Title: Observations on the new constitution, and on the Federal and State conventions by a Columbian patriot
Author: Warren, Mercy Otis
Language: English
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  Old South Leaflets

  _No. 226_

  [Illustration: Decoration]

  Observations on the New
  Constitution, and on the Federal
  and State Conventions
  By a Columbian Patriot

  _Sic transit Gloria Americana_

  [Mercy Otis Warren, Boston, 1788]

  with a Prefatory Note by
  LAWRENCE W. TOWNER
  _Massachusetts Institute of Technology_

  [Illustration: Decoration]

  _Published by_
  THE OLD SOUTH ASSOCIATION
  Old South Meeting-house, Boston, Massachusetts



  Copyright 1955 by the Old South Association.
  Reproduction permitted to all who give credit
  to the Association.


This pamphlet, first printed in Boston shortly after Massachusetts
ratified the Federal Constitution on February 6, 1788, achieved its
largest circulation in New York where it was issued both in pamphlet
form and in a newspaper series during the spring of that year.[1] At
the time of publication the Anti-Federalist cause still seemed hopeful,
for despite the fact that Massachusetts was the sixth state to ratify
(in the two previous months, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Georgia, and Connecticut had voted affirmatively), the approval of
three more states was required before the Constitution would become
operative. Even when Maryland, South Carolina, and New Hampshire would
make the total nine (between April 26 and June 21), no continental
government could be effective without Virginia and New York, where
strong opposition existed (they ratified June 25th and July 26th,
respectively).

The objections to the new Constitution expressed in the _Observations_
are typical of Anti-Federalist thought from New England to Georgia.[2]
Many of the details seem querulous today; many were met, as far as the
author was concerned, by the Bill of Rights.[3] Still, the underlying
questions asked are as vital now as they were then. Essentially, the
problem facing that generation was how to organize political power so
that it could be placed safely in the hands of men. Government had to
be made strong enough to survive, yet it had to be kept properly tender
about individual life, liberty, and property. As might be expected, the
problem was seen in terms of rights _against_ government rather than
in terms of the citizen’s responsibility _to_ government, but in the
twentieth century’s era of absolutism it is useful to be reminded, in
Mrs. Warren’s words, “that man is born free and possessed of certain
unalienable rights....”

For many years this pamphlet was attributed to a leading
Anti-Federalist, Elbridge Gerry. However, the publication of Mercy Otis
Warren’s statement of authorship in a letter of May, 1788, and evidence
within the work that she was its author and Gerry was not, would seem
to indicate that she should be given the honors.[4]

The reproduction of the _Observations_ here made is from the original
in the Massachusetts Historical Society with the kind permission of Mr.
Stephen T. Riley. The first four and one-third pages have been omitted.



Observations on The New Constitution


All writers on government agree, and the feelings of the human mind
witness the truth of these political axioms, that man is born free and
possessed of certain unalienable rights—that government is instituted
for the protection, safety and happiness of the people, and not for the
profit, honour, or private interest of any man, family, or class of
men—That the origin of all power is in the people, and that they have
an incontestible right to check the creatures of their own creation,
vested with certain powers to guard the life, liberty and property
of the community: And if certain selected bodies of men, deputed on
these principles, determine contrary to the wishes and expectations
of their constituents, the people have an undoubted right to reject
their decisions, to call for a revision of their conduct, to depute
others in their room, or if they think proper, to demand further time
for deliberation on matters of the greatest moment: it therefore is
an unwarrantable stretch of authority or influence, if any methods
are taken to preclude this reasonable and peaceful mode of enquiry
and decision. And it is with inexpressible anxiety, that many of the
best friends of the Union of the States—to the peaceable and equal
participation of the rights of nature, and to the glory and dignity
of this country, behold the insidious arts, and the strenuous efforts
of the partisans of arbitrary power, by their vague definitions of
the best established truths, endeavoring to envelope the mind in
darkness the concomitant of slavery, and to lock the strong chains
of domestic despotism on a country, which by the most glorious and
successful struggles is but newly emancipated from the spectre of
foreign dominion.—But there are certain seasons in the course of human
affairs, when Genius, Virtue, and Patriotism, seems [_sic_] to nod over
the vices of the times, and perhaps never more remarkably, than at the
present period; or we should not see such a passive disposition prevail
in some, who we must candidly suppose, have liberal and enlarged
sentiments; while a supple multitude are paying a blind and idolatrous
homage to the opinions of those who by the most precipitate steps are
treading down their dear bought privileges; and who are endeavouring
by all the arts of insinuation, and influence, to betray the people
of the United States, into an acceptance of a most complicated system
of government; marked on the one side with the _dark_, _secret_ and
_profound intrigues_, of the statesman, long practised in the purlieus
of despotism; and on the other, with the ideal projects of _young
ambition_, with its wings just expanded to soar to a summit, which
imagination has painted in such gawdy colours as to intoxicate the
_inexperienced votary_, and to send _him_ rambling from State to State,
to collect materials to construct the ladder of preferment.

But as a variety of objections to the _heterogeneous phantom_, have
been repeatedly laid before the public, by men of the best abilities
and intentions; I will not expatiate long on a Republican _form_ of
government, founded on the principles of monarchy—a democratick branch
with the features of aristocracy—and the extravagance of nobility
pervading the minds of many of the candidates for office, with the
poverty of peasantry hanging heavily on them, and insurmountable, from
their taste for expence, unless a general provision should be made
in the arrangement of the civil list, which may enable them with the
champions of their cause to “_sail down the new pactolean channel_.”
Some gentlemen, with laboured zeal, have spent much time in urging the
necessity of government, from the embarrassments of trade—the want
of respectability abroad and confidence of the public engagements at
home:—These are obvious truths which no one denies; and there are few
who do not unite in the general wish for the restoration of public
faith, the revival of commerce, arts, agriculture, and industry,
under a lenient, peaceable and energetick government: But the most
sagacious advocates for the party have not by fair discussion, and
rational argumentation, evinced the necessity of adopting this many
headed monster; of such motley mixture, that its enemies cannot trace
a feature of Democratick or Republican extract; nor have its friends
the courage to denominate a Monarchy, an Aristocracy, or an Oligarchy,
and the favoured bantling must have passed through the short period of
its existence without a name, had not Mr. _Wilson_, in the fertility of
his genius, suggested the happy epithet of a _Federal Republic_.—But I
leave the field of general censure on the secrecy of its birth, the
rapidity of its growth, and the fatal consequences of suffering it to
live to the age of maturity, and will particularize some of the most
weighty objections to its passing through this continent in a gigantic
size.—It will be allowed by every one that the fundamental principle of
a free government, is the equal representation of a free people.—And
I will _first_ observe with a justly celebrated writer, “That the
principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the absolute
rights which were vested in them by the immediate laws of nature, but
which could not be preserved in peace, without the mutual intercourse
which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities.”
And when society has thus deputed a certain number of their equals
to take care of their personal rights, and the interest of the whole
community, it must be considered that responsibility is the great
security of integrity and honour; and that annual election is the basis
of responsibility,—Man is not immediately corrupted, but power without
limitation, or amenability, may endanger the brightest virtue—whereas
a frequent return to the bar of their Constituents is the strongest
check against the corruptions to which men are liable, either from the
intrigues of others of more subtle genius, or the propensities of their
own hearts,—and the gentlemen who have so warmly advocated in the late
Convention of the Massachusetts, the change from annual to biennial
elections; may have been in the same predicament, and perhaps with the
same views that Mr. _Hutchinson_ once acknowledged himself, when in a
letter to _Lord Hillsborough_, he observed, “that the grand difficulty
of making a change in government against the general bent of the people
had caused him to turn his thoughts to a variety of plans, in order to
find one that might be executed in spite of opposition,” and the first
he proposed was that, “instead of annual, the elections should be only
once in three years:” but the Minister had not the hardiness to attempt
such an innovation, even in the revision of colonial charters: nor has
any one ever defended Biennial, Triennial, or Septennial, Elections,
either in the British House of Commons, or in the debates of Provincial
assemblies, on general and free principles: but it is unnecessary
to dwell long on this article, as the best political writers have
supported the principles of annual elections with a precision, that
cannot be confuted, though they may be darkened, by the sophistical
arguments that have been thrown out with design, to undermine all the
barriers of freedom.

2. There is no security in the profered [_sic_] system, either for
the rights of conscience or the liberty of the Press: Despotism
usually while it is gaining ground, will suffer men to think, say, or
write what they please; but when once established, if it is thought
necessary to subserve the purposes, of arbitrary power, the most unjust
restrictions may take place in the first instance, and an _imprimatur_
on the Press in the next, may silence the complaints, and forbid the
most decent remonstrances of an injured and oppressed people.

3. There are no well defined limits of the Judiciary Powers, they seem
to be left as a boundless ocean, that has broken over the chart of
the Supreme Lawgiver, “_thus far shalt thou go and no further_,” and
as they cannot be comprehended by the clearest capacity, or the most
sagacious mind, it would be an Herculean labour to attempt to describe
the dangers with which they are replete.

4. The Executive and the Legislative are so dangerously blended as to
give just cause of alarm, and every thing relative thereto, is couched
in such ambiguous terms—in such vague and indefinite expression, as is
a sufficient ground without any objection, for the reprobation of a
system, that the authors dare not hazard to a clear investigation.

5. The abolition of trial by jury in civil causes.—This mode of trial
the learned Judge Blackstone observes, “has been coeval with the
first rudiments of civil government, that property, liberty and life,
depend on maintaining in its legal force the constitutional trial by
jury.” He bids his readers pause, and with Sir Matthew Hale observes,
how admirably this mode is adapted to the investigation of truth
beyond any other the world can produce. Even the party who have been
disposed to swallow, without examination, the proposals of the _secret
conclave_, have started on a discovery that this essential right was
curtailed; and shall a privilege, the origin of which may be traced to
our Saxon ancestors—that has been a part of the law of nations, even
in the feudatory systems of France, Germany and Italy—and from the
earliest records has been held so sacred, both in ancient and modern
Britain, that it could never be shaken by the introduction of Norman
customs, or any other conquests or change of government—shall this
inestimable privilege be relinquished in America—either thro’ the fear
of inquisition for unaccounted thousands of public monies in the hands
of some who have been officious in the fabrication of the _consolidated
system_, or from the apprehension that some future delinquent possessed
of more power than integrity, may be called to a trial by his peers in
the hour of investigation.

6. Though it has been said by Mr. _Wilson_ and many others, that a
Standing-Army is necessary for the dignity and safety of America, yet
freedom revolts at the idea, when the Divan, or the Despot, may draw
out his dragoons to suppress the murmurs of a few, who may yet cherish
those sublime principles which call forth the exertions, and lead
to the best improvement of the human mind. It is hoped this country
may yet be governed by milder methods than are usually displayed
beneath the bannerets of military law.—Standing armies have been the
nursery of vice and the bane of liberty from the Roman legions to the
establishment of the artful Ximenes, and from the ruin of the Cortes
of Spain, to the planting of the British cohorts in the capitals of
America:—By the edicts of an authority vested in the sovereign power
by the proposed constitution, the militia of the country, the bulwark
of defence, and the security of national liberty is no longer under
the controul of civil authority; but at the rescript of the Monarch,
or the aristocracy, they may either be employed to extort the enormous
sums that will be necessary to support the civil list—to maintain
the regalia of power—and the splendour of the most useless part of
the community, or they may be sent into foreign countries for the
fulfilment of treaties, stipulated by the President and two thirds of
the Senate.

7. Notwithstanding the delusory promise to guarantee a Republican
form of government to every State in the Union—If the most discerning
eye could discover any meaning at all in the engagement, there are
no resources left for the support of internal government, or the
liquidation of the debts of the State. Every source of revenue is in
the monopoly of Congress, and if the several legislatures in their
enfeebled state, should against their own feelings be necessitated to
attempt a dry tax for the payment of their debts, and the support of
internal police, even this may be required for the purposes of the
general government.

8. As the new Congress are empowered to determine their own salaries,
the requisitions for this purpose may not be very moderate, and the
drain for public moneys will probably rise past all calculation: and
it is to be feared when America has consolidated its despotism, the
world will witness the truth of the assertion—“that the pomp of an
eastern monarch may impose on the vulgar who may estimate the force of
a nation by the magnificence of its palaces; but the wise man judges
differently, it is by that very magnificence he estimates its weakness.
He sees nothing more in the midst of this imposing pomp, where the
tyrant sets enthroned, than a sumptuous and mournful decoration of the
dead; the apparatus of a fastuous funeral, in the centre of which is a
cold and lifeless lump of unanimated earth, a phantom of power ready to
disappear before the enemy, by whom it is despised!”

9. There is no provision for a rotation, nor anything to prevent the
perpetuity of office in the same hands for life; which by a little
well timed bribery, will probably be done, to the exclusion of men of
the best abilities from their share in the offices of government.—By
this neglect we lose the advantages of that check to the overbearing
insolence of office, which by rendering him ineligible at certain
periods, keeps the mind of man in equilibrio, and teaches him the
feelings of the governed, and better qualifies him to govern in his
turn.

10. The inhabitants of the United States, are liable to be draged
[_sic_] from the vicinity of their own country, or state, to answer the
litigious or unjust suit of an adversary, on the most distant borders
of the Continent: in short the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Federal Court, includes an unwarrantable stretch of power over the
liberty, life, and property of the subject, through the wide Continent
of America.

11. One Representative to thirty thousand inhabitants is a very
inadequate representation; and every man who is not lost to all sense
of freedom to his country, must reprobate the idea of Congress altering
by law, or on any pretence whatever, interfering with any regulations
for time, places, and manner of choosing our own Representatives.

12. If the sovereignty of America is designed to be elective, the
circumscribing the votes to only ten electors in this State, and
the same proportion in all the others, is nearly tantamount to the
exclusion of the voice of the people in the choice of their first
magistrate. It is vesting the choice solely in an aristocratic junto,
who may easily combine in each State to place at the head of the Union
the most convenient instrument for despotic sway.

13. A Senate chosen for six years will, in most instances, be an
appointment for life, as the influence of such a body over the minds
of the people will be coequal to the extensive powers with which they
are vested, and they will not only forget, but be forgotten by their
constituents—a branch of the Supreme Legislature thus set beyond all
responsibility is totally repugnant to every principle of a free
government.

14. There is no provision by a bill of rights to guard against the
dangerous encroachments of power in too many instances to be named:
but I cannot pass over in silence the insecurity in which we are left
with regard to warrants unsupported by evidence—the daring experiment
of granting _writs of assistance_ in a former arbitrary administration
is not yet forgotten in the Massachusetts; nor can we be so ungrateful
to the memory of the patriots who counteracted their operation, as so
soon after their manly exertions to save us from such a detestable
instrument of arbitrary power, to subject ourselves to the insolence
of any petty revenue officer to enter our houses, search, insult, and
seize at pleasure. We are told by a gentleman of too much virtue and
real probity to suspect he has a design to deceive—“that the whole
constitution is a declaration of rights,”—but mankind must think for
themselves, and to many very judicious and discerning characters, the
whole constitution with very few exceptions appears a perversion of the
rights of particular states, and of private citizens.—But the gentleman
goes on to tell us, “that the primary object is the general government,
and that the rights of individuals are only incidentally mentioned,
and that there was a clear impropriety in being very particular
about them.” But, asking pardon for dissenting from such respectable
authority, who has been led into several mistakes, more from his
predilection in favour of certain modes of government, than from a
want of understanding or veracity. The rights of individuals ought to
be the primary object of all government, and cannot be too securely
guarded by the most explicit declarations in their favor. This has
been the opinion of the Hampdens, the Pyms, and many other illustrious
names, that have stood forth in defence of English liberties; and even
the Italian master in politics, the subtle and renowned Machiavelli
acknowledges, that no republic ever yet stood on a stable foundation
without satisfying the common people.

15. The difficulty, if not impracticability, of exercising the equal
and equitable powers of government by a single legislature over an
extent of territory that reaches from the Mississippi to the Western
lakes, and from them to the Atlantic Ocean, is an insuperable objection
to the adoption of the new system.—Mr. _Hutchinson_, the great champion
for arbitrary power, in the multitude of his machinations to subvert
the liberties of this country, was obliged to acknowledge in one of his
letters, that, “from the extent of country from north to south, the
scheme of one government was impracticable.” But if the authors of the
present visionary project, can by the arts of deception, precipitation
and address, obtain a majority of suffrages in the conventions of the
states to try the hazardous experiment, they may then make the same
inglorious boast with this insidious politician, who may perhaps be
their model, that “the union of the colonies was pretty well broken,
and that he hoped to never see it re[n]ewed.”

16. It is an undisputed fact that not one legislature in the United
States had the most distant idea when they first appointed members for
a convention, entirely commercial, or when they afterwards authorized
them to consider on some amendments of the Federal union, that they
would without any warrant from their constituents, presume on so bold
and daring a stride, as ultimately to destroy the state governments,
and offer a _consolidated system_, irreversible but on conditions that
the smallest degree of penetration must discover to be impracticable.

17. The first appearance of the article which declares the ratification
of nine states sufficient for the establishment of the new system,
wears the face of dissension, is a subversion of the union of
Confederated States, and tends to the introduction of anarchy and civil
convulsions, and may be a means of involving the whole country in
blood.

18. The mode in which this constitution is recommended to the people
to judge without either the advice of Congress, or the legislatures of
the several states is very reprehensible—it is an attempt to force it
upon them before it could be thoroughly understood, and may leave us in
that situation, that in the first moments of slavery in the minds of
the people agitated by the remembrance of their lost liberties, will be
like the sea in a tempest, that sweeps down every mound of security.

But it is needless to enumerate other instances, in which the proposed
constitution appears contradictory to the first principles which
ought to govern mankind; and it is equally so to enquire into the
motives that induced to so bold a step as the annihilation of the
independence and sovereignty of the thirteen distinct states.—They are
but too obvious through the whole progress of the business, from the
first shutting up the doors of the federal convention and resolving
that no member should correspond with gentlemen in the different
states on the subject under discussion; till the trivial proposition
of _recommending_ a few amendments was artfully ushered into the
convention of the Massachusetts. The questions that were then before
that honorable assembly were profound and important, they were of such
magnitude and extent, that the consequences may run parallel with the
existence of the country; and to see them waved and hastily terminated
by a measure too absurd to require a serious refutation, raises the
honest indignation of every true lover of his country. Nor are they
less grieved that the ill policy and arbitrary disposition of some of
the sons of America has thus precipitated to the contemplation and
discussion of questions that no one could rationally suppose would
have been agitated among us till time had blotted out the principles
on which the late revolution was grounded; or till the last traits of
the many political tracts, which defended the separation from Britain,
and the rights of men were consigned to everlasting oblivion. After
the severe conflicts this country has suffered, it is presumed that
they are disposed to make every reasonable sacrifice before the altar
of peace.—But when we contemplate the nature of men and consider
them originally on an equal footing, subject to the same feelings,
stimulated by the same passions, and recollecting the struggles they
have recently made, for the security of their civil rights; it
cannot be expected that the inhabitants of the Massachusetts, can be
easily lulled into a fatal security, by the declamatory effusions of
gentlemen, who, contrary to the experience of all ages would perswade
them there is no danger to be apprehended, from vesting discretionary
powers in the hands of man, which he may, or may not abuse. The very
suggestion, that we ought to trust to the precarious hope of amendments
and redress, after we have voluntarily fixed the shackles on our own
necks should have awakened to a double degree of caution.—This people
have not forgotten the artful insinuations of a former Governor, when
pleading the unlimited authority of parliament before the legislature
of the Massachusetts; nor that his arguments were very similar to some
lately urged by gentlemen who boast of opposing his measures, “_with
halters about their necks_.”

We were then told by him, in all the soft language of insinuation, that
no form of government, of human construction can be perfect—that we
had nothing to fear—that we had no reason to complain—that we had only
to acquiesce in their illegal claims, and to submit to the requisition
of parliament, and doubtless the lenient hand of government would
redress all grievances, and remove the oppressions of the people:—Yet
we soon saw armies of mercenaries encamped on our plains—our commerce
ruined—our harbours blockaded—and our cities burnt. It may be replied
that this was in consequence of an obstinate defence of our privileges;
this may be true; and when the “_ultima ratio_” is called to aid, the
weakest must fall. But let the best informed historian produce an
instance when bodies of men were entrusted with power, and the proper
checks relinquished, if they were ever found destitute of ingenuity
sufficient to furnish pretences to abuse it. And the people at large
are already sensible, that the liberties which America has claimed,
which reason has justified, and which have been so gloriously defended
by the sword of the brave; are not about to fall before the tyranny
of foreign conquest: it is native usurpation that is shaking the
foundations of peace, and spreading the sable curtain of despotism over
the United States. The banners of freedom were erected in the wilds
of America by our ancestors, while the wolf prowled for his prey on
the one hand, and more savage man on the other; they have been since
rescued from the invading hand of foreign power, by the valor and blood
of their posterity; and there was reason to hope they would continue
for ages to illumine a quarter of the globe, by nature kindly separated
from the proud monarchies of Europe, and the infernal darkness of
Asiatic slavery.—And it is to be feared we shall soon see this country
rushing into the extremes of confusion and violence, in consequence of
the proceedings of a set of gentlemen, who disregarding the purposes of
their appointment, have assumed powers unauthorized by any commission,
have unnecessarily rejected the confederation of the United States,
and annihilated the sovereignty and independence of the individual
governments.—The causes which have inspired a few men to assemble for
very different purposes with such a degree of temerity [a]s to break
with a single stroke the union of America, and disseminate the seeds
of discord through the land may be easily investigated, when we survey
the partizans of monarchy in the state conventions, urging the adoption
of a mode of government that militates with the former professions and
exertions of this country, and with all ideas of republicanism, and the
equal rights of men.

Passion, prejudice, and error, are characteristics of human nature;
and as it cannot be accounted for on any principles of philosophy,
religion, or good policy; to these shades in the human character
must be attributed the mad zeal of some, to precipitate to a blind
adoption of the measures of the late federal convention, without
giving opportunity for better information to those who are misled by
influence or ignorance into erroneous opinions.—Litterary talents
may be prostituted, and the powers of genius debased to subserve the
purposes of ambition, or avarice; but the feelings of the heart will
dictate the language of truth, and the simplicity of her accents will
proclaim the infamy of those, who betray the rights of the people,
under the specious, and popular pretence of _justice_, _consolidation_,
and _dignity_.

It is presumed the great body of the people unite in sentiment with
the writer of these observations, who most devoutly prays that public
credit may rear her declining head, and remunerative justice pervade
the land; nor is there a doubt if a free government is continued,
that time and industry will enable both the public and private
debtor to liquidate their arrearages in the most equitable manner.
They wish to see the Confederated States bound together by the most
indissoluble union, but without renouncing their separate sovereignties
and independence, and becoming tributaries to a consolidated fabrick
of aristocratick tyranny.—They wish to see government established,
and peaceably holding the reins with honour, energy, and dignity;
but they wish for no _federal city_ whose “_cloud cap’t towers_” may
screen the state culprit from the hand of justice; while its exclusive
jurisdiction may protect the riot of armies encamped within its
limits.—They deprecate discord and civil convulsions, but they are not
yet generally prepared with the ungrateful Israelites to ask a King,
nor are their spirits sufficiently broken to yield the best of their
olive grounds to his servants, and to see their sons appointed to run
before his chariots—It has been observed by a zealous advocate for the
new system, that most governments are the result of fraud or violence,
and this with design to recommend its acceptance—but has not almost
every step towards its fabrication been fraudulent in the extreme?
Did not the prohibition strictly enjoined by the general Convention,
that no member should make any communication to his Constituents, or
to gentlemen of consideration and abilities in the other States, bear
evident marks of fraudulent designs?—This circumstance is regretted in
strong terms by Mr. Martin, a member from Maryland, who acknowledges
“He had no idea that all the wisdom, integrity, and virtue of the
States was contained in that Convention, and that he wished to have
corresponded with gentlemen of eminent political characters abroad, and
to give their sentiments due weight”—he adds, “so extremely solicitous
were they, that their proceedings should not transpire, that the
members were prohibited from taking copies of their resolutions, or
extracts from the Journals, without express permission, by vote.”—And
the hurry with which it has been urged to the acceptance of the people,
without giving time, by adjournments, for better information, and
more unanimity has a deceptive appearance; and if finally driven to
resistance, as the only alternative between that and servitude, till in
the confusion of discord, the reins should be seized by the violence
of some enterprizing genius, that may sweep down the last barrier of
liberty, it must be added to the score of criminality with which
the fraudulent usurpation at Philadelphia, may be chargeable.—Heaven
avert such a tremendous ... [scene] and let us still hope a more
happy termination of the present ferment:—may the people be calm and
wait a legal redress; may the mad transport of some of our infatuated
capitals subside; and every influential character through the States,
make the most prudent exertions for a new general Convention, who may
vest adequate powers in Congress, for all national purposes, without
annihilating the individual governments, and drawing blood from every
pore by taxes, impositions and illegal restrictions.—This step might
again re-establish the Union, restore tranquility to the ruffled mind
of the inhabitants, and save America from the distresses, dreadful
even in contemplation.—“The great art of governing is to lay aside
all prejudices and attachments to particular opinions, classes or
individual characters to consult the spirit of the people; to give
way to it; and in so doing, to give it a turn capable of inspiring
those sentiments, which may induce them to relish a change, which
an alteration of circumstances may hereafter make necessary.”—The
education of the advocates for monarchy should have taught them, and
their memory should have suggested that “monarchy is a species of
government fit only for a people too much corrupted by luxury, avarice,
and a passion for pleasure, to have any love for their country, and
whose vices the fear of punishment alone is able to restrain; but by
no means calculated for a nation that is poor, and at the same time
tenacious of their liberty—animated with a disgust to tyranny—and
inspired with the generous feeling of patriotism and liberty, and
at the same time, like the ancient Spartans have been hardened by
temperance and manly exertions, and equally despising the fatigues of
the field, and the fear of enemies,”—and while they change their ground
they should recollect, that Aristocracy is a still more formidable foe
to public virtue, and the prosperity of a nation—that under such a
government her patriots become mercenaries—her soldiers, cowards, and
the people slaves.—Though several State Conventions have assented to,
and ratified, yet the voice of the people appears at present strong
against the adoption of the Constitution.—By the chicanery, intrigue,
and false colouring of those who plume themselves, more on their
education and abilities, than their political, patriotic, or private
virtues—by the imbecility of some, and the duplicity of others, a
majority of the Convention of Massachusetts have been flattered with
the ideas of amendments, when it will be too late to complain—While
several very worthy characters, too timid for their situation,
magnified the hopeless alternative, between the dissolution of the
bands of all government, and receiving the proferred system _in toto_,
after long endeavouring to reconcile it to their consciences, swallowed
the indigestible panacea, and in a kind of sudden desperation lent
their signature to the dereliction of the honourable station they held
in the Union, and have broken over the solemn compact, by which they
were bound to support their own excellent constitution till the period
of revision. Yet Virginia, equally large and respectable, and who
have done honour to themselves, by their vigorous exertions from the
first dawn of independence, have not yet acted upon the question; they
have wisely taken time to consider before they introduce innovations
of a most dangerous nature:—her inhabitants are brave, her burgesses
are free, and they have a Governor who dares to think for himself,
and to speak his opinion (without first pouring libations on the
altar of popularity) though it should militate with some of the most
accomplished and illustrious characters.

Maryland, who has no local interest to lead her to adopt, will
doubtless reject the system—I hope the same characters still live,
and that same spirit which dictated to them a wise and cautious care,
against sudden revolutions in government, and made them the last State
that acceded to the independence of America, will lead them to support
what they so deliberately claimed.—Georgia apprehensive of a war with
the Savages, has acceded in order to insure protection.—Pennsylvania
has struggled through much in the same manner, as the Massachusetts,
against the manly feelings, and the masterly reasonings of a very
respectable part of the Convention: They have adopted the system, and
seen some of its authors burnt in effigy—their towns thrown into riot
and confusion, and the minds of the people agitated by apprehension and
discord.

New Jersey and Delaware have united in the measure, from the locality
of their situation, and the selfish motives which too generally govern
mankind; the Federal City, and the seat of government, will naturally
attract the intercourse of strangers—the youth of enterprize, and the
wealth of the nation to the central States.

Connecticut has pushed it through with the precipitation of her
neighbour, with few dissentient voices;—but more from irritation and
resentment to a sister State, perhaps partiality to herself in her
commercial regulations, than from a comprehensive view of the system,
as a regard to the welfare of all.—But New York has motives, that will
undoubtedly lead her to rejection, without being afraid to appeal to
the understanding of mankind, to justify the grounds of their refusal
to adopt a Constitution, that even the framers dare not to risque
to the hazard of revision, amendment, or reconsideration, least the
whole superstructure should be demolished by more skilful and discreet
architects.—I know not what part the Carolinas will take; but I hope
their determinations will comport with the dignity and freedom of
this country—their decisions will have great weight in the scale.—But
equally important are the small States of New Hampshire and Rhode
Island:—New York, the Carolinas, Virginia, Maryland, and these two
lesser States may yet support the liberties of the Continent; if they
refuse a ratification or postpone their proceedings till the spirits
of the community have time to cool, there is little doubt but the wise
measure of another federal convention will be adopted, when the members
would have the advantage of viewing, at large, through the medium of
truth, the objections that have been made from various quarters; such a
measure might be attended with the most salutary effects, and prevent
the dread consequences of civil feuds.—But even if some of those large
states should hastily accede, yet we have frequently seen in the story
of revolution, relief spring from a quarter least expected.

Though the virtues of a Cato could not save Rome, nor the abilities
of a Padilla defend the citizens of Castile from falling under the
yoke of Charles; yet a _Tell_ once suddenly rose from a little obscure
city, and boldly rescued the liberties of his country.—Every age
has its Bruti and its Decii, as well as its Caesars and Sejani:—The
happiness of mankind depends much on the modes of government, and the
virtues of the governors; and America may yet produce characters who
have genius and capacity sufficient to form the manners and correct
the morals of the people, and virtue enough to lead their country to
freedom. Since their dismemberment from the British empire, America
has, in many instances, resembled the conduct of a restless, vigorous,
luxurious youth, prematurely emancipated from the authority of a
parent, but without the experience necessary to direct him to act
with dignity or discretion. Thus we have seen her break the shackles
of foreign dominion, and all the blessings of peace restored on the
most honourable terms: She acquired the liberty of framing her own
laws, choosing her own magistrates, and adopting manners and modes of
government the most favourable to the freedom and happiness of society.
But how little have we availed ourselves of these superior advantages:
The glorious fabric of liberty successfully reared with so much labor
and assiduity totters to the foundation, and may be blown away as
the bubble of fancy by the rude breath of military combinations, and
politicians of yesterday.

It is true this country lately armed in opposition to regal
despotism—impoverished by the expences of a long war, and unable
immediately to fulfil their public or private engagements that appeared
in some instances, with a boldness of spirit that seemed to set at
defiance all authority, government, or order, on the one hand; while on
the other, there has been, not only a secret wish, but an open avowal
of the necessity of drawing the reins of government much too taut, not
only for a republicanism, but for a wise and limited monarchy.—But the
character of this people is not averse to a degree of subordination,
the truth of this appears from the easy restoration of tranquility,
after a dangerous insurrection in one of the states; this also evinces
a little necessity of a complete revolution of government throughout
the union. But it is a republican principle that the majority should
rule; and if a spirit of moderation should be cultivated on both
sides, till the voice of the people at large could be fairly heard
it should be held sacred.—And if, on such a scrutiny, the proposed
constitution should appear repugnant to their character and wishes;
if they, in the language of a late elegant pen, should acknowledge
that “no confusion in my mind, is more terrible to them than the stern
disciplined regularity and vaunted police of arbitrary governments,
where every heart is depraved by fear, where mankind dare not assume
their natural characters, where the free spirit must crouch to the
slave in office, where genius must repress her effusions, or like the
Egyptian worshippers, offer them in sacrifice to the calves in power,
and where the human mind, always in shackles, shrinks from every
generous effort.” Who would then have the effrontery to say, it ought
not to be thrown out with indignation, however some respectable names
have appeared to support it.—But if after all, on a dispassionate and
fair discussion, the people generally give their voice for a voluntary
dereliction of their privileges, let every individual who chooses
the active scenes of life, strive to support the peace and unanimity
of his country, though every other blessing may expire—And while the
statesman is plodding for power, and the courtier practising the arts
of dissimulation without check—while the rapacious are growing rich by
oppression, and fortune throwing her gifts into the lap of fools, let
the sublimer characters, the philosophic lovers of freedom who have
wept over her exit, retire to the calm shades of contemplation, there
they may look down with pity on the inconsistency of human nature, the
revolutions of states, the rise of kingdoms, and the fall of empires.


FOOTNOTES:

[1] Charles Warren, “Elbridge Gerry, James Warren, Mercy Warren and the
Ratification of the Federal Constitution in Massachusetts,” M.H.S.,
_Proceedings, 1930-1932_, pp. 143-144. The newspaper was the _New York
Journal_, April 2, 1788, _et seq._

[2] For a recent good analysis of the Anti-Federalist position see
Cecelia M. Kenyon, “Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the
Nature of Representative Government,” _William and Mary Quarterly_
(January, 1955), pp. 3-43.

[3] See Mrs. Mercy Warren, _History of the Rise, Progress and
Termination of the American Revolution_ ..., three volumes (Boston,
1805), III, pp. 364-366.

[4] See Paul L. Ford, ed., _Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United
States_ ... (Brooklyn, N. Y., 1888). He attributes the pamphlet, there
reprinted in its entirety, to Gerry. See again Charles Warren, _op.
cit._, pp. 143-144, 157-159, and Mrs. Mercy Warren, _History_ ..., III,
pp. 360, ff.



  Transcriber’s Notes

  pg 5 Changed: behold the insiduous arts
            to: behold the insidious arts

  pg 8 Changed: though they may be darkned
            to: though they may be darkened

  pg 8 Changed: an imprimator on the Press
            to: an imprimatur on the Press

  pg 8 Changed: bids his readers pauze
            to: bids his readers pause

  pg 8 Changed: the fewdatory systems of France
            to: the feudatory systems of France

  pg 10 Changed: the appelate jurisdiction
             to: the appellate jurisdiction

  pg 12 Changed: Italian master in politicks
             to: Italian master in politics

  pg 12 Changed: subtle and renouned
             to: subtle and renowned

  pg 20 Changed: government much too taught
             to: government much too taut




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