upon east
Prussia. But fortunately for the Great Elector, Europe had become tired
of incessant war; and the great states, especially the maritime powers
of England and Holland, had no wish to see their trade interfered with
by the conquests of a new Alexander of the north. They interfered
to impose negotiations for peace upon the combatants. [Sidenote:
=Treaties of Oliva, Copenhagen, and Kardis, 1660–1661.=] The death
of Charles X. in February 1660 made their task the easier,
and on May 3rd, 1660, was signed the treaty of Oliva, between Sweden,
Poland and Brandenburg. In the following month the treaty of Copenhagen
restored peace to Sweden and Denmark, and in 1661 the north was finally
pacified by the conclusion of the treaty of Kardis between Sweden and
Russia.

[Sidenote: =Terms of the pacification of north.=]

By these treaties John Casimir of Poland renounced all claims upon
the throne of Sweden, and acknowledged the independent sovereignty of
Frederick William in east Prussia. Frederic III. of Denmark
surrendered almost all the remaining possessions of Denmark on the
Scandinavian peninsula to Sweden, and all other conquests made were
restored. Sweden thus attained the geographical unity which she had
long desired, and the Great Elector had guaranteed to him by European
treaty the independent sovereignty over the duchy of east Prussia which
he had risked so much to gain. If the peace of Westphalia marks the
first great step in the territorial aggrandisement of Brandenburg,
the peace of Oliva marks the first great step towards the dynastic
aggrandisement of the elector. Already absolute and sovereign in
Brandenburg, he now became sovereign in east Prussia, and only one step
remained to be taken, to make the united state of Brandenburg-Prussia
the most formidable, because the most centralised power of the north.

CHAPTER IX

LOUIS XIV. AND COLBERT

Alteration of political ideals in the middle of the
century--Seventeenth-century kingship--Character of Louis
XIV.--His government--The organisation of France under
him--The training of Colbert--Nicholas Fouquet--Colbert becomes
minister of finance--His financial reforms--The principles of his
financial policy--Advantages and dangers of his system--Character
of Colbert--The choice before Louis in 1671 between commercial and
military supremacy--Preference of military supremacy.

[Sidenote: =Altered political ideals, 1660.=]

The eighteen months which followed the peace of the Pyrenees form the
turning-point of the seventeenth century. Up to that time the ideas and
the policy which sprang from the controversies of the sixteenth century
had made themselves felt, albeit but dimly. As long as the battle
between the Church and Puritanism was being waged in England, as long
as Spain with her uncompromising Catholicism was still in the front
rank of European states, as long as Sweden, strong in the traditions
of Gustavus Adolphus, was still the first power in the north, it was
impossible to say that the interest of religious questions had quite
ceased to be the dominant interest in European politics. But the years
1660 and 1661 saw a great change, not so much in the motives and
ambitions which really actuated nations, as in the men who were called
upon to express them in politics. From the peace of the Pyrenees, Spain
retired from the arena of politics into a sleep of decay and decline,
and ceased to be of importance in the affairs of Europe, until the
ill-omened day when were seen gathering round her carcase the eagles
of the world prepared for deadly strife. From the Restoration in May
1660, England wholly surrendered any claim to be thought to be guided
by moral ideals in her policy at home or abroad, and offered herself
to the highest bidder, under the guidance of a king whose sole thought
was for his own personal comfort. The peace of Oliva, and the death of
Charles X. left Frederick William of Brandenburg the foremost figure
in northern Europe, and consecrated by the rewards of success the
policy of pure selfishness in its most shameless form. History often
has to note how among the contests inspired by religion, liberty and
patriotism, there is much of selfish intrigue and personal ambition;
how in the most sacred causes the dictates of humanity and of justice
are not unfrequently forgotten; and it may well be said, that the
spectacle of a Charles II. bartering away his country’s honour to gain
for himself immunity from trouble, or of a Frederick William cynically
breaking faith with the ally of yesterday because he could obtain
more from the ally of to-day, is only more repulsive, because less
hypocritical, than the ambition of an Elizabeth or a Philip II., which
attempted to conceal itself under nobler ideals. But after all, taking
men at their worst, which is always the most untrue of estimates,
it is something in international politics, where self-interest must
necessarily play so large a part, that its working should be concealed
as much as possible, even from those who are actuated by it. Moral
conventions are necessary where an agreed standard of moral principle
is impossible, and bad faith is as reprehensible in diplomacy as the
employment of savages is in war. Those who use them may gain the
battle, but at the cost of civilisation.

[Sidenote: =Personal power and territorial aggrandisement, the
motives of policy.=]

The monarchs and statesmen who were succeeding to the responsibilities
of government in the middle of the seventeenth century found themselves
in a very different position from that which their fathers had
inherited. No longer were there great ideals around them to take
captive their imaginations and absorb their energies. No longer were
there obvious difficulties of home government to conquer or avoid.
There were no struggling nationalities like that of Holland to protect,
no overgrown dominating tyranny like that of Spain to oppose, no
turbulent territorial baronage to crush, or be crushed by, the Crown.
These questions had worked themselves out in the earlier part of the
century and had left a blank behind them. A young king, who took up
the reins of government after the middle of the century, found an
open map before him. [Sidenote: =Unique position of the Crown.=]
His country was much exhausted by war, longing above everything for
rest, ready to make any sacrifices for order. The nobles, thinned and
impoverished by war, were not in a position to dispute his authority.
The army, well organised and obedient, gave him a power over the lives
and property of his subjects, wholly unknown to former generations.
A highly developed system of diplomacy enabled him to conduct
negotiations secretly with all the important states of Europe, while as
yet the comity of nations had established no general moral standard to
which diplomatists were expected to conform. Under these circumstances
it was only natural that the ambition of sovereigns should impel them
to try and make their own power supreme at home, and to enlarge the
boundaries of their territories abroad. Absolute power and territorial
aggrandisement become the main objects of European kings. The nation is
identified with the king; the larger and the richer the territory he
rules, the greater his glory and circumstance. Before that all things
give way. Differences of speech, differences of race, differences of
religion, differences of government, count for nothing, and whole
peoples are tossed about from one ruler to another like counters at
the table of the diplomatists, not in cynicism but in sheer unconcern.
Wrapped up in the supreme importance of gaining for their respective
masters one district or one town the more, politicians have become
wholly oblivious of everything else; until from the sheer necessity of
having some principle to which to appeal, they eventually evolved the
doctrine of the balance of power, which, when pushed to its logical
development in the succeeding century, meant little else than that, if
one European state managed to steal something, all the other states
had the right of stealing something too. In the nineteenth century,
the cause of oppressed nationalities has most powerfully influenced
the map of Europe. It is the glory and the boast of the greater powers
to have assisted in the unification of Italy, or the liberation of the
Christian states of the Balkan Peninsula. At the end of the seventeenth
century it was quite otherwise. To establish beyond all question
the authority of the crown, to maintain a powerful and perfectly
equipped army, to astonish the world by the splendour of the court,
to push ever further and further away the frontiers of the nation,
to extend a lordly protection, little short of vassalage, to weaker
countries,--such were the objects of a patriot king, such the rewards
of successful statesmanship. The nation was focussed and crystallised
into the person of the king. It worked, fought, lived, conquered for
him alone. In his glory it saw its own reflected, it recognised him as
its representative and its champion, it surrendered its independence to
him ungrudgingly, and in his success it reaped its reward. The rights
of peoples were not so much set aside, as not even thought of, for
everything was absorbed in the personality of the king.

[Sidenote: =Louis XIV. the type of seventeenth century kingship.=]

Of this type of kingship Louis XIV. is always looked upon
as the representative if not the founder. Its founder he certainly
was not, for his was not the mind to found anything. There is nothing
original, no initiative, about Louis XIV. He can use, he
cannot produce. The productive power seems wholly wanting in him. He
is essentially a barren man, singularly skilful in making use of the
material with which he is provided, but unable to add to it. It has
often been pointed out how he inherited everything which has made him
great, and left nothing great behind him. Condé and Turenne, Lionne and
Servien, Colbert, Corneille, and Racine were the products of the age
of Richelieu and Mazarin, and only utilised by Louis, while Villeroy
and Tallard and Boileau were the work of his own hands. [Sidenote:
=Louis a man of second-rate abilities.=] The statement requires
some modification, but the principle which underlies it is true. Nearly
everything which was great in France at the time of his accession to
power Louis had the ability to use. For the most part what became great
in France during his reign was not trained by him, and indeed in the
case of Port Royal attained its greatness in spite of him, and what was
directly trained by him was not great. The reason is not far to seek.
It is the vice of an absolutely centralised monarchy, where the king
is all in all, that it cannot in the nature of things tolerate any one
greater than the king. The ministers are servants, and no servant can
be greater than his master. [Sidenote: =His determination to admit
of no rival.=] Even in the Prussian monarchy of to-day there is
no room for a Bismarck, still less could one have been permitted to
exist at the court of Louis XIV. An absolute monarch sets the
standard of his ministers, if he absorbs the whole state into himself
as did Louis, and does not merely let things govern themselves as is
the fashion among Oriental despots. From the time of the death of
Mazarin, Louis determined he would never have another prime minister.
He himself, like Napoleon after him, would be the head and motive power
of the whole of the governmental and social machinery. He kept his word
with singular patience and pertinacity, and working harder probably
than any sovereign had worked, since the days of Philip II.,
never permitted a minister, not even Louvois, to rise above the merest
departmental independence. The result was inevitable. A commonplace man
himself, without insight, without originality, without independence
of mind, he could not inspire genius, and could not tolerate it
if he found it. He wanted diligence and accuracy, not genius and
statesmanship, clerks not ministers of state, and he got what he
wanted. It is significant that in all departments of administration
except one, when he had used up the men whom Richelieu and Mazarin
had left to him, he found no others to take their places. In diplomacy
alone France remained unrivalled to the end of the century, the one
department of which Louis himself was complete master, and in the
conduct of which he was thoroughly competent to take the lead.

[Sidenote: =His great kingly qualities.=]

But in spite of his deficiencies in the higher qualities of
statesmanship, not Aristides better deserved his title of the Just,
than did Louis XIV. that of _le Grand Monarque_. It was essentially
as a king that Louis was great. No sovereign of modern days has had
the kingly gifts in such rich profusion. Dignity without awkwardness,
courtesy without familiarity, gallantry without coarseness, a winning
manner, ready tact, chivalrous bearing, refined mind, and modest
demeanour, made the young king at once the pride of the French court
and the boast of the French nation. But something more than this was
required to make him the pattern and type of European kingship. It was
not merely that his social insight brought instinctively to his lips
the word which, within the bounds of good breeding, would prove most
pleasing or most effective to those whom he wished to impress, or that
his knowledge of character taught him almost intuitively the best mode
of approaching those whom he wished to win. It was not only that his
elaborate and punctual care for the etiquette and ceremonial of the
court could not fail to affect the mind with a sense of the perfection
of regal state, and attract it by a polished order of courtly
magnificence. [Sidenote: =His theory of kingship.=] Versailles was not
the first court in Europe to be distinguished by the splendour of its
ceremonial, and the refinement of its manners, but Louis XIV. was the
first great sovereign in Europe who made the perfection of his court an
essential part of his system of policy. When the Popes had ceased to
be the common fathers of Western Christendom, they applied themselves
to make the seat of their power the centre of the wider realm of art.
Rome deposed from the throne of universal faith was to be recompensed
by the sceptre of universal culture. So when France was assuming the
headship of Europe, and was preparing to strike for the dominion of the
civilised world, her court was to be the epitome, the representation
of the world’s greatness. Mirrored there in a tiny but radiant sphere
was to be found all which makes humanity noble and life beautiful.
Intellect and birth, genius and beauty, culture and statesmanship,
art and devotion, all were to be there marshalled in an admirable
perfection of order, but shining one and all with a reflected light,
illuminated by the rays of the king, their sun. Not unthinkingly did
Louis adopt the sun as his type. According to his theory of government
he was the centre, the life-giving principle of the system in which
he ruled. All that was young and beautiful in France sprang into life
at his bidding, and withered into decay when he averted his face, all
that was powerful drew its vigour from his favour, while from less
privileged lands the kings of the earth, like the Magi of old, drawn
by the light of his compelling rays, were to come from the ends of the
world to find under his protecting care the pattern of life and the
home of faith.

[Sidenote: =Truth of Thackeray’s caricature.=]

Sarcasm comes easy to the lips when dealing with a theory such as
this. Men cannot stop the course of the winds of heaven by building
houses of cards, and no artificial arrangements of a court can conceal
national weakness or physical decay. The sturdy English pencil of
Thackeray has drawn out the hollowness of this theory of seventeenth
century kingship in the bitter sarcasm of the well-known sketches of
_Louis le Roi_ in his later years. In the first appears the real
_Louis_, insignificant, decrepit, bald, and old, shaking and
feeble with age, a living corpse rather than a man. Opposite to him
stands _le Roi_--the flowing peruke curled and oiled, the royal
robes bedecked with ribbons, flashing with jewels, the tailor-made
divinity that doth hedge a king, standing ready for the monarch’s use
on its skeleton frame. Lastly we see the human atom and its gorgeous
artificial covering united in _Louis le Roi_, and are bidden to
reflect how much of the _Grand Monarque_ is the work of the tailor
and the wigmaker, and how little of God. The argument is true, the
sarcasm is just. Where the splendour of a court is part of the system
of government, represents and enforces the national dignity, sets the
fashion to foreign ambition, is the living embodiment of the power
and genius of the state, king and courtiers must not grow old. Queen
Elizabeth, encouraging protestations of love at the age of seventy,
and Louis XIV. attempting artificially to conceal the advance
of years, are spectacles offensive because unnaturally theatrical.
[Sidenote: =The French court at the head of civilisation.=] But
their loathsomeness never struck contemporaries as it does us. Louis
XIV. never lost the respect of Europe or the love of his
subjects. His kingliness was a fact which had so impressed itself upon
Europe, as both the cause and effect of the greatness of France and
the success of his policy, that men became insensible to the physical
incongruity. And they were right. From the court of Louis flowed out
influences far more potent than those which followed the feet of
his soldiers or the coaches of his diplomatists. Versailles set the
fashion to the civilised world. French manners, French dress, French
speech, French art, French literature, French preaching, French science
became the property and the models of civilised Europe. For a hundred
years in every department of life, from the turning of a couplet to
the drilling of recruits, from the composition of a panegyric to the
design of a card-table, everything is ruled by the French instinct of
order, cramped by the French love of artificial completeness, refined
by the French genius for finish, illuminated by the justness of French
taste. There are few kings to whom it has been given to dictate to
civilisation for a century the principles by which she is to live.

The secret of the wonderful success of Louis XIV. in all
those departments of life and of government which he understood lay in
the close personal attention which he gave to the matter in hand. His
genius certainly lay in his infinite

[Sidenote: =Louis’s attention to business.=]

capacity for taking trouble. [Sidenote: =Louis’s attention to
business.=] Even in his earlier years, when his court was the gayest
in Europe, not only would he listen to all the despatches of his
ambassadors and personally dictate the answers, but he actually kept
up a private correspondence with the more favoured of the envoys on
matters of which he did not wish the foreign office to have cognisance.
Of important negotiations, especially those in connection with the
great treaties of his reign, he took entire management himself, and
frequently wrote his directions to his representatives with his own
hand. He was equally punctilious about the smaller questions of
etiquette which occupied so much of the time and thought of ambassadors
in the seventeenth century. The order of an ambassador’s entry, the
rules by which he is to be guided in the decisive matters of covering
and uncovering, giving or denying the ‘_pas_,’ the supreme
necessity of trying to get in front of the Spanish ambassador, if
it could possibly be managed, are all laid down and commented upon
by Louis with the utmost sense of their importance. Nothing was too
great, nothing too small, for his personal care. The negotiations for
a partition treaty, the arrangements for a fête at Marli, the design
for the fortifications of Lille, the rebuke to be administered to a
malapert courtier or a forgetful servant were alike the subject of
careful consideration. ‘I have almost been obliged to wait’ is a phrase
which has become proverbial.

[Sidenote: =Organisation the characteristic of his government.=]

This minute attention to detail on the part of the Crown in a nation
gifted like the French with a genius for completeness produced a
corresponding thoroughness of treatment in every branch of the
administration. Organisation was the order of the day. During the years
of Louis’s greatness, before the constant strain of the over-ambitious
wars had broken everything down, organisation is the note of his
government. The great ministers are organisers not statesmen. They
are at the very antipodes of genius to Richelieu. And they are
organisers, not in the sense in which Sully was an organiser, merely
the rooter-out of patent abuses, but in the far higher sense in which
Charles Montague was an organiser, one who laid down true principles
of administration and constructed the machinery necessary for carrying
them out. Lionne organised the French foreign office and diplomatic
service, Colbert the internal administration of France, Louvois the
war office, on principles which became the acknowledged principles of
foreign, home, and military administration among all countries for
more than a century, some of which will remain acknowledged principles
for all time. It was this which enabled France to take full advantage
of her centralisation, which enabled her to bear the extraordinary
strain of unsuccessful war in the way she did, which gave her such
advantages in dealing with a huge unorganised mass like the Empire,
which left her even after all her losses at the end of the reign of
Louis XIV. stronger than she had been at the beginning. To the
ministers who planned and carried it out belong justly the honours of
the achievement, but it would never have been carried out at all had it
not been for the master who inspired them.

[Sidenote: =Training of Colbert in the household of Mazarin.=]

Colbert had served his apprenticeship in the household of Mazarin.
Early in life the cardinal had noticed his singular capacity for
business, and had taken him into his service from that of Le Tellier,
and intrusted him with the care of his household. The suggestions which
Colbert made from time to time to his master about the conduct of his
business soon showed Mazarin that he had in his new servant not merely
an accurate clerk, but a financial organiser, and gradually he placed
in his hands the whole management of his private affairs. The cardinal
was at once frugal and extravagant, avaricious and luxurious, and it
was the duty of Colbert to buy the best of everything in the cheapest
market, and to surround his master with comforts, while he doubled and
trebled his fortune. It was no easy task, for the cardinal was very
particular. Shirts for Mazarin’s own use, the trousseaux of his nieces,
carpets for his palace, his wedding gift to the young queen, all had
to receive Colbert’s personal attention; while he was more particularly
responsible for the investments and commercial undertakings by means
of which the cardinal amassed his huge fortune. Colbert was thoroughly
fitted for the work he had to do. Gifted with a keen eye for business,
great shrewdness in his estimate of men, and unlimited patience in his
attention to details, unhampered by scruples, stimulated but not led
away by ambition, he unhesitatingly set himself to satisfy his master’s
avarice. He used the powers of the state to give the cardinal’s
merchandise priority in the markets, and to relieve it from the
overwhelming burden of the dues which pressed so hardly upon all other
merchants. Under his guidance the state itself as it were went into
business for the benefit of the prime minister, with the result that
only seven years after the end of the _Fronde_ the cardinal died
worth £2,000,000 of money, and bequeathed on his deathbed the architect
of his fortune to the young king and to France as his most precious
possession.

[Sidenote: =Nicholas Fouquet.=]

When Mazarin died the finances of the country were under the control
of Nicholas Fouquet, the brother of the Abbé Fouquet, who had for some
years been the head of Mazarin’s secret police. Nicholas Fouquet was
a man of great ability and vaulting ambition. Seeing corruption all
around him he quickly yielded to the prevailing vice, and used his
double position of Superintendant of the Finances and Procureur-General
to collect a large fortune. But unlike Mazarin there was no stain of
avarice about Fouquet. He was the prey of large schemes of ambition,
the dispenser of a magnificence more than royal. By a lavish use of
his ill-gotten wealth he became the owner of colonial settlements,
the patron of art and literature, the builder of the most magnificent
palace in France, the centre and head of a social côterie which might
at any moment become a political danger. But if Fouquet had many
friends at court he had many enemies in the country. His splendour
and success made men jealous of him, his reckless mismanagement made
the business class distrust him, the increase of the debt made all
the _bourgeois_ hate him, his unblushing corruption gave his
enemies the whip-hand over him, and when it was known that the king
would not support him a cabal was formed with Colbert at its head to
ruin him. There was no difficulty in proving charges of peculation
and mismanagement, the question was entirely whether his faction at
court was strong enough to save him. The ladies were on his side, but
the king, either because he was jealous of his political power and
thought him dangerous to the Crown, or because he was jealous of his
personal influence with Mdlle. de la Vallière, who at that moment
exercised unlimited sway over Louis’s susceptible heart, determined
on his destruction. [Sidenote: =Condemnation of Fouquet, 1661.=]
He was induced to sell his office of Procureur-General, which carried
with it the privilege of being tried only by the Parlement, and then
was suddenly arrested only a few days after he had entertained Louis
and his court with regal magnificence at his sumptuous palace of Vaux.
A special commission was formed in order to try him. For three years
the tedious trial spun out its weary length. At last he was found
guilty of crime against the state and banished. Louis’s jealousy and
Colbert’s hate were not to be appeased so easily. By a stretch of royal
power almost unprecedented Louis substituted a sentence of perpetual
imprisonment for that of banishment, and men have darkly whispered
since, that even that severe punishment did not exhaust the royal
vengeance, and that the Iron Mask so well known to French romance
concealed the features of the brilliant Superintendant of Finance who
had dared to raise his eyes to the mistress of the king!

[Sidenote: =Colbert appointed to succeed him.=]

The disgrace of Nicholas Fouquet placed the whole internal
administration of France in the hands of Colbert, and he entered at
once with zeal on the business of its reorganisation. The finances
demanded his first attention. Under the mismanagement of Richelieu
Mazarin and Fouquet all the evils which Sully had suppressed had again
reappeared. The tax-gatherers and the financiers made large fortunes,
while the treasury received but a small percentage of the vast sums
wrung from the people. The expenses of the state were defrayed
from day to day by the sale of offices, by the creation of offices
for the purpose of sale, and by loans raised at ruinous interest.
[Sidenote: =Financial mismanagement.=] There was no check upon
peculation, no system of accounts, no thought of economy. France, like
a happy-go-lucky spendthrift in the hands of the Jews, was drifting
aimlessly into bankruptcy without even having money at command. Colbert
determined on severe measures. His experience in Mazarin’s household
had taught him how fortunes are made, and what sort of consideration
was due to those who became rich by lending money to the state.
[Sidenote: =Remedial measures of Colbert.=] At one stroke he
repudiated the worst of the loans raised by Fouquet, and diminished
the interest payable on those which he acknowledged. Having thus
reduced the burden of the debt to reasonable proportions he proceeded
to deal with the collection of the taxes. He remitted the longstanding
arrears of _taille_, forced the tax-gatherers to render accounts,
took proceedings against the worst of the peculators, and made them
disgorge their stolen gains. Order was restored in the administration
as if by magic. Every penny of expense was carefully considered,
duly authorised, and properly accounted for. Intendants were again
appointed to superintend the farmers of revenue, the _taille_ was
reassessed, the claims for exemption inquired into, the receipt-books
duly audited and checked. By these means he procured sufficient money
to pay the interest on the debt, and the expenses of the government
without increasing the taxes. In 1662, only a year after he became
Controller General, he was able to show a surplus of 45,000,000 of
francs without having increased the financial burdens on a single
honest man.

But Colbert was not content with merely restoring order in the
financial administration. It was not sufficient in his eyes merely
to take care that the receipts should exceed the expenditure, and
that opportunities for peculation should be reduced to a minimum.
[Sidenote: =Principles of his financial policy.=] He was one of
the first of ministers to realise how intimately the greatness and
prosperity of a nation are bound up with a good financial system,
to trace the wonderful effect in developing the national wealth and
promoting the national happiness, produced by a system of taxation
which carefully adjusts the financial burden to the shoulders of those
best able to bear it. Ministers of finance before Colbert’s time had
looked upon taxation solely from the point of view of the government,
had taxed those things upon which it was most easy to levy taxes, and
had levied the taxes in the way which ensured to the government a
certain income with very little trouble, quite regardless of the effect
of the system upon the tax-payer. Colbert on the contrary saw that the
secret of a good revenue lay not in the ease with which the tax was
collected, but in the ease with which it was paid. The interest of the
government and of the tax-payer were identical not antagonistic, and
the more the government could consult the convenience of the tax-payer,
the more the tax-payer would be able to afford for the convenience
of government. A good finance minister therefore would not content
himself with restoring order in the collection of taxes, and economy
in the disbursements of the treasury, but must apply himself to far
greater and more difficult problems, must study how to increase the
resources of the country to their utmost capacity, and how to adjust
the necessary taxation so as to interfere as little as possible with
their development.

[Sidenote: =Character of his protective system.=]

In the answer to these two questions lies the whole secret of
scientific finance. Colbert was the first finance minister to attempt
to give a scientific answer to them, that is, an answer based upon
reasoned principle. The reasoned principles adopted by Colbert have
been in the main the principles acted upon by most civilised countries
from this day to our own. They are principles which underlie the
economical system known as Protection, and are the application of the
theory of national sovereignty to economical subjects. The seventeenth
century, as we have seen, was essentially governed in all political
thought by the theory of the solidarity of nations under their kings.
All Europe was coalescing into territorial entities under their
respective sovereigns. Every such territorial entity guarded itself off
from its neighbours by the acquisition of natural frontiers, and by
the equipment of a professional army, and emphasised its individuality
by its concentration under its king and by the representation of its
king and his interests diplomatically at other courts. The idea of
a Europe united through the Christian brotherhood of man had passed
away. The idea of a Europe united through the cosmopolitan brotherhood
of man had not yet come. Between those two theories of brotherhood,
men were content to relapse practically into a condition of enmity,
and were engaged in building barriers against their neighbours, in
developing their own strength as much as possible, and in preventing
their neighbours from developing theirs. The same principles governed
men’s conduct in economics as in politics. Economic independence was
considered just as important for a nation as political independence. To
be as strong and resourceful as possible within the territorial limits
of the kingdom, to be as independent as possible outside those limits
were the recognised objects of every statesman. In the eyes of Colbert
it was just as necessary for France that she should not depend upon
the foreigner for her bread, as that she should not owe him allegiance
for her land. He would have thought it as reckless a piece of criminal
folly to derive the food-supply of the nation from certain rivals and
possible enemies, as to intrust to them the defence of the frontier.

[Sidenote: =Encouragement of home trade and manufactures.=]

Following out these principles Colbert set before himself two great
objects, to promote within the limits of France itself the production
of wealth by all the means in the power of the government, and to
prevent the foreigner by the imposition of hostile tariffs from
underselling the home producer in any of the commodities necessary
to the national well-being. He endeavoured to abolish the provincial
customs and local dues which impeded the free circulation of trade
from French province to province, and actually succeeded in abolishing
them over three-fourths of the country, in spite of the most strenuous
local opposition. He improved roads and developed the canals which had
been begun by Sully into a great system of water communication. Of this
system the celebrated canal of Languedoc, between the Mediterranean
and the Atlantic, which has done so much to promote the prosperity
of France, was the most striking example. For more than a century it
remained without a rival. When at last other nations began to realise
the importance of quick and easy communication, French roads and canals
became the models upon which they worked, French engineering talent the
authority to which they appealed, and the Suez Canal in the present
day derives its ancestry from the canal of Languedoc and the genius
of Colbert. He encouraged manufactures of all sorts. Under his care
French lace, glass, tapestries, silks, and brocades, became the most
celebrated in the world. He introduced a more scientific system of
dealing with the state forests, promoted large breeding establishments
for horses, encouraged the formation of industrial and commercial
companies, assisted the founding of colonies, and protected the infant
colonial trade by the formation of an efficient navy. At the same time
he relieved the peasantry from the heaviest of the fiscal burdens
which oppressed them by reducing the _taille_ nearly a half, and
recouping the treasury by imposing indirect taxes, principally upon
articles of luxury which were paid by the consumer. He helped the
manufacturer by removing the export duties on articles manufactured at
home, while he imposed heavy import duties on similar articles imported
from abroad. [Sidenote: =Prohibition of corn exportation.=] There
was, however, one serious exception to this policy. So fearful was
he lest France should ever become dependent on other nations for her
bread, that he absolutely refused to allow corn to be exported under
any circumstances. The surplus corn produced by the rich corn fields
of France over and above the wants of the nation would if freely
exported have formed one of the most lucrative sources of the national
wealth, for France in the seventeenth century was the corn-growing
country of Europe, but Colbert deliberately deprived himself of this
source of revenue, and kept the French agriculturist poor, in order to
make food cheap and ensure a large surplus of corn in the country.

[Sidenote: =Condition of France after ten years of Colbert’s
government, 1671.=]

The result of this policy, taken as a whole, was undoubtedly most
beneficial to France, in spite of the exaggeration of Colbert’s
protective measures. In the ten years, from 1661–71, during which
time Colbert had a real control over the national finances, with
the exception of the court expenses, not only was the debt largely
reduced, peculation checked, and the taxation greatly lightened and
better distributed, but new and fertilising streams of prosperity were
tapped in the establishment of manufactures and the opening of means
of communication which no misgovernment could again wholly close. By
the year 1671, France had gained for herself under Louis XIV.,
through the abilities of Colbert, a position to which history does not
afford any exact parallel. United and concentrated far more thoroughly
than any other country, with the whole forces of the nation absolutely
at the control of the king, defended on all sides except one by a
clearly defined and well-fortified frontier, rich by the fertility of
her soil and the industry and frugality of her people, she was now
adding riches to riches by the establishment of manufactures and the
promotion of commercial enterprise. Her colonies were springing up in
every part of the globe, her navy was formidable enough to defend them
from attack, her army second to none in discipline and reputation. Her
people were prosperous, contented and obedient; her administrators
just, careful and honest; her system of administration pure, and based
upon principles which made the security and independence of the country
the first consideration.

[Sidenote: =Dangers of the protective system.=]

On the other hand it did not require much foresight to see that a
system of scientific finance which was based purely upon selfish
principles could not fail to lead to international complications.
If every nation of Europe were to construct for its own advantage a
hostile system of tariffs against other nations, excuses for war would
be endlessly multiplied. However self-sufficient a country may be there
must be many articles of convenience, if not of necessity, for which
it depends upon its neighbours. Let a nation increase its colonial
empire as much as possible, and keep its trade wholly to itself by
an elaborate code of navigation laws, even then international trade
will not die nor foreign smuggling be stopped. Protective duties and
prohibitive legislation have never yet succeeded in destroying the
commercial dependence of one civilised nation upon another. Nations
which wish to protect their own trade by tariffs can only do so by
constructing a system which shall be injurious to that of their
neighbours, and is sure to lead to smuggling and reprisals. In the
sixteenth century trade adventurers looked after themselves, and it
was rare for the home government to consider itself compromised by
high-handed acts of piracy committed by its subjects on the other side
of the world. But when it was the action of governments themselves
which led to collisions between their subjects, they were bound in
honour to defend their own system. Tariff reprisals were instituted,
and claims made of a right to punish foreign smugglers, and search
foreign ships for smuggled goods, which were certain before long to
lead to war in downright earnest. It has often been said that the
wars of the sixteenth century were wars of religion, but those of the
eighteenth century wars of tariffs. The Dutch war of 1672 is adduced
as the first great war of the latter class, which was the first great
war waged in Europe since the adoption of a scientific system of
protective duties by a first-class power. There is some exaggeration
in this statement, but it is undoubtedly true that, from the date of
the adoption of a protective system by France under the guidance of
Colbert, there is not an important war waged in Europe for a century
and a half in which considerations of tariffs and commerce do not
play a large part; and it may well be doubted whether the national
organisation of finance any more than the national organisation of
defence, though steps along the path of civilisation, have proved
movements towards the attainment of peace.

[Sidenote: =Contrast between Louis and Colbert.=]

By the time he had completed his first decade of personal rule
the administrative talents of his ministers and his own gift for
governing had indeed raised Louis to a pinnacle of glory and of
reputation far exceeding all other sovereigns of his time. His court
was the most splendid and the most polished in Europe. Round it were
gathered the genius of Turenne, the brilliance of Condé, the dignity
of Corneille, the wit of Molière, the finish of Boileau, the art of
Racine. From Italy Bernini brought his solid if too dramatic talent
for the embellishment of Paris, while the sweetness of Claude and
the breadth of Le Brun were called upon to minister to the greatness
of the greatest of European sovereigns. In sharp contrast to all
this magnificence and grace stood the minister without whom it could
not have existed. Dour, grim, and harsh, Colbert moved through the
world without a friend, a man to whom ambition was life, and business
pleasure. Scrupulously honest, severely conscientious, strictly just,
painfully accurate, sincerely religious, he was wanting in humanity. He
was absolutely without heart and without sympathy. A man of religion,
he angered the clergy by trying to reduce the number of ‘religious’
because they did not make wealth; a man of the people, he offended
the populace by reducing the number of holidays; a zealous Catholic,
he displeased the orthodox by the favour he extended to the Huguenot
craftsmen, while he made himself unpopular with the Huguenots because
he deserted them in the hour of their need, when the king turned
against them. A man of conscientious probity, he had no scruples in
directing the judges to convict strong and powerful prisoners who were
accused of crime, in order that the king’s galleys might be well
manned, and even prevented galley slaves who had served their time
from being set free if they were still useful for the king’s service.
Less and more than human no wonder that men felt instinctively that he
was their enemy, however great the blessings of good government which
he had conferred upon them, and followed his coffin to the grave with
execrations in 1683.

In that, however, they were grossly unjust. They were visiting upon
him their dislike of the increased war taxation of which he was the
mouthpiece not the author. [Sidenote: =The choice of policy before
Louis, 1671.=] In the year 1671 France stood at the parting of
the ways. On each side stretched far into the future a long vista of
glory and prosperity, but she had to choose between them. Through the
victories of Richelieu and of Mazarin, through the administration of
Colbert, through the government of Louis, France stood at the head
of the countries of Europe in absolute security, without a rival
who wished to attack her, without an enemy whose attack she might
justly fear. [Sidenote: =Commercial supremacy open to France.=]
Entrenched within the borders of a frontier easily defensible by the
genius of a Vauban, she might sit free from all possible danger until
the floodgates of European warfare should reopen. Planting her colonies
in America, in Africa, in Madagascar, and among the islands of the
West, pushing out the operations of her trading companies to India and
the Spice Islands of the East, enjoying a pre-eminence through treaty
over all other European powers at the court of the Sultan and in the
trade of the Levant, on the point of gaining an influence, hitherto
unparallelled and undreamed of, over the vast expanse of the empire of
China through her Jesuit missionaries, she had but to stretch forth her
hand to seize the crown of colonial empire and of commercial supremacy,
which was already threatening to fall from the head of the Dutch. In
the middle of the seventeenth century she had no rivals to fear. The
day of Spain and Portugal was over. Holland, though vigorous, capable
and persevering, could not stand out for long against the pressure
of her greater neighbours. She had gained her unique and glorious
position through their weakness, she could not maintain herself against
them in their strength. Already she was stricken to the knees by the
English Navigation Act and the war of 1651, and had had to recognise
in England an equal in naval power and a rival in commerce. But the
day of England had not yet come. In the lucid intervals of a mad and
despicable policy, Charles II. did something to encourage the
American plantations, and to promote the operations of the East India
Company, but it was quite certain that the power of the state would
never be thrown into commercial or colonial competition with France,
as long as Louis retained in his own hands the means of rendering the
king independent of parliamentary control. It is moreover a significant
fact that the most important and permanent part of the English colonial
empire, which was built up in the eighteenth century, was not the
result of colonial enterprise but of war. Canada, the West Indies, the
Cape of Good Hope, India itself were the direct fruits of the long
wars with France, which in their origin and essence sprang from the
military and political ambition of Louis XIV. The rivalry with
France, which beginning in 1690 did not end till 1815, which produced
during that century and a quarter no less than seven distinct and
prolonged contests between the two nations, which gained for England
mainly at the expense of France a vast colonial empire, which lost
for her her only considerable plantations, was primarily and in its
essence a military and European rivalry. The wars were primarily and
essentially wars to check the military and political ascendency of
France over Europe, and to preserve the balance of power in Europe.
They sprang from the policy adopted by Louis XIV. in 1672,
when, no longer satisfied with pre-eminence in Europe, he deliberately
struck for supremacy over Europe. They followed from the determination
of William III. and the Whig party in England to prevent such
a consummation at all costs. Had Louis turned his ambition into other
directions, followed where the policy of Colbert pointed the way,
thrown the energies of his government and the genius of his people into
the path of colonial development and commercial supremacy, pushed his
fleets and his armies along the savage tracks where the cupidity of his
traders and the self-sacrifice of his missionaries had first marked the
road, he would have had nothing to fear from the impotent stubbornness
of the Dutch, or the venal indolence of England. And if a century or
half a century later England had awoke from her trance and put forth
her claims to dominion, a very different task would have awaited her.
She would have found an established organised power to conquer, not a
rival to outdo.

[Sidenote: =Preference of military supremacy by Louis.=]

But it was not to be. The traditions of France lay in the direction of
military conquest not of commercial supremacy. With an army carefully
trained and organised by Louvois, with generals at his command like
Turenne, Condé and Vauban, with all the traditions of the French
monarchy behind him, with all the longing for glory within him, which
was the very atmosphere he breathed, with his intimate knowledge of
European courts to assist him, what wonder is it that Louis determined
on the course which seemed to combine the certainty of success with the
maximum of glory? There was no nation in Europe that could resist him.
A combination of nations was alone to be feared, and what combination
could long resist the disintegrating effects of his diplomacy and
their own selfishness? What league had ever been a military success?
The resources of France seemed inexhaustible, her armies invincible,
her genius irresistible. In the distance but not so very far removed
from practical politics must come some day the great question of the
succession to the crown of Spain. When that question was ripe for
solution France must be in a position to solve it. Impelled alike by
the foresight of a statesman, the ambition of a king, and the flattery
of a court, Louis took the fatal step and plunged his country into a
century and a half of incessant war. With singular ease he had made
himself master of France, he now determined to be master of Europe too.

CHAPTER X

LOUIS XIV. AND THE UNITED PROVINCES

Humiliation of Spain and the Pope--Purchase of Dunkirk--The war
of devolution--Alarm of Europe--Opposition of the Dutch--The
Triple Alliance--The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle--Overthrow of
the Triple Alliance--Origin of the United Provinces--Their
constitution--Supremacy of the burghers--Unique position of
Holland--The House of Orange--Prosperity of the Dutch--Rivalry
between the republicans and the House of Orange--John Olden
Barneveldt--Attempted revolution of William II.--Supremacy
of the republican party--Character and policy of John de Witt--War
with England--The Act of Navigation--The Act of Exclusion--Second war
with England--The treaty of Breda--Danger from France--The perpetual
edict--Popular movement in favour of William III.--Murder of
de Witt.

[Sidenote: =Humiliation of Spain by Louis, 1661.=]

No sooner had Louis XIV. taken the management of affairs into
his own hands, than he began to let foreign countries understand that
France was now ruled by a sovereign who intended his will to be law,
and was not likely to abate one jot of the dignity which he thought
due to his crown. In the autumn of 1661, on the occasion of the solemn
entry of a Swedish envoy into London, the ambassadors of France and
Spain in their eagerness to gain precedence of each other came to
blows in the narrow streets. The carriage of d’Estrades, the French
ambassador, was overturned, his horse killed, and his suite forced
to take refuge in the adjacent houses wounded and beaten; while the
victorious Spaniard proudly took his place in the procession clothed
with all the insolent dignity of success. Louis took the matter up
fiercely, dismissed d’Estrades for having been beaten, recalled his own
ambassador from Madrid, and demanded and actually obtained from Philip
IV., under threat of war, the acknowledgment of the right of
the crown of France to precede that of Spain.

[Sidenote: =Humiliation of the Pope by Louis, 1662.=]

A few months later a tumult of a less honourable character brought
Louis into sharp antagonism to the Pope. The French ambassador at
Rome, the duc de Créqui, had made himself very unpopular by his
intolerable pride, and some of the Corsican guards of the Vatican,
urged on it is said by the brother of the Pope, and smarting under
the wrong of a personal insult rendered to their body by some of the
French suite, made themselves the organs of the general hatred and of
private revenge, by a gross attack upon the ambassador’s wife as she
was returning to her palace. A page was killed, many of the servants
wounded, and the duc de Créqui, leaving Rome in real or assumed fear
for his own life, demanded from Alexander VII. a reparation
which the Pope seemed very unwilling to give. Louis immediately seized
Avignon, assembled an army, appointed the maréchal du Plessis-Praslin
to the command, and ordered him to form the siege of Rome and force the
Pope to do justice to the outraged majesty of France. Alexander was
astonished at this unexpected display of energy, and sent his nephew
the cardinal Chigi in all haste to Paris to offer an humble apology and
obtain the best terms he could. He was the first legate say the French
historians ever sent by a Pope to ask for pardon. If so, the success
of the experiment hardly warranted its repetition. Louis remained for
some time obstinately irate, and was only pacified by imposing upon the
Pope the public humiliation of banishing his brother, disbanding his
Corsican guard, and erecting a pyramid in Rome as a perpetual memorial
of his disgrace.

[Sidenote: =Purchase of Dunkirk, 1662.=]

More substantial additions to the power of Louis than the precedence
of an ambassador or the disgrace of a Pope soon followed. In 1662 he
purchased the port of Dunkirk from England, and made it a harbour for
warships. In 1663 he sent the count of Schomberg, supported by French
officers and French money, secretly to the assistance of Portugal in
her war against Spain, and contributed materially to the gaining of the
victory of Villa Viciosa in 1665, which established the independence
of the country. [Sidenote: =Assistance given by Louis to Portugal,
and against the Turks, 1663–64.=] At the same time he proceeded
to read the Grand Vizier a lesson by breaking the ancient league of
friendship between France and the Sultan, in consequence of an insult
offered to the French ambassador in 1661, sent French troops to assist
in the defence of Candia, which was then being besieged by the Turks,
and supplied the Emperor with a large sum of money and a contingent of
6000 Frenchmen under La Feuillade and Coligny to resist the incursion
of the Ottoman armies into Hungary and Croatia in 1664. Chiefly owing
to the irresistible valour of the French troops, the imperial general,
Montecuculli, was enabled to inflict a crushing defeat upon the grand
vizier himself at the battle of S. Gothard on the Raab, and hurl the
invaders back behind their own frontiers.

[Sidenote: =The War of Devolution, 1667.=]

In 1667 broke out the first of the great wars of Louis XIV.,
the war of devolution. In September 1665 Philip IV. of Spain
died, leaving two daughters by his first marriage, of whom the queen of
France was the elder, and one son by his second marriage, who succeeded
to the crown of Spain under the name of Charles II. Louis
immediately laid claim to the Spanish Netherlands in virtue of what was
known as the law of devolution. This law was in fact a local custom of
the province of Brabant, by which private property in land passed to
the female children of the first marriage in preference to the male
children of the second marriage. If, therefore, Philip IV. had
in his private capacity bought a farm in Brabant, Louis would by the
law of devolution have become entitled to it in right of his wife; but
to assert that the sovereignty of the Low Countries followed the rule
of land tenure in Brabant was one of the most monstrous claims ever put
forward by hypocritical ambition. Nevertheless Louis played his part
well. The rights of his queen were dwelt upon with much argumentative
force by writers and diplomatists, while Turenne at the head of 35,000
men produced more convincing arguments. By August 1667 Charleroi,
Tournay and Lille were in his hands, and the whole of the Spanish
Netherlands lay open before him. Astonished Europe awoke to see the
once formidable power of Spain falling to pieces before its eyes, to
find itself threatened by the overweening ambition of a prince, whose
will was law from the Rhine to the ocean, and from the Scheldt to the
Pyrenees.

[Sidenote: =Alarm of Europe.=]

It was the first time that European statesmen realised the true nature
of the danger from France, the first time they understood the real bent
of French policy. Hitherto the shade of Philip II. had pressed
upon Europe like a nightmare. Hardly ten years had elapsed since
Cromwell had declared war against Spain in the spirit of Sir Walter
Raleigh, had actually allied himself with France, had called in the aid
of the lion to make sure work of the dying elephant. But five years ago
Clarendon had made over Dunkirk to Louis, never dreaming that France,
and not Spain, was to be the commercial and naval rival of England in
the years which were close at hand. The war of devolution shattered
these illusions somewhat rudely. It was a war of pure ambition, of
undisguised rapacity. It disclosed Louis to the world as absolutely
unscrupulous and alarmingly strong. If Spain thus crumbled to dust at
his feet, what power in Europe could dare to withstand him? Suddenly,
from out the calm which had pervaded all Europe since the treaties of
1660, there loomed in terrific proportions the black shadow of the old
world-wide tyranny, which, so far from having been crushed to death in
the wars of religion, had merely shifted the centre of its power from
Madrid to Paris.

[Sidenote: =Opposition of the Dutch to Louis’s schemes.=]

The burden of organising the opposition to France fell naturally
upon the Dutch. If the French once became masters of Antwerp and the
Scheldt, the pre-eminence of Amsterdam, and the prosperity, if not the
independence, of the United Provinces was gone. The Spanish Netherlands
formed a barrier to the advances of France which was absolutely
necessary to the existence of the Dutch as a nation. It had always been
an important part of their settled policy ever since they had gained
their independence to keep the French frontier away from the Scheldt.
De Witt, the grand pensionary of Holland, who was at that time the
political chief of the republic, was fully alive to the danger. Before
Louis had crossed the frontier he was deep in negotiations with the
Emperor and the princes of Germany, as well as with Sweden and England,
to put limits to the aggression of the French. But Louis’s diplomacy
had been too much for him. By the bribe of a partition treaty for
dividing the Spanish dominions between France and the Empire on the
death of the weakly king of Spain, Leopold was persuaded to remain
neutral while Louis was eating up his leaf of the artichoke. The German
princes were secured at heavy cost in October 1667 and Sweden was
terrified into inaction by threats. [Sidenote: =Negotiations with
England.=] England alone remained dangerous. The fall of Clarendon
in November 1667 had put the chief direction of foreign affairs into
the hands of Arlington who was in favour of a Dutch alliance. Sir
William Temple, the ablest of English diplomatists and a sturdy friend
to the Dutch, was sent as English envoy to the Hague. Charles himself,
though he never intended to break with Louis and lose the French
subsidies, was not averse to an occasional display of independence.
With an impartiality more creditable to his cleverness than his
honesty, he kept on foot negotiations for an alliance with Spain,
France and the Dutch at the same time, waiting to see which side would
offer him most. By December 1667, however, it became abundantly clear
that the English people would not tolerate an alliance with France,
or permit Louis to make himself master of the Low Countries. Charles
accordingly took the line of the least resistance, authorised Temple to
conclude a treaty with the Dutch, and wrote to Louis to explain that he
had been obliged to act against his own wishes.

[Sidenote: =Formation of the Triple Alliance, 1668.=]

The treaty was signed at the Hague on the 13th of January 1668, and on
May 15th Sweden, angered by the threats of Louis, joined the alliance
in order to secure the payment of some old-standing claims upon Spain
which were guaranteed by the English and Dutch governments. The Triple
Alliance, as the treaty was then called, bound the allies to help each
other if attacked, and to endeavour to restore peace between France and
Spain, on the terms of the surrender to Louis, either of the districts
in the Low Countries which he had conquered, or of Franche-Comté and
a few specified frontier towns in the Netherlands. By a secret clause
they further bound themselves to compel peace on these terms, and, if
France refused, they agreed to make war upon her until she was reduced
to the boundaries fixed by the treaty of the Pyrenees.

[Sidenote: =Louis outwitted.=]

This was the first serious rebuff which the diplomacy of Louis had
sustained. His minister at the Hague, d’Estrades, had assured him again
and again that he need not be under any apprehensions of the formation
of a confederation contrary to his interests under the leadership of
the Dutch, because by the constitution of the United Provinces every
treaty required the sanction of the estates of the different provinces,
and it would be quite easy to ensure its publication, and bring about
its defeat, when it was proposed for their acceptance. He overlooked
the fact that during the war with England the provincial estates, in
order to prevent unnecessary delays, had delegated their powers to
a small commission of eight members, and had never resumed them. So
while d’Estrades was awaiting in confidence the publication of the full
text of the proposed treaty before the provincial estates, de Witt
quietly procured the consent of the commission of delegates, and the
treaty was signed and ratified before the French knew that it had been
even discussed. Louis only heard of the secret article from Charles
II. himself. He at once saw the gravity of the crisis, and
determined to put himself in the best possible position for subsequent
action. Though it was the middle of winter Condé received orders to
advance into Franche-Comté at the head of 15,000 men. On the 1st of
February his soldiers crossed the frontier. In a fortnight the whole
country was at his feet, and Louis went in person to Besançon to
receive its submission. _Beati possidentes_ is a diplomatic truth
which was just as thoroughly understood by Louis XIV. as by
Napoleon.

[Sidenote: =The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1668.=]

But unlike Napoleon, Louis knew when he had gone far enough. He was not
going to stake everything on the chance of success in a war against a
combination of European powers, which was certain to grow larger as
time went on. He had already a securer foundation on which ultimately
to raise the edifice of French domination over the Spanish Netherlands
in his secret partition treaty with the Emperor. The terms of the
Triple Alliance guaranteed to him the possession of Lille, Tournai, and
Charleroi, the three fortresses which would make France impregnable on
her north-eastern frontier and open to her the gate of the Netherlands.
The show of moderation at this juncture would do much to disarm the
suspicion of Europe, would give him time to mature his plans for the
future, and enable him to make very substantial additions to his power
in the present. So Louis declared himself willing to negotiate for
peace, and on May 29th, 1668, the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed
between France and Spain. By it France gave back Franche Comté, having
dismantled the fortresses, and received Charleroi, Binch, Ath, Douai,
Tournai, Oudenarde, Lille, Armentiéres, Courtrai, Bergues and Furnes,
with their districts. Some of these towns, such as Courtrai, Oudenarde
and Ath lay within the Netherlands, but in the line of fortresses
which stretched, roughly speaking, along the frontier from Dunkirk
to Charleroi, and included Lille, France had now an adequate defence
for her capital. Paris was safe and the invasions of the years of the
_Fronde_ could never again recur.

The war of devolution added to the ambition of Louis XIV.
the passion of revenge. It ministered to his pride by showing him
the immense superiority of his armies, and the predominance almost
unchallenged of his diplomacy. [Sidenote: =Hatred of Louis for
the Dutch.=] No soldier had been found to face his troops in the
field, no fortress had dared to resist his attack, the success of
his diplomacy had even broken the traditional alliance between the
Emperor and Spain. Germany had remained unconcerned while Spain was
being devoured. There was but one blot on this fair picture. One power
had dared to enter the lists with the all-powerful Louis and had
given him a fall. The Dutch had been the heart and soul of the Triple
Alliance. Without them it would never have been called into existence.
The assistance of England and Sweden was merely fortuitous. It was
the Dutch who were organising a policy and laying down principles of
action. It was galling enough to think that they had ventured to break
away from their condition of humble tutelage. To the Huguenots of
France and to Henry IV. the Dutch owed their very existence,
so every Frenchman believed. That they should be permitted to thwart
the cherished schemes of the king of France unpunished, to show to
Europe the way by which it could successfully resist French ambition,
and yet go scot-free, was impossible. From the day of the signing
of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, Louis set himself to prepare a
deadly punishment for the insolent republicans who had dared to
thwart his will. Europe should learn by a terrible object-lesson that
the vengeance of the king of France was as swift as his spirit was
magnanimous.

[Sidenote: =An additional incentive to the claim of European
supremacy.=]

This determination to punish the Dutch meant for France and for Louis
the deliberate adoption of a policy which had for its object supremacy
over Europe. After the success of the Triple Alliance Louis could not
conceal from himself the probability that an attack upon the Protestant
maritime and republican power of the United Provinces would almost
certainly lead to a coalition of European powers against him. Germany
would never stand aside to permit the destruction of the Dutch. It was
more than doubtful if the careless Charles would have the inclination
or the firmness to keep England neutral. Every hour that Charles of
Spain lived diminished the value of the partition treaty as a bribe to
the Emperor. Louis could only wipe the United Provinces from out the
map of Europe by making himself the master of Europe. For four years
he hesitated before striking the final blow. But everything led him in
that direction. In his own court, besides the fulsome atmosphere of
adulation in which he lived, which must have weakened his judgment,
many influences were urging him on. Lionne, the cautious and trusted
minister of foreign affairs, was dead. Louvois, the indefatigable
minister of war, had raised the army to a pitch of perfection hitherto
unknown, and was anxious to prove its powers. The very success of
Colbert’s finance made Louis too easily forget the real limits of the
resources upon which he was drawing so lavishly. The nobles, ousted by
design from politics, now found their only sphere of activity in the
army, and were eager for war and for glory. Abroad diplomatic success
contributed its spur to his ambition. [Sidenote: =The Triple Alliance
overthrown, 1670–1672.=] The Triple Alliance was already a thing
of the past. In May 1670 the secret treaty of Dover bound Charles
II. hand and foot to France. In November 1671 the Emperor
agreed not to assist the enemies of France. In April 1672 Sweden
returned to her old alliance, and undertook to attack the Empire if the
Emperor helped the Dutch. Finally the bishop of Münster and most of the
smaller princes of Germany promised either assistance or neutrality.
The Great Elector alone remained stubbornly aloof. These astonishing
results of his diplomacy, added to the ceaseless importunities of his
court, fired Louis’s ambition and overcame his prudence. Forgetting
that promises so easily made can be still more easily revoked, he gave
the signal for a war of aggression pure and simple, which brought its
appropriate and ultimate reward in the wreck of his ambition and the
exhaustion of France.

[Sidenote: =The United Provinces.=]

Europe must have been craven-hearted indeed if it had stood tamely by,
wrapped in the cloak of its own selfishness, to watch the death-throes
of the United Provinces. The history of their war of independence was
sufficient to stir the emotions of every generous soul, the use which
they had made of the liberty which they had won such as to guarantee
its continuance in the mind of every prudent statesman. Trained to a
rough and hard life by a constant struggle with nature, consecrated
to a sturdy individualism of character by the religion of Calvin in
its most uncompromising and fatalistic form, the peasants from the
marshes of Holland and the fishermen from the sand-banks of Zealand
had found in the breath of liberty the elixir of a national life.
Under the leadership of the burghers of Amsterdam and Dordrecht, at
the initiative of the nobility of Zealand and Guelderland, with the
support of the scholars of Leyden, the union of Utrecht, formed in
1579, gave to Europe a new nationality, and planted in the very midst
of the great monarchies a confederation of tiny republics. [Sidenote:
=Reasons for the success of the war of independence.=] Nothing
could have preserved their independence at first except a strange
combination of national virtues, natural advantages, and political
fortune. Persecution had fanned the flame of patriotism till it burned
at a white heat. Under the pressure of a long struggle with a superior
power even vices turned into virtues. Slowness and obstinacy became
refined into patience and endurance, dulness into obedience, sloth
into fidelity. Never did men fight with greater heroism, with more
complete self-forgetfulness, than these rude sailors and fishermen who
wrested their liberty and their religion at the edge of the sword from
the pride of Spain. The physical characteristics of the country aided
them. Campaigns were difficult in a land which at any moment might be
restored to the sea by the cutting of a dyke. Sieges of towns open
to the sea by a power which had no navy were fore-doomed to failure.
Political complications aided them also. The opposition of France and
the jealousy of England made the task of Spain far more difficult. But
neither the sympathy of the Huguenots, nor the gold of Elizabeth,
nor the marshes of Holland, nor the defeat of the Armada, would have
availed one jot to save the confederation from ultimate ruin had it
not been for the tenacity, the patriotism, and the self-sacrifice of
the nation itself. Never since the days of Miltiades and Themistocles
did a people better deserve their freedom than did the patient Dutch
under their silent prince when the dagger of the assassin laid him
low in 1584. They had not long to wait, for although the formal
independence of the United Provinces was not acknowledged by Spain
until the peace of Westphalia in 1648, they had ceased to be under any
fear of subjugation since the death of Philip II. in 1598,
and had been able since the beginning of the century to transfer their
attention from the preservation of their liberty to the development of
their power.

[Sidenote: =Constitution of the United Provinces.=]

The confederation formed by the Union of Utrecht in 1579 was an example
of a kind of government seldom found in history to be permanent,
namely a loose confederation of sovereign states. The confederated
states were seven in number, Holland, Friesland, Zealand, Utrecht,
Guelderland, Overyssel, and Gröningen, and a Federal Constitution
was gradually developed. Each of these independent provinces had its
own government vested in its provincial estates and its stadtholder;
but the common affairs of the whole confederation were transacted in
the estates general, which was a representative body consisting of
delegates from the provincial estates. To them appertained the right
of appointing the captain general and the admiral general, who were
the heads of the military and naval forces of the confederation. With
them was associated a council of state in whom the executive was
vested. The stadtholder, for the chief provinces usually elected the
same stadtholder, in virtue of his office, was a member of the council
of state and of the provincial estates as well as of the estates
general. He appointed the burgomasters of the towns, and the principal
magistrates, and had the right of acting as arbiter in any matters of
difference which arose between the provinces. In theory therefore the
constitution of the provinces was that of a confederation of sovereign
states, which had intrusted certain functions of government, such as
the organisation of defence, to a representative body of delegates
and an elective chief magistrate; but had retained to themselves
certain others, such as finance and foreign affairs. But in practice
the influences which made for unity were very much stronger than the
disintegrating forces. The independence of the separate provinces was
much more apparent than real, and served rather to increase delay
and multiply difficulties than to preserve any real independence of
action. This came about from various causes. [Sidenote: =Supremacy
of the burgher aristocracy.=] Owing to the spirit of republicanism
engendered by the war of independence, and the secularisation of
Church property and the overthrow of the Church system brought about
by the Reformation, the two orders of the nobles and of the clergy
lost all share in the government. Political power fell completely into
the hands of the citizens of the towns, and was exercised through the
municipal councils, which were in fact in each town the nominees of
a small burgher aristocracy. Each province therefore was in reality,
as far as politics were concerned, nothing more than a federation of
towns, and the provincial estates but the delegates of the municipal
councils. This limitation of all political power to one class, that of
the burgher aristocracy, did much to secure a unity of interest among
the different provinces. [Sidenote: =Unique position of Holland.=
This was still further developed by the unique position of the province
of Holland in the confederation. It was so far superior to the other
provinces in wealth, in population and in dignity, that in common talk
it has given its name to the whole republic. It contained within its
borders the great trading towns of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Delft and
Dordrecht, Leyden the seat of the university, and the Hague the centre
of the government. It alone had the right of being represented at the
courts of Paris and Vienna. It paid in taxes almost as much as all the
other provinces put together. From its ports issued year by year the
merchant ships which had acquired for the United Provinces the carrying
trade of the world, the navy which at the beginning of the century was
the undisputed mistress of the ocean, and the bands of hardy colonists
who had planted the Dutch flag in every quarter of the globe. The
great city of Amsterdam itself, with its banks, its docks, and its
thousands of fishermen and artisans, founded, as it was said, on the
carcases of herrings, was the centre of the commerce and the opulence
of northern Europe. The Venice of the North, alike in her commercial
prosperity and her close oligarchical government, she so far dominated
over all her colleagues that in the days of her greatness the United
Provinces were little less than Amsterdam writ large. Shorn of the
province of Holland, the country certainly could not have maintained
its independence for a moment.

[Sidenote: =Leadership of the House of Orange.=]

To the unity of interest thus secured by the ascendency of the burgher
aristocracy, and the unquestioned leadership of Holland in all national
concerns, the House of Orange added a continuity of government. If
the United Provinces owed their prosperity to Holland, they owed
their very existence to the House of Orange. Had it not been for the
statesmanship of William the Silent they would never have won their
independence, had it not been for the generalship of Maurice they
would never have maintained it. Had it not been for the patriotism and
moderation of both they would have lost their republicanism as soon as
they had gained it. But fortunately for the Dutch republic the princes
of the House of Orange preferred to exercise most of the powers of
limited kingship under the guise of an elective magistracy. The head
of the House of Orange combined in his person by elections, which
were never questioned for seventy years, the offices of stadtholder
of five provinces, of captain general and of admiral general of the
republic. For the first and most critical half century in the history
of the nation the supreme management of the civil, military and naval
affairs of the country were in the hands of one family, not indeed by
hereditary right, but by an elective custom which had grown at least
strong enough to be described as an hereditary right to election. Under
their wise government the prosperity of the United Provinces had grown
by leaps and bounds. The destruction of the Armada in 1588 removed from
the northern seas all enemies to Dutch trade. France, torn by civil
and foreign war, could not man a warship or despatch a merchant fleet.
England was a more serious rival, but political friendship kept for a
time commercial enmities in check. The world was found large enough
for both countries, and while English enterprise tended to flow in the
direction of America and the West, the Dutch pursued their conquests in
Africa and the East. In the East Indies alone, the famous Spice Islands
of romance, the two nations found themselves in acute and deadly
rivalry, and for some years a war raged on the other side of the globe
between the servants of the two East India companies, which was only
taken notice of by the home governments when some serious breach of
international rights, such as the massacre of Amboyna, forced them to
open their eyes and lazily demand compensation.

[Sidenote: =Prosperity of the Dutch, 1600–1650.=]

With the dawn of the seventeenth century everything seemed to be
conspiring to promote the prosperity of the country. England became
more and more entangled in complications at home, and under a weak and
vain king gave less and less assistance to her traders. In the north,
Sweden and Denmark, engaged first in war among themselves and then
in the Thirty Years’ War, easily let the Baltic trade imperceptibly
glide into the hands of the Dutch. Neither Germany nor France were
in a position to enter the lists with the republic, and the decaying
power of the Hansa fell completely before the blast of the great war.
The United Provinces, it is true, were forced to take their part in
the struggle, but under the cautious and talented Frederick Henry,
the younger son of William the Silent, who had succeeded his brother
Maurice in 1625, the Dutch contingent did little more than garrison
the duchy of Cleves, and keep the Low Countries quiet. Meanwhile the
whole world was open to their enterprise. There was literally not a
country to compete with them, even feebly, as the troubles in England
thickened. They took part of Brazil from Spain, and founded on the
coast of North America the colonies of New Holland and New Jersey,
settled in Africa, in Ceylon, and on the mainland of India, planted
themselves on the rich island of Java, and finally in 1630 made
themselves masters of the Cape of Good Hope. In the first half of the
seventeenth century they enjoyed a colonial empire larger than that of
Venice in its palmy days. They were undisputed masters of the seas,
they had almost the monopoly of the carrying trade of the world.

[Sidenote: =Rivalry between the republican party and the House of
Orange.=]

But in this very prosperity lay the germs of future trouble both
abroad and at home. The frog might swell itself even to bursting
point but it could not rival the dimensions of the ox. The wonderful
maritime success of the Dutch was due largely to the fact that its
two great neighbours of England and France, who were better situated
geographically for the development of trade, were in the throes
of foreign and domestic war. When peace was restored, and men had
leisure once more to attend to the affairs of commerce, it was not
likely that the hardy sailors of Brittany and Devonshire would long
lag behind the fishermen of Zealand or the traders of Amsterdam in
the race for wealth. It was not possible that the Dutch however high
their courage, however great their skill, however tough their pride,
could long compete on equal terms with either monarchy. They could
not pretend to do so even if they were united among themselves, but
that was not the case. The great increase of wealth and prosperity
intensified instead of diminishing their internal jealousies. Ever
since the Union of Utrecht there had been two distinct parties in
the state, the partisans of the House of Orange and the republicans
pure and simple, the former representing the political principles of
a limited monarchy, the latter those of a burgher oligarchy. In the
civil and military authority enjoyed by the princes of the House of
Orange, through their quasi-hereditary tenure of the stadtholderate
and of the supreme military and naval command, their adherents saw
the only guarantee which their country possessed against the dangers
of internal discord. They looked upon this concentration of authority
in the hands of one family as essential to the solidarity of the
state, and valued it all the more because they believed it to be the
only effective counterpoise to the overweening pride and political
domination of Amsterdam. Their weakness lay in the fact that their
adherents were mainly drawn from the classes of the nobles, the clergy
and the peasantry, who had very little political power. Only in the
province of Zealand, where the House of Orange had large possessions,
were the majority of the town councils in their favour. But the very
fact of their political weakness as compared with their numerical
strength inspired them with a jealousy all the more intense of their
more fortunate republican neighbours of the towns. These latter were
imbued with the narrowest spirit of burgher exclusiveness. They feared
alike the democratic tendencies of the populace and the monarchical
instincts of the House of Orange. Within a small circle of capitalist
families the functions of government were divided pretty equally. Any
member of these privileged families, if his capacities were equal to
the charge, had the opportunity of being trained in the public service
from his earliest years. He succeeded as naturally to the diplomatic
or administrative business of his father or his uncle in the political
family party, as he did to the management of the family business or the
ownership of the family ships.

During the first few years of the history of the republic, while
the issue of the war with Spain was still doubtful, the military
necessities of the country forced the House of Orange into prominence,
and kept the republican spirit in check. [Sidenote: =Growth of the
Republican Party.=] But as political dangers from outside grew less
serious, and the wealth and importance of the citizen traders became
by far the most important factors of the national life, the political
preponderance of the republican party, who drew their strength from
the merchant class, soon threatened to be decisive. The province of
Holland, which was republican to a man, assumed an unquestioned lead
in the national councils. It alone had the right of appointing a
representative at the courts of Paris and Vienna. It alone paid more
than half the national taxes. It alone provided nearly the whole of
the national fleet. [Sidenote: =Olden Barneveldt.=]Partly owing
to these circumstances, partly to his own abilities, as early as the
beginning of the century the Advocate of the province of Holland, John
Olden Barneveldt, had insensibly become the foremost statesman of the
republic. In theory he was only the spokesman or first minister of
the provincial estates of Holland, in fact he was the leader of the
republican party and for a few years virtual ruler of the republic. He
it was who negotiated with foreign states and determined the national
policy. Already then it seemed as if the supreme power in the republic
had shifted from the stadtholder and the House of Orange to the
representative of the republican merchants of Amsterdam. But Maurice,
prince of Orange, the second son of William the Silent, was not going
to let power slip out of his hands so easily. Taking advantage of a
quarrel between Barneveldt and his staunch ally and protector Henry
IV., he very skilfully managed to direct upon him, left thus
defenceless, the whole weight of the cruelty and fanaticism of the
Calvinistic clergy. [Sidenote: =Execution of Barneveldt brought about
by Maurice of Nassau, 1610.=] By a crime, more atrocious than that
of the assassination of his own father, because of the hypocrisy which
accompanied it, he brought Barneveldt to the scaffold in 1610 by a
sentence of judicial murder.

The villainy was eminently successful. For forty years the republican
party suppressed itself, and the government of the republic remained
without question in the hands of the stadtholders of the House
of Orange: Maurice, Frederick Henry, and William II. [Sidenote:
=Government of Maurice, Frederick Henry, and William II., 1610–1650.=]
Indeed, when this halcyon period came to an end, it was the ambition
of the stadtholder, not the pride of the republicans, which was at
fault. William II. had married a daughter of Charles I. of England,
and undeterred by the fate of his father-in-law and the outbreak
of the _Fronde_ he determined to effect a _coup d’état_ and turn
the stadtholderate into a monarchy. Just before his death Frederick
Henry had negotiated with Spain a treaty at Münster, finally ratified
in January 1648, by which Spain and the United Provinces agreed to
unite together in defence of the Spanish Netherlands against French
aggression, on condition that Spain closed the Scheldt to trading
vessels and acknowledged the independence of the republic. A more
favourable treaty to the United Provinces cannot be imagined, for by
it they obtained a barrier between their own territories and those of
France, and secured the trade monopoly of Amsterdam. Yet William II. in
his insensate ambition actually agreed to throw all these advantages
away, and allow France to seize the Spanish Netherlands, in return
for the consent of Mazarin to his projected revolution. [Sidenote:
=Attempted coup d’état of William II., 1650.=] Having thus secured the
neutrality of France he proceeded to put his scheme into execution. He
was sure of the support of the army and of Zealand, and need not fear
the opposition of any of the other provinces except Holland. His first
business accordingly was to get up a quarrel between the states-general
and the provincial estates of Holland about the disbandment of some
troops, then, posing as the champion of the states-general, obtained
from them authority to take measures for the preservation of the union,
and to put pressure upon the estates of Holland. This was sufficient
for him. After some negotiation, on the 30th of July 1650 he suddenly
arrested six of the leading deputies of Holland, and directed his
troops to march during the night upon Amsterdam. The city was saved by
the merest accident. The night was dark and rainy, the troops lost
their way. When day broke they were still outside the town. The alarm
was given. Only one magistrate Cornelius Bicker von Swieten happened to
be in the city, but it was enough. [Sidenote: =Death of William II.,
1650.=] The gates were closed, the drawbridges raised, the militia
called out, and Amsterdam was safe, and with Amsterdam the republic.
A _coup d’état_ was now impossible. William saw he could only succeed
by civil war and he did not dare to give the signal for that. For five
months both sides eyed each other suspiciously, but neither dared to
move. Suddenly, in November 1650, William was seized with a violent
fever, and died in a few days.

[Sidenote: =Supremacy of the republican party.=]

The tragic death of William II. decided the crisis in favour
of the republican party. Some weeks after the death of the stadtholder
his wife gave birth to a son, the future William III. of
England. It was obviously impossible to appoint an infant in his
cradle to the supreme command of the civil and military affairs of the
country. It was undesirable to ignore the seriousness of the danger
from which the republic had accidentally been saved. The republican
party at once seized the opportunity and asserted their superiority.
A grand assembly was held at the Hague in January 1651 to decide the
constitutional points which had arisen, and it was agreed that the
stadtholderate should remain vacant, and the functions of the office
devolve upon the provincial estates; while the supreme military
and naval command was divided between the estates general and the
provincial estates. The real gainers by this arrangement were the
provincial estates of Holland. Freed from the rights of the stadtholder
political power naturally gravitated to the centre of the wealth and
intelligence of the nation. In the provincial estates of Holland
it found a body of men thoroughly capable of using it, and a chief
admirably adapted to the task of working its delicate machinery. In
John de Witt, grand pensionary of Dordrecht, elected grand pensionary
of Holland in 1653, the republican party found a champion, and the
United Provinces a minister, second to none in Europe for skill,
honesty and acumen.

[Sidenote: =John de Witt.=]

Called at the age of twenty-eight to the post of first minister of
Holland, John de Witt brought to his task qualities of mind and
character singularly fitted to the part he had to play. In him the
virtues of Dutch republicanism shone pre-eminent. Homely and frugal
in life, straightforward in policy, patient in temper, dignified in
manner, persevering in action, no reverse could daunt his spirit, no
success destroy his self-control. To the somewhat phlegmatic temper
of the Dutch character de Witt added also the finer qualities of the
Latin races. Shrewd foresight, quick inventiveness, ready adaptation
of means to the end marked his management of foreign affairs. He was
the only diplomatist of Europe whose fertility of resource completely
out-generalled Louis XIV., whose steadfastness of purpose
completely baffled the shiftiness of Charles II. Winning
persuasiveness of speech adorned with rich eloquence of phrase gave
him perfect mastery over the assemblies whom it was his business to
lead. But the dominant note in his character and policy was his staunch
almost fanatical belief in republican principles. Republicanism to
him was the whole of patriotism, and almost half of religion. His own
father, Jacob de Witt, had been one of the deputies imprisoned by
William II. during his abortive attempt to make himself king.
[Sidenote: =His opposition to the House of Orange.=] John de Witt
never forgot the dull horror of those anxious days, when each hour as
it sped seemed to be tolling the knell at once of his father’s life
and of his country’s liberty. From that moment the ambition of the
House of Orange seemed to him to be as great a danger to his country as
the aggressiveness of France or the rivalry of England. To keep down
the national sentiment in favour of the young prince, to resist his
hereditary claim to the stadtholderate and the command of the forces,
to strengthen the hold of the estates of Holland over the government
became the keynotes of his home policy, measures which he considered
as essential to the well-being of his country as the maintenance of a
barrier between France and the Scheldt.

The infancy of the young prince, and the consequent victory of
republican principles in the great assembly of 1651, made the danger
from the House of Orange for the time imperceptible. When John de Witt
became Grand Pensionary of Holland in 1653, the safety of the republic
was threatened not by civil dissension but by foreign conquest.
[Sidenote: =Quarrel between the United Provinces and England.=]
With the restoration of order in England by the defeat of the king in
the civil war had naturally come a considerable increase in commercial
enterprise, and the Dutch traders became once more sensible of English
rivalry and opposition in every part of the globe. To this natural
rivalry gradually became added special causes of disagreement. During
the interval between the defeat of the king and the reduction of the
English possessions in the West Indies by the Parliament, the loyal
colonists had preferred to trade with a foreign power whose chief was
closely related to their king, rather than with the rebels of their own
country who had imprisoned him. Consequently the Dutch had succeeded in
withdrawing from English merchants the bulk of their American trade. To
settle this matter and some others the Parliament sent to the Hague in
May 1649 an envoy, Dr. Dorislaus, who had been one of the late king’s
judges. While he was at the Hague in the character of ambassador, he
was murdered by some of Montrose’s men by way of reprisal for the death
of Charles I. In extreme anger at this insult St. John was
sent in 1651 to demand from the estates general the expulsion of prince
Charles and his adherents, and their consent to the union of the two
republics under a common government, which should have its seat in
England. [Sidenote: =The Act of Navigation, 1651.=] The estates
general naturally refused to surrender on demand the independence
which they had fought so hard to win, and in August 1651 the English
Parliament passed the Act of Navigation which was in reality the signal
for war. By this famous act the policy was first enunciated which was
to govern the relations of the great maritime powers to their colonies
for a century and a half, the policy namely which regarded colonies as
the mere feeders of the mother country. It enacted that foreign ships
might only import into England the products of the countries to which
they belonged. [Sidenote: =War with England, 1651–1654.=] It was
directed obviously against the Dutch, who were at that time the great
carriers of the world, and was intended not only to destroy the trade
of the Dutch with the English colonies, but also to enable the English
ships to wrest the bulk of the carrying trade from their hands. War at
once broke out, in which the genius of Blake and the superior guns of
the English fleets triumphed over the tenacity of Tromp and the valour
of Opdam. The Dutch merchant shipping was shut up behind the Texel.
The English remained masters of the sea. Even the Portuguese dared to
seize Brazil, while at home the people, deprived of their trade, and
unable to fish, were beginning to suffer severely. De Witt saw the
necessity of making peace. Cromwell, who had now succeeded to the chief
power in England, proved an easier taskmaster than the Parliament had
been. He was willing to leave the United Provinces their independence,
but he exacted their consent to the Act of Navigation, and their
acknowledgment of the superiority of the English flag. [Sidenote:
=The Act of Exclusion, 1654.=] Sharing with de Witt his dislike to
the House of Orange, whom he looked upon as the chief supporters of the
Stuart cause in Europe, he insisted on the perpetual exclusion of that
house from the stadtholderate by the estates of Holland, as a necessary
preliminary to peace. After protracted negotiations a treaty was at
last signed on this basis in 1654.

[Sidenote: =Continued rivalry with England, 1654–1665.=]

John de Witt had thus succeeded in saving his country from destruction
and in dealing his chief enemy a serious blow at the same time. To do
away with the rivalry of the two nations, and to make the Dutch forget
that a foreign power had compelled them to do injustice to a family
which had served them with singular loyalty was beyond his power. The
war ceased but the causes of the war remained. Each country was ready
to continue the struggle when a fitting opportunity presented itself,
but as long as the Commonwealth existed in England an identity of
interest between the two governments served to keep things quiet. The
English Restoration in May 1660 altered these relations, and so far
strengthened the partisans of the House of Orange as to enable them to
demand and gain the revocation of the Act of Exclusion by the estates
of Holland in September 1660. The accession of Louis XIV. to
power in 1661 further weakened the republican party by placing at the
head of the councils of Europe one who regarded all republics with
aversion, and looked upon ‘messieurs les marchands’ his neighbours with
a contempt which was born of envy. Every month tidings came to the
English government of some fresh defeat of the East India Company by
its Dutch rival, of some new indignity inflicted on English sailors.
Even the slave trade to Barbadoes had passed into Dutch hands. The
time seemed to have arrived when it was necessary to make reprisals.
In 1664 a piratical fleet was sent with the cognisance of the English
government to the Guinea coast, which captured several Dutch ships
and drove out the Dutch settlers from Goree and other places. In the
same year a similar expedition to America seized New Amsterdam, which
Charles unblushingly accepted and made over to his brother James, from
whom it took its better known name of New York. [Sidenote: =Second
war with England, 1665–1667.=] After this war was inevitable, and
in March 1665 it was formally declared. The Dutch had profited by the
experience of the late struggle; their ships were now better manned
and their guns of heavier calibre. Only in seamanship did the English
have the superiority, but that sovereign quality could not fail to make
itself felt. Gradually, after heroic struggles, the Dutch were beaten
back. On June 3d, 1665, Opdam was defeated and killed off Lowestoft. A
year later in the terrible four days’ battle in the Downs Ruyter and
Tromp were driven back to the Texel. In August Ruyter was forced by
Monk to take refuge in the shallows of Zealand, and the Dutch merchant
fleet was burned in the harbours of Flie. The misfortunes of the war
renewed civil dissensions. Again was heard in louder accents the cry
for the restoration of the House of Orange, and de Witt found himself
obliged at least to accept the young prince as the child of the state
and educate him in the affairs of government.

[Sidenote: =Energy of de Witt.=]

Neither foreign war nor civil disturbance could damp the energy of de
Witt. He ceaselessly endeavoured to repair by diplomacy what he had
lost by arms, and he partly succeeded. Louis was bound by treaty to
help the Dutch, and, although it was not possible to induce him to give
active assistance of any value to a nation whom he hated and intended
to ruin, de Witt did succeed for some time in preventing him from
making common cause with the English. With other nations he was more
fortunate. Denmark and the Great Elector openly allied themselves with
the Dutch in 1666, and compelled the warlike bishop of Münster to make
peace, who had invaded Overyssel in the interests of England the year
before. The Quadruple Alliance signed later in the year 1666 between
the United Provinces, Brandenburg, Denmark and Brunswick-Lüneburg,
secured to de Witt help in the case of French aggression. But the
most effective allies of the Dutch came from the enemies’ camp. The
recklessness of Charles’s extravagance made it impossible properly
to repair the necessary ravages of even victorious war. The great
plague which devastated London and its neighbourhood in 1665, and the
great fire which destroyed half the city in 1666, made the raising
of supplies more difficult still. At the beginning of 1667 England
though victorious was exhausted and almost bankrupt. Charles in his
isolation had recourse to Louis. By a secret engagement negotiated
through the queen-mother, Henrietta Maria, Charles threw himself into
the arms of Louis, and promised him a free hand in the Low Countries in
return for Louis’s support to his crown. At the instigation of France
negotiations for peace were begun at Breda in May 1667, but Charles,
sure of Louis’s secret help, was in no hurry to come to terms. De Witt
determined to read him a lesson. Quietly on the 6th of June the Dutch
fleet under Ruyter and Cornelius de Witt left the Texel. Next morning
they were sailing up the Thames in triumphal procession. They seized
Sheerness, sailed up the Medway to Rochester, captured the _Royal
Charles_, burned three other ships of war, and were only checked on
their route to London by the sinking of boats across the river above
Chatham. This unpleasant reminder of his impotence brought Charles
quickly to terms. [Sidenote: =Treaty of Breda, 1667.=] The Act of
Navigation was relaxed so as to permit the Dutch to carry to England
German and Flemish goods. England retained New York and the Dutch the
port of Poleroon in the East Indies. Other conquests were restored.

Once more war had proved but a sorry engine for putting an end to
national rivalry. The success of the Dutch in 1667 no more gave to
the United Provinces the monopoly of the trade of the world, than
their defeat in 1654 had deprived them of their share in it. ‘Must we
then,’ said the Dutch envoy to Monk before the beginning of the war,
‘sacrifice our commerce to yours?’ ‘Whatever happens,’ bluntly replied
the rough soldier, ‘we must have our part.’ And so it happened. The
protracted and stubborn duel between the two greatest maritime powers
of Europe only enforced the truth that the world was wide enough
for both. Upon the two principal combatants it had more serious and
wide-reaching results. It taught Charles II. that he could
not enjoy life and indulge his political ambition as he liked without
the assistance of France. It taught John de Witt the importance of the
friendship of England in face of the ambition of Louis XIV. It
thus led directly to the Triple Alliance, and helped to blind de Witt’s
eyes to the fact, that that alliance had not clipped Louis’s wings,
because for the time in deference to it he had consented to fold them.

The whirligig of fortune had in fact made the worthless Charles II. of
England the arbiter of Europe, while both Louis XIV. and John de Witt
believed that the decisive voice was with them. [Sidenote: =Dangers
from France.=] Louis had determined on the ruin of the Dutch, but
he did not dare to face the united fleets of England and the United
Provinces. John de Witt was under no illusions as to the dangers which
were threatening him from France. He knew quite well that the old
relations of friendship and dependence had passed away with the treaty
of Münster and the development of Dutch trade. Ever since the treaty
of Münster it had been the cardinal point in Dutch foreign policy to
support the Spanish government in the Netherlands, in order to keep
the French away from Antwerp and the Scheldt. Ever since the peace of
the Pyrenees it had been the main object of French foreign policy to
gain the fortresses of the Spanish Netherlands as an adequate defence
to Paris. Ever since the war of devolution it had been the undisguised
ambition of Louis XIV. to seize the whole of the Spanish Netherlands as
the first instalment of his inheritance in the Spanish empire. French
and Dutch interests were sharply antagonistic on this essential point
of policy. Commercial differences were no less pressing. Colbert had
so arranged his protective system as to injure Dutch trade as much as
possible, and the Amsterdam traders were furious at this unneighbourly
treatment. Louis himself never affected to conceal his personal dislike
to the rich and Protestant republic, which dared to run athwart his
designs. [Sidenote: =Blindness of de Witt.=] Yet in spite of all
this, in spite of the continued war preparations of Louis, in spite
of his ceaseless diplomatic activity, in spite of the withdrawal of
Sweden from the Triple Alliance, in spite of the ominous sleepiness of
Leopold, and nonchalance of Charles, de Witt could not bring himself
to believe that Louis would ever be able to turn his threats into
action. The success of the Triple Alliance had been so commanding, its
effect so instantaneous. The temper of the English people had been so
thoroughly roused against Louis. Europe had shown itself so sensitive
of his aggressive policy. As long as the ascendency of the republican
party in the United Provinces was secure, as long as no civil
dissensions interfered to weaken their action, John de Witt believed
himself safe and Europe at his command. He did not know that Charles
had sealed his destruction in the secret treaty of Dover. He had no
suspicions of the partition treaty between Louis and the Emperor.
Deceived by the two powers he most trusted, secure in the results of
his own diplomacy as he saw them, he did not even think it necessary
to take ordinary precautions. [Sidenote: =The Perpetual Edict, 1668.=]
By the Perpetual Edict, as modified by the Project of Harmony accepted
by the republic in 1668, he flattered himself he had secured internal
peace without sacrificing the republican ascendency. By those acts it
was declared that the same person could not be at once stadtholder
and captain and admiral general, and it was provided that the young
prince should be intrusted with the command of the army at the age of
twenty-two. By this division of the civil and military powers de Witt
thought he had secured the republic against a renewal of the _coup
d’état_, and guaranteed the political ascendency of Holland. Yet, so
jealous was he of the prince and his party, that even then he did not
dare to strengthen the army. While Louis was forming vast magazines,
and massing thousands of men on the frontier, the Dutch fortresses
were being allowed to perish and the Dutch army was being deliberately
starved in men and munitions lest the republican supremacy should be
endangered. The state was being sacrificed to the government.

[Sidenote: =Popular movement in favour of William III.=]

Retribution was not long in coming. Directly the thunder cloud burst,
and the French armies were in full march on Amsterdam, the nation awoke
to the fact that it had been betrayed. William was at once declared
captain general. A reaction set in, wild and unreasoning as such
popular movements usually are. A scapegoat was required. The popular
vengeance demanded a victim. The faithful and glorious service of
twenty years was forgotten, and a blunder magnified into treachery.
For the moment the selfish burgher governors of Holland trembled under
the terror of a popular outbreak. They were relieved to find the fury
of the populace directed against de Witt alone. On June 21st 1673,
John de Witt was attacked by ruffians in the streets of the Hague,
who fled for refuge to William’s camp leaving their victim half dead.
In August his brother Cornelius was arrested and put to the torture.
[Sidenote: =Murder of de Witt, 1673.=] On the 20th John de Witt
was induced to visit his brother in the prison. They were caught like
rats in a trap. An infuriated mob surrounded the prison, broke open the
gates, dragged the victims forth, and beat their brains out, while the
Calvinistic clergy hounded them on to their butcher’s work. William
himself, cruel, callous, and calculating in 1673, as he afterwards
showed himself to be in 1692, took care to know nothing and to do
nothing which could stop the impending outrage. As in the massacre of
Glencoe, he looked the other way at the time and tried to screen the
perpetrators from justice afterwards. An accessory before the fact, and
an accessory after the fact, all that his apologists can say for him is
that his ambition necessitated the sacrifice of his humanity.

CHAPTER XI

LOUIS XIV. AND WILLIAM III.

1672–1698

The war between France and the Dutch--The campaign of 1672--Refusal
of reasonable terms--Coalition against France--The campaigns of
1674–1675--Exhaustion of France--The peace of Nimwegen--Virtual
defeat of Louis’s policy--The character and influence of William
III.--The quarrel of Louis with the Papacy--The four
resolutions of 1682--Analogy to the English Reformation--Settlement
of the dispute--Policy of religious uniformity--Influence of Madame
de Maintenon--Persecution of the Huguenots--Revocation of the
Edict of Nantes--Aggressions of Louis--Formation of the league of
Augsburg--Quarrel between Louis and James II.--The war of the
league of Augsburg--Importance of the naval operations--Exhaustion of
France--Peace of Ryswick.

[Sidenote: =Grandeur of Louis XIV., 1672.=]

The year 1672 saw Louis XIV. at the height of his glory,
and France at the summit of the prosperity to which she attained
under his guidance. He was in the prime of life, his court was the
most magnificent and distinguished in Europe, his palace the most
splendid, his throne the most assured. As yet no breath of domestic
or national misfortune had visited the complexion of his fortunes too
roughly. Alone among the monarchs of Europe, thanks to the thrifty
administration of Colbert, he enjoyed the supreme satisfaction of a
well-filled treasury; and if since the war of devolution occasional
grumblings made themselves heard about the reimposition of taxes
once remitted, yet few of the tax-payers would not be constrained
on examination to admit that if the taxes had risen, their power
of paying them had doubled. Through the willing service of able
negotiators his diplomacy was triumphant in all quarters of Europe.
There was not a state which did not dread his displeasure, which was
not prepared to sacrifice something for his friendship. The watchful
diligence of Louvois had given to him as the champion of his honour,
and the instrument of his ambition, a professional army, superior in
discipline, in organisation, in leadership to all the other armies
of Europe put together. His navy, already more powerful than that of
Spain, threatened soon to rival the English and the Dutch on their own
element. England was already his vassal, Sweden Poland and half the
petty sovereigns of Germany his subsidised allies, Spain his defeated
enemy. Only the upstart merchants of Amsterdam ventured to assert
their independence of him and to dispute his authority. He had but to
stretch forth his hand and seize the fruit of supremacy over Europe
thus temptingly lying open to his grasp. He had but to ‘travel’ in the
United Provinces to reduce them to due submission.

[Sidenote: =The Dutch war, 1672.=]

Nevertheless he was wise enough to neglect no precaution to ensure the
safety of his travelling tour. It was in no empty, braggart spirit that
he made war upon so tough an enemy in so difficult a country. Charles
II., in pursuance of the treaty of Dover, declared war upon
the Dutch in March, and Louis trusted to him with the assistance of one
hundred and twenty French vessels to keep the formidable Ruyter quiet
in port, while the great effort was being made by land. Charleroi was
chosen as the basis of operations, and large stores of every warlike
necessity were collected there by Louvois with the utmost diligence.
Further magazines were established at the advanced post of Neuss near
Dusseldorf in the electorate of Köln. No longer, as in the days of
Wallenstein, was war to support war, but for the first time in modern
warfare the army was to be regularly provisioned from its base by
means of magazines established along the line of route. In the early
spring 176,000 men were massed at Charleroi under the orders of Condé
and Turenne. On the 5th of May Louis joined the army and the storm
burst upon the devoted Dutch.[4] [Sidenote: =Campaign of 1672.=]
Marching down the Meuse valley past Liége and Maestricht, masking the
latter fortress as he went, an operation hitherto unconceived of, he
turned sharply to the right at Ruremonde and reached his magazines at
Neuss on the Rhine safely on the 31st. Having thus gained the Rhine
valley he pushed Condé over the river at Kaiserwerth to sweep the right
bank and capture Wesel, while Turenne marched down the left bank and
made himself master of the smaller fortresses of Orsoy Rhynberg and
Bürick. On the 6th of June Turenne rejoined Condé at Wesel, and the
whole army poured down the right bank unchecked across the frontier of
Guelderland, until it was brought to a stop on the 11th by the little
stream of the Yssel, behind which William was posted at the head of all
the available Dutch troops. The hesitation was but momentary. Instead
of forcing the line of the Yssel in the face of the enemy, always a
most hazardous operation, Turenne determined to turn it. On his left
flank as he faced William on the Yssel ran the broad but fordable
stream of the old Rhine, which, leaving the main branch of the river,
called the Waal, in a northerly direction, receives the water of the
Yssel a few miles farther down at Arnheim, where, turning again to
the west, it flows on to the sea. Half-way between Arnheim and the
junction of the Waal and the Rhine is the ford of the Tolhuys. There,
on the 12th of June, Condé crossed the old Rhine with his cavalry
almost without opposition. On the next day a bridge was thrown across
the stream, and the king and the whole army followed. After securing
Nimwegen in his rear, Louis marched down the left bank of the old Rhine
and crossed it again a little below Arnheim without difficulty. He had
thus completely turned William’s position on the Yssel and conquered
the far more formidable difficulties of the country. When he left
Charleroi, only six weeks before, he had, between him and the heart of
his enemies’ country, the deep difficult and treacherous streams of the
Meuse, the Waal, and the Rhine, defended at the most critical points
of their course by the formidable fortresses of Maestricht, Wesel,
Nimwegen and Arnheim. Well might de Witt and the Dutch have calculated
that, according to the usual movements of war in those days, there was
material there for two campaigns at least. By the brilliant strategy
of Turenne--for to him the plan was due--all these difficulties had
been surmounted, and Louis was within striking distance of Amsterdam
itself, without having fought a battle, almost without the loss of
a man. The crossing of the Rhine at Tolhuys was indeed in itself a
military operation of the fourth order, as Napoleon called it. So was
the blockade of Ulm in 1805, but both marked the successful conclusion
of an offensive campaign which evinced the highest qualities of
strategical skill.

[Sidenote: =The cutting of the dykes.=]

Just in the very crisis of success Louis drew back. Condé urged him to
make the most of his opportunity, push on to Amsterdam and end the war
at a blow. There was no one to resist him. He might have ‘travelled
as safely’ to Amsterdam as he had hitherto ‘travelled safely’ to
Arnheim. But with inconceivable folly he refused, sent Turenne towards
Rotterdam, and sat down himself before the petty forts on the Yssel.
Rochefort, acting on his own initiative, rushed forward with some
cavalry to seize Muyden, and so prevent the cutting of the dykes
outside Amsterdam, but he was too late. A Dutch garrison was thrown in
just in time. De Witt had ordered all to be in readiness to let in the
water directly the peasantry had moved from the doomed fields. For a
few days the anxiety was intense lest the French should appear before
all was prepared, but on the 18th the signal was given. The sea resumed
her ancient mastery and Amsterdam was safe on her island throne.

A breathing space was all that was required. If the Dutch could save
their independence until the winter was passed, it was pretty certain
that a coalition against France could be formed. [Sidenote: =Refusal
of reasonable terms of peace by Louis.=] On the 7th of June the
victory of Ruyter over the combined fleets of France and England
removed all danger from the sea. Holland was safe, and stood firm
against all suggestion of submission, but the other provinces either
in the hands of Louis or exposed to his irresistible power desired
peace. For the time they prevailed, and an embassy reached Louis at
the end of June offering him 6,000,000 of livres and the fortress and
district of Maestricht. This would have made him absolute master of
the Spanish Netherlands whenever he chose to occupy them, yet at the
advice of Louvois he deliberately threw away the solid results of his
success merely to gratify his pride. He demanded that the Dutch should
acknowledge their dependence on him, maintain Catholicism with public
money, suppress all commercial edicts unfavourable to France, and pay
24,000,000 of livres. This was in fact to demand the surrender of their
independence, and was only another way of saying that the war was to
be a duel to death. [Sidenote: =Coalition against France.=]They
accepted the position, elected William III. stadtholder and
captain and admiral general, and began to organise a coalition against
the tyrant of Europe. In October 1672 the Emperor Leopold and the Great
Elector made common cause with the Dutch and the war became European.

[Sidenote: =Campaign of 1673.=]

The difference was at once noticeable. Turenne was sent across the
Rhine into Westphalia to prevent the imperial troops under Montecuculli
and the Brandenburgers from crossing to the assistance of William
from Germany, while Condé was told off to guard Alsace from invasion.
The French army thus divided into three parts lost its decisive
superiority. Yet, thanks to its superior organisation and the genius
of Turenne, it emerged victoriously from the campaign of 1673. William
was kept quiet by Luxembourg, while Turenne, by brilliant manœuvring,
checked Montecuculli’s advance on the Rhine, separated him from the
Great Elector, and driving the latter back to Halberstadt, forced
him to make peace on June 6th. But at sea the Dutch maintained their
superiority. On August 21st the intrepid Ruyter inflicted a final
defeat upon Rupert and the English fleet off the coast of Zealand. He
remained at the close of the day master of the channel, and as long as
the water-way was open Holland was safe.

[Sidenote: =Defection of Louis’s allies.=]

In spite of Louis’s success in the field, the coalition continued to
grow. In August 1673 it was joined by Spain and the duke of Lorraine,
in January 1674 by Denmark, in March by the Elector Palatine, in May by
the diet of the Empire, and in July the Great Elector ventured again
to draw the sword. By the middle of the year 1674 nearly all Europe
was engaged against France. Meanwhile her own allies were falling off.
In the autumn of 1673 Montecuculli succeeded in outwitting Turenne.
Slipping past him he joined William on the Rhine and captured Bonn on
November 12th. Frightened by this success the electors of Trier and
Köln and the bishop of Münster hastened to make peace. But that was not
the worst. In February 1674 news came to Versailles that England had
separated her interests from those of France, and Louis found himself
with Sweden as his only ally alone against the world.

[Illustration: MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE CAMPAIGNS
OF 1674 and 1704.]

[Sidenote: =France and Sweden alone against Europe, 1674.=]

The history of the four remaining years of the war is the history of a
noble struggle against impossible odds. However great the superiority
of French leadership and of French organisation, it was out of the
question that France could for long maintain so unequal a struggle. The
allies simply had to tire her out. In the end they must be victorious.
Yet for some time victory was rendered doubtful by the skill and
resource shown by the French commanders. They saw at once the necessity
of acting on the defensive behind the protection of the fortresses of
the Spanish Netherlands and the Rhine. In 1674 Condé retiring at once
from the United Provinces, out-manœuvred William on the line of the
Meuse and the Sambre, driving him back and capturing his baggage train
at Seneff on August 11th. Louis overran Franche Comté, while Turenne
assumed the offensive on the Rhine to divert the attention of the
imperialists. Crossing the river he advanced to Sinzheim and defeating
the enemy there drove him behind the Neckar. The troops at his disposal
were, however, not sufficient for him to maintain his ground and defend
so large a tract of country as the upper Rhineland. In his difficulty
he took a course justifiable only by extreme necessity. Devastating
the palatinate with fire and sword he turned all the rich smiling
country on both sides of the Rhine into a desert, so that the enemy
could not maintain himself there. Having thus limited the area of the
campaign he retired behind the Rhine, and prepared to keep his opponent
at bay on the other side. For some months he was successful, but late
in October the imperialist army, having effected a junction with the
Brandenburgers, managed to elude his vigilance, crossed the river at
Mainz, and marching up the left bank established themselves securely
in lower Alsace. The Rhine barrier was lost. Unless Turenne could
recover it before the campaigning season of 1675 began, the tide of
war must roll back to the Vosges and the plain of Châlons. [Sidenote:
=Winter campaign of Turenne, 1674–75.=] Turenne’s spirit rose
to the crisis. Under his orders was an army of veterans capable of
endurance and devoted to himself. He determined on a masterly piece of
strategy. The Vosges mountains run parallel to the Rhine, fringing the
rich river valley at a distance of some twenty miles from the stream,
and ever increasing in height and ruggedness as they trend southwards,
until from the mountainous, and in winter snow-covered, group of the
Belchen they suddenly sweep down to the plain at the famous Gap of
Belfort, which divides them from the Jura. While the imperialists were
slowly dispersing themselves among the comfortable towns in the river
valley between Strasburg and Mühlhausen, Turenne at the end of November
retired behind the chain of the Vosges, as if to go into winter
quarters in Lorraine. Having put the mountains as a screen between him
and his enemy, he suddenly turned south from Lixheim, marched behind
the Vosges until he reached the rugged group at the southern end where
rise the head-waters of the Moselle. Then dividing his veterans into
four divisions he sent them over the mountain passes through the snow
in the dead of winter to their rendezvous at Belfort. On the 27th
of December the operation was complete. Forty thousand of the best
soldiers of Europe were gathered at the top of the rich Rhine valley of
Alsace, where the enemy was quietly enjoying himself in unsuspecting
security. On the 28th Turenne swept down upon them through the Gap of
Belfort, occupied Mühlhausen, defeated the Great Elector at Colmar, and
bundled the whole army neck and crop out of Alsace across the river at
Strasburg. The Rhine frontier was regained at a blow. Montecuculli was
sent for in haste as the only general fit to cope with so terrible an
antagonist, but fortune seemed to have deserted his standards. In the
spring of 1675 Turenne crossed the Rhine below Strasburg. By a series
of skilful manœuvres he forced Montecuculli from the Rhine to the
Neckar, from the Neckar back to the Black Forest. [Sidenote: =Death
of Turenne, 1675.=]There at Sasbach he obliged him to accept battle
in a position in which success was impossible. ‘I have him now,’ said
Turenne as he reconnoitred the enemy on July 26th. Almost as he spoke a
chance shot struck him on the breast and killed him on the spot.

[Sidenote: =Exhaustion of France.=]

With Turenne fell the last hope of France in the field. Montecuculli
drove the dismayed French over the river into Alsace, and was only
checked by the skill of Condé, who arrived with reinforcements in
time to save Hagenau and Philipsburg. Créqui, who succeeded Condé
on the Moselle, lost Trier in September. The Swedes, who had made a
diversion in favour of France by attacking the Great Elector, were
soundly beaten by him on land at Fehrbellin, and by the Danish and
Dutch fleets at sea in the Baltic. At the end of the year Condé tired
of warfare retired from the command. France was growing exhausted.
Murmurs were heard on all sides. Already the reforms of Colbert were
being undone, and corruption, the sure handmaid of financial distress,
was again raising her head. Still, however, the superiority of the
French soldier showed itself in battle, and both the Dutch and the
imperialists became as tired of fighting battles which they never won,
as the French were of winning victories which they could not utilise.
[Sidenote: =Negotiations for peace.=] Negotiations were set on
foot between the Dutch and Charles and Louis which followed the usual
tortuous course. William did his best to prevent a treaty, and even
wantonly fought a pitched battle with Luxemburg on August 14th, 1678,
near Mons, in which thousands of men were killed, in the last desperate
hope of breaking off negotiations, although he knew that the peace was
almost certainly signed, but it was happily too late. On August 10th,
1678, a treaty was concluded between Louis and the Dutch, on September
17th Spain and France came to terms, and on February 2d, 1679, peace
was made between France and the Emperor. Soon afterwards the minor
combatants followed suit.

[Sidenote: =The peace of Nimwegen, 1678.=]

By these treaties, generally known as the peace of Nimwegen the
United Provinces were not called upon to surrender one acre of their
territory, while they gained the removal of the hostile restrictions
on their trade with France. The barrier of the Spanish Netherlands was
not materially interfered with, and Spain even recovered Charleroi and
some other towns which she had surrendered at Aix-la-Chapelle, and
the frontier was fixed on a fairly straight line, from Dunkirk to the
Sambre at Maubeuge. The Emperor recovered Philipsburg, but surrendered
Freiburg with the passage of the river at Breisach. The only
substantial gain to France was the actual annexation of Franche Comté,
and the virtual annexation of Lorraine. True to his one faithful ally
Louis insisted on the restoration to Sweden of the territories in
Germany taken from her by the Great Elector.

[Sidenote: =Virtual defeat of Louis’s policy.=]

The treaty of Nimwegen is often looked upon as the summit of the
success of Louis XIV., the pinnacle of his glory. It is rather the
first step in his decline, for it marks the limits of his power. He had
made deliberately a bid for supremacy over Europe, and he had failed.
He had determined on an act of signal vengeance upon the petty nation
which had dared to thwart his will, and he had been baffled. But this
was not all. Not only was his failure one of fact, but it was one of
policy. He had failed in a way which made it certain that he would
fail again, if he made a similar attempt. However carefully laid his
plans, however skilfully conceived his campaigns, however brilliantly
led his armies, he could not fight single-handed against Europe; and
Europe was as certain to combine sooner or later against him, if he
continued his policy of universal dominion, as the tides were certain
to ebb and to flow. The selfishness of a Charles II., the ambition of a
bishop of Münster, the greediness of a Swedish oligarchy, the poverty
of a Polish nobility, the cunning inertness of a Leopold might enable
him to purchase alliance and secure neutrality until the storm-cloud
actually burst, until the danger of a French tyranny became instant and
menacing. But in the end the web of diplomacy, however deftly woven,
was certain to be torn into fragments before the rude shock of the
spirit of nationality and the love of independence. De Witt with his
policy of the Triple Alliance had shown Europe how the monster might be
bridled, and Europe did not forget the lesson. Interests rival to those
of France were too numerous, too varied, too deep-seated in national
character, to be for long obscured by the arts of diplomacy, or quieted
by the alliance of governments. The principle of the balance of power
was certain to assert itself sooner or later, and as long as Louis
persisted in an attempt to make himself dictator of Europe, whether
by the conquest of the maritime powers, or by the annexation of the
dominions of Spain, or by the disintegration of Germany and Austria,
so long would Europe combine against him and prevent that dictatorship
from becoming an accomplished fact. Unfortunately, like Napoleon after
him, Louis could not bring himself to acknowledge the permanent limits
of his power. He could not understand that he had embarked on a policy
impossible in the very nature of things. He looked upon Nimwegen as he
had looked upon Aix-la-Chapelle, merely as a check in the game which
he was playing. He knew he had made some mistakes in his play. A fresh
combination of pieces directed by a riper experience could not fail to
succeed. So, like the gambler, who, convinced of the infallibility of
his system, attributes his losses to mere errors of calculation which
experience and care must detect, Louis, in no wise disconcerted by the
failure of Nimwegen, began with increased assiduity to weave his plots
and repair his errors, so that he might again be ready to assert his
claims, when the turn of the cards seemed once more favourable to his
fortune.

[Sidenote: =Character of William III.=]

In reality while Louis was persuading himself that he was marching by
steady and statesmanlike steps to a sure goal, his chances of ultimate
success were dwindling daily. The opposition to him in Europe had
acquired both a policy and a leader. Never had a hero of a great cause
less of the heroic about him than had William of Orange. Taught in
the school of adversity, he had become a man before ever he knew what
it was to be a boy. Implicated from his birth in a web of intrigue,
nurtured in an atmosphere of suspicion, surrounded by foes of his
race and cause, his earliest lessons were those of deceit and fraud.
Generous instincts withered away in a heart in which affection had
ever to give place to policy. At the age of twenty he was heartless
as a Talleyrand, unscrupulous as a Walpole, cold, pitiless, and
self-concentrated as Macchiavelli himself. Strange indeed was the
contrast between this puny, dyspeptic, selfish, taciturn stripling
of twenty, untouched by sentiment, and inaccessible to love, and the
open-hearted, magnificent Louis in the prime of life and of glory,
the prince of gallants and the pattern of chivalry. Yet deep down in
the cold breast of William there burned a fire more enduring and more
intense than any of the fitful flashes which illumined from time to
time the soul of the splendid king. [Sidenote: =Ennobling influence
of his enmity to Louis.=] Love for his country, which, under the
peculiar circumstances of the time, translated itself into an undying
and unconquerable hatred of the aggression and tyranny of France,
slowly through long years of suffering and of patience, fused the
selfish heartlessness of William into metal of heroic stamp. To him
was not given the power of witching the world with noble deeds. He
could not plan campaigns like Turenne, or win battles like Condé or
Luxemburg. He could not enmesh two hemispheres in the bonds of his
policy like Chatham, he could not dazzle Europe with the glow of his
fame like Charles XII., or entrance it with the richness of
personal gifts like Henry IV. He could not command admiration
like Gustavus Adolphus, or extort obedience like Richelieu. The depths
of mind and of character which move nations and sway the world had no
place within the narrow limits of his mean and pedantic nature. But in
their stead were developed to an almost abnormal extent the unyielding
and tenacious qualities of his stubborn ancestry. Endurance, fortitude,
perseverance, inspiring and inspired by unconquerable hate and enlisted
in the noble cause of patriotism and liberty, made him a hero in spite
of himself. He would not recognise failure, he would not accept defeat.
He knew not the meaning of despair. Never for an instant was he tempted
to put personal ambition before public duty, for to him the public duty
of resistance to France summed up his personal ambition.

He valued the crown of England only because it enlisted the power
of England on his side against the great enemy. He was prepared to
abdicate the moment he found that England was but half-hearted and
insular in her views about the war. To die in the last ditch was in
his mouth no empty or braggart boast. He would no more have dreamed
of surrendering the religion and liberty of his country to Louis
XIV. than would Leonidas of submitting to the Persians at
Thermopylæ. He waged the military and diplomatic struggle of thirty
years in the spirit of that declaration. He fought throughout not as a
conqueror but as a defender, till he won for himself the position of
the saviour of his country, and the champion of the liberty of Europe.
Concentrating all his faculties on the personal duel in which he was
engaged, he never fully realised the magnitude of the issues at stake,
and the far-reaching effects of the policy which he had undertaken. To
his successors fell the task of reaping the harvest prepared by his
patient and painful husbandry, to resettle the map of Europe after the
overthrow of the tyrant, and to lay down at Utrecht a new balance of
power. Naturally he could not know that Steinkirk was but the prelude
to Blenheim, and that la Hogue alone made possible the glories alike
of Plassey and Quebec; yet if his spirit was permitted to follow the
Maison du Roi in their flight from Ramillies, or a century later to
brood over the shattered hulks amid the storms of Trafalgar, well might
he proudly have claimed for himself his share in the wreaths of laurel
which encircled the brows of Marlborough and of Nelson.

[Sidenote: =Quarrel of Louis with the Papacy.=]

For ten years Europe was at peace, but it was a peace which was in
reality little more than a breathing space, devoted by both parties
to preparations for the next round in the struggle. While William
was plotting and scheming for his father-in-law’s crown, Louis was
strengthening his frontier by diplomacy as well as by arms. Both
realised that the duel was still undecided, both hesitated to be the
first to loose again the dogs of war. Meanwhile other difficulties
of a serious nature came up for settlement in France herself. The
Church of France had always maintained a much greater independence
of the authority of the Pope than had been the case in Spain or in
Italy or in Germany since the Reformation. The long continued presence
of Mohammedanism in Spain, and the pressure of heresy in Germany,
had naturally tended to augment the personal authority of the Pope
over those countries. In France the tendency had been the other way.
National spirit and national pride called out by the liberation of the
country from the English yoke, and employed in the task of conquest
in Italy, emphasised national rights and distinctions. As in England
the feeling of the people was strongly anti-papal, and it was the
Crown not the Church which found it to its interest to make surrender
to the claims of the Roman Curia, in order to gain a useful ally in
its struggle with the nobles. [Sidenote: =The independence of the
Gallican Church.=] As however the royal power in France gradually
made itself supreme over all departments of the national life, the
kings began in their turn to take up the cudgels against the Pope in
a quarrel, which could not fail in the end to minister to their own
greatness. Francis I. was within an ace of declaring France
independent of the Holy See, the Valois kings refused for many years to
take any part whatever in the council of Trent, and when the cardinal
of Lorraine did appear with the French bishops, it was rather to
present an ultimatum than to take part in a discussion. The doctrinal
decisions of the council were never formally accepted by France at all.
Heresy, in the form of Huguenotism, was suppressed in France much more
by the Crown than by the efforts of the Pope, and the Jesuits were only
admitted into France under strict limitations. Richelieu and Mazarin,
though cardinals of the Roman Church, did not hesitate to pursue a
policy in strong opposition to the wishes of the Pope, and Louis
XIV. himself had not scrupled in the earlier years of his
reign to put a public indignity upon the Pontiff. The very orthodoxy of
the kings themselves and of their government made them the more jealous
of all exercise of authority in their dominions by another sovereign,
even though he was the Pope.

[Sidenote: =Claim of the regale over the whole of France.=]

Among the acknowledged rights of the Crown of France was that of
receiving the emoluments of all benefices during vacancy, which was
known as the _regale_, but it was a right which depended solely
upon custom, and obtained only in the ancient dominions of the
Crown of France. In spite of this, in 1673, Louis XIV., pursuing
his usual policy of royal aggrandisement, issued an edict asserting
that according to law and to custom the _regale_ applied to all the
bishoprics of the kingdom. [Sidenote: =Denied by the Pope.=] On this
the bishops of Pamiers and Alais, who were theologically opposed to the
Jesuit influence dominant in the court, protested and appealed to the
Pope, Innocent XI. who at once gave his decision in their favour. This
action on the part of the bishops and the Pope raised the question out
of the category of a money dispute between the Crown and some of the
clergy, into that of a grave constitutional question between the Church
of France and the Pope. Men asked themselves in France what right the
Pope had to interfere with the emoluments of the Crown, just as in
England one hundred and fifty years before they had asked themselves by
what right the Pope claimed the first-fruits of English benefices. But
Louis XIV. was fortunate enough to find ready to his hand a champion of
his cause far more noble than a Cranmer or a Cromwell. To the orthodoxy
of Sir Thomas More, Bossuet, bishop of Meaux, added the fervid
eloquence of S. Bernard and the learning and taste of Erasmus. In him
the flame of patriotism burned at fever heat. Deeply imbued with the
principles of his age loyalty was to him the first of virtues, and the
king dilated before his dazzled eyes, not as the grasping tyrant that
he really was, but as the God-given champion of an oppressed Church.
[Sidenote: =The four Resolutions, 1682.=] Bossuet felt that the mantle
of Gerson and d’Ailly had descended upon him, and at the bidding of the
king, under his leadership, the French clergy set themselves to follow
up the work of the council of Constance and put limits to the autocracy
of the Roman Pontiff. Constitutionalism once more raised its head for
a brief period within the bounds of the Roman obedience. In 1682 the
king summoned an assembly of clergy to meet at S. Germain and consider
the difficulty. Bossuet at once took the lead, and at his instigation
the assembly recognised the right of the king to the _regale_ all over
France, and passed four resolutions on the limits of the power of the
Pope.

(1) That sovereigns are not subject to the Pope in things
temporal, neither can they be deposed by him nor their subjects
freed from their oaths of allegiance by him.

(2) That a general council is superior to the Pope.

(3) That the power of the Pope is subject to the regulations and
canons of councils, and he cannot decide anything contrary to the
rules and constitutions of the Gallican Church.

(4) That the decisions of the Pope are not irreformable, except by the
consent of the universal Church.

These resolutions thus passed by the clergy were registered by the
Parlements, and accepted by the Sorbonne, and became law of the land
which all loyal subjects were bound to obey.

[Sidenote: =Constitutional question between the Crown and the
Pope.=]

Thus was raised once more the old constitutional question between
the Church and the Pope. The decisions of the Assembly of S. Germain
had behind them a weight of authority and practice, unquestioned in
the primitive Church, repeatedly asserted in the medieval Church,
formulated at the council of Constance, lately vindicated at serious
risk by the English Church, but clean contrary to the pretensions of
the Hildebrandine Papacy and the decisions of the council of Trent.
It was absurd to expect that a Pope however weak could at a moment’s
notice turn his back upon a theory on which the Papacy had continuously
acted for six hundred years. Innocent felt that he had no choice in
the matter. He at once condemned the decrees, and refused to issue the
usual bulls sanctioning the consecration of priests who had accepted
them to the episcopate. Before many years had passed there were no less
than thirty sees in France without a bishop, and hundreds of cures
without canonically instituted priests. The condition of affairs
was singularly like that in England when the statute in restraint
of the payment of Annates was passed. [Sidenote: =Analogy to the
English Reformation.=] Each country had solemnly asserted a view of
the constitutional rights of the Church within its borders, which
was diametrically opposed to that of the Papacy, and was denounced
by the Curia as schismatical. In support of the national theory the
majority of the clergy in each country was prepared to enter at the
bidding of the Crown into a contest with the Pope, which could but
result in the increase of the royal authority over them. In the
mouth of Louis XIV. as in that of Henry VIII. the liberties of the
national Church meant in reality the power of the national king. But
unlike Henry VIII. Louis XIV. was too wary to be pushed to extremes.
He carefully avoided any overt act which could be construed into an
undue assertion of independence. He contented himself with a purely
negative position. Where bulls were refused the sees remained vacant,
and the Crown enjoyed the profits of the vacancy. There was no divorce
question to complicate matters. Henry VIII. could not wait, Louis XIV.
could. Consequently, in spite of much talk about a patriarchate of
France, no definite steps had been taken to increase the difficulties
of a settlement, when it became the obvious interest of both sides to
restore peace. [Sidenote: =Settlement of the quarrel, 1693.=] In 1693,
when Louis was involved in the war of the League of Augsburg, and the
influence of Madame de Maintenon had become paramount at court, he
found the continuance of his quarrel with the Pope both undignified and
prejudicial. Innocent XII. the new Pope was willing to meet him half
way. The articles of S. Germain were repudiated, the Pope recognised
and sanctioned all the royal nominations, and ecclesiastical affairs
resumed their wonted channel. Ten years of warfare had done nothing
more for Louis than to enrich the literature of France by some valuable
works on church-government, and to assist his rival William of Orange
to the throne of England.

[Sidenote: =Policy of Louis toward the Huguenots.=]

Indirectly, however, there is little doubt that this memorable quarrel
with the Pope did much to urge Louis to the committal of the greatest
blunder and crime of his reign--the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.
Since the suppression of their political power by Richelieu the
Huguenots had given up all political ambition. Satisfied with the free
exercise of their worship permitted by the edict, the Huguenots of the
middle class had devoted themselves with great success to industrial
employments of various kinds, while numbers of the nobles, who had only
embraced Huguenotism from political motives, came back to the Church
now that their interest and associations led them in that direction.
Even in the troublous days of the _Fronde_ the Huguenots remained
strictly and significantly quiet, and when Colbert took up the reins
of administration he found among them the most skilful the most
industrious and the most loyal of French artisans. Unfortunately in
the eyes of Louis XIV. and of Louvois their very loyalty and
their wealth proved reasons for their persecution. The time had come,
as it seemed to them, when the work of Richelieu might be safely pushed
to completion. All that he had been able to do was to draw the poison
fangs of the serpent, the time had now come when the monster itself
might be scotched and killed. The very existence of a special law in
favour of one class recognised an imperfection in the uniformity of the
body politic. France would not be herself till she was one in religious
as in political allegiance.

[Sidenote: =Desire for uniformity.=]

In the seventeenth century to a mind like that of Louis XIV.,
small in scope but concentrated in grip, there was much that
was attractive in such an argument. Those were days when social
distinctions, trade interests, local independence were all being
ruthlessly sacrificed to the solidarity of the monarchy. Why should
not religious distinctions be subject to the same law? However
contented and loyal the Huguenots might be, their very existence was an
imperfection in an absolute monarchy, which ought only to be tolerated
as long as the necessities of state required it. But that was not all.
Louis himself was somewhat altering in character as he grew older. The
cup of pleasure had begun to pall. The artificiality of court life was
becoming a restraint to him. The atmosphere of gross adulation by which
he was surrounded proved more distasteful every day. Religion, always
a strong influence over him, reasserted her claims more imperiously as
the pleasures and vanities of life were turning to ashes in his hands.
Louis had always been decorously orthodox. He now became fervently
devout. His court became more strict in life, more healthy in tone.
Simplicity of manners, strong sense of duty, sobriety of conversation
reigned in the place of luxury and frivolity. Courtiers complained that
Versailles was no better than a monastery. [Sidenote: =Influence
of Madame de Maintenon.=] The genius of the change was a woman.
Louis as long ago as 1669 had chosen as the governess of his children
by Madame de Montespan, the young widow of the deformed burlesque
poet Scarron, known to history as Madame de Maintenon. At first he
was piqued by the primness and self-restraint of her demeanour, but
gradually the beauty of her character, the wit and grace of her
conversation, the soundness of her judgment, the force and vigour of
her nature, illuminated and sanctified by the purest flame of religious
devotion, called out a response from his better qualities, and in the
end established a complete mastery over him. In 1683, two years after
the death of Maria Theresa, he married her secretly, and although at
her own wish she never assumed the dignity of queen, her position was
thoroughly well understood both in France and in the courts of Europe,
and she received at all hands the respect due both to her rank and her
virtues. Her political influence has been much exaggerated, for it was
of a quality very difficult to appraise. She rarely if ever interfered
directly except in those matters of personal patronage in which her sex
is always so deeply interested, but her indirect influence was very
strong, not only because Louis had a great opinion of her good sense
and frequently consulted her, but more especially because of the power
which she wielded invisibly over the character and mind of the king
himself. As under her influence he became more devout, he naturally
allowed his increased affection for the interests of religion to mould
his policy. As his conscience became more sensitive to the claims of
the Church, he felt more than he had done before the scandal of his
quarrel with the Holy See, he realised more than before the duties of
his position as the first Catholic power of Europe. Probably had Madame
de Maintenon lived out the rest of her life in poverty as the widow
of Scarron, Louis would still have revoked the Edict of Nantes, have
made up his quarrel with the Pope, and have persecuted the community
of Port Royal. Still, it is none the less true that he was impelled to
that policy by the knowledge that it was approved of by her mind, and
strengthened in it by the sense of duty which he had imbibed from her
society.

[Sidenote: =Disabilities placed upon the Huguenots. Encouragement of
conversions, 1681.=]

Impelled then by his fondness for uniformity, anxious to prove his
orthodoxy in spite of his difficulties with Rome, and believing that
the Huguenots themselves were ripe for conversion, Louis began his
repressive policy in 1681 by excluding all Huguenots from public
employment. They were to be marked by the law, as Roman Catholics
were marked in England, as people who were unfitted by their religion
to hold positions of trust. But repression was only one side of his
policy. While those who obstinately adhered to their independence and
their religion were stamped as persons unworthy of trust, those who
would listen to reason, and be obedient to the wishes of their lord
and father, were covered with benefits and rewarded with pensions. In
1682 missions were held throughout France to convert the heretics.
Bossuet devoted himself to the work with incredible zeal and success.
An office was established in Paris under a convert named Pelisson to
organise the work of conversion. Converts received their rewards in
the best of government posts, and the receipt of government pensions.
So numerous were they that Louis thought that he might safely proceed
to the next step and destroy heresy at its root. Edicts were issued
closing the Huguenot churches and schools and making it a penal offence
for a Huguenot pastor to preach. It soon appeared that he was wrong.
Among the middle classes in the south and centre of France there were
thousands to whom their religion was of far more moment to them than
their property or even their lives. [Sidenote: =Emigration of the
Huguenots and popular risings, 1682–1683.=] In 1682 numbers of the
best and most industrious of the artisans of France began to leave
their country rather than abandon their religion. Louis at once forbade
emigration under pain of the galleys. There was but one resource left
to the poor Huguenots, deprived of all honourable employment in their
own country and prevented from seeking it in another. In desperation
the mountaineers in the Cevennes rose in tumult rather than revolt
in 1683. Stifled almost in its birth by the royal troops it was made
the excuse of inhuman barbarities. [Sidenote: =The ‘Dragonades,’
1684.=] Dragoons were quartered upon the miserable inhabitants until
they renounced their religion. Many a Huguenot who would willingly die
for his religion could not bear to see his family and home at the mercy
of a brutal soldiery. During the year 1684 this vile system was in
force throughout the south of France. Conversions were announced by the
thousand. In Languedoc it was said that as many as 60,000 took place
in three days. At last in October 1685 the coping stone was put to
this edifice of blood and crime. [Sidenote: =Revocation of the Edict
of Nantes, 1685.=] An edict was issued by which all the privileges
accorded to the Huguenots by the Edict of Nantes were withdrawn,
the reformed worship was suppressed, and the ministers expelled.
Huguenotism became from that moment in France, like Episcopacy a few
years later in Scotland, an illegal religion outside the pale of the
law and proscribed by it.

[Sidenote: =Results of the measure.=]

The results of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes were very
different from what Louis and his ministers expected. So far from
crushing the Huguenots into submission it goaded them into madness.
They realised that now there was no chance of peace for them in their
own country. One by one, family by family, they fled from their homes
leaving behind them their property, taking their lives in their hands.
Numbers were caught and sent to the galleys, numbers more escaped, and
carried to the enemies of France in England and Brandenburg and Holland
the thrift and the skill which under Colbert’s enlightened patronage
had done so much to make France the wealthiest of European states.
Holland dates its industrial revival and Brandenburg its industrial
life from the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Huguenot soldiers,
like Ruvigny and Schomberg, brought the discipline and training of
the French armies to bear fruit in the English and Dutch service. It
is said that fifty thousand families escaped in this way to fertilise
with their industry the soil of the enemies of France. Those who were
left behind, who were too poor or too ignorant to escape, continued in
the mountains of the Cevennes a desultory and fanatical struggle with
their oppressor. In the days of Louis’s greatest need, in the War of
the Spanish Succession, they kept the ablest of French generals and
an army of veterans from the theatre of war. Eventually in the next
reign they obtained and have since enjoyed a grudging toleration.
Even the uniformity of religion so dear to the heart of Louis was not
attained. Large numbers of Protestants and of Protestant children, it
is true, were added to the ranks of Catholicism, but Huguenotism lived
on in France, socially and politically insignificant, but still alive.
France soon found that persecution had bereft her of her children and
her wealth, without even giving her in return that complete national
solidarity which formed the excuse for the crime.

[Sidenote: =Aggressive policy of Louis, 1678–1688.=]

The interest of ecclesiastical questions, however intense, however
absorbing, never diverted the jealous eye of Louis XIV. for
one moment from his own aggrandisement. He did not become the less
ambitious because he had grown devout, or the less far-reaching in his
plans because they were now largely affected by his determination
to play the part of champion of the Church. No sooner was the peace
of Nimwegen signed than Louis began to cast about for pretexts for
evading it. By the words of the treaty the towns ceded to France were
expressed to be surrendered ‘with their dependencies.’ The ambiguity
of this phrase, possibly intentional, gave a great opportunity to
that kind of masterful diplomacy which Louis loved. [Sidenote: =The
Chambres des Réunions, 1679.=] In 1679 he appointed tribunals,
called Chambres des Réunions, consisting of members of the parlements
of Metz, Beisach, and Besançon to adjudge the territories in Alsace,
Franche Comté, and the three bishoprics which were included in this
phrase, and accordingly appertained to France. The Chambres well
understood their duty. Without hesitation they pronounced all Alsace,
Zweibrücken, Saarbrück and other smaller districts to be included in
the treaty. No sooner was the decision pronounced than French troops
occupied the territories in question, and their annexation to France
became an accomplished fact. In vain the diet and the princes whose
lands were thus unceremoniously seized protested. Force and possession
were on the side of Louis and he knew it. While they were protesting he
was cynically preparing for a stroke more audacious still. [Sidenote:
=Occupation of Strasburg, 1681.=] The great city of Strasburg was
included in the decision which gave all Alsace to Louis, but Strasburg
could not be occupied in a moment like Saarbrück or Montbéliard. French
gold and diplomacy were set to work, the magistrates were bribed or
intimidated, and at the end of September 1681 all Europe rang with the
news that Louis XIV. was master of the key of the upper Rhine.
The skill of Vauban was at once enlisted in its defence, and before
the war broke out again Strasburg had been added to the impregnable
circle of fortresses, which guarded France and threatened her enemies
from Lille to Pignerol. Like his apt pupil Napoleon in after times
Louis XIV. thoroughly understood the policy of employing brute
force in the time of peace against unwilling enemies, in order to
obtain advantageous positions either in diplomacy or war as the basis
of future effort. The Emperor threatened by the Turks was unable,
Germany was unwilling, to renew the war for the sake of Strasburg, and
Louis proceeded calmly and steadily on his way. By an arrangement with
Charles of Mantua he occupied Casale in Piedmont the same day that
Strasburg fell into his hands. By the truce of Regensburg concluded
after a short war with Spain in 1684, and approved by the diet, he
secured possession for twenty years of his ill-gotten gains.

[Sidenote: =Improvement of the army and navy, 1678–1688.=]

Meanwhile no pains were spared by the vigilant and careful mind of
Louvois to bring the army to a pitch of perfection hitherto unknown.
Camps of instruction were formed, the precursors of the modern Châlons
and Aldershot, where 150,000 men were kept constantly at drill.
Regiments, no longer farmed as it were by their colonel, were paid,
clothed, armed, and victualled by the war office. Stores were collected
along the frontier. All France resounded with the clash of arms and
preparation for war. Through the zeal of Seignelay, the son of Colbert,
similar energy was expended upon the navy. Arsenals were formed at
Brest and Toulon. Ships of war were built to the number of one hundred
and eighty and fitted with all the appliances of naval warfare as it
was then understood. Since the decay of the navy of Spain the command
of the Mediterranean had been shared between the Venetians, the Turks,
and the Corsairs of Algiers. [Sidenote: =Naval supremacy in the
Mediterranean.=]Now under Duquesne and de Tourville France stretched
forth her hand to win an easy supremacy over the Mediterranean, and
to claim partnership with England in the rule of the ocean. In 1683
Duquesne destroyed the pirates of Algiers and Tripoli, and liberated
their Christian slaves. In 1685 he forced the republic of Genoa to
renounce its traditional alliance with Spain and to become the humble
vassal of France.

A policy of aggrandisement so open and so unmistakable could not
fail to arouse at length the slumbering jealousy of Europe, but it
was long before the enemies of France were in a position to take any
active steps. [Sidenote: =Blunders of Louis.=] From 1678 to 1685
the danger from the Turks was too pressing to permit the Emperor
to involve himself in responsibilities on the Rhine. In 1685 the
accession of James II. to the English throne opened out prospects
of ambition to William of Orange, which made him unwilling to have
his hands tied by the necessity of defending the Low Countries. But
gradually as the months passed the blunders of Louis himself gave the
opportunity to his enemies which they desired. [Sidenote: =Alienation
of Europe.=] His continued quarrel with the Pope and his alliance with
the Turks alienated the more zealous Catholic opinion in Europe, and
deprived him of the support of a sentiment, which at that very time
he was most anxious to obtain. How could he claim the allegiance of
zealous Catholics, when he was the enemy of the Pope and the friend
of the Turk? Yet with what face could he apply to the supporters of
Protestantism or the friends of religious liberty, when he was stained
with the cruelties of the ‘dragonades,’ and had just revoked the Edict
of Nantes? His intrigues with the Turks had lost him the assistance
of John Sobieski and Poland. His seizure of the duchy of Zweibrücken
had alienated his old ally of Sweden to whom it belonged. His attack
upon Algiers and Tripoli had forfeited the friendship of the Turks.
The system of tributary states beyond the frontiers of Germany had
completely broken down. [Sidenote: =The league of Augsburg, 1686.=]
The result of this was seen in the secret formation of the League of
Augsburg in 1686, between the Emperor, Spain, Sweden, the princes of
north Germany, and the United Provinces to oppose the domination of
France threatened by the truce of Regensburg. In the next year it was
joined by Bavaria and the princes of Italy, and the Pope, Innocent XI.,
even gave it his secret support.

For the moment the accustomed political skill of Louis deserted him.
Though he knew of the League he hesitated to strike the first blow
while his enemies were unprepared. He even allowed them to deprive him
by a sudden stroke of his most important ally. [Sidenote: =Quarrel
between Louis and James II., 1688.=] James II. of England
was a very different person from his brother Charles. Gifted with much
greater energy and independence of spirit, he was wholly destitute of
political tact and discrimination. Louis quickly found that he was
unable to bend him to his will, and make England humbly attend upon
his chariot wheels as heretofore. All that Charles had cared about
was a quiet life and plenty of money. James on the contrary had high
political ambitions. He wished to make England Roman Catholic, and
the English monarchy absolute, and in comparison with these objects
he cared not a fig for the aggrandisement of France or the glory of
Louis XIV. It was all-important to Louis that James should
not embroil himself with his Parliament and people, when France
wanted the assistance of the English fleet in the Channel and English
soldiers on the Rhine. James on the contrary cared only for his own
home policy, and in spite of the urgent remonstrances of Louis, and
even of the Pope, was busied in schemes for weakening the English
Church, removing the disabilities of Roman Catholics and altering
the English constitution. Louis determined to read him a lesson. He
remembered how years before he had had to teach Charles II.
that he must obey French orders if he wanted French gold. He thought
that a somewhat sharper lesson was needed by James II. now.
He knew that the malcontent politicians in England were in close
communication with William of Orange. He knew that William was fully
prepared to attack his father-in-law’s throne directly he was sure that
his departure for England would not be the signal for French troops to
overrun the Low Countries and march upon Amsterdam. He held the fate
of James II. at his disposal. William could not move without
his permission. At that very moment, in 1688, a disputed election to
the archbishopric of Köln gave Louis the opportunity of declaring war
upon the Rhine. Persuaded that the invasion of England by William
of Orange must bring about a struggle, which would force James to
humble himself and beg for French assistance to crush the rebellion,
he deliberately allowed William to sail. The French army was moved
from the frontiers of the Low Countries to the Rhine, and occupied the
Palatinate. [Sidenote: =James driven out of England by William III.,
1688.=] In the midst of his triumph came the astounding news that
James II. was a fugitive at Versailles, and the strength of
England was added to the formidable coalition which threatened France
from all sides.

[Sidenote: =The war of the League of Augsburg, 1688–1698.=]

The war of the League of Augsburg, which lasted from 1688 to 1698, is
one of the most exhausting and most uninteresting wars of which history
makes mention. Louis found himself alone against the world. Literally
he had not a single ally. By the force of circumstances the war on his
side was largely defensive. Thanks to his prevision and Vauban’s skill,
his frontier was defended by a string of fortresses, which in those
days of bad roads and worse artillery were only conquerable by the
wearisome method of blockade, a method which often, owing to disease
and exposure, was more fatal to the besiegers than the besieged. Using
these fortresses as a base of operations his generals could advance to
deal a blow at the enemy or retire behind them to recruit as occasion
demanded. The allies, seeing the immense defensive strength which
this gave to the French operations, in their turn fortified fortress
against fortress, and Namur and Mons became under the hands of Coëhorn
the equals of Lille and Charleroi. The generals too on both sides
were well fitted for playing the game of war on such conditions. No
strategist worth the name appeared in Europe between the days of
Turenne and Marlborough. Luxemburg was a brilliant tactician. On the
field of battle he had not an equal. But no one knew less how to win
a campaign or utilise a victory. William III. was an excellent war
minister, indefatigable in preparation, indomitable under reverses, but
his commonplace leadership was never relieved by one spark of genius
or even brilliance. In the Low Countries the tide of battle ebbed and
flowed about the fortresses of Mons and Namur. The capture of them by
the French in 1691 and 1692 and the defeats inflicted by Luxemburg upon
William at Steinkirk and Neerwinden, after his efforts to save Namur in
1692, mark the highest point of French military success. The recapture
of Namur by William in 1695 is his chief title to military renown, and
the evidence of the increasing exhaustion of France. On the Rhine there
was no great event which calls for notice, while in Italy the French,
though much weakened by constant drafts for the Netherlands, managed
to hold their own through the fine fighting qualities of Catinat, who
completely defeated the duke Victor Amadeus at Staffarda in 1689, and
drove prince Eugene out of Piedmont after the bayonet fight of Civita
in 1693.

[Sidenote: =Importance of the naval operations.=]

The real interest of the war centres round the struggle at sea between
the fleets of England and France. It was the first tilt in the dread
tourney, which occupies the whole of the eighteenth century, which
extends from Beachy Head to Trafalgar, and has given England her vast
imperial position. The conquest of England and Scotland gave to William
III. the navy of England to use against Louis XIV. The continued
loyalty of Ireland to James II. made the command of the sea necessary
to Louis, for without it he could not hope to maintain James in Ireland
for a moment against the whole power of England. The issue of the
struggle in Ireland depended therefore wholly upon the issue of the
naval war. The great victory of Tourville over the English fleet off
Beachy Head in July 1690 made the French for nearly two years masters
of the Channel, and more than counteracted the effect of the battle
of the Boyne, by enabling Louis to pour French troops and stores into
Ireland, and even threaten the invasion of England itself. The defeat
of Tourville by Russell off La Hogue put a final end of this dream of
French ambition. All thought of invasion had to be laid aside, and
Ireland left to the tender mercies of the cruel conqueror. France had
to acknowledge the superiority of the English at sea, to acquiesce in
the capture and annexation of its colonies in the East and West Indies,
to submit to the absorption of its trade by its dominant rival, and to
content itself with the impotent but lucrative revenge of the legalised
piracy of privateering.

[Sidenote: =Exhaustion of France, 1698.=]

After eight years of war all sides were anxious for peace. To France,
exhausted by maintaining year after year four armies at least in the
field, peace was a necessity. Already the burden had become almost
intolerable. The coinage was debased, the _taille_ had been
doubled, offices were openly sold, and indeed created in order to be
sold, one tenth of the population was without means of subsistence. The
government too had fallen into very inferior hands. Colbert, Louvois,
and Seignelay were all dead. Pontchartrain who took charge of the
finances was incapable, Barbesieux, the son of Louvois, who succeeded
to his father at the war office, was young and without experience. When
he pleaded his inexperience to Louis, the infatuated king replied,
‘Do not disturb yourself, I formed your father and will form you.’ He
seemed to think human nature was a blank sheet of paper on which he
could write what he liked. England too was tired of a struggle which
brought her neither glory nor profit. William himself, worn out by
disease, hated by his subjects, thwarted by his Parliaments, plotted
against by his courtiers, was willing if not anxious to sheathe the
sword. In 1696 Victor Amadeus of Savoy left the League and made a
treaty with France, and negotiations for a general peace were set on
foot, which eventually were brought to a successful issue at Ryswick in
1698 chiefly through the efforts of Bouffiers and Portland.

[Sidenote: =The treaty of Ryswick, 1698.=]

By the treaty of Ryswick France surrendered all the towns which she had
captured since the treaty of Nimwegen except Strasburg, and agreed that
the chief frontier fortresses of the Netherlands should be garrisoned
by the Dutch in order to secure their ‘barrier.’ Clement of Bavaria
was acknowledged as the lawful archbishop of Köln, and the right of
William III. to the throne of England, with the succession to
his sister-in-law Anne, recognised. The peace of Ryswick was a serious
blow, not merely to the pride of Louis XIV., but to his power.
France never had time to recover from the strain of that terrible
and heroic struggle before she was again involved in the war of the
Spanish Succession. Her finances were ruined, her navy was crushed. And
the heir to her greatness was her hated rival. William III.
by ousting the Stuarts from the English throne, by forcing France
to acknowledge his own right, had changed the personal duel between
himself and Louis into a national duel between England and France, a
duel in which England had scored the first pass by wresting from France
the command of the ocean, and compelling Louis to renounce his claim
to be the dictator of Europe and the champion of the cause of Roman
Catholicism in England.

CHAPTER XII

SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

Indifference of Europe to the growth of the Turkish power--Resistance
to it local--Inherent defects of the Turks--Causes of their early
successes--Beginning of their decline--The struggle for the
Danube valley--Their antagonism to the House of Austria--Turkish
misgovernment at the beginning of the century--Mohammed Kiuprili,
grand vizier--Revival of Turkish power under the Kiuprili--Attack
upon Hungary--Capture of Candia--Condition and institutions of
Poland--Decline of its power--War with the Cossacks--Election of
Michael--War with the Turks--Victories of John Sobieski--Election of
John Sobieski--Risings in Hungary against the Emperor--War between the
Emperor and the Turks--Relief of Vienna by John Sobieski--The Holy
League--Conquest of the Danube valley and the Morea--The peace of
Carlovitz--Reconquest of the Morea--Peace of Passarovitz.

[Sidenote: =Indifference of Europe to the establishment and growth of
the Turkish power.=]

Few facts about European history are so strange as the want of interest
shown by the great powers in the empire of the Ottoman Turks until the
present century. The Eastern Question as a serious problem of European
politics, affecting the peace and welfare of the world, has sprung into
existence in consequence of the decay of the Ottoman empire. When the
Ottoman Sultans were in the zenith of their power, when Turkish armies
were marching up the Danube, when Turkish corsairs were plundering
the coasts of Italy and Spain, when Christian communities were being
enslaved, and compelled to pay to their conqueror a yearly tribute of
children, Christian and civilised Europe took very little heed about
the matter. Opposition to the advance of the infidel was mainly local.
The Popes occasionally were enabled to fit out some small expeditions.
Charles V. endeavoured to root out a troublesome nest of
corsairs at Algiers. From time to time small contingents of French
or German or Burgundian soldiers were sent to the assistance of the
Emperor or the king of Hungary. But such efforts were at the best but
fitful and self-interested, and the real work of stemming the tide of
the Turkish advance was left to the half civilised tribes, mainly of
Sclavonic blood, scattered along the valley of the Danube and the hill
country of Bosnia and Albania. The Wallach and the Serb, the Albanian
and the Magyar were the people who jeoparded their lives and sacrificed
their liberty for the salvation of Europe, while the Roman Emperor was
waging a death duel with the most Christian king, and the Vicar of
Christ was dallying with pagan philosophy. Statesmen and princes of the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries could not bring themselves to realise
the danger of the crisis, could not understand that the East was
about to avenge the days of the Crusades, and that the rude threat of
Mohammed II., that he would stable his horses in S. Peter’s,
might at any moment be translated into fact.

[Sidenote: =Resistance to the Turks mainly local.=]

Never was a struggle for life and death carried on in so haphazard
a fashion. Resistance in the Mediterranean was purely local. The
Knights-Hospitallers disputed for years with the conqueror for the
possession of their island fortress of Rhodes, and hurled him back
eventually in confusion from the rocks of Malta. The Venetians kept the
whole Turkish fleet at bay before Candia for twenty years at a most
critical period of Ottoman rule. The Pope and the Venetians entered
into piratical competition with the corsairs of Greece and Africa, in
which the desire to gain money was more conspicuous than the ambition
to overcome the infidel. Even the great victory of Lepanto in 1571, at
the news of which all Christendom rejoiced, was decisive, not so much
because it marked the successful effort of allied Christian powers to
resist a common danger, but because it happened to take place at the
beginning of a period of intestine troubles within the bosom of the
Ottoman empire itself. On land the story is a similar one. Piece by
piece, leaf by leaf, the artichoke of the Balkan peninsula was eaten
by the invader, but the process of digestion was a difficult one. The
crescent was first seen in the plains of Hungary in the middle of
the fifteenth century, yet at the time of their greatest power under
Suleiman the Magnificent the Turks never acquired the whole country.
Transylvania and Moldavia gave in their adherence to the Porte early in
the sixteenth century, the Tartars of the Crimea acknowledged Mohammed
II. fifty years earlier, yet they never became anything more
than vassal states. Even in Bosnia and Servia, though the Turkish
rule was everywhere established, a great deal of local independence
was left. Nothing stands out clearer in the history of the Ottoman
Turks in Europe than the fact that the limits of their conquests were
fixed not by the prowess and skill of their adversaries but by their
own inherent defects. When Sigismond of Hungary and the flower of the
Franco-Hungarian chivalry went down before Bajazet I. on the
field of Nicopolis in 1396, when the flag of Mohammed II.
floated proudly over the ramparts of Otranto in 1480, there seemed
nothing to prevent the triumphant march of the infidel to the heart of
European civilisation, over the wasted lands of the king of Hungary and
the ruins of the Christian Papacy.

[Sidenote: =Inherent defects of the Turks.=]

But fortunately for Europe the Turk had two inherent defects, which
effectually prevented him from establishing himself permanently among
civilised nations. He could not assimilate, he could not govern.
Foresight, perseverance, organisation are denied to him, and they are
among the primary and essential faculties of civilised government.
The Turks swept down upon Europe as a mighty river flood pours itself
out from its mountain gates into the plain below. With an impetuous,
irresistible rush it spreads itself wide among the fields and the
gardens, submerging one by one all the accustomed landmarks of hedge
and tree and hillock, till all the horizon is but a vast waste of
hurrying water. But the further the flood finds its way from the bed
of the stream the quieter is its course, the less the damage which
it causes. Eddies and back currents check the whirling tide, and
even turn its headlong course at the extreme limit of the flood into
gentle, fertilising rills which irrigate the meadows in obedience to
the will of man. For days or even weeks the flood may last and the
swirl of waters boil along, but in the end it wears itself out, the
fountains of the hills above dry up, the stream falls quickly back
into its accustomed channel, and one by one again the old familiar
scenes reappear. Trees and hedges, fields and buildings, greet the
eye, but how different indeed from what they were. Torn, ragged,
desolate, choked with sand and debris, preserving a faint life amid
the desolation, all seems so unlike the once smiling valley. So
unlike and yet the same, the same fields, the same trees, the same
vigorous life, only for the moment obscured by the sudden catastrophe.
In the light and warmth of God’s sun, with a little aid from the
forethought of man, the promise of rich harvest will soon be seen
again. So it has been with the Turkish power in Europe. [Sidenote:
=Want of assimilation.=] The Turks submerged the civilisation of
south-eastern Europe, they did not uproot it. They injured it, they
did not destroy it. They had nothing better to put in its place, and
so it lived on, damaged and maimed, but alive. They imposed their own
government over the conquered lands, but underneath, the old laws,
the old religion, the old customs were still observed. In the extreme
districts beyond the Danube they were content merely to exact tribute,
and left their tributaries far more independence than the British
government in India allows to the native states. To the larger part of
the Turkish dominions in Europe conquest chiefly meant the imposition
of a new governing class and of a new dominant religion, a governing
class which was intermittently tyrannical, but a religion which was
seldom persecuting. Consequently many Christians, who laboured under
the taint of heresy or schism, found themselves actually better off
under Mussulman than under Christian rule, and it frequently happened
in the wars between Venice and the Sultans that the orthodox Christians
of Greece and the islands fought strenuously on behalf of their infidel
conquerors, in order to avoid falling into the hands of their Latin
persecutors.

[Sidenote: =Want of governance.=]

To this inability to assimilate the peoples which he conquered, the
Turk added an inability to govern them. He could neither weld together
the varied materials of which his loosely jointed empire was composed,
nor govern the separate parts. It is singular how few administrators
the Ottoman race has produced. It does not possess faculties for
government, or for trade, or for art. No sooner had the Turks conquered
south-eastern Europe than they found themselves obliged to intrust the
administration of their provinces to the children of the people whom
they had overcome. Turkish art was but a faint and spoiled copy of
Christian and Arab models. Trade remained in the hands of Christian
merchants, or fell into the clutches foreign of Christian powers. When
the Turks ceased to conquer they ceased to prosper. They became idle,
luxurious and inert, lying like an incubus upon the country, deadening
and crushing its civilisation and its spirit, hindering all growth,
stopping all progress, just as incapable of calling out the resources
of a people as of rooting out their national life.

[Sidenote: =Reasons for their early success.=]

So as the flood of conquest began to abate the submerged races began
to reappear. Christendom had not to reconquer Turkish provinces, as
Germany has had to reconquer French provinces, it merely had to remove
the foreign incubus which was lying upon them and crushing them, to
oust the foreign garrison. Accordingly the tide of Turkish invasion
had hardly ceased to flow in south-eastern Europe when it began to
ebb. The Turks owed their wonderful success to three causes. The
disunion of Christendom, the extraordinary vigour and ability of the
earlier Ottoman Sultans, and the institution of the Janizaries which
gave them the best disciplined army in Europe. In the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries these all combined to advance their power. They
came as an army, organised not as a nation but as a camp, led by men
second to none among the greatest sovereigns of Europe for military
and personal gifts. The strength of their forces lay in the tribute
of children exacted from the Christian races, who were brought up in
the faith of Islam to be its special defenders and champions in the
disciplined life of an army, half fanatical and half professional. They
hurled themselves upon Europe at a time when the great powers were
slowly and painfully organising themselves into personal monarchies
out of the ruins of feudalism, when as yet professional armies were
in their cradle. Under Orchan, the founder of the institution of the
tribute children, they first crossed over into Europe in the middle
of the fourteenth century. Under Murad I. they overran Roumelia and
Bulgaria, under Bajazet I. they carried their victorious arms into
Servia and across the Danube into Wallachia, and defeated Sigismond of
Hungary at the great battle of Nicopolis in 1396. Under Murad II. they
spread into Macedonia and Hungary. To Mohammed II. was reserved the
crowning honour of the conquest of Constantinople, but he also extended
his sovereignty over Trebizond, Greece and the islands of the Ægean,
Bosnia, Albania and even the Tartars of the Crimea. At the death of
the great conqueror in 1481, the Turkish empire in Europe had reached
the dimensions which it retained in the middle of the present century.
But it still continued to grow. [Sidenote: =Suleiman the Magnificent,
1520–1566.=] Under Suleiman the Magnificent, who reigned from 1520 to
1566, it attained its greatest power. He drove the Knights-Hospitallers
out of Rhodes, crossed the Danube, captured Belgrade, and turned
half Hungary into a Turkish province under a pasha at Buda, while he
forced the princes of Transylvania and Moldavia to pay him tribute.
So powerful had he become that the powers of Europe began to realise
his importance, and Francis I. of France did not disdain to purchase
by his friendship the aid of the Sultan against his great enemy the
Emperor, and to lay the foundations of French influence in the East by
the privileges which he obtained for his countrymen at Constantinople.
[Sidenote: =Alliance with France.=] From that time to the present
day French policy has always had for one of its chief objects the
maintenance of a group of alliances in northern and eastern Europe,
which may serve to threaten Germany with the danger of being caught
between two fires, should she find herself at war with France. For many
years Sweden Poland and Turkey formed such a group, and the endeavour
to keep them in firm friendship with France was always a leading
feature of French diplomacy. In the seventeenth century, when the House
of Austria was the chief opponent of France, the assistance of Poland
and of the Sultan was naturally of great importance. In modern days,
during the decay of the Ottoman empire and the growth of the rivalry
with northern Germany, the Czar has taken the place of the Sultan as
the necessary ally of France. Thus in the sixteenth century, mainly
through the selfish policy of the French kings, the Ottoman Sultans
found themselves admitted into friendship and alliance with European
sovereigns, just at the very time when they seemed to be threatening
ruin and destruction to European civilisation.

[Sidenote: =Beginning of Turkish decline, 1566.=]

In reality, however, the flood had already reached high-water mark. The
Sultans had begun to prefer a life of ease in the palace of Stamboul
to the active leadership of the army, or the laborious administration
of the empire. Suleiman himself farmed out the taxes and left the
management of the affairs of state mainly to his ministers. Under his
feeble successors degeneration grew apace. The reins of power fell
from the listless hands of the Sultans into those of incapable and
despicable favourites. Palace intrigues decided important affairs of
state, and ministers were made and unmade by the cabals of women and
eunuchs. Corruption spread like a cancer over the whole administration.
Discipline became deteriorated in the army, and the Janizaries, like
the Praetorian guard, ceased to be the champions of their country’s
ambition, and became but the heroes of domestic revolutions. In a
loosely organised empire like that of the Turks, which stretched from
Buda to Bagdad, from the Caspian to the Pillars of Hercules, there was
no cohesive force except that of the central government, no centre of
unity except that of the ruler of Stamboul in his double capacity of
Sultan and Caliph. When the head became effete and incapable the life
blood of the whole organism failed and decay began. Under Selim the
Sot, the successor of Suleiman, Christendom won its great victory over
the Turks at Lepanto in 1571; a battle, which, though its loss was
repaired with incredible energy and counterbalanced by the conquest of
Cyprus, has nevertheless set for all time the limits of Turkish rule in
the Mediterranean, just as the failure of Suleiman’s attack upon Vienna
in 1529, and the subsequent partition of Hungary, had fixed the extreme
boundaries of Turkish power in the valley of the Danube.

[Sidenote: =Loss of the command of the Danube valley in the
seventeenth century.=]

The close of the sixteenth century therefore fixed the limits of
Turkish advance. The opening years of the seventeenth century marked
the first beginnings of Turkish retreat. By the treaty of Sitvatorok,
concluded between the Emperor and the Sultan in 1606, the annual
tribute of 30,000 ducats agreed to be paid by the Emperor for the
portion of Hungary which he still retained under his own government
was abolished. From that day to the present the history of the Ottoman
Turks in Europe has been that of a gradual but steady decline in
the strength of their authority over south-eastern Europe. In the
seventeenth century the struggle was for the possession of the valley
of the Danube. The contest was a severe one. The Turks fought more
strenuously for the command of the Danube than they did for Greece or
Bulgaria. Bit by bit with many changes of fortune they were slowly
driven back, until soon after the end of the century not an acre of
land on the northern bank of the river between the Theiss and the Pruth
was still in their possession. Since then the work of liberation has
progressed steadily but slowly. One by one the Crimea, Wallachia,
Moldavia, Bessarabia, Servia, Greece, Bosnia, and Bulgaria have been
won back by Christendom from the rule of the Turk, either to complete
independence or to subjection to a neighbouring Christian power. But
just as it was the mutual disunion of Christian powers which enabled
the Turks to conquer south-eastern Europe so easily in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries, so it has been the mutual jealousy of
Christian powers which has made the task of emancipation so slow and so
difficult in the nineteenth century. For many years the Ottoman Sultans
have lived in Europe on sufferance, because it has seemed a lesser evil
to the great powers of Europe to retain the Turk than to aggrandise the
Czar.

[Sidenote: =Antagonism to the House of Austria.=]

Before the ambition of Russia gave rise to the Eastern Question the
House of Austria was the Christian power chiefly interested in beating
back the Turks. The Emperors no doubt felt somewhat the obligation
which lay upon them, as the traditional lords of Christendom, to take
the lead in the work of emancipating Christian lands and imperial
vassals from the yoke of the infidel. But much more did they feel the
political necessity which forced them, as kings of Hungary and Croatia
and overlords of Transylvania, to make themselves undisputed masters
of the valleys of the Danube the Drave and the Save. With the Turks
securely planted at Buda, and within striking distance of Agram, Vienna
itself was unsafe, and the communications between Austria and Italy
liable at any moment to be cut. The more the Emperor was being deprived
of leadership in Germany, the more he was being ousted from influence
on the Rhine, the more essential it became to him to retain his hold
upon the Danube. So during the whole of the seventeenth century the
history of south-eastern Europe is the history of a duel between the
House of Austria and the Sultans for political and military supremacy
on the Danube and the Save. Other combatants such as the French, the
Venetians, the Poles and the Russians, appear from time to time and
take part in the struggle from motives of ambition or patriotism or
interest and most powerfully affect its fortunes, but the essential
character of the contest remains unchanged. Austria and the Turks fight
for pre-eminence on the Danube, just as Germany and France fight for
pre-eminence on the Rhine.

[Sidenote: =Misgovernment at Constantinople, 1603–1656.=]

Fortunately for the house of Habsburg the time of their greatest
weakness was also a time of impotence and degeneracy among their foes.
From the death of Mohammed III. in 1603 to the death of Murad
IV. in 1640 the Ottoman empire was the prey of revolution
anarchy and crime. The Sultans, effeminate puppets of a day, were in
no position to take advantage of the opportunities given to them by
the Thirty Years’ War. The satisfaction of their own pleasures and the
preservation of their own lives were much more in their thoughts than
the extension of their power. Murad IV. during the eight years
of his personal rule (1632–1640) did much by a relentless severity to
crush out the spirit of faction, and reduce the turbulent Janizaries
to obedience, but on his death after a drinking bout in 1640, anarchy
broke out again. Ibrahim I. his successor, having been with
difficulty prevented from ordering a general massacre of the Christians
all over the empire, contented himself by fitting out a fleet in 1645
which undertook the conquest of Candia; but the disorganisation of the
government was far too great to enable the attempt to be made with
any chance of success. It only provoked reprisals on the part of the
Venetians and the Knights-Hospitallers. The miserable Sultan himself
was deposed and murdered in 1648, the Ottoman fleet was defeated in
the Ægean in 1649, civil war raged in Asia Minor, while at Stamboul
ministers rapidly succeeded one another in obedience to the caprices of
the harem or the demand of the soldiery. In 1656 Mocenigo the Venetian
admiral occupied the Dardanelles and threatened Constantinople itself.
It seemed as if the Ottoman empire was about to fall to pieces through
sheer want of governance.

[Sidenote: =Mohammed Kiuprili appointed grand vizier, 1656.=]

From this fate it was preserved by the firmness of one man and the
genius of a family. The Kiuprili were of Albanian blood, but had
long been settled in Constantinople, where the head of the family,
Mohammed, now an old man of seventy, was universally respected for the
vigour of his mind and the strength of his character. The mother of
the young Sultan, in whose hands the chief political power had fallen,
turned to Mohammed Kiuprili in her despair, and begged him to accept
the office of grand vizier in 1656. He consented on the condition
that his authority should be uncontrolled. For twenty years he and
his family were the real rulers of the empire, and to them is due the
astonishing revival of the Ottoman power in the latter half of the
seventeenth century. True to the genius of Oriental monarchies they
sought for the sources of strength, not in adaptation to new demands,
but in the resuscitation of the ancient spirit. They resolutely shut
their eyes to the attractions of European civilisation. They refused
as far as possible to have dealings with European powers. Treaties,
concessions, arts were evidences of weakness, admissions of a
brotherhood which could never exist between Christianity and Islam. The
ideal of government ever present to their minds was that of Mohammed
II. and the earlier Sultans. The relation of governors to
governed was that of master and slave in a well-ordered household,
where strict justice on the one hand expected and necessitated implicit
obedience on the other. The mission of the Turks was to conquer
opponents and to dictate terms to the vanquished. Wherever there yet
remained an organised power, Christian in its principles and Western in
its civilisation, there was the enemy.

[Sidenote: =Restoration of order and discipline, 1656–1661.=]

Success was instantaneous. The Turks at once felt that they had got
a leader who understood them, who was actuated by principles which
were their own. Obediently they fell in to the bugle call. Anarchy
disappeared. Discipline re-established itself. The Greek Patriarch and
4000 Janizaries were the only victims required. In the very next year
the Venetian fleet was forced to leave the Dardanelles, Mocenigo was
killed, and Lemnos and Tenedos recovered. In 1659 the old alliance with
France was broken by the imprisonment of the ambassador’s son, and the
refusal of all compensation. The siege of Candia was pushed on with
redoubled zeal, and preparations were made for the renewal of the war
of European conquest. When Mohammed Kiuprili died in 1661 he had the
satisfaction of seeing the Ottoman empire once more united from end to
end of its vast extent, and its energies once more directed to a war of
aggression against its hereditary enemy the Emperor.

The mantle of Mohammed fell upon his son Achmet, who succeeded him in
his office, inherited his ability, and pursued his policy. [Sidenote:
=Attack upon Hungary under Achmet Kiuprili, 1663.=] Placing
himself at the head of 200,000 men he burst into Austrian Hungary in
1663, crossed the Danube at Gran, captured the fortress of Neuhäusel,
and ravaged Moravia up to the walls of Olmütz. But Louis XIV.,
irritated at the insult offered to his ambassador by Mohammed Kiuprili,
came to the aid of the Emperor. With the assistance of 30,000 men in
French pay Montecuculli the imperialist general felt himself strong
enough to threaten the Turkish flank by an advance from Vienna.
Achmet at once retired south to cover Buda, and the two armies met at
S. Gothard on the Raab, where Achmet and his army proved themselves
no match for the talents of his opponent or the wild valour of the
French cavalry. Leopold, however, saw only in this great victory the
opportunity of making peace, and of ridding himself of any further
obligations to France. [Sidenote: =Treaty of Vasvar, 1664.=] Ten
days after the battle of S. Gothard he signed the treaty of Vasvar
(10th August 1664), by which he recognised the suzerainty of the Sultan
over Transylvania, and permitted him to retain the important fortress
of Neuhäusel in Hungary. Elated with this success Achmet turned his
attention to the war with Venice. He took personal charge of the
siege operations before Candia, and in spite of all that European
engineering skill could do, it soon became obvious that the end could
not long be delayed. Morosini the heroic defender of the town made the
capitulation the occasion of negotiating a general treaty. [Sidenote:
=Capture of Candia, 1669.=] On the 17th September 1669 Crete
passed into the hands of the Ottomans, and peace was restored between
Venice and the Porte. It was the last conquest Islam has made from
Christianity.

[Sidenote: =Condition of Poland.=]

No sooner was the war with Venice over than Achmet found himself
involved with a very different Christian power in the extreme northern
frontier of the empire. The kingdom of Poland, to which was joined
the grand duchy of Lithuania, had discharged during the Middle Ages
the office of the sentinel of Western civilisation on its northern
frontier. But the civilisation to which it had itself attained was very
inferior to that of its southern and western neighbours. Extending
as it did, so late as the beginning of the seventeenth century, from
Livonia and Courland on the Baltic to Podolia and the lower waters of
the Dniester on the confines of the Black Sea, it could not fail to be
subject to the dangers of disunion and disorganisation. Its interests
were so varied, its territories so impassable and heterogeneous, its
people so untameable and independent, that it was almost a hopeless
task for even a great statesman to inspire the country with a sense of
national unity, and to lead it along the path of national progress.
Yet forces which under happier circumstances might have led to
contralization were not wanting. Poland occupied geographically the
centre of Europe. Until the rise of Russia on the north and Prussia
to the west it was free from serious danger of conquest. Its people
were Sclavonic by race and Catholic by religion. With the exception of
a few years at the end of the sixteenth century it was untroubled by
religious or racial discord. Brave and chivalrous by nature the Poles
were distinguished for their personal loyalty and their affection for
their country. [Sidenote: =Turbulence of the Poles.=] But all
these promising elements of union and strength weighed as nothing
in the balance, when compared with the evils of their political and
social institutions. The Poles were absolutely deficient in the
capacity for being governed. They never appreciated the advantages of
the reign of law. They never understood that individuals must submit
to some restrictions if the community is to prosper. Discipline was a
virtue wholly unrecognised by them. This lawless and turbulent spirit
was fostered instead of being checked by their social institutions.
[Sidenote: =Their social and constitutional institutions.=] There
were but two classes in Poland, the aristocracy in whose hands lay
the whole of the wealth and the whole of the political power, and the
serfs who were little better than slaves, and had no rights of life or
property against their masters. As in all countries where one class is
dominant, justice and patriotism shrank and withered before the claims
of privilege and selfishness. The determination to use the power which
it has got solely for its own purposes, is not the monopoly of one
class more than another. It has been the characteristic of the petty
democracy of Florence, as of the trading aristocracy of Amsterdam,
or the militant democracy of modern France. The landlord aristocracy
of Poland pushed it to excess. They mistook licence for liberty, and
put personal power in the place of patriotism as unhesitatingly as
a Robespierre or a Napoleon. Their great fear was to find that they
had unwittingly given themselves a master, so they did all they could
to divert the kingship of all real power, and wilfully deprived the
country of the only possible centre of unity. During the Middle Ages
the kingship, though always nominally elective, was in fact hereditary,
but on the death of Sigismond Augustus in 1572 it became wholly
elective, and on his election the king was obliged to sign a compact
by which he practically divested himself of all the usual functions of
royalty except the appointment of the officials and the command of the
army. The government of the country was really vested in the senate,
in which the bishops and the higher magistrates as well as the twelve
great executive officials sat, and in the diet. Originally the whole
adult nobility had the right of attending the diet, but since 1466 it
had become merely a body of delegates, who received the mandate from
the provincial assemblies of nobles, and were not permitted to vary it
in the least. The diet sat for six weeks and all its decisions had to
be unanimous, consequently it was in the power of every member of the
diet to put a stop to all business whatever either by obstructing all
progress for six weeks (drawing out the diet), or by voting against
the proposal (the veto), or by simply withdrawing altogether, which of
course rendered all decision impossible and so practically dissolved
the assembly.

[Sidenote: =Poland the battle-ground of French and Austrian
interests.=]

A constitution such as this might have been thought to have been the
work of some cynical philosopher anxious to exhibit on a large scale
the inconceivable folly of human nature. In reality it was dictated
by the malignant spirit of fear and selfishness. In the hands of a
quick-tempered and turbulent people it could not fail to lead to
anarchy, and anarchy quickly proved itself the parent of corruption.
France soon saw the advantages which the command of a great central
warlike state like Poland would be to her in her duel with the house
of Austria. The Emperor was alarmed by the prospect of seeing his
hereditary dominions almost encircled by the vassal states of France,
and strained every nerve to secure the election of a king opposed to
French interests. But the purse of France was deeper, and the policy
of France was more continuous than that of the embarrassed Emperor,
and so it happened that except under the pressure of some special
danger, the diplomacy and the gold of France could always maintain a
close alliance between the two countries, and prevent the election
of a strongly imperialist candidate. It thus became the interests of
the greater powers of Europe to keep Poland in a state of anarchy,
in order that they might the easier obtain a decisive voice in her
destinies. Her neighbours were not slow to recognise the advantage
thus offered to them. Poland was getting weaker and weaker through the
increase of anarchy, as they were getting stronger and stronger through
centralisation. The rise of Sweden to pre-eminence on the Baltic
under Gustavus Adolphus, the restoration of peace to Russia after
the ‘troublous times’ under the house of Romanoff, the successful war
and cunning diplomacy of the Great Elector all had among their other
results the effect of weakening Poland. By the treaty of Wehlau, 1657,
Poland lost her suzerainty over east Prussia. By the peace of Oliva in
1660 she had to surrender Livonia to Sweden. By the treaty of Andrusoff
in 1667 she was obliged to give up to Russia almost all her possessions
east of the Dnieper, including the important towns of Smolensk and
Kief, which she had gained from her earlier in the century, and the
suzerainty over half the tribes of the Cossacks of the Ukraine.

[Sidenote: =War with the Cossacks of the Ukraine, 1648–1667.=]

It was through her relations with these wild horsemen of the borderland
that Poland became eventually involved in a war with the Ottoman Turks.
The yoke of Poland had always sat heavily upon the Cossack tribes.
Proud independent and high-spirited by nature, they could not brook
the insolence of the Polish nobles, or tamely submit to the rapacity
and extortion of their Jewish stewards. In 1648 they boldly rose in
rebellion and assisted by the Tartars offered their allegiance to
Alexis of Russia. The rising was well-timed, for owing to the ambition
of Charles X. of Sweden, John Casimir of Poland soon found his
country attacked on all sides by Sweden Brandenburg and Russia, his
capital in the hands of his foes, and himself a fugitive in Silesia.
When, however, peace was restored on the Baltic by the treaties of
Oliva, Copenhagen, and Kardis in 1660, Poland found herself able to
cope with her revolted subjects and their protector. Through the
consummate generalship and high personal qualities of John Sobieski,
who was sprung from one of the oldest and staunchest of Polish noble
families, Alexis and his allies were compelled to sue for peace, and
accept the compromise concluded at Andrusoff in 1667. Two years later
John Casimir abdicated the throne, and the usual intrigues began
between the adherents of France and the Empire to secure a favourable
election. [Sidenote: =Election of Michael as king, 1669.=]
But at the moment through the misfortunes of John Casimir, and the
unpopularity of Louise de Nevers, his French wife, the Poles would
have no one of French blood or French connections, and even John
Sobieski who had married a French woman, and belonged to the French
interest, was passed over in favour of a national representative,
Michael Wiesnowiescki, who had nothing but his good looks and his name
to recommend him. The Cossacks regarded the election as an earnest of
the recommencement of persecution, for the new king was the son of one
of their greatest oppressors. [Sidenote: =Request for protection by
the Cossacks to the Turks, 1671.=] In 1670 they rushed to arms but
were easily defeated by Sobieski. Despairing of all hope of justice
from the king they turned to the Turks, and offered to recognise the
suzerainty of the Sultan if he would protect them from the tyrant of
Poland. Achmet Kiuprili gladly seized the opportunity, and in 1671
declared war against Poland as the champion of her oppressed subjects.

[Sidenote: =War between Poland and the Turks, 1672–1676.=]

In June 1672 the preparations were finished and the Sultan himself
accompanied by the grand vizier appeared before the almost impregnable
fortress of Kaminiec, the key of Podolia. In less than a month it fell,
and the craven-hearted king Michael, dismayed at the blow, negotiated a
treaty at Buczacz by which he surrendered Podolia and the Ukraine and
consented to pay tribute. Stung with indignation at such a disgrace
the diet refused to ratify the treaty, and rallied all the forces of
the nation under John Sobieski to resist to the uttermost. For four
years the heroic struggle continued. Without receiving any help from
the great powers, now, through the ambition of Louis XIV.,
engaged in a deadly conflict on the Rhine and the Scheldt, threatened
by intrigues behind his back at court, endangered by insubordination
in his camp, John Sobieski, by sheer ascendency of personal character
and commanding military talent, managed not only to stem the Turkish
advance into Podolia and Galicia, but to inflict on the best of the
Turkish generals crushing defeats at Choczim (1673) and Lemberg (1675),
and to drive them back in confusion across the Danube. In 1674 in the
very midst of the struggle the incapable Michael died, and the Poles
hailed with enthusiasm their hero as their king. Yet characteristically
enough they did not for that serve him one whit the better. [Sidenote:
=John Sobieski elected King, 1674.=] Two years later he found
himself in the direst straits, with his small army hemmed in by the
swarming enemy at Zurawno on the Dniester, unable to break out of the
enclosing lines, without any hope of timely relief. But even at this
crisis the magic of his name prevailed, and Ibrahim the Turkish general
preferred to make peace rather than to run the risk of encounter with
the lion in his den. [Sidenote: =Peace of Zurawno, 1676.=] The
peace of Zurawno, concluded in October 1676, secured to the Sultan
the possession of Kaminiec and part of the Ukraine, but it marks by
these very concessions the failure of Achmet Kiuprili’s great design
of binding upon the brows of his master the laurel wreath of Mohammed
II.

[Sidenote: =Kara Mustafa made grand vizier, 1676.=]

Seven days after the peace of Zurawno Achmet Kiuprili died, but his
policy did not die with him. His successor and brother-in-law, Kara
Mustafa, was fired with an equal ambition but was not possessed of
equal talent. Haughty luxurious and boastful he soon began to destroy,
while seeking to extend, the power which Mohammed and Achmet had so
diligently built up. He determined to win his way to the heart of
Christendom at a blow by the conquest of Vienna itself. Preparations
for an invasion on a scale unexampled and irresistible were secretly
set on foot. The old alliance with France was renewed by the grant
of fresh trade and diplomatic privileges. Peace was made with Russia
and ratified with Poland. By these measures the grand vizier hoped to
procure the isolation of the Emperor, and he very nearly succeeded.
For some years the Hungarians had been on bad terms with the Emperor.
Leopold had pursued a policy both of religious and political
repression. With the object of introducing more centralisation into
the government, he abolished the office of palatine, and ruled
Hungary through Viennese officials. [Sidenote: =Risings against the
Emperor in Hungary, 1674–1681.=] With the object of rooting out
Protestantism he handed over the management of religious affairs to the
Jesuits, and banished and sent to the galleys Protestant ministers on
the pretext of seditious agitation. Measures so high-handed and unjust
brought about the usual result. The Hungarians took advantage of the
war with France on the Rhine, rose against their oppressor in 1674
under Tököli, and were joined by Apafy, the prince of Transylvania. In
1681 they found themselves strong enough to force the Emperor to revive
the office of palatine and grant religious toleration. But Tököli was
not content with this. He desired to become ruler of Hungary himself,
and willingly listened to the persuasions of Kara Mustafa to join the
Turkish invasion, and accept the government of Hungary as the tributary
of the Porte. [Sidenote: =War between the Emperor and the Turks,
1682.=] All was now ready. Trusting to Louis XIV. to keep
Germany from assisting the Emperor, and to Tököli to raise Hungary
against him, Kara Mustafa threw off the mask in 1682, declared Hungary
tributary to the Sultan, and crossed the Danube in the spring of 1683
at the head of 150,000 men.

[Sidenote: =Alliance between Poland and the Emperor, 1683.=]

He had not reckoned on his allies in vain. Wherever the anxious Emperor
turned for help in his extremity, he found himself thwarted by the
diplomacy of France. In Germany Louis was completely successful. The
diet assembled at Ratisbon separated without granting any aid to
its chief. In Poland the struggle was intense, but in the end the
indomitable energy and quick tact of John Sobieski prevailed. All
grumbling at the selfishness and cowardice of Austria in the days of
Poland’s need was chivalrously silenced in the presence of the common
danger to Christianity and civilisation. On March 31st an alliance
was concluded with the Emperor by which Poland bound herself to place
40,000 men in the field. Meanwhile the Turkish war rolled on. Leopold
and the court removed for safety to Passau. The duke of Lorraine, the
imperialist general, abandoning Hungary, intrusted the defence of
Vienna to count Starhemberg, and posted himself a little lower down the
Danube to wait for the Polish reinforcements. On July 9th the Turkish
standards appeared before the walls, on the 14th the city was invested
and trenches opened.

[Sidenote: =Siege of Vienna, 1683.=]

The city was ill prepared for a siege. The garrison only numbered
14,000 men, the town was crowded with peasants from the country, the
walls were old and out of repair, while the Turkish engineers and
artillery were among the best in Europe. But Mustafa was in no haste to
seize the prize. On the 7th of August he drove the imperialists from
their fortification on the counterscarp, and the city lay open to the
attack from all sides. Yet he hesitated to give the word. He wanted
the glory of a capitulation, and the booty of the town for himself.
Meanwhile John Sobieski was collecting his forces with all haste at
Cracow. Lorraine did not dare to move till he came. As usual money
was short, delays were long. It was the 15th August before Sobieski
could begin his march, and even then he had to leave the Lithuanians
behind. On the 2d of September he was on the Danube at the head of
his cavalry. On the 5th he took over the command of the united armies
of the Empire and of Poland. On the 6th he crossed the Danube by the
bridge at Tuln. On the 11th he reached the height of the Kahlenberg
and looked down on the vast camp of the Turks encumbering the plain
which stretches between the heights and the spire of St. Stephen’s.
He had come not a moment too soon. The Turkish engineers had already
undermined the walls, disease had broken out in the crowded city, but
when they saw his signal-fires from the mountain the besieged felt
that the end of their trials had come and victory was within their
grasp. [Sidenote: =Defeat of the Turks by John Sobieski, 1683.=]
They were not disappointed. On the morning of the 12th, after having
received the Holy Communion at the chapel of the Leopoldsberg, John
Sobieski ordered the attack. Quickly driving the Turkish advance guard
from the vineyards which clothe the sides of the Kahlenberg he found
himself opposite the main Turkish battle in the plain about noon. As
his Poles charged with the war shout ‘Sobieski for ever’ the Turks were
seized with a panic at the sound of the dreaded name and fled on all
sides. Sobieski seized the favourable moment with his usual tactical
skill, and threw his whole army upon the retreating masses with a
tremendous shock before they had time to recover themselves. The battle
was won, Vienna was saved, and Christendom preserved. The whole camp of
the invader with its streets of tents, its bazaars, its mosques, its
luxury, all fell into the hands of the victor. Kara Mustafa himself
hardly escaped with his life in the general confusion, and only rallied
the remains of his beaten army at Belgrade.

[Sidenote: =The Holy League, 1684.=]

From the date of the failure of the great attempt upon Vienna in 1683
the fortunes of the Ottoman Turks in Europe quickly declined. Kara
Mustafa paid the penalty of his defeat with his head, but Ibrahim
who succeeded him fared no better in the war. John Sobieski himself
inflicted another defeat upon the Turks in the October of the same
year at Parkan, and drove them out of Hungary. In the following year
Venice joined in the pursuit of the beaten infidel, and the Holy
League was formed between the Emperor Poland and Venice against the
Sultan. Its effects were quickly seen. In spite of the retirement of
John Sobieski in 1685, through ill health and increasing infirmity,
the tide of conquest continued to flow steadily on the Danube and was
augmented by new victories on the Mediterranean. In 1685 the duke of
Lorraine won back the whole of Turkish Hungary except the fortress of
Buda, while Morosini, the hero of Candia, at the head of the Venetian
fleet, seized several places on the Albanian coast. The years 1686
and 1687 were still more unfortunate for the Sultan. On the Danube,
Buda fell into the hands of Lorraine in September 1686. Pushing back
Tököli and his rebel army before him into Transylvania, the imperialist
general once more united all Hungary under the Emperor, and left
the Hungarian rebels to the tender mercies of Leopold and his Jesuit
advisers. [Sidenote: =Conquest of Turkish Hungary, 1686.=] In 1687
he inflicted a crushing defeat upon the grand vizier on the historical
field of Mohacz and recovered possession of Croatia and Sclavonia. In
1688 he procured the submission of Transylvania and crossing the Danube
captured Belgrade and even penetrated as far as Nisch. During the same
time Morosini was no less active in the Mediterranean. [Sidenote:
=Conquest of the Morea, 1686.=]In 1686 he made himself master of
all the chief towns in the Morea. Corinth and Athens next acknowledged
his sway, where the Parthenon, which had hitherto survived so many
sieges of Romans and barbarians almost unhurt, was hurled into ruins
by the explosion of a Venetian bomb. To the spoils of Athens were soon
added those of Negropont, Thebes, and Dalmatia, until by 1694 the Turks
were stripped of all their posessions in Greece and on the coast of the
Adriatic.

[Sidenote: =Mustafa Kiuprili grand vizier, 1688.=]

So continuous a series of misfortunes demanded a victim. In 1688 a
palace revolution replaced Mohammed IV. by his brother Suleiman II.,
and the new Sultan once more intrusted the affairs of the empire to a
Kiuprili. Mustafa Kiuprili, the brother of Achmet, showed the vigour
of character for which his family were noted. By pursuing a policy
of toleration for the Christians and restoring stern discipline to
the army, he was soon enabled to bring victory back to the Turkish
standards, although he was but two years in his office. In 1690 he
recovered Nisch and Belgrade and invaded Hungary, but he was met,
defeated, and killed by the margrave of Baden at the battle of
Szcelankemen in 1691. With him perished the last chances of the Turks.
Although the war continued for eight years with varying success the
imperialists and the Venetians never really lost their hold upon
Hungary, Transylvania and the Morea. In 1697 prince Eugene won one
of the greatest of his victories over Sultan Mustafa II. in person,
at Zenta, and Peter the Great marked the first serious entrance of
Russia into the politics of south-eastern Europe by the capture of
Azof. The Sultan realised that with the Kiuprili the possibility of
fresh conquests had passed away, and he must content himself with the
boundary of the Danube. [Sidenote: =The peace of Carlowitz, 1699.=]
By the peace of Carlowitz, concluded in January 1699, the Emperor
recovered the whole of Hungary, except the district of Temesvar,
the larger part of Croatia and Sclavonia, and the suzerainty over
Transylvania. Poland retained Podolia, including Kaminiec, and Russia
Azof, while the Morea fell to Venice. Thus the Turkish frontier was
practically reduced to the Danube, and the seeds of the Eastern
Question were sown in the decay of the Ottoman empire and the advance
of Russia, and a new epoch in the history of south-eastern Europe began.

[Sidenote: =Reconquest of the Morea, 1715.=]

The conquests on the Danube were more permanent than those in the
Mediterranean. Fifteen years later the grand vizier, Ali Cumurgi,
flushed with an unexpected triumph over the Czar Peter on the Pruth in
1711, and trusting in the exhaustion of the Empire after the war of the
Spanish Succession, determined to make a great effort to wipe out the
disgrace of Carlowitz, and recover Hungary and the Morea. The Venetians
had no longer a hero like Morosini to lead them. The Greek population
in spite of the benefits they had received from Venetian administration
were too faithless and too dispirited to offer serious opposition.
One campaign proved sufficient for the work. In June 1715 Ali Cumurgi
passed the isthmus of Corinth. In September he returned in triumph
to Constantinople the conqueror of the Morea. But there his success
stopped. On the Danube he met more than his match. In August 1716
the Turks were completely defeated by prince Eugene at Peterwardein
in Hungary and the grand vizier himself was killed. In 1717 Belgrade
again passed into the Emperor’s hands, and the road into the heart of
the Ottoman empire was open. The Porte saw the necessity of peace.
[Sidenote: =The peace of Passarovitz, 1718.=] By the treaty of
Passarovitz signed in 1718 the Turks left Austria in possession of
Temesvar and Belgrade but retained the Morea. More than a century was
to elapse, and the proud republic of Venice pass herself into slavery,
before Greece could win her freedom.

CHAPTER XIII

THE NORTHERN NATIONS FROM THE TREATY OF
OLIVA TO THE PEACE OF UTRECHT

1660–1715

The rivalry between Sweden and Brandenburg--Monarchical revolution
in Denmark--Weakness of the aristocracy in Sweden--Frederick William
makes himself absolute in Prussia, Brandenburg, and Cleves--His policy
of centralisation--War between Sweden and Brandenburg--Battle of
Fehrbellin--Monarchical revolution in Sweden--The rise of Russia--The
reign of Alexis--Regency of Sophia--War with the Turks--Peter the
Great becomes absolute ruler--His character and policy--Coalition
against Sweden--Career of Charles XII.--His invasion of
Russia--Battle of Pultava--The campaign on the Pruth--Treaty of
Nystädt--Supremacy of Russia--Reign of Frederick III. of
Brandenburg--Frederick recognised as king of Prussia--Condition of the
north in 1720.

[Sidenote: =Rivalry between Sweden and Brandenburg.=]

The treaties of Oliva and Copenhagen were to the smaller nations
grouped round the Baltic, what the peace of Westphalia and the treaties
of the Pyrenees were to the great powers of Europe. They not only
put an end to a long period of war and disturbance, but also decided
the relations of the northern powers to each other for more than
half a century. To use the language of a later period they adjusted
the balance of power in the north. They mark the end of Danish
domination over the Baltic, they mark the beginning of the supremacy
of Brandenburg in northern Europe, they mark the first great failure
of Sweden to maintain the pride of place gained for her by Gustavus
Adolphus. So far the alterations in the relations of the northern
powers to each other are clearly defined. So far no sense of impending
danger from the half barbarous and distracted kingdom of Russia has
made itself felt. Until that event happens there is a breathing space
in the affairs of the Baltic states for fifty years, and during that
time the main questions of interest in their external politics are
whether Brandenburg will be able to maintain the supremacy which she
has acquired, and whether Sweden will be able to recover the lead which
she has lost. The rivalry between Sweden and Denmark is therefore no
longer the leading feature of the politics of the Baltic states, the
rivalry between Sweden and Russia is still in the womb of futurity, the
rivalry between Sweden and Brandenburg remains for the time the only
serious question unsettled.

[Sidenote: =Monarchical revolution in Denmark.=]

The respite thus gained from foreign war was occupied by all the powers
concerned in altering their domestic institutions. The first to move
was Denmark. In that country as in Poland the authority of the elected
king was completely overshadowed by that of the nobility. They were
in possession of political power as well as of social privilege. They
owned most of the wealth of the country, paid no taxes, and held all
the chief posts in the kingdom. Consequently at each election of a king
they were able not only to decide the election, but to make bargains
with the elected candidate exceedingly profitable to themselves and
burdensome to the rest of the people. There was no country in Europe
where the nobles had made themselves so justly hated by all the other
classes of the community. National misfortune led naturally to the
desire for national revenge. Frederick III. put himself at the
head of the movement, and at a meeting of the diet in 1661 successfully
carried out a _coup d’état_, with the applause of the clergy, the
burghers, and the peasantry. The revolution was entirely in favour of
the king. The Crown was made hereditary and transmissible to females
as well as to males. The privileges of the nobles were abolished,
the capitulation signed by the king on election annulled, and the
government vested in the Crown. At one blow and without bloodshed the
monarchy in Denmark was remodelled on the pattern of that of France,
and Frederick III. became an absolute king with all the powers
of government centralised in himself, and his throne secured by a
professional army.

[Sidenote: =Misgovernment of the nobles in Sweden.=]

In Sweden matters took a different turn. During the minority of Charles
XI., as during the minority of Christina, the administration
fell wholly into the hands of the great aristocratic families.
Unfortunately there was no Oxenstjerna at their head. The council of
regency, under the nominal leadership of the queen-mother, found it
necessary to propitiate the nobles in everything. The suicidal policy
of making grants of the crown lands to them was again weakly adopted,
and the Crown was impoverished while its most dangerous rivals were
enriched. The itching palms of the great nobles found in the gold of
Louis XIV. the loadstone of their country’s policy, and as
long as the French supplies lasted Sweden remained true to the French
alliance. Once only, like Charles II., in the hope of greater
spoils she showed a momentary independence, when she yielded to the
persuasions of de Witt, and joined the Triple Alliance. In a few
months she returned in penitence to her old allegiance, and when the
young king took the reins of government into his own hands in 1672, he
found that if eleven years of aristocratical rule had secured for him
abroad the friendship and support of the greatest prince in Europe, it
had made him the heir at home to an empty treasury and a discredited
administration.

[Sidenote: =Despotic policy of the Great Elector in Prussia.=]

While Sweden was falling into bankruptcy, and was being threatened with
disruption, Frederick William of Brandenburg was diligently employing
the time in making his authority over his various dominions absolute
and unquestioned. He had already succeeded in reducing the diets of
Brandenburg and Cleves to impotence, and organising an administration
dependent on himself alone outside the scope of their interference. But
in Prussia the task was far more difficult, and directly the treaty of
Oliva was signed he applied himself seriously to the business. Under
the suzerainty of Poland the nobles and burghers of Prussia had been
accustomed to exercise a considerable amount of independence, but now
that the Great Elector had been recognised as immediate sovereign over
Prussia by the treaties of Wehlau and of Oliva, both sides understood
that the old relations between the duke and his subjects would have
to be modified. The Prussian diet determined to yield as little as
possible. It refused to ratify the treaty, it drew up a constitution
to secure its own authority. By the treaty Frederick William only
succeeded to the same rights over Prussia which Poland had enjoyed,
_i.e._ those of a feudal suzerain, but he was determined if
possible to make himself absolute sovereign, and reduce the diet to
insignificance. Most foolishly the diet played into his hands. The two
parties of which it was composed, the landed gentry and the burghers,
quarrelled over the nature of a tax which was to be imposed. Each side
wanted the other to bear the burden, and Frederick William was enabled,
under cover of settling the dispute, to march troops into Königsberg,
and arrest Rhode, the leader of the burgher party, in 1662. This
display of determination awed the burghers into submission, but the
nobles and the landed gentry still remained to be dealt with. Led by
Kalkstein, and secretly favoured by Poland, they were too strong to be
crushed.

[Sidenote: =The Charter of 1663.=]

Frederick William had recourse to the arts of diplomacy and
dissimulation of which he was so consummate a master. In 1663 the
diet accepted at his hands a charter which defined its rights. It was
expressed in ample but vague phraseology. By it the Great Elector
agreed that his own powers of government should be only those formerly
enjoyed by himself and the king of Poland, that the diet should be
summoned at least once in six years, and should be consulted in all
important business, and that no new taxes should be imposed without
its consent. But by the very definition of its powers the diet lost
all which was not expressed, while the elector gained all that was not
refused. The balance of authority in the state had clearly shifted
from the diet to the elector. Frederick William had only to avoid for
a few years giving the diet the opportunity of exercising the rights
secured to it, while the authority of his own administrative officers
was being established, and he need no longer fear the diet when it did
meet, than the kings of France need fear the States-General. It might
be troublesome but it could not be dangerous. So gradually by thrifty
management and careful policy Frederick William succeeded in extending
his personal authority more and more over the country, until in 1672 he
felt himself strong enough to strike a final blow. Kalkstein, the head
and front of the opposition to him, had been banished to his estates
for treasonable correspondence with Poland in 1669, but breaking his
parole he escaped across the frontier to Warsaw. Frederick William
demanded his surrender from the king of Poland, but it was refused.
[Sidenote: =Execution of Kalkstein.=]Taking the law into his own
hands, he had him arrested on Polish ground, brought to Memel, and
there beheaded. A more flagrant breach of the rights of nations could
not have been conceived, but the Great Elector well knew it could not
fail to be successful, and with him success justified everything.
Poland was in no condition to declare war, and the death of Kalkstein
was the one thing wanted to make the submission of Prussia complete.

[Sidenote: =Establishment of personal government by the Great
Elector.=]

By these measures Frederick William succeeded in crushing all open
opposition to his will over the whole of his incongruous dominions.
In Cleves and in Prussia, as in Pomerania and Brandenburg, he was
the centre and the mainspring of government. There was no local or
constitutional authority which could legally claim superiority to
him, or practically exercise equality with him. But though he was
the supreme power in the state he had not yet gained absolute power
over the state. There were still many local bodies of advice and
administration, with well-ascertained powers, whose assistance was
necessary to him in carrying his will into effect, though they had
no right to dictate to him the policy which he was to pursue. He had
given to his state political unity, he had gained for himself and his
successors political independence, he had won for himself and his
family within his own dominions political leadership, but he had not
as yet established administrative uniformity. That was necessarily a
work of slow growth, of a century rather than a lifetime. It was not
completed till the days of Frederick William I. and Frederick the
Great, but it was begun by the Great Elector. The important department
of patronage he at once took under his personal control, and appointed
all the chief administrative officers in his various dominions. As
head of the army, he separated the military from the civil revenues,
and placed the former entirely under the management of the minister
of war, who was of course his own nominee. War expenditure was thus
wholly removed from the control of the civil authorities, and the army
was organised on a professional basis. By a series of ordinances he
established an elaborate system of social distinctions and privileges,
which tended to centralise society under him, and attach the nobles to
him by social distinction now that he had deprived them of political
power. In these ways the government of Brandenburg-Prussia received
from him that military and aristocratic character which its greater
prosperity has only increased.

[Sidenote: =Encouragement of trade and manufactures.=]

Frederick William was also by no means unmindful of the general welfare
of his people. The constant want of money under which he laboured,
was in itself enough to draw his attention to the fact, that the
real weakness of his power lay in the sterile and poverty-stricken
state of his country. To improve this, he set an excellent example
of economy in the wise and careful management of his own domains, he
promoted numerous schemes of industrial and commercial enterprise,
and he cordially welcomed the Huguenot exiles from France, after the
revocation of the Edict of Nantes, who brought into Brandenburg many
of the finer manufactures, of which France had for some time had the
monopoly.

[Sidenote: =War with Sweden, 1674.=]

This policy of steady but quiet centralisation and industrial
development was rudely interrupted by the war of aggression undertaken
by Louis XIV. against the Dutch. Frederick William was closely
connected with the Dutch by marriage and by trade interests, and
was one of the first of European sovereigns to draw the sword in
their favour in 1673. Beaten hopelessly in the field by Turenne, he
was obliged to withdraw from the struggle six months after he had
declared war; but in the next year the increasing difficulties of
Louis emboldened him again to enter the field. Louis, however, was
prepared for this move, and the presence of 16,000 Brandenburgers on
the Rhine was the signal of the advance of Charles XI. with a Swedish
army on the road to Berlin. Frederick William at once hastened back
to defend his capital, reached the Elbe in June 1675, and, dashing
forward his cavalry between the two divisions of the Swedish army,
seized Rathenow, and prevented their junction on the Havel. [Sidenote:
=Battle of Fehrbellin, 1675.=] To do this he had been forced to leave
the bulk of his infantry behind. Nevertheless, with the brilliance
of decision which marks a great general, he determined to throw
himself with the few troops which he had with him upon the Swedish
column, which was retreating from Brandenburg, before they reached
the pass of Fehrbellin. Pursuing them by forced marches, he came up
with their rear-guard on the 17th of June, and on the 18th forced
them to accept battle. The weight of numbers was sadly against him.
He had but 6000 men against double the number of his enemies, but the
Swedes were dispirited, and the elector, in spite of the advice of
his generals, insisted on the attack. The battle was hotly contested,
but Frederick William had the better position and the more effective
artillery, and by nightfall a counter-charge, promptly delivered,
carried destruction into the ranks of the enemy. They broke and fled
in complete rout through the pass. The day of Fehrbellin is the first
great victory of the power of Brandenburg-Prussia, the first step in
the ladder which has led to Sadowa and Sedan. It is also the death-day
of the military prestige of the Swedes in Europe. From the battle
of Lützen to the battle of Fehrbellin, they had never been defeated
except by superior numbers. They were now seen not to be able to hold
their own with Brandenburg, for Fehrbellin was no isolated victory.
The elector pushed on into Swedish Pomerania, victorious and almost
unchallenged,--Wohlgart, Stettin, Stralsund and Greifswald fell
successively into his hands. By October 1678 Sweden held not a foot
of territory in Pomerania. Had it not been for her potent ally at
Paris, the work of Gustavus Adolphus and of Oxenstjerna would have been
completely undone long before the close of the century, and Frederick
William would have been admittedly the master of the north. [Sidenote:
=Treaty of S. Germain en Laye, 1679.=] But Louis XIV. insisted upon
the full restoration to Sweden of all which she had lost as the price
of peace, and the Great Elector had to sign the treaty of S. Germain
en Laye in June 1679, by which France evacuated Cleves, which she had
occupied and paid to Brandenburg the sum of 300,000 crowns, while
Brandenburg restored to Sweden all her conquests in Pomerania, except a
small strip of land on the Oder.

[Sidenote: =Monarchical revolution in Sweden.=]

Sweden thus emerged from an unsuccessful and mismanaged war, without
payment of indemnity or substantial loss of territory. As things
turned out she proved to be the gainer rather than the loser for her
misfortunes, for they enabled her to rid herself of her incapable
aristocratical government. Charles XI. did for Sweden what
Frederick III. had done for Denmark. Taking advantage of the
unpopularity of the government, he effected a revolution in favour
of the Crown without difficulty. With the help of the clergy and the
people the royal power was made absolute, and the domain lands, which
the nobles had divided among themselves, were ordered to be restored.
This destroyed at a blow a large part of the wealth of the noble class,
and reduced them to a position of dependence upon the Crown. Charles
proved himself worthy of the responsibility which he had undertaken.
Until his death in 1697 Sweden was at peace, commerce revived, the
abuses of the administration were rooted out, and the government
carried on without the assistance of French subsidies. For eighteen
years tranquillity reigned on the shores of the Baltic. The Great
Elector and his son Frederick III. were busy with schemes of
internal reform and personal aggrandisement. Denmark under Christian
V. was mainly occupied with the pleasures and extravagances of
a courtly magnificence, while Sweden was recovering from the evils of
administration, brought about by the corrupt rule of the nobles during
the king’s minority. The interest of the politics of the Baltic veers
further north, where behind the swamps of the Neva and the Dniester the
barbaric power of Russia was preparing to enter upon the stage of the
civilised world.

[Sidenote: =Condition of Russia.=]

Russia is the last-born child of European civilisation. While the
nations of the west were painfully hammering out their culture and
their polity, under the leadership of the Church, in the school of
feudalism, through the inspiration of Roman law, the thinly populated
expanse of forest and morass, which stretches between the Baltic
and the Ural mountains was subject to Tartar rule and made no claim
to civilised life. Even Christianity, which might under happier
circumstances have become a bond of union between the backward north
and the cultured south, proved rather a hindrance than a help, on
account of the enmity between the East and the West. [Sidenote:
=Ivan the Terrible.=]As long as Constantinople stood, Moscow was
its disciple and its ally; when Constantinople fell, Moscow claimed
to be its heir, and its avenger. It was not till the days of Ivan
the Terrible in the sixteenth century that the domination of the
Tartar was overthrown, and Russia began to be a nation and to enter
into relations with other nations. Its prosperity was short-lived.
[Sidenote: =The troublous times.=] Hardly had the breath left
the body of the savage autocrat in 1584, than a period of anarchy and
misery began, which has left its mark upon the country in the legal
establishment of serfdom, and was only ended by the accession of the
Romanoff dynasty to the throne in 1612.

[Sidenote: =Michael Romanoff.=]

Michael, the first of that ill-fated house, could do little more than
repress the elements of disorder, and restore the authority of the
Czar, but so well was this work done, that he was enabled to hand on
to his son Alexis, on his death in 1645, a crown which was at once
popular secure and despotic. Two dangers only threatened the infant
state; one from the turbulent spirit of the local nobles, the boyárs,
the other from the physical power wielded by the national guard,
called the Streltsi, who played the part of the Prætorian guard, or
the Janizaries, of the court of Moscow, and were always as ready to
intimidate as to protect their sovereign. [Sidenote: =Reign of
Alexis.=] In the earlier years of the reign of Alexis, however, all
went well. In 1648 he began the march of Russia towards the south-east
of Europe by assuming the protectorate of the Cossacks of the Ukraine,
then in revolt against Poland, and succeeded in obtaining legal
sanction for the absolute autocracy of the Czar, by the passing of a
code, or constitution, which concentrated all the powers of the state
in his hands. By these two measures, which established the internal
polity of Russia, and indicated the direction of her foreign policy,
Alexis may with some justice claim to have been the real founder of
the greatness of his country. Unfortunately a change soon took place.
The weak and amiable Czar fell quickly into the hands of courtiers
and favourites. Corruption and faction asserted themselves among the
boyárs. The government became disorganised. Sedition broke out in the
chief towns, and more than once Alexis had to sacrifice his ministers
to the fury of the populace, in order to save his own life. Even
the Church was split into two by an ill-managed effort to revise the
antiquated service-books, and the evils of ecclesiastical schism and
religious persecution were added to those of domestic strife.

[Sidenote: =Reign of Theodore I.=]

Such was the condition of Russia when the Czar Alexis died suddenly in
1676, leaving behind him by his first marriage two sons, Theodore and
Ivan, both extremely delicate in health; and one sturdy little boy of
four years of age, named Peter, by his second wife Natalia Naryshkin,
whom he had married in 1669. The death of Alexis was the signal for
the outbreak of a series of palace revolutions, which afflicted
the unfortunate country for some years. [Sidenote: =Recognition
of Peter as Czar, 1682.=] The Naryshkins, who had absorbed all
places of profit and influence during the later years of Alexis, were
banished at the accession of Theodore in 1676, but on the death of
that prince without children in 1682 they came back to power, and with
the assistance of the boyárs were able to procure the recognition
of the young Peter as Czar, in exclusion of his elder brother Ivan,
who was physically deformed and intellectually incapable. An act so
high-handed naturally created many enemies. [Sidenote: =Revolt of
the Streltsi.=] The opposition party among the nobles called in
the aid of the Streltsi, espoused their grievances, fanned their
discontent, and, persuading them that the life of Ivan was in danger
hurled them suddenly in riotous fury against the palace, in May 1682.
The Naryshkins were murdered. Ivan was proclaimed Czar in company with
his brother Peter, and the princess Sophia, the most capable of his
sisters, was made regent during the infancy of the Czars. The regency
lasted for seven years. [Sidenote: =Regency of Sophia.=] During
that time the real power was in the hands of prince Basil Golitsin,
the head of one of the oldest of the noble families of Russia, and
the acknowledged lover of the princess Sophia. His talent however
proved unequal to his opportunities. In 1686 a definitive peace with
Poland, called the treaty of Eternal Peace, put a finishing touch
to the truce brought about by the treaty of Andrusoff in 1667, on
terms which secured the important town of Kief to Russia, but obliged
her to join the Emperor and the Poles in their efforts to beat back
the Ottoman Turks. In consequence of this pledge, Golitsin waged two
campaigns against the Tartars of the Crimea, who were subjects of the
Porte, in 1687 and 1689, the unsuccessful issue of which filled up
to overflowing the cup of hatred which was preparing for him. Peter
allowed himself to be put at the head of the opposition. On September
17th, 1689, the regency came to an end. The princess Sophia was sent to
a convent, prince Basil Golitsin banished to an obscure village in the
inaccessible north, and the government fell into the hands of the rival
aristocratic faction.

[Sidenote: =Peter becomes the head of the government, 1689.=]

At the age of seventeen, in the year when William III. made himself
master of Great Britain, and the war of the league of Augsburg really
began, Peter the Great became nominally the head of the government of
Russia. In reality he exercised but little influence upon the fortunes
of his country for some years. He was as yet but a boy, brimming over
with health and spirits, exulting in the physical enjoyment of life,
supremely happy when he could get away from the wearisome routine of
the palace to his forge and his carpenter’s shop, or his ship-building
yards at Pereyaslavl and Archangel. The demon of ambition had not yet
waked in his breast, and his ships and his military sham fights, like
his displays of fireworks and his theatricals, were the amusements of
a spoilt child’s fancy, rather than the materials of a man’s policy.
[Sidenote: =War with the Turks, 1695.=] The rude touch of actual war
quickly brought about a change. In 1695 the government determined
to revive the slumbering war with the Turks, and attack the port
of Azof on the Black Sea. Peter threw himself into the scheme with
characteristic impetuosity, worked as a bombardier in the army like
a common soldier, and took his place as Czar in the councils of
the generals. But the result was unfortunate. Partly through sheer
bad management, partly through the inexperience and impulsiveness
of the Czar, the attack on the fortress completely failed, and the
Russian army had to retreat as best it could across the frozen steppes
amid great privations. But Peter was one of those who learn best by
experience. The campaign taught him the necessity of forethought
and preparation. Next year all was different. A flotilla of boats,
constructed especially for the river service at Voronezh, occupied the
mouths of the Don under Peter’s own orders, and prevented the Turks
from relieving Azof from the sea; while the engineering works on land
were pushed on by General Gordon. On July 29th 1696 a general assault
was ordered, but the Turks seeing that the town was no longer tenable
surrendered, and Peter found himself to his great joy the master of a
port on the Black Sea. The capture of Azof is the turning-point in the
life of Peter the Great. His imagination was fired by the opportunities
opened out to his country by the possession of an outlet for her
commerce and a harbour for her fleet in southern waters. The death of
his brother Ivan without male heirs in February left him undisputed
master of his vast dominions. From that moment he bent all the energies
of his powerful intellect and iron will to the service of Russia. He
took the reins of government into his own hands, and, without regard
to precedent, to tradition, to public or private right, he drove the
chariot of the state straight towards the goal of his own ambition, and
his country’s greatness.

[Sidenote: =Character of Peter the Great.=]

Peter himself was well fitted to become the hero of such a policy.
His friendship with Gordon and Lefort and others of the foreign
residents at Moscow had taught him how far Russia lagged behind all
other European countries in the march of civilisation. His quick wit
showed him that he must organise his country on the European model,
and make it formidable by its army and navy to its enemies, and useful
by its resources to its friends, before it could be admitted into
the brotherhood of European nations. To change the institutions and
overthrow the traditions of a country like Russia was a revolution, but
Peter was not the man to shrink back appalled at the consequences, when
he had once made up his mind to act. Sunny, jovial and open-hearted
under ordinary circumstances, in the presence of opposition, when his
blood was up, he became a fiend incarnate. No savage could be more
cruel, no tyrant more brutal, no criminal more lustful and drunken. He
knew not what it was to accept a rebuff, or deny himself a desire. To
incur his suspicion was torture, to thwart his will was death. After
the revolt of the Streltsi in 1698 more than a thousand men were put
to death and eighteen hundred tortured by the knout and roasted at the
fire, many of them in the presence of the Czar himself. He allowed
his eldest son Alexis to be knouted to death in 1718, and personally
superintended the torture of many of his alleged accomplices. His
drunken orgies lasted for days, and were worthy only of Comus and
his crew. Yet with all this hateful savagery there was much that was
attractive about Peter. When free from his fits of depression, there
was a buoyancy and vivacity of intellect, which, combined with singular
simplicity of thought, made him a most delightful companion. No one
could be a truer friend, if no one could be a more brutal enemy. He was
perfectly natural. If there was much of the barbarian about him, there
was nothing of the schemer. He was free from the civilised vices of
deceit and double dealing. Rough, honest, and quick-tempered, he moved
through society like a lion cub among pet dogs, dangerous but noble.

[Sidenote: =Objects of his home government.=]

His two years of foreign travel enabled him to see with his own eyes
the advantages of European civilisation and government, and to learn
how to make with his own hands the ships which were to spread the
greatness of the Russian name round the shores of the Black Sea.
Neither lesson was thrown away. Directly he got back to Russia he
began to foster everything western at the expense of everything
national. He introduced western dress, western habits, western dancing,
and even western shaving. He encouraged the settlement of foreigners,
and spent a good deal of his time in the German suburb of Moscow with
his foreign friends. Directly he obtained possession of the mouth of
the Neva, he built his new capital S. Petersburg, to take the place of
conservative and traditional Moscow, as the centre of his new polity.
At the same time he took good care to make the foundations of his
government secure. The revolt of the Streltsi in 1698 gave him the
opportunity of abolishing a force, which was too much mixed up with the
old aristocracy of Russia ever to be really loyal to the new regime,
and to replace them by a professional army trained on the European
model under foreign officers. He tried as much as possible to depress
the power of the boyárs, surrounding himself with friends and ministers
like Menschikoff, who were drawn from a lower class of society. So
successful was this policy that in 1711 he felt himself able to bring
the political power of the boyárs to an end by forbidding their council
to meet any longer. With a similar object he refused to nominate a
successor to the patriarch Adrian on his death in 1700, but placed the
powers of the patriarchate in the hands of a commission, afterwards
called the Holy Governing Synod, which brought the affairs of the
Church more definitely under his own control.

[Sidenote: =His foreign policy.=]

While Peter was thus engaged in winding the chains of despotism more
tightly round the necks of his subjects at home, he was equally busy in
trying to extend the frontiers of Russia to the sea, at the expense of
his neighbours abroad. No one could doubt that the first essential of
the due development of Russia was to obtain a footing upon the Baltic.
The port of Archangel on the frozen White Sea, and the port of Azof on
the Black Sea, closed as it was to the trade of the Mediterranean by
the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles in the hands of the
Turks, were not sufficient to enable Russia to expand into a commercial
nation. But since the treaties of Stolbovo and Kardis, renewed as late
as 1684 by the princess Sophia, Russia had acquiesced in the annexation
of the Baltic lands by Sweden, and it was certain that Sweden would not
tamely surrender her treaty rights. But in the year 1697 an opportunity
offered, which was too tempting for Peter’s slender stock of virtue
to resist. [Sidenote: =Coalition against Sweden, 1699.=] Charles
XI. of Sweden died, leaving as his heir and successor his
youthful son Charles XII., only fifteen years of age. Patkul,
a nobleman of Livonia, who was eager to restore the independence of
his country, applied to Denmark, Poland, and Russia, the hereditary
enemies of Sweden, for assistance. Each power, thinking only of its own
aggrandisement, caught willingly at the chance of crushing Sweden when
she was weak, and in 1699 this nefarious alliance was concluded, in
which the independence of Livonia was used merely to cloak a policy of
pure aggression.

[Sidenote: =Defeat of the allies by Charles XII.=]

But the allies soon found that they had reckoned without their host.
Charles XII. of Sweden was one of those rare spirits who
are born with a perfect genius for fighting. Without any gifts as a
strategist, without any studied knowledge of the art of war, he was
a born fighter. He loved fighting for fighting’s sake. He was never
happier than when on campaign. He enjoyed the very hardships of war,
and every soldier in his army knew that whatever might be his own
privations, his king was sharing them all. With an unlimited belief in
his own fortunes he succeeded in making every one else believe in them
too. The enthusiasm of his army was unbounded. They willingly rendered
to him an unquestioning obedience, and followed him gladly wherever
he pointed the way. A man with such gifts was not going to wait until
his unwieldy antagonists had united their forces. Early in May 1700
he sailed straight to Copenhagen and ended the Danish war at a blow.
Frederick IV. could not defend his capital, and was obliged
to accept the mediation of England and Holland, and to conclude the
treaty of Travendal, by which he withdrew from the alliance with Poland
and Russia. Leaving Denmark, Charles sailed to the Gulf of Finland
where Peter was besieging the important fortress of Narva. Although
he had only some 8000 men against Peter’s 60,000 Russians, he did not
hesitate to order an attack. The huge undisciplined masses of Peter’s
army were quickly thrown into confusion, and fled panic-stricken to
their own country, leaving Charles the undisputed master of the Baltic
coast. Turning southwards the Swedish king marched through Livonia
and Courland into Poland, occupied Warsaw in 1702, defeated the king,
Augustus the Strong of Saxony, who had been elected to the Polish
crown on the death of John Sobieski in 1697, at the battle of Clissow,
and drove him into Saxony. In 1703 he captured Thorn and Dantzig,
procured the deposition of Augustus in an assembly held at Warsaw in
February 1704, and imposed Stanislas Leczinski upon the Poles as king
in his stead. He then resumed his course of military triumph, overran
Lithuania, driving out the Russians in 1705, defeated Schulenberg at
Frauenstadt in 1706, and finally invaded Saxony in 1707, where he
forced Augustus to conclude the peace of Altranstadt in the September
of that year, by which Stanislas Leczinski was recognised as king of
Poland, and the unfortunate Patkul was surrendered as a victim to the
cruelty of Charles, who, in defiance of every principle of humanity,
had him broken on the wheel as a traitor.

[Sidenote: =Position of Charles XII., 1708.=]

When Charles XII. rested at Altranstadt in the winter of 1707–8, at the
age of twenty-five, he felt himself with reason to be the wonder of the
world. He was courted on all sides by the great powers, at that time
distracted by the throes of the war of the Spanish Succession, and had
he cared to play the rôle, might have posed as the arbiter of Europe.
From Versailles came one of the most trusted diplomatists of Louis
XIV., to remind the young prince of the long friendship of Sweden and
France, and to entreat him to acknowledge the benefits of S. Germain en
Laye by drawing his sword manfully for Louis at the crisis of his fate.
But on behalf of the allies there appeared at the court of Charles
metal still more attractive. Marlborough, the greatest soldier of the
age, came personally to Altranstadt to plead the cause of Europe before
Charles, with the laurels of Blenheim and of Ramillies still green upon
his brow. His task was the easier one. He wanted not the assistance
but the neutrality of Sweden. Charles was flattered by the attention
paid to him, fascinated by the address of the hero diplomatist, and
lent a willing ear to his suggestions. His Protestantism rejected the
idea of an alliance with the author of the ‘dragonades.’ His desire
for vengeance impelled him to come to close quarters with his enemy in
the north. His soldierly pride shrank from committing himself to a war
in which he would have to take a subordinate place. So in the spring
of 1708 he turned his back deliberately on Germany and the Rhine, and
marched to his ruin in the inhospitable north.

[Sidenote: =His invasion of Russia.=]

While Charles had been engaged in the conquest of Poland and Saxony,
Peter had well employed the breathing space allowed to him in the
diligent training of his undisciplined armies, and the occupation of
the Baltic sea-coast on either side of the Neva. He had already overrun
Ingria and Carelia, and had begun the fortifications and houses of a
town at the mouth of the Neva, which was one day to be his capital
city. Charles did not disturb himself over trifles of that sort. He
struck, as was his wont, straight at the heart of his enemies’ power,
and having made an alliance with Mazeppa, a hetman of the Cossacks, who
promised to join him with a large force of those questionable allies,
marched straight upon Moscow at the head of 30,000 men. Misfortune
dogged his steps from the first. The roads were incalculably bad, the
weather unexpectedly severe, progress was hopelessly slow. When no news
had been heard of Mazeppa for some time, Charles, in order to try and
open communications with him, left the main track, and plunged into
the expanses of forest and morass which lie between Little Russia and
the Ukraine. Winter surprised him on the march when he was still many
hundreds of miles from Moscow. Food and supplies became very difficult
to procure. Disease ravaged his army. Still with the courage of despair
he pushed on. Spring found him exhausted but with his face still set
towards Moscow. He was destined never to see it. Peter, at the head
of immensely superior forces, fell upon Levenhaupt who was bringing
a convoy to his aid and cut him to pieces. [Sidenote: =Battle of
Pultava, 1709.=] Eventually he came up with the king himself at
Pultava in the month of June 1709. The defeat of Narva was quickly
avenged. Surrounded by the Russian forces, outnumbered two to one, the
Swedes could only sell their lives dearly. Twenty thousand officers
and men surrendered. Charles himself wounded in the foot made his way
with a few companions across the frontier and took refuge with the
Turks. The dream of his ambition was shattered at a blow, the work of
Gustavus Adolphus was finally overthrown. Livonia and Esthonia with
the important towns of Riga and Revel fell into the hands of the Czar.
Russia made good her hold upon the Baltic, and took the place of Sweden
as the leading power of the north.

[Sidenote: =War between Russia and the Turks, 1711.=]

The battle of Pultava, if it destroyed the power of Sweden, did not put
an end to the war. Charles XII., from his refuge at Bender on Turkish
soil, tried to stir up his hosts to take his part and declare war
against Russia. Peter himself, flushed with triumph and ever steady
to the policy of enlarging the sea boundary of his country, was by no
means averse to the idea of driving back the Turkish empire from the
Dniester to the Danube. The intense religious spirit of the Russians,
always a potent factor in the policy of Russia in the East, impelled
the Czar to put himself forward as the liberator of the oppressed
Christians of Moldavia and Wallachia. But he was too wary to take the
first step. After much hesitation the Sultan made up his mind. Urged
on by his fear of seeing a Russian fleet in the Black Sea, he declared
war against Peter in 1710, and the next year saw the Czar at the head
of a large army on the Pruth. Fortune however now declared against him.
By sheer bad management Peter contrived to get his army completely
hemmed in between the river, the marshes, and the Turkish army, and
was completely at the mercy of his enemies. Luckily for him the grand
vizier was willing to treat for peace, and Peter was enabled to save
himself and his army from an ignominious surrender, by giving back to
the Turks the port of Azof, and destroying all Russian fortresses on
Turkish territory. Charles XII. was sent back to his own dominions,
which he found threatened from all sides by the Russians, the Danes
and the Poles. For seven years he struggled in vain against superior
forces abroad, and the disaffection of the nobles at home. [Sidenote:
=Pacification of the North, 1720.=] By 1716 he had lost every acre of
German soil. In 1718 a bullet shot by one of his own men terminated his
career as he was besieging the fortress of Friedrickshall in Norway.
The death of Charles XII. put an end to many intrigues, and made the
restoration of a general peace more easy. Sweden had learned the lesson
which her king had refused to learn. By a succession of treaties, which
culminated in the peace of Nystädt between Sweden and Russia in 1720,
Hanover became the possessor of Bremen and Verden; Augustus of Saxony
was recognised as the rightful king of Poland, Prussia obtained part of
Swedish Pomerania, with the islands of Usedom and Rugen, and the towns
of Stettin and Dantzig; Frederick of Denmark was permitted to annex
the duchy of Schleswig, but had to restore the rest of his conquests
and possessions to Sweden, while Russia, the largest gainer of all,
obtained Ingria, Esthonia, Livonia, and part of Carelia, and promised
to surrender Finland.

While Russia was engaged in claiming the supremacy of the north at
the hands of Sweden, Brandenburg-Prussia was pursuing a policy of
steady and quiet growth under her undistinguished ruler. [Sidenote:
=Creation of the kingdom of Prussia, 1700.=] It was the business
of Frederick III. to consolidate what the Great Elector had
won. Under him national prosperity quickly increased in a land which
was no longer the theatre of war. The court became more splendid,
roads and canals more numerous, manufactories more active, while the
foundation of the university of Halle in 1694 marks a distinct advance
in German culture. In foreign affairs he adhered steadily to the policy
of his father, and sent his contingent of sturdy Brandenburgers to the
assistance of the League of Augsburg with praiseworthy regularity. But
the treaty of Ryswick contributed nothing either to his dignity or
his possessions, and Frederick, profoundly dissatisfied, proclaimed
aloud that if the great powers wanted his aid again he should exact
his reward beforehand. In two years’ time the opportunity came, and
Frederick, true to his word, insisted on the title of king, as the
condition of supporting the Emperor in the matter of the partition
treaties in 1700. It was some time before Leopold gave way. The thought
of a kingdom in north Germany within the limits of the Empire itself
was hateful to him, and opposed to the traditions of the Empire. He
would have preferred to diminish, rather than to augment, the dignity
and influence of the House of Hohenzollern. But necessity knows no law.
Leopold wanted the aid of the Brandenburgers in the field, and could
get them on no other terms. To save appearances it was arranged that
Frederick should take his title from Prussia, which lay outside the
German Empire, and accordingly in the year 1700 Frederick III.
elector of Brandenburg, became Frederick I. king of Prussia.
In the following year the Grand Alliance was set on foot, and the
allied powers all recognised the new king in order to gain his help.
Frederick fulfilled his part of the bargain faithfully enough. As long
as the war lasted the Prussians fought steadily and well on the side of
the allies, and the peace of Utrecht set the stamp of an international
treaty to the newly made dignity, besides giving to Prussia the more
substantial endowment of Spanish Guelderland.

[Sidenote: =Northern Europe at the end of the century.=]

The treaties of Utrecht and Nystädt, like those of Carlovitz and
Passarovitz, mark the end of one epoch and the beginning of another.
The history of northern Europe in the seventeenth century is the
history of the effort of Sweden to obtain mastery over the Baltic
and a footing in Germany; of the successful assertion by Brandenburg
of leadership in north Germany; of the birth of Russia as a serious
political power. Those questions, fought over so strenuously during
the seventeenth century, received their final answer in the great
treaties which usher in the next epoch. Sweden, stricken from her place
of vantage, deprived of nearly all her German possessions, relegated
to her own side of the Baltic, is dismissed into the obscurity of
a third-rate power, from which she had been originally raised only
by the quarrels of her antagonists, and the unprecedented personal
ability of her sovereigns. Prussia, acknowledged as an equal by the
monarchies of Europe, stands forth without rival as the unquestioned
leader of the northern Germany, and is biding her time until the hour
shall strike, which will permit her to wrest from the House of Habsburg
the leadership of the German people, and inherit from it the duty of
defending the German Fatherland. In the far north Russia, under its
savage but capable ruler, has made her voice heard among the councils
of Europe. Seated firmly on the eastern shores of the Baltic, she is
bent on making herself into a commercial and maritime power, while in
the far south-east corner of her empire, policy has already pointed the
way along which her destiny must move. After the conquest of Azof in
1696, after the campaign on the Pruth in 1711, Turkey and Russia stand
face to face in south-eastern Europe, and the Eastern Question has
begun.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PARTITION TREATIES AND THE GRAND ALLIANCE

The question of the Spanish succession--The claims of
the candidates--Legal and political difficulties of the
problem--Importance of the interests involved--The Partition Treaty of
1668--Adoption by Louis of a policy of partition in 1698--Suspicions
of William and Heinsius--Objects of Louis, William, and Heinsius--The
first Partition Treaty--Death of the Electoral Prince--The
negotiations continued--The second Partition Treaty--Advantages of
the treaty to France and the maritime powers--Acceptance of the
treaty in Europe--Attitude of the Emperor and Savoy--The struggle
round the deathbed of Charles II.--The will in favour of
France--Acceptance of the will by Louis--Political reasons for
his conduct--His deliberate breach of faith--His policy purely
opportunist--Its momentary success--Aggressive conduct of Louis--The
formation of the Grand Alliance.

[Sidenote: =Question of the Spanish Succession.=]

Ever since the death of Philip IV. of Spain in 1666, Europe
had lived under the shadow of an impending catastrophe. Charles
II. was the last male representative of the Habsburgs of
Spain. Weak in body, and imbecile in mind, he could neither bear the
burden of a great empire himself nor hand it on to a child to bear
it after him. Married first to Louise of Orléans, and on her death
to a German princess, Marie of Neuburg, the blessing of an heir was
denied to him; and all Europe knew well that when he died the great
powers would wrangle over his dominions like a pack of wolves round
the carcase of an ox. The question of the succession to the crown of
Spain was one which required the highest powers of statesmanship for
its solution. It was complicated by the nicest points of European
policy, of international law, and of public and private honour.
Practically there were three claimants whose rights were undeniably
superior to those of any one else, the House of Bourbon, the House of
Habsburg, and the Bavarian house of Wittelbach. In default of heirs to
the reigning king, Charles II., the inheritance, according
to the usual rules of legitimate succession, would go to his sisters,
the only other children of Philip IV.[5] [Sidenote: =Claim
of the Dauphin.=] Of them, the elder, Maria Theresa, had married
Louis XIV. of France, and their eldest son, the Dauphin, was
accordingly the rightful heir of the crown of Spain by descent. But by
a special provision of the treaty of the Pyrenees Maria Theresa, in
consideration of a dower of 500,000 crowns, covenanted to be paid her
by her father Philip IV., had expressly renounced all claims
for herself or her descendants upon the throne of Spain. So, if this
renunciation was valid, the Dauphin, though heir by descent, would be
excluded from the inheritance by international law. But on behalf of
the Dauphin it was argued with some force, that as the dower of 500,000
crowns had never been paid by Philip IV., the renunciation,
which was expressed to have been made in consideration of it, fell to
the ground and was of no effect.

[Sidenote: =Claim of the Electoral Prince.=]

The younger daughter of Philip IV., Margaret Theresa, had
married the Emperor Leopold I.; but the only issue of that
marriage was a daughter, Maria Antonia, who married Max Emanuel, the
elector of Bavaria. They had a son, Joseph Ferdinand, generally known
as the Electoral Prince, who became accordingly the representative of
the rights of Margaret Theresa by descent. But in his way, as in that
of the Dauphin, there was a difficulty of international law. Maria
Antonia had on her marriage with the elector of Bavaria expressly
renounced her claims on the Spanish inheritance, and thus shut out her
son legally from the succession.

If Charles II. had no child, and his two sisters had renounced their
claims, it was clear that there was no descendant of Philip IV. who
could make out a valid title by descent and law. Recourse must be had
to the descendants of Philip III. [Sidenote: =Claim of the Emperor.=]
Here again the question lay between two sisters, for Philip IV. was
the only son. The elder daughter of Philip III. was Anne of Austria,
the wife of Louis XIII. and the mother of Louis XIV. of France, but
she, like her niece Maria Theresa, had expressly renounced her claims
to the crown of Spain upon her marriage. The younger daughter, Maria,
had married the Emperor Ferdinand III., and was therefore the mother
of the Emperor Leopold I., who was the living representative of her
rights. She had made no renunciation whatever, and the Emperor Leopold
accordingly maintained that by the combined effect of descent and law
he and he alone was the rightful inheritor of the Spanish monarchy. But
Leopold was much too sensible to dream for a moment that Europe would
permit the resuscitation of the empire of Charles V., just as Louis
XIV. was too sensible to dream of uniting the crowns of France and
Spain upon the same head, and he passed on his rights to his second son
the archduke Charles, just as Louis and the Dauphin passed on theirs to
the second son of the Dauphin, Philip duke of Anjou.

[Sidenote: =Legal difficulties of the question.=]

A more difficult problem has rarely presented itself to statesmen.
The simplest solution no doubt was to be found in the purely legal
view of the matter taken by the Emperor Leopold. The renunciations
had been legally made, and they must be considered legally valid,
otherwise there was no sure basis of procedure at all. But whatever
force might be attributed to an argument of this sort with reference
to the renunciations of Anne of Austria and Maria Theresa, it was
very difficult to admit its validity in the case of Maria Antonia,
and permit a father to profit by a renunciation, which he himself had
imposed upon his own daughter in her extreme youth and in contemplation
of marriage. Yet how could any one maintain the invalidity of the
renunciation of Maria Antonia on account of parental influence, and
the validity of that of Maria Theresa, when it was an admitted fact
that the consideration for the latter, _i.e._ the dowry, had
never been paid? But then, if the renunciations were to be considered
invalid, there was no question as to the right of the Dauphin to the
whole succession, and Europe would find itself face to face with a
danger far greater than the resuscitation of the empire of Charles
V.

[Sidenote: =Political difficulties.=]

Below the purely legal aspect of the matter there was felt to be a
momentous European question. Spain had been permitted to retain her
vast and splendid dominions, because she was daily becoming weaker and
more effete. The longdrawn agony of the Spanish monarchy exactly suited
the plans of European statesmen, as long as Europe was in a state of
transition. When the chief powers were fighting among themselves for
the Low Countries and the Rhine, for the lower Danube and the Baltic,
it was highly convenient that problems so grave should not be further
complicated by questions of South American trade, and access to the
Mediterranean. All Europe was content to leave the monopolies of Spain
alone, because Spain was unable to utilise them. But towards the end of
the century this feeling was passing away, and the prizes which Spain
continued to hold but did not know how to use, were being eagerly and
avariciously eyed from two quite different quarters. The ‘maritime
nations,’ as they were called in the language of diplomacy, England and
Holland, since the revolution of 1688, had succeeded in establishing
on the firm basis of a close mutual alliance the superiority of their
commerce to that of France. Already they shared between them the trade
of the Baltic, of North America, and of the East. But from two quarters
of the world they were shut out. The policy of Spain excluded them from
a share in the trade with the Spanish Indies, and especially from the
lucrative commerce in negroes, which was becoming of greater importance
every day in those islands and districts of central America where white
labour was an impossibility. The want of a harbour and naval station
in the Mediterranean placed their commerce with the Levant at the
mercy of pirates, and dependent on the goodwill of the southern powers.
At the same time the policy of the House of Habsburg, since the peace
of Westphalia, had been tending more and more in the direction of
trying to secure a hold upon north Italy. While national interest and
the course of events had been pushing the Austrian power further and
further down the Danube at the expense of the Turks, the dynastic and
personal policy of the Emperors had been rather directed to the gain of
compensation upon the Po for what they had lost upon the Rhine.

[Sidenote: =Importance of the European interests involved.=]

It was clear then that the question of the succession to the crown of
Spain could not be decided merely according to the legal claims of the
various candidates. The vast empire of Spain could not be disposed
of merely on principles which decide the devolution of a private
inheritance. Behind all personal claims, behind all legal rights,
behind even all national policy, loomed the greater principles of the
balance of power and the freedom of commerce. If the interests and the
rights of France could not permit the union of the Spanish inheritance
with the power of Austria, if the interests and the rights of the House
of Habsburg could no less permit the annexation of the empire of Spain
by the power of France, neither Germany nor England nor the United
Provinces could in the interests of Europe permit either the one or
the other. But if Europe was going to claim her right to be heard, if
claims of descent and of legal rights were to be subordinated to the
general good of the European family of civilised nations, the maritime
nations would assuredly demand their share in the commerce of the
Spanish Indies as the United Provinces would insist upon their barrier
against the aggression of France, and Austria the security of its hold
upon Italy.

With his usual diplomatic foresight Louis XIV. had grasped
the situation as long ago as the period of the war of Devolution. At
that time Charles II. was young and as yet unmarried. It was
quite possible that in spite of the weakness of his health he might
have children born to him before he died. [Sidenote: =The Partition
Treaty of 1668.=] Nevertheless his death might occur at any moment,
and Louis with his keen eye to the future determined to be ready for
all emergencies. He at once recognised the improbability of being able
to annex for himself or his house the whole of the Spanish dominions,
and accordingly decided to try and obtain by negotiation with the only
other serious candidate then in the field--the Emperor Leopold--that
part of the inheritance which was of most value to France. His policy
was completely successful, and on the 19th of January 1668 he concluded
with the Emperor a secret treaty for the partition of the Spanish
dominions, after the death of Charles II. without heirs, by
which the Emperor was to have Spain and the Indies and the Milanese,
and France the Netherlands, Franche Comté, Navarre, Naples, Sicily and
Catalonia. In the thirty years which elapsed between the partition
treaty of 1668 and the peace of Ryswick much had happened. [Sidenote:
=Changes in Europe since 1668.=] Louis had already annexed Franche
Comté, and become master of so much of the Spanish Netherlands as to
give France a safe and defensible frontier. The Netherlands were no
longer of the same value to France as they were in 1668, while their
acquisition was much more difficult. Since 1668 the United Provinces,
through their successful resistance to Louis in the Dutch war of 1672
and in the war of the League of Augsburg, and through their close
alliance with England since 1688, were far more formidable antagonists.
Louis knew well that they would fight to the death rather than permit
him to break down the barrier of the Spanish power in the Netherlands,
which alone kept the Scheldt closed and Amsterdam safe. At the same
time the maritime powers, as we have seen, had ambitions of their own
in the direction of the Spanish and Mediterranean trade, which would
prevent them from acquiescing without a struggle in the rule of France
at Naples, or her ascendency in Spanish waters.

[Sidenote: =Adoption by Louis of a policy of Partition.=]

The problem therefore had increased in difficulty since 1668. New
interests had to be consulted if diplomacy was to try her hand at a
settlement. A long and sanguinary war, which could not fail to embrace
all Europe in its terrible folds, was absolutely certain if things were
left to take their chance. Who could tell what the results of such a
war might be? Both Louis and William had reached an age when statesmen
do not willingly set fire to the house on the chance of carrying
off some valuables in the confusion. It was madness to think that
France could gain more even by a successful war than she had gained
by diplomacy in the treaty of 1668. So when the treaty of Ryswick was
signed and Europe was once more at peace, Louis sent his friend the
Comte de Tallard to London, on a special mission, to submit to William
III. a project for the partition of the Spanish monarchy when
the moribund king had breathed his last.

[Sidenote: =Mistrust of William III. and Heinsius.=]

Tallard found William III. discouraging, and his friend and
confidant the duke of Portland almost hostile. They were naturally
suspicious of gifts which came from so pronounced an enemy as Louis
XIV. They were astonished at the boldness, not to say the
rashness, of the proposal to parcel out the dominions of Charles
II. in his lifetime. But the more William thought over the
idea the more feasible it seemed. Heinsius, the grand pensionary of
Holland, was by no means opposed to it on principle, though he doubted
whether the interested parties could ever come to an agreement on the
details. William found the people of England so distrustful of him, so
suspicious of his designs, so hostile to his advisers, so determined
to deprive him of his army, and fetter him by poverty, that he did
not dare to reckon on their support should he call upon them again to
follow him in a crusade against France. In March 1698 he authorised
Portland, who was at Versailles, to invite Louis to lay his proposals
for a treaty before him. In so doing he not only expressed his
willingness to enter into negotiations with a view to the partition
of the Spanish dominions, but also his determination not to consider
himself bound any longer by the clause in the League of Augsburg
negotiated in 1688, by which he had pledged himself to recognise and
enforce the claims of the Emperor upon the whole inheritance.

[Sidenote: =Progress of the negotiations.=]

In April 1698 the negotiations for a partition treaty between France,
England and the United Provinces were fairly launched. When once begun
they proceeded briskly enough. Did they seem to be flagging, the news
of a relapse in the health of Charles II. would set them again
feverishly at work. Yet the business owing to its delicate character
and many ramifications took a long time to finish. It was not till the
September of that year, after five months of incessant negotiations,
that Louis could feel sure that his efforts would be crowned with
success. During that time the despatches show Louis to have constantly
been the active agent in the discussions. William and Heinsius played
mainly a passive part. It was theirs to criticise, to accept or to
reject what Louis proposed. But as the negotiations continued it is
pleasant to see how the desire for peace and agreement grew stronger
and stronger, how confidence succeeded to suspicion, and frankness
of mind to mistrust. Never did Louis show his great mastery over the
foreign politics of Europe in clearer light than in these negotiations.
Throughout, his is the master mind. Tallard but played the part of his
eyes and ears and mouth in England. William, though quick and clever at
seeing the drift of a suggestion, fixed his eyes too closely upon the
national interests of the maritime nations to take so broad a view of
the whole as that which illuminated the mind of Louis.

At first Louis overrated this tendency of William’s diplomacy. He
thought that if he was ready to give ample security for the safety
of the United Provinces behind their barrier of the Netherlands, and
for the security of English trade in the Mediterranean, he could
procure Spain and the Indies for his grandson. [Sidenote: =Objects
of Louis’s diplomacy.=] But he quickly found out his mistake, and
he fell back upon two principles of action which determined his policy
in the whole question from first to last as long as the negotiations
lasted. The first was to guard against the revival of the power of
the Austro-Spanish House through the succession question. The second
was to neutralise the increase of the influence of the Habsburgs, by
making the frontiers of France strong, not merely for defence but
for offence. In pursuit of the first principle he opposed himself
vigorously to the recognition of the archduke Charles as king of Spain,
and when through the force of circumstances he was obliged to give way
on that point, he did so only on condition that the connection between
Spain and Austria through north Italy was cut by the granting of the
Milanese to an independent prince, and rendered liable to annihilation
by France through her acquisition of the Tuscan ports and Finale. Louis
was not going to see the chain of the Austro-Spanish power, which it
had cost Henry IV. and Richelieu so much to break, once more
woven round her by the arts of diplomacy and the accidents of life.
In pursuit of the second principle he took care, that if his grandson
could not rule at Madrid, his own armies might have a way easily open
to their advance thither by his acquisition of Guipuscoa; while he made
his eastern frontier secure by the annexation of Lorraine, and strove
hard to make it dangerous by his claim upon Luxemburg.

[Sidenote: =Objects of William and Heinsius.=]

These two principles regulated the diplomacy of France throughout the
negotiations for both the partition treaties. Neither of them were
necessarily antagonistic to the chief interests of England and the
United Provinces. To England the all-important matter was to detach
Louis from the support of the House of Stuart, and so to secure
the maintenance of the principles of the Revolution. To the United
Provinces the possession of a secure barrier against French aggression
and the opening of the Scheldt was an essential condition of national
existence. To both the maritime powers the duty of preventing France
from obtaining the monopoly of trade in Spanish American waters seemed
of paramount importance, while the opportunity of obtaining a share in
the trade for themselves was one which it was worth running some risk
to secure. Both sides were therefore in their heart of hearts more
anxious to guard against dangers than to obtain positive increase of
power. They were more eager to prevent their enemies from gaining a
preponderance than to secure preponderance for themselves. Here lay the
secret both of the success and of the dilatoriness of the negotiations.
William and Heinsius were easily convinced of the desirableness of a
treaty for settling the succession of Spain before Charles II.
died. They were attracted by the evident good faith and conciliatory
attitude of Louis. They soon found that they had no cause to fear
for the security of the barrier of the United Provinces or of the
succession in England. The real difficulty lay in providing for the
Dauphin such an inheritance as would secure France against the revival
of the power of the Austro-Spanish House, and yet would not threaten
the trade interests of the maritime powers in the Mediterranean and
the Spanish American waters. But that was after all a matter of detail
which was certain to be settled, although it might take a long time
to settle it. The great object of Louis was to prevent an Austrian
succession. The great object of William and Heinsius was to prevent a
French succession. Directly both sides were convinced of their mutual
interest and each others’ good faith the success of the treaty was
assured.

[Sidenote: =The first Partition Treaty, 1698.=]

Fortunately in the Electoral Prince of Bavaria there was a candidate
whose advancement to the throne of Spain would satisfy all the
conditions required. Neither French nor Austrian by birth and only five
years of age, he could be dangerous to neither party either through his
territorial influence or personal abilities, while he was likely to
be more popular than either of the other candidates in Spain itself,
because owing to his tender years he could be educated as a Spaniard.
In July 1698 it was agreed that Spain, the Indies, and the Netherlands
should go to the Electoral Prince. More than two months were spent
in the discussion of the inheritance of the Dauphin. Eventually, on
the 10th of October 1698, the first partition treaty was signed. It
provided that the Electoral Prince of Bavaria was to receive Spain,
the Indies, and the Netherlands. The archduke Charles was to have the
Milanese and Luxemburg, and the Dauphin Naples, Sicily,[6] the Tuscan
ports, Finale, Guipuscoa, S. Sebastian, and Fuentarabia. On the news
of the treaty oozing out at Madrid, Charles II., though very
angry, determined to make the best of the position, executed a will
in favour of the Electoral Prince, giving him the whole inheritance,
and sent for him to Spain in order that he might be educated there in
accordance with the traditions of the Spanish court.

[Sidenote: =Likelihood of its success.=]

All seemed now settled. It was true that the Emperor was not likely
tamely to acquiesce in the rebuff which had been dealt to his claims,
and that the pride of the Spaniards would urge them to fight to the
last rather than submit to the enforced partition of their splendid
empire. It was probable that the inhabitants of Naples and Sicily would
not readily see their long connection with the crown of Spain rudely
severed at the dictates of the northern powers. France would have to
conquer her inheritance with the sword. But there was little reason
to fear that Spain, under the government of a regency, with a foreign
boy king at her head, in her exhausted and bankrupt condition, could
seriously resist the armies of France and the navies of the maritime
powers. And what substantial assistance could the Emperor render with
the Bavarians opposed to him on the Danube and the French masters of
the sea? Louis knew the sluggish, calculating mind of Leopold too
well not to be persuaded that he would soon accept the inevitable,
and set himself diligently to profit by the opportunities which the
possession of the Milanese gave him in Italy. Venice lay open to him
an easy prey. Ascendency in north Italy and the harbour of Venice was
more practically useful to the land-locked and poverty-stricken House
of Austria than a shadowy and precarious empire beyond the seas. The
contracting powers might have to enforce the treaty by war, but the
struggle would not be general and could not be prolonged.

[Sidenote: =Death of the Electoral Prince, 1699.=]

Suddenly this fair prospect was marred by an unexpected and tragic
blow. On the 6th of February 1699 the Electoral Prince died of
smallpox, and the labours of five weary months were dissipated like a
bubble in the air. Without a moment’s hesitation, without wasting a
minute in unavailing regrets, the indefatigable Louis took up again
the web of diplomacy which had for the moment dropped from his hands,
and instructed Tallard to negotiate for a new treaty. The matter was
much more complicated than heretofore, the details much more difficult
to arrange. There was no third candidate now equally suitable to both
parties. The duke of Savoy, who was suggested by Tallard, was as
objectionable to William and Heinsius as the elector of Bavaria, who
was suggested by William, was to Louis. [Sidenote: =The negotiations
renewed.=] It soon became clear that the archduke Charles was the
only candidate for the crown of Spain and the Indies whom England and
the United Provinces would accept. They even refused to listen to the
suggestion that the Dauphin ought to have part of the share of the
deceased prince. Why should the Dauphin profit, said William, by the
death of the Electoral Prince? Louis saw that he must yield if the
treaty was to be made. He fell back upon the principles of national
consolidation and frontier development, and bent all his energies to
obtain for France such a position as would enable her to neutralise the
increased power of the Austro-Spanish House.

[Sidenote: =The second Partition Treaty, 1699.=]

He urged strongly that if the Netherlands must go to the archduke,
France at least ought to receive compensation in Luxemburg, and that if
the Austrian House was to be permitted to add Spain to its dominions
he at least might recover the kingdom of Navarre. It was all to no
purpose. William and Heinsius refused absolutely to allow Louis to
turn the barrier of the Netherlands by the annexation of Luxemburg,
or to give his armies a shorter road to Madrid than had been already
opened to them by the first treaty. Again Louis saw that he must yield,
and in May 1699 the second Partition Treaty was agreed to between
Louis, William, and Heinsius. By this treaty Spain, the Indies, and
the Netherlands fell to the archduke Charles, the Dauphin received
the Milanese, in addition to the share allotted to him by the first
treaty, but on condition that he should exchange it for Lorraine with
the duke of that country, and annex Lorraine finally to the crown of
France. It was further provided by secret articles that the archduke
Charles should not be permitted to visit Spain until the Emperor had
accepted the Partition Treaty, and that if the Emperor did not accept
the treaty before a given date, and the king of Spain before his death,
the archduke should forfeit his rights under the treaty, and his share
should be given to such prince as the contracting parties might choose.

[Sidenote: =Value of the treaty to France.=]

This treaty was on the face of it more unfavourable to France than
the preceding one, and it may well be a matter of surprise at first
sight that Louis was prepared to make such great sacrifices in order
to obtain it. To seat the archduke Charles on the throne of Spain,
while his brother Joseph ruled at Vienna, was a strange termination to
the policy of one whose life had been spent in determined antagonism
to the House of Habsburg. Yet on consideration it will be seen that
the objections to the treaty from the French point of view were more
apparent than real. Spain was in such a disorganised condition that it
was impossible for her to count among the powers of the world. Her
resources were great, but they neither were nor could be developed
without capital. Of capital available for such a purpose neither
Austria nor Spain had the worth of a dollar. The revenues barely paid
for the expenses of the court in either country. Even ambassadors had
not enough for the expenses of their household. Important as Spain
would soon become if annexed to energetic and prosperous France, she
could not but remain a nonentity when joined to sluggish and bankrupt
Austria. But that was not all. France was relieved of all serious
rivalry on the side of Spain for many years by the disorganisation
of the Spanish and imperial finances. She was placed in a position
of absolute superiority to Spain by her acquisitions in Italy. The
possession of Naples and Sicily made her mistress of the Mediterranean.
No communications could pass, no troops could be sent from Austria to
Spain, without running the blockade of the French fleet in the Gulf
of Lyons. No army could ever reach a port of embarkation without the
consent of the duke of Lorraine or the republic of Venice. The gift of
the Milanese to the duke of Lorraine completed the policy of Richelieu
in 1625. It closed the Valtelline to the armies of the Austro-Spanish
power. Were the duke to forget his associations with France, or
remember them only too well, and side with her enemy, French troops
from the ports of Tuscany and Finale could reach Milan before a German
lance flashed in the Valtelline, and French ships could blockade the
harbours of Genoa and Savoy at the first note of danger. Even during
the war of the Spanish Succession, when English ships rode triumphantly
in the Gulf of Lyons, when the imperial armies held Milan, and Genoa
was friendly, it was found by no means easy to victual or reinforce
the archduke’s troops from Germany. It would have been an absolute
impossibility had France been undisputed mistress of the sea.

The enormous advantage gained by Louis XIV. by a simple alliance with
the maritime powers, even if it only neutralised their opposition
instead of securing their support, has hardly been sufficiently
appreciated by historians. [Sidenote: =Advantages of an alliance
with the maritime powers.=] The Austro-Spanish power was left by the
Partition Treaties huge in bulk but impotent through division. It
consisted of four great masses, all dependent upon one another, but
unable to communicate with each other, except with the permission of
foreign powers. The gold of the Indies was necessary for the payment
of the very officials of the Madrid court and government, yet how
could Spain pretend to guard her treasure-ships from the united fleets
of England and France? The Netherlands depended for their governors
and their armies upon Spain. What chance of escaping capture would a
Spanish fleet of reinforcements have as it beat up the narrow channel
in sight of the coasts of Kent and Picardy? Austria and Spain could
not assist one another without first obtaining the mastery in the
Mediterranean, and the Netherlands could only communicate with Vienna
by permission of the princes of Germany. Had the Partition Treaty been
carried out France would have become at a stroke, without bloodshed,
incontestably the dominant power in Europe, liable only to be deposed
from her pride of place by the rupture of the alliance with the
maritime powers, and for that very reason the maritime powers would
have held the fate of the world in their hands.

[Sidenote: =Reception of the treaty by the contracting powers.=]

Louis XIV. thoroughly grasped the situation. He fully understood the
immense importance of securing the friendship of the maritime powers,
the absolute necessity of avoiding their hostility. It was for this
reason that he laboured so long and patiently for the success of the
policy of partition, that he repressed so strenuously the eager desire
of Harcourt, his ambassador at Madrid, to intrigue for the whole
inheritance, that he made concession after concession rather than
break off the negotiations for a treaty. William and Heinsius were
less far-sighted and more suspicious, yet they too were not unaware
of the greatness of the position in Europe which an alliance with
France would give them. But the people of England and the republican
party in the United Provinces were too narrow in mind and bigoted in
spirit to recognise anything of the sort. Absurdly fearful for their
trade interests, and venomously hostile to the person of William III.,
they opposed the Partition Treaty blindly because he had made it, and
because France had allied with him to make it. There was hardly a
man in England outside the little foreign cabal of the court who was
in favour of it. Even Somers, the staunchest of Whigs and a devoted
adherent of William, when after much doubt he consented to permit it
to be sealed with the great seal, only ventured to say that it would
doubtless become popular in England if it brought with it a large share
of the Spanish-American trade. Fortunately for William England was
powerless to stop it, for all foreign negotiations were then wholly
under the control of the king, but the Amsterdam traders fought hard
and long to prevent its acceptance by the States-General. They insulted
Louis by demanding that it should be registered by the Parlement de
Paris, and he was actually forced to consent that it should be placed
among the archives of that body. It was not till April 1700 that the
treaty was at last signed by the three contracting parties and the
ratifications exchanged.

[Sidenote: =Its reception by Europe.=]

The agreement of the maritime powers and France with reference to
the disposition of the Spanish dominions after the death of Charles
II. was a great step towards the maintenance of the peace
of Europe, but it did not guarantee it. It was necessary to procure
the assent of the chief powers of Europe to the treaty before it was
certain that it could be enforced without bloodshed. Here Louis and
William found much less opposition than they had any reason to expect.
The duke of Lorraine raised no difficulties as to the exchange of his
duchy for the Milanese, the Pope and the republic of Venice agreed to
the treaty in June. Their adhesion was most important, for Venice held
the gates of the passes through the Alps to Austria, and the Pope
could block the way to the march of armies to and from Naples. Besides,
the opinion of the head of the Catholic world might not unreasonably do
much to induce the Spanish court to accept the treaty. Less difficulty
still was experienced in Germany. Prussia, now just become a kingdom,
signed the treaty in order to gain recognition of her new dignity,
the rest of the German princes signed as a protest against the recent
creation of the electorate of Hanover.

[Sidenote: =Opposition of Savoy.=]

By the autumn the adhesion of the king of Portugal left the king of
Spain, the Emperor, and the duke of Savoy the only important powers
of Europe which had not accepted the treaty. Victor Amadeus of Savoy
was playing the part traditional in his house. He knew that among
the projects present to the mind of Louis was that of exchanging the
kingdoms of Naples and Sicily for Savoy and Piedmont. Should war
eventually break out between France and Austria his alliance would be
of the utmost value to Louis, in enabling him to support the operations
of his fleet by the occupation of Milan. Should the Emperor wish to
convey his son secretly to Spain he would find the numerous ports of
Savoy the most available for his purpose. Convinced of his importance
he determined to bide his time and sell himself to the highest bidder.
Before long he found that he had miscalculated his chances and lost his
market. [Sidenote: =Opposition of the Emperor.=] The Emperor could
not bring himself to renounce one jot or tittle of the inheritance
which he claimed as his due. Though he received under the treaty far
more than he was likely to win by war, though the treaty might easily
be described as a diplomatic victory over his rival France, though he
had willingly concluded a partition treaty thirty-two years before,
which was less favourable than the present, though he knew not where to
turn for a florin or look for an ally, nevertheless with the patient
stubbornness characteristic of his race, he set himself to obstruct
the treaty by delay and defeat it by intrigue. Though he never gave a
definite refusal he never really for one moment intended to give an
acceptance. His hopes were bent upon obtaining a will in favour of the
archduke from Charles II. by means of the influence of the
queen, Marie of Neuburg, the sister of the Empress.

[Sidenote: =Events at Madrid.=]

For the moment the interest of the struggle veered to the bedside of
the dying king. As the autumn sped on there could no longer be any
doubt that the end of that troubled life was at hand. All remedies had
been tried but had proved unavailing. The angel of death would not
surrender his victim to the revolting mixtures of quack doctors, or the
superstitious delusions of monkish exorcists. One duty remained to be
performed by Charles ere he quitted the world in which he had lived so
wearily. He had to choose, as far as the power of choice was left to
him, the successor to his throne. If he chose wrongly he might plunge
all Europe into a desolating war and bring his country to absolute
ruin. The choice was by no means an easy one nor did his advisers
make it easier for him. The Spanish people and Charles himself were
united on the great principle of doing all that they could to maintain
the integrity of the empire, but they differed as to the means to be
adopted to achieve this end. Angry as Charles was at the news of the
first Partition Treaty, he accepted it so far as to make a will in
favour of the Electoral Prince, and he sent for the young prince in
order to educate him in Spain as his heir. The act was popular, for
both he and his people believed, no doubt rightly, that the Electoral
Prince had a better chance than any other candidate of uniting the
whole of the Spanish dominions under himself. But on the death of the
prince it became very difficult to decide between the representatives
of the Dauphin and of the Emperor. If the Emperor was the weaker, he
was the nearer by the traditional ties of policy and of race. But was
not France the only power in Europe strong enough to seize and keep
the whole inheritance from the hand of the spoiler? It was a hard
choice for a moribund king to have to make in his last days of extreme
physical and mental weakness.

[Sidenote: =Palace intrigues and revolution.=]

Gradually it became clearer to those who watched by the bedside that
personal influence could alone decide his wavering will. Within the
palace the queen was paramount, and she, after some little vacillation,
had decided to support the archduke strenuously. Outside the palace
the feeling was all in favour of France. It grew in intensity as the
conviction spread that the Emperor by himself could never defeat
a partition treaty. It was fanned by the news that the Pope had
pronounced that a decision in favour of France would not be contrary
to the interests of the Church. Even the report of the signature
of the Partition Treaty did not stem the advancing tide, for with
a willing self-deception the Spaniards ascribed it entirely to the
hated Dutchman. The national party determined on a palace revolution.
The cardinal Porto Carrero, archbishop of Toledo, accompanied by a
few religious established himself in the sick-room, and refused to
allow the queen or any of the adherents of the archduke to enter.
[Sidenote: =Signature of a will in favour of France, 1700.=] He
represented to Charles that a will in favour of France was the only
way to avoid civil war and a partition of the monarchy. The king freed
from the ascendency of his wife gave a tardy assent. On the 7th of
October 1700 he signed the will. ‘It is God alone,’ he said as the
pen dropped from his nerveless hands, ‘who gives kingdoms, for to
Him alone they belong.’ The next day a speedy messenger hurried from
Blécourt, Harcourt’s successor, to Paris to acquaint Louis with what
had happened. Three weeks afterwards, on the 1st of November, the poor
king’s troubles were over, and the last of the line of Arragon was
gathered to his fathers. When the will was opened it was found that the
whole inheritance of the crown of Spain was given to Philip duke of
Anjou, the second son of the Dauphin, and in the event of his death to
his younger brother the duc de Berri. If Philip refused to accept the
inheritance, the right to it was to pass wholly to the archduke Charles.

[Sidenote: =The problem before Louis.=]

For fifteen days all Europe hung breathless in suspense. What would
Louis do? The unexpected, if not the unhoped for, had happened.
Harcourt, the able and showy ambassador of France at Madrid, had always
maintained that in the end a will in favour of France could certainly
be obtained, and Louis, without ever forbidding them, had always
quietly put his suggestions aside, and pushed on with all his skill
the policy of a partition. And now Harcourt had proved to be right and
Louis wrong. The whole of the prize was open to his grasp did he choose
to stretch forth his hand and take it. Louis was sorely perplexed. For
perhaps the first time in his life he did not see his way clear. His
advisers were divided, some of them greatly in doubt. Tallard urged him
strongly to keep faith with Europe and maintain the Partition Treaty.
Torcy was of the same opinion at first. Beauvilliers was more emphatic
even than Tallard. For the moment their advice prevailed, and it was
decided to send an envoy to Heinsius to assure him of the good faith
of France. But the message was never sent. The wishes of Madame de
Maintenon, the earnest remonstrances of the Dauphin, who refused to see
his son disinherited without a struggle, reasserted themselves. The
feeling of the French court was strongly in favour of a bold policy.
Torcy altered his mind as he reflected more carefully upon the state
of Europe. The Dauphin insisted with renewed energy on the rights of
his son. At last the decision could be put off no longer. The Spanish
ambassador reached Paris with the text of the will and required an
answer. If it was unfavourable, he was to go straight to Vienna.
[Sidenote: =Acceptance of the will.=] On the 16th of November a
council was called at Versailles to pronounce a final decision. The
courtiers assembled in the great gallery of the palace in unprecedented
numbers, for even the most frivolous among them could not but feel the
unique gravity of the crisis. The minutes and the hours sped on, the
excitement grew more vivid, the strain more intense. At last the great
folding doors were thrown open, and as every one bowed low to the
ground Louis was seen leaning affectionately on the shoulder of his
grandson. Advancing to the edge of the daïs with that kingly dignity
which was to him a second nature, he said in clear and deliberate
accents, which penetrated to the furthest corners of the vast hall,
_Messieurs, voici le roi d’Espagne!_

[Sidenote: =Political reasons for its acceptance.=]

The die was cast. What is to be said of the gamester who staked--and
lost--his all on the throw? If moral considerations may for the moment
be put on one side, honesty and good faith laid on the shelf, no one
can doubt that Louis was right. The interests of his country and the
interests of his family demanded at that particular juncture of affairs
the acceptance of the will. The difficulties attending the enforcement
of the Partition Treaty, in spite of the favour with which the powers
of Europe had received it were enormous. To impose the archduke Charles
upon Spain by French bayonets, while all Spain and half France was
loudly demanding the duke of Anjou was an impossibility. To permit the
archduke to establish himself in Spain by means of Austrian troops,
before he and his father had accepted the treaty, was too dangerous to
be thought of. To act upon the secret article, declare the rights of
the archduke forfeited, and give Spain and the Indies to some third
person, was to commit a greater outrage than ever upon the pride of
Spain and the claims of the Emperor, and to ensure the outbreak of
war. The determination of the Emperor to resist a treaty which gave
him the lion’s share of the spoil made it impossible to enforce it
in its entirety when Charles II. was dead. The contracting
powers might, it is true, have executed it as far as was possible. They
might have effected the conquest of Naples and Sicily for the Dauphin,
and handed over the Milanese to the duke of Lorraine. They might have
administered Spain and the Netherlands until a decision was eventually
arrived at. But to do these things they would have incurred as large
an expenditure of both men and money as would have been entailed by
open war, and they would not have avoided open war with the Emperor.
To execute the treaty in its entirety was impossible, to execute it
partially was costly and dangerous.

[Sidenote: =Remoteness of the dangers of war.=]

To accept the will, on the contrary, presented difficulties
comparatively slight. Such a course guaranteed the loyal support of
Spain. It did not necessarily involve the active hostility of the
Emperor. There was no reason to think that Prussia or the princes of
Germany would attach sufficient importance to the principle of the
balance of power in Europe, as to incur on its behalf the risks and
responsibilities of war. Danger only threatened from the maritime
powers, but however deeply William and Heinsius might feel, however
bitterly they might resent, his conduct, Louis well knew that they
were powerless to act. In both countries the Partition Treaty was more
unpopular than the will in favour of France. The English people fully
realised that, as long as they kept out of continental complications,
their liberties were safe, their control over their king secure. If
once they allowed him to involve their interests with those of the
Dutch, they thereby put into his hands military and naval power which
he could use to make himself independent of Parliament. All the Tories
and many of the Whigs were resolute against allowing a standing army
on principle, or conniving at it in fact. They cared far more about
keeping their own king weak, than they did about preventing Louis
from becoming strong. As William bitterly admitted in his letters to
Heinsius: ‘I am troubled to the very bottom of my soul to find now that
the business has become public, that nearly everybody congratulates
himself that France has preferred the will to the treaty, insisting
that it is much better for England and for the whole of Europe....
People here are perfectly unconcerned, and turn their thoughts but
little to the great change which is happening in the affairs of the
world. It seems as if it was a punishment of heaven that this nation
should be so little alive to that which passes outside of its own
island, although it ought to have the same interests and the same
anxieties as the continental nations.’

[Sidenote: =Indifference of England and Holland.=]

William did not conceal from himself the fact that to induce England
to declare war against Louis XIV., because of his repudiation of the
Partition Treaty and his acceptance of the will of Charles II., was
wholly out of the question. He had to content himself with urging the
Emperor not to recognise the duke of Anjou, and with endeavouring to
gain time. Heinsius was in a similar plight. The republican party
were overjoyed at the failure of the Partition Treaty. The citizens
of Amsterdam, in their delight at the defeat of the House of Orange,
would not hear of any possible dangers to their trade or their barrier.
It was doubtful if the States-General could be induced to declare
war in alliance with England, it was certain they would not do so by
themselves. As far as purely political dangers were concerned Louis
might accept the will in perfect security. Not a protest was made,
not a murmur was openly heard. Louis thought he might go a step
further. [Sidenote: =Their recognition of Philip V.=] In February
1701 he occupied the frontier towns of the Netherlands, took captive
the Dutch garrisons which they contained, and restored the towns to
the government of the elector of Bavaria, Max Emanuel, who had been
appointed by the Spanish government to that charge. To regain their
troops the Dutch recognised the duke of Anjou as king of Spain. William
held out longer, but at last he was obliged to submit to the pressure
of his ministers. In April 1701 England too recognised Philip V.,
and Louis had for the moment the satisfaction of seeing that he had
calculated the chances rightly, and had placed his grandson on the
throne of Spain without striking a blow, or involving France in war.
Philip himself was received at Madrid with the liveliest expressions of
joy and enthusiasm. The grandiloquent boast had come true, _Il n’y a
plus de Pyrénées_.

But at what cost had this result been achieved? Never since Richelieu
had first launched France on her career of territorial aggrandisement,
never since sovereigns had consciously or unconsciously adopted the
principles of Macchiavelli in their dealings with one another, had any
act so deliberately dishonourable been done as the repudiation of the
Partition Treaty by Louis XIV. [Sidenote: =Louis guilty of a deliberate
breach of faith.=] Honesty, public faith, private honour, were words
of no meaning in international relations, if kings might make treaties
one day and break them the next, because it happened to be to their
advantage to do so. Push the principle but a little further, and
European nations would be once more in a state of pure savagery, for
civilisation and progress depend upon contract, and what contract is
possible among nations when public faith is dead? If might is right,
treaties and bargains are not merely useless but hypocritical. If
ever there was a case in which a sovereign ought to have stuck to the
bargain which he had made, it was that of Louis XIV. in relation to the
Partition Treaty. The treaty was essentially his own handiwork. It was
he who had first suggested it. For two years he had urged it, worked
for it, made sacrifices for it. At his instance it had been published
to the world and accepted by Europe. He was identified with it far more
than were William and Heinsius. For him to repudiate his own offspring,
because his calculations proved wrong, was to deal a blow at the public
morality of Europe from which it took years to recover. His conduct was
as plainly unjustifiable in morals as it was advantageous in politics.
And no one knew this better than Louis himself. The arguments which
he instructed Tallard to advance to William on his behalf, and all
the arguments which his apologists have addressed to the world since
in his justification, are arguments against the making of a partition
treaty, not in favour of its repudiation. They may prove that Louis was
foolish to make a treaty, they do not prove that he was right to tear
it up directly it was made. They are arguments which Louis had himself
discounted when he began the negotiations, and had himself answered,
as far as they admitted of an answer, in his earlier instructions to
Tallard. It is true that he could not actually have been certain that
the Emperor would refuse to accept the treaty, and undoubtedly the fact
of his refusal very seriously diminished the chances of the ultimate
success of the policy of partition, but it was a contingency highly to
be expected, and had as a matter of fact been most carefully provided
for in the treaty itself.

[Sidenote: =Not guilty of a deeply laid plan of deception.=]

But among English historians there has been a tendency to make Louis
out more culpable than he really was. The whole negotiations for a
Partition Treaty have been depicted as an elaborate deception intended
to hoodwink the eyes of the maritime powers until the intrigue in
Spain should be successful and the will in favour of the duke of
Anjou procured. Harcourt at Madrid is described as carrying out
the real policy of Louis, while Tallard at London is purposely his
dupe, in order that he may with the greater honesty make William and
Heinsius his dupes too. The drama is one in which unexampled villainy
is everywhere triumphant, dull virtue oppressed and deceived, and
retribution lamely limps along full thirteen years behind. Such a
theory is opposed both to the facts of history and the limitations of
human nature. To keep up a deception planned on such a gigantic scale
for two years and a half, without accomplice, or confidant, in the face
and to the disadvantage of the ablest intellects of Europe, most of
whom were penetrated by suspicion and eager for revenge, is beyond the
powers of human villainy and opposed to all that we know of Louis’s
character. Louis had often played the hypocrite and broken faith
before, but he had done it pompously in the face of Europe with a show
of bravado. He had claimed the Netherlands by the law of devolution,
and parts of Alsace by virtue of the decisions of the Chambres des
Réunions, by sheer audacity not by cunning. He had often been a bully,
there is nothing in his long reign, except perhaps his conduct to
Fouquet, which could justify the faintest suspicion that he was an
accomplished dissembler before whom even Louis XI. must bow
the knee. For what does the theory involve? It involves the belief
that for two years and a half he was deceiving not merely William and
Heinsius, the Emperor, and the king of Spain, but his own most trusted
emissaries and friends. He was deceiving Torcy his foreign minister,
Tallard his ambassador in London, and Harcourt his ambassador at
Madrid. He was to the last assuring the very man, through whose efforts
alone he could obtain the whole succession, that he had determined
on a different policy; and he was doing this, not in public letters
which might see the light, but in his own secret correspondence,
which was often sent by special messenger and never went through the
foreign office at all. Further he must have carried out this wholesale
deception with an elaboration at which the mind sinks back appalled.
He wrote hundreds of letters in great detail, held a large number
of conferences with his council as a whole, and with individuals by
themselves, made numerous speeches to ambassadors, held many and long
interviews with Lord Jersey and other envoys, and yet never once
in the whole period said or did anything to suggest the slightest
suspicion of his good faith! And more than that. He overacted his part
terribly. If his real object was to amuse the maritime powers, while
his intrigue in Spain was maturing, his obvious course was so to manage
the negotiations for the Partition Treaty, as to give as little trouble
as possible to himself without exciting the suspicions of William. But
on the contrary his private correspondence with Tallard shows that he
continually gave himself infinite and unnecessary trouble. His mind
was fixed upon the possibilities of the negotiations. He sets out his
views at great length on every turn of the diplomatic game. It is he
who is continually urging haste, especially when the news of the king
of Spain’s health gets more unsatisfactory, the very time when, if he
was not in earnest, he might have rested upon his oars without danger.
He continued the policy of partition, after he knew that in consequence
of it Charles II. had made a will in favour of the Electoral
Prince, and that France had become very unpopular in Spain. He even
permitted Harcourt to leave Madrid months before Porto Carrero effected
his palace revolution, and when all probabilities pointed to a will in
favour of the archduke made at the dictation of the queen. Such conduct
would have been sheer folly had Louis not been actuated by honest
motives.

[Sidenote: =Consistent policy of Louis.=]

In the face of these facts can any one doubt that the negotiations
for the Partition Treaties were conducted by Louis in good faith? The
principles on which he acted, if not strictly honourable, were far
less dishonourable than it has been the fashion to assert. This policy
stands out clear in his private letters to Harcourt and to Tallard.
It is consistent throughout and intelligible. He never swerved from
the opinion that Europe would not permit him to acquire the whole
inheritance for his family. He never thought it probable that Charles
II. could be induced to make a will in favour of France.
Under these circumstances, his obvious policy was to prevent Austria
from gaining the whole inheritance, or so much of it as would threaten
the ascendency of France in Europe. The best, if not the only way
of securing this without involving Europe in war, was by means of
the old device of a partition treaty. But it was always possible, if
not probable, that the negotiations for a partition would fail, and
Louis accordingly left Harcourt free to act as he thought best in his
interests until the Partition Treaty was an accomplished fact. Directly
the treaty had been concluded, Harcourt was recalled, and placed at
the head of the army on the frontier. He was no longer wanted to push
the interests of France at the court of Charles II. The time
for diplomacy was over, that for action had come, and his services
were required to prevent the archduke from coming into Spain in
contravention of the treaty. But the unexpected happened. Louis found
himself the possessor of the whole inheritance, at a moment when his
knowledge of Europe told him that it was more than probable that he
could successfuly seize the prize without bloodshed. The temptation
was too great, and after a sincere hesitation of some weeks, he turned
his back on the policy of the last three years and deliberately broke
faith with his allies.

[Sidenote: =Difficulties in the way of Louis.=]

Whatever may have been the motives, the policy of Louis XIV.
seemed crowned with success by the spring of 1701. His grandson sat
secure upon the throne of Spain, amid the enthusiasm of his people,
without a single declared enemy, though it was known that the Emperor
was arming. The expulsion of the Dutch from the frontier fortresses
placed the Netherlands at the disposal of France. The recognition of
Philip V. by the maritime powers seemed to guarantee the peace
of Europe in spite of the preparations of the Emperor. None knew better
than Louis that the storm was not averted, because for the moment there
reigned an ominous calm. It required the most careful and wary tread to
avoid the pitfalls open on all sides of him. With or without allies the
Emperor would probably declare war. William and Heinsius were working
hard to urge the English and the Dutch to action. ‘The only game to
play with this nation,’ wrote the king to his confidant, ‘is to engage
them in war without their knowing it.’ The princes of Germany were
certain to join an alliance against France, were it once set on foot,
provided that they received plenty of money and incurred but little
risk. Prussia was too nearly interested in the lower Rhineland to stand
aloof. Never was it more necessary for Louis to display that spirit of
conciliation of which he at times was apt to boast. All his address,
all his self-restraint was needed successfully to smooth difficulties,
to allay suspicion, to calm prejudice. If one strong power besides the
Emperor determined to draw the sword, the fiery cross would run riot
over Europe in a moment. Already there had been indications that Tory
England and republican Holland had fixed limits to their indifference.
Instructions were given to William by the Parliament of 1701 to take
such measures as might be needful for the protection of the Dutch.
A point might be reached at which distrust of Louis XIV.
would get the better of distrust of William III. If the king
of France wanted to keep the advantages which he had gained, without
running the risks of war, it was essential that he should not excite
the suspicions of the English and Dutch.

With a strange infatuation Louis adopted exactly the opposite policy.
He formally declared that the rights of the duke of Anjou to the
French crown were in no way impaired by the fact of his succession to
the throne Of Spain, and early in 1701 he expelled the Dutch troops
from the fortresses garrisoned by them in the Spanish Netherlands,
and replaced them by French soldiers. [Sidenote: =His aggressive
conduct.=] He refused to entertain any proposals whatever for
granting compensation to the Emperor out of the dominions of Spain,
or security to the Dutch by giving them a fortress barrier. He issued
commercial decrees which pointed plainly to the exclusion of English
and Dutch ships from the Spanish-American trade, and completed the tale
of arrogance and blindness by a deliberate and unpardonable violation
of the treaty of Ryswick. On the death of the exiled James II.
of England in September 1701, Louis recognised his son James, the
Chevalier de St. George, as the rightful king of England. The blunder
soon brought its own punishment. Louis had succeeded in doing what
William with all his craft could never have done. He had inspired all
Englishmen, both Whigs and Tories, with an enthusiastic determination
to fight. [Sidenote: =Formation of the Grand Alliance, 1701.=]
Flouted in her national pride, threatened in her commercial interests,
directly attacked in her liberties and independence, England joined
willingly with the Dutch and the Emperor to bring the haughty tyrant
of Europe to his knees. In the winter of 1701–2 the Grand Alliance was
concluded between England, the Emperor, the Dutch, the king of Prussia,
and the grand duke of Hesse, with the object of destroying the tyranny
of Louis XIV. and breaking up the Franco-Spanish monarchy by
giving Italy to the Emperor, and the Indies to the maritime powers.

[Sidenote: =Death of William III., 1702.=]

The conclusion of the Grand Alliance was the last act permitted to
William in the lifelong struggle which he had carried on with the
French king. In March 1702 he died, but his spirit still continued
to animate the nation. His successor Anne, Tory though she was by
conviction, threw herself heartily into his policy under the influence
of her friend and favourite the duchess of Marlborough. In May 1702
war was declared and Louis found himself once more face to face with
indignant Europe.

CHAPTER XV

THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION
AND THE DEATH OF LOUIS XIV.

The campaign of Prince Eugene in Italy--Appointment of Marlborough
to the command in the Netherlands--His character and abilities--He
establishes himself upon the Rhine--Advance of the French upon
Vienna--Savoy joins the Grand Alliance--Critical position of
the Emperor--The campaign and battle of Blenheim--The English
gain the command of the Mediterranean--Death of the Emperor
Leopold--The campaign and battle of Ramillies--Expedition of the
Archduke Charles to Spain--The battle of Almanza--The campaign and
battle of Oudenarde--Siege and capture of Lille--Negotiations for
peace--Appeal of Louis to his people--The campaign and battle of
Malplaquet--Dismissal of Marlborough--Victories of the Spaniards
over the Allies--The negotiations at Gertruydenberg--The peace of
Utrecht--Its policy and justification--The end of the seventeenth
century--The death of Louis XIV.

[Illustration:

MAP
TO ILLUSTRATE
THE CAMPAIGNS IN
NORTH ITALY,
1701–1706.]

[Sidenote: =Campaign of prince Eugene in Italy, 1701.=]

The war broke out in Italy. By a treaty concluded with the duke of
Savoy in the spring of 1701 the road to north Italy was opened to the
soldiers of France, and Catinat at the head of 40,000 men occupied the
Milanese. Pushing forward his advanced guard to the frontiers of the
territories of Venice at the Lago di Garda, he prepared to fall upon
the Austrian army as it debouched into the plain from the passes of
the mountains. To an invader who comes from Austria or the east, the
plain of north Italy presents serious military difficulties. His path
to the south is blocked by the strong and deep stream of the Po, which,
with its surrounding marshes, treacherous banks, and swift currents,
forms an almost impassable obstacle in the face of an active enemy;
especially as the most important points of its course are defended by
the fortresses of Alessandria, Piacenza, and Mantua. From the Alps on
the north descend into the Po a series of rivers, similar in character
though less in volume, each of which forms, both from the nature of its
stream, and the cities which command it, a strategical position very
easy to defend and exceedingly difficult to attack directly. From the
Lago Maggiore runs the stream of the Ticino joining the Po a little
below Pavia. From the Valtelline through the Lago di Como the Adda
pours its waters into the Po at Cremona, passing a little to the east
of Milan. To the east of the Adda, from the mountains of Bergamo, flows
the stream of the Oglio, receiving on its way to its home in the Po the
waters of a tributary which protects the important city of Brescia.
Further to the east, from the southern end of the Lago di Garda, close
to the fortress of Peschiera, the Mincio makes its way directly into
the Po below Mantua. A few miles further, from the wide valley leading
to the Brenner pass, descends the great stream of the Adige, which,
running through the dominions of Venice, passing the fortresses of
Verona, Legnago and Carpi, makes its own way into the sea north of
the Po amid impassable marshes. Invaders of the Milanese from Germany
and Austria must therefore either force the positions of these rivers
one by one in the face of the enemy, or turn them by thrusting their
way through the mountains on the north. Catinat had made up his mind
that the Austrians would attempt the latter feat, and was carefully
watching the mountain valleys north of the Lago di Garda, when prince
Eugene suddenly appeared behind him at Brescia. Quickly descending the
valley of the Adige he had not scrupled to violate Venetian territory.
Marching behind Verona he crossed the Adige at Carpi, then turning
north-west crossed the Mincio above Mantua without opposition, and
appeared between Peschiera and Brescia, in the rear of the French,
before Catinat knew that he had left the obscurity of the mountains.
The French had only just time to beat a hasty retreat to the Oglio and
cover Milan.

[Sidenote: =Defeat and capture of Villeroy, 1702.=]

Louis was highly indignant at this ominous beginning to the war,
and sent his friend and courtier Villeroy to supersede Catinat. The
change was not to his advantage. Villeroy was a good dancer but an
indifferent general. Having an army far outnumbering that of prince
Eugene, he crossed the Oglio and attacked him on the 1st of September
1701 at Chiari, but was repulsed. Acquiescing in his failure he took up
a position on the Oglio defending Milan, and placed his headquarters
at Cremona for the winter, where he amused himself in all security.
Prince Eugene saw his opportunity. From Mantua, which he was besieging,
he advanced in February 1702, surprised Cremona under cover of night,
captured the French general and his staff, and obliged his army to
retire behind the Adda. The results of this bold stroke were quickly
seen. The dukes of Modena and Guastalla joined the imperialists, the
duke of Savoy began to trim, and to look out for an opportunity of
changing sides. But reinforcements soon came to the French. The duke of
Vendôme and Philip V. left Naples and appeared on the flank
of prince Eugene in Lombardy in August 1702. Greatly outnumbered, the
Austrians had to fall back to a defensive position behind the Adige,
where the French did not dare to attack them.

[Sidenote: =Marlborough appointed to the command in the Netherlands.=]

Meanwhile the war had become general. In May 1702 Marlborough, who
had been appointed to the chief command of the English forces by
Anne, and had been elected captain-general of the Dutch forces by the
states-general, took command of the allied army in the Netherlands.
He had under him about 10,000 English troops, about 20,000 Dutch
troops, and about as many mercenaries, chiefly Germans, in the pay
of England and the United Provinces. It is interesting to notice
how small the body of purely British soldiers was who fought in the
armies of Marlborough. They were never as numerous as the mercenaries,
though they increased in numbers regularly as the war went on. At the
commencement of hostilities, owing no doubt to the great jealousy of a
standing army evinced by all Englishmen, and to the national distrust
of William III., there were very few English soldiers fit to
take the field against the veterans of France.

[Sidenote: =His military qualities.=]

What England lost through want of training among her soldiers was more
than made up to her by the eminent capacity of her general. Marlborough
had learned his first lessons of war in the school of Turenne, he
had shown his talents for command in his successful management of an
expedition to the south of Ireland in 1689, but no one could have
anticipated from his past, when he was appointed to the supreme
command in 1702, the singular combination of qualities which made him
incomparably the first man in Europe. Full of resource, gifted with
a notable mastery over men, and thoroughly trained in the science of
war, he is one of the few generals who have had the power of conceiving
and executing combined movements on a large scale. His provident
eye could take in the whole of Europe as a theatre of operations,
and direct the movements of four or five armies to a common end. As
a strategist, he was too seldom permitted freedom of action for his
originality and resourcefulness fully to display themselves. In this he
must be compared, not with Frederick the Great or Napoleon or Moltke,
but with Wellington or Turenne, and he need not fear the result.
Even when driven by the timidity and unreasonableness of the Dutch,
or by political danger at home into the commonplace, his campaigns
show a grasp of the proportion of things, which is only found in the
highest order of intellects. He fixes with lightning rapidity upon the
important thing to be done, and sees at once how best to do it with
the resources at his command. He never fritters away his strength, he
never wastes life,[7] or runs risks unnecessarily, or for mere effect.
He strikes directly at the key of the position, his combinations are
all aimed at the central point of the enemies’ power. In this capacity
to appreciate exactly the ratio of his strength and resources to those
of the enemy, he strongly resembles his great successor Wellington.
Like him he never lost a battle, unlike him he never failed in a
campaign. The same characteristics are observable in the battle-field.
He had an extraordinarily quick eye for the weak point in an enemy’s
position, and saw at once how best to utilise the opportunities which
the ground afforded for attaining his object. At Blenheim and at
Ramillies, it was his skilful use of difficult ground that mainly
contributed to the victory. And when his real attack was developed, he
showed something of Napoleon’s power of combining the whole strength
of his army upon the end to be achieved. At Blenheim he forced his way
through the centre of his adversaries’ position, and reduced the enemy
from a disciplined army into disorganised masses at a stroke, much as
Napoleon did afterwards by Soult’s famous attack at Austerlitz. But
apart from his military genius, he was no less conspicuous for his
powers of diplomacy, and his singular management of men. [Sidenote:
=His character.=] Of unwearied patience, imperturbable temper,
and immovable resolution he rarely failed to gain his end in the long
run. The Grand Alliance of 1701–2, and the negotiations with Charles
XII. of Sweden at Altranstadt in 1708, are undeniable proofs
of his diplomatic ability. His close friendship with prince Eugene
and Godolphin, and his tender love for his imperious and fretful
wife, attest the warmth of his affections, and the amiableness of his
disposition. The wonderful self-command with which he saw his best
plans ruined, his reputation endangered, his motives suspected, his
very successes decried, by the stupidity of the half envious and half
timid Dutch, and the malignancy of English party spirit, is no mean
tribute to the steadfastness of his patriotism. If France had not the
resources of the allies upon which to draw, neither had she their
divisions and quarrels with which to contend.

[Illustration:

MAP
TO ILLUSTRATE THE
DUTCH WAR OF 1672,
AND THE WAR OF THE
SPANISH SUCCESSION
IN THE NETHERLANDS.

_The advance of Condé & Turenne
open Amsterdam 1672_ -=-=

_Typo. Etching Co. Sc._]

[Sidenote: =Dangerous isolation of Austria, 1702.=]

When Marlborough took command of the allied armies in the Netherlands
in 1702, it was clear to him, that the danger to the cause of the
allies generally lay in the isolation of Austria. Cut off from the
sea, she could not be directly assisted by the English and Dutch
fleets. Accessible from Italy through the passes of Tirol, she might
easily be taken in flank should she receive a repulse in that quarter.
On the side of the Rhine the danger was not only threatening, but
imminent. Bavaria was about to make common cause with Louis, and a
united French and Bavarian force might be at the gates of Vienna long
before tardy succours could force their way there from north Germany
or the Netherlands. It was therefore all-important to Marlborough to
gain command of the lower Rhine valley, so as to be able to open
up communications with the imperial troops on the upper Rhine or
upper Danube if necessary. But in the way of this policy there were
considerable difficulties. The Netherlands formed one vast intrenched
camp in the hands of the French. Behind the curtain of their fortresses
they could make their preparations in secret for a sudden advance upon
Amsterdam, or recruit their armies after a repulse. Boufflers at the
head of the French forces occupied a line which stretched from Antwerp
on the Scheldt, through Venlo on the Meuse, to Kaiserwerth on the
Rhine, thus blocking the three river valleys. If driven from that by a
front attack, he had but to retire on the line of the Demer, between
Antwerp and Liége, or a little further back to the line of the Mehaigne
from Antwerp through Louvain and Tirlemont to Namur, or further back
still to the line of the frontier, and take refuge under the great
fortresses of Lille, Tournai, Mons, Charleroi and Namur. To force these
positions one after another, and capture the fortresses which defended
them, in the face of a watchful and valiant enemy, was a task of much
difficulty, and must take many years. [Sidenote: =Marlborough gains
a footing on the Rhine, 1702.=] To try and turn the fortresses
by advancing on France by the valleys of the Rhine and the Moselle
was sure to be bitterly opposed by the Dutch, whose timidity already
pictured the French at the gates of Amsterdam. Marlborough had
therefore to act very cautiously. He took advantage of Boufflers’s too
extended position, and directed an attack as if to turn his left in
Brabant. Boufflers fell into the trap, moved his troops in all haste
to defend his left, and so gave his right flank over into the enemies’
hands. Marlborough easily turned his right flank between the Meuse and
the Rhine, drove him back on the line of the Mehaigne, and established
himself strongly on the valleys of the Meuse and the Rhine, capturing
Venlo, Ruremonde, and Liége.

[Sidenote: =His indecisive campaign of 1703.=]

The next year he prepared to push his success further. Instructing the
Dutch to advance on the right wing into Flanders, capture Antwerp,
and seize the line of the Scheldt, he with the left wing pushed down
the Rhine, overran the electorate of Köln, and in May 1703 made
himself master of Bonn. He was now secure of his communications with
north Germany, and was preparing to organise a German army to operate
upon the Moselle, and keep up communications between himself and the
Emperor, when he was recalled to the Netherlands in hot haste to
assist the Dutch. Tired of waiting for the siege train and transport
necessary to form the siege of Antwerp, the Dutch had begun to send
out detachments into Flanders for pure plundering purposes. One of
these under Opdam was suddenly attacked by Boufflers, and completely
destroyed in June 1703. Whereupon the Dutch, in the extremity of
terror, absolutely refused to undertake the siege of Antwerp at all.
On Marlborough’s arrival Boufflers withdrew behind the lines of the
Mehaigne, which he had carefully fortified by ramparts and towers.
Marlborough, sure of his ability to force the lines, made preparations
for the attack, but the Dutch declined to co-operate, and the English
general, baffled and dispirited, was obliged to content himself with
the capture of a few inferior fortresses.

[Sidenote: =Advance of the French upon Vienna, 1703.=]

Meanwhile on the upper Rhine things were going badly for the allies.
Louis had always intended to make his main attack in this quarter. His
plan included a simultaneous advance upon Vienna by the Danube and by
Italy, with the help of the duke of Savoy and the elector of Bavaria,
while Boufflers in the Netherlands merely kept the English and the
Dutch army occupied and entangled amid fortresses and fortifications.
The success of prince Eugene in Italy, and his own want of preparation
delayed for some time the commencement of this movement, but by the
beginning of the year 1703 all was ready. Vendôme was facing prince
Eugene upon the Adige ready to attack. The elector of Bavaria had
definitely declared himself on the French side and captured Ulm.
Accordingly in February 1703 Villars crossed the Rhine at Strasburg,
took Kehl by storm, forced the passes of the Black Forest, and joined
the elector on the Danube; while Tallard at the head of another army
on the Rhine supported his movements, and protected his communications
with France. Prince Louis of Baden, and count Stirum, who commanded the
allied forces, unable to make head against the enemy, withdrew into
the lines of Stolhofen, a little below Kehl, which they had carefully
fortified in order to form a base of operations for the imperial armies
on the upper Rhine, and there kept Tallard at bay. The Emperor was in
terrible straits. The Hungarians had risen under Ragotsky, and were
preparing to attack Vienna from the east. Vendôme was pushing prince
Eugene slowly before him over the Brenner pass to Innsbruck. The only
other Austrian force was cooped up behind Stolhofen. There was not a
man between the elector and Vienna, and Villars strongly urged Max
Emanuel to march at once with all his forces on Vienna, and end the war
at a blow, while he posted himself on the Danube at Donauwörth, and
defended Bavaria from a flank attack.

[Sidenote: =Savoy joins the Grand Alliance, 1703.=]

Unfortunately for himself and his ally the elector had not the required
energy. The opportunity passed never to return. Max Emanuel determined
to crush prince Eugene first. In June he was at Kufstein on his way to
Innsbruck, while Vendôme had penetrated up the pass as far as Trent.
The army of Eugene was entangled in the mountains between them. He
owed his preservation to fortune, not to skill. Just at this moment
Victor Amadeus of Savoy, after hesitating some months, made up his mind
that the winning side would be that of the allies. He joined the Grand
Alliance, and Vendôme had to hasten back to Piedmont to preserve his
communications. The elector hearing of the retreat of Vendôme, dared
not face Eugene by himself in such a country, and began to retire.
The Tirolese at once rose on behalf of their much-loved master, and
Max Emanuel had to fight his way back to Bavaria as best he could. He
found Villars defending himself with difficulty against prince Louis of
Baden and Stirum. On the arrival of the elector before Augsburg, prince
Louis left Stirum and marched to Augsburg, hoping to raise the siege,
but Villars was too quick for him. Falling upon Stirum he defeated
him completely at Höchstadt on the 20th of September, and drove him
back on Nuremberg. Prince Louis had at once to retire to the lines of
Stolhofen, and Augsburg fell into the hands of the elector.

[Sidenote: =Dangerous position of the Emperor, 1704.=]

For the moment the Emperor was safe. The year was too far advanced to
permit of a combined movement upon Vienna. But it was clear to all
parties that the attempt would be made in the next campaign. It seemed
equally certain that if made it must succeed, unless Marlborough and
the army of the Netherlands could come to the rescue. Louis made great
preparations for the effort. Villars, whose arrogance was displeasing
to the elector, was recalled and sent to the Cevennes, where the
remnants of the Huguenots had risen under the name of the Camisards.
His place was taken by Marsin, and his army strongly reinforced. The
plan of campaign was simple. Marsin and the elector were to march
straight upon Vienna down the Danube, while Ragotsky attacked the city
from the side of Hungary. Tallard, at the head of 35,000 men, was
posted in Alsace to support the movement, preserve the communications,
and defend the army from any flank attack. Villeroy, with 30,000 men,
was sent to the Netherlands to keep Marlborough at bay and prevent him
from coming to the rescue. Against this overwhelming force Austria
could only oppose the armies of prince Louis of Baden, and prince
Eugene. If the Emperor was to be saved, it must be by Marlborough,
and how could Marlborough leave the Netherlands without throwing open
the United Provinces to invasion? Was it likely that the Dutch would
endanger their own safety for the sake of the Emperor? Even if they
did, was it possible to escape the combined attack of the armies of
Tallard and Marsin and the elector when the Danube was reached?

[Sidenote: =Plan of Marlborough.=]

These were the questions to which Marlborough was preparing to give
an answer in the summer of 1704. He had conceived the brilliant plan
of moving the whole of his army, except the Dutch, from the field of
operations in the Netherlands to a totally new base upon the upper
Danube, and of crushing Marsin and the elector before Tallard could
come to their help from the Rhine, or Villeroy overtake him from the
Meuse. It was a scheme which was certain to fail except in the hands of
a consummate general, for it involved not merely a victory over equal
and possibly superior forces, but a long and extremely hazardous flank
march over difficult country, and a race against time. And that was not
all, for before he could even undertake it, he had to deceive the Dutch
and lull Villeroy into a false security. If the Dutch once suspected
that he was going to move his army away from the protection of their
frontier, they would impose an energetic and decided veto. If Villeroy
once divined that Marlborough was engaged in making a long march up
the Rhine, he could ruin the whole plan in a moment by a well-directed
flank attack. To surmount these difficulties, Marlborough, keeping
his real plan an absolute secret, let it be generally known that he
intended to try and turn the lines and fortresses of the Netherlands,
by advancing into France by way of the Moselle, and he publicly asked
for, and obtained, the permission of the Dutch to that scheme. This
enabled him to summon the Brandenburg contingent to the Rhine at
Mainz, and to move his own headquarters to Coblentz without incurring
suspicion, and to leave Overkirk with the Dutch army and the Dutch
deputies at Maestricht on his extreme right, to guard the line of the
Meuse should Villeroy advance on Amsterdam during his absence. The plan
succeeded admirably. Villeroy, completely deceived, took up a strong
position on the upper Moselle near Trier to resist the advance of the
allies, and waited in vain for the first signs of the invading army.
[Sidenote: =His flank march to the Danube.=] The Dutch left behind
at Maestricht could not interfere with Marlborough’s plans. All was
ready.[8] In June 1704 he threw off the mask, advanced up the Rhine by
forced marches to Mainz, then, picking up the Brandenburg contingent
as he went, he left the Rhine and directed his army straight upon the
upper Danube at Donauwörth. At Heilbronn he was joined by a German
force, and near Ulm by prince Eugene and prince Louis of Baden. It was
agreed that Eugene should return to Stolhofen to prevent Tallard, and
possibly Villeroy if he appeared upon the scene, from coming to the
assistance of the elector and Marsin before the allies could attack
them. Marlborough himself and prince Louis of Baden marched straight
against the elector, who had entrenched himself on the Schellenberg
near Donauwörth, carried the lines by assault on the 2d of July and
drove the elector back on Augsburg, thus thrusting themselves in
between the French and Vienna and completely protecting the latter city.

[Sidenote: =Difficulties of Marlborough.=]

So far the campaign had been brilliantly successful, but the most
difficult part was yet to come. Villeroy on discovering the trick
played upon him by Marlborough marched across Alsace and joined Tallard
before Stolhofen with 30,000 men. This enabled Tallard to leave prince
Eugene to the care of Villeroy, and to march to the assistance of
Marsin and the elector, whom he joined at Augsburg early in August.
Counting the army of Villeroy, the French and Bavarians far outnumbered
the allies. Marlborough himself was a long distance from his true
base of operations. He had no fortress or entrenched camps where he
could collect stores, establish his hospitals, or recruit his army.
It was essential to his safety to be able to strike hard and quick.
Fortunately for him the French played into his hands. Marsin and
Tallard were anxious to have the sole credit of crushing this impudent
Englishman. They would not wait for Villeroy. They would not hear of
Fabian tactics. They determined to destroy him at a blow, and marched
down the Danube to meet him. Prince Eugene, who had abandoned Stolhofen
in pursuit of Tallard, effected his junction with Marlborough near
Donauwörth on the 11th of August, and on the 13th the two armies found
themselves facing each other on the field of Blenheim.

[Sidenote: =The battle of Blenheim.=]

The French generals had taken up a defensive position at right angles
to the Danube, just behind the little stream of the Nebel. Tallard at
the head of the right wing occupied in force the village of Blenheim,
the left wing under Marsin and the elector the village of Lutzingen.
The centre was considered sufficiently protected from serious attack
by the stream of the Nebel and its adjacent marshes, and was weakly
held, chiefly by cavalry. The plan of battle which they had adopted,
clearly was to permit the allies to dash themselves in vain against
the strong positions of Blenheim and Lutzingen, and when they were
exhausted finally to overwhelm them by an advance from the two wings.
Marlborough on reconnoitring the ground saw at once that the weakness
of their position lay in the centre, and that the marshes were not so
impassable as they seemed. Accordingly he instructed prince Eugene to
direct a strong attack upon Marsin and the elector at Lutzingen, and
Cutts to do the same upon Tallard at Blenheim. Under cover of these
assaults he made his real attack on the centre. With some difficulty he
succeeded in crossing the marshes, then, thrusting himself in between
the two wings of the enemy he completely drove the Maison du Roi off
the ground and cut the French line in two. Then turning to the left
he hemmed Tallard in at Blenheim between his army and the Danube, and
forced him to surrender with all his infantry. Marsin and the elector
finding their centre and right wing annihilated fled as best they could
through the Black Forest to Villeroy on the Rhine pursued by the fiery
Eugene. Never was defeat more complete As the sun set on the field of
Blenheim the glory of Louis XIV. departed.

[Sidenote: =Its results.=]

No one can wonder at the outburst of joy which thrilled through England
and Europe at the news of the battle of Blenheim. It was felt to be
decisive of the main issues of the war. France had other armies in
the field and could raise new troops, but she could never replace the
loss of her veterans. She could not again tyrannise over Europe. She
might win victories, she might defend her frontiers, she might emerge
honourably from the contest, but she could no more hope to dictate
terms to Europe after Blenheim, than she could a century later after
the retreat from Moscow. But Blenheim had not only put a bridle in the
mouth of Louis XIV., it had not only destroyed his veteran
army, it had not only saved the Emperor from absolute ruin, it had
unexpectedly brought to light a new and most important factor among
the decisive forces of Europe. The English sailor had been recognised
as a formidable power since the days of the Armada, but the English
soldier had not had an opportunity of proving his real worth since the
fight of Agincourt. Blenheim was as important an event in the history
of civilised warfare as Rocroy, not because it gave the death-blow to
an antiquated system of tactics, but because it was the birthplace of
a new military power of the first class. From Blenheim to Waterloo the
English soldier stands out as the best fighting material in Europe, and
England takes her place among the first military nations of the world.

[Sidenote: =The English gain the mastery in the Mediterranean,
1702–1704.=]

While France was losing her military prestige and superiority at
Blenheim she received a humiliating reminder of her inferiority at
sea. In 1702 a combined fleet of English and Dutch ships was sent
under the command of Sir George Rooke to the coast of Spain, which by
a stroke of good luck fell in with the Spanish plate fleet and the
French ships which were protecting it in the harbour of Vigo, and
after a spirited action completely destroyed them both. Two years
afterwards, in the summer of 1704, Rooke captured the impregnable
rock of Gibraltar, and defeated the French fleet which attempted its
recovery. This gave England an important position in the Mediterranean,
the value of which made itself gradually recognised as the century
wore on, and established the superiority of the allies at sea, the
effect of which soon resulted in the loss of Italy to the French power.
Directly north Italy fell into the hands of the imperialists, as it did
after the brilliant campaign of prince Eugene in Italy in 1706, there
was no means of keeping up communications between Naples and France.
Consequently after the victory of prince Eugene at Turin in 1706 had
finally driven the French back behind their own frontier, a revolution
broke out at Naples which ended in the total loss of Italy to the
French cause.

After the battle of Blenheim the French armies were obliged to act upon
the defensive, and the interest of the war turned once more to the
Netherlands. In 1705 Marlborough took up in earnest the plan with which
he had deceived Villeroy and the Dutch the year before. [Sidenote:
=Death of the Emperor Leopold, 1705.=] He arranged with Prince
Louis of Baden (for Eugene had returned to his command in Italy), a
combined attack upon France by the Moselle and the Saar, in order to
turn the defensive fortresses of the Netherlands. But time slipped
away, and the allies had not completed their preparations, when in May
1705 the Emperor Leopold died, and the imperial troops were summoned
home. All hope of a combined movement had to be abandoned. At the
same time Villeroy, who commanded upon the Meuse, moved forward and
threatened Liége. [Sidenote: =Marlborough forces the lines of the
Mehaigne, 1705.=] Marlborough at once left the Moselle and marched
to relieve Liége, and Villeroy retired into the fortified lines of
the Mehaigne between Antwerp and Namur, just as Boufflers had done in
1703. But by this time the Dutch had learned to have somewhat more
confidence in Marlborough’s skill, and he was permitted to attack.
Making a feint at the two extremities of the lines he easily forced
them in the centre at Tirlemont, and drove Villeroy back on Louvain and
Brussels, thus cutting him off from Namur and his direct communications
with France. The marshal took up a position behind the Dyle, which
the Dutch thought too strong to be safely attacked in front, and
Marlborough moved to the west to turn it and threaten Brussels. To
save Brussels the French retired on the city, and stood at bay near
the forest of Soignes, on ground which in a little more than a hundred
years was to become celebrated for all time as the English position
at Waterloo. Marlborough in pursuit took up the ground afterwards
occupied by Napoleon and prepared to attack. But Dutch timidity stepped
in to prevent this most interesting rehearsal of the last tragedy of
the Napoleonic war with the parts reversed. Marlborough was forced to
retire when the prey was in his grasp. Deeply chagrined he contemplated
leaving the struggle in the Netherlands to the Dutch, and combining
his forces with those of the gallant Eugene in Italy, but this was not
permitted. He could not be spared as long as Villeroy was unhurt on the
Dyle, and Villars held his own upon the Rhine. [Sidenote: =Campaign
of 1706.=] So in the spring of 1706 he again took command of the
army of Flanders and prepared to bring Villeroy to book. That incapable
and boastful general was equally anxious to cross swords with the hero
of Blenheim. Refusing to wait for the arrival of a reinforcement of
15,000 men under Marsin, who were on their way, he left the line of the
Dyle in the spring, and marched towards Namur. On his way Marlborough
met him at Ramillies on 23d of May.

[Sidenote: =Battle of Ramillies.=]

Villeroy had chosen his ground with some skill. His right occupied
the village of Tavières, which stood on a slight eminence above the
Mehaigne, and was protected by that stream. His centre rested upon
the village of Ramillies, which, with the mound called the tumulus
of Ottomond behind it, formed the key of the position. His left was
defended by the marshes in which the stream of the little Gheet rises.
The bulk of his troops were massed at Tavières and Ramillies, and
his left being so well defended by the nature of the ground was very
weakly held. The quick eye of Marlborough soon detected this defect.
He saw too that owing to the nature of the ground within his own
position he could move troops from his own right to his centre without
being observed by the enemy. On these two facts he based his plan of
battle. Early in the morning of the 23d of May he directed a strong
and imposing attack against the French left. Villeroy thinking that he
was going to force his way over the marshes of the little Gheet, as
he had forced his way over the marshes of the Nebel, began to hurry
up troops from his centre in hot haste to defend his threatened left.
Directly Marlborough saw this movement, he marched the bulk of his
troops from his right to his centre under cover of the ground, so that
the operation could not be seen by the enemy, merely leaving enough men
before the French left to keep Villeroy persuaded that the main attack
was still being made in that quarter. When all was prepared he suddenly
launched the bulk of his army upon the weakened French centre between
Tavières and Ramillies. Tavières was carried by the impetuous rush
but the battle was not yet won. The Maison du Roi, mindful of their
old fame, and burning to avenge the disgrace of Blenheim, checked the
advance of the allies upon Ramillies by repeated and heroic charges.
The French infantry hurried back to their old posts from the left, and
round the village of Ramillies the battle swayed backwards and forwards
for some time. At last the French fell slowly back, the village was
won, and the centre of the French position forced. Villeroy gave the
signal for a retreat which quickly changed into a rout. His army was
destroyed as a fighting force. In rapid succession the chief towns of
the Netherlands opened their gates to the victorious allies, and the
French were driven back to the line of the frontier fortresses.

[Sidenote: =Expedition of the Archduke Charles to Spain.=]

The battle of Turin and the battle of Ramillies had reduced France to
the line of her frontiers, but in the next year a gleam of success
visited the arms of her indefatigable master. Marlborough was too
much occupied with the negotiations at Altranstädt and hampered by the
badness of the weather to attempt anything of importance, while on
the Rhine Villars succeeded in capturing the lines of Stolhofen and
preventing the imperialists from moving. But the best news came from
Spain. In the year 1703 through the exertions of Methuen, the English
ambassador at Lisbon, a treaty had been negotiated between England and
Portugal, which had the effect of making Portugal the devoted political
adherent of England for more than a century, and of introducing
English statesmen to the too seductive influences of port wine. By the
accession of Portugal to the Grand Alliance an opening was made for the
archduke Charles to make good his claims to his kingdom. In 1704 he
landed at Lisbon with a force of 12,000 English and Dutch troops under
Schomberg with the object of invading Spain. The expedition met with
little success and Galway replaced Schomberg in 1705. In the same year
the English ministry sent the earl of Peterborough at the head of 5000
men to the assistance of the duke of Savoy, but gave him permission to
employ himself in Spain if he found an opportunity. Peterborough, who
was a man of brilliant imagination and boastful temperament, induced
the archduke to trust himself to his guidance. Sailing round the coast
of Spain he landed in Catalonia, captured Barcelona, chiefly through
the efforts of prince George of Darmstadt in October 1705, and quickly
made himself master of Arragon.

[Sidenote: =His power limited to Catalonia.=]

In the following year Galway determined to support the success achieved
in Arragon by marching upon Madrid from Portugal. The French armies
were engaged in a fruitless siege of Barcelona, and Galway occupied
Madrid and proclaimed the archduke Charles as king almost without
opposition. But now the political wisdom of the determination of Louis
not to force a foreign king upon the Spaniards against their will
showed itself. A national opposition to Charles quickly grew up in
1706, just as it did a century later to Joseph Buonaparte. Wherever the
English soldiers were quartered, all was submission. Directly their
backs were turned all was opposition. To make things worse disease
broke out among the troops, and Galway found it necessary to retire
from Madrid and join Charles and Peterborough in Arragon. In the next
year he determined to repeat the attempt, and leaving Charles at
Barcelona sailed down to Valencia, and marched from there on Madrid. At
Almanza he was met by Berwick, who had lately been strongly reinforced
from the army of Italy, and was completely crushed. Valencia and
Arragon were lost, and the power of Charles limited to the turbulent
province of Catalonia. From that time the allies ceased for some years
to make any serious efforts to oust Philip V. by force from
the throne of Spain. Galway was recalled and Stanhope appointed in his
place, but with the exception of the capture of Port Mahon in Minorca
in 1708 he was unable to achieve anything of importance. Having failed
in open warfare the allies found diplomacy a better weapon with which
to effect the retirement of Philip V.

[Sidenote: =Great efforts of Louis in 1708.=]

The security of Spain and the defeat of the imperialists on the Rhine
in 1707 nerved Louis to make a great effort in 1708 to recover the
ground which he had lost. He fitted out a fleet to land the Chevalier
in Scotland and take advantage of the hostility felt to the Act of
Union with England, which had been lately passed. He placed one army
under Berwick on the Moselle to watch Eugene and the imperialists,
while the main force under Vendôme advanced and occupied almost
without opposition the great towns of Ghent and Bruges in Flanders,
and established itself behind the Scheldt, prepared to move forward
when Berwick was ready to co-operate. In July, finding Marlborough
still inactive, Vendôme advanced his right wing as far as Mons, and
laid siege to Oudenarde in the centre, thus spreading himself out
in an extended line over the whole country between Mons and Bruges.
Marlborough saw his opportunity. Sending in haste to Eugene to join
him with his cavalry he struck sharply at the centre of the French
position. Vendôme at once perceived his mistake and concentrated his
army on Oudenarde by a hurried retreat. Marlborough and Eugene followed
him with all speed, pushed his rear guard over the Scheldt, and finally
forced it to turn and give battle a few miles from Oudenarde on the
left bank of the river. The battle did not begin till three o’clock
in the afternoon. It was a soldiers’ fight. Each regiment as it came
up took ground as it best could and engaged. But the allies had the
advantage of a single command. [Sidenote: =The battle of Oudenarde,
1708.=] The French generals Vendôme and the duke of Burgundy in the
excitement and hurry of a disorganised melée gave contradictory orders,
and made confusion worse confounded. Eventually Marlborough succeeded
in outnumbering the French right, turning it and driving it off the
field. That operation put an end to the battle. The French retired on
Ghent. Marlborough had succeeded in interposing his army between the
French and the frontier. Nothing stood between him and Paris except the
great fortresses of the frontier, of which Lille was the greatest. It
is said that he wished to neglect that fortress altogether and march
straight upon Paris, but the scheme was too bold even for Eugene,
considering that Boufflers held the place with 15,000 men and Berwick
was at Mons with 30,000. In August the siege was begun. Eugene took
charge of the trenches, while Marlborough, posted between the Lys and
the Scheldt, protected the convoys coming from Ostend, and prevented
Berwick or Vendôme from marching to the assistance of the doomed
city. Neither dared to attempt a rescue. [Sidenote: =Capture of
Lille.=] They contented themselves with trying to cut off convoys.
After an attempt of this sort had been entirely defeated at Wynendaal
on September 27th, more by the valour of General Webb than by the skill
of Marlborough, Lille could hold out no longer. On the 22nd of October
the city surrendered. Vendôme made his way safely to Mons, which with
Namur now remained the only great fortress in the hands of France.
Paris lay open to the advance of the allies.

[Sidenote: =Unpopularity of the war in England.=]

But just in proportion as the opportunities for a brilliant and
decisive campaign were opening out to the allies their ability to take
advantage of them was diminishing. In England the strain of the long
war was making itself felt in spite of the accessions to her colonies
and trade which her supremacy over the sea was daily making. Tory
feeling reasserted itself directly the danger to European liberty and
English commerce passed away after the battle of Blenheim. No one in
England cared one straw whether Bourbon or Habsburg sat on the throne
of Spain, as long as the free and peaceful development of Europe and
England went quietly on. Within the precincts of the court itself a
revolution was in progress, and every courtier knew that the ascendency
of the duchess of Marlborough over the mind of Anne was a thing of the
past. In this state of affairs Marlborough did not dare to run the
risk of a doubtful campaign. In the field he restricted himself to the
commonplace. In the cabinet he professed himself willing to listen to
suggestions of peace. [Sidenote: =Exhaustion of France.=] Louis
was overjoyed at the news. France was in a state of extreme exhaustion.
Her veteran armies were destroyed, her magazines empty, her generals
discredited. The taxes had reached a point beyond which taxation could
no further go. Offices were created by the hundred to be sold for what
they would fetch. Loans could be raised no longer. The capitation tax
was made permanent, and even births, marriages and deaths were obliged
to contribute to the revenue. To make the misery still more intolerable
the terribly severe winter of 1708–9 destroyed the fruit-trees and the
vines, and brought the horrors of famine into the fairest districts
of France. Early in 1709 negotiations were begun at the Hague, but it
soon appeared that the allies were determined not merely to humiliate
Louis but to disgrace him. They demanded as a condition precedent to
entering on negotiations for a final treaty of peace, that Louis was
to surrender Mons and Namur, evacuate Alsace including Strasburg, and
force his grandson Philip V. to retire from Spain. [Sidenote:
=Appeal of Louis to France against the demands of the allies.=]
The obligation to make war upon his own grandson in the interests of
the enemy was more than Louis, dispirited as he was, could with honour
accept. He determined to appeal to French patriotism against terms so
cruelly unjust. France responded nobly to his call. Men volunteered
everywhere to protect the sacred soil of France from the invader.
Nobles sent their plate, ladies their jewels, and the peasants their
hoarded sous to organise a national army. Never was Louis more truly
king and leader of his people than when in the days of his humiliation
he sent the last army of France to the front in 1709.

[Sidenote: =Battle of Malplaquet, 1709.=]

Villars was selected as the general to be intrusted with the last hopes
of France. He proved himself equal to the responsibility. Carefully
entrenching himself in strong positions, while he trained his recruits
and collected supplies, he trusted to the great ally Time whom he
knew could not fail him. At last as the summer grew on Marlborough
and Eugene, not daring to attack him in his camp near Lens, marched
upon Mons, and Villars was forced to advance in order to relieve it.
He took up an almost impregnable position at Malplaquet, resting his
two flanks on wooded heights, and holding the gap in the middle, which
he had strongly entrenched, with his main force. There he awaited the
onslaught of the allies. There was nothing for it but a front attack.
The position, if taken at all, must be taken by a direct assault. On
the 11th of September Marlborough and Eugene hurled their troops up
the gap. It was not a battle, it was a carnage. Fighting desperately
hand-to-hand, the victors of Blenheim and Ramillies at last forced the
position. Villars himself was wounded, but Boufflers who succeeded to
the command effected his retreat in good order. Mons remained the prize
of the conquerors.

The battle of Malplaquet was more honourable to the vanquished than to
the victors. It did not even re-establish Marlborough’s influence in
England. In the year in which it was fought the duchess was dismissed
from her court appointments. [Sidenote: =Dismissal of Marlborough,
1711.=] In the following year a definitely Tory and peace ministry
was formed under Harley. It was obvious that the dismissal of
Marlborough was only a question of time. Determined to run no risk,
he contented himself with forcing Villars slowly back into France. At
the beginning of 1711 he learned that the ministry had secretly opened
negotiations for peace, and he proceeded methodically to drive Villars
back from one position to another while awaiting the final blow.
Political necessities had entirely superseded military opportunities.
At last the blow fell. On December 31st, 1711, he was dismissed from a
command which had long ceased to be a reality.

[Sidenote: =Defeat of the allies in Spain, 1710.=]

Meanwhile in Spain the necessities of Louis actually strengthened the
position of Philip V. In 1709 all the French troops were
withdrawn to defend their own frontiers. Stanhope and Stahremberg, who
commanded the imperialists, accordingly advanced against Philip in
1710, drove him first out of Arragon, then almost out of Castile to
Valladolid, and occupied Madrid. The result was a national movement of
the Spaniards in favour of their king. Louis allowed Vendôme to take
command of the Spanish army. The allies found it impossible to maintain
themselves at Madrid, and retreated in two divisions upon Arragon.
Vendôme manœuvring with great skill forced himself between them,
surrounded Stanhope at Brihuega and obliged him to capitulate, then
throwing himself on Stahremberg, routed him at Villa Viciosa, and drove
him back to Barcelona. Again the Spaniards had emphatically pronounced
their determination that Philip, and none but Philip, should reign over
them.

In spite of this the allies were still endeavouring to compel Louis
to make war upon his grandson. In the winter of 1709–10 negotiations
were resumed at Gertruydenberg. [Sidenote: =Negotiations of
Gertruydenberg.=] Louis consented to surrender Alsace, and offered
not only to recognise the archduke Charles as king, but to forbid his
subjects to serve in Spain, and even to provide supplies for the allied
armies in Spain. But the allies were determined to put Louis openly to
shame before the face of Europe, and insisted that he should force his
grandson to resign the crown. Again the negotiations fell through. They
were not renewed. Directly a Tory ministry came into power they opened
private communications with Louis without taking their allies into
their confidence. [Sidenote: =The treaty of Utrecht, 1713.=] By
September 1711 an agreement was arrived at between France and England
alone, and preliminaries of peace settled. These were then communicated
to the Dutch and the other allies, and were accepted with some protests
by all except the Emperor. In accordance with the preliminaries a
congress was held at Utrecht in 1712, and the final peace drawn up
there and signed in 1713.

[Sidenote: =The war continued by the Emperor.=]

The Emperor still stubbornly refused to yield. In 1711, that terrible
year of mortality among princely houses, Joseph I. had died,
and the archduke Charles was now Emperor. His pride would not suffer
him to surrender the crown of Spain to his rival, and Eugene was
instructed to push on military operations in spite of the defection of
the English. Without the aid of Marlborough even Eugene was powerless
against the patriotism of France. Beaten at the bridge of Denain by
Villars in 1712, he was driven back to the frontier of the Netherlands,
and had in consequence of the conclusion of the peace to transfer
his army to the upper Rhine. [Sidenote: =Treaties of Rastadt and
Baden.=] But misfortune pursued him there. In 1713 Villars burst
into Alsace, crossed the Rhine at Strasburg, forced Eugene from his
entrenched camp at Freiburg, and obliged the Emperor at last to consent
to make peace. The definitive treaties were eventually signed at
Rastadt and Baden in 1714.

[Sidenote: =Terms of the Peace of Utrecht.=]

By the treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt, and Baden, generally grouped
together under the name of the Peace of Utrecht, the following
arrangements were effected.

(1) Philip V. was recognised as King of Spain and the Indies,
on the condition that the crowns of France and Spain should never be
united on the same head.

(2) Naples, the Milanese, Sardinia, and the Netherlands were given
to the Emperor, subject to the right of the Dutch to the military
government of Furnes, Ypres, Menin, Ghent, Tournai, Mons, Charleroi
and Namur as their barrier against France.

(3) France was permitted to retain Alsace including Strasburg, as
she had been by the peace of Ryswick, but she had to surrender the
fortresses of Kehl, Breisach, and Freiburg, which she had seized on
the right bank of the Rhine.

(4) The electors of Köln and Bavaria were restored, the succession
of the House of Hanover in England acknowledged, and the Chevalier
banished from France.

(5) England received Gibraltar, Minorca, Newfoundland (subject to
certain rights of fishing on the banks), Hudson’s Bay, Acadia, and S.
Kitts, and acquired by an assiento, or agreement, with Spain the right
to trade under strict limitations with certain towns in Spanish waters
set apart for the purpose.

(6) The kingdom of Prussia was recognised and received upper
Guelderland.

(7) Sicily and part of the Milanese were given to the duke of Savoy,
and the fortifications of Dunkirk were agreed to be demolished.

[Sidenote: =The peace justly liable to censure.=]

The peace of Utrecht has been denounced perhaps with greater fervour
than any of the great settlements of European affairs, except the
treaty of Vienna in 1815. But in these denunciations attention has
usually been directed more to the particular interests of nations and
parties than to the general welfare of Europe. From this circumscribed
point of view much may be said against the treaty itself, and still
more against the means which were taken to bring it about. To institute
secret negotiations for a private peace, behind the back of her
own allies, was a proceeding most unworthy of England. To leave the
Catalans, and the Cevennois, entirely without protection, to the tender
mercies of Philip and Louis, after they had been induced to rise
against their rulers by the promises and assistance of the allies, was
both a crime and a blunder. Who could trust to English faith again?
To permit Philip to retain the crown of Spain, and France to keep
Alsace, to the detriment of the House of Habsburg, was unfair to the
one power which had consistently opposed the supremacy of France,
and unfaithful to the pledges of the Grand Alliance. All this is to
a certain extent true. [Sidenote: =Yet a recognition of existing
fact.=] After the concessions made by Louis at the Hague and
Gertruydenberg, there is no doubt that he would eventually have signed
a treaty much more favourable to the Emperor and his supporters than
the peace actually made, rather than run the risk of continuing the
war. It may be admitted that the Tory ministry made peace as quickly as
they could, without much consideration for anybody except themselves,
in order to be free from foreign complications when the crisis of the
succession should occur at home. Yet from the larger point of view of
the welfare of Europe, the peace of Utrecht, like its predecessor the
peace of Westphalia, mainly registered and sanctioned accomplished
facts. Substantially it ordered Europe for the future on the basis of
development at which it had then arrived.

Since the last great settlement of the affairs of Europe three great
changes had occurred in European politics.

[Sidenote: =1. It recognised the due position of France.=]

(1) France had acquired beyond all question the position of the leading
nation of Europe, and that, not merely through the extension of her
frontiers, the splendour of her court, or the ambition of her king;
but through the energy and ability of her people, the richness of her
soil, and the advantages of her geographical position. A settlement of
Europe, which ignored this fact, could not stand for ten years, and
the allies showed their wisdom in permitting France to retain the
position which she had legitimately won, and guarding against her abuse
of it by forming states on her frontiers, powerful enough to keep her
in check. Events proved that they were right. Austria and the Dutch
in combination on the dangerous northern frontier, Prussia and the
Empire to the east, Savoy to the south-east, with Austria in reserve in
Italy, were as a matter of fact found strong enough to deal with France
in the eighteenth century; and it was not until the balance of power
and the European states system were alike swept away by the militant
democracy of the Revolution, that France became once more a menace to
the liberties of Europe.

[Sidenote: =2. The commercial and maritime supremacy of England.=]

(2) England had launched herself on that career of colonial and
commercial ascendency which has made her the most prosperous country
in the world. She was learning to found her colonial empire more upon
the conquests of colonies, which France could not support, than upon
the efforts of her own children. Her acknowledged superiority at sea,
dating from the battle of La Hogue, emphasised by the battle of Vigo,
and the capture of Gibraltar and Minorca, might from time to time be
questioned by France and Spain, it could never be overthrown, and
it brought naturally with it the acquisition of French colonies and
Spanish trade privileges. The assiento was the thin end of the wedge
by which England soon obtained the lion’s share of the lucrative
and nefarious slave-trade. The cessions in north America were the
beginning of her hold over the vast stretches of land to the north of
her plantations, which were to be reduced wholly under her rule during
the eighteenth century, and are now known as the Dominion of Canada,
and the colony of British Columbia. In securing to England power and
privileges, which she alone, owing to her maritime supremacy could
properly use, the peace not only helped her forward on her true line of
national development, but contributed in no slight degree to add to the
resources and prosperity of the world at large.

[Sidenote: =3. It established European safe-guards against
France.=]

(3) The dismemberment of the Empire, which had been recognised and
made permanent by the peace of Westphalia, had finally removed the
last vestiges of national feeling and national policy in Germany.
The smaller German states grouped themselves for purposes of offence
or defence naturally around the larger powers of the north and
south,--Prussia and Austria. The barrier to French aggression on the
Rhine had therefore to be sought, not in bolstering up an effete
institution like the Empire, out of which vitality had long ago
departed, but in strengthening and utilising the national forces of
the two leading powers. The peace of Utrecht adopted this policy as
far as was at that time possible. It planted Prussia as a sentinel
over against France on the lower Rhine, and added to her possessions
in that quarter as well as to her general dignity, in order to make
her discharge her duties with the greater zeal. The subsequent history
of Europe is one long commentary on the wisdom of this policy. Austria
required no incentive to fulfil a similar task in the upper Rhine and
in Italy, but she was sadly deficient in the necessary resources. In
the last war the gold of England and the armies of England alone had
saved her from irretrievable ruin. By giving over to her the richest
part of Italy, and defending her from French attack by the buffer
state of Savoy, the peace did all that was possible to strengthen
the defences of Europe against a renewal of French tyranny, while
ministering to the dynastic ambition of the House of Habsburg.

[Sidenote: =Advantages gained by the peace.=]

If Europe had no just reason to find fault with the peace of Utrecht
from the point of view of her larger interests, neither could the
nations themselves complain that their individual aspirations had
been unduly neglected. In the Austrian Netherlands, in spite of the
grotesque device of the barrier fortresses, the United Provinces gained
a protection against the aggression of France and the rivalry of
Antwerp, not less efficient than the Spanish Netherlands had proved to
be. By the partial opening of the Spanish trade, and the establishment
of a colonial empire by England, the maritime nations obtained the
extension of their commerce, which was one of the principal objects
which they hoped to gain by taking up arms. Portugal regained its
independence and opened up through the Methuen treaty an important and
lucrative trade with England. Savoy retained its political importance
as a buffer state, and was encouraged to make itself more definitely an
Italian power. Prussia was received into the brotherhood of independent
monarchies. Even Spain, though she lost the integrity of her empire,
was able to retain the king of her own choice. It is here that the
provisions of the peace have been most violently assailed, but with
little justice. The war of the Spanish Succession was fought, say the
critics of the peace, to prevent the House of Bourbon from ascending
the throne of Spain, and after eleven years of terrible bloodshed the
peace of Utrecht sanctioned the very connection between the two crowns
of France and Spain, which the Grand Alliance was formed to render
impossible. The family compacts of the eighteenth century are adduced
to show the evil effects of such a policy. It may be frankly admitted
that the relations between the houses of Habsburg and Bourbon were the
least satisfactory parts of the settlements effected at Utrecht, and
for the simple reason that they were the most difficult satisfactorily
to settle. It might have been possible to impose the archduke Charles
upon the Spanish people under the Partition Treaty or at the beginning
of the war. It had become impossible in 1712, when the Spaniards
themselves had driven him out without French assistance. It was wholly
out of the question when after the death of his brother Joseph he had
become Emperor. Philip V. was left on the throne of Spain because there
was no one else who could be put there. Events soon proved that Austria
could not even hold Naples and Sicily against Spain, much less could
she conquer her. The weak point in the peace of Utrecht, the danger
to Europe from the family compacts, much exaggerated as it has been,
came from a cause over which the negotiations of the peace could have
no control whatever--the inherent weakness of the House of Habsburg.
The danger to Europe from the family compacts lay not in the fact
that France and Spain were intrinsically so much more powerful than
Austria, the Milanese and Naples, but in the far greater ability to use
their opportunities which distinguished the House of Bourbon and their
political advisers.

[Sidenote: =It is the end of the seventeenth century.=]

The seventeenth century ends properly speaking with the peace of
Utrecht. The earnestness and the ambitions to which it had given birth
found in that peace either their accomplishment or their burial-place.
The attempt of France to establish a dictatorship over Europe,
which has formed the dramatic interest of the century, has failed.
France remains but one, and not always the chief, of the nations of
Europe. The determination of England on the contrary to attain the
commercial leadership of the world, the effort made by Prussia to
obtain leadership in Germany, of Austria to obtain command of the left
bank of the Danube, and a footing in Italy, have been crowned with
success. By the treaties of Passarovitch and Nystädt, which were to
follow the peace of Utrecht, as the treaties of Oliva and the Pyrenees
followed the peace of Westphalia, Sweden and Poland have to give way to
Russia and Prussia in the north, while Turkey stands face to face with
Russia on the Pruth and the Black Sea. In the peace of Westphalia the
religious rivalries of the century found their appropriate solution.
In the treaties of Utrecht and Nystädt the political questions of the
century received their appropriate answer. The rivalry between the
House of Bourbon and the House of Habsburg for the Rhine was over.
The aggrandisement of Prussia, the rise of Russia, the development
of England, the failure of Sweden, the decline of the Ottoman Turks,
were accomplished facts, recognised and dealt with by the treaties.
In the future the great political questions of Europe take a somewhat
different form. As the power of the Austro-Spanish house is finally
broken at Utrecht, the Franco-German question begins to take the place
of the Franco-Imperial question. As Russia advances to the Pruth, and
the Turks retire behind the Danube the Eastern Question takes its rise.
As English traders press into every part of the world the old rivalry
between France and England breaks out again and again in another
‘hundred years war.’ But these are the problems of the years which
are to come, and as they appear upon the scene the questions of the
seventeenth century which have given birth to them pass into history.

[Sidenote: =The last years of Louis XIV.=]

Two years were still to drag their weary length along before the
greatest figure of the seventeenth century passed away from the
struggles and the disappointments of life. They were years of domestic
misfortune and public gloom. In the fatal year 1711 the Dauphin and
his eldest son, the duke of Burgundy, the much-loved pupil of Fénélon,
were carried off by the smallpox. The heir of France was the baby duke
of Anjou, and the only legitimate member of the royal family capable
of acting as regent was the libertine and atheist Philip of Orléans.
As Louis XIV. looked into the future he could see nothing but what
he most dreaded for France. As he turned his eyes to the present the
picture was one of sombre misery unrelieved. In his despair of being
able to make public affairs better, Louis turned in the closing years
of his life with almost feverish excitement to the task of atoning for
his sins. Urged on by Madame de Maintenon he determined to root out
heresy from his dominions while still it was possible. He attacked
the Jansenists, procured their condemnation by Pope Clement XI., and
destroyed Port Royal, the home of the keenest intellects and perhaps
the noblest lives in France. [Sidenote: =His death, 1715.=] In the
middle of this strife of mistaken duty his own call came, and on the
15th of September 1715 the great king breathed his last, leaving a
weakly child of five the inheritor of his power. It was a sad and
pathetic ending to a career often mistaken, but never ignoble. The sun
set indeed amid dark and murky clouds. Yet on the page of history he
shines out in clear predominance over all contemporary sovereigns, and
of him it may be said, with more truth than of most kings or statesmen,
that during a reign extending over more than half a century the motive
and inspiration of his every thought and plan was the glory and welfare
of his country.

APPENDIX I.

+------+------------------+------------+---------------+------------+---------------+
| | England. | France. | The Empire. | Spain. | The Papacy. |
+------+------------------+------------+---------------+------------+---------------+
|1598. |Elizabeth. |Henry IV. |Rudolf II. |Philip III. |Clement VIII. |
|1603. |James I. | | | | |
|1604. | | | | | |
|1605. | | | | |Paul V. |
|1608. | | | | | |
|1610. | |Louis XIII. | | | |
|1611. | | | | | |
|1612. | | |Matthias. | | |
|1617. | | | | | |
|1618. | | | | | |
|1619. | | |Ferdinand II. | | |
|1621. | | | |Philip IV. |Gregory XV. |
|1622. | | | | | |
|1623. | | | | | |
|1624. | | | | |Urban VIII. |
|1625. |Charles I. | | | | |
|1632. | | | | | |
|1637. | | |Ferdinand III. | | |
|1640. | | | | | |
|1643. | |Louis XIV. | | | |
| | | d. 1715.· | | | |
|1644. | | | | |Innocent X. |
|1645. | | | | | |
|1648. | | | | | |
|1649. |The Commonwealth. | | | | |
|1654. | | | | | |
|1655. | | | | |Alexander VII. |
|1658. | | |Leopold I. | | |
|1660. |Charles II. | | | | |
|1665. | | | |Charles II. | |
|1667. | | | | |Clement IX. |
|1670. | | | | |Clement X. |
|1676. | | | | |Innocent XI. |
|1682. | | | | | |
|1685. |James II. | | | | |
|1687. | | | | | |
|1688. |William III. | | | | |
|1689. | | | | |Alexander VII. |
|1691. | | | | |Innocent XII. |
|1695. | | | | | |
|1697. | | | | | |
|1699. | | | | | |
|1700. | | | |Philip V. |Clement XI. |
| | | | | d. 1746.· | d. 1724. |
|1702. |Anne. | | | | |
|1703. | | | | | |
|1705. | | |Joseph I. | | |
|1711. | | |Charles VI. | | |
| | | | d. 1742. | | |
|1713. | | | | | |
|1714. |George I. | | | | |
| | d. 1727. | | | | |

-------------------+------------------+-----------------+--------------+--------------+------
Brandenburg. | Sweden. | Russia. | Turkey. | Denmark. |
-------------------+------------------+-----------------+--------------+--------------+------
Joachim Frederick. |Sigismond of |Boris Godunoff. | Mohammed III.|Christian IV. | 1598.
| Poland. | | | |
| | | Achmet. | | 1603.
|Charles IX. | | | | 1604.
| |The Troublous | | | 1605.
| | Times. | | |
John Sigismund. | | | | | 1608.
| | | | | 1610.
|Gustavus Adolphus.| | | | 1611.
| |Michael Romanoff.| | | 1612.
| | | Mustapha I. | | 1617.
| | | Osman II. | | 1618.
George William. | | | | | 1619.
| | | | | 1621.
| | | Mustapha I. | | 1622.
| | | (restored). | |
| | | Murad IV. | | 1623.
| | | | | 1624.
| | | | | 1625.
|Christina. | | | | 1632.
| | | | | 1637.
Frederick William. | | | Ibrahim. | | 1640.
| | | | | 1643.
| | | | |
| | | | | 1644.
| |Alexis. | | | 1645.
| | | Mohammed IV. |Frederick III.| 1648.
| | | | | 1649
|Charles X. | | | | 1654.
| | | | | 1655.
| | | | | 1658.
|Charles XI. | | | | 1660.
| | | | | 1665.
| | | | | 1667.
| | | |Christian V. | 1670.
| |Theodore. | | | 1676.
| |Peter and Ivan | | | 1682.
| | | | | 1685.
| | | Suleiman II. | | 1687.
Frederick III. | | | | | 1688.
| |Peter the Great. | | | 1689.
| | d. 1724. | | |
| | | Achmet II. | | 1691.
| | | Mustapha II. | | 1695.
|Charles XII. | | | | 1697.
| d. 1720. | | | |
| | | |Frederick IV. | 1699.
| | | | d. 1730. |
| | | | | 1700.
| | | | |
| | | | | 1702.
| | | Achmet III. | | 1703.
| | | deposed 1727.| |
| | | | | 1705.
| | | | | 1711.
| | | | |
Frederick William. | | | | | 1713.
d. 1740. | | | | |
| | | | | 1714.

APPENDIX II.

THE HOUSE OF BOURBON.

Continuation of family tree to the right of above.

Francoise of Alençon.

APPENDIX III.

THE SUCCESSION TO CLEVES-JÜLICH.

APPENDIX IV.

THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.

PHILIP III. = Margaret.
|
+-------------------------------+----+----------------------------+
| | |
LOUIS XIII., = Anne of Austria. | FERDINAND III., = Maria.
1643. | | |
| | |
| Elizabeth, = PHILIP IV., =========++ |
| d. of HENRY IV. | 1665. || |
| | || |
| +------------------+ || +-+------+
+---------+ | +----------------------+--|| | |
| | | | || | |
| | | | ++==Maria. Leopold I.
| | | |
| | Louise, = CHARLES II., = Marie |
| | of Orleans, 1700. of Neuburg. |
| | 1689. |
| | |
LOUIS XIV., = Maria Theresa. Margaret Theresa,=LEOPOLD I.,= Eleanor
1715. | | 1705. | of
| | | Neuburg.
| | |
| +--------+ +-----+--+
| | | |
Louis the Dauphin, Max Emanuel, = Maria Antonina. JOSEPH I., |
1711. of Bavaria. | 1711. |
| | |
| | CHARLES VI.,
| | archduke.
+--------------------+ +-----------+
| | |
Louis of Burgundy, PHILIP V., Joseph Ferdinand,
1711. d. of Anjou. Electoral Prince,
| 1699.
LOUIS XV.

INDEX

Accord, the, 64.

Adrian, patriarch of Moscow, 304.

Aides, the, in France, 21.

Aix-la-Chapelle, treaty of, 213.

Alais, peace of, 146.

Aldringer, 102.

Alexander VII. humiliated by Louis XIV., 208.

Alexis, Czar of Russia, 281, 299.

---- son of Peter the Great, 303.

Ali Cumurgi, recaptures the Morea, 288.

Alliance, the Grand, 340.

Almanza, battle of, 361.

Alte Veste, attack on the, 97.

Altranstädt, peace of, 306;
negotiations at, 360.

Amboyna, massacre of, 220.

Amsterdam, importance of, 219;
saved from William II., 224;
saved from the French, 238.

Ancre, marshal of, 33, 36.

Andrusoff, treaty of, 281.

Angoulême, treaty of, 36.

Anne of Austria, regent of France, 118, 154;
appoints Mazarin prime minister, 155;
clever management of the Fronde by, 163;
claim on the Spanish crown of, 314.

Antwerp, truce of, 65.

Apafy, prince of Transylvania, 284.

Assiento, the, 367.

Augsburg, the religious peace of, questions left unsettled by, 46;
the league of, 260.

Augustus the Strong, of Saxony and Poland, 306.

Aulic Council, the, 8.

Austria, the estates of, assist the Bohemians, 57.

Austro-Spanish house, rivalry of with France, 10, 25, 26.

Azof, capture of by Peter the Great, 288, 302;
given back to the Turks, 309.

Baden, treaty of, 367.

Baden-Durlach, margrave of, 49, 65.

Baner, 116.

Barbesieux, 264.

Barrier, the Dutch, question of, 210, 267.

Bärwalde, treaty of, 88, 113.

Bavaria, elector of. _See_ Maximilian, Max Emanuel.

---- electoral prince of. _See_ Joseph Ferdinand.

Beachy Head, battle off, 263.

Beaufort, duke of, 161.

Belgrade, capture of, 287.

Berg, duchy of, 28, 177;
ceded to the count of Neuberg, 51.

Berwick, Marquis of, 361.

Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, takes the command at Lützen, 99;
demands a duchy, 100;
appointed general of the league of Heilbronn, 100;
defeated at Nördlingen, 103;
takes service under France, 114;
captures Breisach, 116;
death of, 116.

Bethlen Gabor assists the Bohemians, 58;
makes terms with Ferdinand II., 61;
assists Christian IV. of Denmark, 71;
makes the treaty of Pressburg, 72.

Biron, marshal, 24.

Blake, admiral, 228.

Blécourt, 330.

Blenau, battle of, 163.

Blenheim, battle of, 355.

Boguslav, duke of Pomerania, 88.

Bohemia, Ferdinand recognised king of, 52;
revolt of the Protestants of, 52;
supported by Savoy, 55;
by the Silesians and estates of Austria, 56, 57;
Frederick V. elected king of, 59;
the revolt of, crushed at the White Mountain, 63;
Protestantism suppressed in, 64.

Bohemian royal charter, the, 50.

Bordeaux, capture of, 162.

Bossuet, bishop of Meaux, 250, 255.

Boufflers, marshal, negotiates the treaty of Ryswick, 264;
strong position of, in the Netherlands, 349;
outwitted by Marlborough, 349;
defeats the Dutch, 350;
defends Lille, 362;
retreats from Malplaquet, 364.

Bouillon, duke of, 24, 37;
plots of against Richelieu, 152, 161.

Boyne, battle of the, 263.

Brandenburg, John Sigismond, elector of, 28;
acquires Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg, 51.

---- George William, elector of, refuses to join Gustavus Adolphus, 88;
joins Saxony and the Swedes, 91;
rivalry of, with Sweden, 175.

---- Frederick William, the Great Elector, makes a treaty with the Swedes, 123;
gains of at the peace of Westphalia, 125;
character and policy of, 174;
state of the dominions of on his accession, 176;
establishes his authority, 179;
annexes east Pomerania, 180;
gives Charles X. a passage through Pomerania, 181;
intrigues against him, 181;
forced to acknowledge Swedish suzerainty, 182;
makes war with Sweden against Poland, 182;
obtains independence from Sweden at Labiau, 182;
makes war upon Sweden with Poland, 183;
obtains independence from Poland at Wehlau, 183;
joins the coalition against France, 239, 296;
is recognized in east Prussia, 293;
establishes personal rule in Prussia, 294;
his policy of centralization, 295;
wins the battle of Fehrbellin, 296;
accepts the treaty of S. Germain-en-Laye, 297.

---- Frederick III., elector of, reign of, 310;
recognised as king of Prussia, 310;
accepts the partition treaty, 328;
joins the Grand Alliance, 340.

Brandenburg, mark of, 176.

Breda, treaty of, 231.

Breisach, capture of, 116.

Breitenfeld, battle of, 91.

Bresse, duchy of, ceded to France, 27.

Brihuega, battle of, 365.

Brömsebro, treaty of, 169.

Broussel, arrest of, 158.

Buckingham, duke of, tries to relieve La Rochelle, 145.

Bucquoi, 53, 56, 57.

Buczacz, treaty of, 282.

Budweis, siege of, 56.

Bugey, duchy of, ceded to France, 27.

Burgundy, Louis, duke of, 362, 373.

Calvinism, character of, in France, 3, 6;
political aspects of, in Germany, 10, 40.

Calvinists, the difficulties of, in Germany, 46, 47.

Camisards, rising of the, 352.

Canada, colonisation of, 17.

Candia, siege of, 209, 267, 275, 277.

Cape of Good Hope, colonisation of, 221.

Carelia ceded to Sweden, 85.

Carlowitz, peace of, 288.

Catalonia, revolt of, 117.

Catalans, desertion of the, in the peace of Utrecht, 368.

Catinat, 149, 342.

Cevennes, risings in the, 256.

Chalais, conspiracy of, 143.

Chambre des Comptes, the, 19.

Chambre de S. Louis, 157.

Charleroi, 213, 236.

Charles I. of England interferes in the thirty years’ war, 68;
marriage of, 110;
makes war with France, 144.

---- II. of England, enters into the triple alliance, 211;
makes the treaty of Dover, 215;
makes war upon the Dutch, 229;
accepts the treaty of Breda, 231;
declares war against the Dutch in 1672, 236;
withdraws from it, 240.

---- II. of Spain, 312;
makes a will in favour of the electoral prince, 322;
intrigues round the deathbed of, 329;
makes a will in favor of France, 330;
death of, 330.

---- IX. of Sweden, reign of, 83.

---- X. of Sweden, accession of, 171;
defeats John Casimir of Poland, 181;
forces Brandenburg to acknowledge his suzerainty, 182;
conquers Poland, 182;
makes the treaty of Labiau, 182;
conquers Denmark, 183;
death of, 183.

Charles XI. of Sweden, regency during minority of, 292;
defeated at Fehrbellin, 296;
makes the treaty of S. Germain-en-Laye, 297;
effects a monarchical revolution, 297;
death of, 305.

---- XII. of Sweden, coalition against, 305;
defeats Denmark, 305;
wins the battle of Narva, 306;
occupies Poland, 306;
makes Stanislas king of Poland, 306;
over runs Saxony, 306;
his position at Altranstädt, 306;
invades Russia, 307;
is defeated at Pultava, 308;
death of, 309.

---- archduke of Austria, claims of to the throne of Spain, 314;
share of under the first partition treaty, 322;
share of under the second treaty, 324;
lands in Portugal, 360;
becomes master of Arragon, 360;
proclaimed king at Madrid, 360;
driven out of Spain, 361;
refuses the terms of Utrecht, 366;
makes the treaties of Rastadt and Baden, 367.

---- Emanuel of Savoy. _See_ Savoy.

---- Lewis, Elector Palatine, 124.

Charnacé, 112.

Cherasco, peace of, 91, 112.

Chevalier de S. George, the, recognised by Louis XIV., 340.

Chevreuse, duchess of, 143.

Chiari, battle of, 344.

Choczim, battle of, 282.

Christian of Anhalt, 48;
advises Frederick to accept the crown of Bohemia, 60.

---- of Brunswick, 65;
dismissed by Frederick V., 66;
employed by the Dutch, 67;
defeated at Stadtlohn, 67.

---- IV. of Denmark, interferes in the Thirty Years’ War, 68;
treaty of with England, 68;
defeated at Lutter, 73;
makes the peace of Lübeck, 75;
attacks Sweden, 85;
makes a treaty with Gustavus Adolphus, 87;
raises the dues of the Sound, 169;
makes the treaty of Brömsebro, 169.

Christina of Sweden, promotes the peace of Westphalia, 123;
character of, 171;
political ability of, 173;
abdication and subsequent life of, 173.

Church, the, religious revival in, 41.

Cinq-Mars, conspiracy of, 152.

Civita, battle of, 263.

Clement VIII., 6.

---- XI., 373.

---- of Bavaria, archbishop of Köln, 264.

Clément, Jacques, 3.

Cleves-Jülich, question of, 28;
partition of, 51.

Cleves, duchy of, 177.

Clissow, battle of, 306.

Colbert, training of under Mazarin, 194;
appointed controller of finance, 196;
administrative reforms of, 197;
principles of the policy of, 198;
objects of the protective system of, 198;
advantages of it to France, 201;
its defects, 202;
character of, 203.

Coligny, 209.

Condé, Henry II., Prince of, 33.

---- Louis II., Prince of, wins Rocroy, 118;
conquers the Rhineland, 120;
wins the battle of Lens, 158;
joins the Fronde against Mazarin, 158;
comes over to the court, 161;
arrested by Mazarin, 162;
rebels against the king, 163;
joins the Spaniards, 130, 164;
overruns Franche Comté, 213;
invades the United Provinces, 237;
defends Alsace, 239;
wins the battle of Seneff, 242;
checks Montecuculli in Alsace, 243;
retirement of, 244.

Conti, prince of, 161.

Copenhagen, treaty of, 183.

Corpus Evangelicorum, the, 95.

Cossacks, the, of the Ukraine, 281.

Counter-Reformation, progress of the, 11, 43, 45.

Créqui, duke of, 208.

Cromwell, makes peace with the Dutch, 228.

Dantzig, 86.

Denmark. _See_ Christian IV., Frederick III., Frederick IV.

Design, the Great, of Henry IV., 28.

Dessau, the bridge of, 71.

Devereux, 102.

Devolution, the law of, 209.

Diet, the German, 8.

Donauwörth, the troubles of, 48.

Dorislaus, Dr., murder of, 227.

Douanes, the, in France, 21.

Dover, treaty of, 215, 236.

Downs, the, battle off, 117.

Dragonades, the, 256.

Dunes, the, the battle of, 131.

Dunkirk, purchase of by France, 208.

Dupes, the Day of, 150.

Duplessis, marshal, 162.

Duquesne, 259.

Dutch, the, employ Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick, 67;
oppose Louis XIV., 210;
character of the war of independence of, 216;
constitution of, 217;
supremacy of the town councils among, 218;
position of Holland among, 218;
position of the House of Orange among, 219;
prosperity of, 220;
internal dissensions of, 221;
quarrel of, with the English Commonwealth, 227;
rivalry of with England, 228;
war of with Charles II., 229;
attack of Louis XIV. upon, 236;
defence of under William III., 239;
position of at the treaty of Nimwegen, 244;
adhesion of to the League of Augsburg, 260;
position of at the treaty of Ryswick, 264;
opposition of to the partition treaty, 327, 334;
recognition of Philip V. by, 334;
adhesion of to the Grand Alliance, 339, 340;
election of Marlborough as captain general by, 345;
defeat of by Boufflers, 350;
resistance of to Marlborough’s plans, 350, 353, 358;
position of at the treaty of Utrecht, 367, 370.

Ecclesiastical Reservation, the, 47.

Electorate of the Palatinate, transference of, 66.

Elector Palatine. _See_ Frederick V., Charles Lewis.

Emanuel, duke of Savoy. _See_ Savoy.

Emperor, the, position of in 1598, 7;
in 1715, 370.

England, condition of in 1598, 12;
in 1715, 369.

Epernon, duke of, 24, 31, 36.

Esthonia, annexed by Sweden, 84.

Estrades, count of, 207, 212.

Eternal Peace, treaty of, 300.

Eugene, prince, victory of at Zenta, 287;
victory of at Peterwardein, 288;
campaign of in Italy 1701, 342;
capture of Villeroy by, 344;
retreat of behind the Adige, 345;
critical position of at Innsbruck, 351;
junction of with Malborough, 354;
victory of at Blenheim, 355;
conquest of north Italy by, 357;
junction with Marlborough before Oudenarde, 362;
capture of Lille by, 362;
storm of Malplaquet by, 364;
defeat of by Villars at Denain and Freiburg, 366.

Exclusion, act of, 228, 229.

Fabert, 139, 149.

Fabricius, 52.

Faubourg S. Antoine, battle of, 163.

Fehrbellin, battle of, 244, 296.

Ferdinand I. emperor, 10.

---- II., emperor, religious policy of, 45;
election of as king of Hungary, 51;
recognised as king of Bohemia, 52;
critical condition of at Vienna, 57;
election of as Emperor, 59;
deposition of by the Bohemian estates, 59;
conquest of Bohemia by, 63;
suppression of Protestantism in Bohemia by, 64;
effect of military success upon, 76;
issue of the Edict of Restitution by, 77;
dismissal of Wallenstein by, 80;
Saxony driven to alliance with Sweden by, 91;
appeal of to Wallenstein, 95;
appointment of Wallenstein as dictator by, 96;
Wallenstein declared traitor by, 102;
refusal of to give the Swedes German territory, 115;
death of, 121.

---- III., emperor, 102, 121.

---- the cardinal infant, 102.

Form of Government, the, 167.

Fouquet, Nicholas, 195.

France, condition of in 1598, 2;
the indefensible frontier of, 25, 108;
the colonial empire of, 204;
condition of in 1715, 368.

Franche Comté, acquisition of, by France, 213, 244.

Frauenstadt, battle of, 306.

Frederick Henry of Nassau, 220, 224.

Frederick III. of Denmark, war of with Sweden, 182;
defeat of by Charles X., 183;
monarchical revolution effected by, 291.

---- IV. of Denmark, war of with Sweden, 305;
defeat of by Charles XII., 306.

---- V., Elector Palatine, head of the Protestant Union, 49;
character of, 55;
support to the Bohemians sent by, 55;
conduct of at the imperial election, 58;
election of as king of Bohemia, 59;
acceptance of the crown of Bohemia by, 61;
alienation of England and the Lutherans by, 61;
driven from Bohemia and the Palatinate, 63;
death of, 122.

Frederick William of Brandenburg, _See_ Brandenburg.

Freiburg, battle of, 120.

Fronde, the, weakness of France owing to, 130;
outbreak of, 157;
constitutional reforms of, 157, 158;
opposition of to a prime minister, 159;
weakness of the constitutional element in, 160;
lead of taken by the nobles, 160;
risings of in the provinces, 162;
factious character of, 163;
end of, 164.

Fuentes, count of, 120.

GABELLE, the, 20.

Gallas, 102.

Gallican Church, liberties of the, 249.

Galway, expedition of to Portugal, 360;
occupation of Madrid by, 360;
defeat of at Almanza, 361;
recall of, 361.

Gaston, duke of Orléans, plots of against Richelieu, 143, 149, 150;
reconciliation of with Richelieu, 152;
conduct of in the Fronde, 162.

George William of Brandenburg. _See_ Brandenburg.

Germain-en-Laye, S., treaty of, 297.

Germany, condition of in 1598, 7–9;
in 1715, 370.

Gertruydenberg, negotiations at, 366.

Gibraltar, capture of, 357.

Golitsin, Prince Basil, 300.

Gondi, archbishop of Paris, 158.

Gordon, general, 302.

Gothard, S., battle of, 209, 277.

Guiton, mayor of La Rochelle, 146.

Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, interference of in Germany, 80;
objects of, 81;
Swedish policy of, 84;
wars of with Denmark, Russia, and Poland, 85;
negotiations of with England, 86;
landing of in Germany, 87;
alliance of with France, 88;
reception of in Germany, 88;
failure of to relieve Magdeburg, 90;
retreat of to Werben, 90;
alliance of with Saxony and Brandenburg, 91;
victory of at Breitenfeld, 91;
conquest of central Germany by, 94;
proposal of for a Protestant alliance under Sweden, 95;
victory of at the Lech, 95;
failure of before Nuremberg, 97;
march of into Saxony, 97;
victory and death of at Lützen, 98;
results of the death of, 99.

Gustavus Vasa of Sweden, 82.

Hague, the, negotiations at in 1708, 363.

Harcourt, count of, ambassador at Madrid, 326, 331, 336.

Harley, Tory ministry of in 1710, 365;
private negotiations of with Louis XIV., 366;
the treaty of Utrecht made by, 366.

Heilbronn, league of, 100, 113.

Heinsius, grand pensionary of Holland, negotiations for a partition treaty by, 318, 320;
the first partition treaty concluded by, 322;
negotiations of for a second treaty, 323;
the second partition treaty concluded by, 324;
unpopularity of the policy of, 334;
the Grand Alliance joined by, 340.

Henrietta Maria, queen of England, marriage of, 110;
treaty between Louis XIV. and Charles II. negotiated by, 230.

Henry III. of France, 3.

---- IV. of France, absolution of, 6, 14;
difficulties of, 14;
character of, 15;
economical policy of, 17;
policy of towards the nobles, 23;
foreign policy of, 24–30;
death of, 30.

Höchstadt, battle of, 352.

Höchst, battle of, 66.

Hogue, La, battle of, 263.

Holland, the province of, importance of, 218, 223.

Holy League, the, 286.

Horn, general, 89, 103.

Hospitallers, the Knights, 267, 275.

Huguenots, the, rising of in 1620, 36;
position of in 1622, 140;
organization of, 141;
risings of, 141, 145;
suppression of as a political organization, 146;
existence of contrary to Louis XIV.’s love of uniformity, 253;
persecution of, 255;
emigration of, 257.

Ibrahim I., Ottoman Sultan, 275.

Imperial courts, the, of Germany, 8.

Ingria, ceded to Sweden, 85.

Innocent XI., quarrel of with Louis XIV., 250.

Innocent XII., reconciliation of with Louis XIV., 252.

Intendants, appointment of in France, 19, 154.

Italy, condition of in 1598, 13.

Ivan the Terrible, Czar of Russia, 298.

---- II., Czar of Russia, 300, 302.

Ivry, battle of, 3.

Jagellon, Catherine, 44, 82.

James I. of England, policy of towards Spain, 55;
attitude of towards the Bohemian question, 60;
disavowal of Frederick by, 61;
enlistment of troops authorised by, 68;
war declared against Spain by, 68.

---- II. of England, quarrel of with Louis XIV., 261;
expulsion of from England, 262;
death of, 340.

Janizaries, the, 270.

Jansenists, condemnation of the, 373.

Jeannin, 35.

Jesus, the Society of, 11, 42.

John Casimir, of Poland, recognition of the Great Elector by, 179;
war of with Sweden, 181;
defeat of at Warsaw, 182;
the treaty of Wehlau made by, 183;
participation of in the treaty of Oliva, 183;
war of with Russia and the Cossacks, 281;
abdication of, 281.

John George, elector of Saxony, refusal of to help the Bohemians, 53;
policy of with regard to the imperial election, 58;
invasion of Silesia by, 64;
refusal of to join Gustavus Adolphus, 88;
refusal of to disband his troops, 91;
alliance of with Gustavus Adolphus, 91;
occupation of Bohemia by, 95;
expulsion of by Wallenstein, 96;
the peace of Prague made by, 103;
political views of, 104;
defeat of at Wittstock, 116;
treaty with the Swedes made by, 123.

John Sigismond, elector of Brandenburg. _See_ Brandenburg.

Joseph, Father, 79, 112, 116.

---- I., emperor, 366.

---- Ferdinand, electoral prince, claim of to the throne of Spain, 313;
share of in the partition treaty, 322;
death of, 323.

Jülich, duchy of, question of the succession to, 28, 51.

Kalkstein, count, 293, 294.

Kara Mustafa, grand vizier, 283;
war of against the empire, 284;
defeat of before Vienna, 286;
death of, 286.

Kardis, treaty of, 183.

Kingship, theory of in the seventeenth century, 187, 188.

Kiuprili, Mohammed, grand vizier, 276;
quarrel of with France, 277.

---- Achmet, grand vizier, attack of upon the empire, 277;
defeat of at S. Gothard, 277;
capture of Candia by, 278;
war of with Poland, 282;
death of, 283.

---- Mustafa, grand vizier, 287.

Knärod, peace of, 85.

Königsberg, treaty of, 181.

Labiau, treaty of, 182.

La Feuillade, 209.

La Force, 37.

La Rochelle, 6, 38;
siege of, 145.

La Vieuville, 38.

League, the Catholic, in Germany, 49;
Ferdinand assisted by in Bohemia, 62;
the dismissal of Wallenstein procured by, 79.

Lefort, 302.

Leopol, battle of, 282.

Leopold I., emperor, the partition treaty of 1667 made by, 211;
coalition against Louis joined by, 239;
war of with the Turks, 277;
the Hungarians persecuted by, 283;
the kingdom of Prussia recognised by, 310;
claim of to the throne of Spain, 314;
designs of, upon Italy, 316;
refusal of to accept the partition treaty, 328;
the Grand Alliance joined by, 340;
death of, 357.

Lepanto, battle of, 267, 273.

Lesdiguières, 30, 37, 110.

Leslie, Alexander, 87.

Le Tellier, 162.

Levenhaupt, 308.

Lille, acquisition of by France, 213;
capture of by prince Eugene, 362.

Lionne, 162, 215.

Lit de justice, a, 5.

Livonia, acquired by Sweden, 84, 86.

Longueville, duke of, 161, 162.

Lorraine, duchy of, occupied by the French, 151.

---- duke of, 284, 286, 327.

Loudun, treaty of, 33.

Louis of Baden, prince, 351, 354.

---- XIII., of France, declared of age, 35;
Luynes supported by, 36;
promise of to let Mansfeld cross France, 68;
withdrawal of the promise, 68;
invasion of Italy by, 111;
character of, 139;
suppression of the Huguenots by, 146;
serious illness of, 149;
support of Richelieu by in the Day of Dupes, 150;
death of, 118, 154.

---- XIV., of France, declared of age, 163;
suppression of the Fronde by, 164;
character and qualities of, 188;
theory of kingship of, 190;
attention of to detail, 193;
organisation of France under, 193;
choice of policy before in 1671, 204;
determination of to be dictator of Europe, 206;
humiliation of Spain and the Pope by, 207, 208;
assistance of the Portuguese and Venetians by, 209;
claim of to the Netherlands by the law of devolution, 209;
defeated by the Triple Alliance, 212;
greatness of the position of in 1672, 235;
attack of upon the Dutch, 236;
formation of a coalition against, 239;
the treaty of Nimwegen made by, 244;
quarrel of with the Pope, 248;
the four resolutions promulgated by, 250, 251;
reconciliation of with Innocent XII., 252;
alteration in the character of, 254;
attempt of to convert the Huguenots, 255;
persecution of the Huguenots by, 256;
revocation of the edict of Nantes by, 256;
aggressions of after Nimwegen, 257;
alienation of Europe by, 260;
invasion of England permitted by, 261;
war of against Europe, 262;
treaty of Ryswick made by, 264;
support of the Turks against the emperor by, 284;
foresight of with regard to the Spanish Succession question, 316;
adoption of a policy of partition by, 317;
objects of during the negotiations, 319;
conclusion of the partition treaties by, 322, 324;
policy of in concluding the treaties, 324;
will of Charles II. accepted by, 331;
policy of in accepting it, 332, 339;
difficulties of, 339;
aggressive policy of, 340;
war of against Europe, 340;
plan of for the conduct of the war, 350, 352;
results of the battle of Blenheim upon, 357;
loss of Italy by, 357;
negotiations of for peace, 363;
appeal of to France, 364;
renewal of negotiations, 365;
conclusion of the peace of Utrecht by, 367;
death of, 373.

Louis, the Dauphin, claim of to the throne of Spain, 313;
share of in the partition treaties, 322, 324;
advocacy of his son’s rights by, 331;
death of, 373.

Louvois, minister of war, 215;
advice of to refuse the Dutch terms, 1672, 239;
organisation of the army by, 259;
death of, 264.

Loyola, Ignatius, 42.

Lübeck, peace of, 75.

Lutheranism, political aspects of in Germany, 10, 11, 40.

Lutter, battle of, 73.

Lützen, battle of, 98.

Luxemburg, duke of, 244.

Luynes, count of, 36, 37.

Macchiavelli, influence of in politics, 108.

Magdeburg, sack of, 89.

Mahon, Port, capture of, 361.

Maintenon, Madame de, 252, 254, 331, 373.

Malplaquet, battle of, 364.

Mancini, Marie, 172.

Mansfeld, employment of in Bohemia, 55–57;
abandonment of the upper Palatinate by, 65;
dismissal of by Frederick V., 66;
employment of by the Dutch and English, 67;
campaign of against Wallenstein, 71;
death of, 72.

Mantua, question of the succession to, 111.

Margaret Theresa, claim of to the throne of Spain, 313.

Maria, daughter of Philip III., claim of to the throne of Spain, 314.

Maria Antonia, claim of to the throne of Spain, 313.

Maria Theresa, claim of to the throne of Spain, 313.

Marie de Medicis, marriage of, 27;
regency of, 31;
disastrous government of, 32–36;
attack of on Richelieu, 150.

Marie of Neuburg, queen of Spain, 329.

Marienbad, treaty of, 182.

Maritime nations, the policy of with regard to Spain, 315.

Marlborough, duke of, visit of to Charles XII., 307;
appointment of, to the command in the Netherlands, 345;
the military qualities of, 345;
personal character of, 347;
occupation of the lower Rhineland by, 349, 350;
the Blenheim campaign of, 353–356;
the Ramillies campaign of, 358;
the Oudenarde campaign of, 361;
critical political situation of, 363;
victory of at Malplaquet, 364;
dismissal of, 365.

Marsin, 352, 355.

Martinitz, 52.

Masaniello, 130.

Matthias, emperor, rising of against Rudolf II. in Austria, 50;
recognition of as king of Bohemia, 50;
election of as emperor, 50;
death of, 56.

Maurice of Nassau, 31, 65, 219, 221, 223.

Maximilian of Bavaria, 30;
religious policy of, 45;
suppression of Protestantism by at Donauwörth, 48;
appointed head of the Catholic league, 49;
assistance of to Ferdinand, 62;
character of, 62;
recognition of as elector, 66;
defeat of by Turenne, 121;
gains of at the peace of Westphalia, 124.

Max Emanuel, elector of Bavaria, 313, 334;
adhesion of to Louis XIV., 350;
campaign of against Eugene, 351;
defeat of by Marlborough, 354, 355.

Mazarin, cardinal, employment of in the peace of Cherasco, 112;
Richelieu’s foreign policy continued by, 118;
success of at the peace of Westphalia, 129;
alliance of with Cromwell, 131;
success of at the peace of the Pyrenees, 131;
character of, 156;
policy of towards the Parlement de Paris, 158;
unpopularity of, 159;
arrest of the princes by, 162;
flight of, 162;
return of to power, 164.

Mazeppa, 307.

Mehaigne, the lines of the, 350.

Mello, 118.

Menschikoff, 304.

Messenius, 173.

Methuen, 360.

Michael, king of Poland, 282.

Michael Romanoff, Czar of Russia, 299.

Milanese, the, 25.

Mocenigo, 275, 277.

Modena, duke of, 344.

Mohacz, battle of, 287.

Mohammed II., 268, 271.

---- III., 275.

---- IV., 287.

Molé, 161.

Monaleschi, murder of, 172.

Monk, general, 230, 231.

Mons, 262, 364.

Montauban, 6, 37.

Montecuculli, victory of at S. Gothard, 209, 277;
campaigns of on the Rhine, 240–243.

Montmorency-Bouteville, execution of, 144.

Montmorency, rising of, 151.

Montpellier, treaty of, 38, 143.

Montpensier, Anne of, Mademoiselle, 163.

Monzon, treaty of, 111, 143.

Morea, the capture and recapture of, 287, 288.

Moriscoes, the expulsion of, 30.

Morosini, 277, 286–288.

Mülhausen, agreement of, 62.

Münster, congress of, 122.

Münster, treaty of, 224.

---- bishop of, 215, 230, 240.

Murad IV., 275.

Mustafa II., 287.

Nantes, the edict of, 6, 14, 256.

Namur, capture of, 263.

Narva, battle of, 306.

Naryshkins, the, 300.

Navigation, act of, 227.

Neerwinden, battle of, 263.

Nevers, duke of, 111.

Neuburg, count palatine of, 28.

Nimwegen, peace of, 244.

Ninon de l’Enclos, 172.

Nördlingen, battle of, 102;
second battle of, 120.

Nystädt, peace of, 309.

Olden-Barneveldt, execution of, 223.

Oliva, peace of, 183, 281, 290.

Opdam, admiral, 228, 229.

---- general, 350.

Orange, House of, importance of the, 219;
rivalry of with the republican party, 221.

Ornano, 143.

Osnabrück, congress of, 122.

Oudenarde, battle of, 362.

Oxenstjerna, leadership of after Lützen, 100;
conduct of in the Thirty Years’ War, 100, 101, 115;
character and policy of, 166;
oligarchy established in Sweden by, 168;
war of with Denmark, 169;
acquisition of Halland by, 170.

Papacy, the, quarrel of with Louis XIV., 250.

Pappenheim, general, 89, 92, 98, 99.

Parkan, battle of, 286.

Parlement de Paris, character and powers of, 4;
recognition of Marie de Medicis as regent by, 31;
the will of Louis XIII. set aside by, 155;
refusal of to register the octroi edict, 157;
programme of reform of, 157, 158;
surrender of to the nobles and populace, 160.

Parthenon, the, destruction of, 287.

Partition Treaties, the, of 1667, 211;
negotiations for that of 1699, 317–321;
conclusion of the first of, 322;
chances of the success of, 322;
conclusion of the second of, 324;
unpopularity of among the English and Dutch, 327;
general acceptance of in Europe, 327;
opposition to by the Emperor and Savoy, 328;
difficulties in the carrying out of, 332.

Passarovitz, treaty of, 289.

Patkul, 305, 306.

Paulette, the, 18, 24.

Paul V., 45.

Pays d’election, and pays d’état, 19.

Pelisson, 255.

Perpetual Edict, the, 233.

Peter the Great, Czar of Russia, capture of Azof by, 288, 302;
defeat of on the Pruth, 288, 309;
education of, 301;
character of, 302;
domestic policy of, 303;
foreign policy of, 304;
defeat of, at Narva, 306;
victory of at Pultava, 308.

Peterborough, earl of, 360.

Petersburg, S., foundation of, 304, 307.

Peterwardein, battle of, 288.

Philip III. of Spain, 63.

---- IV. of Spain, 209.

---- V. of Spain, claim of, 313;
acknowledged as king by the Spaniards, 334, 365;
recognised by the treaty of Utrecht, 367.

Piccolomini, general, 98, 102, 121.

Pinerolo, 27.

Poland, the Counter-Reformation in, 44;
condition and institutions of, 278;
weakness of, 280.
_See_ Sigismund, John Casimir, John Sobieski, Augustus the Strong.

Pomerania, question of the succession to, 175.

---- east, acquired by Brandenburg, 180.

Pontchartrain, 264.

Portland, duke of, 264, 318.

Porto-Carrero, cardinal, 330.

Portugal, independence of, 117.

Prague, treaty of, 103.

Pressburg, treaty of, 72.

Project of Harmony, the, 233.

Protective system, the, of the seventeenth century reasons for, 16, 198.

Protestantism, inherent weakness of, 40;
critical state of in Germany in 1630, 76.

Prussia, East, duchy of, 176.

---- West or Polish, 178.

---- kingdom of, 310.

Pultava, battle of, 308.

Pyrenees, the, peace of, 131.

Quadruple Alliance, the, 230.

Quebec, foundation of, 17.

Ragotsky, 351.

Ramillies, battle of, 358.

Rastadt, treaty of, 366.

Ravaillac, 30.

Ravensberg, duchy of, 51, 177.

Reformation, the, in Germany, 9.

Regale, the, right of, 250.

Regensburg, diets at, 66, 79;
truce of, 259.

Restitution, Edict of, 77, 96.

Rethel, battle of, 162.

Réunions, Chambres des, 258.

Rhode, 293.

Richelieu, cardinal, adviser of Marie de Medicis, 36;
entry of into the ministry, 38;
alliance of with Gustavus Adolphus, 88, 113;
foreign policy of, 106;
the Valtelline recovered by, 110;
interference of in the Mantuan question, 111;
intrigues of in Germany, 112;
declaration of war against Spain by, 114;
want of success of at first, 115;
ultimate success of, 117;
position of France at the death of, 117;
character of, 133;
principles of the government of, 134;
want of sympathy of with the people, 137;
suppression of the Huguenot rising of 1625 by, 142;
war of with England, 144;
the political power of the Huguenots suppressed by, 146;
administrative changes of, 148;
success of in the Day of Dupes, 150;
the power of the nobles crushed by, 151, 152;
centralising policy of, 153.

Rie, battle of, 37.

Rocroy, battle of, 119.

Rohan, risings of, 36, 145.

Romanoff dynasty, the, accession of, 299.

Rooke, Sir George, 356.

Royal, Port, 373.

Rudolf II., emperor, 10, 11, 29, 45, 50.

Ruel, peace of, 162.

Ruppa, 54.

Russia, early history of, 298;
rivalry of with Sweden, 84;
supremacy of after Nystädt, 309.

---- _See_ Alexis, Sophia, Peter the Great.

Ruvigny, 257.

Ruyter, 229, 239.

Ryswick, peace of, 264.

Saluzzo, 27.

Savoy, importance of the duchy of, 26.

---- Emanuel, duke of, 27.

---- Charles Emanuel, duke of, assistance given to the Bohemians by, 55.

---- Victor Amadeus, duke of, defeat of at Staffarda, 263;
refusal of to accept the partition treaty, 328;
alliance of with France, 342;
the Grand Alliance joined by, 351.

Schellenberg, the, storming of, 354.

Schomberg, 208, 257.

Schwartzenburg, 179.

Secularised lands in Germany, question of, 46.

Sedan, surrender of to France, 152.

Seignelay, 259, 264.

Selim the Sot, 273.

Seneff, battle of, 242.

Servien, 162.

Seventeenth century, importance of, 1;
alteration in the political ideas of, 185;
end of the, 372.

Sigismond Augustus, of Poland, 279.

---- of Poland, religious policy of, 44;
expulsion of from Sweden, 83;
war of with Gustavus Adolphus, 85.

Silesia, occupation of by Wallenstein, 73.

Silesians, assistance given by to the Bohemians, 56;
reduction of by John George of Saxony, 64.

Sinzheim, battle of, 242.

Sitvatorok, treaty of, 273.

Slavata, 52.

Sobieski, John, of Poland, alienation of by Louis XIV., 260;
defeat of Russia and the Cossacks by, 281;
defeat of the Cossacks and Turks by, 282;
election of as king of Poland, 283;
the peace of Zurawno made by, 283;
alliance of with the emperor, 284;
relief of Vienna by, 285;
the Turks driven out of Hungary by, 286.

Soissons, count of, 143.

Somers, 327.

Sophia, princess, regency of, 300.

Soubise, risings of, 37, 142.

Spain, state of, in 1598, 12;
weakness of, 129, 322.

Spanish Succession, the, question of, 312.

Spinola, 67, 111.

S. Germain, assembly of, 251.

S. Germain-en-Laye, treaty of, 297.

S. Gothard, battle of, 209.

S. Menehould, treaty of, 33.

St. John, 227.

Stadtholderate, the Dutch, put into commission, 225.

Stadtlohn, battle of, 67.

Staffarda, battle of, 263.

Stahremberg, defence of Vienna by, 285.

---- defeat of, at Villa Viciosa, 365.

Stanhope, capture of Port Mahon by, 361;
capitulation of, 365.

Stanislas Leczinski made king of Poland, 306.

States-General, the, of France, character of, 3;
meeting of in 1614, 33.

Steinkirk, battle of, 263.

Stolbova, peace of, 85.

Stolhofen, lines of, 351.

Stralsund, siege of, 74.

Strasburg, seizure of by Louis XIV., 258.

Streltsi, the, 299;
revolts of, 300;
abolition of, 304.

Stuhmsdorf, treaty of, 86, 87.

Suleiman, the Magnificent, 268, 271.

Sully, character of, 15;
economical policy of, 16;
financial reforms of, 17, 21;
retirement of, 31.

Sweden, condition of at the beginning of the century, 81, 84;
acquisition of Holland by, 170;
adhesion of to the Triple Alliance, 212;
alliance of with France, 215;
loss of supremacy in the north by, 309.

---- _See_ Gustavus Adolphus, Oxenstjerna, Charles X., Charles XI., Charles XII.

Swieten, Cornelius Bicker von, 225.

Szcelankemen, battle of, 287.

Taille, the, in France, 18, 19.

Tallard, count, the partition treaties negotiated by, 318, 323;
advice to Louis XIV. to keep faith, 331;
campaigns of on the Rhine, 351, 354, 355.

Taxation in France, 18–21.

Temple, Sir William, 211.

Theodore, Czar of Russia, 300.

Throwing from the window, the, 52.

Thurn, count, 52, 57.

Tilly, count, general of the League, 30, 49;
victory of at the White Mountain, 63;
victories of at Höchst, Wimpfen and Lutter, 66, 73;
invasion of Saxony by, 91;
defeat of at Breitenfeld, 92;
defeat of at the Lech, and death of, 95.

Tököli, 284, 286.

Tolhuys, the, crossing of the Rhine at, 238.

Torcy, 331.

Torstenson, general, 92, 120, 169.

Tourville, de, admiral, 259, 263.

Travendal, treaty of, 306.

Triple Alliance, the, 212, 215.

Tromp, admiral, 228, 229.

Troublous Times, the, 299.

Turenne, count of, advice of at Freiburg, 120;
determination of the Thirty Years’ War by, 120;
campaign of against Condé in Champagne, 130;
victory of at the Dunes, 131;
adhesion of to the Fronde, 161;
defeat of at Rethel, 162;
return of to the king’s side and defeat of Condé by, 163;
campaign of in the Netherlands, 210;
invasion of the United Provinces by, 237;
campaigns of on the Rhine, 239, 240, 242;
winter campaign of, 242;
death of, 243.

Turin, battle of, 357, 359.

Turks, the Ottoman, establishment of in Europe, 266;
defects of the rule of, 268;
causes of the success of, 270;
summit of the power of, 271;
alliance of with France, 272;
antagonism of to Austria, 274;
revival of under the Kiuprili, 276;
defeat of at Vienna, 285;
loss of the Danube valley by, 288.

Urban VIII., 111.

Union, the Protestant, in Germany, 49, 65.

United Provinces, the. _See_ The Dutch.

Utrecht, peace of, provisions of the, 367;
merits and demerits of the, 367–372.

VALTELLINE, the valley of the, 13, 109.

Vasvar, treaty of, 277.

Vauban, 258, 262.

Vendôme, duke of, 36, 143, 156.

---- duke of, campaign of against Eugene in Italy, 345;
advance of to Trent, 351;
retreat of to Piedmont, 351;
campaign of in the Netherlands, 361;
campaign of in Spain, 365.

Vere, 65.

Vervins, peace of, 6, 11, 14, 27.

Victor Amadeus. _See_ Savoy.

Vigo, battle at, 356.

Villa Viciosa, victory of the Portuguese at, 209;
victory of the Spaniards at, 365.

Villars, marshal, campaign of on the Danube 1703, 351;
capture of Stolhofen by, 360;
intrusted with the last army of France, 364;
campaigns of on the frontiers, 364, 365;
victories of on the Rhine, 366.

Villeroy, marshal, campaign of in Italy, 344;
campaigns of in the Netherlands, 355, 357, 358.

WALLENSTEIN, count, conduct of at Zablat, 58;
character and views of, 69;
offer of to raise an army, 70;
campaign against Mansfeld, 71, 72;
occupation of Silesia and Pomerania by, 73;
resistance of Stralsund to, 74;
political results of the success of, 75;
difference of with Ferdinand and the League, 78;
dismissal of by Ferdinand, 80;
appealed to by Ferdinand, 95;
appointed dictator, 96;
campaigns of against Gustavus Adolphus, 97, 98;
ambitious schemes of, 101;
declared traitor and murdered, 102.

Warsaw, battle of, 182.

Webb, general, 362.

Wehlau, treaty of, 183, 281.

Werth, John, 120.

Westphalia, peace of, the provisions of the, 123, 124;
importance of the, 125–129.

White Mountain, battle of, 63.

William the Silent, of Orange, 217, 219.

---- II. of Orange, attempt of to become king, 224;
death of, 225.

---- III. of Orange, education of by the State, 230;
elected captain general, 233;
accessory to the murder of de Witt, 234;
defence of Holland by in 1672, 237;
elected stadtholder, 239;
defeat of at Seneff, 242;
attacks Luxemburg near Mons to prevent peace, 244;
character of, 246;
made king of England, 262;
campaigns of in the Netherlands, 263;
negotiations for a partition treaty, 318–324;
policy of in the negotiations, 320;
unpopularity of in England, 327;
recognition of Philip V. by, 334;
formation of the Grand Alliance by, 340;
death of, 341.

Willstedt, truce of, 32.

Wimpfen, battle of, 66.

Wittstock, battle of, 116.

Witt, John de, negotiation of the Triple Alliance by, 210–212;
appointment of as grand pensionary of Holland, 225;
character and policy of, 226;
policy of towards England, 228, 231;
policy of towards France, 232;
enmity of to the House of Orange, 226, 233;
murder of, 234.

Wrangel, 121.

Wynendaal, battle of, 362.

Xanten, treaty of, 51, 177.

York, New, capture of by England, 229, 231.

Zablat, battle of, 58.

Zenta, battle of, 288.

Zurawno, peace of, 283.

Zusmarshausen, battle of, 121.

_Crown 8vo. With Maps. 7s. 6d._

European History, 476–918

By C. W. C. OMAN, M.A., Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.

Forming Volume I. of PERIODS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY.

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The Balance of Power, 1715–1789

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The Ascendancy of France, 1598–1715

By H. O. WAKEMAN, M.A., All Souls College, Oxford.

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European History, 1789–1815

By H. MORSE STEPHENS, M.A., Balliol College, Oxford.

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crowded with extraordinary events.’--=Guardian.=

‘The appearance of a text-book of this period of European history
(Period VII.), such as the one before us, is an event which every
genuine historian will heartily welcome. To say that Mr. Morse Stephens
has compiled the best English text-book on the subject would be faint
praise.’--=Journal of Education.=

‘We are happy to extend a hearty welcome to this much-needed series,
which, if it throughout keeps on the same high level of this volume
(Period VII.), will fill up a painful gap in our accessible historical
literature.’--=Educational Times.=

FOOTNOTES:

[1] See Appendix III.

[2] See Appendix II.

[3] See map facing p. 124.

[4] See map, p. 241.

[5] See Appendix IV. p. 381.

[6] The Tuscan Ports comprised Santo Stéphano, Porto Ercole, Orbitello,
Porto Longone, Talamone, and Piombino.

[7] It is sometimes said that he fought Malplaquet, and wasted life
unnecessarily there, in order to restore his waning popularity in
England, but it must be remembered that in 1709, Mons was the last of
the first-class fortresses belonging to the French, and the army of
Villars and Boufflers the only real obstacle between Marlborough and
Paris. Can any one doubt that had Marlborough been well supported in
England, the allies would have been in Paris in 1710?

[8] See Map, p. 241.

Transcriber’s Notes: 1. Obvious printers’, punctuation and spelling
errors have been corrected silently.

2. Some hyphenated and non-hyphenated versions of the same words have
been retained as in the original.

3. Italics are shown as _xxx_.

4. Bold print is shown as =xxx=.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The acendancy of France 1598-1715" ***

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