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Title: Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil, - from Spanish and Portuguese Domination, Volume 2
Author: Dundonald, Thomas Cochrane, Earl of, 1775-1860
Language: English
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LIBERATION OF CHILI, PERU AND BRAZIL, FROM SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE
DOMINATION, VOLUME 2***
NARRATIVE OF SERVICES IN THE LIBERATION OF CHILI, PERU, AND BRAZIL,
FROM SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE DOMINATION
by
THOMAS, EARL OF DUNDONALD, G.C.B.
Admiral of the Red; Rear-Admiral of the Fleet, etc. etc.
VOL. II
MDCCCLIX
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I.
Brazilian and Portuguese factions--Don Pedro ordered to quit
Brazil--Appointed "Perpetual Protector"--Proclaimed Emperor of
Brazil--Efforts to obtain foreign officers and seamen--The naval command
offered to me--Acceptation thereof--Arrival at Rio de Janeiro--Visit of
inspection to the squadron--Condition of the vessels--Inferiority of
seamen--Imperial affability--Attempt to evade the terms offered me--This
failing, to reduce the value of my pay--Pretended commission
conferred--And refused--The point argued--I decline the command--The
Prime Minister gives in--Explanatory Portaria--Formal commission--Orders
to blockade Bahia--Portuguese faction--Averse to me from the outset.
CHAPTER II.
Attempt to cut off the enemy's ships--Disobedience to orders--Letter to
the Prime Minister--Worthlessness of the men--Their treachery--Blockade
established--Equipment of fireships--Enemy's supplies cut
off--Portuguese untrustworthy--Demonstrations of the enemy--His
pretended contempt for us--The enemy returns to port--Their
consternation at the fireships--Portuguese contemplate attacking
us--Flagship reconnoitres enemy at anchor--Excessive alarm at my
nocturnal visit--Proclamation of the Commandant--Consternation in the
city--The authorities decide on evacuating Bahia--Instructions to the
Brazilian Captains--Warnings addressed to the authorities--Enemy quits
Bahia--Readiness for chase--Numbers of the enemy--Capture of the
Convoy--Prizes disabled--Attempt of troops to escape--Prizes sent to
Pernambuco--Pursuit discontinued--Reasons for going to Maranham--Reasons
for not taking more prizes--Advantages to the Empire.
CHAPTER III.
Capture of the Don Miguel--Summons to the authorities--Reasons for
threats held out--Proposals for capitulation--Proclamations--Terms
granted to Portuguese garrison--Declaration of Independence--Portuguese
troops ordered to embark--Symptoms of disobeying the order--Delight of
the people on becoming free--Election of a Provisional
Government--Letters to the Minister of Marine.
CHAPTER IV.
Captain Grenfell sent to summon Parà--The Junta demands the prize
property--My refusal--Imperial approval of my services--Realisation of
prize property--Turi Assu sends in its adhesion--Money captured lent to
the Junta--Its return to the squadron expected--Possession taken of
Parà--Insurrection at Parà--Misconduct of the Maranham Junta--Their
persecution of the Portuguese--Steps in consequence--Manifestation of
the national delight--The Marquisate conferred on me--Vote of thanks by
the Assemblea Geral--My arrival at Rio de Janeiro--Satisfaction with my
services--Lady Cochrane joins me.
CHAPTER V.
First effort to curtail the Imperial power--Portuguese
intrigue--Dismissal of the Andradas--The Assembly dissolved by
force--Exile of the Andradas--Letter to his Imperial Majesty--My advice
partly adopted--and causes ministerial enmity towards me--Ratification
of my patent--I demand the adjudication of prizes--Letter to the
Minister of Marine--Offer of personal advantage to foreign
claims--Squadron remained unpaid--I am appointed a Privy Councillor--The
prize vessels plundered--Shameful treatment of Captain
Grenfell--Troubles in Pernambuco--Hostility of the Prize
Tribunal--Condemns me to the restitution of prizes--Forbids making any
capture at all.
CHAPTER VI.
Remonstrance against decree of Prize Tribunal--Settlement of prize
question by the Emperor--His Ministers refuse to conform to
it--Obstacles thrown in the way of equipment--My services limited to the
duration of war--My remonstrance on this breach of faith--Ministers
refuse to pay the squadron anything--A fresh insult offered to me--Offer
to resign the command--My resignation evaded--Letter to the Prime
Minister--Letter to the Minister of Marine.
CHAPTER VII.
Ministerial malignity towards me--Dangers in Pernambuco--Portuguese
threats--My advice thereon--Failure in Manning the squadron--Plot formed
to search the flagship--Timely warning thereon--I demand his Majesty's
interference--Which was promptly granted--Protest against prize
decisions--My advice sought as regards Pernambuco--Letter to his
Imperial Majesty--Pointing out the annoyance practised--And tendering my
resignation--The Emperor's intervention--His Ministers neglect to fulfil
his engagement--Confirmation of my previous patents--But with an
unjustifiable reservation--Prize money devoted to advance of
wages--Proofs thereof--Baseless imputations on me--Extracts from
log--Further distribution of prize money.
CHAPTER VIII.
Republican Government proclaimed at Pernambuco--Its Concordat--The
President Carvalho--Threat of Bombardment--A bribe offered to me and
refused--The revolt admitted of palliation--It was fast becoming
general--Intimidation ineffectual--The revolutionists expect Foreign
aid--Pernambuco taken possession of--- Payment of prize money--The
accounts rendered in due course--Orders to put down revolt at
Parà--Character of the revolution--Difficulty in finding proper
Governors--Revolt at Cearà--Steps taken to suppress it--They prove
successful--The insurgent leader killed--Measures for preserving
tranquillity.
CHAPTER IX.
Arrival at Maranham--Character of disturbances there--I assume the
military command--Proclamation commanding surrender of arms--Condition
of the people--Corruption of the authorities--Murderous
propensities--Difficulty in detecting assassins--Letter to Minister of
Marine--Pacification of Parahyba--Doubts as to the President's
sincerity--He establishes secret agencies--Extraordinary
memorials--Public complaints of the President--Bruce endeavours to
intercept them--My reply to the memorialists--Letter to the Minister of
Marine--Enclosing complaints of the Consuls--Bruce prepares to resist
my authority--Complaints of the British Consul--He considers my presence
necessary--Letter of the French Consul--Detailing shameful
atrocities--Danger of collision with foreign states--Suspension of the
President--Provision for future Government--Conduct of the faction at
Rio de Janeiro--No instructions sent for my guidance--Letter to the
Minister of Marine--The Ministry had previously deposed Bruce--But
turned on me for anticipating their own act.
CHAPTER X.
Misrepresentations made in England--Letter to the Emperor--Tendering my
resignation--Repayment demanded from the Junta--Conduct of the Prize
Tribunal--No adjudication of prizes intended--Letter to the interim
President--Demanding the sums owing to the squadron--Disturbance in
Parà--Statement of Account to the Junta--Offer of compromise--Imperial
decree--Right of the squadron to the claim.
CHAPTER XI.
Imperial approval--Continued enmity of the Administration--Junta refuses
to pay the squadron's claim--I persevere in the demand--Junta agrees to
pay the amount in bills--This refused--Arrival of a new President--But
without authority for the assumption--Intrigues to establish him in
office--I order him to quit the province--And send him to Parà--Letter
to the President of Cearà--International animosities--The squadron left
to provide for itself--Abuse of authority--Explanations to Minister of
Marine--Of transactions at Maranham--Letter to Carvalho e
Mello--Anticipating ministerial displeasure--The Junta reimburses part
of its debt.
CHAPTER XII.
I quit Maranham for a cruise--Bad state of the frigate--Connivance at
illicit trade--We are compelled to proceed to England--The frigate
reported to the Brazilian Envoy--Who cheats me of £2,000--His assumption
that I had abandoned the service--My contradiction thereof--Order to
return to Rio--Reasons for not doing so--Brazilian Envoy tampers with my
Officer--Who acquaints me therewith--Envoy stops pay and
provisions--Declares that the Brazilian Government will give me
nothing!--Captain Shepherd's reply--I prepare to return to Rio--The
Envoy dismisses me from the service--Without reason assigned--He
declares that I voluntarily abandoned the service--Receipts for accounts
transmitted to Brazil--These denied to have been sent.
CHAPTER XIII.
I am dismissed the service by the Brazilian Government--Without any
acknowledgment of my services--Inconsistency of this with former
thanks--Though dismissed I am tried as a deserter--And am refused all
compensation--Report of recent Commission on the subject--False
representations--But partially true conclusions--My original patents
never set aside--Untrue assumptions as to my dismissal--My claims
founded on the original patents--Less than half the interest due
paid--Opinions of eminent Brazilians thereon--My services tardily
acknowledged--No act of mine had annulled them--The Estate conferred,
not confirmed--Promises on account of Chili unfulfilled--The whole still
my right.
CHAPTER XIV.
Proclamation for payment of Officers and Men--Log extracts in proof
thereof--The sum given up to the squadron disbursed--Denial thereof by
the Brazilian Government--Though made to serve as advance of wages--The
amount received at Maranham--Fully accounted for--By the receipts of the
Officers--Officers' receipts--Extracts from log in further
corroboration--Up to my arrival in England--All our prizes, monopolized
by Brazil--The conduct of the Brazilian Government unjustifiable.
CHAPTER I.
BRAZILIAN AND PORTUGUESE FACTIONS--DON PEDEO ORDERED TO QUIT
BRAZIL--APPOINTED "PERPETUAL PROTECTOR"--PROCLAIMED EMPEROR OF
BRAZIL--EFFORTS TO OBTAIN FOREIGN OFFICERS AND SEAMEN--THE NAVAL COMMAND
OFFERED TO ME--ACCEPTATION THEREOF--ARRIVAL AT RIO DE JANEIRO--VISIT OF
INSPECTION TO THE SQUADRON--CONDITION OF THE VESSELS--INFERIORITY OF
SEAMEN--IMPERIAL AFFABILITY--ATTEMPT TO EVADE THE TERMS OFFERED ME--THIS
FAILING, TO REDUCE THE VALUE OF MY PAY--PRETENDED COMMISSION
CONFERRED--AND REFUSED--THE POINT ARGUED--I DECLINE THE COMMAND--THE
PRIME MINISTER GIVES IN--EXPLANATORY FORTARIA--FORMAL COMMISSION--ORDERS
TO BLOCKADE BAHIA--PORTUGUESE FACTION--AVERSE TO ME FROM THE OUTSET.
Although these memoirs relate to personal services in Brazil, it is
nevertheless essential, in order to their comprehension, briefly to
recapitulate a few events which more immediately led to my connection
with the cause of independence in that country.
The expulsion of the Portuguese Royal Family from Lisbon, in consequence
of the occupation of Portugal by the armies of the French Republic, was
followed by the accession of Don John VI. to the throne of Portugal
whilst resident in Rio de Janeiro.
Twelve months previous to my arrival in Brazil, His Majesty returned to
Portugal, leaving his son and heir-apparent, Don Pedro, regent of the
Portuguese possessions in South America, which had been for some time in
a state of disaffection, arising from a growing desire throughout the
various provinces for a distinct nationality. Hence two opposing
interests had arisen,--a Brazilian party, which had for its object
national independence; and a Portuguese party, whose aim was to prevent
separation from the mother country--or, if this could not be
accomplished, so to paralyse the efforts of the Brazilians, that in case
of revolt it might not be difficult for Portugal to keep in subjection,
at least the Northern portion of her South American Colonies. It will be
necessary, in the course of the narrative, to bear these party
distinctions clearly in mind.
As the Regent, Don Pedro, was supposed to evince a leaning to the
Brazilian party, he gave proportionate offence to the Portuguese
faction, which--though inferior in number, was, from its wealth and
position, superior in influence; hence the Regent found himself involved
in disputes with the latter, which in June 1821 compelled him to submit
to some humiliations.
Shortly previous to this, the Cortes at Lisbon--aware of what was going
on in Brazil, and disregarding the temperate views of the King--issued a
declaration inviting the Brazilian municipalities to repudiate the
Regent's authority at Rio de Janeiro, and to adhere to the immediate
administration of the Cortes alone--thus indicating a course to be
pursued by the Portuguese faction in Brazil. The result was--as had been
anticipated--disunion amongst the people, consequent on the formation of
petty provincial governments; each refusing to pay revenue to the
central Government at Rio de Janeiro, for the alleged reason that the
Regent was only waiting an opportunity to invest himself with absolute
power. This opinion was eagerly adopted by the commercial
class--consisting almost exclusively of native Portuguese--in the hope
that the Cortes would reinvest them with their ancient trade privileges
and monopolies, to the exclusion of foreigners, whom they considered as
interlopers--the English especially, who, protected by a treaty of
commerce, were fast undermining the former monopolists. Amidst these
difficulties Don Pedro, though nominally Regent of Brazil, found
himself, in reality, little more than Governor of Rio de Janeiro.
In July 1821, the Lisbon Cortes passed a decree, that thenceforth the
Brazilian and Portuguese armies should form one body; the object being
to ship the Brazilian troops to Portugal, and to send Portuguese troops
to Brazil, thereby ensuring its subjection. The Regent was, moreover,
ordered to return to Portugal.
These rash steps greatly irritated the native Brazilians, who saw in
them a subversion of all their hopes of nationality. With scarcely less
rashness, they issued proclamations declaring Brazil independent, with
Don Pedro as Emperor; but he repudiated the act, and prepared to quit
Brazil in obedience to orders.
The approaching departure of the Regent caused a general ferment, when a
popular leader arose in the person of José Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva,
vice-president of the provisional Junta at San Paulo. Summoning his
colleagues at midnight, they signed an address to the Regent--to the
effect that his departure would be the signal for a declaration of
independence--daring the Cortes at Lisbon to promulgate laws for the
dismemberment of Brazil into insignificant provinces, possessing no
common centre of union; above all, daring them to dispossess Don Pedro
of the authority of Regent conferred by his august father. This address
was conveyed to the Prince by Bonifacio himself, and was shortly
afterwards followed by others of a similar nature from the Southern
provinces, and from the municipality of Rio de Janeiro--all begging him
to remain and avert the consequences of the late decrees of the Cortes.
On more deliberate reflection Don Pedro consented, and was shortly
afterwards invested with the title of "Perpetual Protector and Defender
of Brazil."
Meanwhile the Cortes, confident in their own power, were enforcing their
obnoxious decrees by the despatch of ships of war and troops to the
Northern provinces. As the intention of this step was unmistakeable, His
Royal Highness the Protector promptly issued a manifesto, declaring the
wish of Brazil to maintain an amicable union with Portugal, but at the
same time calling on the Brazilians to secure their independence by
force, if necessary. In furtherance of this determination, an attack was
made by the Brazilian troops upon General Madeira, the Portuguese
commandant at Bahia, but from want of proper military organization, it
proved unsuccessful.
Despatches now arrived from Portugal, which cut off every hope of
reconciliation, and on the 12th of October, Don Pedro was induced to
accept the title of "Constitutional Emperor of Brazil," with Bonifacio
de Andrada as his Minister of the Interior, of Justice, and of Foreign
Affairs.
The Southern provinces gave in their adhesion to the Emperor, but all
the Northern provinces--including Bahia, Maranham, and Parà--were still
held by Portuguese troops; a numerous and well appointed squadron
commanding the seaboard, and effectually preventing the despatch of
Brazilian forces to those localities by water; whilst by land there were
neither roads, nor other facilities of communication with the Northern
patriots, who were thus isolated from effectual aid, could such have
been rendered from Rio de Janeiro.
His Imperial Majesty saw that, without a fleet, the dismemberment of the
Empire--as regarded the Northern provinces--was inevitable; and the
energy of his minister Bonifacio in preparing a squadron, was as
praiseworthy as had been the Emperor's sagacity in determining upon its
creation. A voluntary subscription was enthusiastically entered into;
artisans flocked into the dockyard; the only ship of the line in the
harbour required to be nearly rebuilt; but to man that and other
available vessels with native seamen was impossible--the policy of the
mother country having been to carry on even the coasting trade
exclusively by Portuguese, who could not now be relied on by Brazil, in
the approaching contest with their own countrymen.
Orders were consequently sent to the Brazilian _chargé d'affaires_ in
London, to engage officers and seamen there; and to stimulate these, a
decree was, on the 11th of December, 1822, issued by His Imperial
Majesty, to sequestrate Portuguese property throughout the Empire, and
also another, _that all prizes taken in the war should become the
property of the captors_, which decrees must be borne in mind.
His Imperial Majesty, having ascertained that the War of Independence in
the Pacific had been brought to a successful conclusion by the squadron
under my command, ordered his minister, Bonifacio, to communicate with
me, through the Brazilian Consul at Buenos Ayres; judging that, from the
termination of hostilities in the Pacific, I might be at liberty to
organize a naval force in Brazil, which--if properly conducted--might
successfully cope with the Portuguese fleet protecting the Northern
harbours of the Empire.
Accordingly, whilst residing on my estate at Quintera, in Chili, I
received from Antonio Manuel Correa, the Brazilian Consul at Buenos
Ayres, a letter on the part of His Imperial Majesty, inviting me to
accept service under the Brazilian flag, guaranteeing moreover rank and
position in no way inferior to that which I then held under the Republic
of Chili; the Consul exhorting me, in addition, "to throw myself upon
the munificence of the Emperor, and the undoubted probity of His
Majesty's Government, which would do me justice." The following is one
of the letters of invitation:--
_Le Conseiller Agent du Brésil, près le Gouvernement de Buenos Ayres
à l'Amiral Lord Cochrane, Commandant-en-Chef les forces navales de
la République du Chili._
MILORD,
Le Brésil, puissance du premier ordre devint un nouvel empire, une
nation indépendente sous le légitime héritier de la monarchie,
Pierre le Grand, son auguste defenseur.
C'est par son ordre--c'est de sa part, et en vertu des dépêches
ministériales, que je viens de reçevoir de Monseigneur Joseph
Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva, Ministre de l'Intérieur et des
Relations Extérieures du Brésil, en date du 13 Septembre
dernier--que j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser cette note; en laquelle
votre Grace est invitée, pour--et de part le Gouvernement du
Brésil--à accepter le service de la nation Brésilienne; chez qui je
suis dûment autorisé à vous assurer le rang et le grade nullement
inférieur à celui que vous tenez de la République.
Abandonnez vous, Milord, à la reconnaisance Brésilienne; à la
munificence du Prince; à la probité sans tache de l'actuel
Gouvernement; on vous fera justice; on ne rabaissera d'un seul point
la haute considération--Rang--grade--caractère--et avantages qui
vous sont dûs.
(Signé) ANTONIO MANUEL CORREA DA CAMARA, Consul de l'Empire du
Brésil, à Buenos Ayres, 4 Novembre, 1822.
Annoyed by the ingratitude with which my services were requited in
Chili, and disliking the inaction consequent on the capture of Valdivia,
followed by the annihilation of the Spanish naval force at Callao, and
elsewhere in the Pacific--whereby internal peace had been obtained for
Chili, and independence for Peru--I felt gratified by the further terms
of invitation, contained in a second letter--"Venez, milord, l'honneur
vous invite--la gloire vous appelle. Venez--donner à nos armés navales
cet ordre merveilleux et discipline incomparable de puissante Albion"
--and on mature consideration returned the following reply:--
Valparaiso, Nov. 29, 1832.
Sir,
The war in the Pacific having been happily terminated by the total
destruction of the Spanish naval force, I am, of course, free for
the crusade of liberty in any other quarter of the globe.
I confess, however, that I had not hitherto directed my attention
to the Brazils; considering that the struggle for the liberties of
Greece--the most oppressed of modern states--afforded the fairest
opportunity for enterprise and exertion.
I have to-day tendered my ultimate resignation to the Government of
Chili, and am not at this moment aware that any material delay will
be necessary, previous to my setting off, by way of Cape Horn, for
Rio de Janeiro, calling at Buenos Ayres, where I hope to have the
pleasure of meeting you, and where we may talk further on this
subject; it being, in the meantime, understood that I hold myself
free to decline--as well as entitled to accept--the offer which
has, through you, been made to me by His Imperial Majesty. I only
mention this from a desire to preserve a consistence of character,
should the Government (which I by no means anticipate) differ so
widely in its nature from those which I have been in the habit of
supporting, as to render the proposed situation repugnant to my
principles--and so justly expose me to suspicion, and render me
unworthy the confidence of His Majesty and the nation.
(Signed) COCHRANE.
To Don ANTONIO MANUEL COEREA DA CAMARA, His Brazilian Majesty's
Consul at Buenos Ayres.
Having obtained the unqualified consent of the Chilian Government--there
being now no enemy in the Pacific--- I chartered a vessel for my own
conveyance, and that of several valuable officers and seamen who,
preferring to serve under my command, desired to accompany me. Knowing
that the Portuguese were making great efforts to re-establish their
authority in Brazil, no time was lost in quitting Chili.
We reached Rio de Janeiro on the 13th of March, 1822, barely six months
after the declaration of Independence. Despatching a letter to the Prime
Minister Bonifacio de Andrada--reporting my arrival in conformity with
the invitation which His Imperial Majesty had caused to be transmitted
to me through his Consul-General at Buenos Ayres--I was honoured by the
Imperial command to attend His Majesty at the house of his Minister,
where a complimentary reception awaited me. The Emperor assured me that,
so far as the ships themselves were concerned, the squadron was nearly
ready for sea; but that good officers and seamen were wanting; adding,
that, if I thought proper to take the command, he would give the
requisite directions to his Minister of Marine.
On the following day, the Prime Minister--after a profusion of
compliments on my professional reputation, and an entire concurrence
with the invitation forwarded to me by the Consul at Buenos Ayres--which
invitation he stated to have arisen from his own influence with the
Emperor--desired me to communicate personally with him, upon all matters
of importance, the Minister of Marine being merely appointed to transact
subordinate business. As nothing more positive was said in relation to
my appointment, it struck me that this also might be included amongst
the subordinate duties of the Minister of Marine, to whose house I
repaired; but he could say nothing on the subject, as nothing specific
had been laid before him. Being desirous to come to a proper
understanding, I wrote to the Prime Minister, that the officers who had
accompanied me from Chili would expect the same rank, pay, and
emoluments as they had there enjoyed; that, as regarded myself, I was
prepared to accept the terms offered by His Imperial Majesty, through
the Consul at Buenos Ayres, viz. the same position, pay, and emoluments
as had been accorded to me by the Chilian Government; and that although
I felt myself entitled to the customary remuneration in all
well-regulated states for extraordinary, as well as ordinary, services,
yet I was more anxious to learn the footing on which the naval service
was to be put, than the nature of any stipulations regarding myself.
On the following day His Imperial Majesty invited me at an early hour to
the palace, in order to accompany him on a visit to the ships of war,
with some of which I was much pleased, as demonstrative of the exertions
which must have been made within a short time to get them into such
creditable condition. Great care had evidently been bestowed upon the
_Pedro Primiero_, rated as a 74--though in the English service she would
have been termed a 64. She was evidently a good sailer, and was ready
for sea, with four months provisions on board, which scarcely half
filled her hold, such was her capacity for stowage; I had therefore
reason to be satisfied with my intended flagship.
Another showy vessel was the _Maria da Gloria_--a North American
clipper; a class of vessels in those days little calculated to do
substantial service, being built of unseasoned wood, and badly fastened.
Though mounting 32 guns, she was a ship of little force, having only
24-pounder carronades, mixed with short 18-pounder guns. As a redeeming
feature, she was commanded by a Frenchman, Captain Beaurepaire, who had
contrived to rally round him some of his own countrymen, mingled with
native Brazilians--in which he displayed considerable tact to free
himself from the unpromising groups elsewhere to be selected from.
The history of this vessel was not a little curious: she had been built
in North America at the expense of the Chilian Government, and sent to
Buenos Ayres, where an additional 40,000 dollars was demanded by her
owners. Payment of this was demurred to, when, without the slightest
consideration for the expense incurred by Chili in her building and
equipment, her captain suddenly got under weigh, and proceeding to Rio
de Janeiro, sold her to the Brazilian Government.
I was further much pleased with the _Piranga_, a noble frigate mounting
long 24-pounders on the main deck. Not to enter into any further
details, with regard to the ships, a brief notice must be taken of the
men, who, with the exception of the crew of the _Maria da Gloria_, were
of a very questionable description,--consisting of the worst class of
Portuguese, with whom the Brazilian portion of the men had an evident
disinclination to mingle. On inquiry, I ascertained that their pay was
only eight milreas per month, whereas in the merchant service, eighteen
milreas was the current rate for good seamen,--whence it naturally
followed that the wooden walls of Brazil were to be manned with the
refuse of the merchant service. The worst kind of saving--false
economy--had evidently established itself in the Brazilian Naval
Administration.
The captains complained of the difficulties they had to contend with as
regarded the crews, particularly that the marines were so much gentlemen
that they considered themselves degraded by cleaning their own berths,
and had demanded and obtained attendants to wait on them! whilst they
could only be punished for offences by their own officers! or, to use
the words of one of the captains, "They were very much their own
masters, and seemed inclined to be his!" It was, indeed, evident to me
that neither seamen nor marines were in any state of discipline.
Not having as yet had experience of political party in the Empire, it
struck me as an anomaly that Portuguese should be employed in such
numbers to fight their own countrymen, though I afterwards became but
too well acquainted with the cause of a proceeding at the time beyond my
comprehension. In the course of our visit of inspection, the phrase
"attacking the Portuguese parliamentary force," was frequently used by
the Emperor, and was no less singular, as implying that the Brazilian
Government did not make war against the King or country of Portugal,
but merely against the Cortes; the distinction, as regarded the conduct
of hostilities, being without a difference.
A curious circumstance occurred after this visit of inspection. On
landing--hundreds of people of all ages and colours, crowded round to
kiss His Majesty's hands--paternally extended on both sides to rows of
devoted subjects, who, under no other circumstances, could have come in
such familiar contact with royalty. To this ceremony the Emperor
submitted with the greatest possible good humour and affability, his
equanimity not even being ruined by familiarities such as I had never
before seen taken with King or Emperor.
On the 17th, a visit was paid to me by the Minister of Marine, Luiz da
Cunha Moreira, relative to the terms of my appointment, he being
evidently desirous that my services should be obtained at as cheap a
rate as possible, notwithstanding the concurrence of the Prime Minister
with the offers which had been made through the Consul-General at Buenos
Ayres. The pay now offered was that of an admiral in the Portuguese
service,--notoriously the worst paid in the world. On enquiring what
this might be, I found it less than half what I had received in Chill!
My pay there being 8000 dollars per annum, with permission from the
Supreme Director to appropriate another 4000 from the Government moiety
of captures made.
By way of reply, I produced a letter from the Chilian Minister of
Marine, counter-signed by the Supreme Director, acknowledging the
receipt of an offer subsequently made to the Chilian Government
voluntarily to give up to public exigencies a portion of my pay greater
than the amount now tendered--at the same time telling the Minister,
that by accepting such an arrangement I should lose more annually by
entering the Brazilian service than the whole sum offered to me. Without
condescending to chaffer on such a subject, I added that His Imperial
Majesty had invited me to Brazil on specific promises, which, if my
services were required, must be strictly fulfilled; if not, it would be
candid in him to say so, as it was not the amount of pay for which I
contended; but the reflection, that if the first stipulations of the
Brazilian Government were violated, no future confidence could be placed
in its good faith. If the State were poor, I had no objection,
conditionally, to surrender an equal or even a greater proportion of pay
than I had tendered to the Chilian Government; but that it was no part
of my intention to be placed on the footing of a Portuguese admiral,
especially after the terms, which, without application on my part, had
been voluntarily offered to induce me to accept service in Brazil.
The Minister of Marine seemed hurt at this, and said the State was not
poor, and that the terms originally offered should be complied with, by
granting me the amount I had enjoyed in Chili; a decision the more
speedily arrived at, from an intimation on my part, of referring to the
Prime Minister, as requested in cases of difficulty. This the Minister
of Marine begged me not to do, saying that there was no occasion for it.
He next proposed that, as my Brazilian pay was to be equivalent to that
which I received in Chili, it should he numerically estimated in Spanish
dollars, at the rate of 800 reis per dollar--though the Brazilian mint
was then actually restamping those very dollars at the rate of 960 reis!
thus, by a manoeuvre, which reflected little credit on a Minister,
lessening the pay agreed on by one-fifth. To this proposition I replied
that there was no objection, provided my services were also revalued--as
he seemed disposed to revalue his dollar; so that, setting aside the
offers which had induced me to leave Chili, I would make a new offer,
which should not only compensate for the difference in dispute, but
leave a considerable surplus on my side into the bargain. Alarmed at the
sarcasm, and perhaps judging from my manner, that I cared little for a
service in which such petty expedients formed an important element, he
at once gave up the false value which he had attached to the dollar, and
agreed to estimate it at 960 reis--a microscopic saving, truly!
As such a mode of proceeding had been adopted towards me, it became
necessary on my part to look well after the interests of the officers
who had accompanied me under the assurance that their position in Brazil
should be at least equal to that which they had held on the other side
of the continent. This was not more a duty than a necessity, for I saw
that, unless supported by officers upon whose talent and courage
reliance could be placed, it would be out of my power individually to
accomplish any enterprise satisfactory to myself or beneficial to
Brazil. I therefore required and obtained the same stipulations with
regard to their respective rank and pay as had, in my own case, been
insisted on. Of these, Admiral Grenfell is the only survivor.
On the 19th, a writing on a common sheet of letter paper was forwarded
to me by the Minister of Marine, purporting to be a commission, with the
rank of admiral; stating, however, inaccurately the amount of pay and
table money agreed upon, by transposing the one for the other,--so that
the table money was figured as pay, and the pay as table money; the
effect being, that when on shore, my pay would have amounted to exactly
one half of the sum stipulated! This proceeding could not be tolerated,
so on the following morning I returned the commission to the Minister of
Marine, who hastened to assure me that it was a mistake, which should be
rectified.
This pretended commission was accompanied by the following order to take
command of the squadron:--
His Imperial Majesty--through the secretary for naval
affairs--commands that the Admiral of the Imperial and National
Marine--Lord Cochrane--shall take command of the squadron at anchor
in this port, consisting of the ship _Pedro Primiero_; the frigates
_Unao, Nitherohy_, and _Carolina_; the corvettes _Maria de Gloria_
and _Liberal_; the brig _Guarani_, and the schooners _Real_ and
_Leopoldina_; hoisting his flag aboard the line-of-battle ship: the
said Admiral having, at his choice, the whole--or any of the said
vessels, for the purpose of the expedition about to sail.
Palace of Rio de Janeiro, March 19, 1823.
(Signed) LUIZ DA CUNHA MOREIEA.
There was, however, another point still less satisfactory. The
commission conferred upon me the rank of Admiral, but of what grade was
not specified. On pressing the Minister of Marine, he admitted that it
was only intended to give me the rank of Junior Admiral,--there being
already two Admirals in the service, whose functions would not, however,
interfere with me, as their duties were confined to the ordinary
administration of a Board of Admiralty. I at once told him that for me
to serve under such naval administrators was out of the question. As the
Minister of Marine professed want of sufficient power to warrant him in
altering the commission, I announced my intention of taking it to the
Prime Minister, and respectfully restoring it into his hands. The
Minister of Marine again begged me not to do so, as an alteration might
be made, if I would consent to go at once on board the _Pedro
Primiero_--on board which ship my flag had been directed to be hoisted
at mid-day! This, it is needless to add, was declined, not only by
myself, but by the officers who had accompanied me from Chili.
The Minister of Marine affected to be surprised at my want of confidence
in the Government, but I explained that this was not the case. "It was
quite possible that a Congress might at any time be convened which would
be less liberally inclined than the present ministry, and that
acceptance of an appointment so loosely made might afford the admirals
placed over me, not only a control over my movements, but an easy and
convenient mode of getting rid of me after I had done their work; and
this without any imputation of injustice on their proceedings. The
fact, indeed, of a Cortes being about to assemble, and the possibility
of their interfering with me, was sufficient to fix my determination to
have nothing to do with the command, under any circumstances, save those
set forth in the tender made to me by command of His Majesty."
To this the Minister replied, that, "if I could be thus dismissed, the
Government must likewise fall--because to suppose that a popular
assembly could dictate to His Majesty in such a case was to suppose the
Government no longer in existence."
I then frankly told the Minister, that "my experience as a naval
officer--founded upon many years' practical observation, had taught me
that, in engagements of this nature, it was necessary to be clear and
explicit in every arrangement. I did not mean to insinuate anything
disrespectful to the ministers of His Brazilian Majesty, but knowing
that a Senate was about to assemble, and having reason to believe that a
majority of the members might differ from the ministerial views, and
might--when the work was done--take a fancy to see the squadron
commanded by one of their own countrymen--a step which would leave me no
alternative but to quit the service--it was much better for all parties
to put our mutual engagements on a firm basis."
The Minister continued to argue the point, but finding argument of no
avail in altering my determination, he insinuated--though not stating as
much in positive terms--that he had no prospect of any arrangement
being effected regarding my rank other than that which had been
tendered.
Determined to be no longer trifled with--on the following morning I
waited on the Prime Minister, Bonifacio de Andrada, whom I found in high
dudgeon at what he termed the unreasonableness of my demands; stating,
moreover, that the Consul at Buenos Ayres had exceeded his authority by
writing me a bombastic letter, though but a few days before, Andrada not
only expressed his entire concurrence in its contents, but stated that
the letter had been written through his influence with the Emperor!
To this I replied that, "be that as it might, it was absurd to suppose
that I should have given up my position in Chili for anything less in
Brazil, and that all that had been offered by the Consul, or desired by
me, was simply an equivalent to my Chilian command, with adequate
reimbursement of any losses I might sustain by quitting Chili so
abruptly, before the settlement of my affairs with that country. This
offer had been made on behalf of His Imperial Majesty, under the express
authority of the Prime Minister himself, as set forth in the Consul's
letters, and for this I held the Government responsible. But, at the
same time, I informed the Prime Minister that if he were disinclined to
fulfil his own voluntary obligations, I would at once free him from them
by declining the proffered command, and therefore begged of him to take
back his commission, about which I would hold no further parley."
This step was evidently unexpected, for, lowering his tone, Bonifacio
assured me that "good faith was the peculiar characteristic of the
Brazilian Administration;" and to prove this, he had to announce to me
that a Cabinet Council had that morning been held, at which it was
resolved that the newly created honour of "First Admiral of Brazil"
should be conferred upon me, with the pay and emoluments of Chili, as
stipulated through the Consul at Buenos Ayres. He then asked me if I was
content, to which I replied in the affirmative; pointing out, however,
how much better it would have been to have taken this course at first,
than to have caused such contention about a matter altogether
insignificant, as compared with the work in hand. He replied that, as
everything had been conceded, it was not worth while to reopen the
question; but to this view I demurred, telling him that _nothing
whatever had been conceded, the Government having only fulfilled its own
stipulations_, which were insignificant in comparison with obtaining the
services of an officer whom it believed competent to carry out alone,
what otherwise would entail great expense on the State. I further
assured him that it would afford me much satisfaction to prove to him of
how little importance was all that which had been the subject of
dispute, and that His Imperial Majesty's Government might rest assured
that my utmost exertions would be used to bring the naval war to a
speedy termination.
He then requested me to hoist my flag forthwith, as the Government was
very anxious on this point. Accordingly, at four o'clock in the
afternoon of the 21st of March, 1823, I went on board the _Pedro
Primiero_, and hoisted my flag, which was saluted with twenty-one guns
from each ship of war, the salute being acknowledged from the flagship
with an equal number.
Shortly afterwards, a _portaria_, dated on the same day, was sent to me,
explanatory of the commission which had given rise to so much trouble,
and detailing my future pay as agreed upon. By the same document I was
ordered to take command of the squadron, and an intimation was given
that a formal commission as "First Admiral" would forthwith be made out.
It was further acknowledged that, by accepting the Brazilian command, I
had risked an admitted reward for services rendered to Chili and Peru,
to the extent of more than sixty thousand dollars--and it was agreed
that this amount should be repaid to me in the event of those countries
not fulfilling their obligations--provided equivalent services were
rendered to Brazil. For more than thirty years Chili has withheld that
amount, but the Brazilian Government has never fulfilled this portion of
its engagements.
Notwithstanding the praiseworthy exertions of the administration to
place their navy in a creditable position as regarded the ships, the
want of seamen was severely felt, and little had been done beyond
shipping a number of Portuguese sailors, whose fidelity to the Imperial
cause was doubtful.
In the hope of getting a more reliable class of men for the flagship, I
authorised Captain Crosbie to offer from my own purse, eight dollars
per man, in addition to the bounty given by the Government, and by this
means procured some English and North American seamen, who, together
with the men who accompanied me from Chili, sufficed to form a tolerable
nucleus for a future crew; as to the rest--though far short of the
ship's complement--it had never before fallen to my lot to command a
crew so inefficient.
On the 26th of March, the following commission from His Imperial Majesty
was presented to me:--
IMPERADOR,
The valour, intelligence, activity, and other qualities of Lord
Cochrane as an admiral, being well-known by the performance of
various services in which he has been engaged, and seeing how
advantageous it would be for the Empire to avail itself of the
known qualities of an Officer so gifted, I deem it proper to confer
on him a patent as "First Admiral of the National and Imperial
Navy," with an annual salary of eleven contos and five hundred and
twenty milreis, whether at sea or on shore; and further in table
money, when embarked, five contos, seven hundred and twenty
milreis, which is the same pay and table money as he received in
Chili. To which favour, no admiral of the Imperial Navy shall claim
succession, neither to the post of "First Admiral," which I have
thought fit to create solely for this occasion, from the motives
aforesaid, and from particular consideration of the merits of the
said Lord Cochrane. The supreme Military Council will so
understand, and shall execute the necessary despatches.
Given at the Palace of Rio de Janeiro, March 21st, 1823.
Second year of the Independence of the Empire.
(Signed) IMPERADOR. LUIZ DA CUNHA MOREIEA,
Secretary of State,
March 26th, 1823.
LEONARDO ANTONIO BASTO.
Thus was a right understanding established, my only object during the
undignified contentions which had arisen, being--relinquishment of the
proffered command, in order to carry out my long-entertained intention
of visiting Greece, then engaged in a struggle for independence--or to
obtain a definite arrangement with the Brazilian Government, which
should recognise the circumstances under which I had been induced to
quit Chili--_confer upon me permanent rank--give me the equivalent
promised with regard to pay_--and be binding on both parties.
On the 29th of March, a proclamation was issued by the Imperial
Government declaring Bahia in a state of blockade, the Portuguese having
there assembled a combined naval and military force superior to that of
Brazil, and, under ordinary circumstances, fully competent to maintain
itself; as well as to put down, or at least paralyse, any movement in
favour of independence.
The following orders were then communicated to me, and were of the usual
kind, viz. "to capture or destroy all enemy's ships and property,
whereever found:"--
His Imperial Majesty, through the Secretary of State for the
Marine, commands that the First Admiral, Lord Cochrane,
Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron, shall, to-morrow morning,
proceed from this port with such vessels as he shall judge proper
to the port of Bahia, to institute a rigorous blockade, destroying
or capturing whatever Portuguese force he may fall in with--doing
all possible damage to the enemies of this Empire, it being left to
the discretion of the said Admiral to act as he shall deem
advantageous, in order to save that city from the thraldom to which
it is reduced by the enemies of the cause of Brazil; for this
purpose consulting with Gen. Labatu, commanding the Army, in order
to the general good of the service, and glory of the national and
Imperial arms.
Palace of Rio Janeiro, March 30, 1823.
LUIZ DA CUNHA MOREIRA.
To the Brazilian party and the mass of the people generally, the
approaching departure of the squadron was a matter for congratulation,
but to the Portuguese faction it presented a cause for fear, as tending
to destroy their hopes of re-establishing the authority of the mother
country. Their influence, as has before been said, was as great, if not
greater, than that of the patriots, and being more systematic, it had
been effectually employed to increase the disaffection which existed in
the Northern provinces to the--as yet--but partially established
authority of his Imperial Majesty.
It is not my intention for a moment to impute malicious motives to the
Portuguese faction in Brazil. The King of Portugal, Don John VI. had,
within twelve months, quitted their shores to resume the throne of his
ancestors, so that they had a right to the praise of loyalty, and the
more so, as at that time few calculated on separation from the mother
country. The Empire itself was not six months old, and therefore they
were not to be blamed for doubting its stability. The Cortes at Lisbon
had sent a large force for the protection of the more remote provinces,
and in an attack upon these at Bahia, the Brazilian troops had been
unsuccessful, so that no great confidence was to be reposed on any
future _military_ efforts to eject the Portuguese troops.
Where the Portuguese party was really to blame, consisted in
this,--that seeing disorder everywhere more or less prevalent, they
strained every nerve to increase it, hoping thereby to paralyse further
attempts at independence, by exposing whole provinces to the evils of
anarchy and confusion. Their loyalty also partook more of self-interest
than of attachment to the supremacy of Portugal, for the commercial
classes, which formed the real strength of the Portuguese faction,
hoped, by preserving the authority of the mother country in her distant
provinces, thereby to obtain as their reward the revival of old trade
monopolies, which twelve years before had been thrown open, enabling the
English traders--whom they cordially hated--to supersede them in their
own markets. Being a citizen of the rival nation, their aversion to me
personally was undisguised; the more so perhaps, that they believed me
capable of achieving at Bahia--whither the squadron was destined--that
irreparable injury to their own cause, which the Imperial troops had
been unable to effect. Had I, at the time, been aware of the influence
and latent power of the Portuguese party in the empire, not all the
so-called concessions made by De Andrada would have induced me to accept
the command of the Brazilian navy; for to contend with faction is more
dangerous than to engage an enemy, and a contest of intrigue was alike
foreign to my nature and inclination.
CHAPTER II.
ATTEMPT TO CUT OFF THE ENEMY'S SHIPS--DISOBEDIENCE TO ORDERS--LETTER TO
THE PRIME MINISTER--WORTHLESSNESS OF THE MEN--THEIR TREACHERY--BLOCKADE
ESTABLISHED--EQUIPMENT OF FIRESHIPS--ENEMY'S SUPPLIES CUT
OFF--PORTUGUESE UNTRUSTWORTHY--DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE ENEMY--HIS
PRETENDED CONTEMPT FOR US--THE ENEMY RETURNS TO PORT--THEIR
CONSTERNATION AT THE FIRESHIPS--PORTUGUESE CONTEMPLATE ATTACKING
US--FLAGSHIP RECONNOITRES ENEMY AT ANCHOR--EXCESSIVE ALARM AT MY
NOCTURNAL VISIT--PROCLAMATION OF THE COMMANDANT--CONSTERNATION IN THE
CITY--THE AUTHORITIES DECIDE ON EVACUATING BAHIA--INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
BRAZILIAN CAPTAINS--WARNINGS ADDRESSED TO THE AUTHORITIES--ENEMY QUITS
BAHIA--READINESS FOR CHASE--NUMBERS OF THE ENEMY--CAPTURE OF THE
CONVOY--PRIZES DISABLED--ATTEMPT OF TROOPS TO ESCAPE--PRIZES SENT TO
PERNAMBUCO--PURSUIT DISCONTINUED--REASONS FOR GOING TO MARANHAM--REASONS
FOR NOT TAKING MORE PRIZES--ADVANTAGES TO THE EMPIRE.
On the 3rd of April, we put to sea with a squadron of four ships only,
viz. the _Pedro Primiero_, Captain Crosbie, _Piranga_, Captain Jowett,
_Maria de Gloria_, Captain Beaurepaire, and _Liberal_, Captain
Garcaõ--two others which accompanied us, viz. the _Guarani_, Captain de
Coito, and _Real_, Captain de Castro, were intended as fireships. Two
vessels of war, the _Paraguassu_ and the _Nitherohy_, being incomplete
in their equipment, were of necessity left behind.
The _Nitherohy_, Captain Taylor, joined on the 29th of April, and on the
1st of May we made the coast of Bahia. On the 4th, we made the
unexpected discovery of thirteen sail to leeward, which proved to be the
enemy's fleet leaving port with a view of preventing or raising the
blockade. Shortly afterwards the Portuguese Admiral formed line of
battle to receive us, his force consisting of one ship of the line, five
frigates, five corvettes, a brig, and schooner.
Regularly to attack a more numerous and better trained squadron with our
small force, manned by undisciplined and--as had been ascertained on the
Voyage--disaffected crews, was out of the question. On board the
flagship there were only a hundred and sixty English and American
seamen, the remainder consisting of the vagabondage of the capital, with
a hundred and thirty black marines, just emancipated from slavery.
Nevertheless, observing an opening in the enemy's line, which would
enable us to cut off their four rearmost ships, I made signals
accordingly, and with the flagship alone gave the practical example of
breaking the line, firing into their frigates as we passed. The
Portuguese Admiral promptly sent vessels to the aid of the four cut off,
when, hauling our wind on the larboard tack, we avoided singly a
collision with the whole squadron, but endeavoured to draw the enemy's
ships assisting into a position where they might be separately attacked
to advantage.
Had the rest of the Brazilian squadron come down in obedience to
signals, the ships cut off might have been taken or dismantled, as, with
the flagship I could have kept the others at bay, and no doubt have
crippled all in a position to render them assistance. To my astonishment
the signals were disregarded, and--for reasons which will presently be
adduced--no efforts were made to second my operations.
For some time the action was continued by the _Pedro Primiero_ alone,
but to my mortification the fire of the flagship was exceedingly
ill-directed. A still more untoward circumstance occurred in the
discovery that two Portuguese seamen who had been stationed to hand up
powder, were not only withholding it, but had made prisoners of the
powder boys who came to obtain it! This would have been serious but for
the promptitude of Captain Grenfell, who, rushing upon the men, dragged
them on deck; but to continue the action under such circumstances was
not to be thought of; and as the enemy had more than double our
numerical force, I did not consider myself warranted in further
attempting, with greater hazard, what on a future opportunity might be
accomplished with less. Quitting the enemy's ships cut off, we therefore
hauled our wind, to join the vessels which had kept aloof, and to
proceed to the station previously appointed as the rendezvous of the
squadron, whither the fireships were to follow. In this affair no lives
were lost.
Extremely annoyed at this failure, arising from non-fulfilment of
orders, and finding, from experience on the voyage, that we had been
hurried to sea, without consideration as to the materials of which the
squadron was composed, a rigid inquiry was instituted, which gave me
such cogent reasons for losing all confidence in it, that on the day
following I considered it expedient to address the following letter to
the Prime Minister, Andrada, pointing out that if prompt steps were not
taken to add to our strength, by providing more efficient crews, the
result might be to compromise the interests of the empire, no less than
the character of the officers commanding.
(Secret) H.I.M.S. _Pedro Primiero_, at Sea,
May 5, 1823.
MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,
Availing myself of your permission to address you
upon points of a particular nature, and referring you to my public
despatches to the Minister of Marine, I beg leave to add that it
was not only unfavourable winds which retarded our progress, but
the extreme bad sailing of the _Piranga_ and _Liberal_. Neither these
ships nor the _Nitherohy_, which sails equally ill, are adapted to the
purposes to be effected, as from their slowness, the enemy has an
opportunity to force an action under any circumstances, however
disadvantageous to this undisciplined squadron. The _Real_ is no
better, and her total uselessness as a ship of war, has determined
me to prepare her as a fireship, there appearing no probability of the
others joining.
From the defective sailing and manning of the squadron it
seems, indeed, to me, that the _Pedro Primiero_ is the only one
that can assail an enemy's ship of war, or act in the face of a
superior force, so as not to compromise the interests of the empire
and the character of the officers commanding. Even this ship--in
common-with the rest--is so ill-equipped as to be much less
efficient than she otherwise would be.
This letter, you will observe, is not intended to meet the public
eye, but merely to put the Government in possession of facts
necessary for its information.
Our cartridges are all unfit for service, and I have been obliged
to cut up every flag and ensign that could be spared, to render them
serviceable, so as to prevent the men's arms being blown off whilst
working the guns, and also to prevent the constant necessity of
sponging, &c. which, from the time it consumes, diminishes the
effective force of the ships fully one half.
The guns are without locks--which they ought to have had in
order to their being efficient.
The sails of this ship are all rotten--the light and baffling airs on
our way hither, having beaten one set to pieces, and the others
are hourly giving way to the slightest breeze of wind.
The bed of the mortar which I received on board this ship was
crushed on the first fire--being entirety rotten; the fuzes for the
shells are formed of such wretched composition that it will not take
fire with the discharge of the mortar, and are consequently unfit
for use on board a ship where it is extremely dangerous to kindle
the fuze otherwise than by the explosion; even the powder with
which this ship is supplied is so bad, that six pounds will not
throw our shells more than a thousand yards, instead of double that
distance.
The marines neither understand gun exercise, the use of
small arms, nor the sword, and yet have so high an opinion of
themselves that they will not assist to wash the decks, or even to
clean out their own berths, but sit and look on whilst these
operations are being performed by seamen; being thus useless as
marines, they are a hinderance to the seamen, who ought to be
learning their duty in the tops, instead of being converted into
sweepers and scavengers. I have not yet interfered in this injurious
practice, because I think that reforms of the ancient practice of the
service, ought to form the subject of instruction from the Government
--and also, because at this moment, any alterations of mine
might create dissatisfactions and dissensions even more prejudicial
to the service in which we are engaged, than the evils in question.
With respect to the seamen, I would observe, that, in order to
create an effective marine, young active lads of from fourteen to
twenty should be selected. Almost the whole of those who
constitute the crews of these vessels--with the exception of the
foreign seamen, are not only totally unpractised in naval profession,
but are too old to learn.
I warned the Minister of Marine, that every native of Portugal
put on board the squadron--with the exception of officers of known
character--would prove prejudicial to the expedition, and yesterday
we had a clear proof of the fact. The Portuguese stationed in the
magazine, actually withheld the powder whilst this ship was in the
midst of the enemy, and I have since learned that they did so from
feelings of attachment to their own countrymen. I now inclose
you two letters on this subject--one just received from the officer
commanding the _Real_, whose crew were on the point of _carrying
that vessel into the enemy's squadron for the purpose of delivering her
up!_ I have also reason to believe, that the conduct of the _Liberal_
yesterday in not bearing down upon the enemy and not complying
with the signal which I had made to break the line--was owing to
her being manned with Portuguese. The _Maria de Gloria_ has also
a great number of Portuguese, which is the more to be regretted,
as otherwise her superior sailing, with the zeal and activity of her
captain, would render her an effective vessel. To disclose to you
the truth, it appears to me that one half of the squadron is
necessary to watch over the other half: and, assuredly, this is a
system which ought to be put an end to without delay.
A greater evil is, that this ship is one hundred and twenty seamen
short of her complement and three hundred short of what I should
consider an efficient crew, whilst the bad quality and ignorance of
the landsmen, makes the task of managing her in action no easy
matter, the incessant bawling going on rendering the voices of the
officers inaudible. Had this ship yesterday been manned and equipped
as she ought to have been, and free from the disadvantages stated,
there is no doubt whatever in my mind, but, that singly, we could
have dismantled half the ships of the enemy.
On the whole, Sir, you must perceive that I have not been supplied
with any of those facilities which I requested to be placed in my
hands. I am, however, aware of the difficulties under which a new
Government labours, and am ready to do all in my power under
any circumstances. What I have to request of you is, that you will
do me the justice to feel that the predicament in which I am now
placed, is somewhat analogous to your own, and that if I cannot
accomplish all I wish, the deficiency arises from causes beyond my
control; but I entreat you to let me have--at least this ship--
_well manned_, and I will answer for her rendering more efficient
service than the whole squadron besides--constituted as it now is.
You will perceive by my public despatch addressed to the Minister
of Marine, that although we passed through the enemy's line, and,
I may add, actually brushed the nearest vessel, which we cut off--yet
nothing really useful was effected, notwithstanding that the
vessel we touched ought to have been sunk, and those separated to
have been dismantled or destroyed. I am quite vexed at the result--which
was such, however, as might have been expected from the bad
manning of the squadron.
I have determined to proceed forthwith to the Moro San Paulo,
and to leave there the ill-sailing vessels. I intend to remove all the
effective officers and seamen from the _Piranga_ and _Nitherohy_, into
this ship, and with her alone, or attended only by the _Maria de
Gloria_, to proceed to Bahia, to reconnoitre the situation of the
enemy at their anchorage, and obtain the information requisite to
enable me to enter on more effectual operations.
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE.
Ill. Exmo. Senor JOSÉ BONIFACIO D'ANDRADE Y SILVA,
Ministro e Secretario d'Estado.
A rigorous blockade was nevertheless established, in spite of our
deficiencies or the efforts made to raise or evade it--though the enemy
were bold in reliance upon their numbers, and none the less so, perhaps,
from considering our recent failure a defeat. They did not, however,
venture to attack us, nor were we yet in a condition to meddle further
with them.
The blockade of the port was not calculated to effect anything decisive,
beyond paralysing the naval operations of the enemy's squadron. Even
this would not prevent the Portuguese from strengthening themselves in
positions on shore, and thus, by intimidating all other districts within
reach,--enable them to bar the progress of independence. I therefore
determined, as a force in our condition was not safe to hazard in any
combination requiring prompt and implicit obedience, to adopt the step
of which I had apprised the Prime Minister, and took the squadron to
Moro San Paulo, where, transferring from the bad sailing frigates to the
flagship, the captains, officers, and best petty officers and seamen,
the _Pedro Primiero_ was rendered more efficient than the whole
together; and with her and the _Maria de Gloria_, I resolved to conduct
further operations against the enemy--leaving the _Piranga_, and
_Nitherohy_, together with all the other vessels, in charge of Captain
Pio--the two senior captains having been transferred to the flagship, in
charge of their officers and men.
There was, however, another reason for leaving the remainder of the
squadron at Moro San Paulo. Before quitting Rio de Janeiro, I had urged
on the Government the necessity of immediately forwarding fireships, as
the most reliable means for destroying a superior force. These had not
been supplied; but in their place a quantity of inflammable and
explosive materials had been sent. As several prizes had been taken, I
determined to convert them into fireships, as well as the _Real_
schooner--a useless vessel, the crew of which had shewn that they were
not to be depended upon; so that the remaining ships of the squadron,
though unreliable in other respects, were well employed in carrying
these objects into execution.
In order to protect the ships and men thus engaged, I directed a body of
marines to be landed, for the purpose of making a show by forming and
manning batteries to repel any attack, though, had such been made,
neither the batteries nor their defenders would have been of much
service.
The flagship, together with the _Maria de Gloria_, now proceeded to
cruize off Bahia, with such success that all supplies were cut off by
sea, notwithstanding repeated attempts to introduce vessels from San
Mattheos with farinha--a dozen of which fell into our hands, in spite of
the enemy's superiority.
As the _Carolina_ had now joined us, I directed her to take under convoy
the captured transports with provisions, whilst the _Guarani_ was sent
to scour the coast, with orders to avoid approaching the enemy's fleet,
and to bring me information as to the progress of the fireships, upon
which I now saw that I must mainly rely.
On the 21st, I considered it expedient to address the following private
letter to the Minister of Marine:--
Off Bahia, N.W. 12 miles,
May 21, 1833.
Most Illustrious Sir,
In addition to my official letters of the 3rd and
4th inst. I beg to acquaint you that, being convinced--not only
from the conduct of the crew of this ship during the attack on the
4th, but from what I observed in regard to the other vessels--that
nothing beneficial to His Imperial Majesty's service could be
effected by any attempts to combine the whole squadron in an
attack against the enemy--but, on the contrary, from the imperfect
and incongruous manner in which the vessels are manned--
consequences of the most serious nature would ensue from any
further attempt of the kind. I have therefore determined to take
the squadron to Moro San Paulo, for the adoption of other measures
essential under such circumstances, viz. to take on board such officers
and men from the bad sailing vessels as will render the _Pedro
Primiero_ more effective than the whole squadron as now constituted.
In the first conversation I had with you, I gave you my opinion
as to the superior benefit of equipping one or two vessels _well_--
rather than many imperfectly, and I again beg to press on your
consideration the necessity of such efficient equipment of all
vessels, whether many or few. I must also remind you of the great
danger that arises from the employment of Portuguese of the
inferior class in active operations against their own countrymen,
because they neither do nor can consider that the dispute between
Brazil and the Portuguese Government, bears any similarity to warfare
as ordinarily understood. I have had sufficient proof since
leaving Rio de Janeiro, that there is no more trust to be placed in
Portuguese, when employed to fight against their countrymen, than
there was in the Spaniards, who, on the opposite side of this continent,
betrayed the patriot Governments, by whom they were employed.
I shall press this point no further than to say, that so long as His
Imperial Majesty's ships are so manned, I shall consider them
as not only wholly inefficient, but requiring to be vigilantly watched
in order to prevent the most dangerous consequences.
Since making my arrangements at the Moro, where I left all
the squadron except this ship and the _Maria de Gloria_, I have been
constantly off the port of Bahia, but could see nothing of the
enemy's squadron, till the 20th, when I learned from an English
vessel that they had been as far down as the Abrolhos shoals, for
what purpose I know not. They consist of thirteen vessels, being
the number which we encountered on the 4th. I am watching an
opportunity to attack them in the night, in the hope not only of
being able to damage them materially by the fire of this ship, but
also in the expectation that, if they are not better disciplined than
the crews of this squadron, they will occasion as much damage
amongst themselves, as they would sustain if they had an equal
force to contend with. In the meantime we are as effectually
blockading Bahia, as if the enemy did not dare to remove from his
anchorage--for both this ship and the _Maria de Gloria_ outsail them
all. We have captured three Portuguese vessels, and from the
letters found therein, many more are expected from Maranham and
other ports to leeward, as well as from San Mattheos.
Should the enemy's squadron return to port before I can obtain
a favourable opportunity of assailing them at sea, I shall endeavour
to attack them at their anchorage, and the Government may be
assured that no exertion shall be wanting on my part, or on that of
the officers now in this ship, to effect their destruction.
I may fairly ascribe the prepared state of the enemy, and the
great force in which they appeared on the 4th, and still exhibit--to
the information carried by the British ship of war Tartar, which
was permitted to sail from Rio so early after our departure for
Bahia, and thus served them as effectually as though she had been
expressly hired for the purpose.
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE.
To the Minister of Marine.
On the 22nd we captured another vessel, and reconnoitred the port of
Bahia, the Portuguese squadron being there at anchor. Finding this to be
the case, I returned to the Moro to expedite the fireships--leaving the
_Maria de Gloria_ to watch the enemy's movements.
On the 26th the Portuguese Admiral again appeared in full force, and
approached towards us at the Moro San Paulo, when we prepared for
action, but the hostile squadron withdrew. The same demonstration was
made for several days, the enemy not venturing on an attack, whilst,
from the causes previously alleged, we were in no condition to take the
initiative.
On the 26th I apprised the Minister of Marine that, when the enemy
returned to port, I should make an attempt on them on the first dark
night with the flagship alone, pending the equipment of the fireships.
At the same time I addressed the following letter to the Prime Minister,
De Andrada:--
Moro San Paulo, 26th May, 1823.
MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,
With regard to the transactions of the squadron, I beg to refer you
to my despatches to the Minister of Marine, but solicit your
attention to a few particulars which appear to me of importance.
In the first place, you will observe from the enclosed Bahia
newspaper, that the maritime force of the enemy is contrasted with
that of the squadron under my command. I should be well content were
the real disparity of the respective forces no greater than the
statement has set forth, but unfortunately, the Brazilians, who have
never before been at sea, are of little or no use, from their total
want of discipline, and of any kind of nautical knowledge; whilst
the Portuguese seamen in the squadron, are not only useless--but a
great deal worse, for the reasons stated in my former letters.
The enemy in Bahia are in want of all kinds of fresh provisions
--though they have been using every means to procure them. Some
supplies they have lately had from Buenos Ayres, and even from the
Cape de Verds; but the most surprising fact is that the Brazilian
Governor of San Mattheos, near the Abrolhos, and the chiefs of other
small Brazilian ports in that quarter have been loading vessels for
the enemy's use--under the simulated destination of Rio de Janeiro.
Permit me to suggest that an investigation into this matter is
highly essential.
From all the information which I can collect, the enemy at Bahia are
considerably distracted in their councils, which dissensions cannot
fail to be increased by seeing their vessels taken in the very mouth
of the harbour, and their look-out ships driven under the guns of
the batteries by those of His Imperial Majesty, I may, indeed, say
by two ships alone, because in the state of the other vessels and
crews I have not deemed it prudent to trust them in the
neighbourhood of a port occupied by the enemy.
I have no doubt of succeeding--by some means or other--in effecting
our object, and that in as short a time as can reasonably be
expected--for it is not to be supposed that I should all at once
accomplish objects of such magnitude with a force so inferior, and
in great part so inexperienced and heterogeneously composed. On
this subject I beg to call your attention to the low opinion
entertained of our squadron by the enemy, as expressed in the
enclosed Bahia Gazette (No 65), which, on that point, is in
conformity with my own opinion as previously expressed.
I have the honour, &c. COCHRANE.
To the Prime Minister.
The following proclamation from the _Bahia Gazette_ will shew the
nature of these vapourings deliberately inserted by the Bahia
authorities:--
Last week the wind was Southerly, with rain, which has rendered
it impossible for our squadron to get at the Rio squadron, to decide
whether Brazil shall remain in the fetters of the usurper of Rio--
or enjoy constitutional liberty. Had they credited me more, we
should not have seen on our bar, an enterprising man who ruined
the commerce of the Pacific, and now thinks to regain the glory he
lost. The conduct of Lord Cochrane verberates in our ears--
examine his conduct in the Pacific, and observe that he lost all, and
was obliged to abandon everything to the Spaniards in Peru, afterwards
losing his little force in attacks and tempests. The Ministry
of Rio sent for him, giving him the pompous title of "Admiral of
the Brazils," and great promises--thinking that he would bring
with him a squadron to help the Imperial fraudulence. This is
the great wonder, who has come to carry fire and blood to the
trusty Bahia, bringing with him vessels manned, for the most part,
with Portuguese sailors--and not leaving in Rio a single vessel,
from which he did not take even the negro sailors.
It is only the _Pedro Primiero_ that is manned with the adventurous
foreigners, so that we shall fall upon the 74, and by beating
her, decide the business of Brazil. Our squadron is superior in
physical force, having at their head brave officers, with plenty of
troops. It is commanded in chief by an Admiral who has success
before him, and who wishes to regain the opinion of the public, so
that we may all wait a happy result.
Commerce--the strong pillar which upholds the Constitutional
edifice--has promised great recompense to the victorious fleet and
their chief, and has precious gifts for those who will shew their
gratitude to Bahia, and defend their liberty. Officers who distinguish
themselves, will have a medal representing their victory,
which will make them known to the citizens of Bahia, who will not
be ungrateful.
Citizens of all classes are ready at a moment's warning to decide
the great cause of our liberty, and will measure the greatness of our
triumph by the sacrifices made. Constance, courage, and union,
and we shall see the despotic monster raging and tearing himself to
pieces.
All we look to, at this moment, is to destroy the Rio squadron.
The usurper who rules in that Capital thinks that, reaching the bar
with the squadron of his imaginary Empire, we should be attacked
on all sides, and compelled to make a shameful capitulation. How
much you are mistaken--new-born monster! We have abundant
force at our disposal; but in the meantime we must overthrow the
plans of the enterprising Cochrane, and wait the result of maritime
prowess.
Notwithstanding that the Portuguese opinion of the Brazilian squadron,
as expressed in the official gazette, is couched in terms of contempt,
as compared with the efficiency of their own squadron--yet most
inconsistently, they did not venture to attack us. The fact was,
however, most painful to me, being aware of its truthfulness, and I
wrote to the Minister of Marine, begging him to enable us to intercept
the numerous vessels expected at Bahia, by procuring three fast-sailing
American clippers, armed with 18 or 24-pounders, in lieu of the useless
schooners with which we were encumbered. In addition to the professed
contempt of the Portuguese authorities for the ships blockading
Bahia--the proclamation in which these expressions were contained,
termed His Imperial Majesty a "Turkish despot,"--his Prime Minister a
"tyrannical vizier," and myself "a coward;" so that I had at least the
satisfaction of being maligned in good company.
On the 2nd of June, to my great satisfaction, the Portuguese returned to
port, and I felt certain that so soon as the fireships in preparation at
the Moro San Paulo were ready, the destruction of the whole was
inevitable--the Portuguese naval officers being of the same opinion,
whatever might be the official boasts of the military Commandant.
According to the secret correspondence which I had established with
Brazilian patriots resident within the city, the Admiral's consternation
on learning that fireships were nearly equipped was excessive--and being
in nightly expectation of a repetition of the scene in Basque Roads; or
at least of that which little more than a year previous had been enacted
before Callao--every precaution was taken against surprise. He was
quite right in the conjecture as to what was intended; but did not
calculate--as I was obliged to do--on the general want of experience of
such matters in the Brazilian service.
Our preparations being, on the 8th of June, reported to be favourably
progressing, I determined to put the attack in execution so soon as the
tide flowed late enough in the evening to prevent the enemy from
perceiving us in time to disturb or defeat our operations. The
difficulty was to find competent persons to take charge of the
fireships, so as to kindle them at the proper moment--the want of which
had rendered most of the fireships ineffective--as such--in the affair
of Basque Roads in 1809, and had formed one of the principal obstacles
when attacking Callao in 1821. Of the explosion vessel I intended myself
to take charge, as I had formerly done in Basque Roads.
On the 9th of June information arrived that the enemy had resolved on an
attempt to destroy the fireships in the Moro San Paulo, and that the
second division of their army was being embarked in transports for that
purpose. Preparations were at once made to receive them by ordering in
the vessels scouring the coast, and by such other precautionary measures
as were necessary for the defence of that important station.
It was, however, difficult to make a proper defence, for, with the
exception of Portuguese--who could not be trusted--there were no
Artillerymen in the Brazilian squadron who had any practical knowledge
of their duty, even if the guns on the Moro could be made to contribute
to its defence, for the place was open, and commanded by heights, of
which, as we had no troops, the enemy could possess themselves by night
or by day. In case they did so, before adequate preparations could be
made, I directed the guns to be spiked, that they might not be turned
against the ships. No attack was, however, made, the enemy being
doubtless deterred by the apparent promptitude in anticipating their
movements.
On the 11th of June further information was received that the
contemplated attack on the Moro had been abandoned, and that the enemy
were seriously deliberating on evacuating the port before the fireships
were completed, I therefore ordered the _Maria de Gloria_ to water and
re-victual for three months, so as to be in readiness for anything which
might occur, as, in case the rumour proved correct, our operations might
take a different turn to those previously intended. The _Piranga_ was
also directed to have everything in readiness for weighing immediately,
on the flagship appearing off the Moro and making signals to that
effect. The whole squadron was at the same time ordered to re-victual,
and to place its surplus articles in a large shed constructed of trees
and branches felled in the neighbourhood of the Moro.
Whilst the other ships were thus engaged, I determined to increase the
panic of the enemy with the flagship alone. The position of their fleet
was about nine miles up the bay, under shelter of fortifications, so
that an attack by day would have been more perilous than prudent.
Nevertheless, it appeared practicable to pay them a hostile visit on the
first dark night, when, if unable to effect any serious mischief, it
would at least be possible to ascertain their exact position, and to
judge what could be accomplished when the fireships were brought to bear
upon them.
Accordingly, having during the day carefully taken bearings of the high
lands at the mouth of the river--on the night of the 12th June, I
decided on making the attempt, which might possibly result in the
destruction of part of the enemy's fleet, in consequence of the
confused manner in which the ships were anchored, and from information
received that the chief officers were invited ashore to a public ball.
As soon as it became dark, we proceeded up the river, but unfortunately,
when within hail of the outermost ship, the wind failed, and the tide
soon after turning, our plan of attack was rendered abortive;
determined, however, to complete the reconnaissance, we threaded our way
amongst the outermost vessels, but dark as was the night--the presence
of a strange ship under sail was discovered--and some beat to quarters,
hailing to know what ship that was? The reply being "an English vessel,"
satisfied them, so that our investigation was made unmolested. The chief
object thus accomplished, we succeeded in dropping out with the ebb
tide, now rapidly running, and were enabled to steady our course
stern-foremost with the stream anchor adrag, whereby we reached our
former position off the mouth of the river.
Finding from the reconnaissance, that it would not be difficult to
destroy the enemy's vessels, huddled together as they were amongst a
crowd of merchantmen, I hastened to Moro San Paulo, to expedite the
completion of the fireships. Returning immediately to Bahia, and again
anchoring off the entrance of the harbour, I now learned that the alarm
created by our nocturnal visit was excessive; indeed, my informants
stated that the exploit had the effect of determining the Portuguese
admiral to remove as quickly as possible from a locality in which he
could no longer consider himself safe.
On the 29th of June, information was again forwarded to me, by persons
favourable to the Imperial cause, that a council of war had been held,
at which it had been resolved to withdraw the fleet to St. Catherine's
or Maranham, and not the fleet alone but the troops also--thus
abandoning the city and province of Bahia to the Imperial squadron; the
council judging that I should be well content to permit them to pass to
another part of the coast, as their departure would result in the
Imperial occupation of Bahia.
The subjoined proclamation issued by General Madeira will shew the
straits to which the blockading squadron had reduced the city and
garrison:--
INHABITANTS OF BAHIA,
The crisis in which we find ourselves is perilous,
because the means of subsistence fail us, and we cannot secure the
entrance of any provisions. My duty as a soldier, and as Governor,
is to make any sacrifice in order to save the city; but it is equally
my duty to prevent, in an extreme case, the sacrifice of the troops I
command--of the squadron--and of yourselves. I shall employ
every means to fulfil both duties. Do not suffer yourselves to be
persuaded that measures of foresight are always followed by disasters.
You have already seen me take such once before. They alarmed
you, but you were afterwards convinced that they portended nothing
extraordinary. Even in the midst of formidable armies measures
of precaution are daily used, because victory is not constant, and
reverses should be provided against. You may assure yourselves,
that the measures I am now taking, are purely precautionary, but it
is necessary to communicate them to you, because if it happens that
_we must abandon the, city_, many of you will leave it also; and I
should be responsible to the nation and to the King if I had not
forewarned you.
(Signed) IGNACIO LUIZ MADEIRA DE MELLA.
Were it dignified to allude to the cowardice imputed to me by the same
authority, it would be easy to refer to the above enumeration of
distresses caused by our two ships having captured all their provisions
in the face of thirteen, in every way better manned and equipped.
The consternation caused by my nocturnal visit, which decided the
evacuation of the city, was described as almost ludicrous. As I had been
correctly informed, the Portuguese admiral and his officers _were_ at a
ball, and information of our appearance amongst the fleet was conveyed
to him in the midst of the festivities. "What"--exclaimed he--"Lord
Cochrane's line-of-battleship in the very midst of our fleet! Impossible
--no large ship can have come up in the dark." We, however, did find our
way in the dark--and did not retire till our _reconnaissance_ was as
complete as darkness would permit.
The lamentations caused by General Madeira's proclamation were no doubt
faithfully chronicled in the Bahia newspapers, one of these declaring
"in the last few days we have witnessed in this city a most doleful
spectacle that must touch the heart even of the most insensible. A panic
terror has seized on all men's minds--the city will be left without
protectors--and families, whose fathers are obliged to fly, will be left
orphans--a prey to the invaders," &c. &c. A prognostication not at all
in accordance with my mode of carrying on warfare, which, as Portuguese
families afterwards found, both at Bahia and elsewhere, was to protect
the defenceless and unoffending.
The before-mentioned resolution of the council was precisely what I
wished, as the evacuation of the port and province by the troops as well
as the fleet, must prove more favourable to the Imperial cause than if
the fleet alone had been destroyed and the military force remained. As I
had, however, every reason to believe that it was General Madeira's
intention to remove the troops to the Northern provinces, which would
only have shifted the scene of war to another locality, I was determined
at all hazards to prevent such movement.
On the 1st of July, information was brought, that, as the fireships were
now known to be in readiness for the attack, the Portuguese admiral had
hastily embarked the whole of the troops in transports, and that a
number of merchantmen were also filled with persons who wished to leave
Bahia under his protection. As it was clear that the total evacuation of
the province by the enemy was preferable to an attack which might only
end in destroying the ships and driving both naval and military forces
on shore to renew their operations--I determined not to interfere with
their retreat, till they were clear out of the harbour, when a vigilant
pursuit would prevent them from again taking shelter in Brazil.
The following order was therefore issued to Captain Beaurepaire, of the
_Maria de Gloria_, Captain Taylor, of the _Nitherohy_, and Captain.
Thompson, of the _Carolina_, these being the only vessels on which I
could in any degree depend:--
Having received information that the enemies of the independence
of Brazil are about to evacuate the city, and quit the
port of Bahia--taking under the protection of their ships of war
numerous transports in which the military force and stores are
embarked, together with all the moveable property, public and
private--not excepting even the sacred vases appropriated to
religious uses--and as it is highly expedient that the progress of
the enemy should be interrupted and impeded as far as is
practicable--you are required to be particularly vigilant in watching
their escape, and are to endeavour to cut off such of their vessels as
you can assail with safety, and are to continue in the execution of
this duty so long as you can keep sight of the enemy.
COCHRANE.
Given on board the _Pedro Primiero_ this 1st of July, 1823.
To Captain Taylor, of the _Nitherohy_, I gave further instructions to
continue the chase as long as he considered it practicable to capture or
destroy the enemy's vessels, using his utmost endeavours to disable all
having troops on board; and as it was necessary to occupy Bahia after
its evacuation, I directed Captains Beaurepaire and Thompson, after
having captured or disabled all they could, to return forthwith to
Bahia, and take possession; for which purpose the following order was
issued to Captain Beaurepaire:--
After having executed the previous order, you are to return to
the port of Bahia, taking upon yourself the command of the naval
department afloat in my absence, and it will be your duty to
ascertain the nature of the cargoes of the neutral ships now in the
port of Bahia, or which may afterwards enter, as there are many
neutral ships said to have embarked property to a large amount,
which has been illegally transferred to such neutrals since the
blockade, for the purpose of fraudulent concealment. All such
vessels and all such property ought to be detained and subjected to
legal investigation in the prize tribunals of His Imperial Majesty.
You will have a perfect right to require this investigation, and
though the neutrals may clamour, they cannot lawfully oppose your
proceedings therein--advisedly taken.
A Portuguese frigate being daily expected at Bahia, as well as
other vessels from Portugal and the Portuguese colonies, it will be
advisable, for the better opportunity of capturing the same, to
arrange with the General and Commander-in-Chief, that the
Portuguese flag shall be displayed at least on the outer fort or
battery on the appearance of such Portuguese vessels, or of others
whose nationality is doubtful.
You are to continue on the service above pointed out until further
orders from me, or from the Minister of Marine, with whom you are
to communicate, and convey to him a copy of the present order.
COCHRANE.
Having learned that a great number of the more influential inhabitants
were about to quit Bahia with the fleet--and not wishing to involve them
in the consequences of war--I addressed the following caution to the
Junta of Bahia:--
GENTLEMEN,
Understanding that it is in contemplation to abandon the town of
Bahia, without any security being given not again to resume
hostilities against the subjects and territories of His Imperial
Majesty, and as you may not be aware of the difficulty of
retiring--whilst hopes may have been held out to you that this is
practicable--I must, for the sake of humanity, caution you against
any attempt to remove yourselves by sea, unless I have a perfect
understanding as to the future intentions of the naval forces which
may accompany you, but to whom I have nothing to suggest.
I tell you however, that it is in my power to take advantages which
may be fatal to your escape, and if, after this notice, you shall
sail, you must not lay anything to my charge in the destruction of
passengers, for in the obscurity of night it is impossible to
discriminate ships in which they may be embarked. If, after this
notice, you embark, or continue embarked, it will be to me a subject
of great regret, because I have ever desired that the dangers of war
should be confined to the military and naval profession.
COCHRANE.
To the Junta, Bahia,
To General Madeira, commanding the Portuguese troops, I wrote as
follows:--
Understanding that you are about to embark the military forces
under your command, with a view to proceed to some of the Northern
provinces, humanity compels me to declare to you my duty, however
painful, to take all measures within my power to dismantle whatever
transports may attempt to sail from Bahia under convoy of the
ships of war. That I have the means of performing this duty, in
defiance of the ships of war which may endeavour to obstruct
my operations, is a fact which no naval officer will doubt--but
which to you as a military man may not be so apparent. If,
after this warning, I am compelled to have recourse to the measures
alluded to, and if numerous lives should be sacrificed thereby, I
shall stand acquitted of those consequences which would otherwise
press heavily on my mind.
(Signed) COCHRANE.
Gen. MADEIRA.
To the Portuguese Admiral I addressed the following note:--
Sir,
I have written to the Junta and the General commanding
the military force, relative to particulars which I have felt it my
duty to submit to their consideration. To you, as a professional
man, I have nothing to suggest or request--but merely to express
my conviction that, for the sake of humanity, you will give that
professional opinion on the subject of my letters--should they be
referred to you--which may be expected from a naval officer of your
experience.
(Signed) COCHRANE.
The Admiral of the Portuguese Squadron.
On the 2nd of July, the whole Portuguese force, naval and military, got
under weigh, and steered out--the troops being embarked in the armed
transports and large merchantmen, whilst other vessels were filled with
Portuguese families and their property--everything moveable being put on
board--with the utmost confidence in the protection of their fleet. As
only the flagship and _Maria de Gloria_ were present, we made no attempt
to attack them whilst issuing from the mouth of the river, they no doubt
ridiculing my warnings as communicated to the Junta and the commanding
officers.
In this, however, they were mistaken; as every thing was in readiness,
both on board the flagship and the _Maria de Gloria_, for immediate
chase, so soon as the whole were clear of the port; though I had no
intention--as they no doubt interpreted my letters--of attacking
thirteen ships of war and numerous armed transports, with two ships
alone, so long as they remained within the harbour; but when once out,
the superior sailing qualities of these two ships would safely enable us
to harass them with impunity.
As the merchant brig, _Colonel Allen_, which had conveyed us from Chili,
was still with us, and as she might be made useful in looking after the
prizes, I adopted her into the Brazilian navy under the name of the
_Bahia_, appointing her master, Captain Haydon, to the rank of
captain-lieutenant.
Whilst the Portuguese were passing out, I wrote and despatched by the
_Liberal_ schooner, the following letter to the Minister of Marine at
Rio de Janeiro:--
_Pedro Primiero_, off Bahia,
July 2nd, 1833.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Excellency
that the enemy's squadron have this day evacuated Bahia, their
resources by sea being no longer available. Their ships of war,
consisting of thirteen sail of different sizes, and many large
merchantmen filled with troops, are now standing out of the bay.
It is my intention to pursue them as long as it shall appear
beneficial so to do. This ship and the _Maria de Gloria_ are the only
two in sight of the enemy, the _Carolina_ having been obliged to
return to the Moro, in consequence of having lost a topmast, and
the _Nitherohy_ not having joined. I hope in my next to be able to
give you some account of the ulterior objects the enemy have in
view, which, whatever they may be, I shall endeavour to frustrate.
(Signed) COCHRANE.
To the commanders of the other ships, I sent the following order on
their joining the pursuit:--
It being improper to weaken the squadron, and impossible to
officer and man the vessels which may fall into our hands, you are to
adopt the following plan to secure them, viz. to send with the boats
crews which board the enemy's vessels a sufficient number of
crowbars, for the purpose of breaking up their water casks, leaving
only water enough to carry them, on short allowance, into Bahia, to
which port you are to order them immediately to return.
Their papers being essential to the justification of this or any
other hostile act, the boarding officer will take especial care to
secure them.
COCHRANE.
In addition to this, the masts of all troopships which might be
boarded, were directed to be so far cut away as to prevent their
escape--a written order instructing them to return forthwith to Bahia,
on pain of being treated with great severity if found on any other
course. Singular as the order may appear, it was in most cases obeyed,
and thus the captured vessels navigated themselves into our hands.
The Portuguese squadron consisted of _Don Joaõ_, 74; _Constitucaõ_,50;
_Perola_, 44; _Princeza Real_,28; _Calypso_, 22; _Regeneracaõ_, 26;
_Activa_, 22; _Dez de Fevereiro_, 26; _Audaz_, 20; _S. Gaulter_, 26;
_Principe do Brazil_, 26; _Restauracaõ_, 26; _Canceicaõ_, 8; with
between sixty and seventy merchant vessels and transports filled with
troops.
As soon as they were clear of the port, we fell upon the rearmost ships,
disabling their main and mizen masts, so as to render it difficult for
them to sail otherwise than before the wind, which would carry them to
the Brazilian coast, and ordering them back to Bahia. The flagship and
the _Maria de Gloria_ then resumed the pursuit, but the latter being
employed in looking after the prizes, on the following morning we were
alone amongst the enemy's convoy.
The next day, July 3rd, the _Carolina_ and _Nitherohy_ came up, as did
also the _Colonel Allen_. The frigates captured a number of merchantmen
mostly filled with Portuguese families--these unfortunate people finding
to their cost that my warnings were not empty threats, though they had
no doubt been led to ridicule the remonstrance by a misplaced
confidence in the protection of their national squadron. Many prizes
were taken, and as evening closed the frigates dropped out of sight with
the captured vessels.
It would have been easy for the flagship also to have taken prizes, but
about this I cared nothing,--my great object being to prevent the enemy
from landing troops elsewhere, and with this view I determined on
closely following the ships of war and transports--leaving the Brazilian
frigates to exercise their own discretion in disabling the convoy. It
may be considered an act of temerity for one ship of war thus to chase
thirteen; but, encumbered as they were, and, as I knew, short of
provisions, I felt assured of accomplishing my object.
The enemy--being greatly annoyed at our perseverance in following, and
still more so at the loss of so many of the convoy--on the morning of
the 4th, gave chase to the flagship with the whole squadron,
endeavouring to hem her in, and at one time we were pursued so closely
inshore, that there was some danger of getting embayed, but the handling
and superior sailing qualities of the _Pedro Primiero_ enabled her to
out-manoeuvre them and get clear. On seeing this, the Portuguese
squadron, finding further chase unavailing, gave us a broadside which
did no damage, and resumed its position in the van of the convoy, to
which we immediately gave chase as before, and as soon as night set in,
dashed in amongst them, firing right and left till the nearest ships
brought to, when they were boarded--the topmasts cut away--the rigging
disabled--the arms thrown overboard--and the officers compelled to give
their _parole_ not to serve against Brazil until regularly exchanged--an
event not likely to happen.
Keeping well up with them on the 5th--as soon as night set in, this mode
of attack was repeated, when we took a Russian vessel filled with
Portuguese troops, and disabled her in like manner. Of the merchantmen
within reach we took no notice, as it was impolitic to weaken the crew
of the flagship by manning prizes, whilst, as we saw nothing of the
remainder of the Brazilian squadron, there was no other means of
preventing their escape.
The prudence of preserving the crew of the flagship entire, was now well
exemplified. After taking possession of the Russian transport, at dusk,
I observed half-a-dozen large ships detach themselves from the main body
of the convoy, and suspecting some valid reason for the movement,
immediately gave chase. Though they crowded all sail, we came up with
them on the following morning, and singling out a large frigate-built
ship, filled with troops, we fired upon her till she brought to. On
boarding, we found her to be the _Gran Para_, containing--with the
others--a division of several thousand troops, destined to maintain
Portuguese authority in the province of Maranham--as, indeed, I had been
informed at Bahia. The private signals and instructions of the
Portuguese admiral--obtained by Flag-Lieutenant Grenfell from her
captain--put me in possession of the whole arrangement, which was thus
luckily frustrated.
As it was of importance not to let any of these troopships escape,
Captain Grenfell was ordered to disable the _Gran Para_, cutting away
her main and mizen masts, throwing the arms and ammunition overboard,
taking possession of the regimental flags, and compelling the officers,
as before, to give their _parole_ not to serve against Brazil. This
done, the other transports were successively boarded and disabled, so
far as was consistent with not leaving them positive wrecks on the
water; for with my single ship, to have made prisoners of so numerous a
body of troops was manifestly impossible.
The brig _Bahia_ having opportunely hove in sight, I seized four of the
vessels carrying troops, and ordered Captain Haydon to convoy them to
Pernambuco, to the President of which province I addressed the following
letter:--
Pedro Primiero, July 7th, 1823.
ILLUSTRIOUS AND EXCELLENT SIR,
The abandonment of Bahia by the enemy, in
consequence of the rigours of blockade--and the capture of half of
his army, ensigns, artillery, and stores, are events which you will
be gratified to learn. Part of the captured officers and troops I
send in for your disposal, having engaged that they shall be treated
after the manner which may justly be expected from the high
character of the Government of His Imperial Majesty, and the
customary practice of all European states. I have to request that
you will be pleased to order their disembarkation without delay.
We require seamen to finish the war. If you will be pleased to
grant the bounty of 24 dollars per man, as at Rio--charging the
same to the Government--you will render an essential service to
your country. I do not mean Portuguese seamen--who are enemies;
but able seamen of any other nation, and I need scarcely say, that
from my knowledge of the character of the men, I should prefer
British seamen to all others.
I shall probably have the honour of shortly making myself known
to you, but that depends on circumstances over which I have no
control. If we can come in, permit me to observe, that it would be
conducive to the health of my crew to have ready a supply of fresh
provisions and fruits, especially lemons and oranges. I hope you
will excuse my freedom in mentioning these things, as the health
of the men is as conducive to the interests of the empire as are
the ships of war themselves.
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE.
Sent by the _Balia_, Captain Haydon.
By the same opportunity I despatched the following to the Minister of
Marine:--
ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,
I have the honour to inform you that half the
enemy's army, their colours, cannon, ammunition, stores, and
baggage, have been taken. We are still in pursuit, and shall
endeavour to intercept the remainder of the troops, and shall then
look after the ships of war, which would have been my first object,
but that, in pursuing this course, the military would have escaped
to occasion further hostilities against the Brazilian Empire.
Such of the enemy's colours as we have had time to take away
I have the honour to transmit, and to lay them at the feet of His
Imperial Majesty, and shall shortly forward the remainder.
The vessels taken are large and beautiful ships, fast sailers, and
resemble, in their appearance, ships of war.
The Portuguese squadron, and other vessels armed for war, I
have every reason to believe are on their route for Lisbon. I have
also fully ascertained that the troopships which separated from their
squadron during the night were destined for Maranham.
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE.
The Minister of Marine.
The pursuit was now resumed, but the weather becoming hazy, we saw
nothing of the enemy till the 11th, when they appeared to have recovered
the _Gran Para_. As it became calm, nothing could be done till the 14th,
when we crossed the Equator in Long. 33-30, making straight for the
ships of war, but finding them well together, considered it prudent to
defer an attack till they should become separated.
On the 15th they continued united, giving us no opportunity for
mischief, yet not venturing to attack us, though only one ship to
thirteen. At 3 A.M. on the 16th, we crowded sail and went in amongst
them, firing a broadside within half musket shot at one of the frigates
with evident effect, as, from the damage caused, they did not return our
fire. Whilst tacking to give them the other broadside, our mainsail
split in two, and night setting in, we relinquished the pursuit in 5
degrees North latitude.
My object in so doing was--that as we had only taken part of the
troopships destined for Maranham, it was quite possible--as that port
lay to leeward--that the remainder might even yet reach their
destination; and as the Portuguese authority still existed in that--as
throughout all the Northern provinces--they might again be armed and
equipped. The instructions of the Portuguese admiral were, moreover,
that, in case of separation, they were to rendezvous at the island of
Fernando de Noronha, near which they were fallen in with some days
afterwards; so that there were good grounds for anticipating the
possibility of their yet reaching their original destination. Instead,
therefore, of following the enemy's squadron farther, I thought we
should better serve the interests of Brazil by proceeding direct to
Maranham, with the double purpose of being beforehand with the enemy's
troops, should the attempt be made--and, if practicable, reducing the
province to the authority of the Emperor; a proceeding which, though not
within my orders, was, as I conceived, nevertheless of great importance.
Accordingly, quitting the Portuguese fleet and convoy, during the
obscurity of night, we made straight for Maranham.
Thus were the Northern provinces entirely rescued from the designs of
this armament, which--luckily for the consolidation of the empire--I had
been enabled to frustrate; so that the cause of independence became free
to develop itself throughout its whole extent. It is satisfactory to
record the fact, that the whole military force was captured or
dispersed, and its objects averted--by a single ship--without the loss
of a man on our part--or the additional cost of a dollar to the Imperial
Government; though, when we left Rio de Janeiro, it was believed that
such objects could only be effected by costly naval and military
expeditions combined.
During this chase, as I have said, it did not appear a national object
to make captures, though many were secured--as officers and seamen must
have been detached for the purpose, thereby diminishing our efficiency
for the annexation of those provinces where the Portuguese authority was
still intact; to accomplish which--though such result was not expected
by the Government--I had formed plans during the pursuit. Considering
that zeal for Brazilian interests would be better shewn by expelling the
enemy which remained, I therefore refrained from taking possession of
many valuable ships, otherwise completely at our mercy, _though not
having done so--then (previous to my experience of the Court of
Admiralty) seemed_ a heavy pecuniary loss to myself, the officers, and
crew. Such sacrifice should have secured us better treatment than we
subsequently endured from the Administration of a country whose entire
independence was thus obtained by our personal sacrifices.
The means of intimidation employed for the expulsion of the Portuguese
from Bahia--the pursuit of the enemy's fleet--and the disabling of the
troopships destined for Maranham--acts altogether in excess of the
Imperial instructions--not only freed the Northern provinces from the
enemy, but, as before stated, saved the Brazilian Government the delay,
expense, and uncertainty of powerful expeditions.
These services--undertaken solely on my own responsibility--were
productive of the most beneficial consequences to the future career of
the Brazilian Empire, the integrity of which they secured at a blow, or
it may rather be said, without a blow, for none of any magnitude was
struck; the dread of the fireships and the certainty arising--from the
nocturnal visit of the flagship on the 12th of June, that my plans for
making use of them were completed--having determined the Portuguese
Admiral to save his fleet by evacuating Bahia.
CHAPTER III.
CAPTURE OF THE DON MIGUEL--SUMMONS TO THE AUTHORITIES--REASONS FOR
THREATS HELD OUT--PROPOSALS FOR CAPITULATION--PROCLAMATIONS--TERMS
GRANTED TO PORTUGUESE GARRISON--DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE--PORTUGUESE
TROOPS ORDERED TO EMBARK--SYMPTOMS OF DISOBEYING THE ORDER--DELIGHT OF
THE PEOPLE ON BECOMING FREE--ELECTION OF A PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT--LETTERS TO THE MINISTER OF MARINE.
On the 26th of July, the _Pedro Primiero_ arrived in the river Maranhaõ,
and--knowing from the Portuguese admiral's instructions found in the
troopships overhauled in the chase, that reinforcements were
expected--we hoisted Portuguese colours, with a view of inducing a
belief that the flagship belonged to that nation, and had arrived in
support of its cause. The authorities, deceived by this ruse, sent off a
brig of war--the _Don Miguel_, Captain Garcaõ--with despatches and
congratulations upon our safe arrival! but the commander of the brig was
disagreeably undeceived by finding himself upon the deck of a Brazilian
ship. The despatches put me in possession of the enemy's plans and
intentions, and from them I learned that some reinforcements had already
reached, independent of those which had been intercepted in the recent
chase; thus shewing the great importance attached by Portugal to the
preservation of the wealthy and influential province of Maranham.
To the surprise of Captain Garcaõ--now a prisoner of war--I offered to
release him and his vessel on condition of his carrying sealed letters
to the Governor and Junta in the city--a proposition gladly accepted.
Previous to his departure--by a fiction held justifiable in war, and,
indeed, necessary under our peculiar circumstances, as having only a
single ship to reduce a province--he was duly impressed by the relation
of an imaginary number of vessels of war in the offing, accompanied by
transports filled with troops, which the superior sailing of the
flagship had enabled her to outstrip. Captain Garcaõ being a seaman and
well able to judge as to the sailing qualities of the _Pedro Primiero_,
was easily impressed with this story, and returned to the city with
intelligence of an irresistible force about to disembark for its
reduction.
My letters to the Governor and Junta were to the same effect; for--as
before noticed--having only a single ship, it was necessary to impress
on their imagination--that a fleet and army were at hand to add the
province to Brazil. As this is the only instance within my knowledge of
a military force surrendering itself and the province which it defended,
to a stratagem of this nature, I shall append the documents by which a
result so desirable was effected.
To Don Agostinho Antonia de Faria, the commandant, I wrote as follows:--
Pedro Primiero, July 26, 1823.
SIR,
The naval and military forces under my command,
leave me no room to doubt the success of the enterprise in which I
am about to engage, in order to free the province of Maranham from
foreign domination, and to allow the people free choice of government
in the same manner as the inhabitants of Portugal have decided
with regard to their constitution.
Of the flight of the Portuguese naval and military forces from
Bahia you are aware. I have now to inform you of the capture of
two-thirds of the transports and troops, with all their stores and
ammunition.
I am anxious not to let loose the Imperial troops of Bahia upon
Maranham, exasperated as they are at the injuries and cruelties
exercised towards themselves and their countrymen, as well as by
the plunder of the people and churches of Bahia. It is for you to
decide whether the inhabitants of these countries shall be further
exasperated by resistance which appears to me unavailing, and alike
prejudicial to the best interests of Portugal and Brazil.
Although it is not customary amongst European nations to receive or
respect flags of truce, being armed vessels, yet as a proof that we
came here with objects far superior to the seizure of the brig of
war just released, I have paid respect to the flag, in the hope that
forbearance will facilitate that harmony which all must be desirous
should exist between the government of the Royal father and that of
the Imperial son; and in doing this, I only fulfil the gracious
intentions of His Imperial Majesty.
Awaiting your early reply,
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE.
Don AGOSTINHO ANTONIA DE FARIA,
Commanding the Portuguese Forces.
The subjoined was at the same time despatched to the Provincial Junta;--
ILLUSTRIOUS AND EXCELLENT SIRS,
The forces of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor
of Brazil, having freed the city and province of Bahia from the
enemies of independence--in conformity with the will of His
Imperial Majesty that the beautiful province of Maranham should
be free also--I now hasten to offer to the oppressed inhabitants
whatever aid and protection they need against a foreign yoke;
desiring to accomplish their liberation and to hail them as brethren
and friends.
Should there, however, be any who--from self-interested motives--oppose
themselves to the deliverance of their country, let such be
assured that the naval and military forces which have driven the
Portuguese from the South, are again ready to draw the sword in
the like just cause--and having drawn it, the result cannot be long
doubtful.
The chief authorities are hereby invited to make known to me
their decision, in order that the responsibility of consequences--in
case of opposition--may not be imputed to any undue haste in the
execution of the duty which I shall have to perform.
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE.
To the Illustrious and Excellent
The Provincial Junta of Maranham.
The reader may perhaps conclude, that the threats held out are somewhat
inconsistent with my only having a single ship, without a soldier in
her; and I must even confess to some compunction at this off-hand sketch
of an imaginary fleet and army--but the matter was of the last
importance. On the one hand, if my demands were vigorously pressed,
there was a strong probability of obtaining them without bloodshed; but,
on the other hand, if any delay took place, the enemy would, in a day or
two at most, find out that the only force was the flagship, when the
acquisition of Maranham would be impossible. The sensation caused by the
evacuation of Bahia gave probability to my representations, and added to
the despondency of the Portuguese, so that the _ruse_ was completely
successful.
Proposals of capitulation were immediately returned; but, as these were
only conditional, I refused to accept them. In order to enforce the
terms proffered, we entered the river--never before navigated by a
line-of-battle ship--and anchored the _Pedro Primiero_ abreast of the
fort. On the following day, July 27th, the Junta, accompanied by the
bishop, came on board, and gave in their adherence to the empire, after
which the city, forts, and island, were unconditionally surrendered,
though not without subsequent hesitation, which was dispelled by firing
a shot over the town, whereupon a flag of truce was sent off, and all
demands were complied with. Landing a party of marines for the
maintenance of order, the Portuguese ensign was hauled down by
Lieutenant Grenfell, who hoisted Brazilian colours in its place.
Thus, without military force or bloodshed, was a second great province
secured to the empire, neither result being anticipated, nor even
contemplated in the orders communicated to me, which were to blockade
the Portuguese in Bahia, and capture or destroy all ships met
with--anything beyond this not having entered the imagination of the
Government.
As--considering the circumstances in which I was placed--there was no
time to be lost in completing the declaration of independence, I
addressed the subjoined instructions to the civil authorities:--
_Pedro Primiero_, July 27, 1823.
MOST EXCELLENT SIRS,
It affords me the highest satisfaction that your Excellencies have
adopted a course by which all hostilities may be avoided, and the
tranquillity and prosperity of this province peaceably established
upon a secure and permanent basis. The declaration of the independence
of Brazil under His Imperial Majesty will at once tranquillise the
public mind, and give opportunity to the worthy and patriotic
inhabitants to proceed afterwards with a due formality and
deliberation to take the oaths, and elect their provisional
government. To-morrow, therefore--being the earliest possible day--it
maybe well that the said declaration shall be made taking every
necessary precaution that the public peace shall not be disturbed by
individuals under any pretence.
(Signed) COCHRANE.
To the inhabitants generally I issued the following proclamation:--
THE FIRST ADMIRAL OF BRAZIL TO THE INHABITANTS OF
MARANHAM.
The auspicious day has arrived on which the
worthy and public-spirited inhabitants of Maranham have it in their
power at once to declare the independence of their country, and
their adherence to their patriotic monarch, Pedro Primiero, whose
protection has afforded them the glorious privilege of freemen--that
of choosing their constitution and enacting their laws by their own
representatives assembled to decide upon their own affairs in their
own country.
That the glory of this day may not be tarnished by any acts of
excess--even proceeding from enthusiasm for the cause in which we
have embarked--must be the wish of every honourable and well-judging
citizen. To these it would be superfluous to offer any
advice as to their conduct; but should there be any who, from whatever
motives, would disturb public tranquillity, they are hereby
warned that the strictest orders are given to bring those guilty of
disturbance to the punishment their crime shall deserve.
Taking the necessary oaths, and the election of civil government,
are acts which must be deliberately performed, and for this, the
1st of August is selected. Citizens! let us proceed gravely and
methodically, without tumult, haste, or confusion, and let the act be
accomplished in a manner worthy the approbation of His Imperial
Majesty, and which shall give no cause for regret, and leave no room
for amendment.
Long live the Emperor, and the Independence and Constitution
of Brazil.
(Signed) COCHRANE.
To the garrison of Maranham, liberty was granted to remain or depart, as
they chose; in the latter case, free egress to Europe being permitted,
with ensigns, arms, and military honours. Of the vessels of war we took
possession, giving to the officers and men, the option of entering the
service of Brazil, or accepting the conditions conceded to the army.
As the Brazilian people will naturally be interested in all that led to
the completion of the integrity of the empire, the terms granted to the
Portuguese garrison are subjoined.
_Pedro Primiero_, July 27, 1823.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
In reply to your letter of this date, I beg leave to
assure you, first, that my utmost endeavours shall be used to
protect the persons and property of the citizens of Maranham--with
the exception of such species of property as, being proved to
belong to a hostile party, shall become, according to the laws of
war, subject to the decision of the tribunals of His Imperial Majesty;
that the same leniency with respect to all past political opinions
shall be used as has been observed under the constitutional government
of His Most Faithful Majesty John VI.; and that all persons
desiring to remove shall be at liberty to do so, under the usual
formalities.
Secondly,--You are at liberty either to depart to any other
country, or to remain in this.
Thirdly,--The commanding officers, superior officers, and soldiers
of the Portuguese nation, shall be free to retire to their native
country, or to any other quarter; and shall be permitted to embark
with their ensigns, arms, and military honours.
As independence is to be declared to-morrow, and as the vessels
of war now in the port bear the ensigns of Portugal--and as I
believe the necessary authority is vested in you, I have to request
that you will order that ensign not to be hoisted on board the said
vessels, in order that the substitution of that of Brazil may be
made in the manner least offensive to the feelings of the officers--all,
or any of whom may remain with their men in the service of
Brazil, or may consider themselves under the third article relating
to the army.
I have to express my regret at your indisposition, which has
deprived me of the pleasure of seeing you; but, if circumstances
permit, I shall avail myself of an early opportunity of paying you
my personal respects.
(Signed) COCHRANE.
To DON AGOSTINHO ANTONIA DE FARIA,
General-at-Arms of Maranhaõ.
On the 28th the declaration of independence was made amidst the
acclamation of the inhabitants generally--those who were adverse to the
measure not venturing to make any demonstration to the contrary.
Still it was important to get rid of the Portuguese troops before they
found out the _ruse_ which had been practised upon them; for, three days
having now elapsed without any appearance of my reputed forces, there
was some fear that they might attempt to recover their former position.
Accordingly I addressed the following letter to General de Faria:--
_Pedro Primiero_, July 29, 1823.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
The declaration of independence having been
formally made, and His Imperial Majesty being declared constitutional
Emperor of Brazil by acclamation of the worthy people of
Maranham--which important event has happily taken place, not
only without disorder, but, to the honour and credit of the
inhabitants, with the greatest harmony and regularity--it now
becomes my duty, as military chief under his Imperial Majesty, to
take care that no military interference or intimidation shall in any
way overawe or influence the choice of the inhabitants in the
election of their provisional government. I have, therefore, to
request that you will be pleased to direct all the Portuguese troops
who intend to avail themselves of the third article of the stipulations
entered into with regard to the military to repair to the
place appointed, and there await the preparations which I shall
immediately make for their transportation to Lisbon.
I have also to beg that you will he pleased to furnish me with a
correct list of those who desire to depart, and also of those who
choose to remain and take the oaths as Brazilian citizens.
I have, &c. &c.
COCHRANE.
To Gen. A.A. DE FARIA.
These instructions were promptly complied with by the Ex-Commandant, and
no time was lost in providing ships for the reception of the Portuguese
troops who wished to avail themselves of permission to sail for Lisbon.
This leniency was scarcely deserved, for the Portuguese authorities had
filled the gaols with respectable Brazilian citizens, who were treated
with great severity; but, for obvious reasons, I was desirous to get rid
of the Portuguese on any terms.
The next step was to provide for the proper administration of
government, and this--from the factions which were afterwards found to
exist--was a work of infinitely greater difficulty than had been the
acquisition of the city. Some of the more influential inhabitants,
however, offering their services, I formed them into a provisional
Junta, until a more popular Government could be provided.
Municipal security being thus attained, the Portuguese troops were
embarked, on the 1st of August, though not without some difficulty, for,
from the non-arrival of my supposed fleet and army, some amongst them
began to suspect that a deception had been practised, and many--backed
by the militia--refused to embark. Upon this, a notice was issued that
if the treaty were not instantly complied with, such steps should be
taken as would render unnecessary the stipulation of safe conveyance to
Europe, as I was determined that a solemn engagement should not be
violated with impunity. This, as a great portion of the troops were
actually on board, and within reach of the flagship's guns, produced the
desired effect on the refractory troops ashore, though not till I was
compelled to send Captain Crosbie with a large party to enforce
compliance and to disarm the militia, both of which objects he effected
without bloodshed.
The embarkation being accomplished, and the foreign portion of the
militia disarmed, so as to leave the city in the hands of the civil
authorities--on the 2nd of August, I issued a proclamation declaring the
commerce of the coast free and uninterrupted; following this, shortly
afterwards by another, declaratory of my willingness to accept from
consignees and others, two-thirds of the estimated value of Portuguese
property liable to confiscation--in place of sending the captured
vessels to Rio de Janeiro; which--from the state of the city, as well as
from want of seamen to man them--was impossible.
To the inhabitants of the city I had been careful to accord complete
liberty, exacting, in return, perfect order, which was preserved, and
property of all kinds respected; the delight of the inhabitants being
unbounded at having been freed from a terrible system of exaction and
imprisonment, which, when I entered the river, was being carried on with
unrelenting rigour by the Portuguese authorities towards all suspected
of a leaning to the Imperial Government. Instead of retaliating--as
would have been gratifying to those so recently labouring under
oppression--I directed oaths to the Constitution to be administered, not
to Brazilians only, but also to all Portuguese who chose to remain and
conform to the new order of things; a privilege, of which many
influential persons of that nation availed themselves.
On the 1st of August the inhabitants of Alcantara made a declaration of
adherence to His Imperial Majesty, notwithstanding a report sedulously
circulated amongst them that the Portuguese troops at Maranham were
about to recover the city. An assurance from me, that the Portuguese
troops were embarked, and were under the guns of the flagship, as well
as the fire of their own gunboats, which could be turned against them,
and that the European militia was disarmed, speedily dispelled all
grounds for alarm.
The proceedings of the temporary Provisional Junta being unsatisfactory,
especially as regarded their desire for retaliation on the Portuguese, I
determined to embody a more popular Government, though, as yet the
election would, of necessity, be confined to the inhabitants of the
city only. Accordingly on the 8th of August, in less than a fortnight
after my first appearance off the port, a Provisional Government was
chosen by the population, and the city and province were incorporated
with Brazil, with the national advantage of adding nearly a million of
dollars to the annual revenue of the empire; and this without the
expense of another expedition to the Government, or the loss of time
which would have been necessary, and might, had the reinforcements
intercepted, gained their destination--have ended in a different result
to the integrity of the empire.
The first act of the new Government was to address a congratulatory
letter to His Imperial Majesty, explaining that they should long before
have espoused the Imperial cause, but from fear of the Portuguese
troops. The following is an extract from this letter:--
What was our joy when unexpectedly we saw the _Pedro Primiero_
summoning our port. Oh, 26th of July, 1823! Thrice happy day,
thou wilt be as conspicuous in the annals of our province, as the
sentiments of gratitude and respect inspired by the illustrious
admiral sent to our aid by the best and most amiable of monarchs
will be deeply engraven on our hearts and on those of our posterity.
Yes! august Sire! the wisdom, prudence, and gentle manners of
Lord Cochrane have contributed still more to the happy issue of our
political difficulties than even the fear of his force. To anchor in
our port--to proclaim independence--to administer the oaths of
obedience to your Majesty--to suspend hostilities throughout the
province--to provide proper government--to bring the troops of the
country into the town, but only in sufficient numbers to ensure
order and tranquillity--to open the communication between the
interior and the capital--to provide it with necessaries--and to
restore navigation and commerce to their pristine state--all this,
Sire, was the work of a few days. Grant Heaven, that this noble
chief may end the glorious career of his political and military labours
with the like felicity and success, and that your Imperial Majesty
being so well served, nothing more may be necessary to immortalise
that admirable commander, not only in the annals of Brazil, but in
those of the whole world.
A large amount of government and public property in the several
departments was seized, in conformity with the Imperial proclamation,
and an addition made to the Brazilian navy of a brig-of-war, the _Don
Miguel_, a schooner, and eight gunboats--besides merchant vessels, some
of which were appropriated to the conveyance of the late garrison to
Lisbon, under engagement to restore their value--a stipulation which was
never fulfilled.
Everything being thus satisfactorily settled, my next step was to inform
the Minister of Marine at Rio de Janeiro of the extraordinary means by
which possession of the city and province of Maranham had been obtained;
the subjoined letters were accordingly despatched.
(Secret.) _Pedro Primiero_, August 8, 1823.
MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,
Your Excellency will perceive by the official
documents accompanying this, that in order to effect the objects I
had in view at Maranham, I judged it expedient to create a belief
amongst the people and garrison, that a large force was at my
disposal, and therefore I used expressions in my public correspondence
that were not borne out by the actual circumstances
under which I summoned that city, as I had--in fact--no other force
than this ship alone, which from the nature of the anchorage could
scarcely approach within gunshot--whilst there was neither a soldier
nor effective marine on board; but the fear entertained by the hostile
Government of Imperial troops from Bahia, whom they understood
to be off the bar with the remainder of the squadron, and the sudden
appearance of so large a ship as this, produced the effect which I
had anticipated, and it is with the greatest satisfaction that I now
communicate the occupation of this important city and province,
which has been accomplished without effusion of blood, or material
disturbance.
As soon as I have completed the necessary arrangements here, I
propose to return to Rio de Janeiro, and to have the honour
personally to inform you of all particulars.
I have, &c.
COCHRANE.
Minister of Marine.
With this was transmitted the following official document:--
_Pedro Primiero_, Aug. 8, 1823.
MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,
I had the honour to inform your Excellency by
letter, off Pernambuco, that we had captured transports containing a
moiety of the enemy's army--that we were in pursuit of the
remainder--and that I hoped for further success. I have now to
acquaint your Excellency that, having followed the enemy's squadron
to the fifth degree of North latitude beyond the line, until, by capture
and dispersion, their convoy was so reduced that only thirteen
vessels out of seventy remained with the ships of war, and as the
latter were evidently steering for Lisbon, and were too strong to be
attacked with success by this ship alone--for the remainder of the
Brazilian squadron had separated in the chase--I judged it advantageous
for the interests of His Imperial Majesty's service, to discontinue
the pursuit, and to proceed, with all possible despatch, to
Maranham, where I arrived on the 26th ultimo.
I have the happiness to acquaint you, for the satisfaction of
the Imperial government, that Maranham is now united to the
Empire, the inhabitants having proclaimed their independence of
Portugal on the 28th, and elected their provisional government this
day. I have embarked the Portuguese troops for Europe, and the
militia are disarmed.
I have the honour to enclose a copy of the correspondence which
has taken place on the occasion, with other papers and documents.
We have found here a fine brig of war--a schooner--eight gunboats,
and about sixteen sail of Portuguese merchant vessels. Amongst
the other advantages of this important event may be mentioned, that
while the expense of an express expedition has been saved, an addition
of nearly a million of dollars is made to the revenue of His
Imperial Majesty.
I have manned and sent the brig of war to Parà, to summon that
city--offering to the enemy the same terms as we have granted
here. The beautiful new frigate, lately launched at Parà, has not
sailed for Portugal, and I am in expectation that the next account
which I shall have the honour to send or bring to your Excellency,
will communicate the pleasing intelligence that His Imperial
Majesty has no enemy, either on shore or afloat, between the extremities
of his empire.
I have, &c.
COCHRANE.
The Minister of Marine.
CHAPTER IV.
CAPT. GRENFELL SENT TO SUMMON PARA--THE JUNTA DEMANDS THE PRIZE
PROPERTY--MY REFUSAL--IMPERIAL APPROVAL OF MY SERVICES--REALISATION OF
PRIZE PROPERTY--TURI ASSU SENDS IN ITS ADHESION--MONEY CAPTURED LENT TO
THE JUNTA--ITS RETURN TO THE SQUADRON EXPECTED--POSSESSION TAKEN OF
PARA--INSURRECTION AT PARA--MISCONDUCT OF THE MARANHAM JUNTA--THEIR
PERSECUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE--STEPS IN CONSEQUENCE--MANIFESTATION OF
THE NATIONAL DELIGHT--THE MARQUISATE CONFERRED ON ME--VOTE OF THANKS BY
THE ASSEMBLEA GERAL--MY ARRIVAL AT RIO DE JANEIRO--SATISFACTION WITH MY
SERVICES--LADY COCHRANE JOINS ME.
As the province of Parà was now the only one which remained under the
authority of Portugal, it became of importance to take possession of it,
whilst the _prestige_ arising from our acquisition of Maranham was in
all its freshness; for we had still no other force than the flagship,
which was necessary to maintain order there. In the absence of a
Brazilian ship-of-war, I manned the captured brig _Don Miguel_--changing
her name to the _Maranhaõ_--and placed her under the command of an able
and gallant officer, Captain-Lieutenant (now Admiral) Grenfell, upon
whose judicious management every reliance was to be placed.
Captain Grenfell was the bearer of a summons from me to the Junta and
garrison of Parà, dated off the bar, as though a force were at hand to
second his operations. In short, he was instructed to employ the same
_ruse_ for intimidating the city as had been so successful at
Maranham--the summons as well as the terms to be granted to the
Portuguese garrison being similar in both cases. He was further
instructed to secure, if possible, the new frigate which had just been
launched for the service of Portugal, and if successful, to name her the
_Impératrice_, in honour of the Empress--to take command of her--and
after the submission of the city to return to Rio de Janeiro with his
prize. The nature of Captain Grenfell's mission will be apparent from
the following extracts from the orders given to him:--
The enclosed orders in Portuguese you may show. They purport to be
addressed to you at the mouth of the river Parà, and to be there
dated on board this ship, she being supposed at anchor there; for it
is essential to create a belief in the Government at Parà that you do
not come alone, but that the squadron is at hand ready to cooperate.
You will therefore fill up the date of the Portuguese orders on the
day of your arrival at the mouth of the river. You will also fill in
the dates of the official letters to the Junta, at the same time,
without regard to the delay which may arise, from proceeding up the
river.
You will perceive that my intentions are to effect, by your means,
objects _which would otherwise require an expedition_, and therefore
the utmost prudence and circumspection are necessary. Next to the
liberation of Parà, the great object is to secure the frigate. If you
succeed in obtaining possession of her, and find yourself deficient
in men, you are at liberty to leave the brig for the purpose of
manning the frigate. I expect everything from your exertions and good
management in bringing about the surrender of Parà, with all that is
important to His Brazilian Majesty.
To return to the state of affairs at Maranham. One of the first acts of
the new Junta--despite their professed admiration of the course I had
pursued--was to transmit to me a demand that the property taken from
the Portuguese should be placed _at their disposal._ My surprise at such
a request from men whom I had unexpectedly released from thraldom, and
elevated to power, ceased as I became better acquainted with the
factions existing amongst them. Now that they were invested with power,
they were evidently bent on turning it to their own private advantage,
by representing to me that if I retained the property of Portuguese in
Maranham--that of Brazilians in Lisbon, viz. _their own mercantile
consignments_--would be confiscated in retaliation, and that, therefore,
I ought to restore it!
To this I replied, that the captures made by the flagship were strictly
in accordance with the decrees of His Imperial Majesty, no less than
with the rights of belligerents as defined by the laws of nations; so
that their request was directly opposed to the Imperial decrees against
all the subjects of Portugal, as well as against all who should
contribute to continue the Brazils under a foreign yoke. The Junta was
reminded that it was within my power to have imposed upon the Portuguese
authorities whatever terms I thought proper, but having granted those I
had judged best for the interests of the empire to which I was bound, I
would adhere to the treaty as it stood, and should any attempt be made
to evade it, it would be my duty--however painful--to enforce its
fulfilment, as being responsible to His Imperial Majesty.
This specimen of patriotism in a body of men who little more than a
fortnight before were imprisoned or in expectation of imprisonment, but
now--to save their own interests in Lisbon--sought to set His Majesty's
decrees and my instructions alike at defiance, inspired me with deep
distrust of their fitness for the Government of the province--it being
evident that if the flagship quitted the port, they would construe the
functions of Government in favour of their own private purposes. I
accordingly wrote to the Prime Minister, Andrada, representing the
course which had been pursued--concluding with the subjoined advice as
to the steps to be taken in order to place the future Government on a
right basis:--
I beg, through your Excellency, to suggest most respectfully to His
Imperial Majesty my opinion that it would greatly conduce to the
peace and prosperity of this province, if some able and honourable
person should be sent to take the chief authority; for--with all
respect to the individuals composing the new Junta, and to those from
whom succeeding Juntas might be chosen--none appear to me to possess
either the talents or acquirements necessary for the good government
of Maranham. I may also add that family connections, together with
private and political friendships, no less than enmities--exist here
to a degree which can hardly fail to involve the province in internal
dissensions, unless averted by the means which I respectfully
suggest.
I had shortly afterwards the pleasure of receiving the following
expressions of satisfaction from His Imperial Majesty through the Prime
Minister:--
Rio, July 12, 1823.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
I have received the secret communications with
which you have favoured me, whereby I learn in detail the distinguished
conduct which you have pursued since quitting this port,
and the various difficulties with which, (to my regret) you have had
to contend. These are, however, of such a nature as to be
irremediable in our present circumstances; but let us hope they
will vanish when the empire is consolidated.
Meanwhile your Excellency--being no less a politician than a
warrior, and enjoying to the utmost the confidence of His Imperial
Majesty--is fully empowered to adopt whatever means your judgment
may suggest to facilitate the important objects of your
commission. On this subject, I also refer to the Imperial authority
and other documents addressed to you in reply to your communications.
I beg to add my personal thanks for the interesting communications
with which you have favoured me, of which I shall avail
myself in order to accomplish the objects desired to be effected.
Be assured of the particular esteem and high consideration
with which I am,
De V. Exa.
Attento venerador e criado,
JOZE BONIFACIO DE ANDRADA E SILVA.
The Junta continuing its unreasonable demand, the moveable property
captured was embarked on board the _Pombinho_, and another vessel--both
prizes--for the purpose of being sent to Rio de Janeiro for
adjudication. I then directed the Provisional Government to furnish me
with an account of all money found in the treasury, customs, military
chest, and other departments; also of all military stores in the various
forts and magazines and of government property of every description,
such property having been wholly awarded to the captors by Imperial
decree of the 11th of December, 1822, issued to induce foreign seamen to
enter the service.
On the 20th of August the Portuguese troops were ordered to depart for
Lisbon--Maranham being thus entirely freed from the presence of the
armaments upon which the mother country had relied for the maintenance
of her Northern provinces; this result, wholly unexpected by the
Imperial Government or the nation, having been accomplished within the
space of a few months, by measures adopted on my own responsibility.
Still numerous vessels and much perishable property taken from the
enemy, remained on hand--with which it was difficult to deal. From
having manned the captured brig-of-war, _Don Miguel_--as well as the
prize vessel, _Pombinho_, from the crew of the flagship, it was not
expedient further to reduce her efficiency; so that there were no means
of forwarding the other prizes and property to Rio de Janeiro for
adjudication. I therefore apprised the Minister of Marine, that the only
course circumstances would permit me to pursue--though not perfectly
regular--would be to dispose of them and remit to the Government in
specie the amount realised; as, in case of my departure from Maranham,
they were certain to be improperly appropriated. Accordingly, an offer
was again made to the merchants, to accept two-thirds of their value in
specie, and to submit the amount to the further decision of the Court of
Admiralty, I little anticipating at the time the anti-Imperial
predilections of the members composing the prize tribunal at Rio de
Janeiro.
The amount of the seizures effected by the squadron was very
considerable, comprising upwards of a hundred and twenty vessels, some
of which contained important cargoes. The aggregate amount of
these--together with merchandise found in the Custom-house--Government
and other public property and stores--was several millions of dollars,
and this by His Imperial Majesty's decree of the 11th of December,
1822--promulgated to attract foreign seamen into the Brazilian
service--was, as before mentioned, the property of the captors; the
Imperial Government, by that decree, disclaiming all share in it,--a
stipulation afterwards remorselessly violated.
On the 25th of August, the province of Turi Assu sent in its adhesion to
the Empire, this favourable circumstance being however counteracted by
the arrival of deputies from the troops of Cearà and Piahuy, reporting
their revolutionary tendency, and demanding payment for their previous
service; the Piahuy troops--consisting for the most part of Indians
recruited in the interior--even threatened to march upon Maranham and
enforce their demand, although they had rendered no assistance. The
Junta, alarmed at this demonstration, now forwarded to me a request that
I would appropriate some portion of the captured property to satisfy the
importunity of the mutinous troops.
Considering that the tranquillity of the province in a great measure
depended upon silencing these troops--who were not only clamorous and
menacing, but in a state of nakedness and destitution--which rendered it
probable that they might help themselves at the expense of the
inhabitants--I consented to the application of the Junta, placing at
their disposal the monies taken in the Portuguese treasury, amounting in
cash to Rs.62.560 $423 (60,560 dollars); that found in the custom-house,
to the amount of Rs.54.167 $877 (54,167 dollars); and outstanding bills
to the amount of Rs.147.316 $656 (147,316 dollars); making in the whole
Rs.264.044 $776 (264,044 dollars): accounts of these sums, and the
urgency of their appropriation to the necessities of the public service,
being duly forwarded to the Minister of Marine at Rio de Janeiro.
These sums are thus minutely set forth, because it has been erroneously
represented that sixty contos of reis alone (60,000 dollars), were given
up to the Junta, though reference to the vouchers themselves would have
dissipated this error, which will be found to have an important bearing
upon a subsequent part of the narrative. It may be also necessary to
explain how "outstanding debts" could be owing to the Government.
Contrary to the English practice of paying duties to the revenue, before
goods are cleared from the custom-house, it was the habit of the
Portuguese authorities to permit their clearance on receipt of bills to
be paid after the goods were disposed of; hence merchants became
indebted to the Government in the amount of such engagements.
It was impossible to avoid assisting the Junta, in the extremity alluded
to, as the neglected troops might have caused a dangerous _émeute_,
which would have proved injurious to the interests of His Imperial
Majesty.
The assistance rendered to the Junta was given at the expense of the
officers and seamen, to whom the money of right belonged, and who looked
for its repayment as soon as circumstances would permit. On this subject
I wrote as follows to the Minister of Marine:--
Maranham, Aug. 26, 1833.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
Since I had the honour of addressing you deputies have arrived from
the troops of Cearà and Piahuy soliciting payment for their services.
The provisional Junta of Maranham have requested my assistance in
this object, and as I consider the tranquillity of this province to
depend in a great measure on the speedy payment of these forces, I
have placed at the disposal of the Junta various funds arising from
the capitulation of this place. This will doubtless be considered by
the seamen--who are the captors--as an unwarrantable sacrifice of
their rights in favour of mutinous troops, who have effected nothing;
but feeling confident of support from the Imperial Government on a
matter so essential to the public interest, I have had no hesitation
in assuring the seamen that they _will not be losers by their
captures being, in the first instance, applied to the relief of the
immediate exigencies of the State._
(Signed) COCHRANE.
On the 30th of August, I had the satisfaction to learn from Captain
Grenfell that his mission to Parà had been completely successful, the
frigate, together with another vessel of war, having been secured, the
former being, by my previous directions, named the _Imperatrice_, and
added to the Imperial navy; several merchantmen were also taken and sent
to Rio de Janeiro.
The summons despatched by Captain Grenfell was--as has been said--based
upon the same _ruse_ as had been so successful at Maranham. In order to
produce a more decisive effect, it had been dated off the mouth of the
river, as though the squadron was there at anchor to compel submission
to the Imperial Government. The plan was so ably conducted by the
talented officer to whom it was entrusted, that although his force
consisted of less than a hundred men, the inhabitants of Parà, without a
dissentient voice--save that of the Portuguese commandant--pronounced
their adhesion to the Government of His Imperial Majesty, and thus a
province, greater in extent than France and England combined, was added
to the empire, and the independence of Brazil effected to its Northern
extremity.
The only blood shed in the liberation of Parà, was that of Captain
Grenfell, who received a severe wound, treacherously inflicted by a
Portuguese who was hired to assassinate him! This cowardly act was
resorted to, on the discovery--when too late--that I was not in the
river, as the Portuguese authorities had been led to believe.
The subjoined is Captain Grenfell's letter announcing the success of his
mission:--
H.I.M.B. Maranham,
August 12, 1833. (Off Parà.)
MY LORD,
I have the honour to inform your Lordship that
your hopes of the union of Parà to the empire of Brazil are verified.
Agreeably to your Lordship's instructions, and in virtue of the
power conferred on me, I opened the communications with the
Junta, and enclose a letter from the General-at-Arms to your
Lordship, and am glad to inform you that his is the only dissenting
voice. I shall pursue the tenor of your Lordship's instructions
until further orders.
I have the honour, &c. &c.
J. PASCOE GRENFELL.
I had directed Captain Grenfell--in case of a declaration of
independence by the inhabitants of Parà--to form a Junta, and to adopt
generally the same course as had been so instrumental in preserving
tranquillity at Maranham; giving him, moreover, power to employ the
resources at his command in supplying the exigencies of the Imperial
service generally, as might be necessary. A Provisional Government was
accordingly formed, though not to the satisfaction of a number of
refractory persons, who, on the pretence of adhesion to the Imperial
Government, connected themselves with a body of undisciplined troops,
and made an attempt to depose the newly constituted Junta, which applied
to Captain Grenfell for support. Landing his men, the insurrection was
with some difficulty put down; but as an ill feeling still prevailed, he
considered it necessary to make an example by ordering the trial of five
of the ringleaders, who, being condemned, were shot in the public
square.
On the 9th of September, I apprised the Junta of Maranham of my
intention to proceed to Parà, though--being without instructions from
the Administration, I really purposed to sail for Rio de Janeiro; for as
the Provisional authority temporarily established was not, by any means
conducting public affairs in a satisfactory manner, I thought it as well
to keep them in ignorance of our real destination, in order that they
should believe me within reach, till the Imperial Government might
exercise its own discretion as to the future.
The Junta of Maranham, indeed, appeared to have no other object than to
shew how liberty suddenly acquired could degenerate into despotism. It
was, for the most part, composed of men, who were not only united by
family connections and private friendship, but who were nearly allied,
as members of one influential family. No sooner had they been invested
with power, than they dismissed all civil and military officers, and
filled the vacant situations with their own friends, relations, and
dependents, without consideration as to their talents or qualifications,
thus equally exciting discontent amongst the Brazilians--who were
excluded, and the Portuguese--who were dismissed.
Their chief aim was to maintain themselves in power against the will of
the people, who, now that tranquillity had been restored, desired a free
and general election of a Constitutional Government throughout the
province, in place of that which, of necessity, had been confined to the
city only. To put down what they considered disaffection--towards
themselves--the Junta brought into the city a large body of irregular
troops, intending, by means of these, to gratify their resentment
against the resident Portuguese, who, having taken the oaths of
allegiance to the Imperial Government, were entitled to protection. It
appeared, moreover, that the Junta and their friends owed large sums of
money to some of the more wealthy and influential Portuguese, and that
they intended to get rid of their debts, by the expulsion of their
creditors.
As it was sufficiently clear that the Junta was determined not to be
advised, it became my duty to avert the evils in contemplation, by
expediting the change of administration so much desired by the people.
Therefore, on the 12th of September, I transmitted to the Junta, an
order for the election of a more comprehensive Government, as they were
only intended to remain in power until a general election throughout the
province could conveniently take place. Satisfactory as was this measure
to the public, it was anything but agreeable to the despotic body, at
whose ill-advised measures it was aimed; their resource being to
increase the ferment amongst the soldiery brought into the city to
uphold their authority, and who--partly from motives of revenge, but
more from the hope of plunder--were eager to execute the hostile
intentions of the Junta against the Portuguese.
An attempt to arrest the president of the Camara, Senor Luiz Salgado, by
the General-at-arms--who had reason to suspect Salgado of intriguing to
remove him from office, gave a pretext for disturbance. On the night of
the 14th of September, the troops rose and plundered many Portuguese
houses, compelling their owners to fly for safety to neutral and other
vessels in the harbour. They then deposed the General-at-arms, and chose
Salgado in his stead, a proceeding which was next day confirmed by a
decree of the Junta, in conjunction with the Camara.
Addressing a letter to Salgado, I firmly refused to acknowledge him as
commandant, telling him, at the same time, that his only means of being
recognised as a Brazilian citizen, was by allaying the ferment he had
contributed to raise. I wrote also to the Junta and Camara, threatening
to act in a decisive manner, if these disgraceful scenes were not
instantly put an end to, pointing out to them that, as they were the
chief proprietors of houses and stores, so they would be the greatest
sufferers from anarchy. This step checked the disturbance, but the Junta
granted the riotous military a gratuity, levied on the Portuguese who
had been attacked. The more respectable of whom soon after quitted
Maranham in disgust.
It must, however, be stated that these disorders admitted of some
palliation, from the consideration that hundreds of Brazilians had been
transported to Lisbon, by the Portuguese authorities, when in power;
whilst hundreds of others were on my arrival imprisoned at Maranham, in
the gaols and vessels in the harbour. On my entrance into the city, I
released numbers of these, and saved many others from impending
incarceration.
By the 18th, though tranquillity was restored, I postponed the election
of a general provisional Junta till the 20th of October, hoping that
before that period, a reply to my earnest entreaties for instructions,
would arrive from the Imperial Government. It was for the sake of
preserving order during the interval, that I had announced my intention
of taking the _Pedro Primiero_ to Parà only, well knowing that a belief
in her speedy return to Maranham would have a salutary influence in
maintaining public peace.
Intelligence of the reduction of Maranham, and the annexation of that
province, together with the province of Parà, to the empire, was
received at Rio de Janeiro with surprise and delight;--surprise, that,
in less than six months, without military force, and, in truth, with one
ship of war only, so much had been effected--and delight that the Empire
was cleared of its enemies without the expense and uncertainty of
expeditions which had been calculated on. All Brazilians were eager to
vie with each other in the expression of entire satisfaction with my
exertions.
His Imperial Majesty was pleased to reward the services rendered, by
creating me Marquis of Maranhaõ, as the fittest title to commemorate the
advantages gained for the empire, at the same time awarding me an estate
commensurate with the dignity of the honours conferred; the "Assemblea
Geral, Constituente e Legislativa" adding a vote of thanks in the name
of the nation. The estate, however, _was never given_, notwithstanding
that, at Maranham, and in other of the Northern provinces, numerous fine
properties, appertaining to the Portuguese Crown, were added to the
Imperial domain. The inconsistency of this was remarkable, seeing that I
had been the means of adding to Brazil a territory larger than half
Europe--for which service I was warmly thanked by the Emperor, his
Ministers, and also by the General Assembly--the latter body,
nevertheless, refusing to confirm the gift of even so minute a portion
of the vast territory unexpectedly added to the Empire.
The subjoined is the Imperial order, elevating me to the Marquisate:--
His Majesty the Emperor, taking into consideration the great services
which your Excellency has just rendered to the nation by assisting to
liberate the city of Bahia from the unjust Lusitanian yoke, and
afterwards wisely aiding the honourable inhabitants of the province
of Maranham in throwing off the said foreign domination, so that they
were enabled, according to their desire, to acknowledge His Majesty
as their constitutional Emperor; and desiring to give your Excellency
a public testimonial of gratitude for these great and extraordinary
services (_per estse altos e extraordinarios serviços_) on behalf of
the generous Brazilian people, who will ever preserve a lively
remembrance of such illustrious acts, I deem it right to confer upon
your Excellency the title of Marquis of Maranhaõ. My Secretary of
State will expedite the necessary patent which I communicate to your
Excellency for your information.
God preserve your Excellency many years.
Palace of Rio de Janeiro, 25th of November, 1823.
(Signed) JOAÕ SEVERIANO MACIEL DA COSTA.
The annexed is the vote of thanks awarded by the _"Assemblea Geral"_
which, as has been said, refused to recognise His Majesty's gift of an
estate in order to support in a dignified manner the title which His
Majesty had graciously been pleased to confer. The reason assigned for
this extraordinary proceeding, in a lengthy debate on the subject was,
that in granting me an estate His Majesty had exercised a feudal
prerogative inconsistent with a free country.
The General Constituent and Legislative Assembly having been
officially informed that your Excellency, after having freed the
province of Bahia from the oppression of Portuguese troops, and
having pursued them beyond the equinoctial line, led the squadron on
your own judgment and responsibility to the port of the city of St.
Louis of Maranhaõ, where, with your accustomed valour and singular
good judgment, you dislodged the Portuguese troops, who had kept down
the patriotism of its generous inhabitants, and accomplished their
liberation, so that they proclaimed and spontaneously swore with
unanimity their independence of Portugal and their decided union with
the Brazilian empire. The General Constituent and Legislative
Assembly, acknowledging the importance of these great services has
decreed in this day's session that there shall be given to your
Excellency in the name of the nation which it represents the thanks
due.
Charged as organs to transmit this resolution to your Excellency,
we fulfil the task with pleasure, and have the honour to lay the
same before your Excellency.
God preserve your Excellency.
Palace of the Assembly, Oct. 3, 1823.
MARTIN FRANCISCO EIBEIEO DE ANDEADA,
JOAÕ SEVERIANO MACIEL DA COSTA,
MIGUEL CALMON DU PIN E ALMEIDA.
This vote of thanks by the Assembly contains a remarkable error, by
averring that I "led the squadron" to Maranhaõ, whereas I had only a
single ship, and with her singly performed all for which I received the
thanks of the nation.
In the interval between this recognition of my services and my return to
Rio de Janeiro, an unfortunate change had taken place in the Councils of
His Imperial Majesty, introductive of persons more favourable to the
interests of Portugal than to furtherance of the judicious measures
contemplated by His Majesty for the consolidation of the
newly-constituted empire. To the obstructive aspirations of these
persons--in ill-concealed concert with the designs of the parent
state--my annexation of the Northern provinces necessarily proved
fatal; and they ever afterwards regarded me with an animosity which
appeared to increase as the empire became, by these, and my subsequent
exertions, more firmly established.
Sailing from Maranham on the 20th of September, the _Pedro Primiero_
arrived at Rio de Janeiro on the 9th of November--the Emperor doing me
the honour to come on board to welcome me. I immediately forwarded to
the Minister of Marine a recapitulation of all transactions since my
departure seven months before; viz. the evacuation of Bahia by the
Portuguese in consequence of our nocturnal visit, connected with the
dread of my reputed skill in the use of fireships, as arising from the
affair of Basque Roads; the pursuit of their fleet beyond the Equator,
and the dispersion of its convoy; the capture and disabling of the
transports filled with troops intended to maintain Portuguese domination
in Maranham and Parà; the device adopted to obtain the surrender to the
_Pedro Primiero_ alone of the enemy's naval and military forces at
Maranham; the capitulation of Parà with the ships of war to my summons
sent by Captain Grenfell; the deliverance of the Brazilian patriots whom
the Portuguese had imprisoned; the declaration of independence by the
intermediate provinces thus liberated, and their union with the empire;
the appointment of Provisional Governments; the embarkation and final
departure of every Portuguese soldier from Brazil; and the enthusiasm
with which all my measures--though unauthorised and therefore extra
official--- had been received by the people of the Northern provinces,
who--thus relieved from the dread of further oppression--had everywhere
acknowledged and proclaimed His Imperial Majesty "Constitutional
Emperor."
The powers which I had taken upon myself to exercise during this
eventful period, were, no doubt; in excess of those conferred by my
orders, but, knowing that everything depended upon the annexation and
pacification of the Northern provinces by the expulsion of the
enemy--setting aside my own interests--I considered it better for the
welfare of the empire to exceed my instructions, than to entail the
continuance of civil war by confining my operations within their scope.
In the exercise of this self-imposed duty it may be said that I had also
exercised Imperial functions, but this was only in the unavoidable
absence of Imperial instructions, which it was my constant endeavour to
anticipate rather than to exceed; that I judged and acted rightly, the
elevation to the title of Marquis of Maranhaõ, before reaching Rio de
Janeiro--the vote of thanks of the legislature, and the warm
acknowledgment of His Imperial Majesty on landing, sufficiently testify.
In addition to the gracious reception accorded by His Majesty, I
received from his own hands a decoration of the Imperial Order of the
Cruizeiro, and, though a foreigner, was subsequently nominated to the
high office of Privy Councillor--the greatest honour in the Imperial
gift to bestow.
During my absence from Rio de Janeiro, Lady Cochrane--ignorant of my
having quitted Chili--was on her way to rejoin me at Valparaiso, but
the vessel in which she embarked, having fortunately put into Rio de
Janeiro, she was at once made acquainted with my change of service, and
remained in the capital till my return. The most hospitable attention
was paid to her by the Royal family, the Empress conferring upon her the
appointment of Lady of Honour to Her Majesty. The relief to my mind on
finding Lady Cochrane at Rio de Janeiro was very great, for, as there
had not been opportunity to apprise her of my departure from Chili in
time to prevent her return thither, it had been a constant source of
regret to me that she would have to endure the discomfort of two tedious
voyages round Cape Horn before she could join me in Brazil. The
fortunate circumstance of putting into Rio happily terminated the
embarrassment.
CHAPTER V.
FIRST EFFORT 10 CURTAIL THE IMPERIAL POWER--PORTUGUESE
INTRIGUE--DISMISSAL Of THE ANDRADAS--THE ASSEMBLY DISSOLVED BY
FORCE--EXILE OF THE ANDRADAS--LETTER TO HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY--MY ADVICE
PARTLY ADOPTED--AND CAUSES MINISTERIAL ENMITY TOWARDS ME--RATIFICATION
Of MY PATENT--I DEMAND THE ADJUDICATION OF PRIZES--LETTER TO THE
MINISTER OF MARINE--OFFER OF PERSONAL ADVANTAGE TO FOREIGN
CLAIMS--SQUADRON REMAINED UNPAID--I AM APPOINTED A PRIVY COUNCILLOR--THE
PRIZE VESSELS PLUNDERED--SHAMEFUL TREATMENT OF CAPTAIN
GRENFELL--TROUBLES IN PERNAMBUCO--HOSTILITY OF THE PRIZE
TRIBUNAL--CONDEMNS ME TO THE RESTITUTION OF PRIZES--FORBIDS MAKING ANY
CAPTURES AT ALL.
Shortly before returning to Rio de Janeiro, a total change had taken
place in the administration of which José Bonifacio de Andrada was the
head. As that minister's views were patriotic, he was, in consequence,
obnoxious to the Portuguese faction, which had made one or two
unsuccessful efforts to supplant him, these only serving to confirm his
power amongst the people, who justly appreciated his leadership in the
cause of independence. Becoming, thus, more confident in his position,
he was accused, whether rightly or wrongly, of intolerance towards
persons who were plotting against him, though, even if the accusation
were true, he was scarcely to blame for discountenancing those whose
chief aim was to paralyse the independence they were unable to prevent.
On the proclamation of the Empire, two influential Portuguese, in the
Assembly, endeavoured to impose a condition on the Emperor that, before
ascending the throne, he should make oath to a constitution framed by
the Constituent Assembly alone, thus reducing His Majesty to a cypher in
the hands of the legislature. The proposition was plausible enough to
those who were anticipating power, but it gave rise to such dissensions,
that Bonifacio de Andrada and his brother sent in their resignations,
which, under these difficult circumstances, were accepted by the
Emperor.
A violent tumult amongst the people was the immediate consequence, and
His Majesty was induced to recall the patriotic Andradas to the
cabinet--they however, refusing to resume their functions, unless their
Portuguese opponents were banished; to this the Emperor assented, and
the Andradas returned to office amidst the plaudits of the populace, who
drew the carriage of José de Andrada in triumph into the town.
As might have been expected, less tolerance was manifested by the
triumphant ministers than before, this just but perhaps impolitic course
being eagerly seized on by the Portuguese faction to excite the
apprehension of the patriots, who were somewhat dissatisfied by the
revival of what were considered feudal usages; above all, by the
creation of an Imperial Guard of Honour, selected from the youth of the
principal families, who were required to take an oath "of implicit
obedience to His Majesty"--this act being especially represented by the
adverse faction as evincing a tendency to absolutism.
On the 20th of June, 1823, a project of law had been laid before the
Assembly, for the expulsion of all Portuguese deemed hostile to the
cause of the empire. This measure might have originated with the
Andradas, or not; it was certainly defended in the Assembly by Antonio
Andrada. The Portuguese party, alarmed by the still impending danger,
formed a coalition with the Brazilian party, to eject the Andradas from
the ministry, and having, during a severe illness of the Emperor, gained
the ascendancy, the now obnoxious ministers were dismissed; and--though
the patriots had not calculated thereon--were succeeded by the leaders
of the Portuguese faction itself, who, to the regret of all true
Brazilians, effected an immediate change of policy in the Government.
The chief object of the new administration, appeared to be to limit the
functions of the Emperor to an extent almost subversive of his
authority; His Majesty, in the unsettled state of the empire, being
comparatively powerless amidst the machinations with which he was
surrounded.
No constitution had, as yet, been fixed upon--His Majesty resenting the
former attempt to force upon him a constitution framed solely by the
will of the Assembly, which was still seeking an opportunity to assert
its supremacy. As the city and province abounded with influential
Portuguese, desirous of overthrowing the new _régime_, and as many of
these were in the Assembly, there was a total want of unity between the
Emperor and his legislature, the administration leaning to the side of
the latter.
About this time, the Marquis of Palmella had widely circulated a
document, appealing to the loyalty of the Portuguese, and declaring the
policy desired by the mother country; which policy was--to divide Brazil
into a number of petty states, easy to be intimidated and controlled. As
this scheme held out large promise of irresponsible power to influential
persons in such anticipated states--it could scarcely fail to be
agreeable to many expectants of office, whose interest it therefore was
to prevent the consolidation of the empire, by promoting disunion. It
was scarcely a secret that some in the administration were favourable to
these views, though not openly professing them; so that the patriotic
efforts of His Majesty were paralysed, and the administration, no less
than the legislature, exhibited a policy seriously detrimental to the
interests of the Empire.
Indeed, a powerful party in the legislative assembly openly called in
question the Emperor's authority--even requiring His Majesty to divest
himself of his crown in their presence. They deprived him of his council
of state; denied him a voice in the enactment of laws, and the functions
of administration; even objecting to His Majesty's exercise of the
common prerogative of royalty to confer crown lands as territorial
rewards for public services--the latter limitation of the royal
prerogative being avowedly directed against the grant of an estate to
myself, as spontaneously accorded by His Majesty, in gratitude for my
recent services to the nation.
This was the state of affairs on my return to Rio de Janeiro, and as
His Majesty did me the honour to consult with me in his difficulties,
I unhesitatingly recommended him to support his dignity
constitutionally--despite all attempts made for its limitation by the
Portuguese faction; which--extraordinary as it may appear--was now said
to be countenanced by the Andradas, who, though out of office, were
still deputies to the assembly, and who--in consequence of their
dismissal from power--were considered to be giving opposition to every
measure calculated to promote unity between the Emperor and the
legislature. The Brazilian patriots--and with good reason--were becoming
alarmed, lest an attempt might yet be made to place Portugal and Brazil
upon their former relative footing, and the Emperor, who was thoroughly
Brazilian--from a conviction that Portuguese ascendancy could never be
regained--was no less so.
Matters, at length, rose to such a pitch in the assembly, that the
intentions of the factious majority became no longer doubtful, when His
Majesty somewhat unceremoniously adopted the course pursued in England
by Cromwell in a somewhat similar predicament, viz. to dissolve the
assembly, and, should it prove refractory, to turn the members out by
force. Cutting short all farther altercation with his legislature, the
scene of the English protectorate was re-enacted in Brazil; the Emperor
entering Rio de Janeiro at the head of a body of cavalry--surrounding
the chamber with a military force--planting cannon before it--and
ordering its instantaneous dissolution; the members--after in vain
remonstrating against this proceeding--being compelled to retire.
The Andradas were soon afterwards arrested, and exiled--a proceeding
impolitic and unjust to men who had laid the foundation of Brazilian
independence, and who were no less distinguished by their honesty than
their ability. By consenting to their exile, His Majesty lost three
valuable servants, and at the same time placed himself in the hands of a
faction which he never afterwards controlled, and which eventually
forced him from his throne.
As the expulsion of the Assembly--whether justifiable or not, it is not
my province to inquire--was decisive, it was obviously of the greatest
importance to follow it up by some measure which should convince the
public that so extreme a course was intended for their good. As yet no
permanent constitution had been declared This, therefore, was clearly
the moment for its proclamation, no less to satisfy the people--who
were heart and soul with the Emperor--than to prevent retaliation by the
faction which had been thus summarily dealt with.
Seeing that nothing was promptly acted upon in an emergency involving
the stability of Government, I addressed to His Imperial Majesty the
following letter:--
Rio de Janeiro, November 14, 1823.
SIRE,
My sense of the impropriety of intruding myself on the
attention of your Imperial Majesty, on any subject unconnected
with the official position with which your Majesty has been pleased
to honour me, could only have been overcome by an irresistible
desire, under existing circumstances, to contribute to the service of
your Majesty and the Empire.
The conduct of the late legislative assembly, which sought to
derogate from the dignity and prerogatives of Your Majesty--even
presuming to require you to divest yourself of your crown in their
presence--who deprived you of your Council of State--denied you
a voice in the enactment of laws and the formation of the constitution,
and who dared to object to your exercising the only
remaining function of royalty--that of rewarding services, and
conferring honours--could no longer be tolerated; and the justice
and wisdom of Your Imperial Majesty in dissolving such an
assembly will be duly appreciated by discerning men, and by those
whose love of good order and their country supersedes their ambition
or personal interests. There are, however, individuals who will
wickedly take advantage of the late proceedings to kindle the flames
of discord, and throw the empire into anarchy and confusion, unless
timely prevented by the wisdom and energy of Your Imperial
Majesty.
The declaration that you will give to your people a practical
constitution, more free than even that which the late assembly
professed an intention to establish, cannot--considering the spirit
which now pervades South America--have the effect of averting
impending evils, unless Your Imperial Majesty shall be pleased to
dissipate all doubts by _at once declaring_--before news of the recent
events can be dispersed throughout the provinces, and before the
discontented members of the late congress can return to their
constituents--what is the precise nature of that constitution which
Your Imperial Majesty intends to bestow.
Permit me, then, humbly and respectfully to suggest to Your
Imperial Majesty, as a means of tranquillising the public mind--of
averting evils at home, and preventing injurious representations
abroad--that, _even before the sailing of the next packet for Europe_,
Your Majesty should specifically declare the nature of the government
you are graciously pleased should be adopted. As no monarch
is more happy, or more truly powerful than the limited monarch of
England, surrounded by a free people, enriched by that industry
which the security of property by means of just laws never fails to
create--if Your Majesty were to decree that the English constitution,
in its most perfect practical form (which, with slight
alteration, and, chiefly in name, is also the constitution of the
United States of North America), shall be the model for the
Government of Brazil under Your Imperial Majesty, with power to
the constituent assembly so to alter particular parts as local
circumstances may render advisable--it would excite the sympathy
of powerful states abroad, and the firm allegiance of the Brazilian
people to Your Majesty's throne.
Were Your Majesty, by a few brief lines in the Gazette, to
announce your intention so to do, and were you to banish all
distrust from the public mind by removing from your person for a
time, and finding employment on honourable missions abroad, for
those Portuguese individuals of whom the Brazilians are jealous--the
purity of Your Majesty's motives would be secured from the
possibility of misrepresentation--the factions which disturb the
country would be silenced or converted--and the feelings of the
world, especially those of England and North America, would
be interested in promoting the glory, happiness, and prosperity
of Your Imperial Majesty.
These thoughts, hastily expressed, but most respectfully submitted
to your gracious consideration will, I hope, be candidly appreciated
by Your Imperial Majesty, proceeding, as they do, from the
heart of
Your Majesty's most faithful and dutiful Servant,
COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
His Majesty saw good to adopt this advice in part, but in offering
it--though instrumental in establishing the political liberties of
Brazil--I had unconsciously placed myself in the position of a partisan
against the powerful faction which influenced the administration, and
through them every part of the empire. My unauthorised services after
the pursuit of the Portuguese fleet and army--resulting in the
annexation of the Northern provinces--had drawn upon me the resentment
of those now in power whose ultimate intentions were thus defeated. That
I--a foreigner, having nothing to do with national politics--should have
counselled His Majesty to banish those who opposed him, was not to be
borne, and the resentment caused by my recent services was increased to
bitter enmity for meddling in affairs which it was considered did not
concern me; though I could have had no other object than the good of the
Empire by the establishment of a constitution which should give it
stability in the estimation of European states.
The effect of this enmity towards me personally, was not long in
manifesting itself, and fearing the extent to which this might be
carried, I lost no time in demanding that the patent under which I had
been invested with the grade of "First Admiral," should be formally
engrossed and registered, according to the engagement of the late Prime
Minister, previous to my departure for Bahia. On the 25th of November,
this was accordingly done, and a commission conferring the same pay and
emolument as before--without limitation as to time, received the sign
manual--was counter-signed by the Ministers--sealed with the great
seal--and registered in the archives of the empire; His Majesty further
testifying his approbation of my conduct and services, by directing the
transmission of the completed patent without payment of the usual fees.
The following are the stipulations of the commission so solemnly
conferred--but afterwards shamefully violated without cause, as though
fidelity to its engagements formed no part of national honour and good
faith:--
I, Don Pedro, by the grace of God, and the unanimous voice
of the people, Constitutional Emperor and Perpetual Defender
of Brazil, hereby make known to those who shall see this my
charter patent, that the valour, intelligence, and activity united in
Admiral Lord Cochrane, now Marquis of Maranhaõ, who has so
distinguished himself in the different services with which he has
been entrusted--giving proof of the greatest bravery and talent;
and seeing how advantageous it would be for the interests of this
empire to avail itself of the skill of so valuable an officer--consider
it beneficial to confer upon him--as by this charter is
confirmed--the patent of "First Admiral," with the annual pay of
eleven contos five hundred and twenty milreas, as well ashore as
afloat; and farther in table money, when embarked, five contos
seven hundred and seventy milreas--which are the same emoluments
as he received in Chili. No admiral in the service having
any right to consider himself entitled to succeed to the post of
First Admiral, which I create solely for this occasion for the motives
expressed, and from the particular consideration merited by the said
admiral.
The pay referred to shall be entered in the books to which it
appertains, in order to the payments when due. In attestation
of that which I have hereby commanded, I give this charter
under the sign manual and sealed with the great seal of the
Empire.
Given in the city of Rio de Janeiro on the 25th day of the month
of November, in the year of our Lord Jesus Christ, 1823. Second
of Independence and of this empire.
(Signed) IMPERADOR P.
Countersigned by all the Ministers.
From the difference of expression used in this commission, as compared
with the temporary commission given previous to my departure for Bahia,
it is clear that my late services were fully recognised; and from the
fact that the new commission was conferred after the war was ended by
the annexation of Bahia, Maranham, Parà, and all the intermediate
provinces, it is equally clear that my rank and pay--as originally
stipulated were conferred without limitation of time--a circumstance
which will have to be borne to mind.
This being complied with, I requested an order for the speedy
adjudication of the prize property surrendered at Maranham, the
flagship's portion being Rs. 607.315 $000, or £.121,463 sterling, in
addition to the captures made by the squadron generally--no less than
one hundred and twenty enemy's ships, with Portuguese registers and
crews, having been taken, the value, at a very moderate computation,
amounting to upwards of 2,000,000 dollars. As officers and men were
anxiously awaiting their prize money, it became my duty to the squadron
to urge its stipulated distribution upon the consideration of the
Government.
His Majesty directed this to be done, but the prize tribunal
appointed--consisting of thirteen members, nine of whom were natives of
Portugal--was directly interested in defeating the claims of the
captors, being inimical to any confiscation of Portuguese vessels and
property taken in the late campaign. Not venturing, as yet, openly to
act in this spirit, they adopted the alternative of doing nothing
towards adjudicating the prizes.
Finding this to be the case, and fearing that the Portuguese tendencies
of the new administration might interfere with the repayment of the sums
temporarily supplied to the Maranham Junta--I addressed the following
letter to the new Minister of Marine, Francisco Villela Barbosa:--
(Secret.) Rio de Janeiro, November 18, 1823.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
In my letter, No. 38, I communicated to your
predecessor my intention of aiding the Provisional Junta of
Maranham, in the payment of the auxiliary troops of Cearà and
Piahuy, who being in a naked and destitute condition had become
clamorous for their arrears; and I now beg to state that in prosecution
of such intention, I placed at the disposal of the Junta the
monies taken in the Portuguese treasury, amounting in cash and
good bills to Rs. 62,560 $243, together with outstanding debts
amounting to Rs. 147,316 $656, and I have also left in their
hands the balance which we found in the Portuguese custom-house,
amounting to Rs. 54,167 $877. All these accounts I have the
honour to convey to you for the information of the Imperial
Government.
In addition to these large sums, I left at the disposal of the
Junta much moveable property which belonged to Portuguese
individuals in Europe, desiring the authorities to render an
account of the same for the information of the Imperial Government.
Your Excellency will perceive that in leaving at Maranham these
monies, and other property captured from the enemy, instead of
bringing them to Rio for adjudication, we could be influenced by no
other motive than zeal for the interests of His Imperial Majesty
and the good of his people; as by so doing, we enabled the
Provisional Government to meet the present exigencies of the
moment, and to quiet the Cearà and Piahuy troops; whilst the
revenue of the province thus remains clear and unanticipated--
being applicable to such purposes as His Imperial Majesty shall
command. All which I trust His Imperial Majesty will take into
his gracious consideration, and be pleased to award such compensation
to the officers and seamen as he, in his princely justice,
shall deem fit.
(Signed) COCHRANE.
For some days no notice was taken of this letter, but on the 24th I
received a visit from the Minister of Marine, bringing what professed to
be a verbal message from His Majesty, that he "would do every thing in
his power for me _personally_." The way in which this intimation was
conveyed led me to infer that these personal favours implied a sacrifice
on my part of the rights of the squadron, by shutting my eyes to the
restoration of the captured Portuguese ships and property to the friends
and adherents of the ministry, for the purpose of conciliating the
Portuguese party. Taking the message, however, literally--I told the
Minister that His Majesty had "already conferred honours upon me quite
equal to my merits--and that the greatest personal favour he could
bestow, was, to urge on the speedy adjudication of the prizes, so that
the officers and seamen might reap the reward decreed by the Emperor's
own authority."
The policy of the Portuguese faction in power, was--now that the
squadron had expelled the fleet and army of the mother country--to
conciliate their countrymen who remained, and thus to create and
maintain an influence which should reduce the Imperial authority to the
smallest possible dimensions. The first object--if I could be brought to
acquiesce--was to restore Portuguese property, captured by Imperial
order, and now the right of the captors--my connivance being supposed to
be procurable by offers of personal enrichment! I scarcely need say that
the offer failed in its purpose.
As the squadron had received no pay during the performance of all its
services, it became my duty to urge attention to the subject, and this
was apparently complied with, the 27th of November being appointed for
the payment of the men. On that day _three months' pay only_ was offered
to them, notwithstanding all they had achieved. This paltry pittance was
refused.
About this time the extraordinary news was received, that great
rejoicings and a general illumination had taken place in Lisbon in
consequence of the destruction of the Brazilian squadron by the
Portuguese fleet at Bahia! this version having, no doubt, been
transmitted home subsequently to the affair of the 4th of May.
Singularly enough, these ill-founded rejoicings were going on in Lisbon
at the time the flagship was chasing the Portuguese fleet across the
Equator! It is difficult to say how the Portuguese admiral contrived to
reconcile this premature vaunt, and the unwelcome fact of his arrival in
the Tagus, with the loss of half his troops and more than half his
convoy.
On the 2nd of December despatches arrived from Captain Grenfell at Parà,
stating that he had possession of the new Portuguese frigate, which
according to my directions, had been named the _Imperatrice_. He had
also captured another vessel of war, and several merchantmen; thus
fulfilling his difficult mission in a way which justified my confidence
in his ability, and should have merited the warmest thanks from the
government, instead of the treatment he subsequently experienced.
On the 19th of December, His Majesty appointed me a member of the Privy
Council, the highest honour in his power to bestow. It was a singular
circumstance that whilst His Imperial Majesty consulted me on matters of
importance, and manifested his appreciation both of my opinions and
services by the honours conferred--his anti-Brazilian ministers were
practising every species of annoyance towards myself and the
squadron--more especially in the matter of the prizes, the condemnation
of which they obstinately opposed.
It would be wearisome to enter into details of the annoyance and injury
now systematised by the Portuguese faction in the administration;
nevertheless, in order to appreciate subsequent occurrences, it is
necessary briefly to advert to these matters. The personal feeling
against myself was easily accounted for from my adherence to the Emperor
in opposition to interested councils, which imperilled the existence of
the Empire. These councils His Majesty was unable to disregard or to
counteract the injury inflicted on the officers and seamen, by the
conduct of the Court of Admiralty towards the squadron; a policy
persevered in with the object of annihilating the naval force, for no
other reason than that its achievements had rendered itself obnoxious to
the Portuguese faction--the leaders of which no doubt calculated, that
if the officers and crews could be worried out of the service, the
dismemberment of the Northern provinces might yet be effected by
disunion.
On the 13th of December, I wrote to the Minister of Marine that, as the
prize vessels were daily being plundered, an immediate investigation was
necessary--they having, by order of the administration, been delivered
over to the charge of the inspector of the arsenal, the naval officers
in charge being withdrawn. One officer was put in prison for obeying my
orders to remain on board his prize till I received an answer from the
Minister of Marine. The ship he had in charge (_the Pombinho_) was
immediately afterwards given up to a Portuguese claim ant, together with
all its contents, promiscuously taken from the custom house at Maranham,
none of which ever belonged to him.
A number of additional prizes had been sent in by Captain Taylor, of the
_Nitherohy_, who had pursued the scattered ships of the enemy to the
Tagus, and there burned four vessels under the guns of the
line-of-battle ship _Don John VI_. For this he was sentenced by the
prize council to six months imprisonment, and to forfeit double the
amount of his prize money, on behalf of the owners of the property
destroyed; it being thus decided by the _quasi_ Portuguese prize
tribunal that, to destroy enemy's property, in pursuance of His
Majesty's orders, was a crime!
Captain Grenfell having arrived in the frigate _Imperatrice_--captured
at Parà--bringing with him some forty thousand dollars--the ransom for
prizes there taken, as had been done at Maranham--the _Imperatrice_ was
boarded in his absence, and the money carried to the treasury, though by
His Majesty guaranteed to the captors. Captain Grenfell was afterwards
charged with acting in opposition to the Junta at Parà, though only
carrying out my instructions. Upon this charge he was tried and
acquitted.
In consequence of these and other arbitrary acts, I represented to His
Majesty the necessity of forming some definite maritime code, which
should put an end to proceedings so arbitrary, and proposed the adoption
of the naval laws of England as the most experienced and complete. His
Majesty approving the suggestion, directed me to transmit a memorial on
the subject to the Privy Council, which was accordingly done.
By this, and similar suggestions to His Majesty, with view to render the
navy more efficient, I was widening the breach between myself and the
Portuguese party in the administration, whose object it was to frustrate
any attempt of the kind. It was not long before an overt blow was struck
at my authority as Commander-in-Chief by the preparation of the
_Atalanta_ for sea without my intervention. Imagining that she might be
on some secret service, I disregarded the circumstance, till, on the
27th of December, a notice appeared in the Gazette announcing her
destination to be for the blockade of Monte Video, whilst I was
mentioned in the Gazette, under the limited title of "Commander of the
naval forces in the port of Rio de Janeiro." Thus, by a stroke of the
Minister's pen, was I, despite the patents of His Imperial Majesty,
reduced to the rank of Port Admiral.
Convinced that this had been done without the sanction or even knowledge
of the Emperor, I protested against the despatch of the _Atalanta_,
except through my orders, as well as against the limitation indicated by
my new title--contrary to the agreement under which I entered the
service, as twice confirmed by Imperial commissions--further informing
the Minister of Marine that, although no one could be less ambitious of
power than myself, I could not allow an agreement solemnly entered into
to be thus violated.
The remonstrance as regarded the _Atalanta_ was effectual, and she was
not despatched; but--as regarded the limitation of my rank--no notice
was taken.
Intelligence now arrived from Pernambuco that a strong party was there
endeavouring to establish a Republic, and that preparatory steps were
being taken to throw off allegiance to the Empire.
The expedition sent by the ministry to put down this rising at
Pernambuco was a premeditated insult to me, as not having been at all
consulted in the matter; and the reason why an inexperienced officer had
been sent, doubtless was, that the ministry did not wish the
insurrection to be put down. In this respect the expedition fulfilled
the wishes of those who despatched it, by having failed. On its return I
personally received _His Majesty's orders_ that the _Pedro Primiero_,
_Piranga_, _Nitherohy_, and _Atalanta_, should be immediately equipped
for important service. It was easy thus to give orders to equip a
squadron, but after the treatment received, not so easy to effect it.
All the foreign seamen had abandoned the ships in disgust, and to have
shipped Portuguese would have been worse than useless. I wrote to the
Minister of Marine that the squadron could not be manned unless
confidence was restored amongst the men, the shameful proceedings of the
prize court having disinclined them to re-enter the service,--even if
they did, I could not be responsible for order and discipline, or for
the safety of the ships, unless some definite adjustment as to pay and
prize money took place before putting to sea.
In the face of these remonstrances the prize tribunal adopted an openly
hostile course, by altogether denying the right of the squadron to the
prizes taken at Maranham, or the property there seized in the custom
house, and shipped by me on board the _Pombinho_ and another vessel. The
_Pombinho_, as has been said, was declared an illegal prize, and given
up to her Portuguese owner, together with all public property contained
in her, though to this he had not the shadow of a claim, as the whole
cargo belonged originally to others, and had been put on board this
particular ship by my orders for transmission to Rio de Janeiro. Numbers
of similar decisions were made, on the false plea that Maranham
previously formed part of the Brazilian empire, and consequently that
all the seizures effected were invalid!
I remonstrated that, on our arrival at Maranham, the city and province
were, and ever had been, in possession of Portugal--that the Portuguese
had by the ordinary capitulations of war delivered up both to an armed
Brazilian force without question--and that, by a previous decree of the
Emperor, no less than by the customary usages of war, all enemy's
property fell to the captors. The prize court not only overruled the
objection, but condemned me to make restitution of all sums received in
ransom for property taken at Maranham. In one instance the tribunal
declared me deserving of corporal punishment (_pena corporal!_) and
would, had they dared, doubtless have enforced this, and the restitution
to which I was condemned.
As the plunder of prize property was becoming notorious, the tribunal
directed it to be unloaded, in order to prevent the cargoes from being
_damaged!_ but, on the execution of the order it was found that all the
valuable portion had already disappeared! How, of course could not be
ascertained; but no one doubted. The ships themselves were neglected
till they became useless to the original owners, the Government, or the
captors.
Thus, of this vast amount of property taken in the campaign, not a
_milrea_ was suffered to find its way into the pockets of the officers
and men, and the squadron would have been wholly defrauded of its
reward, had I not refused to give up to the prize tribunal the
comparatively trifling sums received in redemption of the seizures at
Maranham; these being retained on board the flagship in consequence of
the unjustifiable course which the tribunal was pursuing. A plot was,
however, formed to seize it by force, but this was met by such measures
as were calculated to prevent a renewal of the attempt.
The prize tribunal being thus determined to deprive the squadron of the
whole of its emoluments, proceeded to condemn the ships of war taken as
being _droits_ to the crown, without compensation of any kind,
notwithstanding that the before-mentioned Imperial decree of the 11th of
December, 1822, awarded all prizes wholly to the captors. The tribunal
then issued a decree, that vessels taken within a certain distance from
the shore--where alone a blockade could be effective--were not lawful
seizures; the effect being that, as the squadron was about to blockade
Pernambuco it could have no opportunity of falling in with enemy's
vessels at sea, and therefore _could not make captures at all!_ Thus
enemy's ships would be permitted to carry on their revolutionary
occupations unmolested; which was, no doubt, the intention of those who
framed the resolution, as wishing to defeat the blockade for their own
purposes.
CHAPTER VI.
REMONSTRANCE AGAINST DECREE OF PRIZE TRIBUNAL--SETTLEMENT OF PRIZE
QUESTION BY THE EMPEROR--HIS MINISTERS REFUSE TO CONFORM TO
IT--OBSTACLES THROWN IN THE WAY OF EQUIPMENT--MY SERVICES LIMITED TO THE
DURATION OF WAR--MY REMONSTRANCE ON THIS BREACH OF FAITH--MINISTERS
REFUSE TO PAY THE SQUADRON ANYTHING--A FRESH INSULT OFFERED TO ME--OFFER
TO RESIGN THE COMMAND--MY RESIGNATION EVADED--LETTER TO THE PRIME
MINISTER--LETTER TO THE MINISTER OF MARINE.
On the 1st of January, 1824, I communicated to the Minister of Marine
the contents of a despatch received from Captain Haydon at Pernambuco,
in which he apprised me of a plot on the part of the revolutionary
Government to seize his person and take possession of the Imperial brig
of war which he commanded; the latter intention having been openly
advocated in the Assembly.
On the 6th, I addressed to the Minister of Marine the following
remonstrance against the before-mentioned regulation of the Admiralty
Court, that vessels captured within a certain distance of the shore
should not be prize to the captor; this regulation being evidently
intended as retrospective, with a view of nullifying the captures which
had already been made:--
As I have before endeavoured, by anticipating evils, to prevent
their occurrence, so in the present instance, I feel it my duty to
His Imperial Majesty to place you, as Minister of Marine, on your
guard against countenancing any such measure in regard either to
the vessels captured in the blockade of Bahia, or to those taken
in the colonial possessions, and under the forts and batteries
of the enemy--and also in the case--if such there should be--of
vessels captured on the shores of Portugal.
It is quite clear that these cases of capture are distinct from
those in which protection is afforded by independent states to
belligerents approaching within a certain distance of neutral shores.
But you must be perfectly aware that, if enemy's ships are not to
be prize--if captured navigating near the shore no blockade can be
effective, as there will be no right to disturb them; besides which
the mass of the people engaged in a naval service will certainly not
encounter toil and hazard without remuneration of any kind beyond
their ordinary pay.
Should such a decree be really in contemplation, there is nothing
to hope from the naval service useful or creditable to the state;
and this opinion is founded on more than thirty years' unremitting
experience of seamen--that where there is no premium there is no
permanent zeal or exertion.
(Signed) COCHRANE & MARANHAÕ.
On the 10th of January, I communicated to the Government the contents of
another despatch from Captain Haydon, at Pernambuco, reporting that the
new Junta there had seized the Imperial ship of war, _Independencia ou
morte_, and had removed the officer in command, at the same time
threatening to treat Captain Haydon as a pirate.
The revolt was now becoming serious, and His Majesty--anxious to
expedite the equipment of the squadron--on the 12th of February, 1824,
sent for me to consult on the subject. Having told His Majesty the
course which had been pursued by the prize tribunal, he said he would
see justice done in spite of faction, and asked me to make a moderate
valuation of the prize property taken in the late campaign,
ascertaining, at the same time, if the seamen were willing to accept a
specific sum in compensation of their claims? On asking His Majesty what
assurance could be given that the administration would carry out such an
arrangement, he replied that he would give me his own assurance, and
ordering me to sit down beside him, wrote _with his own hand_ the
following proposal--now in my possession:--
"_The Government is ready to pay to the squadron, the value of the
prizes which have been, or may be judged bad, the value thereof being
settled by arbitrators jointly chosen, and to pay the proprietors
their losses and damages; that in the number of the said prizes, the
frigate Imperatrice is not included, but the Government, as a
remuneration for her capture, will immediately give from the public
treasury the sum of 40,000 milreis to the captors; that the value of
the prizes already declared bad, shall be immediately paid, this
stipulation relating to all captures up to the present date, February
12th, and that henceforth captures shall be adjudged with more
dispatch, the Government being about to decree a provisional
arrangement, remedying all errors and omissions that may have
occurred._"
Nothing can be more clear than the above stipulations in His Majesty's
own handwriting, to pay the squadron immediately the value of their
prizes despite the Court of Admiralty, to pay 40,000 milreis for the
_Imperatrice_, and that even the value of the prizes _adjudged bad_
should be paid, His Majesty thus rightly estimating the conduct and
motives of the Court of Admiralty. _Not one of these conditions was ever
complied with!_
On the 1st of March, His Majesty, through his minister, Francisco
Villela Barbosa, informed me that he had assigned 40,000 milreis in
recompense for the acquisition of the frigate _Imperatrice_; stating
that, with regard to the other prizes made at Parà, they must be
sentenced by the tribunal, in order that their value might be paid by
the public treasury--the said treasury taking upon itself to satisfy all
costs and damages on captures judged illegal; but that with regard to my
assertion, that there were amongst them no illegal prizes, the
Government could not itself decide the question.
That His Majesty gave the order for payment of 40,000 milreis, as
compensation for the _Imperatrice_, there is no doubt; _but not a
shilling of the amount was ever paid by his ministers, nevertheless even
within the past few months the present Brazilian Ministry has charged
that sum against me, as having been received and not accounted for!_ It
is quite possible, that, in ignorance of the practices common amongst
their predecessors of 1824, the present ministers of Brazil may imagine
that the orders of His Majesty were complied with; but if so, the 40,000
milreis never reached me or the squadron. Had it done so, nothing can be
more easy than to find my receipt for the amount, which I defy them to
do.
Considering our difficulties in a fair way of now being settled, I
willingly undertook to conciliate the seamen, and having made the low
calculation of _Rs_. 650.000 milreis--a sum scarcely one-fourth the
value of the prize property--reported to the Minister of Marine the
willingness of the squadron generally to accept 600,000 dollars (about
£.120,000) in compensation of their full rights; agreeing, moreover, to
give up all claim on the Imperial Government on payment of one-half, and
security for the remainder.
Notwithstanding this easy mode of arrangement, solely brought about by
my personal influence with the men, not a milrea was allotted, His
Majesty's ministers deliberately evading the Imperial wishes and
promises. On the contrary, the more His Majesty was determined to do the
squadron justice the more was the Portuguese faction in the ministry
bent on frustrating the Imperial intentions--notwithstanding that, by
the revolutionary proceedings in the North, the integrity of the empire
was at stake. I may indeed go farther and state with great truth, that
whilst His Majesty was most anxious for our speedy departure, in order
to suppress the revolution at Pernambuco, his ministers were, day by
day, addressing to me letters on the most insignificant subjects, with
the apparent object of delaying the squadron by official frivolities,
the necessity of replying to which would prevent my attention to the
fulfilment of the Imperial wish. The best proof of this is the fact
which will be apparent in the course of this chapter, viz.--that
although the province of Pernambuco was in open revolt, the
Administration contrived to delay the sailing of the squadron for _six
months_ beyond the events just narrated.
On the 24th of February, the following extraordinary _portaria_ was
transmitted to me by the Minister of Marine:--
Desiring to give a further testimony of the high estimation in which
the Marquis of Maranhaõ, First Admiral of the National and Imperial
Armada, is held, by reason of the distinguished services which he
has rendered to the state, and which it is hoped that he will
continue to render for the independence of Brazil, I deem it proper
to name him Commander-in-Chief of all the naval forces of the empire
_during the present war_. The Supreme Military Council is hereby
informed thereof, and will cause this decree to be executed.
Palace of Rio Janeiro, the 23rd of February, 1824. Third of the
Independence of the Empire, with the Rubrica of His Imperial
Majesty.
FRANCISCO VILLELA BARBOSA,
Secretariat of State,
27th February, 1824.
(Signed) ANASTASIO DE BRITO,
Acting Chief Secretary.
The audacity of this _portaria_--setting aside the stipulations of His
Majesty and his late ministers in my commission, thus rendering it null
and void without my consent--was only equalled by its hypocrisy. As a
"_further testimony_ of the high estimation in which I was held,"
&c.--His Majesty's ministers were graciously pleased to annul my
commission, in order that they might get rid of me at a moment's
warning!
The document transmitted to me _did not_ bear the Rubrica of the
Emperor, though falsely asserted so to do. If the reader will take the
trouble to compare it with my two commissions, he will agree with me in
the inference that it was written by Barbosa without the Emperor's
knowledge or consent, with the object of terminating my command--the
Imperial patents notwithstanding, as will be evident from the
expression, "_during the present war;_" the war being _already ended_ by
my expulsion of the Portuguese fleet and army.
No time was lost in remonstrating against this insidious decree. After
pointing out to the Minister of Marine the agreements which had been
made with me by the late ministers, and ratified by the Imperial sign
manual, I addressed His Excellency as follows:--
The late decree inserted in the Gazette of February 28th, instead of
increasing my official rank and authority--as it professes to do--in
effect circumscribes it, because _there was no limitation of time_ in
the offer which I accepted from His Imperial Majesty. But by this
decree, my official rank and authority are limited to the duration of
the present war. Now, if I could believe that the idea of this
limitation originated with his Imperial Majesty himself, I should
respectfully and silently acquiesce; but being satisfied--from the
gracious manner in which he has been pleased to act towards me on all
occasions--that it did not so originate, I can only consider it an
intimation of an opinion prevalent in the councils of the state, that
myself and services can very well be done without, as soon as the
independence of Brazil shall be decided or peace restored.
As no man can be expected to dedicate his professional services
to a foreign country, without having a prospect of some recompence
more durable than that which such a limitation as is expressed in the
document in question seems to indicate, I am naturally led to inquire
whether it is the intention of His Majesty's advisers that, on the
termination of the present war, _my pay is to cease with my
authority?_ or whether I am to receive any permanent reward for
services, _the consequences of which will be permanent to Brazil?_
Because--if no recompence is to be received for public services
--however important and lasting in their effects those services may
be--it is a duty to myself and family to consider how far I am
justified in farther devoting my time to a service from which so
little future benefit is to be expected; a consideration the more
interesting to me, in consequence of repeated solicitations from the
Chilian Government to resume my rank and command in that state.
In saying thus much, you may consider me of a mercenary
disposition; but I have received from Brazil _no recompence whatever_,
beyond the honours conferred by His Imperial Majesty. If
you will peruse the accompanying papers, you will find that when I
left Chili I had disbursed of my own monies, 66,000 dollars, to keep
the Chilian squadron from starving, which sum, in consequence of
my leaving Chili, and accepting the offers of His Imperial Majesty,
has not been repaid. This amount His Majesty and his ministers
agreed to repay on my acceptance of the command; but I declined
to seek reimbursement at the expense of Brazil, "unless I
should perform greater services to the Empire than I had rendered
to Chili; but in the event of such services being rendered to
Brazil, and of Chili continuing its refusal to pay me, then--and
not otherwise--I should hope for indemnification." To this
stipulation the late ministers gave their assent.
It is no proof of an avaricious disposition that I at once
acquiesced in the proposition of His Imperial Majesty, that 40,000
dollars only for the _Imperatrice_, which is not one-third of her value,
should be apportioned to her captors.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
I might have added that the squadron had received _no emoluments of any
kind whatever_, notwithstanding the spontaneous stipulations of His
Imperial Majesty to pay everything, there not being even an indication
of handing over to them the 40,000 dollars awarded by His Majesty for
the frigate captured at Parà. On the contrary, I had been condemned in
costs and damages to a great amount for having captured Portuguese
vessels in pursuance of His Majesty's orders; so that had the Court of
Admiralty been in a position to enforce these, I should not only be
unpaid but be mulcted of a very large sum, as the price of having
accepted the command of the Brazilian navy!
So far from the 40,000 dollars awarded by His Majesty for the capture of
the frigate _Imperatrice_ having been paid according to the Imperial
directions, I received from the Minister of Marine a letter dated
February 27th, implying that the above sum--one third the value of the
vessel--was when paid, to be considered as the _sole_ reward of the
squadron. This violation of His Majesty's agreement was at once
repudiated, and an explanatory letter from the Minister of
Marine--almost as ambiguous as the former--assured me that I had
misconstrued his intention, which, however, was not the case, for the
40,000 dollars were never paid.
On the 19th of March, a direct insult was offered me by Severiano da
Costa, now first minister, by an intimation to attend in the Imperial
chapel for the purpose of assisting at the ceremony of swearing to the
Constitution, but I was distinctly told that I should not be permitted
to swear; the reason no doubt being, that, by a clause therein
contained, military officers who swore to it, could not be dismissed
without trial, and sentence of court martial; so that the not permitting
me to swear--coupled with Barbosa's _portaria_ limiting my command to
the duration of the war--indirectly gave power to the Administration to
dismiss me at their option, whenever they might deem it expedient so to
do. That such desire would arise the moment an opportunity might
present itself, was certain, nor should I have waited for its
expression, but from respectful attachment to His Majesty, and from the
expectation of obtaining justice for the squadron, which relied on me
for procuring satisfaction of their claims.
To have accepted an invitation of this public nature, under
circumstances so insulting, was out of the question. I therefore joined
Lady Cochrane at the island of Governador, and sent an excuse to the
minister expressive of my regret at being prevented by unavoidable
circumstances from sharing in the honour of the august ceremony.
In consequence of the insulting conduct of the Administration, and the
impossibility of obtaining compensation for the squadron,
notwithstanding His Majesty's orders to that effect, I made up my mind
to quit a service in which the authority of the adverse Ministry was
superior to that of the Sovereign. Accordingly, on the 20th of March, I
addressed to the Minister of Marine a letter, from which the subjoined
is an extract:--
If I thought that the course pursued towards me was dictated by His
Imperial Majesty, it would be impossible for me to remain an hour
longer in his service, and I should feel it my duty, at the earliest
possible moment, to lay my commission at his feet. If I have not done
so before--from the treatment which, in common with the navy, I have
experienced--it has been solely from an anxious desire to promote His
Majesty's real interests. Indeed, to struggle against prejudices, and
at the same time against those in power, whose prepossessions are at
variance with the interests of His Majesty, and the tranquillity and
independence of Brazil, is a task to which I am by no means equal. I
am, therefore, perfectly willing to resign the situation I hold,
rather than contend against difficulties which appear to me
insurmountable. I have only to add, that it will give me extreme
satisfaction to find that Your Excellency is enabled to rear an
effective marine out of the materials which constituted the fabric of
the old marine of Portugal--or any Brazilian marine at all, without
beginning on principles totally opposite to those which have been
pursued since my return to this port.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
This proffer of resignation was met by an assurance that I had
misconstrued both the acts and intentions of the Administration, and the
expression of a hope that I would not think of abandoning Brazil for
which I had done so much. The real fact was, that although the
Administration was endeavouring to delay the expedition for the
suppression of revolution in the North, they were afraid of its results,
dreading that a _republican_ Government might be established, as was
indeed imminent. It was only from a conviction of not being able to meet
such an emergency, otherwise than through my instrumentality--that my
resignation was not accepted.
Determined to pursue the course I had now begun, I addressed the
following letter to the prime minister:--
Rio de Janeiro, March 30, 1824.
Most Excellent Sir,
The late Prime Minister, José Bonifacio de Andrada
e Silva, was pleased to express a desire that I should communicate
directly with him in all extraordinary difficulties with respect
to the naval service. If I have not had recourse to your Excellency
until the present juncture, it has not been from any doubt of your
readiness to accord me similar indulgence, but because the evils
of which I had to complain were so palpable, that I conceived a
remedy would--of necessity be applied in the ordinary course of
things. But now that a system is adopted which must very soon
bring the naval service of His Imperial Majesty to utter insignificance
and ruin, I can no longer abstain from calling on your
Excellency as Minister of State for the internal affairs of the
empire, to interfere before it is too late.
Here follow complaints of the wretched state of the squadron--its
want of repairs--the neglect of pay--the illegal imprisonment of
officers for months without trial and on untenable grounds, &c. &c.
By the promises held out last year of punctuality in payment, and of
other rewards, foreign officers and seamen were induced to enter the
service--believing in the good faith of the Government. The
result--in the short period that has elapsed--has been the complete
expulsion of the enemy's forces, naval and military; all of whom
would have been still in arms against the independence of Brazil, had
it not been for the assistance of the foreign officers and seamen.
In the course of these important services, various captures were
made and sent for adjudication to Rio de Janeiro, under the
authority of His Imperial Majesty's orders to make war on the
subjects and property of Portugal. The captures made in prosecution
of the war were--according to the engagements under which the
expedition proceeded--to be the reward of the captors in return for
the benefits derived by the empire for their exertions.
Judge then, Sir, of the astonishment of the officers and seamen
at finding on their return to this port eight months afterwards, that
the Court of Admiralty (chiefly composed of natives of Portugal)
pretended to be ignorant whether the nation was at war or peace!
Under this plea they have avoided the adjudication of the
prizes--have
thrown every impediment in the way of the captors--by giving
sentences equally contrary to law, common sense and justice.
Great quantities of goods in the captured ships have decayed or
wholly perished from lapse of time--great quantities more have
been stolen--whilst whole cargoes, by the arbitrary authority of an
auditor, have been given up without trial, to pretended owners,
without even the decency of communication to the captors or their
agents. In short, nothing has been done in furtherance of the
gracious directions of His Majesty, given on the 12th ultimo, that
the prize affairs should be instantly adjusted.
It is certainly a hardship to the Portuguese gentlemen in the
Court of Admiralty, to be under the necessity of condemning
property that belonged to their countrymen, friends, and relations;
but if they have undertaken the duties of such an office, they ought
not to be permitted to weigh their private feelings against their
public duty--nor to bring upon the whole Government that character
of bad faith, which has been so disgraceful, and has proved so
injurious to all the Governments which have hitherto been
established in South America.
Even the payment of wages was not made to the _Pedro Primiero_
till nearly three months after her return, when the seamen--
irritated by the evasion of their dues--had nearly all abandoned the
ship; and if the crews of the _Nitherohy_ and _Carolina_ did not follow
their example on their return to port, it was entirely owing to my
perseverance before their arrival in procuring this tardy justice.
It was a maxim of the Emperor Napoleon, that "no events are
trifling with regard to nations and sovereigns, their destinies
being controlled by the most inconsiderable circumstances,"--
though circumstances which have the effect of causing the Imperial
marine to be abandoned, ought not--in a national point of view--to
be regarded as inconsiderable; but whether this be of importance
or not, the consequences of such abandonment by men who have so
faithfully performed their duty, will be far from beneficial to those
short sighted and vain individuals who imagine that the employment
of foreign officers is an obstacle to their own advancement.
If the present foreign officers are compelled to abandon their
situations an explanation must be given of the cause, and public
indignation must inevitably fall on the unreflecting heads of the
prejudiced or selfish authors of such impolitic injustice.
I have heard it stated, as a motive for the delay in condemning
the prizes, that the Government--in case of a treaty of peace--
might be called upon to refund the value to the original owners.
But, Sir, let me ask such wretched statesmen, what would have
been the situation of Brazil, if foreign officers and seamen had
refused to enter the service--as would have been the case, had no
prize money been promised? In that case, it is true, the vessels
in question would not have been taken--but it is equally true that
the enemy's troops would not have been starved into the evacuation
of Bahia, nor their squadron have been intimidated to flee from
these shores. Military warfare would still have raged in the
interior, and the hostile fleet might now have been engaged in the
blockade of Rio de Janeiro itself. Would it not be infinitely better
that the Government should have to pay the value of these prizes
even twice over--than that such calamities should not have been
averted?
But how can it be argued that the Government may be required
to restore to the enemy prizes lawfully taken in war? Is it possible
that the victors can be compelled to make humiliating terms with
the vanquished? Certainly not--unless the means by which victory
was obtained are insanely sacrificed, by permitting the squadron to
go to ruin and decay. The results which have been obtained could
not have been accomplished by any other measures than those
adopted by the wisdom of His Imperial Majesty. Is it then
justifiable, to suffer the engagements which produced such results
to be evaded and set at nought? Still more monstrous--decrees
have been passed, both by the Auditor of Marine and the Court of
Admiralty, to punish the captors for the execution of their duty,
and by means of pains and penalties to deter them from the performance
of it in future.
It is even more unjust and inconsistent, that although His
Majesty's late ministers held out that ships of war were to be prize
to the captors, they are now declared to be the property of the state!
Do those narrow-minded persons who prompted such a decree,
imagine this to be a saving to the country? or do they expect that
seamen--especially foreign seamen--will fight heartily on such
terms? The power which the British navy has acquired arises
from the wisdom of the government in making the interests of the
officers and men identical with the interests of the state, which
gives bounties and premiums even in addition to the full value of
the prizes; whilst the insignificance and inefficiency of the navies
of governments which adopt opposite principles, sufficiently
indicate whether such liberality, or the want of it, is the best policy
in maritime affairs.
Having said thus much on public matters, I shall very briefly
trouble you with respect to myself, by stating that, as regards all
which does not depend on the uncontrolled exercise of the Imperial
functions--there has been no respect paid to the written stipulations
entered into with me on accepting the command of the Brazilian
navy, and that since my return from freeing the Northern provinces
and uniting them to the Empire, every promise--written and verbal--has
been evaded or set at nought, which facts I am prepared to
prove beyond the possibility of contradiction.
My nature is not suspicious, nor did I ever become doubtful of
promises and professions of friendship till after the third year of
my connection with Chili--when, having swept every ship of war
belonging to the enemy from the Pacific, the Chilian ministers
imagined that they could dispense with my services. They had
not, indeed, the candour which I have experienced here, for, after
appointing me to a command without limitation as to time, _they did
not publicly restrict the duration of that command to the earliest
moment that they could dispense with me_. It was their
plan--while
openly professing kindness and gratitude--to endeavour, by secret
artifices, to render me odious to the public, and to transfer to me
the responsibility which they themselves incurred by bringing the
navy to ruin, and causing the seamen to abandon it, by withholding
their pay, and even the provisions necessary for their subsistence.
As for the rest, my remonstrances against such conduct were treated
in Chili just as my representations have been treated here. Like
causes will ever produce similar effects; but as there was no hostile
or Spanish party in the Chilian state, four years elapsed before
the mischiefs could be accomplished, which, by the machinations of
the Portuguese faction, have been here effected in the short space
of four months.
Truths are often disagreeable to those who are not in the habit
of hearing them, and doubly offensive after long experience of the
homage of blind obedience and subserviency. I have, nevertheless,
always felt it my duty to the Governments under which I have
served, not to abstain from uttering truths under any dread of
offence, because I have ever been impressed with the conviction
that speaking truth is not only the most honourable mode of
proceeding, but that the time seldom fails to arrive when those who
are warned of a wrong line of conduct feel grateful to the man--who
at the risk of personal inconvenience, or even punishment--dared
to apprise them of their danger.
In England--where mischiefs were heaped upon me for _opposing a
ministerial vote of parliamentary thanks to an undeserving
officer_--the people at once saw the propriety of my conduct, and the
Government has since virtually admitted its justice. In Chili, the
ministers who hated me, because they knew me to be aware of their
deceitful and dishonest acts, were succeeded by others who have
solicited my return. And the worthy and excellent Supreme Director
(O'Higgins, whom those ministers, by their wickedness and folly,
brought to ruin) found at last, and acknowledged--but too late to
attend to my warnings--that I had acted towards him, in all cases,
with honour and fidelity.
The error and fate of the excellent and eminent person whom I
have just named--affords a proof of the folly and danger of the
notion--that ministers who have forfeited the confidence of the
public by breach of faith and evil acts, can be upheld by military
force against public opinion, especially in Governments recently
constituted. The people respected their Supreme Director; but
when he marshalled his troops to uphold his evil ministers, he fell
with them. Had he adopted the policy of Cromwell, and delivered
to justice those who merited punishment, he would have saved
himself.
Permit me to say, in conclusion, that the Ministers of His Imperial
Majesty are identified with the Court of Admiralty, and with
the officers whom they maintain in the different departments.
Let them--I repeat--take heed that the operation of similar causes
does not produce like effects; for if the conduct of these individuals
shall cause the naval service to be abandoned, and shall thereby--as
a necessary consequence--occasion great disasters to the Empire,
I am convinced that in a short period, all the troops in Rio de
Janeiro will not be able to repress the storm that will be raised
against the factious Portuguese.
It is my fervent hope--that His Imperial Majesty, by gloriously
adhering to the cause of independence and to Brazil, will save and
unite the largest portion of his royal patrimony in defiance of the
blind efforts of Portugal, and in spite of the cunning intrigues of the
Portuguese faction here, to prolong civil war, and create dismemberment
and disunion.
I have the honour to be,
&c. &c.
COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
His Excellency Joao Severiano Maciel de Costa,
Chief Minister of State, &c. &c.
One effect of the preceding letter was--that the Court of Admiralty
requested my consent to give up certain prize property, the object being
to construe my acquiescence as regarded a small portion--into a
precedent for giving up the remainder. This was firmly refused on the
ground of its being a fraud on the captors.
CHAPTER VII.
MINISTERIAL MALIGNITY TOWARDS ME--DANGERS IN PERNAMBUCO--PORTUGUESE
THREATS--MY ADVICE THEREON--FAILURE IN MANNING THE SQUADRON--PLOT FORMED
TO SEARCH THE FLAGSHIP--TIMELY WARNING THEREON--I DEMAND HIS MAJESTY'S
INTERFERENCE--WHICH WAS PROMPTLY GRANTED--PROTEST AGAINST PRIZE
DECISIONS--MY ADVICE SOUGHT AS REGARDED PERNAMBUCO--LETTER TO HIS
IMPERIAL MAJESTY--POINTING OUT THE ANNOYANCE PRACTISED--AND TENDERING MY
RESIGNATION--THE EMPEROR'S INTERVENTION--HIS MINISTERS NEGLECT TO FULFIL
HIS ENGAGEMENT--CONFIRMATION OF MY PREVIOUS PATENTS--BUT WITH AN
UNJUSTIFIABLE RESERVATION--PRIZE MONEY DEVOTED TO ADVANCE OF
WAGES--PROOFS THEREOF--BASELESS IMPUTATIONS ON ME--EXTRACTS FROM
LOG--FURTHER DISTRIBUTION OF PRIZE MONEY.
Having failed in inducing the Administration to withdraw the _portaria_
issued with a view to nullify the commissions conferred upon me by His
Imperial Majesty,--I waited upon the Emperor to beg his interference in
a matter no less derogatory to his authority, than unjust to myself. His
Majesty regretted the circumstance, but having alluded to the
difficulties in which he was placed with regard to the Administration,
begged me to rely on him for justice, assuring me that he would take
care that nothing was done which should practically alter my original
compact.
His Majesty was exceedingly anxious that the expedition to Pernambuco
should not be delayed, but I could only represent to him that nothing
whatever had been done to satisfy the seamen, who, in consequence,
would not re-enter--that several of the best officers were either in
prison on frivolous accusations, or under arrest--that the necessary
repairs to the ships were not completed--that no steps had been taken to
provide for their equipment--and that, in fact, the greater was His
Majesty's anxiety to put down the revolution, the more obstructive were
the obstacles interposed by the Ministry to the accomplishment of his
wishes.
The Ministers now resorted to a clumsy system in order to lower me in
popular estimation, by imposing, for my guidance in naval matters,
stringent orders about trifles which were absurd or impracticable,
non-observance of these being followed by _printed reprimands_ such as
were never before addressed to a Commander-in-Chief, whilst my
refutations and remonstrances against such treatment were refused
publication. This course was succeeded by another still more unworthy,
the ministers so far forgetting the dignity of their position, as to
write or cause to be written against me a series of scurrilous articles
in the newspapers under the feigned signature of "Curioso," these
containing matters which could only have come from the Minister of
Marine's office; but as I was able to reply to _anonymous_ attacks
through the same channel, I took care that the refutation signally
recoiled on the writers, who, finding the course pursued more
detrimental to their objects than to mine, relinquished this mode of
attack. Pamphlets of an atrocious description were then resorted to, the
more noticeable of which, was one purporting to emanate from Chili, and
representing that not only had I effected nothing for that country or
Peru, but that my very presence in the Peruvian waters had been the
greatest obstacle to the speedy attainment of independence!
A circumstance however occurred which alarmed even the Ministers
themselves. On the 20th of April, I received a despatch from Captain
Taylor, commanding the naval force before Pernambuco, stating that on
the 7th, the Camara of that province had unanimously resolved that they
would no longer obey the Imperial authority--that the Governor appointed
by His Imperial Majesty had been deposed--and that they had elected a
President from amongst their own body.
This was an extremity upon which the Portuguese faction in the
Administration had not calculated--their object being to encourage
disturbance in remote provinces, in order to further their own purposes
at Rio de Janeiro. An attempt to institute a Republican form of
Government was, however, another thing, it being well known that this
movement was fostered by merchants and influential citizens with
republican tendencies.
My advice was now asked as to what was best to be done in the emergency,
to which I replied that "no time ought to be lost in sending small
vessels to enforce the blockade of Pernambuco, which had already been
declared by Captain Taylor; as large vessels would be in imminent danger
of being wrecked if anchored upon that open coast at this season of the
year."
To add to the dangers threatening the Empire, intelligence was received
that the Portuguese had reinforced and refitted their fleet with the
intention of returning to Brazil and recovering the Northern provinces.
This course, no doubt, having been determined upon on account of
information, that, in consequence of the injustice done to the Brazilian
squadron, it had been abandoned by the seamen, and was now powerless.
I did not offer to accompany any vessels that might be sent to
Pernambuco; for I had made up my mind not to undertake anything unless
some satisfaction were accorded to the squadron. On the 3rd of May, I,
however, addressed to the Prime Minister a letter stating the plan
which, in my opinion, ought to be pursued in the present predicament.
The subjoined are extracts:--
Drawing a veil over that which has passed--though had my
recommendations, given in writing to His Imperial Majesty on the
14th of November last--two days after the dissolution of the
Assembly--been attended to, the rebellion and separation of the
Northern provinces might have been prevented. Passing over the
errors committed in the non-employment of the greater part of the
naval forces; passing over the disgust occasioned by the conduct
pursued towards the seamen, the opposition which had been
encountered in every step towards amelioration, and the mischief
occasioned by these and many other sources of disunion and
paralysation, I say--passing over all these--let me call Your
Excellency's attention to the only means which appear to me
practicable to save the country--if not from again devolving to
Portugal as colonial possessions, yet at least from protracted
war, and its attendant calamities.
Taking it then for granted that an expedition is actually fitting
out at Lisbon, destined to act against Brazil, the question is, how
and by what means can that expedition be most successfully opposed?
what is the force necessary? and how, under existing circumstances,
it can be procured?
(Here follow plans for the reorganization of the navy, and its mode
of operation, in order to prevent the anticipated invasion.)
As regards myself, it is my conviction that, though I might be
responsible for the discipline and good order of a single ship, I
could make nothing of a squadron so manned, as it inevitably must
be, and actuated by those feelings which have been excited to the
detriment of the Imperial service.
Since the date of my last letter to Your Excellency, I have
received a copy of the laws relative to prizes, and am convinced
that these laws differ in no material degree from the maritime code
of England, the adoption of which I had solicited; and that the
blame of all the disquiet that has been occasioned is entirely
owing to the non-execution of the laws by those individuals who
have been nominated to dispense justice, but who have perverted it.
(Signed) COCHRANE & MARANHAÕ.
Notwithstanding the threatening aspect of affairs in the North, no steps
were taken to satisfy the seamen. In place of this I received orders to
use my influence with them _to re-enter without payment!_ Determined
that the Government should not have to find fault with any want of
effort on my part, I obeyed the order, with what result the following
letter to the Minister of Marine will shew:--
In consequence of the directions from His Imperial Majesty,
communicated through Your Excellency, to equip the _Pedro Primiero,
Carolina_, and _Maria de Gloria_, with all possible despatch, and
to hold them in readiness to proceed on service, I ordered a
commissioned officer to visit the different rendezvous which the
seamen frequent, and endeavour to prevail on them to re-enter
--assuring them that the continuance of their services was the best
means whereby to obtain their rewards for captures made during the
late campaign. It appears, however, that it will be difficult to
prevail on them to engage again in the service, without some
explicit declaration made public on the part of the Imperial
Government, stating what they have to expect for the past, and to
anticipate for the future; for the conduct that has been pursued,
especially in regard to matters of prize, has led them to draw
conclusions highly prejudicial to the service of His Imperial
Majesty.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
I also protested against the intended arrest of Captain Grenfell,
knowing that there were no grounds for such a step, and more especially
against the seizure of his papers, which necessarily contained the
requisite proofs in justification of his conduct at Parà. The only
offence he had committed was his firmness in repressing the seditious
acts of the Portuguese faction there; and as those whom he had offended
had influence with their countrymen connected with the administration at
Rio de Janeiro, a tissue of false representations as to his conduct, was
the readiest mode of revenge, so that he shared the enmity of the
faction in common with myself, though they did not venture to order my
arrest.
One instance of the annoyance still directed against myself, on the 4th
of June, is perhaps worth relating. It had been falsely reported to the
Emperor by his ministers that--besides the 40,000 dollars which I
refused to give up--specie to a large amount was secreted on board the
_Pedro Primiero_, and it was suggested to His Majesty, that, as I was
living on shore, it would be easy to search the ship in my absence
--whereby the Emperor could possess himself of all the money found. This
disgraceful insult was on the point of being put in execution, when an
accident revealed the whole plot; the object of which was, by implied
accusation, to lower me in popular estimation--a dastardly device,
which, though contemptible, could hardly fail to be prejudicial to
myself, against whom it was directed.
Late one evening I received a visit from Madame Bonpland, the talented
wife of the distinguished French naturalist. This lady--who had singular
opportunities for becoming acquainted with state secrets--came
expressly to inform me that my house was at that moment surrounded by a
guard of soldiers! On asking if she knew the reason of such a
proceeding, she informed me that, under the pretence of a review to be
held at the opposite side of the harbour early the following morning,
preparations had been made by the ministers to board the flagship, which
was to be thoroughly overhauled whilst I was detained on shore, and all
the money found taken possession of!
Thanking my excellent friend for her timely warning, I clambered over my
garden fence, as the only practicable way to the stables, selected a
horse, and notwithstanding the lateness of the hour, proceeded to St.
Christoval, the country palace of the Emperor, where, on my arrival, I
demanded to see His Majesty. The request being refused by the gentleman
in waiting, in such a way as to confirm the statement of Madame
Bonpland--I dared him to refuse me admission at his peril; adding that
"the matter upon which I had come was fraught with grave consequences to
His Majesty and the Empire." "But," said he, "His Majesty has retired to
bed long ago." "No matter," replied I, "in bed, or not in bed, I demand
to see him, in virtue of my privilege of access to him at all times, and
if you refuse to concede permission--look to the consequences."
His Majesty was not, however, asleep, and the royal chamber being close
at hand, he recognised my voice in the altercation with the attendant.
Hastily coming out of his apartments in a _dishabille_ which, under
ordinary circumstances, would have been inconsistent, he asked--"What
could have brought me there at that time of night?" My reply was--that
"understanding that the troops ordered for a review were destined to
proceed to the flagship in search of supposed treasure, I had come to
request His Majesty immediately to appoint confidential persons to
accompany me on board, when the key of every chest in the ship should be
placed in their hands, and every place thrown open to their inspection;
but that if any of his anti-Brazilian Administration ventured to board
the ship in perpetration of the contemplated insult, they would
certainly be regarded as pirates, and treated as such." Adding at the
same time--"Depend upon it, that they are not more my enemies, than the
enemies of your Majesty and the Empire, and an intrusion so
unwarrantable, the officers and crew are bound to resist." "Well,"
replied His Majesty, "you seem to be apprised of everything, but the
plot is not mine; being--as far as I am concerned--convinced that no
money would be found more than we already know of from yourself."
I then entreated His Majesty to take such steps for my justification as
would be satisfactory to the public. "There is no necessity for any,"
replied he; "but how to dispense with the review is the puzzle.--I will
be ill in the morning--so go home, and think no more of the matter. I
give you my word your flag shall not be outraged by the contemplated
proceeding."
The _denouement_ of the farce is worthy of being recorded. The Emperor
kept his word, and in the night was taken suddenly ill. As His Majesty
was really beloved by his Brazilian subjects, all the native
respectability of Rio was early next day on its way to the palace to
inquire after the Royal health, and, ordering my carriage, I also
proceeded to the palace, lest my absence might appear singular. On
entering the room, where--surrounded by many influential persons--the
Emperor was in the act of explaining the nature of his disease to the
anxious inquirers--a strange incident occurred. On catching my eye, His
Majesty burst into a fit of uncontrollable laughter, in which I as
heartily joined; the bystanders, from the gravity of their countenances,
evidently considering that both had taken leave of their senses. The
Ministers looked astounded, but said nothing--His Majesty kept his
secret, and I was silent.
Months had now been consumed in endeavours on the part of the
Administration to give annoyance to me--and on the part of the prize
tribunal to condemn me in costs for making lawful captures, this
appearing to form their only object; save when a prize vessel could be
given up to a claimant or pretended claimant, in outrage of justice, as
evinced in the case of the _Pombinho's_ cargo, and numerous other
instances.
To such an extent was this being carried, that I sent protest after
protest on the subject. The following will serve as a specimen:--
PROTEST.
The Marquis of Maranhaõ, First Admiral and Commander-in-Chief of the
Naval forces of His Imperial Majesty, does hereby protest, on behalf
of himself and those employed under his command in the blockade of
Bahia, and other services of the Empire, against the sentence given
in the case of the Nova Constitucaõ, _whereby costs and damages to
the amount of four times the value are decreed against the captors
of the said vessel_ (taken in the act of violating the blockade of
Bahia), in performance of duties which the law sanctioned and the
service of His Imperial Majesty required.
And further, the said Marquis of Maranhaõ, on behalf of himself and
the captors, does again most solemnly protest against _all sentences
of acquittal_ of vessels which violated the said blockade, or which
were seized, navigating under Portuguese flags or with Portuguese
registers--and against all proceedings to recover damages against
the said Marquis and captors _for any capture whatsoever_; His
Imperial Majesty having been graciously pleased to signify that all
expenses thus incurred in case of vessels pronounced "_malprisa_,"
shall be placed to the account of the State.
Rio de Janeiro, July 23, 1824.
The anxiety of His Majesty on account of the revolt at Pernambuco was
meanwhile utterly set at nought, neither Severiano, nor his colleague
Barbosa--though now beginning to be alarmed--shewing the slightest
disposition to carry out His Majesty's orders for the compromise with
the officers and seamen, in order that the squadron might be manned. At
length intelligence arrived from the revolted districts, of such a
nature as to appear to His Majesty fraught with immediate danger to the
integrity of the Empire, as in truth it was, for the Republican nature
of the insurrection had become an established fact, whilst the squadron
which, months before, ought to have sailed to quell the revolt, was,
from, want of men, lying idle in the port of the capital.
Setting aside all Ministerial interposition, I received His Majesty's
orders to repair at once to the palace, to decide on the best plan of
meeting these revolutionary manifestations. My advice was--at once to
put them down with a strong hand; but I called His Majesty's attention
to the ministerial contempt of his orders to satisfy the seamen, and the
consequent hopeless condition of the squadron--abandoned because no
assurance had been given that past services would be rewarded by the
adjudication of the prizes--against which adjudication the tribunal
resolutely set their faces, or, what was worse, unwarrantably disposed
of the property entrusted to them for adjudication.
His Majesty was greatly annoyed at learning the continuance and extent
of the vexatious opposition to his wishes; but, begging me not to be
influenced by the injustice committed, strongly urged the necessity of
my using every endeavour for immediate action,--I at once pointed out to
His Majesty that the only way to accomplish this was, to restore
confidence to the men by maintaining public faith with the officers and
seamen, giving compensation--at least in part--of their prize money,
with recognition of their claims to the remainder.
Still nothing was done, until, becoming tired of the harassing
circumstances in which I was placed, I made up my mind to a last effort,
which, if unsuccessful, should be followed by my resignation of the
command, even though it might involve the loss of all that which was due
to me. Accordingly, I addressed to His Majesty a letter from which the
following are extracts:--
The time has at length arrived when it is impossible to doubt
that the influence which the Portuguese faction has so long exerted,
with the view of depriving the officers and seamen of their stipulated
rights, has succeeded in its object, and has even prevailed against
the expressed wishes and intentions of Your Majesty in person.
(Here follows a recapitulation of injuries and annoyances with
which the reader is familiar):--
The determined perseverance in a course so opposed to justice,
by those members and adherents of the Portuguese faction, whose
influence prevails in the ministry and council, and more especially
the proceedings of those individuals of that faction, who compose
the naval tribunals, must come to an end.
The general discontent which prevails in the squadron has rendered
the situation in which I am placed one of the most embarrassing
description; for though few may be aware that my own cause of
complaint is equal to theirs, many cannot perceive the consistency of
my patient continuation in the service, with disapprobation of the
measures pursued. Even the honours which Your Majesty has been
pleased to bestow upon me, are deemed by most of the officers, and by
the whole of the men--who know not the assiduity with which I have
persevered in earnest but unavailing remonstrance--as a bribe by
which I have been induced to abandon their interests. Much,
therefore, as I prize those honours, as the gracious gift of Your
Imperial Majesty, yet, holding in still dearer estimation my
character as an officer and a man, I cannot hesitate a moment which
to sacrifice when the retention of both is evidently incompatible.
I can, therefore, no longer delay to demonstrate to the squadron,
and the world, that I am no partner in the deceptions and oppressions
which are practised on the naval service; and as the first,
and most painful step in the performance of this imperious duty, I
crave permission--with all humility and respect--to return those
honours, and lay them at the feet of Your Imperial Majesty.
I should, however, fall short of my duty to those who were
induced to enter the service by my example or invitation, were I to
do nothing more than convince them that I had been deceived. It
is incumbent on me to make every effort to obtain for them the
fulfilment of engagements for which I made myself responsible.
As far as I am personally concerned, I could be content to quit
the service of Your Imperial Majesty, either with or without the
expectation of obtaining compensation at a future period, and could
submit to the same sacrifices here as I did on the other side of
the continent, even to abandoning the ships which I captured from
the enemy--without payment or reward--as I did in Chili and Peru.
After effectually fighting the battles of freedom and independence
on both sides of South America, and clearing the two seas of every
vessel of war, I could submit to return to my native country
unrewarded; but I cannot submit to adopt any course which shall
not redeem my pledge to my brother officers and seamen. Neither
can I relinquish the object which I have equally at heart, of
depriving the Portuguese faction of the means of undermining the
nationality and independence of the empire, to which--notwithstanding
their admission to places of honour and trust--they are
notoriously and naturally opposed.
It is impossible to view the prize tribunal--consisting of natives
of the hostile nation--in any other light than as a party of the
enemy, who, in the disguise of judges, have surprised and recaptured
our prizes, after we had lodged them--as we thought--safely in
port. And we have not the slightest reason to doubt that, if
suffered to proceed unmolested, they will eventually get them clean
out of the harbour, and convey them back to their own country.
We do not ask for reprisals upon these people, but simply restitution
of the fruits of our labours in the service of Your Majesty, of which
they have insidiously despoiled us, and that no impediment to this
act of justice may arise, or be pretended by the individuals in
question, we are willing to wait for a still further period--retaining,
however, what remains of the prizes in our own custody--until our
claims are settled; when we shall punctually surrender them into
Your Imperial hands at whatever moment Your Majesty shall be
pleased to cause the said claims to be duly discharged.
We most earnestly beseech Your Imperial Majesty--upon whom
alone we depend for justice--to take into your consideration the
necessity of withdrawing all control over the naval service and its
interests from the hands of individuals with whose country Your
Majesty is at war, and against which, under Your Imperial authority,
we have been employed in active hostilities. It is only by the removal
of Portuguese functionaries--more especially from the naval department,
and the appointment of native Brazilians in their stead, that
Your Imperial Majesty can reasonably hope to possess the full
confidence of your people. Such a proceeding would be far more
effective for the suppression of the rebellion in the North, than
the ill-equipped naval detachment employed on that service.
I trust that Your Imperial Majesty will perceive that nothing
short of the most thorough conviction in my own mind, with regard
to the step now taken, could have led me to adopt it on my own
account, or on that of the squadron. To myself, in particular, it
must be a source of great anxiety, and in all probability, for a time
--before the circumstances are generally understood--it may bring
on me a large share of obloquy. My resignation is attended with
the surrender of the high honours with which Your Majesty has
graciously invested me, in addition to the honourable situation
which I hold under Your Imperial authority. Your Majesty may be
assured that such sacrifices as these are not made without extreme
reluctance, and if there had remained the slightest probability of
obtaining by any ordinary means the justice for the squadron,
which it is my bounden duty to persevere in demanding, I should
have avoided a step so pregnant with disadvantages to myself.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
His Majesty frankly admitted that the course pursued by his Ministers
towards the squadron was no less discreditable than injurious to the
vital interests of the state, but begged me to reconsider my
determination. To prevent further ministerial interposition, at a moment
so pregnant with danger, the Emperor offered to place at my disposal,
for the temporary satisfaction of the men, 200,000 milreis in paper
currency--not one-tenth of the value of the prizes--if I would endeavour
to rally them under the national flag, and merge my own injuries in
oblivion, till he should be better able to do us justice.
My reply was that, personally, His Majesty had ever manifested his
desire to fulfil his promises to me, and that I would stand by the
integrity of the empire, and its consolidation. It was of the ministers
I had to complain, by whom all the Imperial promises had been broken,
and His Majesty's intentions thwarted; but that this would neither
interfere with my duty nor gratitude to His Majesty, personally; and
that if the 200,000 milreis were paid, I would endeavour to use the
money to the best advantage by inducing the men to return to the ships.
The amount was directed to be placed in my hands, with the request that
I would proceed to Pernambuco, and use my discretion in putting down the
revolution, unfettered by orders; His Majesty recommending me to
withhold payment till the squadron was at sea, in order to prevent delay
and desertion. I begged of His Majesty to appoint a commission for the
distribution of the money, as the responsibility was foreign to my
duties. This, however, was overruled with a gracious compliment as to
the manner in which my services had uniformly been conducted; being thus
pressed I made no further opposition.
Still the ministers withheld the money, on which I wrote to the
Emperor, requesting that His Majesty would perform the gracious
compliment of delivering it on board personally. The Emperor at once
comprehended the nature of the hint, and insisted on the sum being
placed in my hands. On receiving it, I immediately issued a proclamation
to the seamen, informing them of His Majesty's concession--inviting them
to return to their duty--and promising payment to the extent of the
funds supplied. The result was, that all who had not quitted Rio de
Janeiro in despair, with one accord rejoined the service, and every
effort was made to get the expedition ready for sea.
Before sailing for Pernambuco I was naturally desirous of coming to a
definite understanding on the subject of my commission, the patents
conferring which had been ruthlessly attempted to be set aside under the
signature of Barbosa, on the _assumed pretence of authority_ from His
Imperial Majesty, whose _rubrica_, however, was not attached to this
violation of our original compact. Accordingly, on the 26th of July, I
addressed a letter to Barbosa on the subject, and on the 29th received
the following reply:--
His Imperial Majesty commands, through the Secretary of State
and Marine, that there shall be transmitted to the First Admiral
commanding-in-chief the naval forces of this empire the enclosed copy
of a decree of the 27th of this month, by which His Imperial Majesty
has judged proper to determine that the said First Admiral shall
receive _in full_, so long as he shall continue in the service of this
empire, _the full pay of his patent_; and, _in the event of his not
choosing to continue therein after the termination of the present
war of independence, the one-half of his pay as a pension_--the same
being extended to his wife in the event of his decease.
The said First Admiral is hereby certified that the said decree of
His Imperial Majesty is not required to be inserted in his patent,
as he requests in his letter of the 26th instant, the said decree
being as valid as the patent itself.
Palace of Rio de Janeiro,
July 29th, 1824.
(Signed) FRANCISCO VILLELA BARBOSA.
Decree of His Imperial Majesty, inserted in the _Mercurio de
Brazil_, Sunday, 31st July, 1824.
In consequence of what has been represented to me by the
Marquis of Maranhaõ, First Admiral and Commander-in-Chief of the
naval forces of the empire, and in consequence of the great services
he has rendered, and which we hope he will continue to render to
the sacred cause of Brazil, I hereby--by the advice of my Council
of State--determine that the said Marquis of Maranhaõ shall be
paid in full, during the period that he shall remain in the service of
this empire, the whole amount of salary due to his patent; and in
the case of his _not wishing to continue in the service_ after the
termination of the present war of independence, the one-half of the
said pay as a pension, the same, in case of his death, being extended
to his wife.
Francisco Villela Barbosa, of my Council of State, Minister and
Secretary of Marine, is hereby commanded to promulgate the same,
and execute the necessary despatches.
Given in the palace of Rio de Janeiro, the 27th of July, 1824,
and the third of independence and the empire.
With the _Rubrica_ of His Imperial Majesty.
(Signed) FRANCISCO VILLELA BARBOSA.
This decree nullified the unjustifiable _portaria_ issued by Barbosa,
limiting my services to the period of the war, which, in reality, had
been ended by my expulsion of the Portuguese from Bahia and Maranham. It
recognised and established the validity of the Emperor's original
patents, of which, by the minister's own explanation, it was a
continuation, with an extension to Lady Cochrane; a boon spontaneously
granted by the Emperor, as a mark of gratitude for services rendered in
the preceding year. It was, moreover, clearly left to my own option to
continue in the service or to quit it on half-pay, on the termination of
the war of independence.
If there was any faith to be placed in princes or ministers, nothing
could be more definite or satisfactory than the preceding document, with
the exception of the phrase, "_in the event of his not choosing to
continue therein_," which evidently contained an _arrière pensée_,
implying, as was afterwards proved, that when I could be got rid of it
would be easy to _compel me_ to retire from the service; but even this
alternative was subsequently disregarded--though His Imperial Majesty,
on my thanking him for having so far done me justice against the
attempts of his Ministers--remarked, "_never mind their injustice--they
can't deprive you of that"_--alluding to the stipulations contained in
the Imperial patents, and this renewed confirmation thereof.
The concession of 200,000 dollars, as a portion of the prize money so
long due to the officers and crews, was actually made to suffice, in
place of an advance of wages usually given on the departure of a naval
expedition; so that, in fact, the squadron was manned at its own
expense! no other payment being accorded by the _Government_. As His
Majesty had requested that the men should not receive their money before
going to sea, _the squadron_, with the exception of the flagship, was
despatched on its voyage, the crews being satisfied--now that the money
was on board--with my promise of payment when they should assemble at
the rendezvous appointed.
It is requisite to enter into some detail relative to the distribution
of prize money thus of necessity substituted as an advance of wages: it
being impossible to get the requisite numbers of foreign seamen for the
_Pedro Primiero_ without such advance; and although the frigates which
had sailed, manned for the most part with Portuguese or Brazilian crews,
relied upon _me_ for payment of their prize money, the foreign seamen
refused even to remain on board the flagship without the usual advance;
the officers also were in want of everything, and the men--indebted to
tavern keepers--clamorous for payment.
As the necessity was urgent, I did not choose that the flagship, under
my immediate command, should leave port in a discreditable manner, I
therefore took upon myself--notwithstanding His Majesty's suggestion to
withhold payment till we were at sea--to accommodate the officers and
satisfy the crew by the advance demanded; a step, in my judgment, the
more necessary, since, as had been the case in the former campaign, I
should mainly have to depend upon the foreign officers and seamen of my
own ship, for the execution of plans which might become requisite--the
best way, therefore, to ensure their zealous co-operation throughout the
voyage, was to establish harmony at its commencement by complying with
their just demand.
The following were the principal sums disbursed on this occasion, as
appears from my private memoranda, the vouchers themselves being
afterwards transmitted to the Minister of Marine through Captain
Shepherd, as will subsequently appear:--
Dollars.
To Myself 85,000
Paid Messrs. May and Lukin, Prize Agents,
for Admiralty Court expenses, and
commission, at 5 per cent 15,000
Advanced to Squadron generally 23,000
Ditto to Captain Crosbie 5,000
Ditto, to other Officers 3,750
Disbursed at Rio, 70,750
This sum, about £.14,000, may appear trivial to the English reader,
accustomed to lavish expenditure in all naval expeditions as the most
economical way of securing their future efficiency--and hence the
mention of such an amount may be deemed superfluous. That this is not
the case will presently appear.
The reader must not however imagine that I am about to inflict on him an
account current of the expenditure of the squadron; but circumstances
compel me to a precision in this respect on personal grounds: the
Brazilian Government--though in possession of the documents and vouchers
afterwards transmitted by Captain Shepherd--publicly persisting in the
statement that I never furnished accounts of the expedition to
Pernambuco and Maranham--thus leaving the public to infer that the
disbursements just narrated, together with subsequent payments, had
never in reality been made! In other words, that I induced the crews to
go to sea--put down the revolution in the North--spent nine months in
pacifying the revolutionary provinces--and yet fraudulently withheld
200,000 dollars, the only sum supplied during the whole of the
expedition; the seamen meanwhile not only serving without reward, but
being content with my monopolizing the portion of the prize-money known
by them to have been awarded for the expulsion of the Portuguese in the
preceding year, and notoriously in my possession! Their forbearance
being so improbable as to refute itself, being contrary to common sense;
even in the absence of the vouchers, which were transmitted to the
Brazilian Government, _but never acknowledged_--I am able however to
account for the whole from documents no less convincing than the
vouchers transmitted.
It is true that nothing but the blind hatred of the old Portuguese
faction towards me could have originated such charges, and that hatred
was greatly increased by my pacification of the revolutionary
provinces--this being the death-blow to the intrigues recommended by
Palmella in favour of the mother country. As, however, the Brazilian
Government did not acknowledge to me the receipt of my accounts, which
must either exist to this day in the office of the Minister of Marine,
or must have been destroyed, for the sake of traducing my character in
justification of my prospective dismissal--it is incumbent on me to
supply, for the information of the Brazilian people, explanations which
have been repeatedly given to their Government, but which have not as
yet been made public through the medium of the press--and that not for
the information of the Brazilian people solely, but of the British
public, who, in the absence of official imputations recently
promulgated, have never before been put in possession of facts.
The Brazilian people may rest assured that whenever I received, for the
use of the squadron, sums which itself had captured, I could neither
then conceal the circumstance nor can I now disavow the fact--giving,
however, the reasons which, for the interests of the Empire, justified
my proceedings. The only instance of this kind which had hitherto
occurred was my retention of 40,000 dollars captured at Maranham, and
they who have perused the preceding narrative will be at no loss for the
ground of my refusal to surrender to the Court of Admiralty a sum which
would have been returned by that tribunal to their Portuguese
brethren--nor for my resistance to the plot which the ministers had
formed to take it by force from on board the flagship.
To return to the advances made to the officers and seamen of the
flagship. The following extracts from the original log kept by my
secretary will shew the fact of the distribution previously narrated:--
_July 12th_, 1824. Received the 200,000 dollars at the treasury, and
gave receipt, with Captain Crosbie and the Commissary. Deposited
the notes in the iron chest on board the _Pedro Primiero_.
_July 19th_. Went on board the _Pedro Primiero_ to pay advance.
(Paid May and Lukin 15,000 dollars.) Engaged all day in paying
the men.
_July 26th._ Went to the _Pedro_, with the Admiral and Lieutenant
Blake, to pay advance from the prize-money. In the evening the
Emperor called and announced to the Admiral that he was to sail
on Sunday next.
_July 31st_. On board the _Pedro_ paying seamen as before.
Soldiers came on board.
_August 2nd._ Emperor came alongside. Admiral embarked.
Got under way, and set sail in company with the _Maranhaõ_ brig
and three transports.
The preceding extracts shew that not only was an advance made for the
good of the service, but this was done with such publicity, that both
the Emperor and his ministers could not fail to be aware of the
circumstance. The further distribution as prize-money, according to His
Majesty's direction, took place at Bahia and Pernambuco, as will be
shewn in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VIII.
REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT PROCLAIMED AT PERNAMBUCO--ITS CONCORDAT----THE
PRESIDENT CARVALHO--THREAT OF BOMBARDMENT--A BRIBE OFFERED TO ME AND
REFUSED--THE REVOLT ADMITTED OF PALLIATION--IT WAS FAST BECOMING
GENERAL--INTIMIDATION INEFFECTUAL--THE REVOLUTIONISTS EXPECT FOREIGN
AID--PERNAMBUCO TAKEN POSSESSION OF--PAYMENT OF PRIZE MONEY--THE
ACCOUNTS RENDERED IN DUE COURSE--ORDERS TO PUT DOWN REVOLT AT
PARA--CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTION--DIFFICULTY IN FINDING PROPER
GOVERNORS--REVOLT AT CEARA--STEPS TAKEN TO SUPPRESS IT--THEY PROVE
SUCCESSFUL--THE INSURGENT LEADER KILLED--MEASURES FOR PRESERVING
TRANQUILLITY.
On the 2nd of August, 1824, the Imperial squadron again quitted Rio de
Janeiro, the rendezvous being appointed at Jurugua, where we arrived on
the 13th, and on the 16th landed a body of twelve hundred troops under
General Lima, at Alagoas, seventy or eighty miles from the seat of
revolt! this notable step being taken in pursuance of strict orders from
the Administration at Rio de Janeiro.
On the 18th, the squadron reached Pernambuco, falling in, near the
entrance of the port, with a number of Portuguese vessels quitting the
city with passengers; but in consequence of the prize tribunal having
_decreed damages_ for the seizure of enemy's ships within a certain
distance of the coast, they were permitted to pass unmolested.
We did not reach Pernambuco too soon, for proclamations had been
issued by Manuel Carvalho Paes de Andrade, the revolutionary
President--denouncing Don Pedro as a traitor, whose aim it was to
abandon Brazil to the Portuguese; which denunciation, though right in
one sense, was wrong as regarded the Emperor, whose views were
thoroughly national--though the object of his ministers was as
thoroughly Portuguese. Had the Pernambucans been aware of the want of
concord between the Emperor's intentions and those of his ministers, who
had forced themselves upon him--the probability is that they would have
supported, instead of denouncing his government.
The revolution had, however, now taken vigorous root, and the democratic
spirit of the Pernambucans was not to be trifled with. A republican form
of Government had been proclaimed, the views of which were on a more
extensive scale than was commensurate with the abilities of those
propounding them; it being their vain hope to constitute all the
equatorial provinces into a federation, on the model of the United
States, a project fostered--if not originated--by Americans resident in
the city. To further this object, an appeal was made to the other
Northern provinces to repudiate the Imperial authority, and to form with
Pernambuco an alliance, under the title of "Confederation of the
Equator;" the consequence being, that a large proportion of the
inhabitants of Parahyba, Piahuy, Rio Grande do Norte, and Cearà,
declared in favour of the measure.
The annexed is the Concordat of the revolutionary provinces:--
In the year of Our Lord 1824, third year of the Independence of
Brazil, and the 3rd of August in that year, in the Hall of Session of
the Government of the Province of Pernambuco, there being present,
the Brazilian citizen, Quaresma Torreaõ, on behalf of His Excellency
the President, Carvalho Paes de Andrade, and the Illustrious and
Reverend Francisco da Costa Leixas; José Joaquim Fernandez Barros,
and the Citizen José Joaquim Germiniano de Moraes Navarro, on behalf
of the province of Rio Grande del Norte, by diploma dated August 16,
1824, and also the Illustrious deputies commissioned by His
Excellency the Governor of the Province of Pernambuco to treat on
behalf of his Government, with a view to extinguish dissension in
political opinions, which has so greatly retarded the progress of
Brazil, and of independence and liberty; and, at the same time, to do
their endeavour to banish a servile spirit which tends to enthral
Brazil by a pretended Constitution, domineering over the Brazilian
nation like that of the Grand Seignior of the Ottoman Porte.
The Commission of the Government of this province, and the
illustrious deputations before-mentioned, having maturely considered
these subjects, agree--
First,--That these provinces of Pernambuco and Rio Grande
unite in a fraternal league, offensive and defensive, to assemble
all their forces against any aggression of the Portuguese Government,
or that of the Government of Rio de Janeiro, to reduce these
provinces to a state of thraldom.
Secondly,--That the said league shall extend to the establishing
constitutional liberty throughout the said provinces, and to supplant
the servile spirit with which they are infected, and thus avert civil
war, engendered by the intrigues at Rio de Janeiro, the influence of
which now pervades the whole of Brazil.
Thirdly,--That to insure the effect of this compact, the Government
of Rio Grande must form a body of troops, and place them on
the borders of the province of Parahyba, to be employed as necessity
requires.
Fourthly,--That this body of troops shall be supported by the
province of Pernambuco, but shall be afterwards supported by the
"Confederation of the Equador." And that the same may be
carried into immediate effect, this Concordat shall have full force,
after being signed and ratified by their Excellencies the Presidents
of the said provinces of Pernambuco and Rio del Norte.
(Signed)
P. FRANCISCO DA COSTA LEIXAS.
JOSÉ JOAQUIM FERNANDEZ BARROS.
JOSÉ JOAQUIM GERMINIANO DE MORAES NAVARRO.
BASILIO QUARESMA TORREAÓ.
MANOEL DE CARVALHO PAES D'ANDRADE, President.
_Printed at the National Press._
Carvalho, however, was not the man to carry out such a scheme, his
enthusiasm being without prudence or daring; hence, on our arrival--in
place of union, the contending factions were engaged in destroying each
other's sugar-mills and plantations, whilst Carvalho himself had taken
the precaution to station a vessel at the island of Tamarica, for the
purpose of escaping, if necessary, from the turbulence which he had
raised, but could not control. On learning this, I felt it my duty to
despatch a corvette to seize her, _though at the risk of four-fold
damages, according to the regulations of the Admiralty Court!_
Knowing that it would take some time for the troops to come up, I
determined to try the effect of a threat of bombardment, and issued a
proclamation remonstrating with the inhabitants on the folly of
permitting themselves to be deceived by men who lacked the ability to
execute their schemes; pointing out, moreover, that persistence in
revolt would involve both the town and its rulers in one common ruin;
for, if forced to the necessity of bombardment,--I would reduce the
port and city to insignificance. On the other hand, I assured them that
if they retraced their steps, and rallied round the Imperial throne,
thus aiding to protect it from foreign influence--it would be more
gratifying to me to act the part of a mediator, and to restore
Pernambuco to peace, prosperity and happiness--than to carry out the
work of destruction which would be my only remaining alternative.
In another proclamation I called the attention of the inhabitants to the
distracted state of the Spanish republics on the other side of the
Continent, asking whether it would be wise to risk the benefits of
orderly government for social and political confusion; entreating them
not to compel me to proceed to extremities, as it would become my duty
to destroy their shipping and block up their port, unless within eight
days the integrity of the empire were acknowledged.
These threats were held out in the hope that by intimidation a struggle
might be prevented, but they failed to produce the desired effect. One
result was, however, not a little curious, as originating an offer to
myself from the revolutionary President, of a bribe of 400,000 milreis,
to be shipped immediately on board the English packet anchored off the
port, if I would abandon the Imperial cause, and come over to the
Republicans; this offer alluding, in strong terms, to the "infamous
treatment with which my services had been met by the administration at
Rio de Janeiro, and warning me that, by adhering to it, I should meet
with nothing but continued ill-treatment and ingratitude."
The subjoined is the revolutionary President's letter:
MY LORD,
Frankness is the distinguishing character of free men, but
Your Excellency has not found it in your connection with the
Imperial Government. _Your not having been rewarded for the
first expedition affords a justifiable inference that you will get
nothing for the second._ I therefore use the freedom to assure Your
Excellency the amount of 400 contos of Reis, as an indemnification
for your losses.
The services required from Your Excellency are to take up the
cause of the "Confederation of the Equator," as adopted by the
majority of the Northern provinces, whose limits will be the river of
Francisco da Norte.
I have the honour to be
Your Excellency's most humble servant,
MANUEL DE CARVALHO PAES D'ANDEADE.
The letter contained, in addition, an argumentative justification of the
revolt, but as it abounds in abuse of the Emperor, couched in the most
indecorous language, I will not sully these pages by printing it entire.
The result predicted by Carvalho--as I had learned by experience--was
not improbable, but it did not follow that, because the Brazilian
ministers were unjust and hostile to me, I should accept a bribe from a
traitor to follow his example. I therefore transmitted the following
reply to his impudent proposal:--
_Pedro Primiero,_ Off Pernambuco, Aug. 26, 1824.
SIR,
If I shall have an opportunity of becoming personally known to Your
Excellency, I can afford you proof to conviction, that the opinion
you have formed of me has had its origin in the misrepresentations
of those in power, whose purposes I was incapable, on principle, to
serve.
I have, &c. &c. COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
His Excellency M. DE C. PAES D'ANDEADE.
On the 19th, the Junta requested the interposition of the English and
French consuls to induce me to give further time for consideration. This
I refused, from the dangerous nature of the anchorage, by which the
safety of the ships was imperilled.
Unwilling, however, to injure this fine city, I sent in proposals for
capitulation, giving permission to the revolutionary leaders to depart
unpunished, together with their property, provided they quitted the
Brazilian territory--demanding in return the surrender of the forts,
ships of war, gunboats, &c. as well as of all public property. In order
to prevent waste of time in correspondence, I proposed to Carvalho to
meet me on board any neutral ship of war, pledging my honour as to his
being permitted to return in safety; he nevertheless declined the
interview, proposing in return to meet me on shore on an island near the
town but--as after his insulting proposal, I could have no confidence in
his honour, this was of course declined.
Still anxious to avoid extremities--from which, after the threats made,
I could not consistently refrain--I again wrote to Carvalho, that, had
he possessed the means of distinguishing between the intentions of the
Emperor, and the proceedings of a foreign faction, he would not have
been in arms against His Imperial Majesty, by adherence to whom Brazil
could alone be saved from that anarchy and confusion into which Mexico
and other South American States had fallen through individual rivalry
and the ignorance of their popular assemblies. I further pointed out to
him, that if, by procrastination I was compelled to bombard the city,
the popular clamour against the insurgent authorities might be followed
by melancholy proof to himself how quickly political adventurers may be
abandoned or betrayed in the hour of danger, and that he had better
yield to reason, what he could not prevent my effecting by force.
By writers who could not have known anything of the circumstances--which
exist only in my own documents--I have been blamed for this tone of
moderation towards the revolutionary President. There were two valid
reasons for this course; first, that the conduct of the Pernambucans
admitted of great palliation, seeing that the distractions resulting
from the Portuguese faction in the administration at Rio de Janeiro had
been ignorantly construed into acts of His Imperial Majesty--so that the
injured people argued that it would have been better for them to have
remained a colony of Portugal, than a colony of the Government at Rio de
Janeiro--this mode of reasoning not being very far wrong. Secondly--and
this fully accounts for the moderation complained of--I knew, from the
most authentic sources that, in case of attack on the city, Carvalho had
determined to retire into the interior, there to carry on civil war by
enlisting the negro population under his standard; to avert which, I
considered that moderation was the best course to induce him and his
partisans to quit the empire, which would thus have been well rid of
them.
It was folly, therefore, to consider the rebellion local, as had been
represented to the Imperial Government, or that its actors and
instigators were few and insignificant, for, in truth, as has been said,
it had already extended far and wide into the adjacent provinces, I
therefore wrote to the Minister of Marine, that "although it might not
be difficult to put down the revolution in the city, which, even the
land forces could have already accomplished, had they not been landed at
a distance--yet that without great circumspection, the prevention of
further revolution in the interior would be a work of time, trouble, and
expense; and that even all these would be thrown away, unless the causes
which had led to the rebellion, were removed or explained."
The time given having expired without acceptance of the terms, it became
necessary to make at least a shew of enforcing them, though the water
was too shallow to admit vessels of large burden to approach with
safety, and the small vessels were ill adapted to the purpose; still I
determined to make a demonstration, and as a preparatory step ordered
Captain Welsh, of the _Paraguassu_, to shift into the flagship all the
English petty officers and seamen; but a heavy swell set in, and as the
anchorage was bad, I considered the risk imprudent.
The schooner _Leopoldina_ was therefore ordered to try the effect of a
few experimental shells; but the mortar so shook the vessel, that she
had to be withdrawn, it being evident that nothing further could be done
till the weather would permit the approach of ships, or that rafts could
be constructed--for which purpose timber had been ordered from Bahia.
Little damage was effected by this experiment, for the wealthiest
inhabitants had fled into the interior, taking with them all their
valuable property.
Heavy weather having now set in compelled the flagship to run to Bahia
for safety, the outer road of Pernambuco being at this season
exceedingly dangerous from the coralline nature of the bottom, as was
practically proved by the fact that the _Pedro Primiero_ lost every
anchor but one, so that to remain was certain destruction, and there was
no alternative but to make for Bahia to procure anchors.
Nothing had been heard of General Lima's force since its debarkation, I
was therefore anxious to know what had become of it, and how far it was
in a condition to cooperate, the speedy possession of the place being
nautically an important point--for, whilst blockading we had intercepted
a Portuguese vessel, only forty-three days from the Tagus, and learned
from her letters that a large force was preparing at Lisbon, consisting
of sixteen ships of war and numerous transports, their destination
being Pernambuco; this forming sufficient proof that the Portuguese
Government counted on the recovery of those disorganised provinces which
had alike revolted against the mother country and the Emperor of Brazil.
On the 4th of September, the flagship left for Bahia, first visiting the
island of Alexo, where the _Cacique_ and _Maranhaõ_ were at anchor. From
them we learned that General Lima's head-quarters were at Leimham, his
advance guard having joined the troops at Mogado, on the banks of a
river near Cape St. Augustine, the revolutionary forces occupying the
other bank.
On reaching Bahia, we received information that the rebel Government at
Pernambuco was in immediate expectation of several fast sailing vessels,
ordered by the revolutionary President from North America, and also of
two steamers from England. I therefore wrote to the Minister of Marine
to send me some superior sailing vessels, as, if the anticipated
expedition from Lisbon, or those expected from England and America, made
their appearance, four at least of our force would, from their bad
sailing, run the risk of being captured on the first appearance of the
enemy.
On learning the panic which had been created in Pernambuco, by the show
of bombardment, and its anticipated repetition in earnest on my return,
General Lima pushed forward towards the capital with no more formidable
opposition than a few desultory skirmishes; and on the 11th of
September, with the co-operation of the naval officers and seamen there
left, took possession of the city, Carvalho retreating into the
suburbs, where, breaking down the bridge which united them, he
entrenched himself. On the following day, it was said that General Lima
found in the treasury 400,000 dollars; perhaps the same which Carvalho
had offered to me as a bribe to join the republican party.
The _Piranga_ arriving at this juncture with a convoy bringing eight
hundred additional troops, preparations were made to attack Carvalho;
but the insurgent president, making his escape on a fishing raft, took
refuge on board the British corvette _Tweed_, and afterwards got to sea.
During the interval which elapsed between my departure for Bahia and my
return to Pernambuco, the distribution of prize money amongst those
entitled to it took place, the flagship and the _Maria de Gloria_ being
paid at Bahia, and the rest at Pernambuco. As His Imperial Majesty had
left me altogether unfettered by orders or instructions, and as he had
given the 200,000 dollars to be used in furthering the Imperial objects,
I determined not to regard the advances which had been made at Rio de
Janeiro, as forming any portion of the reward, especially to the
flagship, which had, unaided, achieved the more important results of the
late campaign, and was therefore entitled to a share commensurate with
the arduous exertions of the officers and crew, now again under my flag.
The subjoined extracts from the log of my secretary will shew the
periods at which the distribution took place:--
_Sept.10th._ Made distribution of prize money in silver.
_Sept.15th to 16th._ Went on board the _Maria de Gloria_, and paid
prize money.
_Sept. 17th._ Paid Capt. Crosbie, 10,400 dollars in specie. Paid
other officers 5750 dollars.
_Sept. 18th._ Paid Admiral 4750 dollars.
_Sept. 27th._ Paying prize money to the _Paraguassu_ and others.
_Sept. 28th._ Similarly employed.
_Sept. 30th._ Paying prize money.
_Oct. 1st to 5th._ Paying prize money.
The following were the amounts disbursed on these occasions, as far as
they appear in my private memoranda--some doubtless having been lost:--
Dollars.
Disbursements at Rio de Janeiro 70,750
_(Paid Squadron as per account, made up Sept. 23, 1824.)_
To petty officers and seamen of flagship, in classes
numbered A to Y, as per pay books transmitted
by _Piranha_ 18,289
Paid Captain Crosbie 10,400
" Captain-Lieutenants Carvalho, Grenfell, and
Shepherd, 2250 dollars each 6,750
" Capt. Grenfell, on account of captures at Parà 2,750
" Seven Lieutenants, at 1500 dollars each 10,500
" Two Lieutenants at 1000 dollars each 2,000
" Six Lieutenants at 750 dollars each 4,500
" Lieutenant Ross as prize master 500
" _Maria de Gloria_ 2,483
" _Nitherohy, Carolina,_ and _Paraguassu_, no
account, say the same 7,500
" Brig _Bahia_ 274
" Officers and men of the _Piranga_ 7,053
" Mr. Dean, purser 600
" Lieutenant Ayre 480
" Florencia José da Costa 140
" Gratifications to artisans 419
" To Admiral 4,750
" Secretary, for distribution 5,000
" May and Lukin, prize agents, as per balance
of account, July 15, 1824 5,324
------
160,462
Original amount 200,000
------
Balance to be accounted for 39,538
======
The above were not the whole amounts paid, but they are all that a
search amongst my numerous papers at present furnish; and as the
original accounts, as has been previously stated, were sent to Rio de
Janeiro, a more precise balance cannot here be drawn; but even this is
sufficient to carry conviction to any reasonable mind, that the sums
above stated were disbursed in ordinary routine, and should make the
Brazilian administration ashamed to say, that "the First Admiral never
sent in his accounts of the 200,000 dollars entrusted to him," thus
inducing an unworthy inference that they were not disbursed; though any
man possessed of common understanding could never believe that a
squadron, constituted as the Brazilian Marine was, would obey orders and
cheerfully act in unison with me, knowing that their prize money was on
board--of which I unwarrantably held possession!
These explanations are more humiliating to the Brazilian administration
than to myself--though for so many years the subject of unmerited
obloquy from their denial of accounts which must unquestionably have
been in the possession of the Administration of 1825. But I must carry
these explanations yet farther. With the exception of 4750 dollars for
my own necessities, I took none as my share, though entitled to an
eighth in all cases, and to a fourth in the absence of other ships
whenever important services were performed by the flagship alone.
Neither had I received from the Imperial Government a single dollar of
the customary emoluments due to me, though, had these been honestly paid
according to the usages of nations and the stipulations of the Emperor's
decree of December 11, 1822, my share ought to have been more than
double the whole amount entrusted to me to man the ships and satisfy the
officers and men. Still I did not appropriate the 39,000 dollars which
remained, after paying the men, but determined to withhold it till I saw
what course the prize tribunal at Rio de Janeiro intended to pursue;
and, if that course were not satisfactory, then to appropriate it as a
right, although it was wholly inadequate to the services rendered, for
which I had been loaded with Imperial honours and national thanks,
without a shilling of emolument, notwithstanding the capture of a
hundred and twenty _bona fide_ enemy's ships--the expulsion of their
fleet and army--and the annexation of more than one half the empire. But
more of this in another place.
On my return to Pernambuco, I found General Lima in quiet possession of
the city, and as the _Piranga_ had brought me instructions from His
Imperial Majesty, that, as soon as order was restored, a force should
proceed to Parà, and depose the, General-at-Arms there nominated, I
applied to General Lima for a small military detachment to effect that
object; but he declined--on the ground, that in the present state of
affairs in Pernambuco, it was not practicable to diminish his force.
It was not at Parà only that irregularities prevailed: even at Maranham
serious disturbances had broken out, with the avowed intention, on the
part of the insurgents, of deposing the Governor acting under the
authority of His Imperial Majesty--to whom this new attempt at
revolution was as yet unknown. In short, the order to depose the
General-at-Arms at Parà had unexpectedly resolved itself into the
necessity of tranquillizing the whole of the Northern provinces, which
were only waiting the result of Carvalho's measures at Pernambuco,
openly to declare against the Imperial authority.
The dissatisfaction in the Northern provinces originated solely in the
anti-Brazilian system of Government pursued at Rio de Janeiro, which in
the estimation of all at a distance was Portuguese rather than
Brazilian. As they were either ignorant, or did not believe, that the
patriotic intentions of the Emperor were overruled or thwarted by the
Portuguese faction in the administration, which, holding in reality the
reins of power, left to His Majesty little more than nominal authority.
It was not, then, to be wondered at, that the inhabitants of these
distant provinces, who, only a year before, had welcomed me as their
liberator from Portuguese oppression, and as the representative of
constitutional authority, should now be dissatisfied with what they
rightly considered an unnational system of government--preferring to
submit to a bad government of their own choosing rather than to one thus
arbitrarily imposed upon them.
To avert revolution required able presidents, well skilled in the
management of public affairs; but, in place of these, men of an opposite
character had, for the most part, been chosen by the administration.
It was no less essential that the Generals-at-Arms, or military
commandants, should be temperate and unprejudiced; but those placed in
this responsible position used their authority in the most obnoxious and
arbitrary manner. It was, no doubt, difficult to find proper men; or, if
they existed amongst the Brazilians, the jealousy of the Portuguese
party in the administration prevented their elevation to power; the aim
of that faction being disorder, as auxiliary to their anti-imperial
views. This had been strikingly evinced by the instructions given to
disembark General Lima's force at Alagoas, instead of near the seat of
disturbance; thus entailing loss of time and a difficult and tedious
march, which might have ended in failure, had it not been for the
distraction caused by the threatened bombardment of Pernambuco by water,
and the demonstration made to shew how easily it would be effected, when
means for a destructive attack were complete; the result was,
that--knowing my return from Bahia, with everything in readiness for an
attack in earnest, could not be delayed beyond a few days, no serious
opposition was offered to the occupation of the city by the force under
General Lima.
The reports of increased disaffection in the Northern provinces becoming
daily more precise, it was necessary to take advantage of the panic
which the recovery of Pernambuco had occasioned; the more so, as serious
commotions had arisen, whilst a strong disposition to revolt was almost
universally manifested. As General Lima had refused me a military
detachment--and as the _Pedro Primeiro_ and _Piranga_ could render him
no further assistance, I considered it more in conformity with His
Majesty's interests to visit the Northern ports with these ships; taking
also the _Cacique_ and _Atalanta_, for the performance of services to
which the larger vessels were not adapted. The mere presence of these
off the disaffected ports would, I knew, suffice to restore order, by
affording inferential demonstration that, if force were required, it was
ready to be applied.
Accordingly, leaving at Pernambuco the remainder of the squadron, we
sailed on the 10th of October for Rio Grande do Norte, where great
confusion prevailed amongst the inhabitants, threatened by the
insurgents in the adjacent province of Cearà, on account of their
abandonment of revolutionary designs in consequence of events at
Pernambuco.
Arriving off the Rio Grande on the 12th, I requested information from
the President, relative to the state of the maritime towns and provinces
between Rio Grande and Parà, especially with regard to Cearà. The
nature of the reply determined me at once to proceed to the latter
place, though regretting the necessity of going farther to leeward, on
account of the time which would be occupied in getting back to Rio de
Janeiro; yet feeling assured that it would not be satisfactory to His
Majesty, were we to return without ascertaining more particularly the
condition of the North, and without contributing to the restoration of
tranquillity.
Arriving off Cearà on the 18th, I sent a communication to the President,
requiring him to make known my arrival for the purpose of restoring
order, and promising that all disaffected persons who, within fourteen
days, should return to their allegiance, would be permitted to retire
quietly to their homes, and would not in any way be molested on account
of their previous acts or opinions.
A deputation of the inhabitants came off to the flagship, asking me to
land as large a force as I could spare, but as General Lima had declined
to supply a military detachment, it was out of my power to comply; for
the roadstead being unsafe, and the flagship nearly aground, I could not
dispense with the English seamen, whilst the Portuguese portion of the
crews was not to be trusted. Besides which, the foreign seamen were not
adapted to garrisoning a town.
The application was, therefore, evaded; but with an assurance to the
President that, should the insurgents advance, we would render effectual
assistance; reminding him, however, that the inhabitants ought to be
induced to adopt amongst themselves, measures for their own protection
and preservation of tranquillity, which results were perfectly within
their power; and would render unnecessary the presence of military.
I however landed a small detachment for the purpose of ascertaining the
means of defence, as well as in the hope of exciting the authorities on
shore to some degree of activity in their own cause. In case of attack,
I promised to disembark for their assistance the whole of the men who
could be spared; at the same time giving permission to withdraw to the
ships in case of sudden emergency, which might not admit of
communication with me in time.
This offer produced the best effect in the city, giving confidence to
the well-affected, whilst, as the discontented were ignorant of the
extent of aid that could be afforded, they deemed it wisest to keep
quiet. On the following day, the inhabitants returned to their
allegiance, the officiating President hoisting the Imperial flag on the
ramparts with his own hands, amidst every demonstration of general
satisfaction.
I next caused despatches to be sent to all quarters of the province,
announcing the return of the city to its allegiance, promising oblivion
of the past to all who followed the example, and this was succeeded by a
general acknowledgment of the Imperial authority. Confidential agents,
entrusted with similar despatches, were likewise sent to the
revolutionary forces headed by Bizarra, the rebel General-at-Arms, the
whole of whose troops abandoned him; whilst, by similar agency, the
_corps_, under the immediate command of the revolutionary president,
Araripe, was reduced to a hundred men--even the Indians, without
exception, abandoning his standard.
As one of the first steps towards the pacification of the province, I
had published not only a general amnesty, but also a particular amnesty,
offering to the insurgent leaders themselves especial pardon, from
which, in ordinary general amnesty, they might otherwise imagine
themselves excluded, I had, in my own mind, determined upon this as a
general course to be pursued, as I could not but see that, in the outset
of the revolt, both insurgents and leaders had good cause to be
dissatisfied with the central Government at Rio de Janeiro. I had even
addressed a letter personally to the revolutionary president, Araripe,
remonstrating upon the folly of the course he was pursuing, and
promising my protection to _himself_, as well as to the other
revolutionary leaders, if they would return to their allegiance. He
chose rather to withdraw into the interior, with the discontented who
adhered to him, intending, no doubt, to wait till the naval force had
retired. Foreseeing the danger of this, I issued a proclamation,
offering a reward for his capture, sufficient to induce the Indians who
had previously been his supporters to proceed in quest of him, the
result being that he himself was killed, and the whole of his followers
captured. The Indian chiefs, as well as their dependants, were of great
service in the restoration of order, combining superior bodily strength
and activity, with energy, docility, and unfailing power of endurance
--forming, indeed, the best specimens of the native race I had seen in
South America.
Previous to this I had succeeded, without much trouble, in restoring
tranquillity to the province of Parahyba, which had also been disturbed
by the mandates of Araripe; the inhabitants complying with his orders,
from the immediate danger to which they were exposed by his violence,
and being under the impression that Rio de Janeiro was too far distant
to afford them succour. Their delight at finding a squadron at hand was,
therefore, immediately followed by a repudiation of the insurgent chief,
and a return to unqualified allegiance.
My next endeavour was to organise an effective force at Cearà, and this
was accomplished by the embodiment of more than a thousand men, though
we had not a soldier in the squadron. Various _corps_ were also raised
in the towns and villages of the province, and were active in pursuit of
the scattered remains of the republican army.
Having thus assured myself of the complete restoration of order in the
capital and province of Cearà, and addressed a proclamation to the
inhabitants, pointing out to them the folly of being misled by designing
persons, who could have no accurate knowledge of matters which formed
the ground of complaint against the Imperial Government, we sailed on
the 4th of November for Maranham, which province was found in a state of
even greater anarchy than had prevailed at Cearà.
CHAPTER IX.
ARRIVAL AT MARANHAM--CHARACTER OF DISTURBANCES THERE--I ASSUME THE
MILITARY COMMAND--PROCLAMATION COMMANDING SURRENDER OF ARMS--CONDITION
OF THE PEOPLE--CORRUPTION OF THE AUTHORITIES--MURDEROUS
PROPENSITIES--DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING ASSASSINS--LETTER TO MINISTER OF
MARINE--PACIFICATION OF PARAHYBA--DOUBTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S
SINCERITY--HE ESTABLISHES SECRET AGENCIES--EXTRAORDINARY
MEMORIALS--PUBLIC COMPLAINTS OF THE PRESIDENT--BRUCE ENDEAVOURS TO
INTERCEPT THEM--MY REPLY TO THE MEMORIALISTS--LETTER TO THE MINISTER OF
MARINE--ENCLOSING COMPLAINTS OF THE CONSULS--BRUCE PREPARES TO RESIST MY
AUTHORITY--COMPLAINTS OF THE BRITISH CONSUL--HE CONSIDERS MY PRESENCE
NECESSARY--LETTER OF THE FRENCH CONSUL--DETAILING SHAMEFUL
ATROCITIES--DANGER OF COLLISION WITH FOREIGN STATES--SUSPENSION OF THE
PRESIDENT--PROVISION FOR FUTURE GOVERNMENT--CONDUCT OF THE FACTION AT
RIO DE JANEIRO--NO INSTRUCTIONS SENT FOB MY GUIDANCE--LETTER TO THE
MINISTER OF MARINE--THE MINISTRY HAD PREVIOUSLY DEPOSED BRUCE--BUT
TURNED ON ME FOR ANTICIPATING THEIR OWN ACT.
We arrived at Maranham on the 9th of November, and ascertained that the
city and province--as had been reported--were in a complete state of
anarchy, arising from causes almost incomprehensible. The leaders of the
army had risen against the authority of the president, Miguel Bruce, and
fighting was going on when we entered the river. The strangest part of
the affair was, that both parties declared themselves supporters of the
Imperial authority, whilst each accused the other of plotting to form a
republic. Bruce kept possession of the city by means of negro troops,
from amongst whom he had also picked his officers, conferring upon them
regular commissions; the result being, that their excesses kept the
respectable inhabitants in a state of constant terror, so that my
arrival was hailed with the greatest satisfaction, and addresses of
congratulation were sent in from all quarters, even the ladies adopting
the unusual course of sending a deputation to welcome me.
I immediately demanded from the president a report of the condition of
the province; but before this was presented, memorials from every part
put me in possession of the causes of disorder universally prevailing.
The general complaint was, that the president had established an
autocracy, refusing the co-operation of a council, as required by the
constitution, and that under his individual authority, military
disorders of all kind prevailed, even to murder, whilst outrages of the
most revolting nature were committed amidst cheers of "Long live His
Imperial Majesty;" thus using the Imperial name as a sanction to the
perpetration of acts the most unlawful and injurious.
The President Bruce was the same individual whom, on the expulsion of
the Portuguese in the previous year, I had temporarily appointed
President to the first provisional Junta under the Empire, which body
was quickly superseded by a Government elected by the people. Possessing
influence amongst the Portuguese, of which faction--as afterwards
appeared--he was a prominent supporter, he had contrived to get himself
reinstated as head of the provincial Government, and was apparently
following the policy of the Portuguese faction in power at Rio de
Janeiro, viz. that of keeping his province in a state of confusion with
a view to disgust the populace with the Imperial rule, and so dispose
them, should opportunity offer, to favour the views of the mother
country. This policy, as has been said, was marked out by the agents of
Portugal; but Bruce, with every disposition to favour the views of the
parent state, was not the man to be entrusted with political strategy of
this nature. The fact being that, though possessed of a certain amount
of cunning, Bruce was unfit to be entrusted with authority at all--much
less to exercise that which recognises no control--so that the disorder
which prevailed was rather a natural consequence of his own want of
capacity, and arbitrary system of government. Finding every one against
him, he was gradually throwing himself on the black population for
support, promoting emancipated slaves to the rank of officers; and it
was generally acknowledged that had it not been for our opportune
arrival, both himself and the whites who remained in the city might
speedily have fallen a sacrifice to the force which had been organised
for his especial protection.
On the other hand, the opponents of the president were not only in arms
against him, but there were two or three family parties fighting each
other under the Imperial flag! and carrying their revengeful animosities
to an outrageous extent, which threatened the extermination of one, at
least, of the contending parties, if not the total ruin of the province.
To deal with these parties was, from their mutual recriminations, more
difficult than had they declared themselves inimical to the Imperial
Government. In one thing, however, they were all agreed, viz. in
opposition to the president; but as his was the constituted authority,
this was precisely what I did not intend to sanction.
It was clear to me that the first remedy was the appointment of a proper
military authority, and as none could be trusted, I apprised the
president of my intention to assume the chief military command during my
stay, or at least until order was restored, issuing a proclamation to
that effect.
As hostilities were still going on, I sent an order to both parties to
lay down their arms, with which mandate the anti-president party
immediately complied, and dispersed; but as the savage blacks under the
authority of the president attacked their now unarmed adversaries, and
committed great excesses, I seized and put them on board some vessels,
anchoring these under the guns of the flagship, and retained the whole
as prisoners, thus keeping them out of the way of further mischief.
The surrender of the arms was effected by the following proclamation,
which also explains my motives for this measure:--
Whereas, it is essential to the interests of the empire in general
and to the province of Maranham in particular, to put an end to
all public disturbances, whether arising from the contentions of
individuals, or from other causes; and whereas, the Constitution
has provided not only for the administration of justice in civil cases,
but also for the summary trial of military offences.
Be it henceforth known that--all persons armed, or commanding
or acting with men in arms, or aiding and assisting any body of
armed men in the support or defence of any persons assuming or
pretending to authority as chieftains, or attempting to alter the
Constitution by force--are hereby subject to military jurisdiction
and shall be tried by military law accordingly. But this regulation
is not intended to prohibit individuals from meeting together unarmed,
for the purpose of uniting in an application for the redress
of grievances, or petitioning His Imperial Majesty on points connected
with public or private interests.
And whereas, military arms and ammunition have been obtained,
by numerous individuals on the pretext of using them for private
defence--it being essential to public tranquillity and general good
that people should have recourse to the protection of the laws, and
not to violence for their security--notice is hereby given, that all
persons in possession of such military arms are to deliver them up
to the chief military officers in their respective districts, to be
deposited in the public armoury. Whoever shall be found in
possession of arms after the termination of this present month of
November, shall be judged according to military law.
Given on board the _Pedro Primiero_ this 12th day of November,
1824.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
This proclamation is adduced in order to shew the condition of the
province on my arrival, which it does more fully than would pages of
description. To these difficulties were now added the chagrin of Bruce,
at having his military authority superseded, though his civil authority
was not only uninterfered with, but supported. Still, having the orders
of His Imperial Majesty to use my discretion in tranquillizing the
disturbed provinces, it was not my intention to permit His Majesty's
views to be frustrated by undue deference to a Governor, whose folly and
despotism combined, had been the chief cause of the disturbances, though
I well knew that the course I was pursuing, even though approved by His
Majesty, would bring down upon me the indignation of the Portuguese
faction in power at Rio de Janeiro.
The proclamation had the effect of procuring the surrender of arms to a
great extent, followed by the disbandment of all irregular forces
collected by the contending chieftains, so that apparent tranquillity
was everywhere enforced.
The great point was to establish permanent order, which, had we gone
away, would soon have been broken. As, since the reduction of
Pernambuco, there was no other field for my active services, and as I
had no instructions how to dispose of the squadron, I determined to
remain at Maranham, and employ myself in consolidating the good already
produced, till further commands from His Imperial Majesty; for having in
the preceding year expelled the Portuguese from the province, its
welfare was a matter of interest to me, and I felt assured that were His
Majesty acquainted with the want of unity existing, authority would be
given to carry out my views.
In Maranham, as in the other Northern provinces of the empire, there had
been no amelioration whatever in the condition of the people, and
without such amelioration, it was absurd to place reliance on the
hyperbolical professions of devotion to the Emperor which were now
abundantly avowed by those who before my arrival had been foremost in
promoting and cherishing disturbance.
The condition of the province--and indeed of all the provinces--was in
no way better than they had been under the dominion of Portugal, though
they presented one of the finest fields imaginable for improvement. All
the old colonial imposts and duties remained without alteration--the
manifold hindrances to commerce and agriculture still existed--and
arbitrary power was everywhere exercised uncontrolled; so that in place
of being benefited by emancipation from the Portuguese yoke, the
condition of the great mass of the population was literally worse than
before.
To amend this state of things it was necessary to begin with the
officers of Government, of whose corruption and arbitrary conduct,
complaints--signed by whole communities--were daily arriving from every
part of the province; to such an extent, indeed, was this misrule
carried, that neither the lives nor property of the inhabitants were
safe, where revenge, or baser motives, existed for the exercise of acts
of oppression[1].
[Footnote 1: Numerous original, but lengthy, documents are in my
possession proving all these facts.]
I therefore addressed a letter to the president, warning him that such
things ought not to be tolerated; that reports of excesses committed by
those under his authority were reaching me from all quarters, the
perpetrators deserving the most severe and exemplary chastisement; that
I had determined to investigate these matters; and under the reservation
made--of personally acting under extraordinary circumstances--would
visit these cases with severe punishment, should the reality come up to
the representations made.
The recklessness of human life was amongst the more remarkable features
of these excesses. Only a short time before this, I had granted a
passport to Captain Pedro Martins, as the bearer of an offer from an
insurgent party to lay down their arms, but he was murdered on his
return. This atrocious act, perpetrated, as I had reason to believe, by
some factious adherents to the president's party, from motives of
revenge, was unfortunate, as affording a pretext for others who were
ready to submit, to continue in arms for their mutual protection. I
therefore directed that all troops under the authority of the president
should remain where they were until further orders from me; and demanded
of His Excellency to use every endeavour to apprehend the parties guilty
of an act so disgraceful to the Imperial cause, that they might meet
with due punishment.
Finding no effort made to apprehend the murderers, I addressed to Bruce
the following letter:--
It is with great regret that I have learned the atrocious act committed
by your soldiers against an officer having my passport
for the purpose of endeavouring to tranquillize the province, by
inducing the dissentient party to lay down their arms. This is
a matter so disgraceful to the cause of those by whom it has been
perpetrated, that I must enforce on your attention the necessity of
exertion to apprehend all persons who may be suspected of having
committed this crime, and send them immediately, prisoners, to this
city.
I have further to direct, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, that
the troops under your command shall remain where they are until
further orders from me, as Commander-in-chief of the military and
naval forces of this province, notwithstanding any authority or order
which you may heretofore have received, or which you may hereafter
receive--except from me--to the contrary.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ
It is almost needless to say that the guilty parties--though doubtless
well known--were permitted to escape with impunity; the president
alleging as his excuse, "the insufficiency of the regular troops to
preserve the tranquillity of the city;" this remark being intended to
throw upon me the responsibility of having secured on board the black
savages whom he had organized. My reply was, that--"for what I had done,
I was responsible to the supreme Government and the public, and if he
could not find means to preserve the public tranquillity, I must do so;
as he must be sensible that I had acted with propriety in relieving him
from a portion of the labour and responsibility which he had hitherto
sustained."
On the 28th of November, I forwarded to the Minister of Marine, at Rio
de Janeiro, a full report of these transactions, from which the
subjoined are extracts:--
The completion of the task of tranquillizing Cearà in a manner
I trust satisfactory to His Imperial Majesty, was, in a great
measure, effected by the pardon promulgated in the name of His
Majesty--consigning to oblivion those occurrences which would
otherwise have agitated the public mind. The only exception
made was the intrusive President Araripe, and this, because,
instead of availing himself of the first proclamation of amnesty, in
which he was included, he retired into the interior with a band of
robbers, in order to excite further disturbance. The consequence
of this obstinate perseverance in disobedience on the part of
Araripe, has been his death, and the capture of all his followers.
The restoration of Cearà to its allegiance and tranquillity having
been thus accomplished, we proceeded to Parahyba, where all was
tranquil, the inhabitants having unanimously declared His Imperial
Majesty Constitutional Emperor, the moment that they became free
from the terror of their more powerful and military neighbours at
Cearà. Some dissensions, however, remained in the province. With
respect to Maranham, things are different: no republican flag has
been displayed--nor, as far as I can learn, did any intention exist
on the part of the inhabitants of raising the standard of rebellion;
the state of civil war in which we found the presidency arising
from personal animosities amongst some of the principal families,
especially between those families and that of His Excellency the
President. Certain it is, that all were united against the President,
who, to protect himself, had recourse to the assistance of the lowest
classes of the community, even to emancipated slaves. The result
has been, military disorders of all kinds--and there is no outrage
which has not been perpetrated.
The general complaint against the President is, that the constitution
has in no way been put in practice; that he has not
established any lawful council; and that he has been guilty of
arbitrary acts. The original documents relating to these matters
are enclosed for the judgment of His Imperial Majesty.
I humbly hope that His Imperial Majesty will perceive that,
although I had no express authority to interfere in internal disputes,
yet it became my duty--on finding the province in a state of civil
war--without any General-at-Arms, or other military officer of
sufficient authority or capacity, to restore public peace--to take
upon myself powers which I trust have been used for the benefit of
His Imperial service. In order that the Imperial Government may
judge of my proceedings, I have the honour to enclose copies of
proclamations, and other documents relative to my transactions.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
On the 4th of December I was not a little surprised at receiving from
President Bruce a letter requiring me to banish certain persons
obnoxious to himself, amongst others Francisco de Moraes, who had been
the first to set the example of submission to the proclamation issued on
my arrival. This most unreasonable request I refused--writing to Bruce
that dissensions were not likely to be healed by punishing those who had
laid down their arms on the faith of a proclamation issued in the name
of His Imperial Majesty; further assuring him that, if he did his duty,
he would not find me remiss in endeavours to relieve the province and
himself from the miseries and difficulties with which he had been
surrounded.
On the 5th of December I had the satisfaction of receiving a deputy from
Parahyba, assuring me of the perfect pacification of the town and
province. On receipt of this gratifying intelligence I transmitted to
Parahyba a general amnesty, coupled with advice as to the folly "of
rebelling under erroneous impressions of circumstances with regard to
His Imperial Majesty, which could not come within the sphere of their
personal knowledge, and hoping that, for the future, they would duly
appreciate the beneficence of a sovereign who desired that his authority
--limited by the Constitution--should be felt by his people only through
the exercise of justice and benevolence."
It was a vexatious task to be thus constantly exhorting the disaffected
in the Northern provinces to confidence in the Imperial Government,
because I knew that they had but too good reason to be dissatisfied--not
with the Emperor--but with his administration, whose hopes were founded
on anarchy and intrigue. It was therefore my practice to exhort them to
rely on His Imperial Majesty--it not being within the scope of my duty
to draw the distinction between the Imperial wishes and the sinister
practices of those by whom His Majesty was surrounded.
During the period of my absence I had been pressing upon the Department
of Marine at Rio de Janeiro the necessity of a speedy adjudication of
the prizes belonging to the squadron, according to the written order of
His Imperial Majesty. On the 5th of December I received an evasive reply
from the Auditor of Marine, stating that "he did not consider himself in
possession of all the laws and regulations whereon his judgment should
be founded in regard to seizures made or vessels captured by the naval
forces of Brazil." A miserable subterfuge!--as though it were any part
of my duty to supply an official with "laws and regulations" on such a
subject. It was quite evident to me that, despite His Majesty's orders,
no adjudication was intended, nor was any afterwards made; but in order
to prevent complaint of neglect on my part. I transmitted, on the same
date, to the auditor the whole of my documents, with a request that they
might be returned.
From the state of the province on my first arrival, I had entertained
suspicions as to the President's sincerity; and as outbreaks were again
of frequent occurrence, notwithstanding the general desire for
pacification, an investigation into the causes of these elicited the
fact that he was secretly sending agents to promote disturbance, for the
purpose of revenging himself upon those now disarmed, who, before my
arrival, had opposed his arbitrary authority.
To such an extent was this carried, that memorials reached me begging my
interference, as the memorialists could not now defend themselves. Two
of these memorials, signed by upwards of three hundred of the
respectable inhabitants of the province, were of such a nature as to
render hopeless the perfect restoration of order so long as the
President was permitted to exercise the autocracy, which, contrary to
all the principles of the constitution, he had irresponsibly assumed.
In order to account for a step which I subsequently considered it my
duty to adopt, it is necessary to give some extracts from one of these
memorials, signed by a hundred and fifty-two of the most respectable
inhabitants in a distant part of the province:--
"That the most demoralizing excesses are permitted amongst
the soldiery, and, in order to preserve his influence with the troops,
the President permits them to murder with impunity--even Europeans;
the perpetrators of these acts being not only unpunished,
but rewarded, whilst military commandants and others attempting to
repress these disorders are dismissed; so that absolute authority is
established--the public money being squandered on the soldiery, in
order to support a criminal despotism.
"Your Excellency must have witnessed the state to which the
province was reduced on your arrival, the people being compelled
to have recourse to arms in order to ward off a multitude of vexations.
Your Excellency must also have observed how quickly they
laid down their arms at your summons, of which circumstance the
party of the President availed themselves to sack and plunder the
towns and villages everywhere in the country; the tears, desolation,
and misery of so many villages and estates, accompanied by the
blood of the murdered and wounded, remaining eternal monuments
of these crimes.
"The President and his followers, convinced of the abhorrence
with which such atrocities were viewed, availed themselves of the
false pretext that such acts were necessary for the Imperial service,
the people being in rebellion against him.
"At the present moment he has given out that he has three thousand
men ready to support him in the Presidency against the measures of
your Excellency, and it is a fact that, in various parts of the
province, he has troops, militia, and arms; whilst the commandants,
appointed by himself, are all ready to execute his measures.
"If your Excellency should unhappily quit the province, whilst
matters are in this state, it will be totally desolated--its commerce
annihilated--and its agriculture abandoned; confiscation and terror
will be everywhere established, accompanied by rebellion towards
the Emperor. If you will remain, we, the undersigned, undertake
to support the squadron, in the absence of funds from the Imperial
treasury.
"To terminate these evils, we beg to represent to your Excellency
that there is only one remedy. President Bruce must be deposed
and sent to Rio de Janeiro, with his coadjutors, who are well known,
in order that his acts may be lawfully investigated, and punished
as justice demands; and that, in the interim, there should be
elected by your Excellency, from amongst the more respectable
inhabitants of this province, a person to represent to His Imperial
Majesty the horrible state of things here existing, and to implore
His Imperial Majesty's interposition for its salvation--your Excellency,
in the meantime, assuming the civil and military government
of the province, until His Imperial Majesty's pleasure can
become known. And we further beg of your Excellency that you will
name able magistrates, of known probity, to the respective districts,
and cause oaths to be taken, in order that the respective Camaras
may proceed to the work of saving the province from tumult and
anarchy, by observing faithful obedience to His Imperial Majesty
and by the administration of laws for the government of the people.
"Maranhaõ, Dec. 11, 1824."
Signed by one hundred and fifty-two
of the principal inhabitants of the province.
A similar document, signed by upwards of a hundred and fifty of the
respectable inhabitants of Alcantara--upon whom excesses had been
committed in no way less reprehensible than at Maranham--had been
forwarded to me on the 6th of December; but, as the complaints were of
the same nature, it is unnecessary to do more than advert to the
circumstance. In addition to these, I received a statistic list of the
murders and robberies perpetrated throughout the province, under the
agency of those placed in authority by the President. The whole of these
documents were retained by me as a justification of any contingency that
might arise, and are still in my possession.
The Maranham memorial reached me on the 14th of December, and had
scarcely been placed in my hands, when a letter arrived from President
Bruce, deprecating its reception, thus shewing that he had previously
been made aware of the contents, and--as I had afterwards reason to
believe--had attempted to intercept the memorial, but had failed in so
doing. After glancing at the contents, I made him the following reply:--
SIR,
I have this moment been honoured with the receipt
of your Excellency's letter, and have to state that the document to
which you allude had not been delivered to me five minutes previous
to your Excellency's communication, and that I have not yet had
time to read it.
Your Excellency may, however, rest assured that if the said paper
contains any thing injurious to the interests or dignity of his Imperial
Majesty, I shall not fail to take such steps as the occasion may
require. All papers that have been presented to me, it is my intention
to transmit to Rio de Janeiro, where the Imperial government
will judge of the motives of the writers, and of the contents of their
communications.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
Dec. 14, 1824.
My reply to the memorialists was as follows:--
Maranham, Dec. 18,1834.
GENTLEMEN,
I have read your memorial with attention, and
regret that you should have occasion to detail complaints of so painful
a nature, the more so as I do not know whether I am authorised
to remedy the evils otherwise than by such measures as have been
already adopted.
According to the Constitution, you ought to find a remedy in the
laws; but if any authority, commissioned by His Imperial Majesty,
has improperly placed obstacles in the way of law, to His
Majesty only can an appeal against such conduct be made, for they
who attempt to redress evils arising from a breach of the Constitution,
by violating that very Constitution place themselves in an
equally disadvantageous position with the object of their accusation.
As regards the deposition of the President, which you request, I
frankly confess to you, Gentlemen, that whatever may be my private
opinion as to the course most advantageous to you and the province
in general--and even to the President himself--I should feel extremely
reluctant, except in a case of manifest and extreme necessity,
to take upon myself a responsibility which might possibly subject
me to the displeasure of His Imperial Majesty, and would most
certainly expose me to be continually harassed by prejudicial reports
and false accusations, supported by artful intrigues, against which
neither prudence nor rectitude could effectually avail.
To mention an instance of this, within your own knowledge, you
all know that, last year, when this province was annexed to the
empire, the property of Brazilians under the flag of Portugal, and of
all resident Portuguese, was by me respected and unmolested. You
know, too, that all the public property of the Portuguese Government
in the arsenals and magazines was left untouched, and it is
equally true that upwards of sixty contos of reis (60,000 dollars) in
specie, and one hundred and forty contos (140,000 dollars) in bills
taken in the Portuguese treasury and custom house, were left by
me in the hands of the Government of Maranham, for the payment
of the army. Yet, notwithstanding these notorious facts, it has
been audaciously declared by the Portuguese authorities composing
the prize tribunal at Rio de Janeiro, that that very army--which I
had thus left the means to pay--_had served disinterestedly at their
own expense, and that I was a mercenary and a robber!_ I may add,
too, that the Junta of Maranham contributed in no small degree to
this calumny, for, after they had secured the money, they refused to
give me a receipt, though the sum I had so lent for the use of the
army was, and still is, the indisputable property of the officers and
men of the ships of war who were instrumental in freeing this
province from a colonial yoke.
In short, great as is my desire to render you every service in my
power, I am not willing to interfere in matters over which I have
no express authority--because I do not like to risk the displeasure
of His Imperial Majesty, attended, as it might be, not only with
sudden dismissal from my official situation, but even with heavy
fines and imprisonment; not to mention the sacrifice of all those
pecuniary interests which I possess at Rio de Janeiro, where I have
enemies _eagerly watching for a pretence to deprive me of all to which
I have a claim_. Neither am I disposed to afford to those persons
any opportunity of giving plausibility to those calumnies which
they are ever so ready to utter, nor to be under the necessity of
placing myself on my defence before the world against their false
accusations.
I have the honour, GENTLEMEN,
&c. &c.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
The memorial of the inhabitants of Maranham was, together with other
complaints, forwarded by me to the Imperial Government, accompanied by
the following letter to the Minister of Marine:--
December 16th, 1824.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
My letters 278-279, will have acquainted your
Excellency of our proceedings here up to their respective dates, and
will also have afforded the Imperial Government such information
as I could collect regarding the origin and progress of the disputes
which have so unhappily prevailed.
It was my hope that--by taking their implements of war from
the hands of the contending parties, and removing the most disorderly
portion of the military--the public mind would have
subsided into tranquillity. It appears, however, that--from the
constant alarm occasioned by the "_Pedestres_," and other irregular
troops lately maintained by the President--the public still continue
in dread of being exposed to outrages, similar to those lately committed
on their persons and property. The terror excited is
universal, and as the people must be well acquainted with the
character and conduct of persons with whom they have been bred
up, I cannot bring myself to believe--however desirous to support a
President nominated by His Imperial Majesty--that all the
respectable portion of the population, without exception, entertain
fears that are groundless. Indeed, from all that I have seen or
heard, there is but little reason to hope that his Excellency the
President has any intention to govern this province on any other
system than that of the Captains-General, under the old Portuguese
government; that is to say, rather according to his own will than
in conformity with the dictates of justice or equity.
Certain it is, that, up to the present moment, the Constitution
has never been put in practice, and even military law has not been
adhered to. Numerous persons have been banished without accuser
or declared crime--others have been thrown into gaol--and the
greater portion of the principal people who remained had--previous
to our arrival--fled to the woods, to avoid being the objects of the
like arbitrary proceedings.
The representations which I now enclose to your Excellency as a
sample of the numerous documents of a similar nature addressed to
me, will, at least, lead His Imperial Majesty to the conclusion that
such complaints could not have arisen, and continued under the
government of a person calculated to preside over the interests
of so important a province.
Your Excellency will find a memorial from the French Consul,
marked No. 7, and the other Consuls have only been restrained
from sending similar representations from the consideration that,
on the squadron quitting this port, the consequences might be
highly prejudicial to their interests and those whom they
represent.
I would further state to your Excellency the remarkable fact
that the President--after having continued a _high pay_ to the
soldiery during the existence of those disorders of which they were
the instrument--did, at the moment of my taking the command,
send me an old order respecting the diminution of the pay of the
troops, which order he himself had never put in execution. And it
is still more extraordinary, that he since refused _any pay whatever_,
to the small number of troops of the line, who are continued in
service for the preservation of the tranquillity of the city.
Since my last letters, I have been using all possible diligence to
get the remainder of the firearms out of the hands of the lower
classes of the population. Many, however, have been withheld--a
circumstance which gives additional importance to the extraordinary
fact, which I have only by accident learned--that the
Junta of Fazenda, acting under the President, issued an order
on the 6th of December (an attested copy of which is enclosed),
_authorising the sale of powder, and that too, under the false pretence
that "all motives for suspending the sale of powder had ceased."_
I have not words in which to express the astonishment I felt at this
extraordinary proceeding. I shall only add that, as soon as it
came to my knowledge, I gave orders that such sale should not be
permitted, and I have since directed the whole of the powder in the
magazines at Maranham to be embarked and deposited in a vessel
near the anchorage of the ships-of-war; by which precaution I
consider the security of the white population to be in a great
measure secured, till His Imperial Majesty shall be enabled to
take such steps as in his judgment may appear necessary.
Were I to detail to your Excellency all the facts that lead my
mind to a conclusion that this province will be entirely lost to the
empire unless a speedy remedy be applied to the evils which here
exist--it would be necessary to trespass upon you at very great
length; but as the brother of the Secretary of Government proceeds
to Rio de Janeiro by the same conveyance as this, your Excellency
and colleagues will be able to obtain from him such further information
as may satisfy your minds regarding the state of this
province.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
It was not long before I learned that in many parts troops were being
secretly organised to support the President's authority against me, but
this was met by removing from command those officers who had either
permitted or encouraged military insubordination; supplying their places
with others upon whom I could better rely.
An occurrence, however, now took place which threatened to involve
Brazil in serious difficulties. From the indiscrimination of Bruce's
troops in their career of injury and plunder, some renewed outrages had
been committed on French subjects; for which the French consul required
reparation from me, as having assumed the chief authority; at the same
time again demanding passports for himself and the whole of the French
residents, in case of my intention to quit the city and leave Bruce
again in power. The British consul also forwarded additional complaints
of similar outrages against his countrymen; but, in place of requiring
reparation at my hands, he forwarded representations to his own
government, requesting protection against the acts of Bruce, at the same
time communicating the fact of these representations to me, but
declining to furnish me with a copy of his despatch, as I had no direct
appointment from the Imperial Government for the authority I was
exercising. The demands of the French consul were, however, pressing;
but I could only reply with regard to the outrages committed against
French subjects by the adherents of the President:--"I was sorry that it
was not in my power to remedy past evils; but that such steps had been
taken as would prevent their recurrence for the future."
The subjoined is one of the letters of the British Consul:--
British Consul's Office,
Maranhaõ, Dec. 17, 1824.
My Lord,
Understanding that your Lordship has an intention of soon withdrawing
your presence from this province, I am forced, as the official and
responsible protector of British interests in this quarter, to make
the following statement, leaving it to be proved by the facts therein
set forth that I am, by this course, adopting the only means within
my reach, of providing for the interests confided to my attention, a
satisfactory security! and that I am, by so doing, not departing from
that line of conduct which, as a neutral officer, I am bound to
observe.
By this time your Lordship must be fully aware of the violent
character and desolating effects of the late civil commotions
throughout this province. These commotions unhappily existed during a
protracted period, and whilst they were raging, the regular pursuits
of the community were either interrupted by violent party
intrigues--suspended by a barbarous warfare--or totally stopped by
merciless outrages.
Notwithstanding this disjointed state of society, and the consequent
inefficiency of all constituted authority, the resident British, by
general and firm perseverance in a strictly neutral line of conduct,
and by calm endurance of not a few unavoidable ills--succeeded in
averting from themselves the chief weight of those evils to which all
the remaining population were exposed.
But though they now feel grateful at having escaped outrage
and have passed unhurt amidst general anarchy, still, they recollect,
that while by their conduct they were entitled to protection, they
nevertheless continued in a painful anxiety for their safety.
In this state of uncertain security the resident British continued
for several months, and when at last intrigue attempted to force
them into the general scene of distress--some being openly
threatened--your Lordship's providential arrival averted the destruction
of many inhabitants, and the dangerous condition of all.
Into this critical situation were British interests at this place
thrown by violent party spirit. That spirit, though at present
smothered, cannot be totally extinguished without time. It has
unsettled the community at large, and disorganised all the military
establishments of the province.
After this exposition of facts, I may be allowed to assert, without
thereby offering the least disrespect to any constituted authority,
that your Lordship's presence in this province for the time being is
indispensable for the tranquillity and security of all its inhabitants--
because the only means by which legal control can be revived, and
consequently an occurrence which must be as desirable and needful
to all public functionaries, as I frankly avow it to be to one, who has
the honour to declare himself
Your Lordship's
Most obedient and humble servant,
ROBERT HESKETH,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul.
To the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane,
Marquis of Maranhaõ, Admiral, &c. &c.
The letter of the French Consul is even more precise, and therefore I
subjoin that also:--
Vice Consulate of France at S. Louis de Maragnon,
Monsieur le Marquis, Dec. 4, 1821.
La position difficile dans laquelle je me suis trouvé depuis trois
mois--la délicatesse de celle dans laquelle je suis placé maintenant
vis-à-vis M. le Président de la province de Maragnon, m'imposant le
devoir de porter à la connoissance de votre Excellence les justes
motifs de plainte que j'ai à lui exposer centre la conduite de M. le
Président Bruce envers un Agent de Sa Majesté le Roi de France, et
venir à ce titre reclâmer un appui que je ne puis plus dorénavant
attendre de sa part. La confiance que m'inspire le caractère dont
votre Excellence est revêtue, et la certitude qu'elle n'ignore pas
les intimes relations qui lient la France à l'Empire du Brésil, me
font qu'elle saura apprécier les conséquences graves que doivent
entraîner l'avance faite ici aux sujets de mon Souverain, et le
silence méprisant que garde à cet égard le Président depuis un mois
que je lui ai demandé la participation du résultat d'une enquête
qu'il m'assura avoir été ordonnée par lui. Sans m'entendre sur les
évènements facheux qui ont désolé cette province depuis cinq mois,
pour être hors du but que je me propose je me bornerai à parler de
ceux dont je puis garantir l'authenticité et de l'influence du
Gouvernement de M. Bruce pendant cet intervalle sur le bien-être de
mes nationaux.
Lors des premières armamens faits dans la province, pour opposer des
forces à une expédition supposée de la part du Portugal, un François
établi à Caixas, compris dans une mesure générale fut obligé
d'autorité de délivrer une partie d'armes dont il ne recût jamais la
valeur, malgré un sejour prolongé de plusieurs mois dans le même
endroit. Quelque modique que soit la somme qu'il s'est vu dans la
nécessité de venir reclâmer ici, elle est proportionnée à ses
moyens. C'est un tort évident fait à cet homme qui ne put continuer
à exercer son industrie dans le lieu qu'il avoit choisi, et fut
contraint à un déplacement coûteux qui doit lui retirer toute
confiance à l'avenir.
L'arrivée des troupes envoyées par le Président pour réprimer un
mouvement dans l'intérieur immédiatement après le départ de M. José
Felix Burgos, ne fut signalée dans la ville d'Alcantara que par des
désordres, les Etrangers même n'y furent pas respectés dans cet
endroit, qui n'étoit pas encore le théâtre des hostilités. Un homme
de ma Nation y exerçant paisiblement son commerce fut attaqué chez
lui, eut les portes de sa maison enfoncées par les soldats, fut
temoin deux fois du pillage de sa boutique et forcé pour sauver ses
jours d'aller séjourner dans le bois; ce malheureux n'a d'autre
ressource maintenant que le travail de ses mains, ce fait contre
lequel il eut été de mon devoir de reclâmer vient seulement de
parvenir à ma connoissance.
Les François établis en cette ville avoient joui jusqu'à l'arrivée
dans l'île des troupes armées contre le Président d'une trop grande
sécurité, pour ne pas révailler contre eux toute la haine dont avoit
eut fait preuve déjà les Portugais avant l'adhésion de cette
province a l'Empire du Brésil. Un acte émané _de leur despotique
Junte_ avoit malgré les traités fait fermer les loges Françoises
jusqu'à la reception des ordres précis de leur gouvernement, qui
désapprouvait hautement cette mesure. Ces mêmes Portugais oubliant
la générositie avec laquelle les commandants de trois bâtimens de Sa
Majesté le Roi de France venoient de sauver un grand nombre de leurs
compatriotes lors des derniers troubles du Parà, n'écoutant que leur
jalousie ne s'efforcèrent qu'à nous perdre dans l'opinion publique
_par le plus noires inculpations._ Je les considère comme ayant
influé puissament sur le malhereux évènement que j'ai eu à dèplorer.
Malgré l'avertissement que j'avois donné huit jours auparavant au
Président de la menace qui étoit faite aux François de leur faire
subir le genre d'assassinat usité ici, le 21 Septembre, quatre
François été surpris par des assassins, deux furent très maltraités,
l'un atteint de plusieurs blessures à la tête et au bras fut
reconduit chez lui baigné dans son sang; ses blessures au bras,
fracturé en deux endroits laissent encore douter après 70 jours de
douleurs aigues s'il ne devra par subir l'amputation. Le même jour à
la même heure, un François fut attaqué chez lui malgré le signe de
reconnaisance qui distingue depuis les troubles les maisons des
François; des pierres lancées dans sa porte et ses fenêtres pendant
un long espace de temps, l'obligèrent à venir lui-même dissiper par
des menaces une troupe d'hommes qu'il espéroit ne pas voir échapper
à la surveillance d'un porte militaire à proximité de sa maison.
M'étant rendu chez le Président, lui demander d'abord la punition
de ce crime atroce, il eut l'inconvenance de m'objecter que la
conduite des François étoit très repréhensible, je remarquoi ces
paroles et le lui fis observer; elles ne pouvoient s'appliquer
d'ailleurs qu'à deux individus passés au service du parti opposé,
que j'étois venu desavouer lui en demandant expulsion. Le Président
repondant se rendit à ma demande, et me donna l'espoir d'avoir une
satisfaction, tant pour l'attentat à la vie des quatre individus de
ma Nation, que pour l'attaque du domicile d'un François.
Néanmoins les jours suivants les désordres continuerant, les
François étoient outragés publiquement; un soldat eut l'audace de
poursuivre mon negre dans la maison Consulaire et de l'y frapper en
se repondant en invectives contre les François; un enfant de neuf
ans fut horriblement maltraité par des soldats, jusqu'aux négres
osoient lever la tête, et nous insulter. Mr. Bruce avoit-il pris du
mesures de repression? Est-ce la protection que devoit en attendre
l'Agent d'une puissance amie du Brésil? En butte à l'animositie
d'une soldatesque indisciplinée, nous courûmes pendant quinze jours
le danger le plus imminent, nous attendant à tout instant à voir se
réaliser ses menaces de venir nous massacre dans nos maisons.
J'ai eu depuis à reclamer contre le violation d'un batimen du
commerce François. Malgré trois gardes de la Douane, cinq soldats
armés furent envoyés à son bord à neuf heures du soir; je les fis
retirer le lendemain; ce dernier acte du Président qui des lors
commença à ne plus garder aucuns ménagemens avec moi, faisant
incarcerer un des mes nationaux sans m'en donner avis ainsi que des
motifs qui l'y portoient; le pavilion du Roi placé au dessus de
l'Écusson de France, que je trouvai lacéré, me firent prévoir que je
n'avois plus rien à attendre de la protection de l'autorité.
Monsieur le Marquis, je me suis maintenu à mon poste malgré les
dangers tant que j'ai eu l'espoir que l'arrivée de Votre Excellence
si desirée de la population entière de la province, viendroit nous
délivrer de ce déplorable état de choses. Sans connaître les
intentions de Votre Excellence, je vois Mr. Bruce encore président,
non-seulement il ne m'a donné aucune satisfaction, mais encore
apporte dans sa conduite, le mépris le plus marqué par un fileure
qui ne pent s'interprêter autrement.
C'est donc contre lui, Monsieur le Marquis, que je vieus en
solliciter une aujourd'hui pour ce total oubli de ses devoirs
envers un Agent de Sa Majesté très Chrétienne; cette conduite
emporte le refus d'aucun appui de sa part pour l'avenir; d'ailleurs
mon caractère publique m'impose de ne pas m'exposer à un outrage, et
l'intérêt que je dois à mes nationaux de les soustraire à son
implacable vengeance. Si Votre Excellence ne jugeoit pas convenable
d'user de ses pleins pouvoirs pour m'accorder la seule garantie qui
puisse me permettre de séjourner plus longtemps ici, je viens lui
demander de protéger mon embarquement et celui des François qui
restant encore à Maragnon.
Je suis, avec respect, Monsieur le Marquis, de Votre Excellence le
très humble et très obéissant serviteur,
(Signé) PL. DES SALLIERES.
À son Excellence LORD COCHRANE, Marquis de Maragnon, Premier Amiral
du Brésil, &c. &c.
The steps alluded to were such as I considered most essential for the
safety of the as yet unacknowledged empire; which, through the folly of
a provincial Governor, was in danger of being jeopardised by collision
with powerful European states. As stated to the Maranham memorialists, I
did not adopt the extreme measure of deposing Bruce from the
presidential authority, but resolved to suspend him therefrom till the
pleasure of His Imperial Majesty as regarded his conduct should be made
known. Accordingly, on Christmas day, 1824, I addressed to him the
following letter;--
Maranham, Dec. 25,1824.
SIR,
It is with extreme regret that I feel myself under
the necessity of acquainting your Excellency that it is impossible
for me to withdraw the squadron from Maranham, so long as your
Excellency continues to exercise the functions of President of this
province; because it is evident that if your Excellency is left in
authority, without the aid of the squadron, you must again
have recourse to the assistance of the lowest order of the people,
whom, on my arrival here, I found in arms in support of your
Excellency, against nine-tenths of the upper classes of society, who
continue to entertain the greatest terror of being left under the
authority of your Excellency.
To prevent the recurrence of so lamentable a state of things--the
loss of lives--and the calamities of every kind which would inevitably
ensue, I would respectfully suggest to your Excellency the
necessity of your withdrawing from office, until the determination of
His Imperial Majesty can be obtained.
I can, with great truth, assure your Excellency that my intentions
are not in any degree dictated by any feelings of personal ill-will
towards your Excellency. On the contrary, I have a wish to rescue
you from a situation of great jeopardy, and it is chiefly with a view
of avoiding to do anything that might appear derogatory to your
Excellency, that I am desirous the change so necessary to be effected
should proceed from your Excellency's voluntary resignation. But
I regret to add that so pressing is that necessity, that it is quite
essential that your Excellency's determination should be immediate,
and therefore I hope to be favoured with your Excellency's reply in
the course of the present forenoon.
Permit me to assure you that if it should be your desire to continue
in this city in the character of a private gentleman until the
determination of His Imperial Majesty, with respect to your resumption
of office, or otherwise, shall be known, no impediment to
your Excellency's wishes will originate with me; or, if you should
think proper to proceed at once to the Court of Rio de Janeiro, a
commodious conveyance shall be provided for the accommodation of
your Excellency, and of those whom you may deem it convenient to
accompany you.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
Bruce did not resign, preferring to accept my offer of conveyance to Rio
de Janeiro, there to await His Majesty's decision. Complete tranquillity
being thus restored to the province of Maranham, and not to that only,
but also to the adjoining provinces, which had more or less entered into
the existing disorders, either as adherents of the insurgent chiefs, or
of the President, it became requisite to organize a government. Not
deeming it politic to elevate to power any member of those families of
distinction whose feuds were only dormant on compulsion, I appointed
Manuel Telles de Silva Lobo, the Secretary of Government, as interim
President; he being entirely unconnected with family factions, well
acquainted with the details of government, and of unimpeachable
integrity. At the same time I caused the Camaras to be re-assembled, so
that the administration of law and public affairs might be carried on
according to the forms and intentions of the constitution.
This suspension of the President was afterwards fully approved of by His
Majesty, and the more patriotic of his advisers, as only anticipating
their intentions, it being a remarkable fact that, at the very time I
was suspending him, _an order from His Majesty was on its way to
supersede him_; information of his proceedings having previously reached
Rio de Janeiro, so that in what had been done, I had only carried out
the intentions of His Majesty.
Nevertheless, the occasion--as affording a good opportunity to traduce
me--was afterwards eagerly seized by the Portuguese faction in the
administration. All attempts to injure me in the estimation of the
population at Rio de Janeiro--which was firmly attached to the Emperor,
and grateful to me for my services--had signally failed; but on his
arrival at Rio de Janeiro the representations of the ex-president whose
mal-administration I had summarily checked, were published in every
possible shape, whilst the Minister of Marine unwarrantably withheld my
despatches from the public, as well as from His Majesty, the consequence
of which was that the prejudicial representations of what were termed my
arbitrary acts had full effect. It was represented that I, a foreigner,
had dared, unauthorised, and on false pretences, to seize on the person
of a gentleman occupying the highest position in one of the most
important provinces, and had sent him to Rio de Janeiro as a prisoner,
whilst it was I who deserved to be brought to condign punishment for the
outrage; and had I at the moment been within reach of the Portuguese
faction at the capital, which was embittered against me for establishing
order, when to further their own anti-Imperial designs disorder was
alone wished--a summary end might have been put to my efforts for
preserving and consolidating the integrity of the Brazilian empire.
That this vituperation and hostility would be the result I well knew;
but as the Portuguese party in the administration could scarcely treat
me worse than they had done, I had made up my mind to encounter their
displeasure. Of His Majesty's approval I felt certain; and, in return
for the uninterrupted favour and reliance, which, notwithstanding the
self-interested hostility of his anti-Brazilian Ministers, I had
uniformly experienced at his hands, I had all along resolved to secure
that which I knew to be His Majesty's earnest wish--the unity of the
empire by the pacification of the Northern provinces. All attempts to
thwart this on the part of the Portuguese faction were futile, and even
unconsciously favourable to the course I was perseveringly pursuing,
though all my despatches to the minister remained unanswered, and no
instructions were sent for my guidance.
Notwithstanding the neglect of the administration to supply the squadron
with necessaries, and myself with instructions, in a position foreign to
my duties as naval Commander-in-Chief, and which I had only accepted at
the earnest wish of His Imperial Majesty--I carefully kept the
Government advised of all that took place. The same ship which conveyed
the ex-president to Rio de Janeiro, carried also the following despatch
to the Minister of Marine:--
Maranham, December 31st, 1824.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
I have to acquaint your Excellency that a belief
that the squadron was about to withdraw and leave the abandoned
and disorderly military of this place under the feeble control of his
Excellency the President, excited a degree of dread in the public
mind amounting almost to a state of frenzy--and convinced me
that I had no alternative, but either to abandon the principal
inhabitants, and, indeed, the whole white population, to the fury of
mercenary troops and blacks--or to remain with the squadron until
another President should be nominated by His Imperial Majesty.
This last measure, however, upon mature consideration, appeared
to be wholly incompatible with the interests of His Imperial
Majesty, not only on account of the violent animosities subsisting
between President and people, which, notwithstanding the utmost
vigilance on my part, daily disturbed the public tranquillity--but
because the presence on shore of nearly the whole of the
seamen in the ships of war is requisite to counterbalance the
influence and power which the President has obtained over the
soldiery and irregular bands, by the impunity with which he has
suffered them to act, and by rewards bestowed on persons in the
ranks, or of the lowest orders of society. The continued absence of
seamen from the ships would, it is evident, endanger the safety of
the latter; besides which, the season is now approaching when diseases
incident to the climate become prevalent, and would not fail
considerably to thin the small force at my disposal.
The necessity of adopting some decided measure became every day more
urgent. Representations continued to pour in from all quarters
against the conduct of the President. The Consul of His Britannic
Majesty, moreover, having heard that the squadron is about to depart,
has written me a letter, of which I enclose to your Excellency a
copy.
I am aware that it is difficult to follow a course, under the
circumstances in which I am placed, that when judged of at a
distance, and merely on such evidence as can be conveyed by writing,
will leave no room for persons to contend that a different line might
have been followed with greater advantage; and I am perfectly aware
that whether I had left this province, and anarchy had followed, or
whether by remaining I had succeeded in preventing that anarchy, _I
should equally be exposed to the cavils of those who are always
disposed to reprobate the measures actually adopted, whatever they
may be_.
Having, therefore, but _a choice of evils with respect to myself_,
I have--without further care as to my personal responsibility--pursued
that course which, on full consideration, appeared to me
to be most conducive to the interests of His Imperial Majesty, and
best adapted to secure the tranquillity of this province; and I have
_reserved for my own security_ such original documents as will satisfy
the mind of His Imperial Majesty on the subject of my conduct in
suspending the functions of the President of Maranham.
A few of the many reasons which have induced me thus to take
upon myself a heavier responsibility than would have attached to
the adoption of either of the measures before alluded to, will be
found on the printed paper which I enclose. In that paper, however,
I did not consider it proper to set forth all the facts which
have come to my knowledge; such as his tampering through various
agents with the troops, artillery, and police, and above all with the
disbanded "_Pedestres_;" and the sending of emissaries to the
distant quarters of the province to excite the people again to rise in
arms for his support--though no legal prerogative which the
President does, or ought to possess, had been in any way infringed
by me or any person acting under my authority. The fact is, that
this gentleman, bred up under the despotic Captains-General,
accustomed to their arbitrary proceedings, to the mal-administration
of colonial law, and the absence of everything like fair trial, cannot
brook any limitation to his power, and has demonstrated his desire,
if not to establish an independent sway, at least to act solely
according to his will and pleasure. I am anxious to ascribe his
faults rather to the circumstances under which he has unfortunately
been brought up, and to his advanced age, than to premeditated
evil intentions.
I have the satisfaction of adding, that, by the course I have
adopted, a desolating civil war has been terminated--the treasury
saved further expenditure--and the persons and property of the
people have been rescued from destruction, and placed under the
protection of the laws.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
Such was the history of an affair, which would not have been thus
minutely detailed, but for the obloquy against me to which it
subsequently gave rise; the ministry afterwards declaring that, to serve
my own purposes, I had _deposed_ Bruce, and appointed Lobo in his
place--the facts being, that I never deposed him at all, but suspended
his functions merely till His Majesty's pleasure should be known--and
that, at the very period when this took place, _the Administration,
unknown to me, had deposed him for the same causes which led me to
suspend him!_ as will appear in the next chapter. Nevertheless, when
they found that--acting under the discretion accorded to me by His
Imperial Majesty--I had partially only anticipated their own act, and
that vituperation against me in my absence might be turned to their own
account, they took up the cause of the very man whom they had deposed,
and loaded me with abuse for having outraged the feelings and position
of a most excellent person nominated by His Majesty to one of the
highest offices in the state.
CHAPTER X.
MISREPRESENTATIONS MADE IN ENGLAND--LETTER TO THE EMPEROR--TENDERING MY
RESIGNATION--REPAYMENT DEMANDED FROM THE JUNTA--CONDUCT OF THE PRIZE
TRIBUNAL--NO ADJUDICATION OF PRIZES INTENDED--LETTER TO THE INTERIM
PRESIDENT--DEMANDING THE SUMS OWING TO THE SQUADRON--DISTURBANCE IN
PARA--STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT TO THE JUNTA--OFFER OF COMPROMISE--IMPERIAL
DECREE--RIGHT OF THE SQUADRON TO THE CLAIM.
Worn down in health by the harassing duties of the naval, military, and
civil departments, the conduct of all these wholly devolving upon me,
whilst the Ministry at Rio, by withholding instructions, neither
incurred trouble nor responsibility--and aware that my character was
being traduced by every species of malignity which could be devised by
the party whose views were destroyed by the successful manner in which
those duties had been performed, I was heartily sick of the ingratitude
and misrepresentation with which the service of having twice secured the
Northern provinces to Brazil was met on the part of the Administration,
in addition to their now apparent determination that neither myself nor
the squadron should reap any benefit from the prize property taken in
the preceding year, notwithstanding that, under the Andrada ministry,
both had been solemnly guaranteed to the captors.
I was, however, even more annoyed on another account, viz. from being
apprised that the vilest misrepresentations of my conduct were being
sedulously circulated in England by the partisans of the Administration.
Their vituperation in Brazil could, to some extent, be met; but the
petty meanness of attacking a man in a distant country, without the
possibility of his defending himself, was a matter against which no
prudence or foresight could guard.
Determined no longer to contend with an Administration, which could thus
conduct itself towards an officer whose exertions had been deemed worthy
of the highest honours from the Emperor, and the warmest thanks from the
National Assembly, I resolved to request permission from His Imperial
Majesty to retire from so unequal a contest, for I did not choose
spontaneously to abandon the command, without at least some compensation
beyond my ordinary pay. Even setting aside the stipulations under which
I had entered and continued in the Imperial service--this was at least
due to me from the unquestioned fact that to my twice rendered
exertions--first as naval Commander-in-Chief; and, secondly, as a
pacificator--the empire owed its unity and stability, _even in the
estimation of European governments_, which, now that the provinces were
tranquillized and the empire consolidated, exerted themselves to promote
peace between Brazil and the mother country.
Accordingly--on New Year's day, 1825--I addressed to the Emperor the
following letter:--
SIRE,
The condescension with which your Imperial
Majesty has been pleased to permit me to approach your royal
person, on matters regarding the public service, and even on those
more particularly relating to myself, emboldens me to adopt
the only means in my power, at this distance, of craving that
your Majesty will be graciously pleased to judge of my conduct in
the Imperial service, by the result of my endeavours to promote
your Majesty's interests, and not by the false reports spread by
those who--for reasons best known to themselves--desire to alienate
your Majesty's mind from me, and thus to bring about my removal
from your Majesty's service.
Whilst I have the honour to continue as an officer acting under
the authority of your Imperial Majesty, I shall ever perform my
duty to your Majesty and to the Brazilian people; and I trust that,
up to the present day, your Majesty has not felt any reason to doubt
my sincerity and fidelity to your Imperial interests. And if his
Excellency the Minister of Marine has failed to lay before the
public my despatches, and thereby permitted rumours prejudicial to
my character to go forth, I respectfully look up to your Imperial
Majesty for justice.
In this hope, I most respectfully entreat permission to refer
your Imperial Majesty to my letter No. 271, which I addressed to his
Excellency the Minister of Marine, from Pernambuco, early in
October, previous to my departure from that port, announcing my
intention of proceeding northward, and the necessity of so doing, for
the pacification of the northern provinces; also to my letter of the
13th of October (No. 273), written from Rio Grande do Norte; and
No. 274, dated October 28th, written from Cearà; all of which
letters, explicitly describing my proceedings, intentions, and reasons,
were duly transmitted, both in original and duplicate, by different
conveyances.
I trust that your Imperial Majesty will please to believe me to be
sensible that the honours which you have so graciously bestowed upon
me, it is my duty not to tarnish; and that your Majesty will further
believe that, highly as I prize those honours, I hold the maintenance
of my reputation in my native country in equal estimation.
I respectfully crave permission to add, that--_perceiving it to be
impossible to continue in the service of your Imperial Majesty, without_
_at all times, subjecting my professional character to great risks under
the present management of the Marine department--I trust that your
Majesty will be graciously pleased to grant me leave to retire from your
Imperial service, in which it appears to me that I have now accomplished
all that can be expected from me--the authority of your Imperial
Majesty being established throughout the whole extent of Brazil._
I have the honour to be
Your Imperial Majesty's
Dutiful and faithful servant,
COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
The permission to retire was neither granted, nor was the request
noticed, yet--notwithstanding that the ministerial organs of the press
teemed with matters injurious to my reputation, and displayed the most
unfair comments on my proceedings--no complaint was officially made to
me, as indeed none could be made; this ungenerous mode of attack being
resorted to, whilst the whole of my letters and despatches were withheld
from public knowledge.
On the 3rd of January, intelligence was received that an outbreak had
occurred at Caixas, promoted by the adherents of Bruce on learning the
fact of his suspension from the presidentship. The interim-president,
Lobo, was anxious to re-arm the disbanded troops against them, but this
I forbade, telling him that, "in my opinion a military mode of governing
was neither suited to the maintenance of tranquillity nor the promotion
of obedience to the law, and that it would be better to give the civil
law a trial before proceeding to extremities; and that although some
outrages had occurred in the heat of party spirit, yet they would
probably cease on the intelligence that President Bruce had embarked
for Rio de Janeiro." The result was in accordance with these
anticipations, for, on learning this fact, the insurgents immediately
laid down their arms--being only too glad to escape further notice.
In the expectation that His Imperial Majesty would approve of the act,
and that his ministers could offer no opposition, I considered it my
duty to the officers and seamen of the squadron, no less than to myself,
to obtain repayment from the Junta of Maranham--at least in part--of the
sums temporarily left for their use in the preceding year.
It will be remembered that after the expulsion of the Portuguese from
Maranham in 1823, considerable sums of money and bonds had been taken in
the treasury, custom-house, and other public offices, together with
military and other stores--and the value of these, though guaranteed by
His Imperial Majesty to the captors, had, with the consent of officers
and seamen, been temporarily lent to the then Provisional Government,
for the double purpose of satisfying the mutinous troops of Cearà and
Piahuy, and carrying on the ordinary functions of Government--there
being no other funds available!
At the period of this temporary surrender of the prize property to state
exigencies, it was expressly stipulated and fully understood that, as
soon as commerce had returned to its usual channels, and with it the
customary revenues of the province, the whole should be repaid to the
account of the captors. This had not been done, and the officers and men
were still losers to the amount, in addition to the non-adjudication of
their prizes generally by the Portuguese tribunal at Rio de Janeiro,
which, in unprincipled violation of the express decrees of His Imperial
Majesty--asserted that "they knew nothing of prizes, and did not know
that Brazil was at war with Portugal!" though, in the Imperial order of
March 30th, 1823--given for the vigorous blockade of Bahia, His Majesty
had explicitly ordered the Portuguese to be considered as "enemies of
the empire."--"Distruindo ou tomando todas as forcas Portuguesas que
encontrar e fazendo todas damnos possives a os inimigos deste Imperio."
It was further pretended by the tribunal that Bahia and Maranham were
not foreign ports, but parts of the Brazilian empire, though, at the
time of my appearance before them, both provinces were then, and ever
had been, in possession of Portugal; the tribunal, nevertheless,
deciding with equal absurdity and injustice, that captures made in those
ports, or within three miles of the shore, were unlawful--this decision
including, of necessity, the unaccountable declaration, that His
Majesty's orders to me to blockade the enemy's port of Bahia, and to
take, burn or destroy all Portuguese vessels and property--were also
unjust and unlawful! although this was the very purpose for which I had
been invited to quit the Chilian service. Yet, notwithstanding this
Imperial decision, the tribunal also most inconsistently condemned all
ships of war taken (as _droits_) to the crown, without the slightest
compensation to the captors.
But there was still a more flagrant injustice committed, viz. that
whilst the officers and seamen were thus deprived of the fruits of their
exertions, they became liable to about twenty thousand milreas in the
prosecution of their claims; for no other reason than the unwillingness
of the prize tribunal to order condemnations injurious to their friends
and native country; for as has been said nine out of the thirteen
members of the tribunal were Portuguese!
It had, therefore, been long apparent that no adjudication in favour of
the squadron was intended, and that its services in having united the
empire and saved it from dismemberment, would only be met by continued
injustice.
As the property left with the Provisional Government of Maranham had
been used for the benefit of that province, and as no part of it had
ever been repaid, I determined that those to whom it was due should not,
at least, be defrauded of that portion of their claims, or of a
reasonable compromise thereof; and therefore I addressed to the
interim-president the following letter:--
TO HIS EXCELLENCY MANOEL TELLES DA SILVA LOBO,
PRESIDENT INTERINO.
SIR,
The public duties which I had to perform for the
service of His Imperial Majesty, and the pacification of this province,
being now happily brought to a termination, it becomes my duty, as
Commander-in-chief, to call your Excellency's attention to some
facts concerning the interests of the officers and seamen under my
command.
On the occasion of my former visit, in 1823, which was so happily
instrumental in rescuing this province from the yoke of Portugal
and annexing it to the Empire, I was desirous of rendering the
service performed still more grateful to the people by voluntarily
granting, in the conditions of capitulation, not only my guarantee for
the inviolability of all Brazilian property then under the Portuguese
flag, but also of all the property belonging to resident Portuguese
who should subscribe to the independence of the Empire, and the
authority of His Imperial Majesty. These conditions were most
scrupulously observed and fulfilled on my part, without the slightest
infringement in any one instance.
But--on the other hand--it was expressly set forth in the terms
of capitulation, that all property belonging to those who remained in
hostility--that is to say, property belonging to the crown or government
of Portugal, or to absent Portuguese (though with respect to
the latter a commutation was subsequently consented to) being,
according to the laws of war, subject to condemnation to the captors
--should be delivered to the captors accordingly, to be, by themselves,
subjected to the customary investigation in the prize tribunals of
His Imperial Majesty.
Amongst other articles of property of this description were, of
course, included the money due on the balance of public accounts
to the crown of Portugal, and this amount--partly in specie and
partly in bills--was held in readiness by the capitulating authorities
to be delivered when required. But, as my attention was for some
time solely directed to the arrangement of public affairs, I neglected
to call for the said balance until the new Junta of Government,
chosen under my authority, had taken possession of their office, and
obtained the control of the public moneys.
After several applications on my part to the said Junta, and as
many evasions on their part, I had, at last, a personal conference
with them on the subject--on which occasion they solicited, as a
particular favour, that I would permit the amount to remain in their
hands, for the purpose of satisfying the claims of the troops of
Piahuy and Cearà, whom they represented as being clamorous for
their pay. To this request I agreed, under the assurance that I
should receive bills from the said Junta for the amount. These,
however, they not only evaded granting, but, when afterwards called
upon for a receipt, they declined giving any acknowledgment.
To the truth, however, of the main fact, viz., the claims of myself,
and the officers and men under my command, your Excellency
has now the power of satisfying yourself by a reference to the official
documents that passed between the functionaries of government and
myself, both previous and subsequent to the surrender of the Portuguese
authorities in this province.
The conduct of this Junta has proved to be merely a type of that
which we have since experienced on a larger scale at the hands of
the supreme tribunal of justice at Rio de Janeiro. But there is a
point beyond which forbearance ceases to be a virtue, and I now
call upon your Excellency to direct that the Junta of Fazenda, who
so unjustly and deceitfully withheld from the officers and men the
property above described, shall, with all convenient despatch,
proceed to the adjustment of the claim in question.
An attested copy of the accounts, signed by the members of the
late Portuguese Junta of Government--being in my possession, I
enclose a copy thereof, which your Excellency can cause to be
compared with the original treasury and custom-house books. I
likewise enclose to your Excellency a copy of a gracious communication
which I received from His Imperial Majesty--the original of
which, in His Majesty's own handwriting, is now in my possession.
This will enable your Excellency to judge as to what the
understanding and intentions of His Imperial Majesty really are,
with respect to the claims of the squadron--when influenced by the
dictates of honour and his own unbiassed judgment.
Nevertheless--should your Excellency consider it necessary, I
have no objection to prosecute the claims of the officers and seamen
to the balance before alluded to--in the Court of Admiralty which
your Excellency is about to convene. But I beg it may be distinctly
understood that I hold myself bound not to relax in any way
from my determination that these accounts shall be settled, so as to
enable me to fulfil the duty which I am engaged to perform to those
under my command.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
To my annoyance Parà became the scene of renewed disturbance, and even
the life of the President was threatened. This was disheartening, as
evincing a desire on the part of the provinces to pursue--each its own
separate course; proving the deep hold which the counsels of Palmella
had taken to promote anarchy by fostering provincial pride--as a means
to promote discord, and thus to reduce the newly-formed empire to
insignificance and ruin,--from the same cause which had befallen the
liberated provinces of Spanish America.
Not having been furnished with troops, it was difficult to spare a force
to meet this new emergency. There was no time, however, for hesitation,
so I despatched the _Atalanta_ to Parà, with a detachment of the best
seamen, under the command of Lieutenants Clarence and Reed, upon whose
zeal every reliance was to be placed; at the same time sending a
recommendation to the President to use the force for the purpose of
remitting to me those who had threatened his life, and of overawing
those who had been endeavouring to subvert his authority.
The Junta of Fazenda having now assembled, I transmitted to them the
following;
GENERAL STATEMENT
Of the money and other property claimed by the squadron on the
surrender of the Portuguese authorities of Maranham; in conformity
to the laws relative to matters of prize, and the gracious
decrees of His Imperial Majesty:--
Milreis.
Treasury and custom-house 62,000 000
In bills and debts 147,000 000
Value of artillery, stores, and ammunition,
say 100,000,000 at 1/5th
for the squadron 20,000 000
Value of stores in the arsenal, including
gunboats, launches, boats,
and materials of all kinds 25,000,000
___________
Public property 254,000 000
Obligations delivered as Portuguese
property under the decree of
H.I.M. of Dec. 11th, 1822; by
that decree confiscated to the
Crown, but by the gracious bounty
of H.I.M. awarded to the squadron,
in his own handwriting, dated
12th February, 1824 170,196 461
___________
Sum total 424,196 461
Together with this statement of account, I forwarded the following offer
of compromise, on the part of the squadron, for the payment of
one-fourth only:--
His Imperial Majesty, having--by decree of the 11th of December,
1822--commanded the seizure and confiscation of all merchandise in
the custom-houses of Brazil belonging to Portuguese subjects--all
merchandise so belonging, or the proceeds thereof, in the hands of
merchants--and all vessels or parts of vessels belonging to such
subjects--I, therefore, in conformity with the said decree, having,
on the occasion of the capitulation of Maranham, directed, that all
persons having property in their hands of the nature set forth in the
said decree, should deliver in an account of the same; and the bills
and papers herewith annexed having been given up by their respective
holders as _Portuguese property of the description set forth_, the
said bills and papers are now laid before the Court of
Vice-Admiralty, in order to the adjudication thereof in conformity to
the said decree.
But, whereas, the said Imperial decree could not be enforced at
Maranham in the ordinary manner, by means of civil officers acting
under the authority of His Imperial Majesty, by reason of the
port and province being under the authority and government of
Portugal; And whereas, His Imperial Majesty, in consideration of
the annexation of the said port and province to the Empire, by
the naval means under my command--and generally of other
important services--was graciously pleased, by virtue of a grant
in his own handwriting, bearing date the 12th day of February last,
to accord the value of the seizures to the officers and men as a
reward for their exertions and services; the said officers and men
agree to surrender these bills and the property, as set forth in the
annexed list, amounting to 484,196,461, together with all other
claims, for the sum of one-fourth, or 106,000, to be paid by the
Treasury of Maranham by instalments, within the period of thirty
days from the date hereof.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
The following is the Imperial decree alluded to in the preceding
letter:--
DECREE.
It being obvious that the scandalous proceedings and hostility
manifested by the government of Portugal against the liberty, honour,
and interests of this Empire, and by the captious insinuations of the
demagogical congress of Lisbon, which--seeing it impracticable to
enslave this rich region and its generous inhabitants--endeavours to
oppress them with all kinds of evils, and civil war, which has occurred
through their barbarous vandalism. It being one of my principal
duties, as Constitutional Emperor and Defender of this vast Empire,
to adopt all measures to render effective the security of the country,
and its defence efficient against further and desperate attempts
which its enemies may adopt; and also to deprive, as far as possible,
the inhabitants of that kingdom from continuing to act hostilely
against Brazil--tyrannizing over my good and honourable subjects--
deem it well to order that there be placed in effective sequestration,
1_st_. All goods and merchandise existing in the custom-houses of
this Empire, belonging to subjects of the kingdom of Portugal.
2_nd_. All Portuguese merchandise, or the value thereof, which
exists in the hands of subjects of this Empire.
3_rd_. All real and agricultural property, held under the same
circumstances.
4_th_. Finally, all vessels or parts of vessels, which belong to
merchants of the said kingdom. There being excepted from this
sequestration, bills of the national bank, banks of security, and
those of the Iron Company of Villa Sorocaba.
Joseph Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva, of my Council of State,
Minister of the Interior, and of Foreign Affairs, shall cause the
execution of this decree.
Given in the Palace of Rio de Janeiro, December the Eleventh,
1822, first of the Independence of the Empire.
With the Rubrica of His Imperial Majesty,
JOSÉ BONIFACIO DE ANDRADE E SILVA.
These documents--coupled with the decree of Dec. 1822, awarding the
above confiscations to the captors--shew so clearly the right of the
squadron's claim, and the injustice of the course pursued by the prize
tribunal at Rio de Janeiro, in refusing to adjudge Portuguese property
to the captors, that further comment is unnecessary. In order, however,
to give every possible information relative to a matter which has been,
to me, a cause of so much obloquy, I subjoin my letter to the interim
President, accompanying the preceding documents:--
SIR,
I have the honour to enclose to your Excellency,
two hundred and sixty obligations seized under the orders of His
Imperial Majesty--dated the 11th December, 1822--which I
request you will be pleased to cause to be laid before the Junta of
Fazenda, together with the papers enclosed, in order that the Junta
may take the necessary steps to the liquidation of the just and
moderate claims of the officers and seamen. I further beg your
Excellency will be pleased to intimate to the Junta, that I cannot
abstain from taking whatever measures may be necessary to prevent
the violation of the laws and regulations of the military service--the
infraction of the express engagement of His Imperial Majesty--and
the consequent disorganization of the squadron, so essential for the
maintenance of tranquillity, and the preservation of the independence
of the Empire.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
20th Jan. 1825.
CHAPTER XI.
IMPERIAL APPROVAL--CONTINUED ENMITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION--JUNTA REFUSES
TO PAY THE SQUADRON'S CLAIM--I PERSEVERE IN THE DEMAND--JUNTA AGREES TO
PAY THE AMOUNT IN BILLS--THIS REFUSED--ARRIVAL OF A NEW PRESIDENT--BUT
WITHOUT AUTHORITY FOR THE ASSUMPTION--INTRIGUES TO ESTABLISH HIM IN
OFFICE--I ORDER HIM TO QUIT THE PROVINCE--AND SEND HIM TO PARA--LETTER
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CEARA--INTERNATIONAL ANIMOSITIES--THE SQUADRON LEFT
TO PROVIDE FOR ITSELF--ABUSE OF AUTHORITY--EXPLANATIONS TO MINISTER OF
MARINE--OF TRANSACTIONS AT MARANHAM--LETTER TO CARVALHO E
MELLO--ANTICIPATING MINISTERIAL DISPLEASURE--THE JUNTA REIMBURSES PART
OF ITS DEBT.
On the 16th of January I had at length the satisfaction to receive,
through the Minister of Marine, the Emperor's approval of the course
pursued in the pacification of the Northern provinces, and his
confirmation of the changes that had been made in their administration.
Still not a word of instruction was vouchsafed for my future guidance.
The subjoined is the letter conveying His Imperial Majesty's approval of
my acts and judgment:--
His Imperial Majesty commands the Secretary of State of the
Marine to apprise the First Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the
naval forces of this Empire, that His Majesty received his despatches
by the schooner _Maria de Gloria_, by which His Majesty was informed
of his proceedings, and approves of his determination to proceed to
the Northern provinces, where the fire of rebellion has been lighted,
with a view to establish therein the order and obedience due to the
said august sovereign, a duty which he has so wisely and judiciously
undertaken, and in which course he must continue, notwithstanding
the previous instructions sent to him, bearing date the 4th of October
last, which instructions are hereby annulled until he shall attain
the highly important objects proposed in the before-mentioned provinces,
viz., till they submit themselves to the authorities lately
appointed, and enjoy the benefits of the paternal Government of His
Imperial Majesty.
Palace of Rio Janeiro, Dec. 2, 1824.
(Signed) FRANCISCA VILLELA BARBOSA.
To this letter--annulling my recall after the fall of Pernambuco--I
returned the following reply:--
No. 289.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
Since I had the honour of addressing your Excellency
in my letter, No. 288, I have not had any further intelligence
from Parà; I therefore conclude that the officers and seamen whom
I detached there, will be sufficient to aid the President in maintaining
good order.
Here, nothing particular has happened, beyond the collecting
of a few runaway soldiers and vagabonds in the woods. A party
detached in pursuit of them, dispersed them all, and brought in
several prisoners yesterday.
I have received your Excellency's communication by the schooner
_Maria de Gloria_, and _feel highly gratified that His Imperial Majesty
has been pleased to approve of the course which I have pursued for the
termination of dissensions in the Northern provinces. Since the
gracious communication of His Imperial Majesty, I feel less weight of
responsibility in the course which circumstances have compelled me to
follow, with a view to restore order in the province of Maranham._
I hope soon to inform your Excellency that the task which His
Imperial Majesty has been further pleased to confide to me, of
causing the newly-appointed authorities to be acknowledged, is
accomplished; but I beg respectfully again to add my opinion that
these Northern provinces will not long continue in a state of
tranquillity, unless the provincial forces are shifted to other
quarters of the empire. In fact, if attention be not paid to this, I
consider that these provinces will shortly be entirely lost, both to
the empire of Brazil and to Portugal.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
Jan. 21, 1834.
The continued absence of even the slightest instructions for my
guidance--coupled with the Imperial approval of all I had done upon my
own responsibility, naturally implied that it was considered better to
leave me entirely unfettered by orders, which, if given at all, must be
issued in ignorance of the actual state of things which required
renovation. In this light I should have regarded the omission to direct
my conduct, but for the warnings privately received, to be careful what
I was about, for that, despite any apparent public approval of my
proceedings, my enemies in the administration were on the watch for some
act which might be construed to my disadvantage, and thus become the
pretext for blame which should outweigh the praise accorded. The
opportunity I felt had already been afforded by the suspension of Bruce
from the presidency, notwithstanding that this--as has been seen--was
fully justified by circumstances, and was not resorted to without
deliberate consideration, and the deepest conviction of its necessity.
Still, any opposition to the suspension of Bruce could only be factious,
for, on the 2nd of December, the Minister of Marine had in anticipation
forwarded to me a list of new presidents and generals-at-arms, every
person in authority throughout the whole extent of the Northern coast
being changed--with the exception of the president of Parà; so that
there was every reason to anticipate that even the strong measures
which I had been compelled to adopt with regard to Bruce would meet the
views of His Imperial Majesty.
On the 31st of January, the interim President apprised me that the Junta
refused to liquidate any part of the claim made in behalf of the
squadron. Upon this refusal, I wrote to the Junta that, such being their
decision, I would hold them personally responsible that no bills, debts,
nor claims of any kind beyond the current expenses of government should
be paid, till this prior claim--in honour and justice due to the
officers and seamen, who had generously advanced their prize money to
meet state exigencies--should be liquidated; adding, that the seamen
_relied on me for justice_, and if my warning were not attended to, I
should be compelled to take such steps as the necessity of upholding the
interests of the crown and the efficiency of the naval service appeared
to demand.
In taking this step, I frankly admit that it was the only way to obtain
from the Government of Maranham even a compromise for the amount owing
by the province to the captors. I had every confidence in His Imperial
Majesty that as far as lay in _his_ power justice would be done, as
evinced by the acknowledgments given in his own handwriting in
opposition to the measures of his ministers, on whom, or the prize
tribunal, no reliance could be placed; the former having done all in
_their_ power to thwart my efforts in His Majesty's service, whilst the
tribunal, acting by the sanction or in conformity to the known wishes
of the ministry, had delayed adjudication, with the evident intention
of _evading it altogether_, except in cases which gave a colour for
condemning me in damages, in which respect--apparently their only
object--they were prompt enough.
I therefore determined that as a specific portion of the prize property
taken at Maranham in 1823, had, at its own request, been given up to the
provisional Government, upon the express understanding of repayment
--without which it could not have been thus surrendered--the Junta
should be made to preserve their own good faith, as well as mine, to the
squadron, which, relying on my promises, had been influenced temporarily
to devote to the exigencies of the State that which by imperial decree,
as well as according to the laws of all nations, was their undoubted
right.
My orders to the Junta of Fazenda not to pay any claims--with the
exception of the ordinary expenses of Government--till those of the
squadron had been satisfied, were, however, almost superogatory; for, on
a visit of inspection to the arsenal on the 2nd of February, it appeared
that they had established a system of not paying any debts, even those
incurred for the provisions of the squadron, the contract prices being
set down at _treble the market price!_ This overcharge was accounted for
by the merchants on the ground of dilatory payments, which could only be
obtained at all from the Junta by fees to those whose duty it was to
pass the accounts! To counteract this, I requested the interim President
to forbid any further purchases on the part of the provincial
Government, as, in future, I would make them myself, and, what was more
to the purpose, pay for them.
By limiting the demand of repayment to one-fourth only of the amount
captured from the Portuguese Government, I was not pressing at all
severely upon the resources of the province, which is one of the richest
in Brazil; nor should I have put them to any inconvenience had I
demanded repayment of the whole, _as I justly might have done_.
On the 8th of February, the Junta of Fazenda sent me a verbal
communication to the effect that they would give the sum agreed upon in
commutation of prize money due to the captors--_in five bills, payable
in five months_. As I knew that, in case of my departure, these would
not be worth the paper upon which they were written, I refused the
offer, adding that, after the course pursued by the prize tribunal at
Rio de Janeiro the seamen had no faith in promises.
Finding that the Junta shewed every disposition to evade the demand, I
requested a personal interview with that body, intimating that I
expected all the members to be present. At this interview, I told the
Junta that all the documents necessary in support of the claim had been
laid before them, these being too precise to admit of dispute--that they
had no right in law, justice, or precedent, to withhold the portion of
the prize property left at Maranham, by the request of the provisional
government, no funds of their own being then available to meet the
exigencies which had arisen--and therefore they were in honour bound to
restore it.
I was induced to adopt this step, not only on account of the evasive
conduct experienced at the hands of the administration at Rio de
Janeiro, but because I knew that negotiations were actually pending for
the restitution of all the Portuguese property captured, as a basis of
the projected peace between Portugal and Brazil; in other words, that
the squadron--whose exertions had added to the Empire a territory larger
than the whole empire as it existed previous to the complete expulsion
of the Portuguese--was to be altogether sacrificed to a settlement
which its own termination of the war had brought about. So barefaced a
proceeding towards those whose services had been engaged on the express
stipulation of a right to all captures is, perhaps, unparalleled in the
history of nations; and, as both officers and men looked to me for
protection, I determined to persevere in demanding from the Government
of Maranham--at least a compromise of the sums which the captors had, in
1823, lent to its pressing exigencies.
No small amount of obloquy has been attached to me with regard to this
act of justice, the only one the squadron was ever likely to obtain; but
the transaction involved my own good faith with both officers and men,
who had lent the money solely on my assurance that the Government at Rio
de Janeiro could not do otherwise than refund the amount--so important
was it at the time, that the pressing difficulties of the province
should be promptly met. A man must have a singularly constituted mind,
who, in my position, would have acted otherwise. To this subject it will
be necessary to recur.
On the 7th of February, I was surprised by an intimation from Pedro
José da Costa Barros, of his intention to assume the presidency of
Maranham, founding his pretensions upon a letter addressed to Bruce,
whom I had suspended. At first--believing that he possessed the
requisite authority--I invited him to take possession of the office, but
finding that he had no patent to shew for the appointment, I considered
it my duty to His Majesty not to admit such pretensions till their
validity was established, and therefore told Barros that he must await
the official communications from Rio de Janeiro, before I could
acknowledge him as president--for that tranquillity being now restored,
I would not have the minds of the people again unsettled on the mere
presumption of his appointment.
In this arrangement Barros appeared to acquiesce, but being a well-known
partisan of the Portuguese faction, he was soon surrounded by the
adherents of that party in Maranham. On the 10th of March, a series of
allegations was forwarded to me by the party of Barros against the
interim President, but as they were of the most insignificant nature,
and unsupported by proof, I refused to pay attention to them. They were
shortly afterwards followed by a letter from Barros to the same purport,
but without any specific accusation against Lobo, whom he nevertheless
represented as about to fly from Maranham in order to evade the
punishment due to his crimes! Upon this I addressed to him the following
letter demanding specific charges against the interim President:--
Maranham, 10th March, 1825.
SIR,
I have received your Excellency's letter, in which the interim
President, Manuel Pellas da Silva Lobo, is charged with an intention
of departing from Maranham in a sudden and clandestine manner, and
in which your Excellency calls on me to adopt measures for the
prevention of his flight. I must, however, represent to your
Excellency that, since I have been in this province, so many reports
have been made to me with the greatest confidence, impeaching the
character and motives of individuals--all of which have proved
unfounded--that I feel it impossible to act with any propriety on
your Excellency's intimation--without being furnished with proof of
the truth of the allegation.
Your Excellency, I am persuaded, is too honourable to propagate so
serious a charge without believing it to be well founded, and I
cannot doubt that you will have the candour to admit that I am
entitled to be made acquainted with the grounds on which your
Excellency's belief rests, before proceeding to any measure of
severity against the party accused.
I have further to request that your Excellency will be pleased to
say _for what crime, or crimes_, the President interino is supposed
to be about to abandon--not only this province--but to flee from his
native country?
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
To PEDRO JOSÉ DE COSTA BARROS.
The charges against Lobo, I well knew to have been fabricated for the
purpose of getting me to place him in arrest, and instal Barros in the
presidency. This plot failing, I learned, on the following day, that
arrangements had been made for the forcible seizure of the interim
President's person without any specific cause for dissatisfaction with
his government, which was in all respects just and excellent. Finding
the spirit of intrigue thus again manifested for the neutralisation of
all my efforts to restore order and prosperity to the province--to the
discomfiture of the intriguants--I again, on the 11th of March, declared
martial law. Such was the terror inspired by this act in the minds of
those who had fomented renewed disorder, that, anticipating summary
retribution from me, they prepared for the flight of which they had
accused an innocent man. On learning this, I despatched a vessel with a
competent officer to cruise at the mouth of the port, under orders
neither to let ships nor passengers leave without passports
counter-signed by myself.
Having received a letter from José Feliz de Azevedo e Sa, the President
of Cearà, warning me of the intentions of Barros, who had come from that
province, I was confirmed in my determination that the good which had
been effected at Maranham should not be neutralised by one who had no
authority to shew for his interference. Accordingly, I wrote to Barros
the following order to quit the province forthwith, until His Majesty's
intentions with regard to him should be made known:--
March 11th,1825.
SIR,
Your Excellency having acquainted me that the
President interino intended to fly from justice, at the same time
calling upon me to take precautionary measures to prevent his
escape, without setting forth any crime of which he had been guilty;
and further, with regard to my letter requesting that you would
make known the nature of the delinquency which impelled the said
President interino to fly from the province, you have not considered
it necessary to give the slightest explanation.
Now, as I have ample reason to believe the whole allegation to be
a fabrication--as I know that your Excellency--instead of waiting,
as is your duty, for communications from His Imperial Majesty
--has, by your countenance, suffered to be stirred up a spirit of
dissension and party, and as I understand the laws which I have been
compelled to call into operation to prevent greater evils.
I have to acquaint your Excellency that I have provided a convenient
conveyance for your Excellency and suite, in order that you
may reside in the neighbouring province of Parà, until the arrival of
orders from His Imperial Majesty; and that my barge will be at
the service of your Excellency and suite at any hour to-morrow,
between sunrise and sunset, in order to proceed to the anchorage of
the _Pedro 1'ro_, where you will find the _Cacique_ ready for your
reception.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
To PEDRO JOSÉ DE COSTA BARROS.
Barros strongly remonstrated against this proceeding; but knowing that
the machinations of his party had been the direct cause of renewed
disorders, I resolved not to give way; telling him that he had only
himself to blame, by not having abstained from meddling with public
affairs till the arrival of competent authority from His Imperial
Majesty. Accordingly, I insisted on his immediately embarking on board
the _Cacique_, in charge of Captain Manson, for conveyance to Parà, to
the President of which province I addressed the following letter:--
Maranham, 13th March,1825.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
Since I had the honour of writing to your
Excellency, Pedro José de Costa Barros, who arrived from Cearà
with the intention to take upon himself the office of President
here--has unfortunately been the occasion of stirring up old
animosities, which I had hoped experience might have taught him
the advantage of leaving dormant. Had Barros been provided
with proper authority under the sign manual of His Imperial
Majesty, the difficulties that have occurred since his arrival might
have been prevented; though I am extremely apprehensive that if
ever he shall be invested with such authority, still greater evils will
befal the province. The Portuguese party are in favour of Barros,
and have expressed their sentiments unequivocally, and this your
Excellency knows is sufficient to raise up the native Brazilians
against him.
The Portuguese and some others had combined to place Barros
in the Presidency by force, which intention I happily frustrated by
arriving in Maranham with a considerable reinforcement from the
_Pedro Primiero_, at midnight--when the attempt was to have
occurred. To put a stop to proceedings so injurious to the interests
of His Imperial Majesty and the public, I have felt it necessary to
remove Barros from Maranham until his commission shall arrive,
or until His Majesty's pleasure respecting the appointment of
Manoel Telles da Silva Lobo, shall be known. Barros therefore
proceeds in the _Cacique_ (which is the bearer of this) to Parà--where
having no pretensions, he will have no partisans, and will be
inoffensive.
I have not time, nor would it be of any utility to occupy your
Excellency with a minute detail of the affairs of this province,
whilst your Excellency has so much to do in that under your
immediate superintendence: I am convinced that in all I have
done, I have acted in conformity with the true interests of His
Majesty and his people, and am in no degree under any apprehension
that the malevolent aspersions of self-interested or
disappointed individuals will have the least influence on any candid
mind, when a real statement of facts shall be laid before the
public.
I shall be gratified if your Excellency attains the satisfaction
of preserving the province of Parà free from those party dissensions,
the danger and inconvenience of which are best known to those who
are obliged to be on the watch to counteract them.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
To José Feliz de Azevedo e Sa, the President of Cearà, I addressed the
subjoined letter of thanks for the warning he had given me respecting
Barros:--
Maranham, March 16th, 1825.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
I have to offer your Excellency many thanks for
your kind letter, informing me, by anticipation, of the character of
an individual whose principles and plans I was not long in discovering.
Scarcely had he placed his foot on the soil of Maranham,
when he was surrounded by all the Portuguese of the city, who
expressed their joy at his arrival in no equivocal manner. To give
you a history of his intrigues would require pages. Suffice it to say,
that--after having attempted to thrust himself into the Government
within forty-eight hours after his arrival,--without having any lawful
commission from His Imperial Majesty--and being defeated in that
object--he placed himself at the head of a faction, brought charges
against the President interino, and on the night of the 10th formed
a plan to seize his person! This, however, I defeated, and as his
charges against Lobo were entirely false and malicious, I have sent
him off to Parà, there to await the determination of His Imperial
Majesty.
The intrigues here are so numerous, and there are so many
interests to reconcile, that the harmony now restored will probably
cease with the departure of the force under my command. But
it is obvious that the squadron cannot remain here for ever to watch
over private broils and feuds of so contemptible a nature. The only
thing of which I am seriously afraid, is the influence and number of
the Portuguese settled here, should they find a president desirous of
promoting their views and supposed interests.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
There was great difficulty to act for the best in this matter: but
whether Barros were appointed to the presidency or not, the course taken
was the only one even temporarily to ensure public tranquillity. If
appointed, it was evident, from his acts, that he had been selected by
the administration to put in execution their anti-Brazilian projects;
whilst the Portuguese party in Maranham unequivocally expressed their
intention to revive the old animosities between themselves and the
native Brazilians; thus causing a renewal of disorder which I was
determined not to permit, in favour of one who had no patent to shew for
his assumption of authority.
This monstrous state of affairs--fostered by the Imperial
administration--was a natural consequence of their Portuguese
predilections, and could not have existed, except from want of union
amongst the Brazilians themselves, who, unskilled in political
organization, were compelled to submit to a foreign faction, unable to
carry out its own views, and only powerful in thwarting those of the
patriots. Their policy was the more reprehensible, for even the
government of the mother country conceded that Brazil was too extensive
and powerful to be again reduced to a state of colonial dependence, and
therefore confined its aims to the Northern provinces, the Portuguese
party in the administration seconding the intentions of the parent
state; both, however, shutting their eyes to the fact, that, if these
were separated from Brazil, they would become disorganized in a vain
attempt to imitate the constitution of the United States--by whose more
enlightened citizens they were greatly influenced--and, as a
consequence, would be lost both to the parent state and the Empire. As
it was, all I had effected for their annexation and tranquillization was
regarded with perfect hatred by the Portuguese residents in the
provinces as well as by the administration, who did everything in their
power to thwart my measures for the union and consolidation of the
Empire.
During the whole of this period, I repeat that I had received no
communication from Rio de Janeiro, with the exception of the letter
before mentioned, with the rubrick of His Imperial Majesty, thanking me
for the course I had pursued. Though no instructions were sent for my
guidance, nor any fault found with my acts, yet, from private sources, I
was advised that my success in restoring order to the Northern provinces
had greatly embittered the administration against me, as having
destroyed the hopes of Portugal--expressed through Palmella--of
profiting by disorder. I was also left to provide for the pay and
maintenance of the squadron, one vessel only with supplies having been
forwarded since our departure from Rio de Janeiro, in the preceding
August!
Notwithstanding this marked neglect, I took care to keep the
administration well advised of all my proceedings, and the causes
thereof, the following being extracts from my letters to the Minister of
Marine, respecting the events just narrated:--
No. 290.
Maranham, March 16th, 1825.
I beg to acquaint your Excellency, for the satisfaction of the
Imperial government, that I have caused the provinces which required
military assistance, to furnish pay and provisions for the ships
immediately under my command; and further, that I have required the
government of Maranham to pay, as a recompence to the officers and
seamen, _one-fourth part_ of the amount of money and bills, and
_one-fifth part_ of the value of the military stores surrendered by
the Portuguese authorities on the 28th of July, 1823. Thus the
Imperial government at Rio de Janeiro will be relieved from
considerable disbursement, and the officers and
seamen--notwithstanding the great additional trouble to which they
have been put--will be satisfied, so far as regards their claim to
the value of their captures in compensation for their services at
Maranham.
I cannot refrain from drawing the attention of the Imperial
government to the abuses which exist in every department of the
provincial government, where, notwithstanding the great revenue
derived from various sources, the Junta of Fazenda possess so little
credit, that their bills have actually been sold at 30 per cent.
discount, and I am credibly informed that no money can, at any time,
be received from the treasury without a heavy per centage being given
to the inferior officers; but how such per centages are afterwards
disposed of, is to me unknown.
The price at which provisions were being purchased by the
Intendente for the use of the squadron being exorbitant, I instituted
a minute inquiry, the result of which was the discovery of
a fraudulent system which I abolished by purchasing our own
provisions. American salt beef, for which the Provincial Government
charged 25 milreis the barrel, I have purchased for 12 milreis--pork
charged 32 milreis, I buy for 15-1/2 milreis. Bread is charged
10 milreis the quintal, whilst the English sloop-of-war _Jaseur_ is
purchasing it at 5 milreis, for bills on England. Indeed, the abuses
here of all kinds are too numerous to be detailed by letter, and to
endeavour to put a stop to them, unless under the express authority
and protection of the Imperial Government, would be a thankless
task.
* * * * *
No. 291.
Maranham, March 17th, 1825.
The difficulties with which I have had to contend in this
province have been greatly increased by the arrival of Pedro José
de Costa Barros on the 5th of last month--when intrigue within
intrigue was set on foot by different parties, and which--if Barros
were placed in power--I clearly foresaw would end in anarchy and
bloodshed--and probably in the destruction of all the Portuguese
part of the community, whose unequivocal reception of a partisan
President excited at once the jealousy and distrust of the
Brazilians.
Under these circumstances, I felt that the only course to be
adopted, for the prevention of serious evils, was to defer the
introduction of Barros into authority, and to leave Lobo as President
interino, until further directions from the Imperial Government.
This additional degree of responsibility I took upon myself with the
less reluctance, as Barros had no other authority to assume the
Government than a letter to Bruce, whom I had previously been
compelled to suspend from office and send to Rio--to whom, therefore,
such letter could not be delivered. Besides which, having
appointed Lobo to be President interino, until His Majesty's
pleasure should be known, I could not consistently consent to his
removal from office until His Majesty was acquainted with his
appointment, and had expressed his pleasure thereon.
* * * * *
No. 292.
Maranham, March 18th, 1825.
As I observe by the Lisbon newspapers that most of the vessels
acquitted by the Court of Admiralty have arrived at Lisbon, I beg to
call your Excellency's attention to the fact that I have received no
reply to my letter addressed to your Excellency on the 1st of
August last, requesting to know whether, in addition to the loss
of the property, _which ought to have been condemned_, I was personally
liable to the enormous costs and damages decreed against me by
that tribunal.
* * * * *
No. 293.
Maranham, March 18, 1825.
In my letter, No. 291, I acquainted your Excellency
of the course pursued with regard to Pedro José de Costa Barros,
who, under the mistaken counsels of a faction here, would have
again involved this province in scenes of bloodshed and confusion.
It is neither my duty nor inclination to become a tool in the hands
of any faction, whose views are contrary to the true interests of
His Imperial Majesty, and, were they countenanced and protected,
would infallibly involve all Brazil in civil war and anarchy.
I contented myself, however, with continuing the usual precautions,
which were sufficient to prevent disasters till His Majesty's
pleasure, with regard to recent occurrences in this province, should
become known, of which I have been in daily expectation for some
time past; but Barros--after agreeing to await the expected
instructions--considered that he had gained over a sufficient party
to overthrow the government by violent means, and addressed to me
the letter A, which was considered by him a sufficient pretext to
warrant the imprisonment of the President interino, during my
temporary absence on board the flagship, whence, it was supposed,
I should not be able to arrive in time to prevent the execution of
that violent measure; and I regret to add, that, in this plot--so
prejudicial to His Majesty's interests, and so disgraceful to the
parties concerned--persons whose duty it was to have at once combatted
such unjustifiable proceedings took an underhand but active
part. The letters of Barros, A and B, will sufficiently shew the
violence of his prejudices, his credulity, and precipitancy in acting
upon false information and reports, as well as his total ignorance of
law and justice, in requiring the seizure of an individual without
specifying either crime or accuser.
I enclose to your Excellency all the correspondence which has
taken place between Barros and myself, together with the proclamation
which I felt it my duty to issue for the maintenance of order;
for the legal department here now profess to consider that, although
the constitution has been granted and accepted, they have no
authority to put it in practice--hence, between the ancient and new
laws, justice is at a stand.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
To these and all my previous communications no reply was returned either
in the way of approval or otherwise. There was, however, one member of
the administration, Luiz José Carvalho e Mello, who had ever been my
friend, being himself a man of patriotic and enlightened views, but
without the influence to counteract the designs of his Portuguese
colleagues. As I knew from private sources, that this silence had its
objects, I addressed to Carvalho e Mello the following letter:--
Maranham, March 22nd, 1825.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
By the arrival of my despatches transmitted by the _George_ and other
ships, your Excellency will have been successively informed of such
public transactions and occurrences as seemed to me worthy of the
attention of the Imperial Government. But notwithstanding that three
months and upwards have now elapsed since the date of my first
communications, I have the misfortune (for so I must call it) to be
left without any precise or applicable instructions from Rio de
Janeiro. The responsibility, therefore, rests entirely on my
shoulders, and I feel this the more--being aware that not only shall
I meet with no support from the majority of the Ministry itself--but
that the most powerful faction in Rio de Janeiro will represent every
thing I have done--or may do--in the blackest colours.
I console myself, however, with the knowledge that I possess the
means of exposing the falsehood of every allegation that can be
brought against me. I have acted towards His Imperial Majesty
and the Brazilian nation, in the same manner as I should have
done for my native Sovereign and country; and I must say--that,
had I freed the shores of England from a superior hostile force, and
rescued half the country from the dominion of an enemy--the
British Government would not have left me to seek the fruit of my
labours, and those of the officers and seamen who served with me,
in the manner in which I have been compelled to seek them in
Brazil; and would never have subjected me to the necessity of
having recourse to measures capable of being so perversely represented
as to obscure for a time that credit to which I am entitled
for the successful conduct of the naval war. I am, however,
resolved never to be deterred, by fear of consequences, from using
every endeavour within my power to obtain justice for all who have
continued to perform their duty in the Imperial service. And
I have the less hesitation in persevering in this resolution--because
it cannot be denied that I have strictly limited the claims of the
naval service to such rewards as would have been admitted to
be due, under similar circumstances, in the navy of England.
I have used the freedom to say thus much to your Excellency as
my friend--because I am well aware that the old cry of the Portuguese
faction in Rio will be set up against me the moment they
hear that I have caused the Junta of Fazenda of this province to pay
a part of the amount of the money and bills taken on the surrender
of the Portuguese authorities at Maranham. This, of course, though
only one-fourth of the amount due, _will be represented as an outrageous
robbery_; but I again say, that it is not from the Portuguese
faction at Rio, that I expect either credit or justice. Their object is
sufficiently evident, namely--_the expulsion of every foreign officer
from the service, by means of privation and insult, in order that they
may fill the ships with their Portuguese countrymen and dependents_;
a result which I should lament to witness, because fraught with mischief
to His Imperial Majesty and Brazil.
I feel myself much shaken in health by the great heat of the climate,
and the anxiety occasioned by the peculiar circumstances in which I
have been placed; all of which I might have saved myself under the
plea of want of instructions, but for my desire to promote the real
interests of His Imperial Majesty, by once more accomplishing that
which His Majesty, in his instructions to me of the 31st of July
last, was graciously pleased to describe as "_of no less importance
than the integrity and independence of the Empire_."
I am, with great respect,
Your Excellency's devoted friend,
and obedient servant,
COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
On the 16th of March, the Junta--finding that I would not listen to any
farther evasion--paid 30 contos (£.6000) in bills, and 3 contos (£.600)
in silver, as the first instalment of the 106,000 dollars (£.21,200) for
which the restoration of 425,000 dollars (£.85,000) had been commuted.
The disbursement of this sum amongst the officers and men entitled to
it, is fully narrated in the concluding chapter, containing a full
statement of the disbursement of this and other monies charged against
me, which statement is accompanied by vouchers fortunately retained in
my possession, these placing the proper disbursement of the money
amongst its rightful owners beyond doubt or question.
CHAPTER XII.
I QUIT MARANHAM FOR A CRUISE--BAD STATE OF THE FRIGATE--CONNIVANCE AT
ILLICIT TRADE--WE ARE COMPELLED TO PROCEED TO ENGLAND--THE FRIGATE
REPORTED TO THE BRAZILIAN ENVOY--WHO CHEATS ME OF £.2,000--HIS
ASSUMPTION THAT I HAD ABANDONED THE SERVICE--MY CONTRADICTION
THEREOF--ORDER TO RETURN TO RIO--REASONS FOR NOT DOING SO--BRAZILIAN
ENVOY TAMPERS WITH MY OFFICER--WHO ACQUAINTS ME THEREWITH--ENVOY STOPS
PAY AND PROVISIONS--DECLARES THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WILL GIVE ME
NOTHING!--CAPTAIN SHEPHERD'S REPLY--I PREPARE TO RETURN TO RIO--THE
ENVOY DISMISSES ME FROM THE SERVICE--WITHOUT REASON ASSIGNED--HE
DECLARES THAT I VOLUNTARILY ABANDONED THE SERVICE--RECEIPTS FOE ACCOUNTS
TRANSMITTED TO BRAZIL--THESE DENIED TO HAVE BEEN SENT.
The anxiety occasioned by the constant harassing which I had
undergone--unalleviated by any acknowledgment on the part of the
Imperial government of the services which had a second time saved the
Empire from intestine war, anarchy and revolution--began to make serious
inroads on my health; whilst that of the officers and men, in
consequence of the great heat and pestilential exhalations of the
climate, and of the double duty which they had to perform, afloat and
ashore, was even less satisfactory. As I saw no advantage in longer
contending with factious intrigues at Maranham--unsupported and
neglected as I was by the administration at Rio de Janeiro, and as I
knew that my immediate return to the Capital would instantly be followed
by resident contention, I resolved upon a short run into a more bracing
Northerly atmosphere, which would answer the double purpose of
restoring our health, and of giving us a clear offing for our
subsequent voyage to Rio de Janeiro.
Accordingly--after paying both to officers and crews their share of the
prize money refunded by the Junta of Maranham (see concluding Chapter),
I shifted my flag into the _Piranga_, despatched the _Pedro Primiero_ to
Rio, and leaving Captain Manson, of the _Cacique_, in charge of the
naval department at Maranham, put to sea on the 18th of May.
On the 21st we crossed the Equator, and meeting with a succession of
Easterly winds, were carried to the Northward of the Azores, passing St.
Michael's on the 11th of June. It had been my intention to sail into the
latitude of the Azores, and then to return to Rio de Janeiro; but strong
gales coming on we made the unpleasant discovery that the frigate's
maintopmast was sprung, and when putting her about, the main and
maintopsail yards were discovered to be unserviceable. A still worse
disaster was, that the salt provisions shipped at Maranham were reported
bad; mercantile ingenuity having resorted to the device of placing good
meat at the top and bottom of the barrels; whilst the middle, being
composed of unsound provisions, had tainted the whole, thereby rendering
it not only uneatable, but positively dangerous to health.
For the condition of the ship's spars I had depended on others, not
deeming it necessary to take upon myself such investigation; it is
however possible that we might have patched these up, so as to reach Rio
de Janeiro, had not the running rigging been as rotten as the masts,
and we had no spare cordage on board. The state of the provisions,
however, rendered a direct return to Rio de Janeiro out of the question,
the good provisions on board being little more than sufficient for a
week's subsistence of the crew.
On ascertaining these facts, I convened the officers for the purpose of
holding a survey on the state of the ship and provisions, they all
agreeing with me as to the impracticability of attempting a six weeks'
voyage with defective masts and rigging, and only a week's provisions on
board, at the same time signing a survey to that effect, which document
is now in my possession. It was therefore determined to put into some
port for the purpose of refitting; but here another difficulty presented
itself. Portugal was still an enemy's country. Had we made a Spanish
port, the prominent part I had taken in depriving Spain of her colonies
in the Pacific would have ensured me a questionable reception. A French
port too was unsuitable, as France had not acknowledged the independence
of Brazil.
To enter an English harbour was attended with some risk of annoyance to
myself, in consequence of the enactments of the "Foreign Enlistment
Bill," the provisions of which had been specially aimed at my having
taken service in South America though before that Bill was passed, so
that I did not consider myself to come within the meaning of the Act.
Still the point was debateable, and were it raised, might subject me to
considerable personal inconvenience, the more so as being in command of
a foreign ship of war belonging to an unacknowledged state. The
necessity was, however, urgent, and taking all circumstances into
consideration, I resolved, notwithstanding the Foreign Enlistment Bill,
to stretch on to Portsmouth, and there procure provisions, anchors,
cables, and stores, indispensable for the use of a ship of war; the
frigate being so destitute of all these, that, had I been fully aware of
her condition before quitting Maranham, I should have hesitated to put
to sea.
In passing the Azores, we overtook the brig _Aurora_, which left
Maranham ten days before the _Piranga_, cleared out for Gibraltar under
Brazilian colours. She was now steering direct for Lisbon under a
Portuguese ensign, in company with a Portuguese schooner; this
circumstance clearly shewing the kind of intercourse carried on between
Brazil and the mother country by connivance of the authorities. Though
both vessels were within my grasp I did not molest them, in consequence
of having received private information of a decree passed by the supreme
military council at Rio de Janeiro on the 26th of October, from the
tenor of which decree, had I made further captures from the enemy, I
should have incurred additional penalties, as acting contrary to the
obvious intentions of a majority of the council, though their views had
not been officially communicated to me.
I had, however, stronger reasons for not molesting these vessels.
Knowing that both were bound for Lisbon, I felt certain that they would
carry the news of our approaching the shores of Portugal with a view to
mischief--and that a knowledge of the proximity of a Brazilian ship of
war, with the further consideration of the injury she might do to the
trade of that nation in case of rupture of the pending negociations,
could not fail to inspire a desire for peace on the minds of the
mercantile portion of the population, who had hitherto been chiefly
instrumental in delaying the paternal intentions of His Portuguese
Majesty with regard to the independence of Brazil as now firmly
established under the government of his descendant and heir apparent.
The effect anticipated was, in reality, produced by their report, so
that we contributed in no small degree to hasten the peace which was
shortly afterwards established.
Another motive for not molesting these vessels was, that being
compelled, for the reasons before stated, to resort to an English
port, at a time when I knew the British Government to be carrying
on negociations for peace between Portugal and Brazil, I felt it
better to abstain from hostilities against Portuguese vessels or
property--considering that a contrary course might impede the
reconciliation which was desirable both for the interests of His
Imperial Majesty and his royal father; a result scarcely less
advantageous to England on account of her rapidly extending commerce in
Brazil.
We sighted the English coast on the 25th of June, and on the following
day came to anchor at Spithead, our available provisions being entirely
expended. My first step was to inquire of the authorities at
Portsmouth, whether, in case of the _Piranha's_ saluting, the
compliment would be returned with the same number of guns? The inquiry
being answered in the affirmative, the salute was fired, and replied to;
thus, for the first time, was the flag of His Imperial Majesty saluted
by an European state, and the independence of Brazil virtually
acknowledged.
My next step was to report the arrival of the _Piranga_ at Portsmouth,
to the Chevalier Manoel Rodriguez Gameiro Pessoa, the Brazilian Envoy in
London; at the same time informing his Excellency of the circumstances
which had unavoidably led to our appearance in British waters, and
requesting him to forward the means of paying the men's wages. This
requisition was complied with, to the extent of two months' pay to the
men.
As it was contrary to the law or usage of England to assist in the
equipment of ships of war belonging to foreign belligerent states, the
articles required for the re-equipment of the frigate could not be
furnished from the Royal arsenal--the duty of providing these,
therefore, devolved upon the Brazilian Envoy, who soon afterwards
represented that he was without means for the purpose, thus impeding the
equipment of the frigate. The men being also without fresh provisions or
the means to procure them, were beginning to desert, I advanced £.2000,
in order to keep them together, giving the Chevalier Gameiro an order
for this amount on my bankers, Messrs. Coutts, and taking his receipt
for the amount, for which I drew a bill upon the Imperial Government at
Rio de Janeiro, which was _protested, and has not been paid to this
day!_
On the 4th of August, I was surprised at receiving from the Envoy a
letter charging _me personally_ with the amount he had advanced to the
_Piranga_, and also with £.295, an alleged error of account in payments
made at Maranham; his Excellency concluding with the extraordinary
declaration, that--"having received from my bankers, Messrs. Coutts and
Co. the sum of £.2000 he had placed against it the amount advanced, the
transaction leaving me indebted to the Legation in the sum of £.25!"
Though the Legation could not have anything to do with the assumed error
arising from transactions at Maranham.
On the 21st of August, I received a letter from the Brazilian Envoy to
the effect that he had perceived in the newspapers a report that I had
accepted from the Government of Greece the command of its navy--and
wished to know if there was any truth in the assertion. To this inquiry
I replied that so long as I continued in the Brazilian service I could
not accept any other command; that the Greek command had been offered to
me whilst in Brazil, in the same manner as the Brazilian command had
been offered to me whilst in the service of Chili; and that, soon after
my return to Portsmouth, the Greek committee, zealous in the cause which
they had adopted, had renewed their offers, under the impression that my
work in Brazil was now completed. At the same time, I assured the Envoy
that as, in the case of Chili, I did not accept the Brazilian command
till my work was done, neither should I accept a Greek commission till
my relations with Brazil were honourably concluded, but that
nevertheless the offer made to me on behalf of Greece was not rejected.
This reply was construed by the Chevalier Gameiro into an admission that
_I had_ accepted the Greek command, and he addressed to me another
letter, expressive of his regret that I should have "come to the
resolution to retire from the service of His Imperial Majesty the
Emperor of Brazil, in the great work of whose independence I had taken
so glorious a part, (a grande obra da independencia, V. E'a teve tao
gloriosa parte) regretting the more especially that his august Sovereign
should be deprived of my important services (prestantes servicios) just
at a moment when new difficulties required their prompt application,"
&c. &c.
These expressions were probably sincere, for, since my departure from
Maranham, serious difficulties had arisen in the river Plate, which
afterwards ended with little credit to the Brazilian cause. But _I had
not accepted the Greek command_, and had no intention of so doing
otherwise than consistently with my engagements with Brazil. On the 6th
of September, I therefore addressed to the Envoy the following letter:--
Edinburgh, 6th Sept. 1825.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
I regret that your translator should have so far
mistaken the words and meaning of my last letter as to lead your
Excellency to a conclusion that I had taken the resolution to leave
the service of H.I.M. the Emperor of Brazil, or, in other words,
that it was I who had violated the engagements entered into with
the late ministers of His Imperial Majesty in 1823. Whereas, on
the contrary, the _portaria_ published in the Rio Gazette on the 28th
of February, 1824, was promulgated without my knowledge or
sanction, and the limitation of my authority to _the existing war_ was
persevered in by the present ministers, notwithstanding my remonstrance
in writing, both to the Minister of Marine and the Minister
of the Interior.
Your Excellency ought not therefore to be surprised, if--threatened
as I am with this _portaria_--I should provide beforehand
against a contingency which might _hereafter_ arise from an occasion
happily so nigh, as seems to be the restoration of peace and amity
between His Imperial Majesty and his royal father.
With regard to any communications of a pressing nature relative
to the equipment of the _Piranga_, your Excellency may consider
Captain Shepherd authorised to act, in my absence, in all ordinary
cases. And that officer, having instructions to acquaint me whenever
the _Piranga_ shall have two-thirds of her complement of men on
board--I can at any time be in London within two days of the
receipt of such communication, and most assuredly before the
complement can be procured.
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
To Chevalier MANOEL RODRIGUEZ GAMBIRO PESSOA.
Notwithstanding that my engagements with Brazil rested on the original
patents conferred upon me by His Majesty, of which the validity had been
further established by the additional documents given before my
departure for Pernambuco--the latter completely setting aside the
spurious _portaria_ of Barbosa, limiting my services to the duration of
the war--I nevertheless felt confident that, when my services were no
longer required, no scruples as to honourable engagements would prevent
the ministry from acting on the spurious documents, though promulgated
without my knowledge or consent, against every principle of the
conditions upon which I entered the Brazilian service. No blame could
therefore attach to me, for not rejecting the offer of the Greek
command, in case a trick of this kind should be played, as I had every
reason to believe it would be--and as it afterwards in reality was.
On the 27th of September, the Brazilian Envoy forwarded to me an order
from the Imperial Government at Rio, dated June 27th, and addressed to
me at Maranham; the order directing me to proceed from that port to Rio
immediately on its receipt, to give an account of my proceedings
there--though despatches relating even to minute particulars of every
transaction had, as the reader is well aware, been sent by every
opportunity. His Majesty, when issuing the order, was ignorant that I
had quitted Maranham, still more that on the day the order was issued at
Rio de Janeiro, I had anchored at Spithead, so that obedience to His
Majesty's commands was impossible.
Acting on this order, the Chevalier Gameiro took upon himself to
"require, in the name of the Emperor, the immediate return of the
_Piranga_, so soon as her repairs were completed, and her complement of
men filled up." As I knew that the order in question would not have been
promulgated by the Emperor, had he known the effect produced by the
presence of the _Piranga_ in the vicinity of Portugal; and as, in
everything I had accomplished in Brazil, His Majesty had placed the
fullest confidence in my discretion, I felt certain that he would be
equally well satisfied with whatever course I might deem it necessary to
pursue, I did not therefore think it expedient to comply with the
requisition of the Envoy, assigning the following reasons for using my
own judgment in the matter:--
Edinburgh, Oct. 1, 1825.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
I have this day been favoured with your letter containing
a copy of a _portaria_ dated June 27th, wherein His Imperial
Majesty, through his Minister of Marine, directs my immediate
return from Maranham to Rio de Janeiro, leaving only the small
vessels there; which order you will observe I had anticipated on the
20th of May, when I left the Imperial brig-of-war _Cacique_ and the
schooner _Maria_ in that port. Since then, His Excellency the
Minister of Marine is in possession of duplicates of my correspondence
mentioning the arrangements I had so made in anticipation
of the Imperial order; and of my official communications--also in
duplicate--transmitted on my arrival at Portsmouth, by your
Excellency's favour, with your despatches.
These will have acquainted His Imperial Majesty with the cause
and necessity of our arrival at Spithead--as well as with my intention
there to wait a reasonable time before the departure of the _Piranga,_
in order to learn the result of the negociations with Portugal.
I have only to add that, by some inadvertence, your Excellency's
secretary has sent me the copy instead of the original order addressed
to me by order of His Imperial Majesty, which mistake may be
remedied on my return to town.
I am gratified to learn that there is less difficulty in procuring men
than I had anticipated under the regulations respecting foreign seamen.
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
The Chevalier GAMEIRO.
Shortly previous to this, the Chevalier Gameiro addressed a letter to
Lieutenant Shepherd, under the title of "Commander of the _Piranga_!"
unjustifiably informing him officially that _"I had retired from the
service of His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil!"_ notwithstanding my
letters to him in contradiction. Indeed, the letter just quoted is
sufficient to shew that not only had I not relinquished the service, but
that I refused to obey Gameiro's order to proceed to Rio, because I knew
that if the frigate returned to Brazil, the impression her presence had
produced on Portugal would be altogether neutralized, and the
negociations for peace might be indefinitely prolonged; so that his
order to run away from the good which had been effected, was so truly
absurd, that I did not choose to comply with it. Had the negociations
for peace been broken off, I had formed plans of attacking Portugal in
her own waters, though with but a single frigate; and I had no
reasonable doubt of producing an impression there of no less forcible a
character than, with a single ship, I had, two years before, produced on
the Portuguese fleet in Brazil. The order was, therefore, one commanding
me to run away from my own plans, of which the Envoy however knew
nothing, as I did not feel justified in entrusting him with my
intentions.
On receiving the above-mentioned intimation to proceed to Rio de
Janeiro--without my intervention, Lieutenant Shepherd very properly
forwarded the Envoy's letter to me--when, of course, I apprised him that
he was under my command, and not under that of the Chevalier Gameiro.
At the same time I wrote to the latter, that "it would be the subject of
regret if anything should cause the spurious decree of the 28th of
February, 1824, to be brought into operation, but that, _at present,
being in full possession of my office and authority_, my opinion was in
no way changed, that the _Piranga_ should be first fully equipped, and
then wait for a reasonable time for the decision of those important
matters in discussion."
Finding that Lieutenant Shepherd would not fly in the face of my
authority, the Envoy finally resorted to the extraordinary measure of
stopping the seamen's wages and provisions. On the 6th of October,
Lieutenant Shepherd wrote to me, that "in consequence of their wages not
being paid they had all left off work, and though Clarence did all he
could to pacify them, and get them to return to their duty, they had
determined not to go to work until they were paid." On the 8th,
Lieutenant Shepherd again wrote, "that Gameiro having ceased to supply
the frigate with fresh provisions, he had, on his own responsibility,
ordered the butcher to continue supplying them as usual." On Lieutenant
Shepherd waiting upon the Envoy to remonstrate against this system of
starvation, he replied--and his words are extracted from Lieutenant
Shepherd's letter to me, that as "His Lordship did not think proper to
sail at the time he wished, he would not be responsible for supplying
the frigate with anything more--nor would he advance another shilling."
In all this, Gameiro--acting, no doubt, on instructions from the
Portuguese faction at Rio--resorted to every kind of falsehood to get
the officers to renounce my authority and to accept his! Of the
character of the man and his petty expedients, the following extract
from Lieutenant Shepherd's letter of the 8th of October, will form the
best exponent:--
I have had another visit from General Brown, when he began a
conversation by mentioning the evils which would arise from the
feeling between your Lordship and Gameiro, who was at a loss how to
act, as he had no authority over you--Gen. Brown suggesting how much
better it would be for me to place myself under Gameiro's orders.
Finding that I refused--on the following morning he called again, and
told me that he had seen Gameiro, and had heard that the
misunderstanding between your Lordship and him was at an end, but
that Gameiro wanted to see me. On this I waited on Gameiro, who after
some conversation told me that if I had any regard for His Imperial
Majesty's service, I should never have acted as I had done. I told
him that all I had done had been for the good of the service, and
that I was ready to put to sea as soon as I received your Lordship's
orders. He then asked me if I was the effective Captain of the ship?
and whether I was not under the orders of Captain Crosbie? I told him
that I was not acting under the orders of Captain Crosbie, but that I
was Captain of the ship by virtue of a commission from the Emperor,
and by an order from Lord Cochrane. He then said--Are you authorised
to obey the orders of Captain Crosbie? and I said, I was not. Suppose
you were to receive an order from Captain Crosbie, would you obey it?
I said I would not. Then you consider yourself the lawful Captain of
that ship? I do.
Upon this Gameiro remarked, "You are not an officer of Lord
Cochrane's, but of the Imperial Government. It is impossible for Lord
Cochrane to return to the Brazils as the Admiralty Court there _has
sentenced him to pay £.60,000 sterling, and his command will cease as
soon as peace is made between Brazil and Portugal! Besides, Lord
Cochrane's motive for detaining the_ Piranga _is the expectation on
his part of receiving £.6000 per annum at the termination of the war,
which the Government will never give him_!"
Finding that this made no impression on me, he began to threaten,
saying that "he would state to his Government that all delay was
occasioned by me, and that I should have to answer for it." I told
him that, in the event of my sailing without your orders, I subjected
myself to be tried by a court-martial for so doing, and leaving your
Lordship behind. He answered that "I must be aware that he was the
legal representative of His Imperial Majesty, and that he would give
me despatches of such a nature as would not only exonerate me from
all blame, but would shew the great zeal I had for His Imperial
Majesty's service."
I asked Gameiro--if I were to act in such a manner, what would people
think of me? The answer was, "_Never mind what Lord Cochrane says,
you will be in the Brazils and he in England, and I will take upon
myself all the blame and the responsibility._" He gave me till the
evening to think of his proposals, and if I would not consent to
them, he had other means of sending the _Piranga_ to sea. He further
requested me to keep this secret from your Lordship, as if you heard
of it you would come post and stop it; adding that if I would
consent, he would send a sufficient number of men in a steamboat,
with every kind of store and provisions required to complete us, and
we were to sail immediately.
This deep laid plot of Gameiro's was not to be carried on as
Portuguese plots are in general, but was to be done--using his own
words--_at a blow_, before anybody could know anything about it.
With this I send a copy of my answer to Gameiro's proposals, and a
letter representing the state of the ship.
I have the honour to remain
Your Lordship's obedient Servant,
JA'S. SHEPHERD.
Such were the underhand expedients of a man who was silly enough to tell
the secrets of his Government, as regarded the intended injustice of the
Brazilian Ministry towards me--in spite of stipulations thrice ratified
by the Emperor's own hand. But in confiding them to Lieutenant Shepherd,
the Envoy's want of common honesty, no less than of common sense, did
not perceive that he was imparting iniquitous projects to a brave and
faithful officer, who would not lose a moment till he had apprised me of
the whole. I should be unjust to the memory of Captain Shepherd did I
not give his written reply to the infamous proposals of Gameiro, a copy
of which was enclosed to me in the preceding letter.
Copy of my answer to Gameiro's proposals, sent in Portuguese, and
translated by Mr. March:--
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
In answer to the wishes of your Excellency to place
myself under your immediate orders, I have to acquaint you that I
have this morning had a letter from Lord Cochrane, stating that he
had received letters from your Excellency of such a nature as to
require his immediate presence in town, where he intends to be on
Monday next. This alone--you must be aware--will entirely preclude
the possibility of putting into execution the arrangements
which you wished; the celerity of the Admiral's movements being
such as to preclude all hope of effecting them.
I am sorry to add, that all our men have this morning left
the ship in a complete state of mutiny, occasioned by their not
having received their last two months' pay, and I much fear that it
will be now more difficult than ever to get her manned--as, from
their having been so long kept in arrears, and leaving their ship
without being paid, has irritated their feelings to such a degree, that
I have no hesitation whatever in saying that they will do all in their
power to prevent others from joining her.
I have the honour to remain
Your obedient humble Servant,
JAMES SHEPHERD.
To His Excellency
MANOEL RODRIGUEZ GAMEIRO PESSOA.
On the 29th of October, I received from the Brazilian Legation in
London, further orders from the Imperial Government, dated August 25th,
1825, to return with the _Piranga_ to Rio de Janeiro--and with these I
made preparations to comply, notifying to Gameiro my readiness to
sail--by the following letter:--
London, Nov. 3, 1825.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
Having informed your Excellency on the 1st of
October, that previous to quitting Maranham I had anticipated the
Imperial resolutions, and having in my letter of the 24th further
made known to your Excellency that the _Piranga_ should sail for
Brazil on or as soon after the 10th of this month as the wind would
permit, your Excellency will perceive that there is nothing remaining
of the Imperial decree to be executed, unless the _Piranga_ (which I
much doubt) should be enabled to put to sea before the early day
which I have fixed for departure.
(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
His Excellency
MANOEL RODRIGUEZ GAMEIRO PESSOA.
This declaration of my readiness to comply with His Imperial Majesty's
orders did not, however, suit the Envoy, nor did it fall in with his
instructions from the Brazilian Ministry, which, no doubt were, as soon
as peace was proclaimed, _to get rid of me without satisfying my
claims_--this course being, indeed, apparent from what the Envoy, as
just shewn, had communicated to Lieutenant Shepherd. (See page 260.) On
the 3rd of November, peace between Portugal and Brazil was announced,
and the independence of the Empire acknowledged; Gameiro being, on the
occasion, created Baron Itabayana, whilst I--to whose instrumentality
the peace--as a consequence of the consolidation of the Empire had been
mainly owing, _was to be ignominiously dismissed the service_!
On the 7th of November--four days only after the announcement of
peace--Gameiro took upon himself the execution of the spurious
ministerial decree issued by Barbosa on the 27th of February, 1824,
which _had been abrogated by the Emperor, through the same minister, in
the July following, as a prelude to my employment in the
tranquillisation of the Northern provinces_. Gameiro did not venture
previously to apprise me of the act lest I should resist it--but
insultingly sent an order to the officers of the Piranga to "disengage
themselves from all obedience to my command." (Se desligaõ de toda
subordinacaõ a o Ex'mo S'r Marquez do Maranhaõ), thus unjustifiably
terminating my services--as I was on the point of returning, in
obedience to the order of the Emperor. The subjoined is the order
alluded to:--
_To_ Captain SHEPHERD, _commanding the Piranga, still refusing
supplies whilst I held the command._
Having received the two letters which you addressed to me on the
4th of this month, enclosing three demands for various articles for
the use of the frigate, I have to reply that I persist in my resolution
not to furnish anything to the frigate unless she is placed under the
immediate orders of this Legation, which I shall only consider
accomplished when I shall receive a reply signed by yourself, and
by all the other officers, declaring that--in compliance with the
orders of His Imperial Majesty, contained in the two portarias of
37th of June and 20th of August last--_you all place yourselves under
the orders of this Legation, and cast off all subordination to the
Marquis of Maranhaõ!_
Dated London, 7th November, 1825.
(Signed) GAMEIRO.
As this was done without the slightest motive existing or assigned,
there was no doubt in my mind but that Barbosa and his colleagues in the
ministry had instructed Gameiro to dismiss me from the service whenever
peace was effected; indeed, he had so informed Lieutenant Shepherd by
the letter before quoted. To resist a measure--though thus insultingly
resorted to--in the face of the Imperial order to return, was out of the
question, as the instant consequence would have been a disgraceful
outbreak between the Brazilian and Portuguese seamen of the _Piranga,_
in the principal war port of England, to my own scandal, no less than to
that of the Imperial government. I had, therefore, no alternative to
avert this outrage but by submitting to the forcible deposition from my
authority as Commander-in-Chief.
This act of the Envoy--_based upon the deliberate falsehood that His
Imperial Majesty had ordered the officers not to obey me, no such order
existing_ in either of the Portarias mentioned--precluded my obedience
to the Imperial command to return to Rio de Janeiro, for being no longer
acknowledged as "First Admiral of Brazil, and Commander-in-Chief of the
National Armada," I could only have accompanied the _Piranga_ as a
passenger, or rather _quasi_ prisoner; and to this, in either capacity,
it was impossible, without degradation, to submit. I had no inclination
to place myself at the mercy of men who had taken advantage of a
spurious decree to dismiss me--now that--in spite of their
opposition--the destiny of the Empire had been irrevocably decided by
my having counteracted their _anti-national_ views whilst carrying out
the intentions of His Imperial Majesty.
As will presently be seen, it was falsely represented by Gameiro, to the
Imperial Government, that I had _voluntarily abandoned the service!_
though, from the letter just quoted--ordering the officers to "disengage
themselves from all subordination to me," this subterfuge of my having
_dismissed myself_ is obviously false. I will not, therefore, trespass
on the patience of the reader by dilating upon the subject; suffice it
to say that, not choosing to return to Rio de Janeiro as a passenger, I
had no dignified alternative but to give up the frigate to the command
of the senior officer, Captain Shepherd; confiding to him all accounts
of monies distributed for the Imperial service, with the vouchers for
the same--taking the precaution to send however the duplicate receipts
given by the officers on account of the monies paid by the Junta of
Maranham--and retaining the originals in my possession, where they now
remain, and will be adduced in the statement of account forming the
concluding chapter of this volume.
For these accounts--which the Brazilian ministers _deny ever to have
received_--Captain Shepherd gave me, under his own signature, the
following acknowledgment--now in my possession; a photograph of which,
together with photographs of other important documents has long since
been sent to the Brazilian Government:--
Received from Lord Cochrane, Marquess of Maranhaõ, the key of the
iron chest, in which the prize lists and receipts for the
disbursement of public monies have been kept during His Excellency's
command; which key and chest I engage faithfully to deliver to the
accountant-general of His Imperial Majesty's navy, or to the proper
authority at Rio de Janeiro, taking his receipt for the same.
On board H.I.M.'s ship _Piranga_, November 12th, 1825,
JA's SHEPHERD.
The denial by the Brazilian Administration--of the accounts and receipts
thus acknowledged by Captain Shepherd, and the absence of any
ministerial communication on the subject, forms an unworthy imputation
on the memory of a gallant officer, who a short time afterwards nobly
died in action in the cause of Brazil. It was utterly impossible that
Captain Shepherd should have done otherwise than have delivered them,
for he was a man upon whose honour no reproach could be cast. There are
only two ways to account for their not having been delivered, if such be
the case. 1st, that Gameiro on the delivery of the frigate to the
legation obtained possession of the chest in which they were deposited,
and withheld them to justify my dismissal by casting the reproach upon
me of having appropriated the amount--an act of which the Brazilian
Government may judge whether he was capable; or, 2ndly, that from the
same reason they were purposely withheld or destroyed by the ministers
who had been so inimical to me. The present Brazilian Administration is
happily composed of men of a different stamp, and it becomes them, for
the sake of the national reputation, to institute the strictest search
for the documentary evidence adduced, as no man will believe that I
withheld documents which could alone justify my acts.
And here I must be permitted to remark, that the documentary evidence
adduced in this volume proves the history, and not the history the
documents. If any question be made as to their validity or fidelity, _I
hereby call upon the Brazilian Government to appoint a Commission, or
authorise their Embassy to compare the extracts with the originals in my
possession, so that no manner of doubt or question shall attach to
them._ My object in now producing them is, that I will not voluntarily
go to my grave with obloquy, cast on me by men, who, at the outset of
Brazilian independence, were a misfortune to the Empire no less than to
myself; men who not only pursued this shameful line of conduct towards
me who was unable to resist it,--but towards His Imperial Majesty,--who,
by similar practices, was eventually disgusted into AN ABDICATION OF HIS
THRONE AND AN ABANDONMENT OF THE COUNTRY--to which he had given one of
the freest Constitutions in existence--achieved under the Imperial
watchword, "Independencia ou morte."
CHAPTER XIII.
I AM DISMISSED THE SERVICE BY THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT--WITHOUT ANY
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF MY SERVICES--INCONSISTENCY OF THIS WITH FORMER
THANKS--THOUGH DISMISSED I AM TRIED AS A DESERTER--AND AM REFUSED ALL
COMPENSATION--REPORT OF RECENT COMMISSION ON THE SUBJECT--FALSE
REPRESENTATIONS--BUT PARTIALLY TRUE CONCLUSIONS--MY ORIGINAL PATENTS
NEVER SET ASIDE--UNTRUE ASSUMPTIONS AS TO MY DISMISSAL--MY CLAIMS
FOUNDED ON THE ORIGINAL PATENTS--LESS THAN HALF THE INTEREST DUE
PAID--OPINIONS OF EMINENT BRAZILIANS THEREON--MY SERVICES TARDILY
ACKNOWLEDGED--NO ACT OF MINE HAD ANNULLED THEM--THE ESTATE CONFERRED,
NOT CONFIRMED--PROMISES ON ACCOUNT OF CHILI UNFULFILLED--THE WHOLE
STILL MY RIGHT.
Having been thus unceremoniously dismissed from the Imperial
service--without doubt, by order of the Brazilian Ministry to their
Envoy in London, I was some months afterwards surprised by the receipt
of a letter from the Imperial Government, dated December 21st, 1825, and
signed "Visconde de Paranagua," informing me that His Imperial Majesty
had ordered all my pay and other claims to be suspended till I should
return to Rio de Janeiro to justify myself and give an account of my
commission--this being now out of my power, as I had been deprived of
command, and the frigate in which I came to England had returned, by
order of the Envoy, to Rio de Janeiro.
Without, however, giving me time to do this, I received another letter
from the same authority, dated Dec. 30, containing my formal dismission
from the service--this shewing that Gameiro had previous instructions
to act in the way narrated in the last chapter.
The following is the official letter dismissing me from the command of
the Navy, and from the post of First Admiral:--
His Majesty the Emperor, informed of that which your Excellency has
set forth in your letter No. 300, dated the 5th of November last, has
been pleased to determine that your Excellency shall fulfil the
orders already several times transmitted to you, and further in
compliance with the order of the 20th inst., a copy of which I
inclose, you are to return to this Court, where it is necessary you
shall give an account of the Commission with which you were
entrusted. His Majesty is much surprised that, after having taken the
frigate _Piranga_ to a foreign port, and having there remained in
despite of the Baron Itabayana, you should have adopted the
extraordinary resolution, not only _to abandon that frigate, but also
to retire from the service of the Emperor_, without having returned
to give an account of your proceedings _previous to your dismissal
from the command of the naval forces, and from the post of First
Admiral_ of the National and Imperial Armada. All which I communicate
for the information and execution of your Excellency.
God preserve your Excellency.
Palace of Rio de Janeiro, Dec. 30th, 1825.
(Signed) VISCONDE DE PARANAGUA.
To the Marquis of Maranhaõ.
From this extraordinary document it is plain that Gameiro had written to
the Imperial Government the same falsehood, as he had used when
endeavouring to seduce Lieut. Shepherd from his duty to me as his
Commander-in-Chief; viz. that I had voluntarily retired from the
service, because the Admiralty Court having condemned me in £.60,000
_damages, I durst not return to Rio de Janeiro!_ though I announced to
him my readiness to sail in the frigate. The Jesuitical nature of the
preceding letter amply proves its object and motive. It does not dismiss
me--but _it calls on me to come and be dismissed_! carefully addressing
me, however, as "Marquis of Maranhaõ," and not as First Admiral, thereby
intimating that I was _already dismissed_! As there can be no mistake
about the meaning of the document, it is not worth while to discuss
it--the reason why it is adduced being to shew that I was not only
dismissed by the Envoy Gameiro, but in a little more than a month
afterwards by the Imperial Government itself; which for thirty years
reiterated in reply to my often pressed claims--that _I dismissed myself
by abandoning the service of my own accord_!
Not a word of acknowledgment was ever given for having a second time
saved the Empire from dismemberment, though this service was entirely
extra-official, it being no part of my contract with the Brazilian
Government to put down revolution, nor to take upon myself the
responsibility and difficult labour of reducing half the Empire to the
allegiance which it had perhaps not without cause repudiated--at the
same time, of necessity, taking the management of the whole upon myself.
This had been done at the pressing personal request of His Imperial
Majesty, in face of the decree of the Court of Admiralty _that no prizes
should be made within a certain distance of the shore_; so that no
benefit, public or private--arising from the operations of war--could
result from blockade; yet I had a right to expect even greater thanks
and a more liberal amount of compensation in case of success, than from
the first expedition. Not a word of acknowledgment nor a shilling of
remuneration for that service has ever been awarded to this day; though
such treatment stands out in glaring inconsistency with the Imperial
thanks and honours--the thanks of the Administration--and the vote of
the General Assembly, for expelling on the first expedition enemies not
half so formidable as were the revolutionary factions with which I had
to contend in the Northern provinces.
Neither in Brazil nor in England had I done anything to forfeit my right
to the fulfilment of the explicit stipulations set forth in the Imperial
patents of March 26th, and November 25th, 1823. His Imperial Majesty had
all along marked his approbation of my zealous exertions for the
interests of the empire--designating them "_altos e extraordinarios
servicios_."--and desired that I should have the most ample
remuneration; having, in addition to every honour in his power to
confer, granted me an estate, which grant was by the Portuguese faction
strenuously and successfully opposed, and not this only, but every other
recompence proposed by His Majesty as a remuneration for my services.
The object being to subvert whatever had been effected by my exertions,
though, but for these the inevitable consequence would have been the
establishment of insignificant local governments in perpetual turmoil
and revolution, in place of an entire empire in the enjoyment of
uninterrupted repose. Had I connived at the views of the Anti-Imperial
faction--even by avoiding the performance of extra-official services--I
might, without dereliction of my duty as an officer, have amply shared
in their favours; but for my adherence to the Emperor against their
machinations, that influence was successfully used to deprive me even of
the ordinary reward of my labours in the cause of independence.
As soon as the compulsory deprivation of my command, by the Envoy
Gameiro, became known in Rio de Janeiro--where, doubtless, it was
expected--a great outcry was raised against me, _as though my non-return
had been my own act_. The press was set in motion, and every effort was
used to traduce me in the eyes of the Brazilian people, from whom the
truth of the matter was carefully withheld; the whole, eventually,
terminating with a mock trial in my absence, when it had been placed out
of my power to defend myself. At this trial I was accused of
contumacy--stigmatised as a deserter, though, as has just been seen,
formally dismissed by the government, in confirmation of my dismissal by
the Envoy in England--and not only this, but I was declared by the
creatures of the administration in the National Assembly, to merit
punishment as a deserter! Such was my reward for first consolidating and
afterwards preserving the Empire of Brazil.
Never dreaming of the advantage which might thus be taken by the
Administration of the act of their envoy--on the 10th of February, 1826,
I drew a bill upon the Brazilian Government for the remainder of my pay
up to the period of my dismissal by Itabayana. This was refused and
protested, as was also another afterwards drawn.
This course clearly indicated the intention of the Administration not to
pay me anything, now that they had dismissed me from the service. To
have returned then to prosecute my claims against such judges, would
have been an act of folly, if not of insanity; my only alternative being
to memorialize the Emperor, which for many successive years I did
without effect--the execution of the Imperial will unhappily depending
on the decision of his ministers, who, little more than five years
afterwards, partly forced, and partly disgusted His Majesty into an
abdication in favour of his infant son, Don Pedro de Alcantara, now
Emperor of Brazil; committing the guardianship of his family to José
Bonifacio de Andrada, who, like myself, had been forced into exile from
the hatred of the very men who had so bitterly persecuted me, but had
been permitted to return to Brazil from which he never ought to have
been exiled.
For more than twenty years did I unceasingly memorialize successive
Brazilian governments, but without effect. At length the Administration
which had so bitterly visited its hatred on me passed away, and it
became evident to His present Imperial Majesty, and the Brazilian
people, that I had been most shamefully treated. Nearly at the same time
I had fortunately succeeded in convincing the British Government that
the obloquy for so many years heaped upon me was unmerited; and Lord
Clarendon warmly espoused my cause, as did the Hon. Mr. Scarlett, the
British Minister at Rio de Janeiro; these excellent personages taking
the trouble to investigate the matter, a boon which I had in vain
solicited from any of their predecessors; though, had the favour
previously been granted, it would have had the effect of explaining my
conduct in Brazil as satisfactorily as, I trust, this volume has done to
the reader.
The result of this was a commission, appointed by the Brazilian
Government, to inquire into the case of the squadron generally. The
following is an extract from their report, so far as regards myself:--
LORD COCHRANE.
The first in rank and title assuredly is Lord Cochrane, Earl of
Dundonald, and Marquis of Maranhaõ, First Admiral and Commander-in-Chief
of the National Armada during the War of Independence.
The fame of the services rendered by Lord Cochrane in Chili, as
Commander-in-Chief of the squadron of that republic induced the
Imperial Government to invite him to accept a similar command in
Brazil, so long as the War of Independence should last, with the
promise of the same advantages which he there enjoyed.
Accepting the invitation, he was appointed by the decree of the
21st of March, 1823, with the pay of 11.520 milreis, being the same
as he had in Chili, conferring upon him, by communication of the
same date, the command of the squadron which was being equipped
in the port of this city; and by decree of the 23rd of February,
1824, the command-in-chief of the naval forces of the Empire during
the War of Independence.
It was afterwards decreed, on the 27th of July, 1824, that he
should enjoy the said pay in full, so long as he continued in the
service of the Empire; and _in case of his not desiring to continue
therein_ after the War of Independence, one half of the said pay as
a pension, which, in the event of his decease, should revert to Lady
Cochrane.
Lastly, by a _portaria_ of the 20th of December, 1825, it was
decreed that all his muniments and rights should be suspended, and
he was dismissed by a decree of the 10th April, 1827.
Justice demands that we shall acknowledge (says the Commission)
that the services of Lord Cochrane in the command of the squadron,
put an end to the war more speedily than had been expected; but if
his services were great, it is impossible to conceal that unqualified
and arbitrary acts of the most audacious daring were committed by
him and by the ships under his command, occasioning to the National
Treasury enormous losses, particularly by the heavy indemnification
of an infinite number of bad prizes, which it was obliged to satisfy;
and truth demands that we should declare that if the pretended
claims are suspended, the fault was entirely his own, from having
disobeyed the repeated orders of the Imperial Government, which
commanded his return to this Court to give account of his commission,
aggravated by the crime of having withdrawn himself from the
Empire for England with the frigate _Piranga_, and there remaining
with that frigate, notwithstanding the reiterated orders of the
Imperial Government, for more than two years, pretending that he
had not received the said orders, which at last were ordered to be
communicated to him through the Brazilian Minister resident in
London.
All this is amply proved by different official documents, some of
which documents are from the claimant himself, this justifying the
suspension of the payment of his claims, no less than the crime of
his obstinate disobedience; and, indeed more by the indispensable
obligation by which he was bound to give accounts of the sums
which he received on account of prizes to distribute to the squadron
under his command, which distribution he himself acknowledged in
his letter of the 5th of November, 1825, wherein he says, "I shall
forward to the Imperial Government an account of the money
received from His Imperial Majesty for distribution to the seamen,
as well as other sums to the account of the captors."
Having traced this outline relative to the services and excesses of
Lord Cochrane, the Commission now proceeds to discuss his claims.
First,--His annual pay is 11.520 milreis, which was owing to him
from the 1st of August to the 10th of November 1825, when he left
the service of the Empire. The claimant founds his demand on the
decree of the 21st of March 1823, added to and confirmed on the
27th of July, 1824.
The second decree says,--"I deem fit, by the advice of my
Council of State, to determine that the said Marquis of Maranhaõ
shall receive, so long as he is in the service of the Empire, the
pay of his patent (11.520 milreis), and in case of his not choosing
to continue therein after the termination of the present war, the
half of the said pay, as a pension, the same being extended, in
case of his death, to Lady Cochrane." The said enactment being
so positive that at the sight thereof, the Commission declares, that
_it cannot do otherwise than confirm the right of the claimant to the
prompt payment of the pension due to him._
In this report there are many inaccuracies. It is stated that when in
Chili I accepted "the Brazilian command during the war of Independence"
only.--"_Viesse occupar igual commando no Brazil emquanto durasse Guerra
da Independencia._" This is contrary to fact, as will be seen in the
first chapter of this volume, where both the invitation to accept the
command, and my conditional acceptance thereof are given. To repeat the
actual words of the invitation, _"Abandonnez-nous, Milord, à la
reconnaissance Brésilienne--a la munificence du Prince--à la probité
sans tache de l'actuel Gouvernement--on vous fera justice"_ &c. &c. It
was neither "princely munificence"--"ministerial probity"--nor "common
justice," to dismiss me from the service without my professional and
stipulated emoluments, or even the arrears of my pay, the very moment
tranquillity had been established as a consequence of my exertions, and
so far the Commission decided; though they ought to have added, as was
well known, that my command in Chili had been without limitation of
time, and therefore my Brazilian command, as expressed in the Imperial
patents, was not accepted under other conditions. The above opinion,
expressed by the Commission, could only have been given to justify the
spurious decree of Barbosa, in virtue of which, though set aside by His
Imperial Majesty, I was dismissed by Gameiro, that decree--under the
hypocritical pretence of conferring upon me a boon--limiting my services
to the war, _after the war had been terminated by my exertions;_ the
object being to get rid of me, and thus to avoid condemning the prizes
captured by the squadron. Nevertheless, the promises held out to me in
Chili, were most honourably admitted by His Imperial Majesty and his
first Ministry--and were moreover twice confirmed by Imperial patent,
counter-signed by the Ministers, and registered in the National
Archives. These patents _have never been set aside by any act of mine,_
yet to this day their solemn stipulations remain unfulfilled.
The Commission complains that the Treasury was caused to sustain
"enormous losses by the indemnification of an infinite number of bad
prizes, which it was obliged to satisfy." I deny that there was _one bad
prize,_ all, without exception, being captured in violation of blockade,
or having Portuguese registers, crews, and owners. But even if they had
been bad--His Majesty's stipulation, in his own handwriting (see page
118), provided that they should be paid by the state. The fact was, as
proved in these pages beyond contradiction, that they were given back
by the Portuguese members of the Prize Tribunal to their own friends and
relations--this alone constituting the illegality of the captures.
Some--as in the case of the _Pombinho_'s cargo--were given up to persons
who had not the shadow of a claim upon them. The squadron never received
a shilling on their account.
Again, the Commission declares that I was dismissed the service on the
10th of April, 1827; whereas I have given the letter of Gameiro,
dismissing me, on the 7th of November, 1825, and the _portaria_ of the
Imperial Government, dismissing me, on the 30th of December, in the same
year! This renewed dismissal was only a repetition of the former
unjustifiable dismissals, adding nothing to their force, and in no way
alleviating their injustice.
The imputation of "the crime of obstinate disobedience" has been so
fully refuted in this volume, that it is unnecessary to offer another
word of explanation.
Finally, the Commission decided that the "Imperial act of July 27, 1824,
_is so positive that, at the sight thereof, the Commission declares it
cannot do otherwise than confirm the right of the claimant to the prompt
payment of the pension due to him._" But if the Commissioners had
examined this act of His Imperial Majesty more closely, together with
the explanatory letter of Barbosa, accompanying it, they would have seen
that the decree of July 27th, 1824, was not only additive to the
Imperial patents, but admitted _to be confirmatory of them_, by Barbosa
himself, notwithstanding his own spurious decree, nullified by His
Imperial Majesty, but afterwards unjustifiably acted upon. (See page
150.)
If I have any claim at all for the numerous and important services which
I rendered to Brazil, it is founded _on the original patents_ granted to
me by His Imperial Majesty, without limitation as to time, which I
solemnly declare was not even mentioned--much less stipulated--as the
patents themselves prove. The decree awarding me half pay as a pension,
"in case _I did not choose_ to continue in the service," has no
reference to me. I never left the service, but--as even admitted by
Gameiro, in his negotiations with Lieutenant Shepherd--was most
unjustifiably, and by wilful falsehood, _turned out of it_, in order to
rid the administration of my claims on a hundred and twenty ships, and a
vast amount of valuable property captured in lawful warfare, under the
express directions of His Imperial Majesty.
Why also is no compensation awarded to me for my extra-official services
in putting down revolution in the Northern provinces--an act, or series
of acts--in my estimation, of far greater importance and difficulty than
the expulsion of the Portuguese fleet and army? Every historian of
Brazil has spoken in high praise of my execution of this almost
impracticable task--but coupled with the infamous lie derived from the
Government that, for my own personal benefit, I robbed the Treasury at
Maranham of 106,000 dollars; though in the concluding chapter _I will
print in full the receipt of every officer under my command for his
share of the money returned by the Junta_, the original receipts being
now in my possession for the inspection of the Brazilian Government, or
of any commission or persons it may choose to appoint for that purpose.
Were these services nothing, just as half the Empire had declared itself
Republican? Was my refusal to accept a bribe of 400,000 dollars from the
revolutionary president of Pernambuco the act of a man who would
afterwards conduct himself as has been falsely imputed to me? The
Brazilian Government cannot refuse to inspect or authorise the
inspection of the originals of documents contained in this narrative,
and if they consent, I have no fear but that the national honour will
yet do me justice.
It is not justice to have awarded to me the above-named pension
merely--even on the assumption of the Commissioners that I did leave the
service of my own accord--for that sum is _less than one half the simple
interest_ of the amount of which for thirty years I was, even by their
own admission, unjustly deprived. This may be a cheap way of liquidating
obligations, but it is not consistent with the honour of a nation thus
to delay its pecuniary obligations, and then _pay the principal with
less than half the interest_! I feel certain that when making an
award--which they admit could not be avoided--the Commissioners
inadvertently lost sight of this obvious truth.
Let me refer the Brazilian Government to the officially recorded
opinions of honourable men on the Commission, or "_Seccoes_," when
commenting upon this very inadequate reward about to be given after the
lapse of thirty years of unmerited obloquy, which would have sunk any
man unsupported by the consciousness of rectitude to a premature grave.
Senor Alvez Bhanco E Hollanda declared that "as a commemoration
of the benefits which Brazil had derived from Lord
Cochrane, there was no other conclusion than that _he ought to be
paid the whole sum which he claimed, for which the 'Assemblea
Geral' should ask a credit_."
Senor Hollanda Cavalcante, in taking into account the requisition
of Lord Cochrane, was "altogether of the opinion expressed
by Senor Alvez Branco--that his Lordship as well as others
should have the whole amount claimed."
Viscount Olinda, in the Council of State, gave his opinion that
"Lord Cochrane shall be paid the various demands he has made.
He repeated his opinion that this course alone was consistent
with the dignity of the Government, or the services of the Admiral.
He (Viscount Olinda) well remembered the great services of Lord
Cochrane, and these ought not to be depreciated by paltry imputed
omissions. It appeared to him little conformable to the dignity
of Brazil, to enter, at this distance of time, into questions of
money with one to whom they owed so much."
Viscount Parana "was of opinion that _no responsibility for
captures rested on the officers who had made them, they acting
under the orders of the Government, which took the responsibility
on itself_. Justice demanded this view of the matter, and even
the acquittal of many of the prizes might be attributed to _a
change of Ministerial policy_."
Senor Aranjo Vicuna. "There is no necessity for continuing the
suspension of Lord Cochrane's pay. It ought to be paid as remuneration
for important services, the benefits whereof were not diminished
by any subsequent conduct on the part of His Lordship."
"It was the opinion of the Council that Lord Cochrane's pension
ought to be paid, notwithstanding any question as to the limitation
of prizes, or any defects in the prize accounts."--_Correio
Mercantil_, Aug. 29, 1854.
Yet notwithstanding these expressions of opinion, less than half the
interest of even the limited sum admitted to be due to me was awarded.
The Commissioners admit in the preceding Report that _my speedy
annexation of the Portuguese provinces was unexpected_, and this alone
should have made them pause ere they awarded me less than half the
interest of my own money, withheld for 30 years--themselves retaining
the principal--the amount received, being, in reality, insufficient to
liquidate the engagements which I had of necessity incurred during the
thirty years of neglect to satisfy my claims--now admitted to be beyond
dispute. Their admission involves the fact that the "_unexpected_"
expulsion of the Portuguese fleet and army _saved Brazil millions of
dollars in military and naval expeditions_ against an organised European
power, which only required time to set at complete defiance any efforts
which Brazil herself was in a condition to make. It was, in fact, a
question of "_speedy_" annexation, or no annexation at all, and it was
this consideration which impelled me to the extraordinary measures
adopted for the intimidation of the enemy, in the absence of means for
their forcible expulsion. But is it generous to reward a service of such
admitted importance, by giving me less than half the interest of a
sum--acknowledged as a right which could no longer be withheld?
Is it not ungenerous to exclude me from my share of the prize-money
taken in the first expedition, though a prize tribunal is at this moment
sitting in Rio de Janeiro to consider the claims of officers and men,
nine-tenths of whom are dead? Is it not ungenerous to have engaged me in
the extra-professional service of putting down revolution and anarchy in
the Northern provinces, and when the mission was successfully
accomplished, to have dismissed me from the Imperial service without one
expression of acknowledgment or the slightest reward?
But to put generosity out of the question--is it wise so to do? That,
says Burke--"can never be politically right which is morally wrong."
Brazil, doubtless, expects other nations to keep faith with her, and it
is not wise on her part to afford a precedent for breaking national
faith. The _Amazon_ is a rich prize, and may one day be contested. What
reply would Brazil give to a power which might attempt to seize it,
under the argument that she broke faith with those _who gave her the
title to this, the most magnificent river on the face of the earth_, and
that therefore it was not necessary to preserve faith with her? It would
puzzle Brazilian diplomatists to answer such a question.
From what has been adduced in this volume, it must be clear to all who
have perused it with ordinary attention that Brazil is to this day in
honour bound to fulfil the original stipulations solemnly entered into
with me, and twice guaranteed under the Imperial sign manual, with all
the official ratifications and formalities usual amongst civilized
states. This _I claim individually_; and further--_conjointly with the
squadron_--my share of the prize-money conceded to the captors by
Imperial decree, without which customary incentive neither myself, nor
any other foreign officer or seaman, would have been likely to enter the
service. My _individual claim_, viz. the pay stipulated in the Imperial
patents, was agreed upon without limitation as to time, as is clear from
the expression that I should receive it whether "afloat or ashore,"
"_tanto em terra como no mar_," _i.e._ whether "actively engaged or
not"--whether "in war or peace." I have committed no act whereby this
right could be cancelled, but was fraudulently driven from the Imperial
service, as the shortest way of getting rid of me and my claims
together. These are no assertions of mine, but are the _only possible
deductions_ from documents which have one meaning, and that
incontestible.
I claim, moreover, the estate awarded to me by His Imperial Majesty,
with the double purpose of conferring a mark of national approbation of
my services, and of supporting the high dignities to which--with the
full concurrence of the Brazilian people and legislature--I was raised
as a reward for those services, the magnitude and importance of which
were on all hands admitted. To have withheld that estate, after the
reasons assigned by His Imperial Majesty for conferring it, was a
national error which Brazil should not have committed, and which it
should, even now, be careful to efface; for by approving the dignities
conferred, and withholding the means of supporting them, it has
pronounced its highest honours to be worthless, empty sounding titles,
lightly esteemed by the givers, and of no value to the recipient. Had
this estate cost anything to the Brazilian nation, a miserable economy
might have been pleaded as a reason for withholding it; but even this
excuse is wanting. Any territorial grant to myself could only have been
an imperceptible fraction of the vast regions, which, together with an
annual revenue of many millions of dollars--my own exertions, _without
cost to the Empire_, had added to its dominions "_unexpectedly_" as the
Commission appointed to investigate my claim felt bound to admit. If
Brazil value its national honour, that blot upon it should not be
suffered to remain.
With regard to the sum owing to me by Chili, for which, in the event of
its non-payment, both His Imperial Majesty Don Pedro I. and his Minister
José Bonifacio de Andrada made the Brazilian nation responsible. The
discussion in the National Assembly testifies to the validity of the
claim, which therefore rests upon the generosity no less than the good
faith of Brazil, for whose interests, in accordance with the most
flattering promises, I was induced to quit Chili. To this day, Chili has
not fulfilled her obligations to me; the miserable pittance of £.6000,
which--by some process I do not now care to inquire into, she has fixed
upon as ample remuneration for one who consolidated her liberties and
those of Peru, supporting her navy at its own expense during the
operation--constituted no part of my admitted claim for the capture of
Valdivia and other previous services, involving no dispute. Payment of
this sum (67,000 dollars) was promised at the earliest possible period
by the then Supreme Director of the Republic--but to this day the
promise has never been redeemed by succeeding Chilian Governments. With
regard to this claim, founded on the concessions of His late Imperial
Majesty and his Minister, I am content, as before said, to leave the
matter to the generosity of the Brazilian nation. The other, and more
important claims, I demand as a right which has never been cancelled,
and which a strict sense of national honour ought not longer to evade.
If it be evaded, the documentary history of the whole matter is now
before the world--and let the world judge between us. I have no fears as
to its decision.
CHAPTER XIV.
PROCLAMATION FOR PAYMENT OF OFFICERS AND MEN--LOG EXTRACTS IN PROOF
THEREOF--THE SUM GIVEN UP TO THE SQUADRON DISBURSED--DENIAL THEREOF BY
THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT--THOUGH MADE TO SERVE AS ADVANCE OF WAGES--THE
AMOUNT RECEIVED AT MARANHAM FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR--BY THE RECEIPTS OF THE
OFFICERS--OFFICERS' RECEIPTS--EXTRACTS FROM LOG IN FURTHER
CORROBORATION--UP TO MY ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND--ALL OUR PRIZES MONOPOLIZED
BY BRAZIL--THE CONDUCT OF THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT UNJUSTIFIABLE.
The whole dispute raised by the Brazilian Administration as a pretext
for evading my claims, has been--as the reader is now aware--about the
sum of 200,000 dollars, _given out of the proceeds of our own captures,
which cost nothing to the Government; but were made to serve as a
substitute for the usual advance of wages!_ Also about 40,000 dollars
ordered by His Imperial Majesty as compensation for the _Imperatrice_
frigate, captured by Captain Grenfell at Parà--but _never paid_, and
therefore never accounted for. Finally, with regard to 106,000 dollars
reimbursed by the authorities of Maranham, as a compromise for four
times the amount generously surrendered by the squadron to the
necessities of the province in 1823--on promise of repayment. As regards
the whole of the sums, it is alleged that _I never furnished accounts
of their expenditure, and therefore they are charged against me, as
though not expended at all._
For the disbursement of the first item of 200,000 dollars, I have
already stated sufficient to satisfy any reasonable person. The accounts
set forth at page 169, shews that a balance remained in hand from the
200,000 dollars put on board at Rio de Janeiro, of 39,538 dollars. I
shall now state what became of this sum. And first let me adduce the
following proclamation:--
By His Excellency the Marquis of Maranhaõ, First Admiral, &c. &c.
WHEREAS, many officers and seamen are here employed who were
not present, last year, at the capitulation of the hostile authorities,
and seizure of Portuguese funds and property at Maranhaõ;
And whereas it is condusive to the interests of His Imperial
Majesty, that all those officers and seamen who have now contributed
to the restoration of tranquillity, good order, and obedience to His
Imperial Majesty, shall receive encouragement and reward;
It is hereby directed that three months additional pay shall,
without deduction, be distributed _as a gratuity_ to the said officers
and men.
Given under my hand, this 8th day
of February, 1825,
COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
I had, it is true, no authority for making this extra payment, but at
the same time, I had the authority of His Imperial Majesty to devote the
200,000 dollars to the good of the service--thus clearly leaving its
disbursement to my discretion; and this appeared to me to be properly
exercised in rewarding those who had been performing double duty afloat
and ashore, in the arduous task of putting down, and keeping down
revolt and anarchy. On this principle, I had previously doubled the pay
of some of the officers, without whose incessant exertion, I could not
have effected the tranquillization of the province. It is true that the
principle adopted was opposed to that pursued by the Administration,
viz. neither to acknowledge these extra services nor reward them; but
such a course neither accorded with my judgment nor discretion. The sums
paid as above were entered in the usual manner in a pay book,
acknowledged by the signatures of the recipients--attested by the
officers--and, as has been said, duly forwarded to the Imperial
Government.
I shall now give some extracts from the log before quoted in reference
to these and other transactions:--
_January 5th_, 1825. His Lordship left at Hesketh's his last two
months' pay, received this month, and also two months' pay for
Captain Crosbie. Paid other officers and men two months' pay.
_6th_. Employed in sorting the paper money in the small
iron chest. _Found its contents to be only_ 16,000 dollars.
(This was all that now remained of the 200,000 dollars received at
Rio de Janeiro.)
_8th_. Officers having been paid, the men received to-day two
months' pay.
_9th_. Admiral took to Hesketh's three bags of dollars (Each containing
1000 dollars, the remainder of money which I had brought
from Chili, and which therefore had nothing to do with the Brazilian
Government).
_February 10th_. Paid third payment of prize-money to Clewley,
Clare and January.
_11th_. Paid prize-money to March and Carter.
_26th_. Paid Lieutenant Shepherd 1,500 dollars.
_28th_. Paid Commissary, Escrivaõ, and Pilot.
_March 1st_. Paid Portuguese Doctor.
_3rd_. Paid Corning's account for ship provisions.
The above payments, with others disbursed in pursuance of my
proclamation, were all made out of the balance of the 200,000 dollars
aforesaid, and 40,000 dollars which had been in my possession ever since
the capture of Maranham; the latter being the amount which I had refused
to give up to the prize tribunal at Rio de Janeiro, well knowing that it
would be returned to their Portuguese friends and connections. When
these payments were made, a few hundred dollars alone remained. As this
200,000 dollars was the indisputable property of the squadron before it
was assigned for distribution amongst those to whom it belonged--on this
ground alone it scarcely became the Government to raise doubts about its
proper application; for they well knew that if it were not distributed,
the fact could not be concealed from the officers and men, who would not
have submitted quietly to my retention of their money, as has been
shamelessly imputed to me. Not only was the whole disbursed--but the
accounts, as has been stated, were faithfully transmitted to the
Brazilian authorities at Rio de Janeiro, as appears by Captain
Shepherd's receipt, adduced in the present volume, and years ago
photographed, and transmitted with a memorial to the Brazilian
Government, which, nevertheless, on the 28th of April, _in the present
year_, published in its official organ, the _Correio Mercantil_, a
report on the prizes made during the war of independence--excluding me
from a share, on _the ground of not having delivered my accounts_. The
following is an extract:--
(After enumerating the prizes, and estimating their gross value
at 521,315 dollars--_not one-fourth of the real amount_--the Commission
goes on to say:--)
Referring to what has been stated, it appears that the First
Admiral and Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron from its commencement
to the conclusion of the war, _had a right to his share
of all prizes_--and so the Commission has judged in regard to the
total value, amounting to the said sum of 521,315 milreis up to
the 12th of February, 1824. _From that sum, however, must be
deducted 200,000 dollars given to the Admiral on account of prize-money
for distribution, which it does not appear by any document that
he made_. It also appears by the report of the Junta of Maranhaõ,
of the 17th of October, 1825, that the said Admiral received the
further sum of 217,659 dollars at different times, there appearing
108,736 dollars under the title of indemnification for prizes made
by the squadron in the port of that city, to be divided as such. _This
division does not seem to have been made_.
From this it appears that the said Admiral must be charged as
having received the sum of 308,238 dollars on account of prizes to
be divided amongst the squadron; with the addition of 40,000
dollars which he received also by decree of the 23rd of February,
to be, in like manner, divided amongst those who co-operated in
the annexation of the province of Maranhaõ, and the capture of
the frigate _Imperatrice--seeing that there is no evidence that such
distribution took place_--thus increasing the sum due to 348,238
dollars, of which the said claimant is bound to give account to the
Imperial Government.
In consequence of the determination of the Regulations let this
decree be printed and published.
Rio, April 21, 1858.
(Signed) JOAQUIM JOSÉ IGNACIO,
_Chefe de esquadra_, President.
ANTONIO JOSÉ DA SILVA,
_Contador da Marinha_.
JOSÉ BAPTISTA LISBOA,
_Auditor e Secretario_.
This document, so recently promulgated, after the decision of the
_Seccoes_ in 1854, and the expression of opinion given by the most
eminent men of Brazil (see page 282), that I ought to have the whole of
my claims--is really wonderful. But the false assertions it contains
must be met.
And first--the receipt of the 40,000 dollars for the _Imperatrice_, I
altogether deny, and can be easily convicted of untruth if my receipt
for that sum can be produced. It is worthy of note, that the date of the
decree for the payment of this sum is carefully given in the preceding
document, but the data of my acknowledgment of having received is
annulled for the sufficient reason that no acknowledgment was ever
given. The 200,000 dollars, I trust that I have sufficiently accounted
for, as well as for the vouchers sent to Rio by Captain Shepherd, whose
receipt I took for the chest containing them. But the 200,000 dollars
with which the Government charges me--even supposing the accounts to be
lost--destroyed--or purposely made away with--was not the property of
the Brazilian Government, but of the squadron, who received it only as
part payment of ten times the amount due to them! This sum though the
property of the squadron, was made to serve _as an advance of wages_, no
less than as prize-money; and does the Brazilian Government imagine that
any squadron could be sent to sea without money? Or that any reader of
common sense will acquiesce in the assertion that under such
circumstances it was not properly disbursed, even though I had not shewn
_its precise disbursement_? The Brazilian Government well knows that
the men composing the squadron were of so mutinous a character, that the
slightest deviation from their rights would have been met with instant
insubordination. Did this ever occur, even in the slightest possible
degree? It is no fault of mine, if the accounts were destroyed, as I
have no doubt they were, from pure malice towards myself, in order to
bring me into an amount of disrepute, which might justify the
withholding of my claims according to the stipulations of the Imperial
patents. By whom this infamy was perpetrated, it is impossible for me to
say--but that it was perpetrated--there cannot be the smallest possible
doubt.
It is altogether unnecessary to say another word about the 40,000
dollars for the _Imperatrice_, or the 200,000 dollars for
distribution--as the evidence adduced is sufficient to satisfy any man
not determined to be unconvinced.
I now come to the amount alleged to have been received from the Junta of
Maranham, viz. 217,659 dollars, "at different times," which I have no
doubt is perfectly correct, though that portion of it under the title of
"indemnification for prizes"--is incorrect, the amount being 106,000
dollars--_minus_ the discount, and not 108,736 dollars as represented.
The difference is not, however, worth notice. Deducting this sum from
the total of 217,659 dollars, would leave 108,923 dollars to be
accounted for otherwise than as "indemnifieation." This also is, no
doubt, correct. The inhabitants of Maranham cheerfully agreed _to pay
and subsist the squadron_, provided it remained amongst them to
preserve the order which had been restored, and the offer was accepted
by me. The 108,923 dollars thus went for the pay and subsistence of the
squadron during many months of disturbance; and if it prove any thing,
it is the economy with which the wants of the squadron were satisfied,
despite the corruption of the authorities, in paying double for
provisions, because the merchants could only get paid at all, except by
bribes to their debtors. Does the Brazilian Government mean to tell the
world that it sent a squadron to put down revolution in a territory as
large as half Europe, _without receiving a penny in the shape of wages_,
except their own 200,000 dollars of prize-money--that it never
considered it necessary to send to the squadron a single dollar of pay
whilst the work was in process--and that it now considers it just to
charge the whole expenses to me as Commander-in-Chief, though the
expedition did not cost the Government any thing? Yet this is precisely
that which the Brazilian Administration has done--with what justice let
the world decide. I aver that the accounts were faithfully transmitted.
The Imperial Government of the present day, says that the accounts are
not in existence--_not that I did not transmit them_! Surely they ought
to blame their predecessors, not me. Let this history decide which of
the two is deserving of reprobation.
I now come to the 108,736 dollars--or rather 106,000 dollars received
from the Junta of Maranham as "indemnification,"--respecting which the
Commission unjustly asserts that "_no division appears to have been
made!_" The untruth of this imputation, the most atrocious of all, is
very easily met _by the publication of every receipt connected with the
matter_; and to this I now proceed, requesting the reader to bear in
mind that in my letter to the Minister of Marine (see page 209), I
announced my intention of retaining for my own justification all
_original documents_, sending to the Government, copies or duplicates.
The whole of the subjoined receipts are now in my possession, and I
demand from the Brazilian Government their verification, by its
Ministerial or Consular representatives in Great Britain.
RECEIPTS OF OFFICERS,
And others for their proportion of 106,000 dollars paid by the
Junta of Fazenda of Maranham in commutation of 425,000
dollars--the value of prize property left for the use of the Province
on its acquisition from Portugal in 1823; the duplicates having
been sent by me to the Imperial Government, the originals now
remaining in my possession.
5,000 000.
Received from the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane, Marquis
of Maranhaõ, and Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Armada,
the sum of five thousand milreis, being four thousand one hundred
and thirty-seven, or one-third of the Admiral's share of prize-money;
and eight hundred and sixty three to account of double pay for services
on shore.
DAVID JOWETT,
Maranhaõ, 19th March, 1825. Chief of Division.
* * * * *
Received of the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane, Marquis
of Maranhaõ, First Admiral of Brazil, and Commander-in-Chief of
the Naval Forces of the Empire, the sum of five hundred milreis,
as a recompence for extra services as Commandant-Interim of His
Imperial Majesty's ship _Piranga_, during the absence of Chief of
Division Jowett, on service on shore at Maranhaõ during four
months past.
March 32nd, 1825. JAMES WALLACE.
Witness, W. JACKSON.
* * * * *
Received this 18th day of March, 1825, of the Right
Hon. Lord Cochrane, Marquis of Maranhaõ, First Admiral of
Brazil, and Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the Empire,
the sum of ten thousand milreis, on account of a distribution
of eighty contos of reis, being part of certain monies received from
the Junta of Fazenda of Maranhaõ.
T. SACKVILLE CROSBIE.
_Rs._ 10,000 000.
* * * * *
5,000 000.
Received of the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane, Marquis
of Maranhaõ, First Admiral and Commander-in-Chief of the Naval
Forces of the Empire, the sum of five thousand milreis, being the
amount of additional pay to all the subordinate officers and seamen
of His Imperial Majesty's ship _Piranga_, who have served on shore
at Maranhaõ, between the 18th day of November, 1824, and the
14th day of March, 1825.
DAVID JOWETT,
Chief of Division, Commandant of the _Piranga_.
Maranhaõ, 20th March, 1825.
* * * * *
Received this 18th day of March, 1825, of the Right
Hon. Lord Cochrane, &c. &c. the sum of one thousand five hundred
milreis, on account of a distribution of eighty contos of reis, being
part of certain monies received from the Junta of Fazenda at
Maranhaõ.
W. JACKSON,
_Rs._ 1,500 000. Capt.-Lieut. and Secretary.
Received this 21st day of March, 1825, of the Right
Hon. Lord Cochrane, Marquis of Maranhaõ, &c. &c. the sum of one
thousand milreis, on account of an allowance of one-half per cent.
for my trouble in the distribution of prize-money.
W. JACKSON,
1,000 000. Capt.-Lieut. and Secretary.
* * * * *
Received this 21st of March, 1825, of the Right
Hon. Lord Cochrane, &c. &c. the sum one thousand five hundred
milreis, on account of a distribution of eighty contos of reis, being
part of certain monies received from the Junta of Fazenda of
Maranhaõ.
JA's SHEPHERD,
1,500 000. First Lieut. of _Pedro Primiero._
* * * * *
_Pedro Primiero,_ March 24, 1825.
Received from the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane,
&c. &c. the sum of one thousand milreis, on account of a distribution
of eighty contos of reis, being part of certain monies received
from the Junta of Fazenda of Maranhaõ.
1,000 000. S.E. CLEWLEY.
* * * * *
_Pedro Primiero_, March 24th, 1825.
Received from the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane,
&c. &c. the sum of one thousand milreis, on account of a distribution
of eighty contos of reis, &c. &c.
1,000 000. FRANCIS CLARE.
* * * * *
Naõ Nacional e Imperial,
_Pedro Iro_, March 24, 1825.
Recebei do Excellentissimo Lord Cochrane, &c. &c.
a quartier de hum contos de reis, pro conta de huma divisiaõ de
octento contos de reis, senda parte de certos dinheiros recebidos da
Junta da Fazenda do Maranhaõ.
FRANCISCO DE PAULO DOS SANTOS GOMEZ.
1,000 000.
* * * * *
OFFICERS' RECEIPTS
Precisely similar receipts, on same date, from the following
officers:
FRANCISCO ADEIAO PERA............................... 1,000 000
MANOEL S. SINTO .................................... 500 000
ALEXANDER JOSÉ (remainder illegible) ............... 200 000
* * * * *
Received from the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane, &c. &c. the sum of five
hundred milreis, on account of a distribution, &c. &c. 500 000. G.
MARCH.
* * * * *
Maranhaõ, 24th March, 1825. Received from the Right Hon. Lord
Cochrane, &c. &c. the sum of five hundred milreis, on account of a
distribution, &c. &c. 500 000. W. JANNARY.
* * * * *
24th March, 1825. Received from the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane, &c.
&c. the sum of five hundred milreis, on account of distribution, &c.
&c. 500 000. DAVID CARTER, Second Lieut.
* * * * *
Received, April 9th, 1825, of the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane, &c. &c.
the sum of one thousand four hundred and eighty milreis, being
prize-money due to Capt.-Lieut. G. Manson. For CAPT.-LT. MANSON,
1,480 000. W. JANNARY.
* * * * *
Received of the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane, &c. &c. the sum of one
thousand milreis, on account of a distribution of eighty contos of
reis, being part of certain monies received from the Junta of
Fazenda of Maranhaõ. 1,000 000. GEO. MANSON. April 9, 1825.
* * * * *
Received of the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane, &c. &c. the sum of four
hundred and eighty milreis, on account of prize-money due to me. 480
000. GEO. MANSON. Maranhaõ, April 9, 1825.
Authoriso Se José Perea de sua Excellencia Marques do Maranhaõ
recober e quantier de quinhentos milreis. March 9th, 1825. (Name
illegible.)
500 000.
* * * * *
Maranham, March 3, 1825.
Received of Lord Cochrane, &c. &c. the sum of two thousand six
hundred and five milreis, being the amount of my account for
provisions supplied to the Brazilian Squadron.
2,605 000. LEONARD COMING.
* * * * *
Received, the 12th of April, 1885, of His Excellency Lord Cochrane,
&c. &c. one hundred and ninety-five milreis, being additional pay
for extra duty on shore for five months.
Rs. 195 000. G. MARCH.
* * * * *
Received, April 12th, 1825, of His Excellency Lord Cochrane, &c. &c.
four hundred and eighty milreis, being additional pay for extra duty
as Secretary to His Lordship for the period of five months.
480 000. W. JACKSON.
* * * * *
Received, April 21, 1825, of the Right. Hon. Lord Cochrane, &c. &c.
thirty-nine milreis, being a month's additional pay for extra
services at Maranham.
39 000. FRANCIS DRUMMOND.
* * * * *
Received, April 21, 1825, of the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane, &c. &c.
sixty-nine milreis, being additional pay for sixty days' extra
service at Maranham.
69 000. JOSEPH FITZCOSTEN.
* * * * *
Received, April 3rd, of His Excellency the Marquis of Maranhaõ, &c.
&c. twenty-three dollars for my services as prize master of the
vessels _Dido_ and _Joaninho_.
23 000. C. ROSE, Second Lieut.
* * * * *
Received, May 14th, 1825, of Mr. W. Jackson, two hundred and
eighty-five milreis, part of prize money due to me.
285 000. JA'S SHEPHERD.
* * * * *
_Piranga_, Spithead, July 5, 1835.
Received of Mr. W. Jackson, Secretary to His Excellency the Marquis
of Maranham, &c. &c. the sum of two hundred and thirty-five pounds
sterling, in order to pay the same as prize-money to those persons,
late of the _Pedro Primiero_, but now belonging to this frigate, to
whom the sum is due. £.235 or 1,175 000.
* * * * *
There is, however, _one omission_. The payment of the crews is not
adduced, because the pay books were sent with duplicate receipts to Rio
de Janeiro by the _Piranga_. But as no reasonable man will imagine that
I publicly paid the officers and _neglected payment to the crews_, the
omission is of the least possible consequence. But lest the payment of
the crews may be disputed, I subjoin the following extracts from the log
before quoted, from the commencement of the payment, to its termination.
DATES AND PARTICULARS.
1825.
March 16th. Received from the Junta of Maranham, 30 contos
(£6,000) in bills, and 3 contos (£600) in money.
" 17th. Writing new book of distribution.
" 18th. Captain Crosbie brought 30 contas (£6,000). Went
with him to Hesketh's, where I found that he had
received 10 contos (£2,000) for himself.
" 19th. Lord Cochrane paid Jowett 5,000 dollars as
prize-money and double pay.
" 20th. 5,000 dollars paid to Jowett's officers and men as
double pay. Paid March his further share of
prize-money, 500 dollars. Took at Admiral's
desire 500 dollars for my distribution of the 100
contos in part received--from which it appears
that I am to have half per cent, for distribution.
March 22nd. Received two months' pay to the 1st of February.
Went on board the _Piranga_, and made Wallace
a gratuity from the Admiral of 500 dollars.
" 24th. Paid Shepherd, Clewley, Clare, Commissary, Doctors
Escrivaõ, Jannary, and the Pilot, a proportion of
80 contos, in course of payment by the Junta.
Went on board the _Piranga_, and paid prize-money
to Carter and a number of men.
" 26th. Paying prize-money to such of Jowett's men as were
absent on shore on the 24th.
" 27th. Paying prize-money to such of the _Pedro's_ people
entitled thereto, as are to remain on board that ship.
" 30th. Making book for distribution of double pay to those
who have served on shore.
April 6th. Counting out the money for double pay to the men
who did shore service.
" 7th. Paid part of the men their additional pay.
" 8th. Paying the additional pay.
" 9th. Paying additional pay. Sent Capt. Manson by
January 1480 dollars prize-money.
" 10th. A decree arrives by the _Guarani _from the Imperial
Government, directing the Interim President that
no money shall be paid to the squadron on account
of the taking of Maranham. Admiral suspects
Barros to be at the bottom of it.
" 11th. Went on shore with the Admiral, with sixteen bags
of dollars, besides Clewley's bag and mine.
" 13th. Paid Inglis and his men additional pay.
" 14th. Admiral proposed to Hesketh to ship cotton to the
extent of forty or sixty contos, to which Mr. Hesketh
(British Consul) agreed.
" 25th. Remainder of the money from the Junta promised
to-morrow.
April 26th. Captain Crosbie received 2,000 dollars as his further
share. Received 285 dollars, seventy-six for
distribution.
More money from the Treasury.
May 5th. Wrote to the Junta, with further demand of 13,000
dollars to make up the stipulated amount.
" 11th. Paying his Lordship's bills.
" 12th. Paying his Lordship's bills.
" 17th. Received my last three months' pay to the 30th of
April.
" 18th. Received the remaining money from the Treasury.
" 19th. Sailed in the _Piranga_.
" 20th. Sent sixty dollars by pilot to two soldiers on shore.
June 6th. Captain Crosbie appointed Captain of the Fleet, with
rank of Chief of Division.
July 2nd. At Portsmouth. Agent arrived from London with
two months' pay.
" 4th. Paying prize-money to men who had not been paid.
Received two months' pay to the 1st instant.
" 11th. Paid John Skirr £.10 for wounds.
The amount paid by the Junta was, in fact, 105,800 dollars, partly in
bills, from which a discount of 1800 dollars had to be taken. But these
trifles are unworthy of notice: I have thus accounted for every shilling
received from the Brazilian Government for the use of the squadron--to
the satisfaction of my own conscience, and, I trust, to the satisfaction
of all who may read this narrative.
From what has been herein stated, it is obvious that Brazil was, by my
instrumentality--though with inadequate means--entirely freed from a
foreign yoke, not only without national cost, but with positive gain,
arising from the vast territories and revenues annexed--as well as from
prizes, the value of which alone exceeded the cost of all naval
equipments. It is true that, after a lapse of thirty-five years, a
profession is made of adjudicating these prizes--but as nearly all the
claimants are dead, and as an intention is manifested to retain my
share, unless I produce accounts already transmitted--Brazil will have
thus monopolized the fruits of our exertions in the cause of
independence--achieved without trouble or thought to the Imperial
Government. For, beyond the usual orders on the departure of the
squadron, not a single instruction was given--all being left to my
discretion, and accomplished on my sole responsibility. Even the
favourable contraction of a loan in England--the acknowledgment of
Brazilian independence by European states--and the establishment of
permanent peace--were the direct consequences of my services, but for
which Brazil might still have presented the same lamentable specimen of
weakness without, and anarchy within, which forms the characteristics of
other South American states.
Can any government then justify the conduct pursued towards me by
Brazil? Can any government believe that the promises held out to me as
an inducement to accept the command--may be optionally evaded after the
more than completion of my part of the contract? The services rendered
were fully acknowledged by those with whom that contract was made, and
only repudiated by their factions successors, to whom Brazil owed
nothing but prospective confusion. Can any one, then, judge
otherwise--than that the present Brazilian Government is bound, in
honour and good faith, to fulfil the national contract with me--not
only on account of professional services accomplished--even beyond
national expectation; but also on account of extra-official services
which did not come within the scope of my professional duties, viz. the
pacification of the Northern provinces? That the fulfilment of these
obligations is due, I once more quote the Imperial invitation to adopt
the cause of Brazil:--"_Votre Grace est invitée, pour--et de part le
Gouvernement du Brésil, à accepter le service de la nation Brésilienne;
chez qui je suis dûment autorisé à vous assurer le rang et le grade
nullement inférieur à celui que vous tenez de la République.
Abandonnez-vous, Milord, à la reconnaissance Brésilienne;_ À LA
MUNIFICENCE DU PRINCE; À LA PROBITÉ SANS TACHE DE L'ACTUEL GOUVERNEMENT;
ON VOUS FERA JUSTICE; ON NE RABAISSERA D'UN SEUL POINT LA HAUTE
CONSIDÉRATION--RANG--GRADE--CARACTÈRE--ET AVANTAGES QUI VOUS SONT DÛS."
"VENEZ, MILORD, L'HONNEUR VOUS INVITE--LA GLOIRE VOUS APPELLE. VENEZ,
DONNER À NOS ARMES NAVALES, CET ORDRE MERVEILLEUX ET DISCIPLINE
INCOMPARABLE DE PUISSANTE ALBION."
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil, - from Spanish and Portuguese Domination, Volume 2" ***
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