Title: The Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, Volume II., Part 4
Author: Sherman, William T. (William Tecumseh), 1820-1891
Language: English
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MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN

By William T. Sherman



VOLUME II

Part 4



CHAPTER XXI.

THE MARCH TO THE SEA FROM ATLANTA TO SAVANNAH.

NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1864.


On the 12th of November the railroad and telegraph communications
with the rear were broken, and the army stood detached from all
friends, dependent on its own resources and supplies.  No time was
to be lost; all the detachments were ordered to march rapidly for
Atlanta, breaking up the railroad en route, and generally to so
damage the country as to make it untenable to the enemy.  By the
14th all the troops had arrived at or near Atlanta, and were,
according to orders, grouped into two wings, the right and left,
commanded respectively by Major-Generals O. O. Howard and H. W.
Slocum, both comparatively young men, but educated and experienced
officers, fully competent to their command.

The right wing was composed of the Fifteenth Corps, Major-General
P. J. Osterhaus commanding, and the Seventeenth Corps,
Major-General Frank P. Blair commanding.

The left wing was composed of the Fourteenth Corps, Major-General
Jefferson C. Davis commanding, and the Twentieth Corps,
Brigadier-General A. S. Williams commanding.

The Fifteenth Corps had four divisions, commanded by
Brigadier-Generals Charles R. Woods, W. B. Hazen, John E. Smith,
and John M. Gorse.

The Seventeenth Corps had three divisions, commanded by
Major-General J. A. Mower, and Brigadier-Generals M. D. Leggett
and Giles A. Smith.

The Fourteenth Corps had three divisions, commanded by
Brigadier-Generals W. P. Carlin, James D. Morgan, and A. Baird.

The Twentieth Corps had also three divisions, commanded by
Brigadier-Generals N. J. Jackson, John W. Geary, and W. T. Ward.

The cavalry division was held separate, subject to my own orders.
It was commanded by Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick, and was
composed of two brigades, commanded by Colonels Eli H. Murray, of
Kentucky, and Smith D. Atkins, of Illinois.

The strength of the army, as officially reported, is given in the
following tables, and shows an aggregate of fifty-five thousand
three hundred and twenty-nine infantry, five thousand and
sixty-three cavalry, and eighteen hundred and twelve artillery in
all, sixty-two thousand two hundred and four officers and men.

The most extraordinary efforts had been made to purge this army of
non-combatants and of sick men, for we knew well that there was to
be no place of safety save with the army itself; our wagons were
loaded with ammunition, provisions, and forage, and we could ill
afford to haul even sick men in the ambulances, so that all on this
exhibit may be assumed to have been able-bodied, experienced
soldiers, well armed, well equipped and provided, as far as human
foresight could, with all the essentials of life, strength, and
vigorous action.

The two general orders made for this march appear to me, even at
this late day, so clear, emphatic, and well-digested, that no
account of that historic event is perfect without them, and I give
them entire, even at the seeming appearance of repetition; and,
though they called for great sacrifice and labor on the part of the
officers and men, I insist that these orders were obeyed as well as
any similar orders ever were, by an army operating wholly in an
enemy's country, and dispersed, as we necessarily were, during the
subsequent period of nearly six months.


[Special Field Orders, No. 119.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, GEORGIA, November 8, 1864

The general commanding deems it proper at this time to inform the
officers and men of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Twentieth Corps, that he has organized them into an army for a
special purpose, well known to the War Department and to General
Grant.  It is sufficient for you to know that it involves a
departure from our present base, and a long and difficult march to
a new one.  All the chances of war have been considered and
provided for, as far as human sagacity can.  All he asks of you is
to maintain that discipline, patience, and courage, which have
characterized you in the past; and he hopes, through you, to strike
a blow at our enemy that will have a material effect in producing
what we all so much desire, his complete overthrow.  Of all things,
the most important is, that the men, during marches and in camp,
keep their places and do not scatter about as stragglers or
foragers, to be picked up by a hostile people in detail.  It is
also of the utmost importance that our wagons should not be loaded
with any thing but provisions and ammunition.  All surplus
servants, noncombatants, and refugees, should now go to the rear,
and none should be encouraged to encumber us on the march.  At some
future time we will be able to provide for the poor whites and
blacks who seek to escape the bondage under which they are now
suffering.  With these few simple cautions, he hopes to lead you to
achievements equal in importance to those of the past.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,
L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.



[Special Field Orders, No. 120.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, GEORGIA, November 9, 1864


1.  For the purpose of military operations, this army is divided
into two wings viz.:

The right wing, Major-General O. O. Howard commanding, composed of
the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps; the left wing, Major-General
H. W. Slocum commanding, composed of the Fourteenth and Twentieth
Corps.

2.  The habitual order of march will be, wherever practicable, by
four roads, as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at
points hereafter to be indicated in orders.  The cavalry,
Brigadier-General Kilpatrick commanding, will receive special
orders from the commander-in-chief.

3.  There will be no general train of supplies, but each corps will
have its ammunition-train and provision-train, distributed
habitually as follows: Behind each regiment should follow one wagon
and one ambulance; behind each brigade should follow a due
proportion of ammunition-wagons, provision-wagons, and ambulances.
In case of danger, each corps commander should change this order of
march, by having his advance and rear brigades unencumbered by
wheels.  The separate columns will start habitually at 7 a.m., and
make about fifteen miles per day, unless otherwise fixed in orders.

4.  The army will forage liberally on the country during the march.
To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good and
sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more
discreet officers, who will gather, near the route traveled, corn
or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn-meal, or
whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in
the wagons at least ten days' provisions for his command, and three
days' forage.  Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the
inhabitants, or commit any trespass; but, during a halt or camp,
they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other
vegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of their camp.  To
regular foraging-parties must be intrusted the gathering of
provisions and forage, at any distance from the road traveled.

6.  To corps commanders alone is intrusted the power to destroy
mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc.; and for them this general
principle is laid down:

In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no
destruction of each property should be permitted; but should
guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the
inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest
local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a
devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of
such hostility.

6.  As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the
inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and
without limit; discriminating, however, between the rich, who are
usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or
friendly.  Foraging-parties may also take mules or horses, to
replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as
pack-mules for the regiments or brigades.  In all foraging, of
whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or
threatening language, and may, where the officer in command thinks
proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts;
and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable
portion for their maintenance,

7.  Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to the
several columns may be taken along; but each army commander will
bear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one,
and that his first duty is to see to those who bear arms.

8.  The organization, at once, of a good pioneer battalion for each
army corps, composed if possible of negroes, should be attended to.
This battalion should follow the advance-guard, repair roads and
double them if possible, so that the columns will not be delayed
after reaching bad places.  Also, army commanders should practise
the habit of giving the artillery and wagons the road, marching
their troops on one side, and instruct their troops to assist
wagons at steep hills or bad crossings of streams.

9.  Captain O. M. Poe, chief-engineer, will assign to each wing of
the army a pontoon-train, fully equipped and organized; and the
commanders thereof will see to their being properly protected at
all times.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.


The greatest possible attention had been given to the artillery and
wagon trains.  The number of guns had been reduced to sixty-five,
or about one gun to each thousand men, and these were generally in
batteries of four guns each.

Each gun, caisson, and forges was drawn by four teams of horses.
We had in all about twenty-five hundred wagons, with teams of six
mules to each, and six hundred ambulances, with two horses to each.
The loads were made comparatively light, about twenty-five hundred
pounds net; each wagon carrying in addition the forage needed by
its own team: Each soldier carried on his person forty rounds of
ammunition, and in the wagons were enough cartridges to make up
about two hundred rounds per man, and in like manner two hundred
rounds of assorted ammunition were carried for each gun.

The wagon-trains were divided equally between the four corps, so
that each had about eight hundred wagons, and these usually on the
march occupied five miles or more of road.  Each corps commander
managed his own train; and habitually the artillery and wagons had
the road, while the men, with the exception of the advance and rear
guards, pursued paths improvised by the aide of the wagons, unless
they were forced to use a bridge or causeway in common.

I reached Atlanta during the afternoon of the 14th, and found that
all preparations had been made-Colonel Beckwith, chief commissary,
reporting one million two hundred thousand rations in possession of
the troops, which was about twenty days' supply, and he had on hand
a good supply of beef-cattle to be driven along on the hoof.  Of
forage, the supply was limited, being of oats and corn enough for
five days, but I knew that within that time we would reach a
country well stocked with corn, which had been gathered and stored
in cribs, seemingly for our use, by Governor Brown's militia.

Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, of my staff, had been busy in
his special task of destruction.  He had a large force at work, had
leveled the great depot, round house, and the machine-shops of the
Georgia Railroad, and had applied fire to the wreck.  One of these
machine-shops had been used by the rebels as an arsenal, and in it
were stored piles of shot and shell, some of which proved to be
loaded, and that night was made hideous by the bursting of shells,
whose fragments came uncomfortably, near Judge Lyon's house, in
which I was quartered. The fire also reached the block of stores
near the depot, and the heart of the city was in flames all night,
but the fire did not reach the parts of Atlanta where the
court-house was, or the great mass of dwelling houses.

The march from Atlanta began on the morning of November 15th, the
right wing and cavalry following the railroad southeast toward
Jonesboro', and General Slocum with the Twentieth Corps leading off
to the east by Decatur and Stone Mountain, toward Madison.  These
were divergent lines, designed to threaten both Mason and Augusta
at the same time, so as to prevent a concentration at our intended
destination, or "objective," Milledgeville, the capital of Georgia,
distant southeast about one hundred miles.  The time allowed each
column for reaching Milledgeville was seven days.  I remained in
Atlanta during the 15th with the Fourteenth Corps, and the
rear-guard of the right wing, to complete the loading of the trains,
and the destruction of the buildings of Atlanta which could be
converted to hostile uses, and on the morning of the 16th started
with my personal staff, a company of Alabama cavalry, commanded by
Lieutenant Snelling, and an infantry company, commanded by Lieutenant
McCrory, which guarded our small train of wagons.

My staff was then composed of Major L. M. Dayton, aide-de-camp and
acting adjutant-general, Major J. C. McCoy, and Major J. C.
Audenried, aides.  Major Ward Nichols had joined some weeks before
at Gaylesville, Alabama, and was attached as an acting
aide-de-camp.  Also Major Henry Hitchcock had joined at the same
time as judge-advocate.  Colonel Charles Ewing was
inspector-general, and Surgeon John Moore medical director.  These
constituted our mess.  We had no tents, only the flies, with which
we nightly made bivouacs with the assistance of the abundant
pine-boughs, which made excellent shelter, as well as beds.

Colonel L. C. Easton was chief-quartermaster; Colonel Amos
Beckwith, chief-commissary; Colonel O. M. Poe, chief-engineer; and
Colonel T. G. Baylor, chief of ordnance.  These invariably rode
with us during the day, but they had a separate camp and mess at
night.

General William F.  Barry had been chief of artillery in the
previous campaign, but at Kingston his face was so swollen with
erysipelas that he was reluctantly compelled to leave us for the
rear; and he could not, on recovering, rejoin us till we had
reached Savannah.

About 7 a.m. of November 16th we rode out of Atlanta by the Decatur
road, filled by the marching troops and wagons of the Fourteenth
Corps; and reaching the hill, just outside of the old rebel works,
we naturally paused to look back upon the scenes of our past
battles.  We stood upon the very ground whereon was fought the
bloody battle of July 22d, and could see the copse of wood where
McPherson fell.  Behind us lay Atlanta, smouldering and in ruins,
the black smoke rising high in air, and hanging like a pall over
the ruined city.  Away off in the distance, on the McDonough road,
was the rear of Howard's column, the gun-barrels glistening in the
sun, the white-topped wagons stretching away to the south; and
right before us the Fourteenth Corps, marching steadily and
rapidly, with a cheery look and swinging pace, that made light of
the thousand miles that lay between us and Richmond.  Some band, by
accident, struck up the anthem of "John Brown's soul goes marching
on;" the men caught up the strain, and never before or since have I
heard the chorus of "Glory, glory, hallelujah!" done with more
spirit, or in better harmony of time and place.

Then we turned our horses' heads to the east; Atlanta was soon lost
behind the screen of trees, and became a thing of the past.  Around
it clings many a thought of desperate battle, of hope and fear,
that now seem like the memory of a dream; and I have never seen the
place since.  The day was extremely beautiful, clear sunlight, with
bracing air, and an unusual feeling of exhilaration seemed to
pervade all minds--a feeling of something to come, vague and
undefined, still full of venture and intense interest.  Even the
common soldiers caught the inspiration, and many a group called out
to me as I worked my way past them, "Uncle Billy, I guess Grant is
waiting for us at Richmond!"  Indeed, the general sentiment was
that we were marching for Richmond, and that there we should end
the war, but how and when they seemed to care not; nor did they
measure the distance, or count the cost in life, or bother their
brains about the great rivers to be crossed, and the food required
for man and beast, that had to be gathered by the way.  There was a
"devil-may-care" feeling pervading officers and men, that made me
feel the full load of responsibility, for success would be accepted
as a matter of course, whereas, should we fail, this "march" would
be adjudged the wild adventure of a crazy fool.  I had no purpose
to march direct for Richmond by way of Augusta and Charlotte, but
always designed to reach the sea-coast first at Savannah or Port
Royal, South Carolina, and even kept in mind the alternative of
Pensacola.

The first night out we camped by the road-side near Lithonia.
Stone Mountain, a mass of granite, was in plain view, cut out in
clear outline against the blue sky; the whole horizon was lurid
with the bonfires of rail-ties, and groups of men all night were
carrying the heated rails to the nearest trees, and bending them
around the trunks.  Colonel Poe had provided tools for ripping up
the rails and twisting them when hot; but the best and easiest way
is the one I have described, of heating the middle of the
iron-rails on bonfires made of the cross-ties, and then winding
them around a telegraph-pole or the trunk of some convenient
sapling.  I attached much importance to this destruction of the
railroad, gave it my own personal attention, and made reiterated
orders to others on the subject.

The next day we passed through the handsome town of Covington, the
soldiers closing up their ranks, the color-bearers unfurling their
flags, and the bands striking up patriotic airs.  The white people
came out of their houses to behold the sight, spite of their deep
hatred of the invaders, and the negroes were simply frantic with
joy.  Whenever they heard my name, they clustered about my horse,
shouted and prayed in their peculiar style, which had a natural
eloquence that would have moved a stone.  I have witnessed
hundreds, if not thousands, of such scenes; and can now see a poor
girl, in the very ecstasy of the Methodist "shout," hugging the
banner of one of the regiments, and jumping up to the "feet of
Jesus."

I remember, when riding around by a by-street in Covington, to
avoid the crowd that followed the marching column, that some one
brought me an invitation to dine with a sister of Sam. Anderson,
who was a cadet at West Point with me; but the messenger reached me
after we had passed the main part of the town.  I asked to be
excused, and rode on to a place designated for camp, at the
crossing of the Ulcofauhachee River, about four miles to the east
of the town.  Here we made our bivouac, and I walked up to a
plantation-house close by, where were assembled many negroes, among
them an old, gray-haired man, of as fine a head as I ever saw.  I
asked him if he understood about the war and its progress.  He said
he did; that he had been looking for the "angel of the Lord" ever
since he was knee-high, and, though we professed to be fighting for
the Union, he supposed that slavery was the cause, and that our
success was to be his freedom.  I asked him if all the negro slaves
comprehended this fact, and he said they surely did.  I then
explained to him that we wanted the slaves to remain where they
were, and not to load us down with useless mouths, which would eat
up the food needed for our fighting men; that our success was their
assured freedom; that we could receive a few of their young, hearty
men as pioneers; but that, if they followed us in swarms of old and
young, feeble and helpless, it would simply load us down and
cripple us in our great task.  I think Major Henry Hitchcock was
with me on that occasion, and made a note of the conversation, and
I believe that old man spread this message to the slaves, which was
carried from mouth to mouth, to the very end of our journey, and
that it in part saved us from the great danger we incurred of
swelling our numbers so that famine would have attended our
progress.  It was at this very plantation that a soldier passed me
with a ham on his musket, a jug of sorghum-molasses under his arm,
and a big piece of honey in his hand, from which he was eating,
and, catching my eye, he remarked sotto voce and carelessly to a
comrade, "Forage liberally on the country," quoting from my general
orders.  On this occasion, as on many others that fell under my
personal observation, I reproved the man, explained that foraging
must be limited to the regular parties properly detailed, and that
all provisions thus obtained must be delivered to the regular
commissaries, to be fairly distributed to the men who kept their
ranks.

From Covington the Fourteenth Corps (Davis's), with which I was
traveling, turned to the right for Milledgeville, via Shady Dale.
General Slocum was ahead at Madison, with the Twentieth Corps,
having torn up the railroad as far as that place, and thence had
sent Geary's division on to the Oconee, to burn the bridges across
that stream, when this corps turned south by Eatonton, for
Milledgeville, the common "objective" for the first stage of the
"march."  We found abundance of corn, molasses, meal, bacon, and
sweet-potatoes.  We also took a good many cows and oxen, and a
large number of mules.  In all these the country was quite rich,
never before having been visited by a hostile army; the recent crop
had been excellent, had been just gathered and laid by for the
winter.  As a rule, we destroyed none, but kept our wagons full,
and fed our teams bountifully.

The skill and success of the men in collecting forage was one of
the features of this march.  Each brigade commander had authority
to detail a company of foragers, usually about fifty men, with one
or two commissioned officers selected for their boldness and
enterprise.  This party would be dispatched before daylight with a
knowledge of the intended day's march and camp; would proceed on
foot five or six miles from the route traveled by their brigade,
and then visit every plantation and farm within range.  They would
usually procure a wagon or family carriage, load it with bacon,
corn-meal, turkeys, chickens, ducks, and every thing that could be
used as food or forage, and would then regain the main road,
usually in advance of their train.  When this came up, they would
deliver to the brigade commissary the supplies thus gathered by the
way.  Often would I pass these foraging-parties at the roadside,
waiting for their wagons to come up, and was amused at their
strange collections--mules, horses, even cattle, packed with old
saddles and loaded with hams, bacon, bags of cornmeal, and poultry
of every character and description.  Although this foraging was
attended with great danger and hard work, there seemed to be a
charm about it that attracted the soldiers, and it was a privilege
to be detailed on such a party.  Daily they returned mounted on all
sorts of beasts, which were at once taken from them and
appropriated to the general use; but the next day they would start
out again on foot, only to repeat the experience of the day before.
No doubt, many acts of pillage, robbery, and violence, were
committed by these parties of foragers, usually called "bummers;"
for I have since heard of jewelry taken from women, and the plunder
of articles that never reached the commissary; but these acts were
exceptional and incidental.  I never heard of any cases of murder
or rape; and no army could have carried along sufficient food and
forage for a march of three hundred miles; so that foraging in some
shape was necessary.  The country was sparsely settled, with no
magistrates or civil authorities who could respond to requisitions,
as is done in all the wars of Europe; so that this system of
foraging was simply indispensable to our success.  By it our men
were well supplied with all the essentials of life and health,
while the wagons retained enough in case of unexpected delay, and
our animals were well fed.  Indeed, when we reached Savannah, the
trains were pronounced by experts to be the finest in flesh and
appearance ever seen with any army.

Habitually each corps followed some main road, and the foragers,
being kept out on the exposed flank, served all the military uses
of flankers.  The main columns gathered, by the roads traveled,
much forage and food, chiefly meat, corn, and sweet-potatoes, and
it was the duty of each division and brigade quartermaster to fill
his wagons as fast as the contents were issued to the troops.  The
wagon-trains had the right to the road always, but each wagon was
required to keep closed up, so as to leave no gaps in the column.
If for any purpose any wagon or group of wagons dropped out of
place, they had to wait for the rear.  And this was always dreaded,
for each brigade commander wanted his train up at camp as soon
after reaching it with his men as possible.

I have seen much skill and industry displayed by these
quarter-masters on the march, in trying to load their wagons with
corn and fodder by the way without losing their place in column.
They would, while marching, shift the loads of wagons, so as to have
six or ten of them empty.  Then, riding well ahead, they would secure
possession of certain stacks of fodder near the road, or cribs of
corn, leave some men in charge, then open fences and a road back for
a couple of miles, return to their trains, divert the empty wagons
out of column, and conduct them rapidly to their forage, load up and
regain their place in column without losing distance. On one occasion
I remember to have seen ten or a dozen wagons thus loaded with corn
from two or three full cribs, almost without halting.  These cribs
were built of logs, and roofed.  The train-guard, by a lever, had
raised the whole side of the crib a foot or two; the wagons drove
close alongside, and the men in the cribs, lying on their backs,
kicked out a wagon-load of corn in the time I have taken to describe
it.

In a well-ordered and well-disciplined army, these things might be
deemed irregular, but I am convinced that the ingenuity of these
younger officers accomplished many things far better than I could
have ordered, and the marches were thus made, and the distances
were accomplished, in the most admirable way.  Habitually we
started from camp at the earliest break of dawn, and usually
reached camp soon after noon.  The marches varied from ten to
fifteen miles a day, though sometimes on extreme flanks it was
necessary to make as much as twenty, but the rate of travel was
regulated by the wagons; and, considering the nature of the roads,
fifteen miles per day was deemed the limit.

The pontoon-trains were in like manner distributed in about equal
proportions to the four corps, giving each a section of about nine
hundred feet.  The pontoons were of the skeleton pattern, with
cotton-canvas covers, each boat, with its proportion of balks and
cheeses, constituting a load for one wagon.  By uniting two such
sections together, we could make a bridge of eighteen hundred feet,
enough for any river we had to traverse; but habitually the leading
brigade would, out of the abundant timber, improvise a bridge
before the pontoon-train could come up, unless in the cases of
rivers of considerable magnitude, such as the Ocmulgee, Oconee,
Ogeechee, Savannah, etc.

On the 20th of November I was still with the Fourteenth Corps, near
Eatonton Factory, waiting to hear of the Twentieth Corps; and on
the 21st we camped near the house of a man named Mann; the next
day, about 4 p.m., General Davis had halted his head of column on a
wooded ridge, overlooking an extensive slope of cultivated country,
about ten miles short of Milledgeville, and was deploying his
troops for camp when I got up.  There was a high, raw wind blowing,
and I asked him why he had chosen so cold and bleak a position.  He
explained that he had accomplished his full distance for the day,
and had there an abundance of wood and water.  He explained further
that his advance-guard was a mile or so ahead; so I rode on, asking
him to let his rear division, as it came up, move some distance
ahead into the depression or valley beyond.  Riding on some
distance to the border of a plantation, I turned out of the main
road into a cluster of wild-plum bushes, that broke the force of
the cold November wind, dismounted, and instructed the staff to
pick out the place for our camp.

The afternoon was unusually raw and cold.  My orderly was at hand
with his invariable saddle-bags, which contained a change of
under-clothing, my maps, a flask of whiskey, and bunch of cigars.
Taking a drink and lighting a cigar, I walked to a row of
negro-huts close by, entered one and found a soldier or two warming
themselves by a wood-fire.  I took their place by the fire,
intending to wait there till our wagons had got up, and a camp made
for the night.  I was talking to the old negro woman, when some one
came and explained to me that, if I would come farther down the
road, I could find a better place.  So I started on foot, and found
on the main road a good double-hewed-log house, in one room of
which Colonel Poe, Dr. Moore, and others, had started a fire.  I
sent back orders to the "plum-bushes" to bring our horses and
saddles up to this house, and an orderly to conduct our headquarter
wagons to the same place.  In looking around the room, I saw a
small box, like a candle-box, marked "Howell Cobb," and, on
inquiring of a negro, found that we were at the plantation of
General Howell Cobb, of Georgia, one of the leading rebels of the
South, then a general in the Southern army, and who had been
Secretary of the United States Treasury in Mr. Buchanan's time.  Of
course, we confiscated his property, and found it rich in corn,
beans, pea-nuts, and sorghum-molasses.  Extensive fields were all
round the house; I sent word back to General David to explain whose
plantation it was, and instructed him to spare nothing.  That night
huge bonfires consumed the fence-rails, kept our soldiers warm, and
the teamsters and men, as well as the slaves, carried off an
immense quantity of corn and provisions of all sorts.

In due season the headquarter wagons came up, and we got supper.
After supper I sat on a chair astride, with my back to a good fire,
musing, and became conscious that an old negro, with a
tallow-candle in his hand, was scanning my face closely.  I inquired,
"What do you want, old man!"  He answered, "Dey say you is Massa
Sherman."  I answered that such was the case, and inquired what he
wanted.  He only wanted to look at me, and kept muttering, "Dis
nigger can't sleep dis night."  I asked him why he trembled so, and
he said that he wanted to be sure that we were in fact "Yankees,"
for on a former occasion some rebel cavalry had put on light-blue
overcoats, personating Yankee troops, and many of the negroes were
deceived thereby, himself among the number had shown them sympathy,
and had in consequence been unmercifully beaten therefor.  This
time he wanted to be certain before committing himself; so I told
him to go out on the porch, from which he could see the whole
horizon lit up with camp-fires, and he could then judge whether he
had ever seen any thing like it before.  The old man became
convinced that the "Yankees" had come at last, about whom he had
been dreaming all his life; and some of the staff officers gave him
a strong drink of whiskey, which set his tongue going.  Lieutenant
Spelling, who commanded my escort, was a Georgian, and recognized
in this old negro a favorite slave of his uncle, who resided about
six miles off; but the old slave did not at first recognize his
young master in our uniform.  One of my staff-officers asked him
what had become of his young master, George.  He did not know, only
that he had gone off to the war, and he supposed him killed, as a
matter of course.  His attention was then drawn to Spelling's face,
when he fell on his knees and thanked God that he had found his
young master alive and along with the Yankees.  Spelling inquired
all about his uncle and the family, asked my permission to go and
pay his uncle a visit, which I granted, of course, and the next
morning he described to me his visit.  The uncle was not cordial,
by any means, to find his nephew in the ranks of the host that was
desolating the land, and Spelling came back, having exchanged his
tired horse for a fresher one out of his uncle's stables,
explaining that surely some of the "bummers" would have got the
horse had he not.

The next morning, November 23d, we rode into Milledgeville, the
capital of the State, whither the Twentieth Corps had preceded us;
and during that day the left wing was all united, in and around
Milledgeville.  From the inhabitants we learned that some of
Kilpatrick's cavalry had preceded us by a couple of days, and that
all of the right wing was at and near Gordon, twelve miles off,
viz., the place where the branch railroad came to Milledgeville
from the Mason & Savannah road.  The first stage of the journey
was, therefore, complete, and absolutely successful.

General Howard soon reported by letter the operations of his right
wing, which, on leaving Atlanta, had substantially followed the two
roads toward Mason, by Jonesboro' and McDonough, and reached the
Ocmulgee at Planters' Factory, which they crossed, by the aid of
the pontoon-train, during the 18th and 19th of November.  Thence,
with the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair's) he (General Howard)
had marched via Monticello toward Gordon, having dispatched
Kilpatrick's cavalry, supported by the Fifteenth Corps
(Osterhaus's), to feign on Mason.  Kilpatrick met the enemy's
cavalry about four miles out of Mason, and drove them rapidly back
into the bridge-defenses held by infantry.  Kilpatrick charged
these, got inside the parapet, but could not hold it, and retired
to his infantry supports, near Griswold Station.  The Fifteenth
Corps tore up the railroad-track eastward from Griswold, leaving
Charles R.  Wood's division behind as a rear-guard-one brigade of
which was intrenched across the road, with some of Kilpatrick's
cavalry on the flanks.  On the 22d of November General G. W. Smith,
with a division of troops, came out of Mason, attacked this brigade
(Walcutt's) in position, and was handsomely repulsed and driven
back into Mason.  This brigade was in part armed with Spencer
repeating-rifles, and its fire was so rapid that General Smith
insists to this day that he encountered a whole division; but he is
mistaken; he was beaten by one brigade (Walcutt's), and made no
further effort to molest our operations from that direction.
General Walcutt was wounded in the leg, and had to ride the rest of
the distance to Savannah in a carriage.

Therefore, by the 23d, I was in Milledgeville with the left wing,
and was in full communication with the right wing at Gordon.  The
people of Milledgeville remained at home, except the Governor
(Brown), the State officers, and Legislature, who had ignominiously
fled, in the utmost disorder and confusion; standing not on the
order of their going, but going at once--some by rail, some by
carriages, and many on foot.  Some of the citizens who remained
behind described this flight of the "brave and patriotic" Governor
Brown.  He had occupied a public building known as the "Governor's
Mansion," and had hastily stripped it of carpets, curtains, and
furniture of all sorts, which were removed to a train of
freight-cars, which carried away these things--even the cabbages and
vegetables from his kitchen and cellar--leaving behind muskets,
ammunition, and the public archives.  On arrival at Milledgeville I
occupied the same public mansion, and was soon overwhelmed with
appeals for protection.  General Slocum had previously arrived with
the Twentieth Corps, had taken up his quarters at the Milledgeville
Hotel, established a good provost-guard, and excellent order was
maintained.  The most frantic appeals had been made by the Governor
and Legislature for help from every quarter, and the people of the
State had been called out en masse to resist and destroy the invaders
of their homes and firesides.  Even the prisoners and convicts of the
penitentiary were released on condition of serving as soldiers, and
the cadets were taken from their military college for the same
purpose.  These constituted a small battalion, under General Harry
Wayne, a former officer of the United States Army, and son of the
then Justice Wayne of the Supreme Court.  But these hastily retreated
east across the Oconee River, leaving us a good bridge, which we
promptly secured.


At Milledgeville we found newspapers from all the South, and
learned the consternation which had filled the Southern mind at our
temerity; many charging that we were actually fleeing for our lives
and seeking safety at the hands of our fleet on the sea-coast.  All
demanded that we should be assailed, "front, flank, and rear;" that
provisions should be destroyed in advance, so that we would starve;
that bridges should be burned, roads obstructed, and no mercy shown
us.  Judging from the tone of the Southern press of that day, the
outside world must have supposed us ruined and lost.  I give a few
of these appeals as samples, which to-day must sound strange to the
parties who made them:


Corinth, Mississippi, November 18, 1884.

To the People of Georgia:


Arise for the defense of your native soil!  Rally around your
patriotic Governor and gallant soldiers!  Obstruct and destroy all
the roads in Sherman's front, flank, and rear, and his army will
soon starve in your midst. Be confident.  Be resolute.  Trust in an
overruling Providence, and success will soon crown your efforts.  I
hasten to join you in the defense of your homes and firesides.

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD.



RICHMOND, November 18, 1884.

To the People of Georgia:

You have now the best opportunity ever yet presented to destroy the
enemy.  Put every thing at the disposal of our generals; remove all
provisions from the path of the, invader, and put all obstructions
in his path.

Every citizen with his gun, and every negro with his spade and axe,
can do the work of a soldier.  You can destroy the enemy by
retarding his march.

Georgians, be firm!  Act promptly, and fear not!

B. H. Hill, Senator.

I most cordially approve the above.
James A. SEDDON, Secretary of War.



Richmond, November 19,1864.

To the People of Georgia:


We have had a special conference with President Davis and the
Secretary of War, and are able to assure you that they have done
and are still doing all that can be done to meet the emergency that
presses upon you.  Let every man fly to arms! Remove your negroes,
horses, cattle, and provisions from Sherman's army, and burn what
you cannot carry.  Burn all bridges, and block up the roads in his
route.  Assail the invader in front, flank, and rear, by night and
by day.  Let him have no rest.

JULIAN HARTRIDGE
MARK BLANDFORD,
J. H. ECHOLS
GEO. N. LESTER
JOHN T. SHUEMAKER
JAS. M. SMITH,

Members of Congress.


Of course, we were rather amused than alarmed at these threats, and
made light of the feeble opposition offered to our progress.  Some
of the officers (in the spirit of mischief) gathered together in
the vacant hall of Representatives, elected a Speaker, and
constituted themselves the Legislature of the State of Georgia!  A
proposition was made to repeal the ordinance of secession, which
was well debated, and resulted in its repeal by a fair vote!  I was
not present at these frolics, but heard of them at the time, and
enjoyed the joke.

Meantime orders were made for the total destruction of the arsenal
and its contents, and of such public buildings as could be easily
converted to hostile uses.  But little or no damage was done to
private property, and General Slocum, with my approval, spared
several mills, and many thousands of bales of cotton, taking what
he knew to be worthless bonds, that the cotton should not be used
for the Confederacy.  Meantime the right wing continued its
movement along the railroad toward Savannah, tearing up the track
and destroying its iron.  At the Oconee was met a feeble resistance
from Harry Wayne's troops, but soon the pontoon-bridge was laid,
and that wing crossed over.  Gilpatrick's cavalry was brought into
Milledgeville, and crossed the Oconee by the bridge near the town;
and on the 23d I made the general orders for the next stage of the
march as far as Millen.  These were, substantially, for the right
wing to follow the Savannah Railroad, by roads on its south; the
left wing was to move to Sandersville, by Davisboro' and
Louisville, while the cavalry was ordered by a circuit to the
north, and to march rapidly for Millen, to rescue our prisoners of
war confined there.  The distance was about a hundred miles.

General Wheeler, with his division of rebel cavalry, had succeeded
in getting ahead of us between Milledgeville and Augusta, and
General P. J. Hardee had been dispatched by General Beauregard from
Hood's army to oppose our progress directly in front.  He had,
however, brought with him no troops, but relied on his influence
with the Georgians (of whose State he was a native) to arouse the
people, and with them to annihilate Sherman's army!

On the 24th we renewed the march, and I accompanied the Twentieth
Corps, which took the direct road to Sandersville, which we reached
simultaneously with the Fourteenth Corps, on the 26th.  A brigade
of rebel cavalry was deployed before the town, and was driven in
and through it by our skirmish-line.  I myself saw the rebel cavalry
apply fire to stacks of fodder standing in the fields at
Sandersville, and gave orders to burn some unoccupied dwellings
close by.  On entering the town, I told certain citizens (who would
be sure to spread the report) that, if the enemy attempted to carry
out their threat to burn their food, corn, and fodder, in our
route, I would most undoubtedly execute to the letter the general
orders of devastation made at the outset of the campaign.  With
this exception, and one or two minor cases near Savannah, the
people did not destroy food, for they saw clearly that it would be
ruin to themselves.

At Sandersville I halted the left wing until I heard that the right
wing was abreast of us on the railroad.  During the evening a negro
was brought to me, who had that day been to the station (Tenille),
about six miles south of the town.  I inquired of him if there were
any Yankees there, and he answered, "Yes."  He described in his own
way what he had seen.

"First, there come along some cavalry-men, and they burned the
depot; then come along some infantry-men, and they tore up the
track, and burned it;" and just before he left they had "sot fire
to the well."

The next morning, viz., the 27th, I rode down to the station, and
found General Corse's division (of the Fifteenth Corps) engaged in
destroying the railroad, and saw the well which my negro informant
had seen "burnt."  It was a square pit about twenty-five feet deep,
boarded up, with wooden steps leading to the bottom, wherein was a
fine copper pump, to lift the water to a tank above.  The soldiers
had broken up the pump, heaved in the steps and lining, and set
fire to the mass of lumber in the bottom of the well, which
corroborated the negro's description.

From this point Blair's corps, the Seventeenth, took up the work of
destroying the railroad, the Fifteenth Corps following another road
leading eastward, farther to the south of the railroad.  While the
left wing was marching toward Louisville, north of the railroad,
General Kilpatrick had, with his cavalry division, moved rapidly
toward Waynesboro', on the branch railroad leading from Millen to
Augusta.  He found Wheeler's division of rebel cavalry there, and
had considerable skirmishing with it; but, learning that our
prisoners had been removed two days before from Millen, he returned
to Louisville on the 29th, where he found the left wing.  Here he
remained a couple of days to rest his horses, and, receiving orders
from me to engage Wheeler and give him all the fighting he wanted,
he procured from General Slocum the assistance of the infantry
division of General Baird, and moved back for Waynesboro' on the 2d
of December, the remainder of the left wing continuing its march on
toward Millers.  Near Waynesboro' Wheeler was again encountered,
and driven through the town and beyond Brier Creek, toward Augusta,
thus keeping up the delusion that the main army was moving toward
Augusta.  General Kilpatrick's fighting and movements about
Waynesboro' and Brier Creek were spirited, and produced a good
effect by relieving the infantry column and the wagon-trains of all
molestation during their march on Millen.  Having thus covered that
flank, he turned south and followed the movement of the Fourteenth
Corps to Buckhead Church, north of Millen and near it.

On the 3d of December I entered Millen with the Seventeenth Corps
(General Frank P.  Blair), and there paused one day, to communicate
with all parts of the army.  General Howard was south of the
Ogeechee River, with the Fifteenth Corps, opposite Scarboro'.
General Slocum was at Buckhead Church, four miles north of Millen,
with the Twentieth Corps.  The Fourteenth (General Davis) was at
Lumpkin's Station, on the Augusta road, about ten miles north of
Millen, and the cavalry division was within easy support of this
wing.  Thus the whole army was in good position and in good
condition.  We had largely subsisted on the country; our wagons
were full of forage and provisions; but, as we approached the
sea-coast, the country became more sandy and barren, and food
became more scarce; still, with little or no loss, we had traveled
two-thirds of our distance, and I concluded to push on for
Savannah.  At Millen I learned that General Bragg was in Augusta,
and that General Wade Hampton had been ordered there from Richmond,
to organize a large cavalry force with which to resist our
progress.

General Hardee was ahead, between us and Savannah, with McLaw's
division, and other irregular troops, that could not, I felt
assured, exceed ten thousand men.  I caused the fine depot at
Millen to be destroyed, and other damage done, and then resumed the
march directly on Savannah, by the four main roads.  The Seventeenth
Corps (General Blair) followed substantially the railroad,
and, along with it, on the 5th of December, I reached Ogeechee
Church, about fifty miles from Savannah, and found there fresh
earthworks, which had been thrown up by McLaw's division; but he
must have seen that both his flanks were being turned, and
prudently retreated to Savannah without a fight.  All the columns
then pursued leisurely their march toward Savannah, corn and forage
becoming more and more scarce, but rice-fields beginning to occur
along the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers, which proved a good
substitute, both as food and forage.  The weather was fine, the
roads good, and every thing seemed to favor us.  Never do I recall
a more agreeable sensation than the sight of our camps by night,
lit up by the fires of fragrant pine-knots.  The trains were all in
good order, and the men seemed to march their fifteen miles a day
as though it were nothing.  No enemy opposed us, and we could only
occasionally hear the faint reverberation of a gun to our left
rear, where we knew that General Kilpatrick was skirmishing with
Wheeler's cavalry, which persistently followed him.  But the
infantry columns had met with no opposition whatsoever.  McLaw's
division was falling back before us, and we occasionally picked up
a few of his men as prisoners, who insisted that we would meet with
strong opposition at Savannah.

On the 8th, as I rode along, I found the column turned out of the
main road, marching through the fields.  Close by, in the corner of
a fence, was a group of men standing around a handsome young
officer, whose foot had been blown to pieces by a torpedo planted
in the road.  He was waiting for a surgeon to amputate his leg, and
told me that he was riding along with the rest of his brigade-staff
of the Seventeenth Corps, when a torpedo trodden on by his horse
had exploded, killing the horse and literally blowing off all the
flesh from one of his legs.  I saw the terrible wound, and made
full inquiry into the facts.  There had been no resistance at that
point, nothing to give warning of danger, and the rebels had
planted eight-inch shells in the road, with friction-matches to
explode them by being trodden on.  This was not war, but murder,
and it made me very angry.  I immediately ordered a lot of rebel
prisoners to be brought from the provost-guard, armed with picks
and spades, and made them march in close order along the road, so
as to explode their own torpedoes, or to discover and dig them up.
They begged hard, but I reiterated the order, and could hardly help
laughing at their stepping so gingerly along the road, where it was
supposed sunken torpedoes might explode at each step, but they
found no other torpedoes till near Fort McAllister.  That night we
reached Pooler's Station, eight miles from Savannah, and during the
next two days, December 9th and 10th, the several corps reached the
defenses of Savannah--the Fourteenth Corps on the left, touching
the river; the Twentieth Corps next; then the Seventeenth; and the
Fifteenth on the extreme right; thus completely investing the city.
Wishing to reconnoitre the place in person, I rode forward by the
Louisville road, into a dense wood of oak, pine, and cypress, left
the horses, and walked down to the railroad-track, at a place where
there was a side-track, and a cut about four feet deep.  From that
point the railroad was straight, leading into Savannah, and about
eight hundred yards off were a rebel parapet and battery.  I could
see the cannoneers preparing to fire, and cautioned the officers
near me to scatter, as we would likely attract a shot.  Very soon I
saw the white puff of smoke, and, watching close, caught sight of
the ball as it rose in its flight, and, finding it coming pretty
straight, I stepped a short distance to one side, but noticed a
negro very near me in the act of crossing the track at right
angles.  Some one called to him to look out; but, before the poor
fellow understood his danger, the ball (a thirty-two-pound round
shot) struck the ground, and rose in its first ricochet, caught the
negro under the right jaw, and literally carried away his head,
scattering blood and brains about.  A soldier close by spread an
overcoat over the body, and we all concluded to get out of that
railroad-cut.  Meantime, General Mower's division of the Seventeenth
Corps had crossed the canal to the right of the Louisville
road, and had found the line of parapet continuous; so at Savannah
we had again run up against the old familiar parapet, with its deep
ditches, canals, and bayous, full of water; and it looked as though
another siege was inevitable.  I accordingly made a camp or bivouac
near the Louisville road, about five miles from Savannah, and
proceeded to invest the place closely, pushing forward
reconnoissances at every available point.

As soon as it was demonstrated that Savannah was well fortified,
with a good garrison, commanded by General William J. Hardee, a
competent soldier, I saw that the first step was to open
communication with our fleet, supposed to be waiting for us with
supplies and clothing in Ossabaw Sound.

General Howard had, some nights previously, sent one of his best
scouts, Captain Duncan, with two men, in a canoe, to drift past
Fort McAllister, and to convey to the fleet a knowledge of our
approach.  General Kilpatrick's cavalry had also been transferred
to the south bank of the Ogeechee, with orders to open
communication with the fleet.  Leaving orders with General Slocum
to press the siege, I instructed General Howard to send a division
with all his engineers to Grog's Bridge, fourteen and a half miles
southwest from Savannah, to rebuild it.  On the evening of the 12th
I rode over myself, and spent the night at Mr. King's house, where
I found General Howard, with General Hazen's division of the
Fifteenth Corps.  His engineers were hard at work on the bridge,
which they finished that night, and at sunrise Hazen's division
passed over.  I gave General Hazen, in person, his orders to march
rapidly down the right bank of the Ogeechee, and without hesitation
to assault and carry Fort McAllister by storm.  I knew it to be
strong in heavy artillery, as against an approach from the sea, but
believed it open and weak to the rear.  I explained to General
Hazen, fully, that on his action depended the safety of the whole
army, and the success of the campaign.  Kilpatrick had already felt
the fort, and had gone farther down the coast to Kilkenny Bluff, or
St. Catharine's Sound, where, on the same day, he had communication
with a vessel belonging to the blockading fleet; but, at the time,
I was not aware of this fact, and trusted entirely to General Hazen
and his division of infantry, the Second of the Fifteenth Corps,
the same old division which I had commanded at Shiloh and
Vicksburg, in which I felt a special pride and confidence.

Having seen General Hazen fairly off, accompanied by General
Howard, I rode with my staff down the left bank of the Ogeechee,
ten miles to the rice-plantation of a Mr. Cheevea, where General
Howard had established a signal-station to overlook the lower
river, and to watch for any vessel of the blockading squadron,
which the negroes reported to be expecting us, because they nightly
sent up rockets, and daily dispatched a steamboat up the Ogeechee
as near to Fort McAllister as it was safe.

On reaching the rice-mill at Cheevea's, I found a guard and a
couple of twenty-pound Parrott gone, of De Gres's battery, which
fired an occasional shot toward Fort McAllister, plainly seen over
the salt-marsh, about three miles distant.  Fort McAllister had the
rebel flag flying, and occasionally sent a heavy shot back across
the marsh to where we were, but otherwise every thing about the
place looked as peaceable and quiet as on the Sabbath.

The signal-officer had built a platform on the ridge-pole of
the rice-mill.  Leaving our horses behind the stacks of rice-straw,
we all got on the roof of a shed attached to the mill, wherefrom I
could communicate with the signal-officer above, and at the same
time look out toward Ossabaw Sound, and across the Ogeechee River
at Fort McAllister.  About 2 p.m.  we observed signs of commotion
in the fort, and noticed one or two guns fired inland, and some
musket-skirmishing in the woods close by.

This betokened the approach of Hazen's division, which had been
anxiously expected, and soon thereafter the signal-officer
discovered about three miles above the fort a signal-flag, with
which he conversed, and found it to belong to General Hazen, who
was preparing to assault the fort, and wanted to know if I were
there.  On being assured of this fact, and that I expected the fort
to be carried before night, I received by signal the assurance of
General Hazen that he was making his preparations, and would soon
attempt the assault.  The sun was rapidly declining, and I was
dreadfully impatient.  At that very moment some one discovered a
faint cloud of smoke, and an object gliding, as it were, along the
horizon above the tops of the sedge toward the sea, which little by
little grew till it was pronounced to be the smoke-stack of a
steamer coming up the river.  "It must be one of our squadron!"
Soon the flag of the United States was plainly visible, and our
attention was divided between this approaching steamer and the
expected assault.  When the sun was about an hour high, another
signal-message came from General Hazen that he was all ready, and I
replied to go ahead, as a friendly steamer was approaching from
below.  Soon we made out a group of officers on the deck of this
vessel, signaling with a flag, "Who are you!"  The answer went back
promptly, "General Sherman."  Then followed the question, "Is Fort
McAllister taken?"  "Not yet, but it will be in a minute!"  Almost
at that instant of time, we saw Hazen's troops come out of the dark
fringe of woods that encompassed the fort, the lines dressed as on
parade, with colors flying, and moving forward with a quick, steady
pace.  Fort McAllister was then all alive, its big guns belching
forth dense clouds of smoke, which soon enveloped our assaulting
lines.  One color went down, but was up in a moment.  On the lines
advanced, faintly seen in the white, sulphurous smoke; there was a
pause, a cessation of fire; the smoke cleared away, and the
parapets were blue with our men, who fired their muskets in the
air, and shouted so that we actually heard them, or felt that we
did.  Fort McAllister was taken, and the good news was instantly
sent by the signal-officer to our navy friends on the approaching
gunboat, for a point of timber had shut out Fort McAllister from
their view, and they had not seen the action at all, but must have
heard the cannonading.

During the progress of the assault, our little group on Cheeves's
mill hardly breathed; but no sooner did we see our flags on the
parapet than I exclaimed, in the language of the poor negro at
Cobb's plantation, "This nigger will have no sleep this night!"

I was resolved to communicate with our fleet that night, which
happened to be a beautiful moonlight one.  At the wharf belonging
to Cheeves's mill was a small skiff, that had been used by our men
in fishing or in gathering oysters.  I was there in a minute,
called for a volunteer crew, when several young officers, Nichols
and Merritt among the number; said they were good oarsmen, and
volunteered to pull the boat down to Fort McAllister.  General
Howard asked to accompany me; so we took seats in the stern of the
boat, and our crew of officers pulled out with a will.  The tide
was setting in strong, and they had a hard pull, for, though the
distance was but three miles in an air-line, the river was so
crooked that the actual distance was fully six miles.  On the way
down we passed the wreck of a steamer which had been sunk some
years before, during a naval attack on Fort McAllister.

Night had fairly set in when we discovered a soldier on the beach.
I hailed him, and inquired if he knew where General Hazen was.  He
answered that the general was at the house of the overseer of the
plantation (McAllister's), and that he could guide me to it.  We
accordingly landed, tied our boat to a driftlog, and followed our
guide through bushes to a frame-house, standing in a grove of
live-oaks, near a row of negro quarters.

General Hazen was there with his staff, in the act of getting
supper; he invited us to join them, which we accepted promptly, for
we were really very hungry.  Of course, I congratulated Hazen most
heartily on his brilliant success, and praised its execution very
highly, as it deserved, and he explained to me more in detail the
exact results.  The fort was an inclosed work, and its land-front
was in the nature of a bastion and curtains, with good parapet,
ditch, fraise, and chevaux-de-frise, made out of the large branches
of live-oaks.  Luckily, the rebels had left the larger and unwieldy
trunks on the ground, which served as a good cover for the
skirmish-line, which crept behind these logs, and from them kept
the artillerists from loading and firing their guns accurately.

The assault had been made by three parties in line, one from below,
one from above the fort, and the third directly in rear, along the
capital.  All were simultaneous, and had to pass a good abatis and
line of torpedoes, which actually killed more of the assailants
than the heavy guns of the fort, which generally overshot the mark.
Hazen's entire loss was reported, killed and wounded, ninety-two.
Each party reached the parapet about the same time, and the
garrison inside, of about two hundred and fifty men (about fifty of
them killed or wounded), were in his power.  The commanding
officer, Major Anderson, was at that moment a prisoner, and
General Hazen invited him in to take supper with us, which he did.

Up to this time General Hazen did not know that a gunboat was in
the river below the fort; for it was shut off from sight by a point
of timber, and I was determined to board her that night, at
whatever risk or cost, as I wanted some news of what was going on
in the outer world.  Accordingly, after supper, we all walked down
to the fort, nearly a mile from the house where we had been,
entered Fort McAllister, held by a regiment of Hazen's troops, and
the sentinel cautioned us to be very careful, as the ground outside
the fort was full of torpedoes.  Indeed, while we were there, a
torpedo exploded, tearing to pieces a poor fellow who was hunting
for a dead comrade.  Inside the fort lay the dead as they had
fallen, and they could hardly be distinguished from their living
comrades, sleeping soundly side by side in the pale moonlight.  In
the river, close by the fort, was a good yawl tied to a stake, but
the tide was high, and it required some time to get it in to the
bank; the commanding officer, whose name I cannot recall, manned
the boat with a good crew of his men, and, with General Howard, I
entered, and pulled down-stream, regardless of the warnings all
about the torpedoes.

The night was unusually bright, and we expected to find the gunboat
within a mile or so; but, after pulling down the river fully three
miles, and not seeing the gunboat, I began to think she had turned
and gone back to the sound; but we kept on, following the bends of
the river, and about six miles below McAllister we saw her light,
and soon were hailed by the vessel at anchor.  Pulling alongside,
we announced ourselves, and were received with great warmth and
enthusiasm on deck by half a dozen naval officers, among them
Captain Williamson, United States Navy.  She proved to be the
Dandelion, a tender of the regular gunboat Flag, posted at the
mouth of the Ogeechee.  All sorts of questions were made and
answered, and we learned that Captain Duncan had safely reached the
squadron, had communicated the good news of our approach, and they
had been expecting us for some days.  They explained that Admiral
Dahlgren commanded the South-Atlantic Squadron, which was then
engaged in blockading the coast from Charleston south, and was on
his flag-ship, the Harvest Moon, lying in Wassaw Sound; that
General J. G. Foster was in command of the Department of the South,
with his headquarters at Hilton Head; and that several ships loaded
with stores for the army were lying in Tybee Roads and in Port
Royal Sound.  From these officers I also learned that General Grant
was still besieging Petersburg and Richmond, and that matters and
things generally remained pretty much the same as when we had left
Atlanta.  All thoughts seemed to have been turned to us in Georgia,
cut off from all communication with our friends; and the rebel
papers had reported us to be harassed, defeated, starving, and
fleeing for safety to the coast.  I then asked for pen and paper,
and wrote several hasty notes to General Foster, Admiral Dahlgren,
General Grant, and the Secretary of War, giving in general terms
the actual state of affairs, the fact of the capture of Fort
McAllister, and of my desire that means should be taken to
establish a line of supply from the vessels in port up the Ogeechee
to the rear of the army.  As a sample, I give one of these notes,
addressed to the Secretary of War, intended for publication to
relieve the anxiety of our friends at the North generally:


ON BOARD DANDELION, OSSABAW SOUND, December 13, 1864--11.50 p.m.


To Hon. E.  M.  STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

To-day, at 6 p. m., General Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps
carried Fort McAllister by assault, capturing its entire garrison
and stores.  This opened to us Ossabaw Sound, and I pushed down to
this gunboat to communicate with the fleet.  Before opening
communication we had completely destroyed all the railroads leading
into Savannah, and invested the city.  The left of the army is on
the Savannah River three miles above the city, and the right on the
Ogeechee, at King's Bridge.  The army is in splendid order, and
equal to any thing.  The weather has been fine, and supplies were
abundant.  Our march was most agreeable, and we were not at all
molested by guerrillas.

We reached Savannah three days ago, but, owing to Fort McAllister,
could not communicate; but, now that we have McAllister, we can go
ahead.

We have already captured two boats on the Savannah river and
prevented their gunboats from coming down.

I estimate the population of Savannah at twenty-five thousand, and
the garrison at fifteen thousand.  General Hardee commands.

We have not lost a wagon on the trip; but have gathered a large
supply of negroes, mules, horses, etc., and our teams are in far
better condition than when we started.

My first duty will be to clear the army of surplus negroes, mules,
and horses.  We have utterly destroyed over two hundred miles of
rails, and consumed stores and provisions that were essential to
Lee's and Hood's armies.

The quick work made with McAllister, the opening of communication
with our fleet, and our consequent independence as to supplies,
dissipate all their boasted threats to head us off and starve the
army.


I regard Savannah as already gained.
Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


By this time the night was well advanced, and the tide was running
ebb-strong; so I asked.  Captain Williamson to tow us up as near
Fort McAllister as he would venture for the torpedoes, of which the
navy-officers had a wholesome dread.  The Dandelion steamed up some
three or four miles, till the lights of Fort McAllister could be
seen, when she anchored, and we pulled to the fort in our own boat.
General Howard and I then walked up to the McAllister House, where
we found General Hazen and his officers asleep on the floor of one
of the rooms.  Lying down on the floor, I was soon fast asleep, but
shortly became conscious that some one in the room was inquiring
for me among the sleepers.  Calling out, I was told that an officer
of General Fosters staff had just arrived from a steamboat anchored
below McAllister; that the general was extremely anxious to see me
on important business, but that he was lame from an old Mexican-War
wound, and could not possibly come to me.  I was extremely weary
from the incessant labor of the day and night before, but got up,
and again walked down the sandy road to McAllister, where I found a
boat awaiting us, which carried us some three miles down the river,
to the steamer W.  W.  Coit (I think), on board of which we found
General Foster.  He had just come from Port Royal, expecting to
find Admiral Dahlgren in Ossabaw Sound, and, hearing of the capture
of Fort McAllister, he had come up to see me.  He described fully
the condition of affairs with his own command in South Carolina.
He had made several serious efforts to effect a lodgment on the
railroad which connects Savannah with Charleston near Pocotaligo,
but had not succeeded in reaching the railroad itself, though he
had a full division of troops, strongly intrenched, near Broad
River, within cannon-range of the railroad.  He explained,
moreover, that there were at Port Royal abundant supplies of bread
and provisions, as well as of clothing, designed for our use.  We
still had in our wagons and in camp abundance of meat, but we
needed bread, sugar, and coffee, and it was all-important that a
route of supply should at once be opened, for which purpose the
assistance of the navy were indispensable.  We accordingly
steamed down the Ogeechee River to Ossabaw Sound, in hopes to meet
Admiral Dahlgren, but he was not there, and we continued on by the
inland channel to Warsaw Sound, where we found the Harvest Moon,
and Admiral Dahlgren.  I was not personally acquainted with him at
the time, but he was so extremely kind and courteous that I was at
once attracted to him.  There was nothing in his power, he said,
which he would not do to assist us, to make our campaign absolutely
successful.  He undertook at once to find vessels of light draught
to carry our supplies from Port Royal to Cheeves's Mill, or to
Grog's Bridge above, whence they could be hauled by wagons to our
several camps; he offered to return with me to Fort McAllister, to
superintend the removal of the torpedoes, and to relieve me of all
the details of this most difficult work.  General Foster then
concluded to go on to Port Royal, to send back to us six hundred
thousand rations, and all the rifled guns of heavy calibre, and
ammunition on hand, with which I thought we could reach the city of
Savannah, from the positions already secured.  Admiral Dahlgren
then returned with me in the Harvest Moon to Fort McAllister.  This
consumed all of the 14th of December; and by the 15th I had again
reached Cheeves's Mill, where my horse awaited me, and rode on to
General Howard's headquarters at Anderson's plantation, on the
plank-road, about eight miles back of Savannah.  I reached this
place about noon, and immediately sent orders to my own
head-quarters, on the Louisville road, to have them brought over to
the plank-road, as a place more central and convenient; gave written
notice to Generals Slocum and Howard of all the steps taken, and
ordered them to get ready to receive the siege-guns, to put them in
position to bombard Savannah, and to prepare for the general assault.
The country back of Savannah is very low, and intersected with
innumerable saltwater creeks, swamps, and rice-fields. Fortunately
the weather was good and the roads were passable, but, should the
winter rains set in, I knew that we would be much embarrassed.
Therefore, heavy details of men were at once put to work to prepare a
wharf and depot at Grog's Bridge, and the roads leading thereto were
corduroyed in advance.  The Ogeechee Canal was also cleared out for
use; and boats, such as were common on the river plantations, were
collected, in which to float stores from our proposed base on the
Ogeechee to the points most convenient to the several camps.

Slocum's wing extended from the Savannah River to the canal, and
Howard's wing from the canal to the extreme right, along down the
Little Ogeechee.  The enemy occupied not only the city itself, with
its long line of outer works, but the many forts which had been
built to guard the approaches from the sea-such as at Beaulieu,
Rosedew, White Bluff, Bonaventura, Thunderbolt, Cansten's Bluff,
Forts Tatnall, Boggs, etc., etc.  I knew that General Hardee could
not have a garrison strong enough for all these purposes, and I was
therefore anxious to break his lines before he could receive
reenforcements from Virginia or Augusta.  General Slocum had
already captured a couple of steamboats trying to pass down the
Savannah River from Augusta, and had established some of his men on
Argyle and Hutchinson Islands above the city, and wanted to
transfer a whole corps to the South Carolina bank; but, as the
enemy had iron-clad gunboats in the river, I did not deem it
prudent, because the same result could be better accomplished from
General Fosters position at Broad River.

Fort McAllister was captured as described, late in the evening of
December 13th, and by the 16th many steamboats had passed up as
high as King's Bridge; among them one which General Grant had
dispatched with the mails for the army, which had accumulated since
our departure from Atlanta, under charge of Colonel A. H. Markland.
These mails were most welcome to all the officers and soldiers of
the army, which had been cut off from friends and the world for two
months, and this prompt receipt of letters from home had an
excellent effect, making us feel that home was near.  By this
vessel also came Lieutenant Dune, aide-de-camp, with the following
letter of December 3d, from General Grant, and on the next day
Colonel Babcock , United States Engineers, arrived with the letter
of December 6th, both of which are in General Grant's own
handwriting, and are given entire:



HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,  December 3, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Armies near Savannah,
Georgia.

GENERAL: The little information gleaned from the Southern press
indicating no great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your
mails (which had been previously collected in Baltimore by Colonel
Markland, special-agent of the Post-Office Department) to be sent
as far as the blockading squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to
you as soon as heard from on the coast.

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from
congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has
been struck.  I have never had a fear, however, for the result.

Since you left Atlanta no very great progress has been made here.
The enemy has been closely watched, though, and prevented from
detaching against you.  I think not one man has gone from here,
except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry.  Bragg
has gone from Wilmington.  I am trying to take advantage of his
absence to get possession of that place.  Owing to some
preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are making to blow
up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do not believe
a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition off.  I
hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will
not have started back by that time.

In this letter I do not intend to give you any thing like
directions for future action, but will state a general idea I have,
and will get your views after you have established yourself on the
sea-coast.  With your veteran army I hope to get control of the only
two through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy before
the fall of Atlanta.  The condition will be filled by holding
Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of
Savannah and Branchville.  If Wilmington falls, a force from there
can cooperate with you.

Thomas has got back into the defenses of Nashville, with Hood close
upon him.  Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads,
except the main one leading to Chattanooga.  Part of this falling
back was undoubtedly necessary, and all of it may have been.  It
did not look so, however, to me.  In my opinion, Thomas far
outnumbers Hood in infantry.  In cavalry Hood has the advantage in
morale and numbers.  I hope yet that Hood will be badly crippled,
if not destroyed.  The general news you will learn from the papers
better than I can give it.

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there
is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will run
down the coast to see you.  If you desire it, I will ask Mrs.
Sherman to go with me.
Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES.
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi

GENERAL: On reflection since sending my letter by the hands of
Lieutenant Dunn, I have concluded that the most important operation
toward closing out the rebellion will be to close out Lee and his
army.

You have now destroyed the roads of the South so that it will
probably take them three months without interruption to reestablish
a through line from east to west.  In that time I think the job here
will be effectually completed.

My idea now is that you establish a base on the sea-coast, fortify
and leave in it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry
to protect them, and at the same time so threaten the interior that
the militia of the South will have to be kept at home.  With the
balance of your command come here by water with all dispatch.
Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want in
person.  Unless you see objections to this plan which I cannot see,
use every vessel going to you for purposes of transportation.

Hood has Thomas close in Nashville.  I have said all I can to force
him to attack, without giving the positive order until to-day.
To-day, however, I could stand it no longer, and gave the order
without any reserve.  I think the battle will take place to-morrow.
The result will probably be known in New York before Colonel
Babcock (the bearer of this) will leave it.  Colonel Babcock will
give you full information of all operations now in progress.
Very respectfully your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


The contents of these letters gave me great uneasiness, for I had
set my heart on the capture of Savannah, which I believed to be
practicable, and to be near; for me to embark for Virginia by sea
was so complete a change from what I had supposed would be the
course of events that I was very much concerned.  I supposed, as a
matter of course, that a fleet of vessels would soon pour in, ready
to convey the army to Virginia, and as General Grant's orders
contemplated my leaving the cavalry, trains, and artillery, behind,
I judged Fort McAllister to be the best place for the purpose, and
sent my chief-engineer, Colonel Poe, to that fort, to reconnoitre
the ground, and to prepare it so as to make a fortified camp large
enough to accommodate the vast herd of mules and horses that would
thus be left behind.  And as some time might be required to collect
the necessary shipping, which I estimated at little less than a
hundred steamers and sailing-vessels, I determined to push
operations, in hopes to secure the city of Savannah before the
necessary fleet could be available.  All these ideas are given in
my answer to General Grant's letters (dated December 16, 1864)
herewith, which is a little more full than the one printed in the
report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, because in that
copy I omitted the matter concerning General Thomas, which now need
no longer be withheld:


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 16, 1864.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point,
Virginia.

GENERAL: I received, day before yesterday, at the hands of
Lieutenant Dunn, your letter of December 8d, and last night, at the
hands of Colonel Babcock, that of December 6th.  I had previously
made you a hasty scrawl from the tugboat Dandelion, in Ogeechee
River, advising you that the army had reached the sea-coast,
destroying all the railroads across the State of Georgia, investing
closely the city of Savannah, and had made connection with the
fleet.

Since writing that note, I have in person met and conferred with
General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, and made all the arrangements
which were deemed essential for reducing the city of Savannah to
our possession.  But, since the receipt of yours of the 6th, I have
initiated measures looking principally to coming to you with fifty
or Sixty thousand infantry, and incidentally to capture Savannah,
if time will allow.

At the time we carried Fort McAllister by assault so handsomely,
with its twenty-two guns and entire garrison, I was hardly aware
of its importance; but, since passing down the river with General
Foster and up with Admiral Dahlgren, I realize how admirably
adapted are Ossabaw Sound and Ogeechee River to supply an army
operating against Savannah.  Seagoing vessels can easily come to
King's Bridge, a point on Ogeechee River, fourteen and a half miles
due west of Savannah, from which point we have roads leading to all
our camps.  The country is low and sandy, and cut up with marshes,
which in wet weather will be very bad, but we have been so favored
with weather that they are all now comparatively good, and heavy
details are constantly employed in double-corduroying the marshes,
so that I have no fears even of bad weather.  Fortunately, also, by
liberal and judicious foraging, we reached the sea-coast abundantly
supplied with forage and provisions, needing nothing on arrival
except bread.  Of this we started from Atlanta, with from eight to
twenty days' supply per corps and some of the troops only had one
day's issue of bread during the trip of thirty days; yet they did
not want, for sweet-potatoes were very abundant, as well as
corn-meal, and our soldiers took to them naturally.  We started
with about five thousand head of cattle, and arrived with over ten
thousand, of course consuming mostly turkeys, chickens, sheep,
hogs, and the cattle of the country.  As to our mules and horses,
we left Atlanta with about twenty-five hundred wagons, many of
which were drawn by mules which had not recovered from the
Chattanooga starvation, all of which were replaced, the poor mules
shot, and our transportation is now in superb condition.  I have no
doubt the State of Georgia has lost, by our operations, fifteen
thousand first-rate mules.  As to horses, Kilpatrick collected all
his remounts, and it looks to me, in riding along our
columns, as though every officer had three or four led horses, and
each regiment seems to be followed by at least fifty negroes and
foot-sore soldiers, riding on horses and mules.  The custom was for
each brigade to send out daily a foraging-party of about fifty men,
on foot, who invariably returned mounted, with several wagons
loaded with poultry, potatoes, etc., and as the army is composed of
about forty brigades, you can estimate approximately the number of
horses collected.  Great numbers of these were shot by my order,
because of the disorganizing effect on our infantry of having too
many idlers mounted.  General Euston is now engaged in collecting
statistics on this subject, but I know the Government will never
receive full accounts of our captures, although the result aimed at
was fully attained, viz., to deprive our enemy of them.  All these
animals I will have sent to Port Royal, or collected behind Fort
McAllister, to be used by General Saxton in his farming operations,
or by the Quartermaster's Department, after they are systematically
accounted for.  While General Easton is collecting transportation
for my troops to James River, I will throw to Port Royal Island all
our means of transportation I can, and collect the rest near Fort
McAllister, covered by the Ogeeehee River and intrenchments to be
erected, and for which Captain Poe, my chief-engineer, is now
reconnoitring the ground, but in the mean time will act as I have
begun, as though the city of Savannah were my objective: namely,
the troops will continue to invest Savannah closely, making attacks
and feints wherever we have fair ground to stand upon, and I will
place some thirty-pound Parrotts, which I have got from General
Foster, in position, near enough to reach the centre of the city,
and then will demand its surrender.  If General Hardee is alarmed,
or fears starvation, he may surrender; otherwise I will bombard the
city, but not risk the lives of our men by assaults across the
narrow causeways, by which alone I can now reach it.

If I had time, Savannah, with all its dependent fortifications,
would surely fall into our possession, for we hold all its avenues
of supply.

The enemy has made two desperate efforts to get boats from above to
the city, in both of which he has been foiled-General Slocum (whose
left flank rests on the river) capturing and burning the first
boat, and in the second instance driving back two gunboats and
capturing the steamer Resolute, with seven naval officers and a
crew of twenty-five seamen.  General Slocum occupies Argyle Island
and the upper end of Hutchinson Inland, and has a brigade on the
South Carolina shore opposite, and is very urgent to pass one of
his corps over to that shore.  But, in view of the change of plan
made necessary by your order of the 6th, I will maintain things in
statu quo till I have got all my transportation to the rear and out
of the way, and until I have sea-transportation for the troops you
require at James River, which I will accompany and command in
person.  Of course, I will leave Kilpatrick, with his cavalry (say
five thousand three hundred), and, it may be, a division of the
Fifteenth Corps; but, before determining on this, I must see
General Foster, and may arrange to shift his force (now over above
the Charleston Railroad, at the head of Broad River) to the
Ogeeohee, where, in cooperation with Kilpatrick's cavalry, he can
better threaten the State of Georgia than from the direction of
Port Royal.  Besides, I would much prefer not to detach from my
regular corps any of its veteran divisions, and would even prefer
that other less valuable troops should be sent to reenforce Foster
from some other quarter.  My four corps, full of experience and
full of ardor, coming to you en masse, equal to sixty thousand
fighting men, will be a reenforcement that Lee cannot disregard.
Indeed, with my present command, I had expected, after reducing
Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina; thence to
Raleigh, and thence to report to you.  But this would consume, it
may be, six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah; whereas, by
sea, I can probably reach you with my men and arms before the
middle of January.

I myself am somewhat astonished at the attitude of things in
Tennessee.  I purposely delayed at Kingston until General Thomas
assured me that he was all ready, and my last dispatch from him of
the 12th of November was full of confidence, in which he promised
me that he would ruin Hood if he dared to advance from Florence,
urging me to go ahead, and give myself no concern about Hood's army
in Tennessee.

Why he did not turn on him at Franklin, after checking and
discomfiting him, surpasses my understanding.  Indeed, I do not
approve of his evacuating Decatur, but think he should have assumed
the offensive against Hood from Pulaski, in the direction of
Waynesburg.
I know full well that General Thomas is slow in mind and in action;
but he is judicious and brave and the troops feel great confidence
in him.  I still hope he will out-manoeuvre and destroy Hood.

As to matters in the Southeast, I think Hardee, in Savannah, has
good  artillerists, some five or six thousand good infantry, and,
it may be, a mongrel mass of eight to ten thousand militia.  In all
our marching through Georgia, he has not forced us to use any thing
but a skirmish-line, though at several points he had erected
fortifications and tried to alarm us by bombastic threats.  In
Savannah he has taken refuge in a line constructed behind swamps
and overflowed rice-fields, extending from a point on the Savannah
River about three miles above the city, around by a branch of the
Little Ogeechee, which stream is impassable from its salt-marshes
and boggy swamps, crossed only by narrow causeways or common
corduroy-roads.

There must be twenty-five thousand citizens, men, women, and
children, in Savannah, that must also be fed, and how he is to feed
them beyond a few days I cannot imagine.  I know that his
requisitions for corn on the interior counties were not filled, and
we are in possession of the rice-fields and mills, which could
alone be of service to him in this neighborhood.  He can draw
nothing from South Carolina, save from a small corner down in the
southeast, and that by a disused wagon-road.  I could easily get
possession of this, but hardly deem it worth the risk of making a
detachment, which would be in danger by its isolation from the main
army.  Our whole army is in fine condition as to health, and the
weather is splendid.  For that reason alone I feel a personal
dislike to turning northward.  I will keep Lieutenant Dunn here
until I know the result of my demand for the surrender of Savannah,
but, whether successful or not, shall not delay my execution of
your order of the 6th, which will depend alone upon the time it
will require to obtain transportation by sea.

I am, with respect, etc., your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General United States Army.


Having concluded all needful preparations, I rode from my
headquarters, on the plank-road, over to General Slocum's
headquarters, on the Macon road, and thence dispatched (by flag of
truce) into Savannah, by the hands of Colonel Ewing,
inspector-general, a demand for the surrender of the place.  The
following letters give the result.  General Hardee refused to
surrender, and I then resolved to make the attempt to break his
line of defense at several places, trusting that some one would
succeed.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 17, 1864.

General WILLIAM J. HARDEE, commanding Confederate Forces in
Savannah.

GENERAL: You have doubtless observed, from your station at Rosedew
that sea-going vessels now come through Ossabaw Sound and up the
Ogeechee to the rear of my army, giving me abundant supplies of all
kinds, and more especially heavy ordnance necessary for the
reduction of Savannah.  I have already received guns that can cast
heavy and destructive shot as far as the heart of your city; also,
I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which the
people and garrison of Savannah can be supplied, and I am therefore
justified in demanding the surrender of the city of Savannah, and
its dependent forts, and shall wait a reasonable time for your
answer, before opening with heavy ordnance.  Should you entertain
the proposition, I am prepared to grant liberal terms to the
inhabitants and garrison; but should I be forced to resort to
assault, or the slower and surer process of starvation, I shall
then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and
shall make little effort to restrain my army--burning to avenge the
national wrong which they attach to Savannah and other large cities
which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil
war.  I inclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for the
surrender of the town of Resaoa, to be used by you for what it is
worth. I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.



HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA AND FLORIDA
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 17, 1864

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Federal Forces near
Savannah, Georgia.

GENERAL: I have to acknowledge the receipt of a communication from
you of this date, in which you demand "the surrender of Savannah
and its dependent forts," on the ground that you "have received
guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot into the heart of the
city," and for the further reason that you "have, for some days,
held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison
can be supplied."  You add that, should you be "forced to resort to
assault, or to the slower and surer process of starvation, you will
then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and will
make little effort to restrain your army," etc., etc.  The position
of your forces (a half-mile beyond the outer line for the
land-defense of Savannah) is, at the nearest point, at least four
miles from the heart of the city.  That and the interior line are
both intact.

Your statement that you have, for some days, held and controlled
every avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied, is
incorrect.  I am in free and constant communication with my
department.

Your demand for the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts
is refused.

With respect to the threats conveyed in the closing paragraphs of
your letter (of what may be expected in case your demand is not
complied with), I have to say that I have hitherto conducted the
military operations intrusted to my direction in strict accordance
with the rules of civilized warfare, and I should deeply regret the
adoption of any course by you that may force me to deviate from
them in future.  I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your
obedient servant,

W.  J.  HARDEE, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 18, 1864 8 p.m.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

GENERAL: I wrote you at length (by Colonel Babcock) on the 16th
instant.  As I therein explained my purpose, yesterday I made a
demand on General Hardee for the surrender of the city of Savannah,
and to-day received his answer--refusing; copies of both letters
are herewith inclosed.  You will notice that I claim that my lines
are within easy cannon-range of the heart of Savannah; but General
Hardee asserts that we are four and a half miles distant.  But I
myself have been to the intersection of the Charleston and Georgia
Central Railroads, and the three-mile post is but a few yards
beyond, within the line of our pickets.  The enemy has no pickets
outside of his fortified line (which is a full quarter of a mile
within the three-mile post), and I have the evidence of Mr. R. R.
Cuyler, President of the Georgia Central Railroad (who was a
prisoner in our hands), that the mile-posts are measured from the
Exchange, which is but two squares back from the river.  By
to-morrow morning I will have six thirty-pound Parrotts in
position, and General Hardee will learn whether I am right or not.
From the left of our line, which is on the Savannah River, the
spires can be plainly seen; but the country is so densely wooded
with pine and live-oak, and lies so flat, that we can see nothing
from any other portion of our lines.  General Slocum feels
confident that he can make a successful assault at one or two
points in front of General Davis's (Fourteenth) corps.  All of
General Howard's troops (the right wing) lie behind the Little
Ogeecbee, and I doubt if it can be passed by troops in the face of
an enemy.  Still, we can make strong feints, and if I can get a
sufficient number of boats, I shall make a cooperative
demonstration up Vernon River or Wassaw Sound.  I should like very
much indeed to take Savannah before coming to you; but, as I wrote
to you before, I will do nothing rash or hasty, and will embark for
the James River as soon as General Easton (who is gone to Port
Royal for that purpose) reports to me that he has an approximate
number of vessels for the transportation of the contemplated force.
I fear even this will cost more delay than you anticipate, for
already the movement of our transports and the gunboats has
required more time than I had expected.  We have had dense fogs;
there are more mud-banks in the Ogeechee than were reported, and
there are no pilots whatever.  Admiral Dahlgren promised to have
the channel buoyed and staked, but it is not done yet.  We find
only six feet of water up to King's Bridge at low tide, about ten
feet up to the rice-mill, and sixteen to Fort McAllister.  All
these points may be used by us, and we have a good, strong bridge
across Ogeechee at King's, by which our wagons can go to Fort
McAllister, to which point I am sending all wagons not absolutely
necessary for daily use, the negroes, prisoners of war, sick, etc.,
en route for Port Royal.  In relation to Savannah, you will remark
that General Hardee refers to his still being in communication with
his department.  This language he thought would deceive me; but I
am confirmed in the belief that the route to which he refers (the
Union Plank-road on the South Carolina shore) is inadequate to feed
his army and the people of Savannah, and General Foster assures me
that he has his force on that very road, near the head of Broad
River, so that cars no longer run between Charleston and Savannah.
We hold this end of the Charleston Railroad, and have destroyed it
from the three-mile post back to the bridge (about twelve miles).
In anticipation of leaving this country, I am continuing the
destruction of their railroads, and at this moment have two
divisions and the cavalry at work breaking up the Gulf Railroad
from the Ogeechee to the Altamaha; so that, even if I do not take
Savannah, I will leave it in a bad way.  But I still hope that
events will give me time to take Savannah, even if I have to
assault with some loss.  I am satisfied that, unless we take it,
the gunboats never will, for they can make no impression upon the
batteries which guard every approach from the sea.  I have a faint
belief that, when Colonel Babcock reaches you, you will delay
operations long enough to enable me to succeed here.  With Savannah
in our possession, at some future time if not now, we can punish
South Carolina as she deserves, and as thousands of the people in
Georgia hoped we would do.  I do sincerely believe that the whole
United States, North and South, would rejoice to have this army
turned loose on South Carolina, to devastate that State in the
manner we have done in Georgia, and it would have a direst and
immediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General United States Army.


As soon as the army had reached Savannah, and had opened
communication with the fleet, I endeavored to ascertain what had
transpired in Tennessee since our departure.  We received our
letters and files of newspapers, which contained full accounts of
all the events there up to about the 1st of December.  As before
described, General Hood had three full corps of infantry--S. D.
Lee's, A. P. Stewart's, and Cheatham's, at Florence, Alabama--with
Forrest's corps of cavalry, numbering in the aggregate about
forty-five thousand men.  General Thomas was in Nashville, Tennessee,
quietly engaged in reorganizing his army out of the somewhat broken
forces at his disposal.  He had posted his only two regular corps,
the Fourth and Twenty-third, under the general command of
Major-General J. M. Schofield, at Pulaski, directly in front of
Florence, with the three brigades of cavalry (Hatch, Croxton, and
Capron), commanded by Major-General Wilson, watching closely for
Hood's initiative.

This force aggregated about thirty thousand men, was therefore
inferior to the enemy; and General Schofield was instructed, in
case the enemy made a general advance, to fall back slowly toward
Nashville, fighting, till he should be reenforced by General Thomas
in person.  Hood's movement was probably hurried by reason of my
advance into Georgia; for on the 17th his infantry columns marched
from Florence in the direction of Waynesboro', turning, Schofield's
position at Pulaski.  The latter at once sent his trains to the
rear, and on the 21st fell back to Columbia, Tennessee.  General
Hood  followed up this movement, skirmished lightly with Schofield
at Columbia, began the passage of Duck River, below the town, and
Cheatham's corps reached the vicinity of Spring Hill, whither
General Schofield had sent General Stanley, with two of his
divisions, to cover the movement of his trains.  During the night
of November 29th General Schofield passed Spring Hill with his
trains and army, and took post at Franklin, on the south aide of
Harpeth River.  General Hood now attaches serious blame to General
Cheatham for not attacking General Schofield in flank while in
motion at Spring Hill, for he was bivouacked within eight hundred
yards of the road at the time of the passage of our army.  General
Schofield reached Franklin on the morning of November 30th, and
posted his army in front of the town, where some
rifle-intrenchments had been constructed in advance.  He had the
two corps of Stanley and Cox (Fourth and Twenty-third), with
Wilson's cavalry on his flanks, and sent his trains behind the
Harpeth.

General Hood closed upon him the same day, and assaulted his
position with vehemence, at one time breaking the line and wounding
General Stanley seriously; but our men were veterans, cool and
determined, and fought magnificently.  The rebel officers led their
men in person to the several persistent assaults, continuing the
battle far into the night, when they drew off, beaten and
discomfited.

Their loss was very severe, especially in general officers; among
them Generals Cleburn and Adams, division commanders.  Hood's loss
on that day was afterward ascertained to be (Thomas's report):
Buried on the field, seventeen hundred and fifty; left in hospital
at Franklin, thirty-eight hundred; and seven hundred and two
prisoners captured and held: aggregate, six thousand two hundred
and fifty-two.  General Schofields lose, reported officially, was
one hundred and eighty-nine killed, one thousand and thirty-three
wounded, and eleven hundred and four prisoners or missing:
aggregate, twenty-three hundred and twenty-six.  The next day
General Schofield crossed the Harpeth without trouble, and fell
back to the defenses of Nashville.

Meantime General Thomas had organized the employees of the
Quartermaster's Department into a corps, commanded by the
chief-quartermaster, General J. Z. Donaldson, and placed them in the
fortifications of Nashville, under the general direction of
Major-General Z. B. Tower, now of the United States Engineers.  He
had also received the two veteran divisions of the Sixteenth Corps,
under General A. J. Smith, long absent and long expected; and he
had drawn from Chattanooga and Decatur (Alabama) the divisions of
Steedman and of R. S. Granger.  These, with General Schofields army
and about ten thousand good cavalry, under General J.  H.  Wilson,
constituted a strong army, capable not only of defending Nashville,
but of beating Hood in the open field.  Yet Thomas remained inside
of Nashville, seemingly passive, until General Hood had closed upon
him and had entrenched his position.

General Thomas had furthermore held fast to the railroad leading
from Nashville to Chattanooga, leaving strong guards at its
principal points, as at Murfreesboro', Deckerd, Stevenson,
Bridgeport, Whitesides, and Chattanooga.  At Murfreesboro' the
division of Rousseau was reenforced and strengthened up to about
eight thousand men.

At that time the weather was cold and sleety, the ground was
covered with ice and snow, and both parties for a time rested on
the defensive.  Those matters stood at Nashville, while we were
closing down on Savannah, in the early part of December, 1864; and
the country, as well as General Grant, was alarmed at the seeming
passive conduct of General Thomas; and General Grant at one time
considered the situation so dangerous that he thought of going to
Nashville in person, but General John A. Logan, happening to be at
City Point, was sent out to supersede General Thomas; luckily for
the latter, he acted in time, gained a magnificent victory, and
thus escaped so terrible a fate.

On the 18th of December, at my camp by the side of the plank-road,
eight miles back of Savannah, I received General Hardee's letter
declining to surrender, when nothing remained but to assault.  The
ground was difficult, and, as all former assaults had proved so
bloody, I concluded to make one more effort to completely surround
Savannah on all aides, so as further to excite Hardee's fears, and,
in case of success, to capture the whole of his army.  We had
already completely invested the place on the north, west, and
south, but there remained to the enemy, on the east, the use of the
old dike or plank-road leading into South Carolina, and I knew that
Hardee would have a pontoon-bridge across the river.  On examining
my maps, I thought that the division of John P. Hatch, belonging to
General Fosters command, might be moved from its then position at
Broad River, by water, down to Bluffton, from which it could reach
this plank-road, fortify and hold it--at some risk, of course,
because Hardee could avail himself of his central position to fall
on this detachment with his whole army.  I did not want to make a
mistake like "Ball's Bluff" at that period of the war; so, taking
one or two of my personal staff, I rode back to Grog's Bridge,
leaving with Generals Howard and Slocum orders to make all
possible preparations, but not to attack, during my two or three
days' absence; and there I took a boat for Wassaw Sound, whence
Admiral Dahlgren conveyed me in his own boat (the Harvest Moon) to
Hilton Head, where I represented the matter to General Foster, and
he promptly agreed to give his personal attention to it.  During
the night of the 20th we started back, the wind blowing strong,
Admiral Dahlgren ordered the pilot of the Harvest Moon to run into
Tybee, and to work his way through to Wassaw Sound and the Ogeechee
River by the Romney Marshes.  We were caught by a low tide and
stuck in the mud.  After laboring some time, the admiral ordered
out his barge; in it we pulled through this intricate and shallow
channel, and toward evening of December 21st we discovered, coming
toward us, a tug, called the Red Legs, belonging to the
Quarter-master's Department, with a staff-officer on board, bearing
letters from Colonel Dayton to myself and the admiral, reporting that
the city of Savannah had been found evacuated on the morning of
December 21st, and was then in our possession.  General Hardee had
crossed the Savannah River by a pontoon-bridge, carrying off his men
and light artillery, blowing up his iron-clads and navy-yard, but
leaving for us all the heavy guns, stores, cotton, railway-cars,
steamboats, and an immense amount of public and private property.
Admiral Dahlgren concluded to go toward a vessel (the Sonoma) of his
blockading fleet, which lay at anchor near Beaulieu, and I
transferred to the Red Legs, and hastened up the Ogeechee River to
Grog's Bridge, whence I rode to my camp that same night. I there
learned that, early on the morning of December 21st, the skirmishers
had detected the absence of the enemy, and had occupied his lines
simultaneously along their whole extent; but the left flank (Slocum),
especially Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps, claimed to have
been the first to reach the heart of the city.

Generals Slocum and Howard moved their headquarters at once into
the city, leaving the bulk of their troops in camps outside.  On
the morning of December 22d I followed with my own headquarters,
and rode down Bull Street to the custom-house, from the roof of
which we had an extensive view over the city, the river, and the
vast extent of marsh and rice-fields on the South Carolina side.
The navy-yard, and the wreck of the iron-clad ram Savannah, were
still smouldering, but all else looked quiet enough.  Turning back,
we rode to the Pulaski Hotel, which I had known in years long gone,
and found it kept by a Vermont man with a lame leg, who used to be
a clerk in the St. Louis Hotel, New Orleans, and I inquired about
the capacity of his hotel for headquarters.  He was very anxious to
have us for boarders, but I soon explained to him that we had a
full mess equipment along, and that we were not in the habit of
paying board; that one wing of the building would suffice for our
use, while I would allow him to keep an hotel for the accommodation
of officers and gentlemen in the remainder.  I then dispatched an
officer to look around for a livery-stable that could accommodate
our horses, and, while waiting there, an English gentleman, Mr.
Charles Green, came and said that he had a fine house completely
furnished, for which he had no use, and offered it as headquarters.
He explained, moreover, that General Howard had informed him, the
day before, that I would want his house for headquarters.  At first
I felt strongly disinclined to make use of any private dwelling,
lest complaints should arise of damage and lose of furniture, and
so expressed myself to Mr. Green; but, after riding about the city,
and finding his house so spacious, so convenient, with large yard
and stabling, I accepted his offer, and occupied that house during
our stay in Savannah.  He only reserved for himself the use of a
couple of rooms above the dining-room, and we had all else, and a
most excellent house it was in all respects.

I was disappointed that Hardee had escaped with his army, but on
the whole we had reason to be content with the substantial fruits
of victory.  The Savannah River was found to be badly obstructed by
torpedoes, and by log piers stretched across the channel below the
city, which piers were filled with the cobble stones that formerly
paved the streets.  Admiral Dahlgren was extremely active, visited
me repeatedly in the city, while his fleet still watched
Charleston, and all the avenues, for the blockade-runners that
infested the coast, which were notoriously owned and managed by
Englishmen, who used the island of New Providence (Nassau) as a
sort of entrepot.  One of these small blockade-runners came into
Savannah after we were in full possession, and the master did not
discover his mistake till he came ashore to visit the custom-house.
Of coarse his vessel fell a prize to the navy.  A heavy force was
at once set to work to remove the torpedoes and obstructions in the
main channel of the river, and, from that time forth, Savannah
became the great depot of supply for the troops operating in that
quarter.

Meantime, on the 15th and 16th of December, were fought, in front
of Nashville, the great battles in which General Thomas so nobly
fulfilled his promise to ruin Hood, the details of which are fully
given in his own official reports, long-since published.  Rumors of
these great victories reached us at Savannah by piecemeal, but his
official report came on the 24th of December, with a letter from
General Grant, giving in general terms the events up to the 18th,
and I wrote at once through my chief of staff, General Webster, to
General Thomas, complimenting him in the highest terms.  His
brilliant victory at Nashville was necessary to mine at Savannah to
make a complete whole, and this fact was perfectly comprehended by
Mr. Lincoln, who recognized it fully in his personal letter of
December 26th, hereinbefore quoted at length, and which is also
claimed at the time, in my Special Field Order No. 6, of January 8,
1865, here given:

(Special Field Order No. 6.)

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 8, 1864.

The general commanding announces to the troops composing the
Military Division of the Mississippi that he has received from the
President of the United States, and from Lieutenant-General Grant,
letters conveying their high sense and appreciation of the campaign
just closed, resulting in the capture of Savannah and the defeat of
Hood's army in Tennessee.

In order that all may understand the importance of events, it is
proper to revert to the situation of affairs in September last.  We
held Atlanta, a city of little value to us, but so important to the
enemy that Mr. Davis, the head of the rebellious faction in the
South, visited his army near Palmetto, and commanded it to regain
the place and also to ruin and destroy us, by a series of measures
which he thought would be effectual.  That army, by a rapid march,
gained our railroad near Big Shanty, and afterward about Dalton.
We pursued it, but it moved so rapidly that we could not overtake
it, and General Hood led his army successfully far over toward
Mississippi, in hope to decoy us out of Georgia.  But we were not
thus to be led away by him, and preferred to lead and control
events ourselves.  Generals Thomas and Schofield, commanding the
departments to our rear, returned to their posts and prepared to
decoy General Hood into their meshes, while we came on to complete
the original journey.  We quietly and deliberately destroyed
Atlanta, and all the railroads which the enemy had used to carry on
war against us, occupied his State capital, and then captured his
commercial capital, which had been so strongly fortified from the
sea as to defy approach from that quarter.  Almost at the moment of
our victorious entry into Savannah came the welcome and expected
news that our comrades in Tennessee had also fulfilled nobly and
well their part, had decoyed General Hood to Nashville and then
turned on him, defeating his army thoroughly, capturing all his
artillery, great numbers of prisoners, and were still pursuing the
fragments down in Alabama.  So complete success in military
operations, extending over half a continent, is an achievement that
entitles it to a place in the military history of the world.  The
armies serving in Georgia and Tennessee, as well as the local
garrisons of Decatur, Bridgeport, Chattanooga, and Murfreesboro',
are alike entitled to the common honors, and each regiment may
inscribe on its colors, at pleasure, the word "Savannah" or
"Nashville."  The general commanding embraces, in the same general
success, the operations of the cavalry under Generals Stoneman,
Burbridge, and Gillem, that penetrated into Southwest Virginia, and
paralyzed the efforts of the enemy to disturb the peace and safety
of East Tennessee.  Instead of being put on the defensive, we have
at all points assumed the bold offensive, and have completely
thwarted the designs of the enemies of our country.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,
L.  M.  DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.


Here terminated the "March to the Sea," and I only add a few
letters, selected out of many, to illustrate the general feeling of
rejoicing throughout the country at the time.  I only regarded the
march from Atlanta to Savannah as a "shift of base," as the
transfer of a strong army, which had no opponent, and had finished
its then work, from the interior to a point on the sea-coast, from
which it could achieve other important results.  I considered this
march as a means to an end, and not as an essential act of war.
Still, then, as now, the march to the sea was generally regarded as
something extraordinary, something anomalous, something out of the
usual order of events; whereas, in fact, I simply moved from
Atlanta to Savannah, as one step in the direction of Richmond, a
movement that had to be met and defeated, or the war was
necessarily at an end.

Were I to express my measure of the relative importance of the
march to the sea, and of that from Savannah northward, I would
place the former at one, and the latter at ten, or the maximum.

I now close this long chapter by giving a tabular statement of the
losses during the march, and the number of prisoners captured.  The
property captured consisted of horses and mules by the thousand,
and of quantities of subsistence stores that aggregate very large,
but may be measured with sufficient accuracy by assuming that
sixty-five thousand men obtained abundant food for about forty
days, and thirty-five thousand animals were fed for a like period,
so as to reach Savannah in splendid flesh and condition.  I also
add a few of the more important letters that passed between
Generals Grant, Halleck, and myself, which illustrate our opinions
at that stage of the war:

STATEMENT OF CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE ARMY IN THE
FIELD, CAMPAIGN OF GEORGIA.

   Killed        Wounded         Missing       Captured
Officers/Men   Officers/Men   Officers/Men   Officers/Men
   10    93        24   404       1    277       77  1,261



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, December 16, 1864

Major-General SHERMAN (via Hilton Head).


GENERAL: Lieutenant-General Grant informs me that, in his last
dispatch sent to you, he suggested the transfer of your infantry to
Richmond.  He now wishes me to say that you will retain your entire
force, at least for the present, and, with such assistance as may
be given you by General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, operate from
such base as you may establish on the coast.  General Foster will
obey such instructions as may be given by you.

Should you have captured Savannah, it is thought that by
transferring the water-batteries to the land side that place may be
made a good depot and base of operations on Augusta, Branchville,
or Charleston.  If Savannah should not be captured, or if captured
and not deemed suitable for this purpose, perhaps Beaufort would
serve as a depot.  As the rebels have probably removed their most
valuable property from Augusta, perhaps Branchville would be the
most important point at which to strike in order to sever all
connection between Virginia and the Southwestern Railroad.

General Grant's wishes, however, are, that this whole matter of
your future actions should be entirely left to your discretion.

We can send you from here a number of complete batteries of
field-artillery, with or without horses, as you may desire; also, as
soon as General Thomas can spare them, all the fragments,
convalescents, and furloughed men of your army.  It is reported that
Thomas defeated Hood yesterday, near Nashville, but we have no
particulars nor official reports, telegraphic communication being
interrupted by a heavy storm.

Our last advises from you was General Howard's note, announcing his
approach to Savannah.  Yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, December 18, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah (via Hilton Head).

My DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 13th, by Major Anderson, is just
received.  I congratulate you on your splendid success, and shall
very soon expect to hear of the crowning work of your campaign--the
capture of Savannah.  Your march will stand out prominently as the
great one of this great war.  When Savannah falls, then for another
wide swath through the centre of the Confederacy.  But I will not
anticipate.  General Grant is expected here this morning, and will
probably write you his own views.

I do not learn from your letter, or from Major Anderson, that you
are in want of any thing which we have not provided at Hilton Head.
Thinking it probable that you might want more field-artillery, I
had prepared several batteries, but the great difficulty of
foraging horses on the sea-coast will prevent our sending any
unless you actually need them.  The hay-crop this year is short,
and the Quartermaster's Department has great difficulty in
procuring a supply for our animals.

General Thomas has defeated Hood, near Nashville, and it is hoped
that he will completely, crush his army.  Breckenridge, at last
accounts, was trying to form a junction near Murfreesboro', but, as
Thomas is between them, Breckenridge must either retreat or be
defeated.

General Rosecrans made very bad work of it in Missouri, allowing
Price with a small force to overrun the State and destroy millions
of property.

Orders have been issued for all officers and detachments having
three months or more to serve, to rejoin your army via Savannah.
Those having less than three months to serve, will be retained by
General Thomas.

Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident the
place may be destroyed, and, if a little salt should be sown upon
its site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of
nullification and secession.
Yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, December 18, 1864.

To Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

My DEAR GENERAL: I have just received and read, I need not tell you
with how mush gratification, your letter to General Halleck.  I
congratulate you and the brave officers and men under your command
on the successful termination of your most brilliant campaign.  I
never had a doubt of the result.  When apprehensions for your
safety were expressed by the President, I assured him with the army
you had, and you in command of it, there was no danger but you
would strike bottom on salt-water some place; that I would not feel
the same security--in fact, would not have intrusted the expedition
to any other living commander.

It has been very hard work to get Thomas to attack Hood.  I gave
him the most peremptory order, and had started to go there myself,
before he got off.  He has done magnificently, however, since he
started.  Up to last night, five thousand prisoners and forty-nine
pieces of captured artillery, besides many wagons and innumerable
small-arms, had been received in Nashville.  This is exclusive of
the enemy's loss at Franklin, which amounted to thirteen general
officers killed, wounded, and captured.  The enemy probably lost
five thousand men at Franklin, and ten thousand in the last three
days' operations.  Breckenridge is said to be making for
Murfreesboro'.

I think he is in a most excellent place.  Stoneman has nearly wiped
out John Morgan's old command, and five days ago entered Bristol.
I did think the best thing to do was to bring the greater part of
your army here, and wipe out Lee.  The turn affairs now seem to be
taking has shaken me in that opinion.  I doubt whether you may not
accomplish more toward that result where you are than if brought
here, especially as I am informed, since my arrival in the city,
that it would take about two months to get you here with all the
other calls there are for ocean transportation.

I want to get your views about what ought to be done, and what can
be done.  If you capture the garrison of Savannah, it certainly
will compel Lee to detach from Richmond, or give us nearly the
whole South.  My own opinion is that Lee is averse to going out of
Virginia, and if the cause of the South is lost he wants Richmond
to be the last place surrendered.  If he has such views, it may be
well to indulge him until we get every thing else in our hands.

Congratulating you and the army again upon the splendid results of
your campaign, the like of which is not read of in past history, I
subscribe myself, more than ever, if possible, your friend,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 26, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah, Georgia.

GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 22d inst., brought by
Major Grey of General Foster's staff; is fast at hand.  As the
major starts back at once, I can do no more at present than simply
acknowledge its receipt.  The capture of Savannah, with all its
immense stores, must tell upon the people of the South.  All well
here.
Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 24, 1864.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

GENERAL: Your letter of December 18th is just received.  I feel
very much gratified at receiving the handsome commendation you pay
my army.  I will, in general orders, convey to the officers and men
the substance of your note.

I am also pleased that you have modified your former orders, for I
feared that the transportation by sea would very much disturb the
unity and morale of my army, now so perfect.

The occupation of Savannah, which I have heretofore reported,
completes the first part of our game, and fulfills a great part of
your instructions; and we are now engaged in dismantling the rebel
forts which bear upon the sea-channels, and transferring the heavy
ordnance and ammunition to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, where they
can be more easily guarded than if left in the city.

The rebel inner lines are well adapted to our purpose, and with
slight modifications can be held by a comparatively small force;
and in about ten days I expect to be ready to sally forth again.  I
feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans.  I have thought them
over so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight.  I
left Augusta untouched on purpose, because the enemy will be in
doubt as to my objective point, after we cross the Savannah River,
whether it be Augusta or Charleston, and will naturally divide his
forces.  I will then move either on Branchville or Colombia, by any
curved line that gives us the best supplies, breaking up in our
course as much railroad as possible; then, ignoring Charleston and
Augusta both, I would occupy Columbia and Camden, pausing there
long enough to observe the effect.  I would then strike for the
Charleston & Wilmington Railroad, somewhere between the Santee and
Cape Fear Rivers, and, if possible, communicate with the fleet
under Admiral Dahlgren (whom I find a most agreeable gentleman,
accommodating himself to our wishes and plans).  Then I would favor
an attack on Wilmington, in the belief that Porter and Butler will
fail in their present undertaking.  Charleston is now a mere
desolated wreck, and is hardly worth the time it would take to
starve it out.  Still, I am aware that, historically and
politically, much importance is attached to the place, and it may
be that, apart from its military importance, both you and the
Administration may prefer I should give it more attention; and it
would be well for you to give me some general idea on that subject,
for otherwise I would treat it as I have expressed, as a point of
little importance, after all its railroads leading into the
interior have been destroyed or occupied by us.  But, on the
hypothesis of ignoring Charleston and taking Wilmington, I would
then favor a movement direct on Raleigh.  The game is then up with
Lee, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and fights me; in
which case I should reckon on your being on his heels.  Now that
Hood is used up by Thomas, I feel disposed to bring the matter to
an issue as quick as possible.  I feel confident that I can break
up the whole railroad system of South Carolina and North Carolina,
and be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time
spring fairly opens; and, if you feel confident that you can whip
Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident that I
can handle him in the open country.

One reason why I would ignore Charleston is this: that I believe
Hardee will reduce the garrison to a small force, with plenty of
provisions; I know that the neck back of Charleston can be made
impregnable to assault, and we will hardly have time for siege
operations.

I will have to leave in Savannah a garrison, and, if Thomas can
spare them, I would like to have all detachments, convalescents,
etc., belonging to these four corps, sent forward at once.  I do
not want to cripple Thomas, because I regard his operations as
all-important, and I have ordered him to pursue Hood down into
Alabama, trusting to the country for supplies.

I reviewed one of my corps to-day, and shall continue to review the
whole army.  I do not like to boast, but believe this army has a
confidence in itself that makes it almost invincible.  I wish you
could run down and see us; it would have a good effect, and show to
both armies that they are acting on a common plan.  The weather is
now cool and pleasant, and the general health very good. Your true
friend,

W. T. SHERMAN Major-General.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 24, 1864.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK, Chief-of-Staff; Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I had the pleasure of receiving your two letters of the
16th and 18th instant to-day, and feel more than usually flattered
by the high encomiums you have passed on our recent campaign, which
is now complete by the occupation of Savannah.

I am also very glad that General Grant has changed his mind about
embarking my troops for James River, leaving me free to make the
broad swath you describe through South and North Carolina; and
still more gratified at the news from Thomas, in Tennessee, because
it fulfills my plans, which contemplated his being able to dispose
of Hood, in case he ventured north of the Tennessee River.  So, I
think, on the whole, I can chuckle over Jeff. Davis's
disappointment in not turning my Atlanta campaign into a "Moscow
disaster."

I have just finished a long letter to General Grant, and have
explained to him that we are engaged in shifting our base from the
Ogeeohee to the Savannah River, dismantling all the forts made by
the enemy to bear upon the salt-water channels, transferring the
heavy ordnance, etc., to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, and in
remodeling the enemy's interior lines to suit our future plans and
purposes.  I have also laid down the programme for a campaign which
I can make this winter, and which will put me in the spring on the
Roanoke, in direct communication with General Grant on James River.
In general terms, my plan is to turn over to General Foster the
city of Savannah, to sally forth with my army resupplied, cross the
Savannah, feign on Charleston and Augusta, but strike between,
breaking en route the Charleston & Augusta Railroad, also a large
part of that from Branchville and Camden toward North Carolina, and
then rapidly to move for some point of the railroad from Charleston
to Wilmington, between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers; then,
communicating with the fleet in the neighborhood of Georgetown, I
would turn upon Wilmington or Charleston, according to the
importance of either.  I rather prefer Wilmington, as a live place,
over Charleston, which is dead and unimportant when its railroad
communications are broken.  I take it for granted that the present
movement on Wilmington will fail.  If I should determine to take
Charleston, I would turn across the country (which I have hunted
over many a time) from Santee to Mount Pleasant, throwing one wing
on the peninsula between the Ashley and Cooper.  After
accomplishing one or other of these ends, I would make a bee-line
for Raleigh or Weldon, when Lee world be forced to come out of
Richmond, or acknowledge himself beaten. He would, I think, by the
use of the Danville Railroad, throw himself rapidly between me and
Grant, leaving Richmond in the hands of the latter.  This would not
alarm me, for I have an army which I think can maneuver, and I
world force him to attack me at a disadvantage, always under the
supposition that Grant would be on his heels; and, if the worst
come to the worst, I can fight my way down to Albermarle Sound, or
Newbern.

I think the time has come now when we should attempt the boldest
moves, and my experience is, that they are easier of execution than
more timid ones, because the enemy is disconcerted by them--as, for
instance, my recent campaign.

I also doubt the wisdom of concentration beyond a certain extent,
for the roads of this country limit the amount of men that can be
brought to bear in any one battle, and I do not believe that any
one general can handle more than sixty thousand men in battle.

I think our campaign of the last month, as well as every step I
take from this point northward, is as much a direct attack upon
Lee's army as though we were operating within the sound of his
artillery.

I am very anxious that Thomas should follow up his success to the
very utmost point. My orders to him before I left Kingston were,
after beating Hood, to follow him as far as Columbus, Mississippi,
or Selma, Alabama, both of which lie in districts of country which
are rich in corn and meat.

I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy's
country, because this war differs from European wars in this
particular: we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile
people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard
hand of war, as well as their organized armies.  I know that this
recent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effect
in this respect.  Thousands who had been deceived by their lying
newspapers to believe that we were being whipped all the time now
realize the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of the
same experience.  To be sure, Jeff. Davis has his people under
pretty good discipline, but I think faith in him is much shaken in
Georgia, and before we have done with her South Carolina will not
be quite so tempestuous.

I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and do not think
"salt" will be necessary.  When I move, the Fifteenth Corps will be
on the right of the right wing, and their position will naturally
bring them into Charleston first; and, if you have watched the
history of that corps, you will have remarked that they generally
do their work pretty well.  The truth is, the whole army is burning
with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina.
I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that
seems in store for her.

Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why we did not go to
South Carolina; and, when I answered that we were enroute for that
State, the invariable reply was, "Well, if you will make those
people feel the utmost severities of war, we will pardon you for
your desolation of Georgia."

I look upon Colombia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I doubt if
we shall spare the public buildings there as we did at
Milledgeville.

I have been so busy lately that I have not yet made my official
report, and I think I had better wait until I get my subordinate
reports before attempting it, as I am anxious to explain clearly
not only the reasons for every step, but the amount of execution
done, and this I cannot do until I get the subordinate reports; for
we marched the whole distance in four or more columns, and, of
course, I could only be present with one, and generally that one
engaged in destroying railroads.  This work of destruction was
performed better than usual, because I had an engineer-regiment,
provided with claws to twist the bars after being heated.  Such
bars can never be used again, and the only way in which a railroad
line can be reconstructed across Georgia is, to make a new road
from Fairburn Station (twenty-four miles southwest of Atlanta) to
Madison, a distance of one hundred miles; and, before that can be
done, I propose to be on the road from Augusta to Charleston, which
is a continuation of the same.  I felt somewhat disappointed at
Hardee's escape, but really am not to blame.  I moved as quickly as
possible to close up the "Union Causeway," but intervening
obstacles were such that, before I could get troops on the road,
Hardee had slipped out.  Still, I know that the men that were in
Savannah will be lost in a measure to Jeff. Davis, for the Georgia
troops, under G. W. Smith, declared they would not fight in South
Carolina, and they have gone north, en route for Augusta, and I
have reason to believe the North Carolina troops have gone to
Wilmington; in other words, they are scattered.  I have reason to
believe that Beauregard was present in Savannah at the time of its
evacuation, and think that he and Hardee are now in Charleston,
making preparations for what they suppose will be my next step.

Please say to the President that I have received his kind message
(through Colonel Markland), and feel thankful for his high favor.
If I disappoint him in the future, it shall not be from want of
zeal or love to the cause.

From you I expect a full and frank criticism of my plans for the
future, which may enable me to correct errors before it is too
late.  I do not wish to be rash, but want to give my rebel friends
no chance to accuse us of want of enterprise or courage.

Assuring you of my high personal respect, I remain, as ever, your
friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.



[General Order No. 3.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON, January 14, 1865.

The following resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives
is published to the army:

[PUBLIC RESOLUTION--No. 4.]

Joint resolution tendering the thanks of the people and of Congress
to Major-General William T. Sherman, and the officers and soldiers
of his command, for their gallant conduct in their late brilliant
movement through Georgia.

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks of
the people and of the Congress of the United States are due and are
hereby tendered to Major-General William T. Sherman, and through
him to the officers and men under his command, for their gallantry
and good conduct in their late campaign from Chattanooga to
Atlanta, and the triumphal march thence through Georgia to
Savannah, terminating in the capture and occupation of that city;
and that the President cause a copy of this joint resolution to be
engrossed and forwarded to Major-General Sherman.

Approved, January 10, 1865.

By order of the Secretary of War,
W. A. NICHOLS, Assistant Adjutant-General.



CHAPTER XXII.

SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO.

DECEMBER, 1884, AND JANUARY, 1885.

The city of Savannah was an old place, and usually accounted a
handsome one.  Its houses were of brick or frame, with large yards,
ornamented with shrubbery and flowers; its streets perfectly
regular, crossing each other at right angles; and at many of the
intersections were small inclosures in the nature of parks.  These
streets and parks were lined with the handsomest shade-trees of
which I have knowledge, viz., the Willow-leaf live-oak, evergreens
of exquisite beauty; and these certainly entitled Savannah to its
reputation as a handsome town more than the houses, which, though
comfortable, would hardly make a display on Fifth Avenue or the
Boulevard Haussmann of Paris.  The city was built on a plateau of
sand about forty feet above the level of the sea, abutting against
the river, leaving room along its margin for a street of stores and
warehouses.  The customhouse, court-house, post-office, etc., were
on the plateau above.  In rear of Savannah was a large park, with a
fountain, and between it and the court-house was a handsome
monument, erected to the memory of Count Pulaski, who fell in 1779
in the assault made on the city at the time it was held by the
English during the Revolutionary War.  Outside of Savannah there
was very little to interest a stranger, except the cemetery of
Bonaventura, and the ride along the Wilmington Channel by way of
Thunderbolt, where might be seen some groves of the majestic
live-oak trees, covered with gray and funereal moss, which were
truly sublime in grandeur, but gloomy after a few days' camping
under them:

Within an hour of taking up my quarters in Mr. Green's house, Mr.
A. G. Browne, of Salem, Massachusetts, United States Treasury agent
for the Department of the South, made his appearance to claim
possession, in the name of the Treasury Department, of all captured
cotton, rice, buildings, etc.  Having use for these articles
ourselves, and having fairly earned them, I did not feel inclined
to surrender possession, and explained to him that the
quartermaster and commissary could manage them more to my liking
than he; but I agreed, after the proper inventories had been
prepared, if there remained any thing for which we had no special
use, I would turn it over to him.  It was then known that in the
warehouses were stored at least twenty-five thousand bales of
cotton, and in the forts one hundred and fifty large, heavy
sea-coast guns: although afterward, on a more careful count, there
proved to be more than two hundred and fifty sea-coast or siege
guns, and thirty-one thousand bales of cotton.  At that interview
Mr. Browne, who was a shrewd, clever Yankee, told me that a vessel
was on the point of starting for Old Point Comfort, and, if she had
good weather off Cape Hatteras, would reach Fortress Monroe by
Christmas-day, and he suggested that I might make it the occasion
of sending a welcome Christmas gift to the President, Mr. Lincoln,
who peculiarly enjoyed such pleasantry.  I accordingly sat down and
wrote on a slip of paper, to be left at the telegraph-office at
Fortress Monroe for transmission, the following:


SAVANNAH GEORGIA, December 22, 1884.
To His Excellency President Lincoln, Washington, D. C.:

I beg to present you as a Christmas-gift the city of Savannah, with
one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, also
about twenty five thousand bales of cotton.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


This message actually reached him on Christmas-eve, was extensively
published in the newspapers, and made many a household unusually
happy on that festive day; and it was in the answer to this
dispatch that Mr. Lincoln wrote me the letter of December 28th,
already given, beginning with the words, "many, many thanks," etc.,
which he sent at the hands of General John A.  Logan, who happened
to be in Washington, and was coming to Savannah, to rejoin his
command.

On the 23d of December were made the following general orders for
the disposition of the troops in and about Savannah:

[Special Field Order No. 139.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 23, 1864.

Savannah, being now in our possession, the river partially cleared
out, and measures having been taken to remove all obstructions,
will at once be made a grand depot for future operations:

1.  The chief-quartermaster, General Euston, will, after giving the
necessary orders touching the transports in Ogeechee River and
Oasabaw Sound, come in person to Savannah, and take possession of
all public buildings, vacant storerooms, warehouses, etc., that may
be now or hereafter needed for any department of the army.  No
rents will be paid by the Government of the United States during
the war, and all buildings must be distributed according to the
accustomed rates of the Quartermaster's Department, as though they
were public property.

2.  The chief commissary of subsistence, Colonel A.  Beckwith, will
transfer the grand depot of the army to the city of Savannah,
secure possession of the needful buildings and offices, and give
the necessary orders, to the end that the army may be supplied
abundantly and well.

S.  The chief-engineer, Captain Poe, will at once direct which of
the enemy's forts are to be retained for our use, and which
dismantled and destroyed.  The chief ordnance-officer, Captain
Baylor, will in like manner take possession of all property
pertaining to his department captured from the enemy, and cause the
same to be collected and conveyed to points of security; all the
heavy coast-guns will be dismounted and carried to Fort Pulaski.

4.  The troops, for the present, will be grouped about the city of
Savannah, looking to convenience of camps; General Slocum taking
from the Savannah River around to the seven-mile post on the Canal,
and General Howard thence to the sea; General Kilpatrick will hold
King's Bridge until Fort McAllister is dismantled, and the troops
withdrawn from the south side of the Ogeechee, when he will take
post about Anderson's plantation, on the plank-road, and picket all
the roads leading from the north and west.

5.  General Howard will keep a small guard at Forts Rosedale,
Beaulieu, Wimberley, Thunderbolt, and Bonaventura, and he will
cause that shore and Skidaway Island to be examined very closely,
with a view to finding many and convenient points for the
embarkation of troops and wagons on seagoing vessels.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L.  M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.



[Special Field Order No. 143.]


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 26, 1864.

The city of Savannah and surrounding country will be held as a
military post, and adapted to future military uses, but, as it
contains a population of some twenty thousand people, who must be
provided for, and as other citizens may come, it is proper to lay
down certain general principles, that all within its military
jurisdiction may understand their relative duties and obligations.

1.  During war, the military is superior to civil authority, and,
where interests clash, the civil must give way; yet, where there is
no conflict, every encouragement should be given to well-disposed
and peaceful inhabitants to resume their usual pursuits.  Families
should be disturbed as little as possible in their residences, and
tradesmen allowed the free use of their shops, tools, etc.;
churches, schools, and all places of amusement and recreation,
should be encouraged, and streets and roads made perfectly safe to
persons in their pursuits.  Passes should not be exacted within the
line of outer pickets, but if any person shall abuse these
privileges by communicating with the enemy, or doing any act of
hostility to the Government of the United States, he or she will be
punished with the utmost rigor of the law.  Commerce with the outer
world will be resumed to an extent commensurate with the wants of
the citizens, governed by the restrictions and rules of the
Treasury Department.

2.  The chief quartermaster and commissary of the army may give
suitable employment to the people, white and black, or transport
them to such points as they may choose where employment can be had;
and may extend temporary relief in the way of provisions and vacant
houses to the worthy and needy, until such time as they can help
themselves.  They will select first the buildings for the necessary
uses of the army; next, a sufficient number of stores, to be turned
over to the Treasury agent for trade-stores.  All vacant
store-houses or dwellings, and all buildings belonging to absent
rebels, will be construed and used as belonging to the United States,
until such time as their titles can be settled by the courts of the
United States.

8.  The Mayor and City Council of Savannah will continue to
exercise their functions, and will, in concert with the commanding
officer of the post and the chief-quartermaster, see that the
fire-companies are kept in organization, the streets cleaned and
lighted, and keep up a good understanding between the citizens and
soldiers.  They will ascertain and report to the chief commissary
of subsistence, as soon as possible, the names and number of worthy
families that need assistance and support.  The mayor will forth
with give public notice that the time has come when all must choose
their course, viz., remain within our lines, and conduct themselves
as good citizens, or depart in peace.  He will ascertain the names
of all who choose to leave Savannah, and report their names and
residence to the chief-quartermaster, that measures may be taken to
transport them beyond our lines.

4.  Not more than two newspapers will be published in Savannah;
their editors and proprietors will be held to the strictest
accountability, and will be punished severely, in person and
property, for any libelous publication, mischievous matter,
premature news, exaggerated statements, or any comments whatever
upon the acts of the constituted authorities; they will be held
accountable for such articles, even though copied from other
papers.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L.  M.  DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.


It was estimated that there were about twenty thousand inhabitants
in Savannah, all of whom had participated more or less in the war,
and had no special claims to our favor, but I regarded the war as
rapidly drawing to a close, and it was becoming a political
question as to what was to be done with the people of the South,
both white and black, when the war was actually over.  I concluded
to give them the option to remain or to join their friends in
Charleston or Augusta, and so announced in general orders.  The
mayor, Dr. Arnold, was completely "subjugated," and, after
consulting with him, I authorized him to assemble his City Council
to take charge generally of the interests of the people; but warned
all who remained that they must be strictly subordinate to the
military law, and to the interests of the General Government.
About two hundred persona, mostly the families of men in the
Confederate army, prepared to follow the fortunes of their husbands
and fathers, and these were sent in a steamboat under a flag of
truce, in charge of my aide Captain Audenried, to Charleston
harbor, and there delivered to an officer of the Confederate army.
But the great bulk of the inhabitants chose to remain in Savannah,
generally behaved with propriety, and good social relations at once
arose between them and the army.  Shortly after our occupation of
Savannah, a lady was announced at my headquarters by the orderly or
sentinel at the front-door, who was ushered into the parlor, and
proved to be the wife of General G. W. Smith, whom I had known
about 1850, when Smith was on duty at West Point.  She was a native
of New London, Connecticut, and very handsome.  She began her
interview by presenting me a letter from her husband, who then
commanded a division of the Georgia militia in the rebel army,
which had just quitted Savannah, which letter began, "DEAR SHERMAN:
The fortunes of war, etc-., compel me to leave my wife in Savannah,
and I beg for her your courteous protection," etc., etc.  I
inquired where she lived, and if anybody was troubling her.  She
said she was boarding with a lady whose husband had, in like manner
with her own, gone off with Hardee's army; that a part of the house
had been taken for the use of Major-General Ward, of Kentucky; that
her landlady was approaching her confinement, and was nervous at
the noise which the younger staff-officers made at night; etc.  I
explained to her that I could give but little personal attention to
such matters, and referred her to General Slocum, whose troops
occupied the city.  I afterward visited her house, and saw,
personally, that she had no reason to complain.  Shortly afterward
Mr. Hardee, a merchant of Savannah, came to me and presented a
letter from his brother, the general, to the same effect, alleging
that his brother was a civilian, had never taken up arms, and asked
of me protection for his family, his cotton, etc.  To him I gave
the general assurance that no harm was designed to any of the
people of Savannah who would remain quiet and peaceable, but that I
could give him no guarantee as to his cotton, for over it I had no
absolute control; and yet still later I received a note from the
wife of General A. P. Stewart (who commanded a corps in Hood's
army), asking me to come to see her.  This I did, and found her to
be a native of Cincinnati, Ohio, wanting protection, and who was
naturally anxious about the fate of her husband, known to be with
General Hood, in Tennessee, retreating before General Thomas.  I
remember that I was able to assure her that he had not been killed
or captured, up to that date, and think that I advised her, instead
of attempting to go in pursuit of her husband, to go to Cincinnati,
to her uncle, Judge Storer, there await the issue of events.

Before I had reached Savannah, and during our stay there, the rebel
officers and newspapers represented the conduct of the men of our
army as simply infamous; that we respected neither age nor sex;
that we burned every thing we came across--barns, stables,
cotton-gins, and even dwelling-houses; that we ravished the women
and killed the men, and perpetrated all manner of outrages on the
inhabitants.  Therefore it struck me as strange that Generals
Hardee and Smith should commit their, families to our custody, and
even bespeak our personal care and attention.  These officers knew
well that these reports were exaggerated in the extreme, and yet
tacitly assented to these publications, to arouse the drooping
energies of the people of the South.

As the division of Major-General John W. Geary, of the Twentieth
Corps, was the first to enter Savannah, that officer was appointed
to command the place, or to act as a sort of governor.  He very
soon established a good police, maintained admirable order, and I
doubt if Savannah, either before or since, has had a better
government than during our stay.  The guard-mountings and parades,
as well as the greater reviews, became the daily resorts of the
ladies, to hear the music of our excellent bands; schools were
opened, and the churches every Sunday were well filled with most
devout and respectful congregations; stores were reopened, and
markets for provisions, meat, wood, etc., were established, so that
each family, regardless of race, color, or opinion, could procure
all the necessaries and even luxuries of life, provided they had
money.  Of course, many families were actually destitute of this,
and to these were issued stores from our own stock of supplies.  I
remember to have given to Dr. Arnold, the mayor, an order for the
contents of a large warehouse of rice, which he confided to a
committee of gentlemen, who went North (to Boston), and soon
returned with one or more cargoes of flour, hams, sugar, coffee,
etc., for gratuitous distribution, which relieved the most pressing
wants until the revival of trade and business enabled the people to
provide for themselves.

A lady, whom I had known in former years as Miss Josephine Goodwin,
told me that, with a barrel of flour and some sugar which she had
received gratuitously from the commissary, she had baked cakes and
pies, in the sale of which she realized a profit of fifty-six
dollars.

Meantime Colonel Poe had reconnoitred and laid off new lines of
parapet, which would enable a comparatively small garrison to hold
the place, and a heavy detail of soldiers was put to work thereon;
Generals Easton and Beckwith had organized a complete depot of
supplies; and, though vessels arrived almost daily with mails and
provisions, we were hardly ready to initiate a new and hazardous
campaign.  I had not yet received from General Grant or General
Halleck any modification of the orders of December 6,1864, to
embark my command for Virginia by sea; but on the 2d of January,
1865, General J. G. Barnard, United States Engineers, arrived
direct from General Grant's headquarters, bearing the following
letter, in the general's own handwriting, which, with my answer, is
here given:



HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 27, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: Before writing you definite instructions for the next
campaign, I wanted to receive your answer to my letter written from
Washington.  Your confidence in being able to march up and join
this army pleases me, and I believe it can be done.  The effect of
such a campaign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent the
organization of new armies from their broken fragments.  Hood is
now retreating, with his army broken and demoralized.  His loss in
men has probably not been far from twenty thousand, besides
deserters.  If time is given, the fragments may be collected
together and many of the deserters reassembled.  If we can, we
should act to prevent this.  Your spare army, as it were, moving as
proposed, will do it.

In addition to holding Savannah, it looks to me that an intrenched
camp ought to be held on the railroad between Savannah and
Charleston.  Your movement toward Branchville will probably enable
Foster to reach this with his own force.  This will give us a
position in the South from which we can threaten the interior
without marching over long, narrow causeways, easily defended, as
we have heretofore been compelled to do.  Could not such a camp be
established about Pocotaligo or Coosawhatchie?

I have thought that, Hood being so completely wiped out for present
harm, I might bring A. J. Smith here, with fourteen to fifteen
thousand men.  With this increase I could hold my lines, and move
out with a greater force than Lee has.  It would compel Lee to
retain all his present force in the defenses of Richmond or abandon
them entirely.  This latter contingency is probably the only danger
to the easy success of your expedition.  In the event you should
meet Lee's army, you would be compelled to beat it or find the
sea-coast.  Of course, I shall not let Lee's army escape if I can
help it, and will not let it go without following to the best of my
ability.

Without waiting further directions, than, you may make your
preparations to start on your northern expedition without delay.
Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the
armies operating against Richmond as soon as you can.  I will leave
out all suggestions about the route you should take, knowing that
your information, gained daily in the course of events, will be
better than any that can be obtained now.

It may not be possible for you to march to the rear of Petersburg;
but, failing in this, you could strike either of the sea-coast
ports in North Carolina held by us.  From there you could take
shipping.  It would be decidedly preferable, however, if you could
march the whole distance.

From the best information I have, you will find no difficulty in
supplying your army until you cross the Roanoke.  From there here
is but a few days' march, and supplies could be collected south of
the river to bring you through.  I shall establish communication
with you there, by steamboat and gunboat.  By this means your wants
can be partially supplied.  I shall hope to hear from you soon, and
to hear your plan, and about the time of starting.

Please instruct Foster to hold on to all the property in Savannah,
and especially the cotton.  Do not turn it over to citizens or
Treasury agents, without orders of the War Department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 2, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point.

GENERAL: I have received, by the hands of General Barnard, your
note of 26th and letter of 27th December.

I herewith inclose to you a copy of a projet which I have this
morning, in strict confidence, discussed with my immediate
commanders.

I shall need, however, larger supplies of stores, especially grain.
I will inclose to you, with this, letters from General Easton,
quartermaster, and Colonel Beckwith, commissary of subsistence,
setting forth what will be required, and trust you will forward
them to Washington with your sanction, so that the necessary steps
may be taken at once to enable me to carry out this plan on time.

I wrote you very fully on the 24th, and have nothing to add.  Every
thing here is quiet, and if I can get the necessary supplies in our
wagons, shall be ready to start at the time indicated in my projet
(January 15th).  But, until those supplies are in hand, I can do
nothing; after they are, I shall be ready to move with great
rapidity.

I have heard of the affair at Cape Fear.  It has turned out as you
will remember I expected.

I have furnished General Easton a copy of the dispatch from the
Secretary of War.  He will retain possession of all cotton here,
and ship it as fast as vessels can be had to New York.

I shall immediately send the Seventeenth Corps over to Port Royal,
by boats, to be furnished by Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster
(without interfering with General Easton's vessels), to make a
lodgment on the railroad at Pocotaligo.

General Barnard will remain with me a few days, and I send this by
a staff-officer, who can return on one of the vessels of the
supply-fleet.  I suppose that, now that General Butler has got
through with them, you can spare them to us.

My report of recent operations is nearly ready, and will be sent
you in a day or two, as soon as some farther subordinate reports
come in.

I am, with great respect, very truly, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.



[Entirely confidential]

PROJET FOR JANUARY.

1.  Right wing to move men and artillery by transports to head of
Broad River and Beaufort; reestablish Port Royal Ferry, and mass
the wing at or in the neighborhood of Pocotaligo.

Left wing and cavalry to work slowly across the causeway toward
Hardeeville, to open a road by which wagons can reach their corps
about Broad River; also, by a rapid movement of the left, to secure
Sister's Ferry, and Augusta road out to Robertsville.

In the mean time, all guns, shot, shell, cotton, etc., to be moved
to a safe place, easy to guard, and provisions and wagons got ready
for another swath, aiming to have our army in hand about the head
of Broad River, say Pocotaligo, Robertsville, and Coosawhatchie, by
the 15th January.

2.  The whole army to move with loaded wagons by the roads leading
in the direction of Columbia, which afford the best chance of
forage and provisions.  Howard to be at Pocotaligo by the 15th
January, and Slocum to be at Robertsville, and Kilpatrick at or
near Coosawhatchie about the same date.  General Fosters troops to
occupy Savannah, and gunboats to protect the rivers as soon as
Howard gets Pocotaligo.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


Therefore, on the 2d of January, I was authorized to march with my
entire army north by land, and concluded at once to secure a
foothold or starting-point on the South Carolina side, selecting
Pocotaligo and Hardeeville as the points of rendezvous for the two
wings; but I still remained in doubt as to the wishes of the
Administration, whether I should take Charleston en route, or
confine my whole attention to the incidental advantages of breaking
up the railways of South and North Carolina, and the greater object
of uniting my army with that of General Grant before Richmond.

General Barnard remained with me several days, and was regarded
then, as now, one of the first engineers of the age, perfectly
competent to advise me on the strategy and objects of the new
campaign.  He expressed himself delighted with the high spirit of
the army, the steps already taken, by which we had captured
Savannah, and he personally inspected some of the forts, such as
Thunderbolt and Causten's Bluff, by which the enemy had so long
held at bay the whole of our navy, and had defeated the previous
attempts made in April, 1862, by the army of General Gillmore,
which had bombarded and captured Fort Pulaski, but had failed to
reach the city of Savannah.  I think General Barnard expected me to
invite him to accompany us northward in his official capacity; but
Colonel Poe, of my staff, had done so well, and was so perfectly
competent, that I thought it unjust to supersede him by a senior in
his own corps.  I therefore said nothing of this to General
Barnard, and soon after he returned to his post with General Grant,
at City Point, bearing letters and full personal messages of our
situation and wants.

We were very much in want of light-draught steamers for navigating
the shallow waters of the coast, so that it took the Seventeenth
Corps more than a week to transfer from Thunderbolt to Beaufort,
South Carolina.  Admiral Dahlgren had supplied the Harvest Moon and
the Pontiac, and General Foster gave us a couple of hired steamers;
I was really amused at the effect this short sea-voyage had on our
men, most of whom had never before looked upon the ocean.  Of
course, they were fit subjects for sea-sickness, and afterward they
begged me never again to send them to sea, saying they would rather
march a thousand miles on the worst roads of the South than to
spend a single night on the ocean.  By the 10th General Howard had
collected the bulk of the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair) on
Beaufort Island, and began his march for Pocotaligo, twenty-five
miles inland.  They crossed the channel between the island and
main-land during Saturday, the 14th of January, by a pontoon-
bridge, and marched out to Garden's Corners, where there was some
light skirmishing; the next day, Sunday, they continued on to
Pocotaligo, finding the strong fort there abandoned, and
accordingly made a lodgment on the railroad, having lost only two
officers and eight men.

About the same time General Slocum crossed two divisions of the
Twentieth Corps over the Savannah River, above the city, occupied
Hardeeville by one division and Purysburg by another.  Thus, by the
middle of January, we had effected a lodgment in South Carolina,
and were ready to resume the march northward; but we had not yet
accumulated enough provisions and forage to fill the wagons, and
other causes of delay occurred, of which I will make mention in due
order.

On the last day of December, 1864, Captain Breese, United States
Navy, flag-officer to Admiral Porter, reached Savannah, bringing
the first news of General Butler's failure at Fort Fisher, and that
the general had returned to James River with his land-forces,
leaving Admiral Porter's fleet anchored off Cape Fear, in that
tempestuous season.  Captain Breese brought me a letter from the
admiral, dated December 29th, asking me to send him from Savannah
one of my old divisions, with which he said he would make short
work of Fort Fisher; that he had already bombarded and silenced its
guns, and that General Butler had failed because he was afraid to
attack, or even give the order to attack, after (as Porter
insisted) the guns of Fort Fisher had been actually silenced by the
navy.

I answered him promptly on the 31st of December, that I proposed to
march north inland, and that I would prefer to leave the rebel
garrisons on the coast, instead of dislodging and piling them up in
my front as we progressed.  From the chances, as I then understood
them, I supposed that Fort Fisher was garrisoned by a comparatively
small force, while the whole division of General Hoke remained
about the city of Wilmington; and that, if Fort Fisher were
captured, it would leave General Hoke free to join the larger force
that would naturally be collected to oppose my progress northward.
I accordingly answered  Admiral Porter to this effect, declining to
loan him the use of one of my divisions.  It subsequently
transpired, however, that, as soon as General Butler reached City
Point, General Grant was unwilling to rest under a sense of
failure, and accordingly dispatched back the same troops,
reenforced and commanded by General A. H. Terry, who, on the 15th
day of January, successfully assaulted and captured Fort Fisher,
with its entire garrison.  After the war was over, about the 20th
of May, when I was giving my testimony before the Congressional
Committee on the Conduct of the War, the chairman of the committee,
Senator B. F. Wade, of Ohio, told me that General Butler had been
summoned before that committee during the previous January, and had
just finished his demonstration to their entire satisfaction that
Fort Fisher could not be carried by assault, when they heard the
newsboy in the hall crying out an "extra" Calling him in, they
inquired the news, and he answered, "Fort Fisher done took!"  Of
course, they all laughed, and none more heartily than General
Butler himself.

On the 11th of January there arrived at Savannah a revenue-cutter,
having on board Simeon Draper, Esq., of New York City, the Hon. E.
M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Quartermaster-General Meigs,
Adjutant-General Townsend, and a retinue of civilians, who had come
down from the North to regulate the civil affairs of Savannah....

I was instructed by Mr. Stanton to transfer to Mr. Draper the
custom house, post-office, and such other public buildings as these
civilians needed in the execution of their office, and to cause to
be delivered into their custody the captured cotton.  This was
accomplished by--


[Special Field Orders, No. 10.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 12, 1865.

1.  Brevet Brigadier-General Euston, chief-quartermaster, will turn
over to Simeon Draper, Esq., agent of the United States Treasury
Department, all cotton now in the city of Savannah, prize of war,
taking his receipt for the same in gross, and returning for it to
the quartermaster-general.  He will also afford Mr. Draper all the
facilities in his power in the way of transportation, labor, etc.,
to enable him to handle the cotton with expedition.

2.  General Euston will also turn over to Mr. Draper the
custom-house, and such other buildings in the city of Savannah as
he may need in the execution of his office.

By order of General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.


Up to this time all the cotton had been carefully guarded, with
orders to General Euston to ship it by the return-vessels to New
York, for the adjudication of the nearest prize-court, accompanied
with invoices and all evidence of title to ownership.  Marks,
numbers, and other figures, were carefully preserved on the bales,
so that the court might know the history of each bale.  But Mr.
Stanton, who surely was an able lawyer, changed all this, and
ordered the obliteration of all the marks; so that no man, friend
or foe, could trace his identical cotton.  I thought it strange at
the time, and think it more so now; for I am assured that claims,
real and fictitious, have been proved up against this identical
cotton of three times the quantity actually captured, and that
reclamations on the Treasury have been allowed for more than the
actual quantity captured, viz., thirty-one thousand bales.

Mr. Stanton staid in Savannah several days, and seemed very curious
about matters and things in general.  I walked with him through the
city, especially the bivouacs of the several regiments that
occupied the vacant squares, and he seemed particularly pleased at
the ingenuity of the men in constructing their temporary huts.
Four of the "dog-tents," or tentes d'abri, buttoned together,
served for a roof, and the sides were made of clapboards, or rough
boards brought from demolished houses or fences.  I remember his
marked admiration for the hut of a soldier who had made his door
out of a handsome parlor mirror, the glass gone and its gilt frame
serving for his door.

He talked to me a great deal about the negroes, the former slaves,
and I told him of many interesting incidents, illustrating their
simple character and faith in our arms and progress.  He inquired
particularly about General Jeff. C. Davis, who, he said, was a
Democrat, and hostile to the negro.  I assured him that General
Davis was an excellent soldier, and I did not believe he had any
hostility to the negro; that in our army we had no negro soldiers,
and, as a rule, we preferred white soldiers, but that we employed a
large force of them as servants, teamsters, and pioneers, who had
rendered admirable service.  He then showed me a newspaper account
of General Davis taking up his pontoon-bridge across Ebenezer
Creek, leaving sleeping negro men, women, and children, on the
other side, to be slaughtered by Wheeler's cavalry.  I had heard
such a rumor, and advised Mr. Stanton, before becoming prejudiced,
to allow me to send for General Davis, which he did, and General
Davis explained the matter to his entire satisfaction.  The truth
was, that, as we approached the seaboard, the freedmen in droves,
old and young, followed the several columns to reach a place of
safety.  It so happened that General Davis's route into Savannah
followed what was known as the "River-road," and he had to make
constant use of his pontoon-train--the head of his column reaching
some deep, impassable creek before the rear was fairly over
another.  He had occasionally to use the pontoons both day and
night.  On the occasion referred to, the bridge was taken up from
Ebenezer Creek while some of the camp-followers remained asleep on
the farther side, and these were picked up by Wheeler's cavalry.
Some of them, in their fright, were drowned in trying to swim over,
and others may have been cruelly killed by Wheeler's men, but this
was a mere supposition.  At all events, the same thing might have
resulted to General Howard, or to any other of the many most humane
commanders who filled the army.  General Jeff. C. Davis was
strictly a soldier, and doubtless hated to have his wagons and
columns encumbered by these poor negroes, for whom we all felt
sympathy, but a sympathy of a different sort from that of Mr.
Stanton, which was not of pure humanity, but of politics.  The
negro question was beginning to loom up among the political
eventualities of the day, and many foresaw that not only would the
slaves secure their freedom, but that they would also have votes.
I did not dream of such a result then, but knew that slavery, as
such, was dead forever, and did not suppose that the former slaves
would be suddenly, without preparation, manufactured into voters,
equal to all others, politically and socially.  Mr. Stanton seemed
desirous of coming into contact with the negroes to confer with
them, and he asked me to arrange an interview for him.  I
accordingly sent out and invited the most intelligent of the
negroes, mostly Baptist and Methodist preachers, to come to my
rooms to meet the Secretary of War.  Twenty responded, and were
received in my room up-stairs in Mr. Green's house, where Mr.
Stanton and Adjutant-General Townsend took down the conversation in
the form of questions and answers.  Each of the twenty gave his
name and partial history, and then selected Garrison Frazier as
their spokesman:

First Question.  State what your understanding is in regard to the
acts of Congress and President Lincoln's proclamation touching the
colored people in the rebel States?

Answer.  So far as I understand President Lincoln's proclamation to
the rebel States, it is, that if they will lay down their arms and
submit to the laws of the United States, before the 1st of January,
1863, all should be well; but if they did not, then all the slaves
in the Southern States should be free, henceforth and forever.
That is what I understood.

Second Question.  State what you understand by slavery, and the
freedom that was to be given by the President's proclamation?

Answer.  Slavery is receiving by irresistible power the work of
another man, and not by his consent.  The freedom, as I understand
it, promised by the proclamation, is taking us from under the yoke
of bondage and placing us where we can reap the fruit of our own
labor, and take care of ourselves and assist the Government in
maintaining our freedom.

Fourth Question.  State in what manner you would rather live
--whether scattered among the whites, or in colonies by yourselves?

Answer.  I would prefer to live by ourselves, for there is a
prejudice against us in the South that will take years to get over;
but I do not know that I can answer for my brethren.

(All but Mr. Lynch, a missionary from the North, agreed with
Frazier, but he thought they ought to live together, along with the
whites.)

Eighth Question.  If the rebel leaders were to arm the slaves, what
would be its effect?

Answer.  I think they would fight as long as they were before the
"bayonet," and just as soon as they could get away they would
desert, in my opinion.

Tenth Question.  Do you understand the mode of enlistment of
colored persons in the rebel States by State agents, under the act
of Congress; if yea, what is your understanding?

Answer.  My understanding is, that colored persons enlisted by
State agents are enlisted as substitutes, and give credit to the
State and do not swell the army, because every black man enlisted
by a State agent leaves a white man at home; and also that larger
bounties are given, or promised, by the State agents than are given
by the United States.  The great object should be to push through
this rebellion the shortest way; and there seems to be something
wanting in the enlistment by State agents, for it don't strengthen
the army, but takes one away for every colored man enlisted.

Eleventh Question.  State what, in your opinion, is the best way to
enlist colored men as soldiers?

Answer.  I think, sir, that all compulsory operations should be put
a stop to.  The ministers would talk to them, and the young men
would enlist.  It is my opinion that it world be far better for the
State agents to stay at home and the enlistments be made for the
United States under the direction of General Sherman.

Up to this time I was present, and, on Mr. Stanton's intimating
that he wanted to ask some questions affecting me, I withdrew, and
then he put the twelfth and last question

Twelfth Question.  State what is the feeling of the colored people
toward General Sherman, and how far do they regard his sentiments
and actions as friendly to their rights and interests, or
otherwise.

Answer.  We looked upon General Sherman, prior to his arrival, as a
man, in the providence of God, specially set apart to accomplish
this work, and we unanimously felt inexpressible gratitude to him,
looking upon him as a man who should be honored for the faithful
performance of his duty.  Some of us called upon him immediately
upon his arrival, and it is probable he did not meet the secretary
with more courtesy than he did us.  His conduct and deportment
toward us characterized him as a friend and gentleman.  We have
confidence in General Sherman, and think what concerns us could not
be in better hands.  This is our opinion now, from the short
acquaintance and intercourse we have had.


It certainly was a strange fact that the great War Secretary should
have catechized negroes concerning the character of a general who
had commanded a hundred thousand men in battle, had captured cities
conducted sixty-five thousand men successfully across four hundred
miles of hostile territory, and had just brought tens of thousands
of freedmen to a place of security; but because I had not loaded
down my army by other hundreds of thousands of poor negroes, I was
construed by others as hostile to the black race.  I had received
from General Halleck, at Washington, a letter warning me that there
were certain influential parties near the President who were
torturing him with suspicions of my fidelity to him and his negro
policy; but I shall always believe that Mr. Lincoln, though a
civilian, knew better, and appreciated my motives and character.
Though this letter of General Halleck has always been treated by me
as confidential, I now insert it here at length:



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., December 30, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah.


MY DEAR GENERAL: I take the liberty of calling your attention, in
this private and friendly way, to a matter which may possibly
hereafter be of more importance to you than either of us may now
anticipate.

While almost every one is praising your great march through
Georgia, and the capture of Savannah, there is a certain class
having now great influence with the President, and very probably
anticipating still more on a change of cabinet, who are decidedly
disposed to make a point against you.  I mean in regard to
"inevitable Sambo."  They say that you have manifested an almost
criminal dislike to the negro, and that you are not willing to
carry out the wishes of the Government in regard to him, but
repulse him with contempt! They say you might have brought with you
to Savannah more than fifty thousand, thus stripping Georgia of
that number of laborers, and opening a road by which as many more
could have escaped from their masters; but that, instead of this,
you drove them from your ranks, prevented their following you by
cutting the bridges in your rear, and thus caused the massacre of
large numbers by Wheeler's cavalry.

To those who know you as I do, such accusation will pass as the
idle winds, for we presume that you discouraged the negroes from
following you because you had not the means of supporting them, and
feared they might seriously embarrass your march.  But there are
others, and among them some in high authority, who think or pretend
to think otherwise, and they are decidedly disposed to make a point
against you.

I do not write this to induce you to conciliate this class of men
by doing any thing which you do not deem right and proper, and for
the interest of the Government and the country; but simply to call
your attention to certain things which are viewed here somewhat
differently than from your stand-point.  I will explain as briefly
as possible:

Some here think that, in view of the scarcity of labor in the
South, and the probability that a part, at least, of the
able-bodied slaves will be called into the military service of the
rebels, it is of the greatest importance to open outlets by which
these slaves can escape into our lines, and they say that the route
you have passed over should be made the route of escape, and
Savannah the great place of refuge.  These, I know, are the views
of some of the leading men in the Administration, and they now
express dissatisfaction that you did not carry them out in your
great raid.

Now that you are in possession of Savannah, and there can be no
further fears about supplies, would it not be possible for you to
reopen these avenues of escape for the negroes, without interfering
with your military operations? Could not such escaped slaves find
at least a partial supply of food in the rice-fields about
Savannah, and cotton plantations on the coast?

I merely throw out these suggestions.  I know that such a course
would be approved by the Government, and I believe that a
manifestation on your part of a desire to bring the slaves within
our lines will do much to silence your opponents.  You will
appreciate my motives in writing this private letter.
Yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK.



There is no doubt that Mr. Stanton, when he reached Savannah,
shared these thoughts, but luckily the negroes themselves convinced
him that he was in error, and that they understood their own
interests far better than did the men in Washington, who tried to
make political capital out of this negro question.  The idea that
such men should have been permitted to hang around Mr. Lincoln, to
torture his life by suspicions of the officers who were toiling
with the single purpose to bring the war to a successful end, and
thereby to liberate all slaves, is a fair illustration of the
influences that poison a political capital.

My aim then was, to whip the rebels, to humble their pride, to
follow them to their inmost recesses, and make them fear and dread
us.  "Fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom."  I did not want
them to cast in our teeth what General Hood had once done in
Atlanta, that we had to call on their slaves to help us to subdue
them.  But, as regards kindness to the race, encouraging them to
patience and forbearance, procuring them food and clothing, and
providing them with land whereon to labor, I assert that no army
ever did more for that race than the one I commanded in Savannah.
When we reached Savannah, we were beset by ravenous State agents
from Hilton Head, who enticed and carried away our servants, and
the corps of pioneers which we had organized, and which had done
such excellent service.  On one occasion, my own aide-de-camp,
Colonel Audenried, found at least a hundred poor negroes shut up in
a house and pen, waiting for the night, to be conveyed stealthily
to Hilton Head.  They appealed to him for protection, alleging that
they had been told that they must be soldiers, that "Massa Lincoln"
wanted them, etc.  I never denied the slaves a full opportunity for
voluntary enlistment, but I did prohibit force to be used, for I
knew that the State agents were more influenced by the profit they
derived from the large bounties then being paid than by any love of
country or of the colored race.  In the language of Mr. Frazier,
the enlistment of every black man "did not strengthen the army, but
took away one white man from the ranks."

During Mr. Stanton's stay in Savannah we discussed this negro
question very fully; he asked me to draft an order on the subject,
in accordance with my own views, that would meet the pressing
necessities of the case, and I did so.  We went over this order,
No. 15, of January 16, 1865, very carefully.  The secretary made
some verbal modifications, when it was approved by him in all its
details, I published it, and it went into operation at once.  It
provided fully for the enlistment of colored troops, and gave the
freedmen certain possessory rights to land, which afterward became
matters of judicial inquiry and decision.  Of course, the military
authorities at that day, when war prevailed, had a perfect right to
grant the possession of any vacant land to which they could extend
military protection, but we did not undertake to give a fee-simple
title; and all that was designed by these special field orders was
to make temporary provisions for the freedmen and their families
during the rest of the war, or until Congress should take action in
the premises.  All that I now propose to assert is, that Mr.
Stanton, Secretary of War, saw these orders in the rough, and
approved every paragraph thereof, before they were made public:

[Special Field Orders, No. 15.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 16, 1865.

1.  The islands from Charleston south, the abandoned rice-fields
along the rivers for thirty miles back from the sea, and the
country bordering the St. John's River, Florida, are reserved and
set apart for the settlement of the negroes now made free by the
acts of war and the proclamation of the President of the United
States.

2.  At Beaufort, Hilton Head, Savannah, Fernandina, St. Augustine,
and Jacksonville, the blacks may remain in their chosen or
accustomed vocations; but on the islands, and in the settlements
hereafter to be established, no white person whatever, unless
military officers and soldiers detailed for duty, will be permitted
to reside; and the sole and exclusive management of affairs will be
left to the freed people themselves, subject only to the United
States military authority, and the acts of Congress.  By the laws
of war, and orders of the President of the United States, the negro
is free, and must be dealt with as such.  He cannot be subjected to
conscription, or forced military service, save by the written
orders of the highest military authority of the department, under
such regulations as the President or Congress may prescribe.
Domestic servants, blacksmiths, carpenters, and other mechanics,
will be free to select their own work and residence, but the young
and able-bodied negroes must be encouraged to enlist as soldiery in
the service of the United States, to contribute their share toward
maintaining their own freedom, and securing their rights as
citizens of the United States.

Negroes so enlisted will be organized into companies, battalions,
and regiments, under the orders of the United States military
authorities, and will be paid, fed, and clothed; according to law.
The bounties paid on enlistment may, with the consent of the
recruit, go to assist his family and settlement in procuring
agricultural implements, seed, tools, boots, clothing, and other
articles necessary for their livelihood.

8.  Whenever three respectable negroes, heads of families, shall
desire to settle on land, and shall have selected for that purpose
an island or a locality clearly defined within the limits above
designated, the Inspector of Settlements and Plantations will
himself, or, by such subordinate officer as he may appoint, give
them a license to settle such island or district, and afford them
such assistance as he can to enable them to establish a peaceable
agricultural settlement.  The three parties named will subdivide
the land, under the supervision of the inspector, among themselves,
and such others as may choose to settle near them, so that each
family shall have a plot of not more than forty acres of tillable
ground, and, when it borders on some water-channel, with not more
than eight hundred feet water-front, in the possession of which
land the military authorities will afford them protection until
such time as they can protect themselves, or until Congress shall
regulate their title.  The quartermaster may, on the requisition of
the Inspector of Settlements and Plantations, place at the disposal
of the inspector one or more of the captured steamers to ply
between the settlements and one or more of the commercial points
heretofore named, in order to afford the settlers the opportunity
to supply their necessary wants, and to sell the products of their
land and labor.

4.  Whenever a negro has enlisted in the military service of the
United States, be may locate his family in any one of the
settlements at pleasure, and acquire a homestead, and all other
rights and privileges of a settler, as though present in person.
In like manner, negroes may settle their families and engage on
board the gunboats, or in fishing, or in the navigation of the
inland waters, without losing any claim to land or other advantages
derived from this system.  But no one, unless an actual settler as
above defined, or unless absent on Government service, will be
entitled to claim any right to land or property in any settlement
by virtue of these orders.

5.  In order to carry out this system of settlement, a general
officer will be detailed as Inspector of Settlements and
Plantations, whose duty it shall be to visit the settlements, to
regulate their police and general arrangement, and who will furnish
personally to each head of a family, subject to the approval of the
President of the United States, a possessory title in writing,
giving as near as possible the description of boundaries; and who
shall adjust all claims or conflicts that may arise under the same,
subject to the like approval, treating such titles altogether as
possessory.  The same general officer will also be charged with the
enlistment and organization of the negro recruits, and protecting
their interests while absent from their settlements; and will be
governed by the rules and regulations prescribed by the War
Department for such purposes.

6.  Brigadier-General R.  Saxton is hereby appointed Inspector of
Settlements and Plantations, and will at once enter on the
performance of his duties.  No change is intended or desired in the
settlement now on Beaufort Island, nor will any rights to property
heretofore acquired be affected thereby.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,
L.  M.  DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.


I saw a good deal of the secretary socially, during the time of his
visit to Savannah.  He kept his quarters on the revenue-cutter with
Simeon Draper, Esq., which cutter lay at a wharf in the river, but
he came very often to my quarters at Mr. Green's house.  Though
appearing robust and strong, he complained a good deal of internal
pains, which he said threatened his life, and would compel him soon
to quit public office.  He professed to have come from Washington
purposely for rest and recreation, and he spoke unreservedly of the
bickerings and jealousies at the national capital; of the
interminable quarrels of the State Governors about their quotas,
and more particularly of the financial troubles that threatened the
very existence of the Government itself.  He said that the price of
every thing had so risen in comparison with the depreciated money,
that there was danger of national bankruptcy, and he appealed to
me, as a soldier and patriot, to hurry up matters so as to bring
the war to a close.

He left for Port Royal about the 15th of January, and promised to
go North without delay, so as to hurry back to me the supplies I
had called for, as indispensable for the prosecution of the next
stage of the campaign.  I was quite impatient to get off myself,
for a city-life had become dull and tame, and we were all anxious
to get into the pine-woods again, free from the importunities of
rebel women asking for protection, and of the civilians from the
North who were coming to Savannah for cotton and all sorts of
profit.

On the 18th of January General Slocum was ordered to turn over the
city of Savannah to General J. G. Foster, commanding the Department
of the South, who proposed to retain his own headquarters at Hilton
Head, and to occupy Savannah by General Grovers division of the
Nineteenth Corps, just arrived from James River; and on the next
day, viz., January 19th, I made the first general orders for the
move.

These were substantially to group the right wing of the army at
Pocotaligo, already held by the Seventeenth Corps, and the left
wing and cavalry at or near Robertsville, in South Carolina.  The
army remained substantially the same as during the march from
Atlanta, with the exception of a few changes in the commanders of
brigades and divisions, the addition of some men who had joined
from furlough, and the loss of others from the expiration of their
term of service.  My own personal staff remained the same, with the
exception that General W. F. Barry had rejoined us at Savannah,
perfectly recovered from his attack of erysipelas, and continued
with us to the end of the war.  Generals Easton and Beckwith
remained at Savannah, in charge of their respective depots, with
orders to follow and meet us by sea with supplies when we should
reach the coast at Wilmington or Newbern, North Carolina.

Of course, I gave out with some ostentation, especially among the
rebels, that we were going to Charleston or Augusta; but I had long
before made up my mind to waste no time on either, further than to
play off on their fears, thus to retain for their protection a
force of the enemy which would otherwise concentrate in our front,
and make the passage of some of the great rivers that crossed our
route more difficult and bloody.

Having accomplished all that seemed necessary, on the 21st of
January, with my entire headquarters, officers, clerks, orderlies,
etc., with wagons and horses, I embarked in a steamer for Beaufort,
South Carolina, touching at Hilton Head, to see General Foster.
The weather was rainy and bad, but we reached Beaufort safely on
the 23d, and found some of General Blair's troops there.  The pink
of his corps (Seventeenth) was, however, up on the railroad about
Pocotaligo, near the head of Broad River, to which their supplies
were carried from Hilton Head by steamboats.  General Hatch's
division (of General Foster's command) was still at Coosawhatchie
or Tullafinny, where the Charleston & Savannah Railroad crosses the
river of that name.  All the country between Beaufort and
Pocotaligo was low alluvial land, cut up by an infinite number of
salt-water sloughs and freshwater creeks, easily susceptible of
defense by a small force; and why the enemy had allowed us to make
a lodgment at Pocotaligo so easily I did not understand, unless it
resulted from fear or ignorance.  It seemed to me then that the
terrible energy they had displayed in the earlier stages of the war
was beginning to yield to the slower but more certain industry and
discipline of our Northern men.  It was to me manifest that the
soldiers and people of the South entertained an undue fear of our
Western men, and, like children, they had invented such ghostlike
stories of our prowess in Georgia, that they were scared by their
own inventions.  Still, this was a power, and I intended to utilize
it.  Somehow, our men had got the idea that South Carolina was the
cause of all our troubles; her people were the first to fire on
Fort Sumter, had been in a great hurry to precipitate the country
into civil war; and therefore on them should fall the scourge of
war in its worst form.  Taunting messages had also come to us, when
in Georgia, to the effect that, when we should reach South
Carolina, we would find a people less passive, who would fight us
to the bitter end, daring us to come over, etc.; so that I saw and
felt that we would not be able longer to restrain our men as we had
done in Georgia.

Personally I had many friends in Charleston, to whom I would gladly
have extended protection and mercy, but they were beyond my
personal reach, and I would not restrain the army lest its vigor
and energy should be impaired; and I had every reason to expect
bold and strong resistance at the many broad and deep rivers that
lay across our path.

General Foster's Department of the South had been enlarged to
embrace the coast of North Carolina, so that the few troops serving
there, under the command of General Innis N. Palmer, at Newbern,
became subject to my command.  General A. H. Terry held Fort
Fisher, and a rumor came that he had taken the city of Wilmington;
but this was premature.  He had about eight thousand men.  General
Schofield was also known to be en route from Nashville for North
Carolina, with the entire Twenty-third Corps, so that I had every
reason to be satisfied that I would receive additional strength as
we progressed northward, and before I should need it.

General W. J. Hardee commanded the Confederate forces in
Charleston, with the Salkiehatchie River as his line of defense.
It was also known that General Beauregard had come from the
direction of Tennessee, and had assumed the general command of all
the troops designed to resist our progress.

The heavy winter rains had begun early in January, rendered the
roads execrable, and the Savannah River became so swollen that it
filled its many channels, overflowing the vast extent of
rice-fields that lay on the east bank.  This flood delayed our
departure two weeks; for it swept away our pontoon-bridge at
Savannah, and came near drowning John E. Smith's division of the
Fifteenth Corps, with several heavy trains of wagons that were en
route from Savannah to Pocotaligo by the old causeway.

General Slocum had already ferried two of his divisions across the
river, when Sister's Ferry, about forty miles above Savannah, was
selected for the passage of the rest of his wing and of
Kilpatrick's cavalry.  The troops were in motion for that point
before I quitted Savannah, and Captain S. B. Luce, United States
Navy, had reported to me with a gunboat (the Pontiac) and a couple
of transports, which I requested him to use in protecting Sister's
Ferry during the passage of Slocum's wing, and to facilitate the
passage of the troops all he could.  The utmost activity prevailed
at all points, but it was manifest we could not get off much before
the 1st day of February; so I determined to go in person to
Pocotaligo, and there act as though we were bound for Charleston.
On the 24th of January I started from Beaufort with a part of my
staff, leaving the rest to follow at leisure, rode across the
island to a pontoon-bridge that spanned the channel between it and
the main-land, and thence rode by Garden's Corners to a plantation
not far from Pocotaligo, occupied by General Blair.  There we found
a house, with a majestic avenue of live-oaks, whose limbs had been
cut away by the troops for firewood, and desolation marked one of
those splendid South Carolina estates where the proprietors
formerly had dispensed a hospitality that distinguished the old
regime of that proud State.  I slept on the floor of the house, but
the night was so bitter cold that I got up by the fire several
times, and when it burned low I rekindled it with an old
mantel-clock and the wreck of a bedstead which stood in a corner of
the room--the only act of vandalism that I recall done by myself
personally during the war.

The next morning I rode to Pocotaligo, and thence reconnoitred our
entire line down to Coosawhatchie.  Pocotaligo Fort was on low,
alluvial ground, and near it began the sandy pine-land which
connected with the firm ground extending inland, constituting the
chief reason for its capture at the very first stage of the
campaign.  Hatch's division was ordered to that point from
Coosawhatchie, and the whole of Howard's right wing was brought
near by, ready to start by the 1st of February.  I also
reconnoitred the point of the Salkiehatchie River, where the
Charleston Railroad crossed it, found the bridge protected by a
rebel battery on the farther side, and could see a few men about
it; but the stream itself was absolutely impassable, for the whole
bottom was overflowed by its swollen waters to the breadth of a
full mile.  Nevertheless, Force's and Mower's divisions of the
Seventeenth Corps were kept active, seemingly with the intention to
cross over in the direction of Charleston, and thus to keep up the
delusion that that city was our immediate "objective."  Meantime, I
had reports from General Slocum of the terrible difficulties he had
encountered about Sister's Ferry, where the Savannah River was
reported nearly three miles wide, and it seemed for a time almost
impossible for him to span it at all with his frail pontoons.
About this time (January 25th), the weather cleared away bright and
cold, and I inferred that the river would soon run down, and enable
Slocum to pass the river before February 1st.  One of the divisions
of the Fifteenth Corps (Corse's) had also been cut off by the loss
of the pontoon-bridge at Savannah, so that General Slocum had with
him, not only his own two corps, but Corse's division and
Kilpatrick's cavalry, without which it was not prudent for me to
inaugurate the campaign.  We therefore rested quietly about
Pocotaligo, collecting stores and making final preparations, until
the 1st of February, when I learned that the cavalry and two
divisions of the Twentieth Corps were fairly across the river, and
then gave the necessary orders for the march northward.

Before closing this chapter, I will add a few original letters that
bear directly on the subject, and tend to illustrate it:


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D. C.  January 21, 1866.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at
City Point, and read with interest. Not having them with me,
however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on
all points of recommendation.  As I arrived here at 1 p.m., and
must leave at 6 p.m., having in the mean time spent over three
hours with the secretary and General Halleck, I must be brief.
Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into the
heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, Maryland,
with his corps.  The advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboard
by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad
transportation can be procured from Cincinnati.  The corps numbers
over twenty-one thousand men.

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force, surplus to go to
Selma under an energetic leader.  He has been telegraphed to, to
know whether he could go, and, if so, by which of several routes he
would select.  No reply is yet received.  Canby has been ordered to
set offensively from the seacoast to the interior, toward
Montgomery and Selma.  Thomas's forces will move from the north at
an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to Canby.  Without
further reenforcement Canby will have a moving column of twenty
thousand men.

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured.  We have a force
there of eight thousand effective.  At Newbern about half the
number.  It is rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has
fallen.  I am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we
knew the enemy were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and
that on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there.  If not, he
will be sent to Newbern.  In either event, all the surplus forces
at the two points will move to the interior, toward Goldsboro', in
cooperation with your movements.  From either point, railroad
communications can be run out, there being here abundance of
rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads.

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army
south.  Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if
Wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher
having overtaken about two thousand.

All other troops are subject to your orders as you come in
communication with them.  They will be so instructed.  From about
Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches many men, or
attempts to evacuate, will pitch in.  In the meantime, should you
be brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirty
thousand effective men to your support, from the troops about
Richmond.

To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the
Gulf.  A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful.
A force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will cooperate with you
from Newbern or Wilmington, or both.  You can call for
reenforcements.

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will
return with any message you may have for me.  If there is any thing
I can do for you in the way of having supplies on shipboard, at any
point on the seacoast, ready for you, let me know it.

Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 29, 1885.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

DEAR GENERAL: Captain Hudson has this moment arrived with your
letter of January 21st, which I have read with interest.

The capture of Fort Fisher has a most important bearing on my
campaign, and I rejoice in it for many reasons, because of its
intrinsic importance, and because it gives me another point of
security on the seaboard.  I hope General Terry will follow it up
by the capture of Wilmington, although I do not look for it, from
Admiral Porter's dispatch to me.  I rejoice that Terry was not a
West-Pointer, that he belonged to your army, and that he had the
same troops with which Butler feared to make the attempt.

Admiral Dahlgren, whose fleet is reenforced by some more ironclads,
wants to make an assault a la Fisher on Fort Moultrie, but I
withhold my consent, for the reason that the capture of all
Sullivan's Island is not conclusive as to Charleston; the capture
of James Island would be, but all pronounce that impossible at this
time.  Therefore, I am moving (as hitherto designed) for the
railroad west of Branchville, then will swing across to Orangeburg,
which will interpose my army between Charleston and the interior.
Contemporaneous with this, Foster will demonstrate up the Edisto,
and afterward make a lodgment at Bull's Bay, and occupy the common
road which leads from Mount Pleasant toward Georgetown.  When I get
to Columbia, I think I shall move straight for Goldsboro', via
Fayetteville.  By this circuit I cut all roads, and devastate the
land; and the forces along the coast, commanded by Foster, will
follow my movement, taking any thing the enemy lets go, or so
occupy his attention that he cannot detach all his forces against
me.  I feel sure of getting Wilmington, and may be Charleston, and
being at Goldsboro', with its railroads finished back to Morehead
City and Wilmington, I can easily take Raleigh, when it seems that
Lee must come out.  If Schofield comes to Beaufort, he should be
pushed out to Kinston, on the Neuse, and may be Goldsboro' (or,
rather, a point on the Wilmington road, south of Goldsboro').  It
is not necessary to storm Goldsboro', because it is in a distant
region, of no importance in itself, and, if its garrison is forced
to draw supplies from its north, it, will be eating up the same
stores on which Lee depends for his command.

I have no doubt Hood will bring his army to Augusta.  Canby and
Thomas should penetrate Alabama as far as possible, to keep
employed at least a part of Hood's army; or, what would accomplish
the same thing, Thomas might reoccupy the railroad from Chattanooga
forward to the Etowah, viz., Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona, thereby
threatening Georgia.  I know that the Georgia troops are
disaffected.  At Savannah I met delegates from several counties of
the southwest, who manifested a decidedly hostile spirit to the
Confederate cause.  I nursed the feeling as far as possible, and
instructed Grower to keep it up.

My left wing must now be at Sister's Ferry, crossing the Savannah
River to the east bank.  Slocum has orders to be at Robertsville
to-morrow, prepared to move on Barnwell.  Howard is here, all ready
to start for the Augusta Railroad at Midway.

We find the enemy on the east aide of the Salkiehatchie, and
cavalry in our front; but all give ground on our approach, and seem
to be merely watching us.  If we start on Tuesday, in one week we
shall be near Orangeburg, having broken up the Augusta road from
the Edisto westward twenty or twenty-five miles.  I will be sure
that every rail is twisted.  Should we encounter too much
opposition near Orangeburg, then I will for a time neglect that
branch, and rapidly move on Columbia, and fill up the triangle
formed by the Congaree and Wateree (tributaries of the Santee),
breaking up that great centre of the Carolina roads.  Up to that
point I feel full confidence, but from there may have to manoeuvre
some, and will be guided by the questions of weather and supplies.

You remember we had fine weather last February for our Meridian
trip, and my memory of the weather at Charleston is, that February
is usually a fine month.  Before the March storms come we should be
within striking distance of the coast. The months of April and May
will be the best for operations from Goldsboro' to Raleigh and the
Roanoke.  You may rest assured that I will keep my troops well in
hand, and, if I get worsted, will aim to make the enemy pay so
dearly that you will have less to do.  I know that this trip is
necessary; it must be made sooner or later; I am on time, and in
the right position for it.  My army is large enough for the
purpose, and I ask no reinforcement, but simply wish the utmost
activity to be kept up at all other points, so that concentration
against me may not be universal.

I suspect that Jeff. Davis will move heaven and earth to catch me,
for success to this column is fatal to his dream of empire.
Richmond is not more vital to his cause than Columbia and the heart
of South Carolina.

If Thomas will not move on Selma, order him to occupy Rome,
Kingston, and Allatoona, and again threaten Georgia in the
direction of Athena.

I think the "poor white trash" of the South are falling out of
their ranks by sickness, desertion, and every available means; but
there is a large class of vindictive Southerners who will fight to
the last.  The squabbles in Richmond, the howls in Charleston, and
the disintegration elsewhere, are all good omens for us; we must
not relax one iota, but, on the contrary, pile up our efforts: I
world, ere this, have been off, but we had terrific rains, which
caught us in motion, and nearly drowned some of the troops in the
rice-fields of the Savannah, swept away our causeway (which had
been carefully corduroyed), and made the swamps hereabout mere
lakes of slimy mud.  The weather is now good, and I have the army
on terra firma.  Supplies, too, came for a long time by daily
driblets instead of in bulk; this is now all remedied, and I hope
to start on Tuesday.

I will issue instructions to General Foster, based on the
reenforcements of North Carolina; but if Schofield comes, you had
better relieve Foster, who cannot take the field, and needs an
operation on his leg.  Let Schofield take command, with his
headquarters at Beaufort, North Carolina, and with orders to secure
Goldsboro' (with its railroad communication back to Beaufort and
Wilmington).  If Lee lets us get that position, he is gone up.

I will start with my Atlanta army (sixty thousand), supplied as
before, depending on the country for all food in excess of thirty
days.  I will have less cattle on the hoof, but I hear of hogs,
cows, and calves, in Barnwell and the Colombia districts.  Even
here we have found some forage.  Of course, the enemy will carry
off and destroy some forage, but I will burn the houses where the
people burn their forage, and they will get tired of it.

I must risk Hood, and trust to you to hold Lee or be on his heels
if he comes south.  I observe that the enemy has some respect for
my name, for they gave up Pocotaligo without a fight when they
heard that the attacking force belonged to my army.  I will try and
keep up that feeling, which is a real power.  With respect, your
friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-general commanding.

P. S.--I leave my chief-quartermaster and commissary behind to
follow coastwise.
W. T. S.



[Dispatch No. 6.]

FLAG-STEAMER PHILADELPHIA
SAVANNAH RIVER, January 4, 1865.

HON. GIDEON WELLS, Secretary of the Navy.

SIR: I have already apprised the Department that the army of
General Sherman occupied the city of Savannah on the 21st of
December.

The rebel army, hardly respectable in numbers or condition, escaped
by crossing the river and taking the Union Causeway toward the
railroad.

I have walked about the city several times, and can affirm that its
tranquillity is undisturbed.  The Union soldiers who are stationed
within its limits are as orderly as if they were in New York or
Boston....  One effect of the march of General Sherman through
Georgia has been to satisfy the people that their credulity has
been imposed upon by the lying assertions of the rebel Government,
affirming the inability of the United States Government to
withstand the armies of rebeldom.  They have seen the old flag of
the United States carried by its victorious legions through their
State, almost unopposed, and placed in their principal city without
a blow.

Since the occupation of the city General Sherman has been occupied
in making arrangements for its security after he leaves it for the
march that he meditates.  My attention has been directed to such
measures of cooperation as the number and quality of my force
permit.

On the 2d I arrived here from Charleston, whither, as I stated in
my dispatch of the 29th of December, I had gone in consequence of
information from the senior officer there that the rebels
contemplated issuing from the harbor, and his request for my
presence.  Having placed a force there of seven monitors,
sufficient to meet each an emergency, and not perceiving any sign
of the expected raid, I returned to Savannah, to keep in
communication with General Sherman and be ready to render any
assistance that might be desired.  General Sherman has fully
informed me of his plans, and, so far as my means permit, they
shall not lack assistance by water.

On the 3d the transfer of the right wing to Beaufort was began, and
the only suitable vessel I had at hand (the Harvest Moon) was sent
to Thunderbolt to receive the first embarkation.  This took place
about 3 p.m., and was witnessed by General Sherman and General
Bernard (United States Engineers) and myself.  The Pontiac is
ordered around to assist, and the army transports also followed the
first move by the Harvest Moon.

I could not help remarking the unbroken silence that prevailed in
the large array of troops; not a voice was to be heard, as they
gathered in masses on the bluff to look at the vessels.  The notes
of a solitary bugle alone came from their midst.

General Barnard made a brief visit to one of the rebel works
(Cansten's Bluff) that dominated this water-course--the best
approach of the kind to Savannah.

I am collecting data that will fully exhibit to the Department the
powerful character of the defenses of the city and its approaches.
General Sherman will not retain the extended limits they embrace.
but will contract the line very much.

General Foster still holds the position near the Tullifinny.  With
his concurrence I have detached the fleet brigade, and the men
belonging to it have returned to their vessels.  The excellent
service performed by this detachment has fully realized my wishes,
and exemplified the efficiency of the organization--infantry and
light artillery handled as skirmishers.  The howitzers were always
landed as quickly as the men, and were brought into action before
the light pieces of the land-service could be got ashore.

I regret very much that the reduced complements of the vessels
prevent me from maintaining the force in constant organization.
With three hundred more marines and five hundred seamen I could
frequently operate to great advantage, at the present time, when
the attention of the rebels is so engrossed by General Sherman.

It is said that they have a force at Hardeeville, the pickets of
which were retained on the Union Causeway until a few days since,
when some of our troops crossed the river and pushed them back.
Concurrently with this, I caused the Sonoma to anchor so as to
sweep the ground in the direction of the causeway.

The transfer of the right-wing (thirty thousand men) to Beaufort
will so imperil the rebel force at Hardeeville that it will be cut
off or dispersed, if not moved in season.

Meanwhile I will send the Dai-Ching to St. Helena, to meet any want
that may arise in that quarter, while the Mingo and Pontiac will be
ready to act from Broad River.

The general route of the army will be northward; but the exact
direction must be decided more or less by circumstances which it
may not be possible to foresee....

My cooperation will be confined to assistance in attacking
Charleston, or in establishing communication at Georgetown, in case
the army pushes on without attacking Charleston, and time alone
will show which of these will eventuate.

The weather of the winter first, and the condition of the ground in
spring, would permit little advantage to be derived from the
presence of the army at Richmond until the middle of May.  So that
General Sherman has no reason to move in haste, but can choose such
objects as he prefers, and take as much time as their attainment
may demand.  The Department will learn the objects in view of
General Sherman more precisely from a letter addressed by him to
General Halleck, which he read to me a few days since.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral, commanding South-Atlantic Blockading Squadron.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 29, 1885.

Major-General J. G. FOSTER, commanding Department of the South.

GENERAL: I have just received dispatches from General Grant,
stating that Schofield's corps (the Twenty-third), twenty-one
thousand strong, is ordered east from Tennessee, and will be sent
to Beaufort, North Carolina.  That is well; I want that force to
secure a point on the railroad about Goldsboro', and then to build
the railroad out to that point.  If Goldsboro' be too strong to
carry by a rapid movement, then a point near the Neuse, south of
Goldsboro', will answer, but the bridge and position about Kinston,
should be held and fortified strong.  The movement should be masked
by the troops already at Newbern.  Please notify General Palmer
that these troops are coming, and to be prepared to receive them.
Major-General Schofield will command in person, and is admirably
adapted for the work.  If it is possible, I want him to secure
Goldsboro', with the railroad back to Morehead City and Wilmington.
As soon as General Schofield reaches Fort Macon, have him to meet
some one of your staff, to explain in full the details of the
situation of affairs with me; and you can give him the chief
command of all troops at Cape Fear and in North Carolina.  If he
finds the enemy has all turned south against me, he need not
follow, but turn his attention against Raleigh; if he can secure
Goldsboro' and Wilmington, it will be as much as I expect before I
have passed the Santee.  Send him all detachments of men that have
come to join my army.  They can be so organized and officered as to
be efficient, for they are nearly all old soldiers who have been
detached or on furlough.  Until I pass the Santee, you can better
use these detachments at Bull's Bay, Georgetown, etc.

I will instruct General McCallum, of the Railroad Department, to
take his men up to Beaufort, North Carolina, and employ them on the
road out.  I do not know that he can use them on any road here.  I
did instruct him, while awaiting information from North Carolina,
to have them build a good trestle-bridge across Port Royal ferry;
but I now suppose the pontoon-bridge will do.  If you move the
pontoons, be sure to make a good road out to Garden's Corners, and
mark it with sign-boards--obstructing the old road, so that, should
I send back any detachments, they would not be misled.

I prefer that Hatch's force should not be materially weakened until
I am near Columbia, when you may be governed by the situation of
affairs about Charleston.  If you can break the railroad between
this and Charleston, then this force could be reduced.

I am, with respect, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 18, 1865.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

SIR: When you left Savannah a few days ago, you forgot the map
which General Geary had prepared for you, showing the route by
which his division entered the city of Savannah, being the first
troops to occupy that city.  I now send it to you.

I avail myself of the opportunity also to inclose you copies of all
my official orders touching trade and intercourse with the people
of Georgia, as well as for the establishment of the negro
settlements.

Delegations of the people of Georgia continue to come in, and I am
satisfied that, by judicious handling and by a little respect shown
to their prejudices, we can create a schism in Jeff. Davis's
dominions.  All that I have conversed with realize the truth that
slavery as an institution is defunct, and the only questions that
remain are what disposition shall be made of the negroes
themselves.  I confess myself unable to offer a complete solution
for these questions, and prefer to leave it to the slower
operations of time.  We have given the initiative, and can afford
to await the working of the experiment.

As to trade-matters, I also think it is to our interest to keep the
Southern people somewhat dependent on the articles of commerce to
which they have hitherto been accustomed.  General Grover is now
here, and will, I think, be able to handle this matter judiciously,
and may gradually relax, and invite cotton to come in in large
quantities.  But at first we should manifest no undue anxiety on
that score; for the rebels would at once make use of it as a power
against us.  We should assume, a tone of perfect contempt for
cotton and every thing else in comparison with the great object of
the war--the restoration of the Union, with all its rights and
power.  It the rebels burn cotton as a war measure, they simply
play into our hands by taking away the only product of value they
have to exchange in foreign ports for war-ships and munitions.  By
such a course, also, they alienate the feelings of a large class of
small farmers who look to their little parcels of cotton to
exchange for food and clothing for their families.  I hope the
Government will not manifest too much anxiety to obtain cotton in
large quantities, and especially that the President will not
indorse the contracts for the purchase of large quantities of
cotton.  Several contracts, involving from six to ten thousand
bales, indorsed by Mr. Lincoln, have been shown me, but were not in
such a form as to amount to an order to compel me to facilitate
their execution.

As to Treasury agents, and agents to take charge of confiscated and
abandoned property, whose salaries depend on their fees, I can only
say that, as a general rule, they are mischievous and disturbing
elements to a military government, and it is almost impossible for
us to study the law and regulations so as to understand fully their
powers and duties.  I rather think the Quartermaster's Department
of the army could better fulfill all their duties and accomplish
all that is aimed at by the law.  Yet on this subject I will leave
Generals Foster and Grover to do the best they can.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 2, 1865.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have just received from Lieutenant-General Grant a copy of
that part of your telegram to him of December 26th relating to
cotton, a copy of which has been immediately furnished to General
Easton, chief-quartermaster, who will be strictly governed by it.

I had already been approached by all the consuls and half the
people of Savannah on this cotton question, and my invariable
answer was that all the cotton in Savannah was prize of war,
belonged to the United States, and nobody should recover a bale of
it with my consent; that, as cotton had been one of the chief
causes of this war, it should help to pay its expenses; that all
cotton became tainted with treason from the hour the first act of
hostility was committed against the United States some time in
December, 1860; and that no bill of sale subsequent to that date
could convey title.

My orders were that an officer of the Quartermaster's Department,
United States Army, might furnish the holder, agent, or attorney, a
mere certificate of the fact of seizure, with description of the
bales' marks, etc., the cotton then to be turned over to the agent
of the Treasury Department, to be shipped to New York for sale.
But, since the receipt of your dispatch, I have ordered General
Easton to make the shipment himself to the quartermaster at New
York, where you can dispose of it at pleasure.  I do not think the
Treasury Department ought to bother itself with the prizes or
captures of war.

Mr. Barclay, former consul at New York, representing Mr. Molyneux,
former consul here, but absent a long time, called on me with
reference to cotton claimed by English subjects.  He seemed amazed
when I told him I should pay no respect to consular certificates,
that in no event would I treat an English subject with more favor
than one of our own deluded citizens, and that for my part I was
unwilling to fight for cotton for the benefit of Englishmen openly
engaged in smuggling arms and instruments of war to kill us; that,
on the contrary, it would afford me great satisfaction to conduct
my army to Nassau, and wipe out that nest of pirates.  I explained
to him, however, that I was not a diplomatic agent of the General
Government of the United States, but that my opinion, so frankly
expressed, was that of a soldier, which it would be well for him to
heed.  It appeared, also, that he owned a plantation on the line of
investment of Savannah, which, of course, was pillaged, and for
which he expected me to give some certificate entitling him to
indemnification, which I declined emphatically.

I have adopted in Savannah rules concerning property--severe but
just--founded upon the laws of nations and the practice of
civilized governments, and am clearly of opinion that we should
claim all the belligerent rights over conquered countries, that the
people may realize the truth that war is no child's play.

I embrace in this a copy of a letter, dated December 31, 1864, in
answer to one from Solomon Cohen (a rich lawyer) to General Blair,
his personal friend, as follows:

Major-General F. P. BLAIR, commanding Seventeenth Army Corps.

GENERAL: Your note, inclosing Mr. Cohen's of this date, is
received, and I answer frankly through you his inquiries.

1.  No one can practise law as an attorney in the United States
without acknowledging the supremacy of our Government.  If I am not
in error, an attorney is as much an officer of the court as the
clerk, and it would be a novel thing in a government to have a
court to administer law which denied the supremacy of the
government itself.

2.  No one will be allowed the privileges of a merchant, or,
rather, to trade is a privilege which no one should seek of the
Government without in like manner acknowledging its supremacy.

3.  If Mr. Cohen remains in Savannah as a denizen, his property,
real and personal, will not be disturbed unless its temporary use
be necessary for the military authorities of the city.  The title
to property will not be disturbed in any event, until adjudicated
by the courts of the United States.

4.  If Mr. Cohen leaves Savannah under my Special Order No. 148, it
is a public acknowledgment that he "adheres to the enemies of the
United States," and all his property becomes forfeited to the
United States.  But, as a matter of favor, he will be allowed to
carry with him clothing and furniture for the use of himself, his
family, and servants, and will be trans ported within the enemy's
lines, but not by way of Port Royal.

These rules will apply to all parties, and from them no exception
will be made.

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


This letter was in answer to specific inquiries; it is clear, and
covers all the points, and, should I leave before my orders are
executed, I will endeavor to impress upon my successor, General
Foster, their wisdom and propriety.

I hope the course I have taken in these matters will meet your
approbation, and that the President will not refund to parties
claiming cotton or other property, without the strongest evidence
of loyalty and friendship on the part of the claimant, or unless
some other positive end is to be gained.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



CHAPTER XXIII.

CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS.

FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 1865.

On the 1st day of February, as before explained, the army designed
for the active campaign from Savannah northward was composed of two
wings, commanded respectively by Major-Generals Howard and Slocum,
and was substantially the same that had marched from Atlanta to
Savannah.  The same general orders were in force, and this campaign
may properly be classed as a continuance of the former.

The right wing, less Corse's division, Fifteenth Corps, was grouped
at or near Pocotaligo, South Carolina, with its wagons filled with
food, ammunition, and forage, all ready to start, and only waiting
for the left wing, which was detained by the flood in the Savannah
River.  It was composed as follows:

Fifteenth Corps, Major-General JOHN A. LOGAN.

First Division, Brigadier-General Charles R. Woods;
Second Division, Major-General W. B. Hazen;
Third Division, Brigadier-General John E. Smith;
Fourth Division, Brigadier-General John M. Corse.
Artillery brigade, eighteen guns, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Ross,
First Michigan Artillery.


Seventeenth.  Corps, Major-General FRANK P. BLAIR, JR.

First Division, Major-General Joseph A.  Mower;
Second Division, Brigadier-General M.  F.  Force;
Fourth Division, Brigadier-General Giles A.  Smith.
Artillery brigade, fourteen guns, Major A.  C.  Waterhouse, First
Illinois Artillery.


The left wing, with Corse's division and Kilpatrick's cavalry,
was at and near Sister's Ferry, forty miles above the city of
Savannah, engaged in crossing the river, then much swollen.
It was composed as follows:

Fourteenth Corps, Major-General JEFF. C. DAVIS.

First Division, Brigadier-General W.  P.  Carlin;
Second Division, Brigadier-General John D.  Morgan;
Third Division, Brigadier-General A.  Baird.
Artillery brigade, sixteen guns, Major Charles Houghtaling, First
Illinois Artillery.


Twentieth Corps, Brigadier-General A. S. WILLIAMS.

First Division, Brigadier-General N. I. Jackson;
Second Division, Brigadier-General J. W. Geary;
Third Division, Brigadier-General W. T. Ward.
Artillery brigade, Sixteen gnus, Major J. A. Reynolds, First New
York Artillery.


Cavalry Division, Brigadier-General JUDSON KILPATRICK.

First Brigade, Colonel T. J. Jordan, Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry;
Second Brigade, Colonel S. D. Atkins, Ninety-second Illinois Vol.;
Third Brigade, Colonel George E.  Spencer, First Alabama Cavalry.
One battery of four guns.


The actual strength of the army, as given in the following official
tabular statements, was at the time sixty thousand and seventy-nine
men, and sixty-eight guns.  The trains were made up of about
twenty-five hundred wagons, with six mules to each wagon, and about
six hundred ambulances, with two horses each.  The contents of the
wagons embraced an ample supply of ammunition for a great battle;
forage for about seven days, and provisions for twenty days, mostly
of bread, sugar, coffee, and salt, depending largely for fresh meat
on beeves driven on the hoof and such cattle, hogs, and poultry, as
we expected to gather along our line of march.

RECAPITULATION-CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS.

      February 1.    March 1.    April 1.    April 10
Pers:  60,079         57,676      81,150      88,948


The enemy occupied the cities of Charleston and Augusta, with
garrisons capable of making a respectable if not successful
defense, but utterly unable to meet our veteran columns in the open
field.  To resist or delay our progress north, General Wheeler had
his division of cavalry (reduced to the size of a brigade by his
hard and persistent fighting ever since the beginning of the
Atlanta campaign), and General Wade Hampton had been dispatched
from the Army of Virginia to his native State of South Carolina,
with a great flourish of trumpets, and extraordinary powers to
raise men, money, and horses, with which "to stay the progress of
the invader," and "to punish us for our insolent attempt to invade
the glorious State of South Carolina!"  He was supposed at the time
to have, at and near Columbia, two small divisions of cavalry
commanded by himself and General Butler.

Of course, I had a species of contempt for these scattered and
inconsiderable forces, knew that they could hardly delay us an
hour; and the only serious question that occurred to me was, would
General Lee sit down in Richmond (besieged by General Grant), and
permit us, almost unopposed, to pass through the States of South
and North Carolina, cutting off and consuming the very supplies on
which he depended to feed his army in Virginia, or would he make an
effort to escape from General Grant, and endeavor to catch us
inland somewhere between Columbia and Raleigh?  I knew full well at
the time that the broken fragments of Hood's army (which had
escaped from Tennessee) were being hurried rapidly across Georgia,
by Augusta, to make junction in my front; estimating them at the
maximum twenty-five thousand men, and Hardee's, Wheeler's, and
Hampton's forces at fifteen thousand, made forty thousand; which,
if handled with spirit and energy, would constitute a formidable
force, and might make the passage of such rivers as the Santee and
Cape Fear a difficult undertaking.  Therefore, I took all possible
precautions, and arranged with Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster
to watch our progress inland by all the means possible, and to
provide for us points of security along the coast; as, at Bull's
Bay, Georgetown, and the mouth of Cape Fear River.  Still, it was
extremely desirable in one march to reach Goldsboro' in the State
of North Carolina (distant four hundred and twenty-five miles), a
point of great convenience for ulterior operations, by reason of
the two railroads which meet there, coming from the seacoast at
Wilmington and Newbern.  Before leaving Savannah I had sent to
Newbern Colonel W. W. Wright, of the Engineers, with orders to look
to these railroads, to collect rolling-stock, and to have the roads
repaired out as far as possible in six weeks--the time estimated as
necessary for us to march that distance.

The question of supplies remained still the one of vital
importance, and I reasoned that we might safely rely on the country
for a considerable quantity of forage and provisions, and that, if
the worst came to the worst, we could live several months on the
mules and horses of our trains.  Nevertheless, time was equally
material, and the moment I heard that General Slocum had finished
his pontoon-bridge at Sister's Ferry, and that Kilpatrick's cavalry
was over the river, I gave the general orders to march, and
instructed all the columns to aim for the South Carolina Railroad
to the west of Branchville, about Blackville and Midway.

The right wing moved up the Salkiehatchie, the Seventeenth Corps on
the right, with orders on reaching Rivers's Bridge to cross over,
and the Fifteenth Corps by Hickory Hill to Beaufort's Bridge.
Kilpatrick was instructed to march by way of Barnwell; Corse's
division and the Twentieth Corps to take such roads as would bring
them into communication with the Fifteenth Corps about Beaufort's
Bridge.  All these columns started promptly on the 1st of February.
We encountered Wheeler's cavalry, which had obstructed the road by
felling trees, but our men picked these up and threw them aside, so
that this obstruction hardly delayed us an hour.  In person I
accompanied the Fifteenth Corps (General Logan) by McPhersonville
and Hickory Hill, and kept couriers going to and fro to General
Slocum with instructions to hurry as much as possible, so as to
make a junction of the whole army on the South Carolina Railroad
about Blackville.

I spent the night of February 1st at Hickory Hill Post-Office, and
that of the 2d at Duck Branch Post-Office, thirty-one miles out
from Pocotaligo.  On the 3d the Seventeenth Corps was opposite
Rivers's Bridge, and the Fifteenth approached Beaufort's Bridge.
The Salkiehatchie was still over its banks, and presented a most
formidable obstacle.  The enemy appeared in some force on the
opposite bank, had cut away all the bridges which spanned the many
deep channels of the swollen river, and the only available passage
seemed to be along the narrow causeways which constituted the
common roads.  At Rivers's Bridge Generals Mower and Giles A.
Smith led, their heads of column through this swamp, the water up
to their shoulders, crossed over to the pine-land, turned upon the
rebel brigade which defended the passage, and routed it in utter
disorder.  It was in this attack that General Wager Swayne lost his
leg, and he had to be conveyed back to Pocotaligo.  Still, the loss
of life was very small, in proportion to the advantages gained, for
the enemy at once abandoned the whole line of the Salkiehatchie,
and the Fifteenth Corps passed over at Beaufort's Bridge, without
opposition.

On the 5th of February I was at Beaufort's Bridge, by which time
General A. S. Williams had got up with five brigades' of the
Twentieth Corps; I also heard of General Kilpatrick's being abreast
of us, at Barnwell, and then gave orders for the march straight for
the railroad at Midway.  I still remained with the Fifteenth Corps,
which, on the 6th of February, was five miles from Bamberg.  As a
matter of course, I expected severe resistance at this railroad,
for its loss would sever all the communications of the enemy in
Charleston with those in Augusta.

Early on the 7th, in the midst of a rain-storm, we reached the
railroad; almost unopposed, striking it at several points.  General
Howard told me a good story concerning this, which will bear
repeating: He was with the Seventeenth Corps, marching straight for
Midway, and when about five miles distant he began to deploy the
leading division, so as to be ready for battle.  Sitting on his
horse by the road-side, while the deployment was making, he saw a
man coming down the road, riding as hard as he could, and as he
approached he recognized him as one of his own "foragers," mounted
on a white horse, with a rope bridle and a blanket for saddle.  As
he came near he called out, "Hurry up, general; we have got the
railroad!"  So, while we, the generals, were proceeding
deliberately to prepare for a serious battle, a parcel of our
foragers, in search of plunder, had got ahead and actually captured
the South Carolina Railroad, a line of vital importance to the
rebel Government.

As soon as we struck the railroad, details of men were set to work
to tear up the rails, to burn the ties and twist the bars.  This
was a most important railroad, and I proposed to destroy it
completely for fifty miles, partly to prevent a possibility of its
restoration and partly to utilize the time necessary for General
Slocum to get up.

The country thereabouts was very poor, but the inhabitants mostly
remained at home.  Indeed, they knew not where to go.  The enemy's
cavalry had retreated before us, but his infantry was reported in
some strength at Branchville, on the farther side of the Edisto;
yet on the appearance of a mere squad of our men they burned their
own bridges the very thing I wanted, for we had no use for them,
and they had.

We all remained strung along this railroad till the 9th of
February--the Seventeenth Corps on the right, then the Fifteenth,
Twentieth, and cavalry, at Blackville.  General Slocum reached
Blackville that day, with Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps,
and reported the Fourteenth Corps (General Jeff. C. Davis's) to be
following by way of Barnwell.  On the 10th I rode up to Blackville,
where I conferred with Generals Slocum and Kilpatrick, became
satisfied that the whole army would be ready within a day, and
accordingly made orders for the next movement north to Columbia,
the right wing to strike Orangeburg en route.  Kilpatrick was
ordered to demonstrate strongly toward Aiken, to keep up the
delusion that we might turn to Augusta; but he was notified that
Columbia was the next objective, and that he should cover the left
flank against Wheeler, who hung around it.  I wanted to reach
Columbia before any part of Hood's army could possibly get there.
Some of them were reported as having reached Augusta, under the
command of General Dick Taylor.

Having sufficiently damaged the railroad, and effected the junction
of the entire army, the general march was resumed on the 11th, each
corps crossing the South Edisto by separate bridges, with orders to
pause on the road leading from Orangeberg to Augusta, till it was
certain that the Seventeenth Corps had got possession of
Orangeburg.  This place was simply important as its occupation
would sever the communications between Charleston and Columbia.
All the heads of column reached this road, known as the Edgefield
road, during the 12th, and the Seventeenth Corps turned to the
right, against Orangeburg.  When I reached the head of column
opposite Orangeburg, I found Giles A. Smith's division halted, with
a battery unlimbered, exchanging shots with a party on the opposite
side of the Edisto.  He reported that the bridge was gone, and that
the river was deep and impassable.  I then directed General Blair
to send a strong division below the town, some four or five miles,
to effect a crossing there.  He laid his pontoon-bridge, but the
bottom on the other side was overflowed, and the men had to wade
through it, in places as deep as their waists.  I was with this
division at the time, on foot, trying to pick my way across the
overflowed bottom; but, as soon as the head of column reached the
sand-hills, I knew that the enemy would not long remain in
Orangeburg, and accordingly returned to my horse, on the west bank,
and rode rapidly up to where I had left Giles A. Smith.  I found
him in possession of the broken bridge, abreast of the town, which
he was repairing, and I was among the first to cross over and enter
the town.  By and before the time either Force's or Giles A.
Smith's skirmishers entered the place, several stores were on fire,
and I am sure that some of the towns-people told me that a Jew
merchant had set fire to his own cotton and store, and from this
the fire had spread.  This, however, was soon put out, and the
Seventeenth Corps (General Blair) occupied the place during that
night.  I remember to have visited a large hospital, on the hill
near the railroad depot, which was occupied by the orphan children
who had been removed from the asylum in Charleston.  We gave them
protection, and, I think, some provisions.  The railroad and depot
were destroyed by order, and no doubt a good deal of cotton was
burned, for we all regarded cotton as hostile property, a thing to
be destroyed.  General Blair was ordered to break up this railroad,
forward to the point where it crossed the Santee, and then to turn
for Columbia.  On the morning of the 13th I again joined the
Fifteenth Corps, which crossed the North Edisto by Snilling's
Bridge, and moved straight for Columbia, around the head of Caw-Caw
Swamp.  Orders were sent to all the columns to turn for Columbia,
where it was supposed the enemy had concentrated all the men they
could from Charleston, Augusta, and even from Virginia.  That night
I was with the Fifteenth Corps, twenty-one miles from Columbia,
where my aide, Colonel Audenried, picked up a rebel officer on the
road, who, supposing him to be of the same service with himself,
answered all his questions frankly, and revealed the truth that
there was nothing in Columbia except Hampton's cavalry.  The fact
was, that General Hardee, in Charleston, took it for granted that
we were after Charleston; the rebel troops in Augusta supposed they
were "our objective;" so they abandoned poor Columbia to the care
of Hampton's cavalry, which was confused by the rumors that poured
in on it, so that both Beauregard and Wade Hampton, who were in
Columbia, seem to have lost their heads.

On the 14th the head of the Fifteenth Corps, Charles R. Woods's
division, approached the Little Congaree, a broad, deep stream,
tributary to the Main Congaree; six or eight miles below Columbia.
On the opposite side of this stream was a newly-constructed fort,
and on our side--a wide extent of old cotton-fields, which, had been
overflowed, and was covered with a deep slime.  General Woods had
deployed his leading brigade, which was skirmishing forward, but he
reported that the bridge was gone, and that a considerable force of
the enemy was on the other side.  I directed General Howard or
Logan to send a brigade by a circuit to the left, to see if this
stream could not be crossed higher up, but at the same time knew
that General Slocum's route world bring him to Colombia behind this
stream, and that his approach would uncover it.  Therefore, there
was no need of exposing much life.  The brigade, however, found
means to cross the Little Congaree, and thus uncovered the passage
by the main road, so that General Woods's skirmishers at once
passed over, and a party was set to work to repair the bridge,
which occupied less than an hour, when I passed over with my whole
staff.  I found the new fort unfinished and unoccupied, but from
its parapet could see over some old fields bounded to the north and
west by hills skirted with timber.  There was a plantation to our
left, about half a mile, and on the edge of the timber was drawn up
a force of rebel cavalry of about a regiment, which advanced, and
charged upon some, of our foragers, who were plundering the
plantation; my aide, Colonel Audenried, who had ridden forward,
came back somewhat hurt and bruised, for, observing this charge of
cavalry, he had turned for us, and his horse fell with him in
attempting to leap a ditch.  General Woods's skirmish-line met this
charge of cavalry, and drove it back into the woods and beyond.  We
remained on that ground during the night of the 15th, and I camped
on the nearest dry ground behind the Little Congaree, where on the
next morning were made the written' orders for the government of
the troops while occupying Columbia.  These are dated February 16,
1865, in these words:

General Howard will cross the Saluda and Broad Rivers as near their
mouths as possible, occupy Columbia, destroy the public buildings,
railroad property, manufacturing and machine shops; but will spare
libraries, asylums, and private dwellings.  He will then move to
Winnsboro', destroying en route utterly that section of the
railroad.  He will also cause all bridges, trestles, water-tanks,
and depots on the railroad back to the Wateree to be burned,
switches broken, and such other destruction as he can find time to
accomplish consistent with proper celerity.

These instructions were embraced in General Order No. 26, which
prescribed the routes of march for the several columns as far as
Fayetteville, North Carolina, and is conclusive that I then
regarded Columbia as simply one point on our general route of
march, and not as an important conquest.

During the 16th of February the Fifteenth Corps reached the point
opposite Columbia, and pushed on for the Saluda Factory three miles
above, crossed that stream, and the head of column reached Broad
River just in time to find its bridge in flames, Butler's cavalry
having just passed over into Columbia.  The head of Slocum's column
also reached the point opposite Columbia the same morning, but the
bulk of his army was back at Lexington.  I reached this place early
in the morning of the 16th, met General Slocum there; and explained
to him the purport of General Order No. 26, which contemplated the
passage of his army across Broad River at Alston, fifteen miles
above Columbia.  Riding down to the river-bank, I saw the wreck of
the large bridge which had been burned by the enemy, with its many
stone piers still standing, but the superstructure gone.  Across
the Congaree River lay the city of Columbia, in plain, easy view.
I could see the unfinished State-House, a handsome granite
structure, and the ruins of the railroad depot, which were still
smouldering.  Occasionally a few citizens or cavalry could be seen
running across the streets, and quite a number of negroes were
seemingly busy in carrying off bags of grain or meal, which were
piled up near the burned depot.

Captain De Gres had a section of his twenty-pound Parrott guns
unlimbered, firing into the town.  I asked him what he was firing
for; he said he could see some rebel cavalry occasionally at the
intersections of the streets, and he had an idea that there was a
large force of infantry concealed on the opposite bank, lying low,
in case we should attempt to cross over directly into the town.  I
instructed him not to fire any more into the town, but consented to
his bursting a few shells near the depot, to scare away the negroes
who were appropriating the bags of corn and meal which we wanted,
also to fire three shots at the unoccupied State-House.  I stood by
and saw these fired, and then all firing ceased.  Although this
matter of firing into Columbia has been the subject of much abuse
and investigation, I have yet to hear of any single person having
been killed in Columbia by our cannon.  On the other hand, the
night before, when Woods's division was in camp in the open fields
at Little Congaree, it was shelled all night by a rebel battery
from the other aide of the river.  This provoked me much at the
time, for it was wanton mischief, as Generals Beauregard and
Hampton must have been convinced that they could not prevent our
entrance into Columbia.  I have always contended that I would have
been justified in retaliating for this unnecessary act of war, but
did not, though I always characterized it as it deserved.

The night of the 16th I camped near an old prison bivouac opposite
Columbia, known to our prisoners of war as "Camp Sorghum," where
remained the mud-hovels and holes in the ground which our prisoners
had made to shelter themselves from the winter's cold and the
summer's heat.  The Fifteenth Corps was then ahead, reaching to
Broad River, about four miles above Columbia; the Seventeenth Corps
was behind, on the river-bank opposite Columbia; and the left wing
and cavalry had turned north toward Alston.

The next morning, viz., February 17th, I rode to the head of
General Howard's column, and found that during the night he had
ferried Stone's brigade of Woods's division of the Fifteenth
Corps across by rafts made of the pontoons, and that brigade was
then deployed on the opposite bank to cover the construction of a
pontoon-bridge nearly finished.

I sat with General Howard on a log, watching the men lay this
bridge; and about 9 or 10 A.M.  a messenger came from Colonel Stone
on the other aide, saying that the Mayor of Columbia had come out
of the city to surrender the place, and asking for orders.  I
simply remarked to General Howard that he had his orders, to let
Colonel Stone go on into the city, and that we would follow as soon
as the bridge was ready.  By this same messenger I received a note
in pencil from the Lady Superioress of a convent or school in
Columbia, in which she claimed to have been a teacher in a convent
in Brown County, Ohio, at the time my daughter Minnie was a pupil
there, and therefore asking special protection.  My recollection
is, that I gave the note to my brother-in-law, Colonel Ewing, then
inspector-general on my staff, with instructions to see this lady,
and assure her that we contemplated no destruction of any private
property in Columbia at all.

As soon as the bridge was done, I led my horse over it, followed by
my whole staff.  General Howard accompanied me with his, and
General Logan was next in order, followed by General C.  R.  Woods,
and the whole of the Fifteenth Corps.  Ascending the hill, we soon
emerged into a broad road leading into Columbia, between old fields
of corn and cotton, and, entering the city, we found seemingly all
its population, white and black, in the streets.  A high and
boisterous wind was prevailing from the north, and flakes of cotton
were flying about in the air and lodging in the limbs of the trees,
reminding us of a Northern snow-storm.  Near the market-square we
found Stone's brigade halted, with arms stacked, and a large detail
of his men, along with some citizens, engaged with an old
fire-engine, trying to put out the fire in a long pile of burning
cotton-bales, which I was told had been fired by the rebel cavalry
on withdrawing from the city that morning.  I know that, to avoid
this row of burning cotton-bales, I had to ride my horse on the
sidewalk.  In the market-square had collected a large crowd of
whites and blacks, among whom was the mayor of the city, Dr.
Goodwin, quite a respectable old gentleman, who was extremely
anxious to protect the interests of the citizens.  He was on foot,
and I on horseback, and it is probable I told him then not to be
uneasy, that we did not intend to stay long, and had no purpose to
injure the private citizens or private property.  About this time I
noticed several men trying to get through the crowd to speak with
me, and called to some black people to make room for them; when
they reached me, they explained that they were officers of our
army, who had been prisoners, had escaped from the rebel prison and
guard, and were of course overjoyed to find themselves safe with
us.  I told them that, as soon as things settled down, they should
report to General Howard, who would provide for their safety, and
enable them to travel with us.  One of them handed me a paper,
asking me to read it at my leisure; I put it in my breast-pocket
and rode on.  General Howard was still with me, and, riding down
the street which led by the right to the Charleston depot, we found
it and a large storehouse burned to the ground, but there were, on
the platform and ground near by, piles of cotton bags filled with
corn and corn-meal, partially burned.

A detachment of Stone's brigade was guarding this, and separating
the good from the bad.  We rode along the railroad-track, some
three or four hundred yards, to a large foundery, when some man
rode up and said the rebel cavalry were close by, and he warned us
that we might get shot.  We accordingly turned back to the
market-square, and en route noticed that, several of the men were
evidently in liquor, when I called General Howard's attention to
it.  He left me and rode toward General Woods's head of column,
which was defiling through the town.  On reaching the
market-square, I again met Dr. Goodwin, and inquired where he
proposed to quarter me, and he said that he had selected the house
of Blanton Duncan, Esq., a citizen of Louisville, Kentucky, then a
resident there, who had the contract for manufacturing the
Confederate money, and had fled with Hampton's cavalry.  We all
rode some six or eight squares back from the new State-House, and
found a very good modern house, completely furnished, with stabling
and a large yard, took it as our headquarters, and occupied it
during our stay.  I considered General Howard as in command of the
place, and referred the many applicants for guards and protection
to him.  Before our headquarters-wagons had got up, I strolled
through the streets of Columbia, found sentinels posted at the
principal intersections, and generally good order prevailing, but
did not again return to the main street, because it was filled with
a crowd of citizens watching the soldiers marching by.

During the afternoon of that day, February 17th, the whole of the
Fifteenth Corps passed through the town and out on the Camden and
Winnsboro' roads.  The Seventeenth Corps did not enter the city at
all, but crossed directly over to the Winnsboro' road from the
pontoon bridge at Broad River, which was about four miles above the
city.

After we had got, as it were, settled in Blanton Duncan's house,
say about 2 p.m., I overhauled my pocket according to custom, to
read more carefully the various notes and memoranda received during
the day, and found the paper which had been given me, as described,
by one of our escaped prisoners.  It proved to be the song of
"Sherman's March to the Sea," which had been composed by Adjutant
S. H. M. Byers, of the Fifth Iowa Infantry, when a prisoner in the
asylum at Columbia, which had been beautifully written off by a
fellow-prisoner, and handed to me in person.  This appeared to me
so good that I at once sent for Byers, attached him to my staff,
provided him with horse and equipment, and took him as far as
Fayetteville, North Carolina, whence he was sent to Washington as
bearer of dispatches.  He is now United States consul at Zurich,
Switzerland, where I have since been his guest. I insert the song
here for convenient reference and preservation.  Byers said that
there was an excellent glee-club among the prisoners in Columbia,
who used to sing it well, with an audience often of rebel ladies:


SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA.

Composed by Adjutant Byers, Fifth Iowa Infantry.  Arranged and sung
by the Prisoners in Columbia Prison.


I

Our camp-fires shone bright on the mountain
That frowned on the river below,
As we stood by our guns in the morning,
And eagerly watched for the foe;
When a rider came out of the darkness
That hung over mountain and tree,
And shouted, "Boys, up and be ready!
For Sherman will march to the sea!"


CHORUS:

Then sang we a song of our chieftain,
That echoed over river and lea;
And the stars of our banner shone brighter
When Sherman marched down to the sea!


II

Then cheer upon cheer for bold Sherman
Went up from each valley and glen,
And the bugles reechoed the music
That came from the lips of the men;
For we knew that the stars in our banner
More bright in their splendor would be,
And that blessings from Northland world greet us,
When Sherman marched down to the sea!
             Then sang we a song, etc.

III

Then forward, boys! forward to battle!
We marched on our wearisome way,
We stormed the wild hills of Resacar
God bless those who fell on that day!
Then Kenesaw frowned in its glory,
Frowned down on the flag of the free;
But the East and the West bore our standard,
And Sherman marched on to the sea!
        Then sang we a song, etc.


IV

Still onward we pressed, till our banners
Swept out from Atlanta's grim walls,
And the blood of the patriot dampened
The soil where the traitor-flag falls;
But we paused not to weep for the fallen,
Who slept by each river and tree,
Yet we twined them a wreath of the laurel,
As Sherman marched down to the sea!
        Then sang we a song, etc.

V

Oh, proud was our army that morning,
That stood where the pine darkly towers,
When Sherman said, "Boys, you are weary,
But to-day fair Savannah is ours!"
Then sang we the song of our chieftain,
That echoed over river and lea,
And the stars in our banner shone brighter
When Sherman camped down by the sea!


Toward evening of February 17th, the mayor, Dr. Goodwin, came to my
quarters at Duncan's house, and remarked that there was a lady in
Columbia who professed to be a special friend of mine.  On his
giving her name, I could not recall it, but inquired as to her
maiden or family name.  He answered Poyas.  It so happened that,
when I was a lieutenant at Fort Moultrie, in 1842-'46, I used very
often to visit a family of that name on the east branch of Cooper
River, about forty miles from Fort Moultrie, and to hunt with the
son, Mr. James Poyas, an elegant young fellow and a fine sportsman.
His father, mother, and several sisters, composed the family, and
were extremely hospitable.  One of the ladies was very fond of
painting in water-colors, which was one of my weaknesses, and on
one occasion I had presented her with a volume treating of
water-colors.  Of course, I was glad to renew the acquaintance, and
proposed to Dr. Goodwin that we should walk to her house and visit
this lady, which we did.  The house stood beyond the Charlotte
depot, in a large lot, was of frame, with a high porch, which was
reached by a set of steps outside.  Entering this yard, I noticed
ducks and chickens, and a general air of peace and comfort that was
really pleasant to behold at that time of universal desolation; the
lady in question met us at the head of the steps and invited us
into a parlor which was perfectly neat and well furnished.  After
inquiring about her father, mother, sisters, and especially her
brother James, my special friend, I could not help saying that I
was pleased to notice that our men had not handled her house and
premises as roughly as was their wont.  "I owe it to you, general,"
she answered.  "Not at all.  I did not know you were here till a
few minutes ago."  She reiterated that she was indebted to me for
the perfect safety of her house and property, and added, "You
remember, when you were at our house on Cooper River in 1845, you
gave me a book;" and she handed me the book in question, on the fly
leaf of which was written: "To Miss Poyas, with the compliments of
W. T. Sherman, First-lieutenant Third Artillery."  She then
explained that, as our army approached Columbia, there was a doubt
in her mind whether the terrible Sherman who was devastating the
land were W. T. Sherman or T. W. Sherman, both known to be generals
in the Northern army; but, on the supposition that he was her old
acquaintance, when Wade Hampton's cavalry drew out of the city,
calling out that the Yankees were coming, she armed herself with
this book, and awaited the crisis.  Soon the shouts about the
markethouse announced that the Yankees had come; very soon men were
seen running up and down the streets; a parcel of them poured over
the fence, began to chase the chickens and ducks, and to enter her
house.  She observed one large man, with full beard, who exercised
some authority, and to him she appealed in the name of "his
general."  "What do you know of Uncle Billy?"  "Why," she said,
"when he was a young man he used to be our friend in Charleston,
and here is a book he gave me."  The officer or soldier took the
book, looked at the inscription, and, turning to his fellows, said:
"Boys, that's so; that's Uncle Billy's writing, for I have seen it
often before."  He at once commanded the party to stop pillaging,
and left a man in charge of the house, to protect her until the
regular provost-guard should be established.  I then asked her if
the regular guard or sentinel had been as good to her.  She assured
me that he was a very nice young man; that he had been telling her
all about his family in Iowa; and that at that very instant of time
he was in another room minding her baby.  Now, this lady had good
sense and tact, and had thus turned aside a party who, in five
minutes more, would have rifled her premises of all that was good
to eat or wear.  I made her a long social visit, and, before
leaving Columbia, gave her a half-tierce of rice and about one
hundred pounds of ham from our own mess-stores.

In like manner, that same evening I found in Mrs. Simons another
acquaintance--the wife of the brother of Hon. James Simons, of
Charleston, who had been Miss Wragg.  When Columbia was on fire
that night, and her house in danger, I had her family and effects
carried to my own headquarters, gave them my own room and bed, and,
on leaving Columbia the next day, supplied her with a half-barrel
of hams and a half-tierce of rice.  I mention these specific facts
to show that, personally, I had no malice or desire to destroy that
city or its inhabitants, as is generally believed at the South.

Having walked over much of the suburbs of Columbia in the
afternoon, and being tired, I lay down on a bed in Blanton Duncan's
house to rest. Soon after dark I became conscious that a bright
light was shining on the walls; and, calling some one of my staff
(Major Nichols, I think) to inquire the cause, he said there seemed
to be a house on fire down about the market-house.  The same high
wind still prevailed, and, fearing the consequences, I bade him go
in person to see if the provost-guard were doing its duty.  He soon
returned, and reported that the block of buildings directly
opposite the burning cotton of that morning was on fire, and that
it was spreading; but he had found General Woods on the ground,
with plenty of men trying to put the fire out, or, at least, to
prevent its extension.  The fire continued to increase, and the
whole heavens became lurid.  I dispatched messenger after messenger
to Generals Howard, Logan, and Woods, and received from them
repeated assurances that all was being done that could be done, but
that the high wind was spreading the flames beyond all control.
These general officers were on the ground all night, and Hazen's
division had been brought into the city to assist Woods's division,
already there.  About eleven o'clock at night I went down-town
myself, Colonel Dayton with me; we walked to Mr. Simons's house,
from which I could see the flames rising high in the air, and could
hear the roaring of the fire.  I advised the ladies to move to my
headquarters, had our own headquarter-wagons hitched up, and their
effects carried there, as a place of greater safety.  The whole air
was full of sparks and of flying masses of cotton, shingles, etc.,
some of which were carried four or five blocks, and started new
fires.  The men seemed generally under good control, and certainly
labored hard to girdle the fire, to prevent its spreading; but, so
long as the high wind prevailed, it was simply beyond human
possibility.  Fortunately, about 3 or 4 a.m., the wind moderated,
and gradually the fire was got under control; but it had burned out
the very heart of the city, embracing several churches, the old
State-House, and the school or asylum of that very Sister of
Charity who had appealed for my personal protection.  Nickerson's
Hotel, in which several of my staff were quartered, was burned
down, but the houses occupied by myself, Generals Howard and Logan,
were not burned at all.  Many of the people thought that this fire
was deliberately planned and executed.  This is not true.  It was
accidental, and in my judgment began with the cotton which General
Hampton's men had set fire to on leaving the city (whether by his
orders or not is not material), which fire was partially subdued
early in the day by our men; but, when night came, the high wind
fanned it again into full blaze, carried it against the
frame-houses, which caught like tinder, and soon spread beyond our
control.

This whole subject has since been thoroughly and judicially
investigated, in some cotton cases, by the mixed commission on
American and British claims, under the Treaty of Washington, which
commission failed to award a verdict in favor of the English
claimants, and thereby settled the fact that the destruction of
property in Columbia, during that night, did not result from the
acts of the General Government of the United States--that is to
say, from my army.  In my official report of this conflagration, I
distinctly charged it to General Wade Hampton, and confess I did so
pointedly, to shake the faith of his people in him, for he was in
my opinion boastful, and professed to be the special champion of
South Carolina.

The morning sun of February 18th rose bright and clear over a
ruined city.  About half of it was in ashes and in smouldering
heaps.  Many of the people were houseless, and gathered in groups
in the suburbs, or in the open parks and spaces, around their
scanty piles of furniture.  General Howard, in concert with the
mayor, did all that was possible to provide other houses for them;
and by my authority he turned over to the Sisters of Charity the
Methodist College, and to the mayor five hundred beef-cattle; to
help feed the people; I also gave the mayor (Dr.  Goodwin) one
hundred muskets, with which to arm a guard to maintain order after
we should leave the neighborhood.  During the 18th and 19th we
remained in Columbia, General Howard's troops engaged in tearing up
and destroying the railroad, back toward the Wateree, while a
strong detail, under the immediate supervision of Colonel O. M.
Poe, United States Engineers, destroyed the State Arsenal, which
was found to be well supplied with shot, shell, and ammunition.
These were hauled in wagons to the Saluda River, under the
supervision of Colonel Baylor, chief of ordnance, and emptied into
deep water, causing a very serious accident by the bursting of a
percussion-shell, as it struck another on the margin of the water.
The flame followed back a train of powder which had sifted out,
reached the wagons, still partially loaded, and exploded them,
killing sixteen men and destroying several wagons and teams of
mules.  We also destroyed several valuable founderies and the
factory of Confederate money.  The dies had been carried away, but
about sixty handpresses remained.  There was also found an immense
quantity of money, in various stages of manufacture, which our men
spent and gambled with in the most lavish manner.

Having utterly ruined Columbia, the right wing began its march
northward, toward Winnsboro', on the 20th, which we reached on the
21st, and found General Slocum, with the left wing, who had come by
the way of Alston.  Thence the right wing was turned eastward,
toward Cheraw, and Fayetteville, North Carolina, to cross the
Catawba River at Peay's Ferry.  The cavalry was ordered to follow
the railroad north as far as Chester, and then to turn east to
Rocky Mount, the point indicated for the passage of the left wing.
In person I reached Rocky Mount on the 22d, with the Twentieth
Corps, which laid its pontoon-bridge and crossed over during the
23d.  Kilpatrick arrived the next day, in the midst of heavy rain,
and was instructed to cross the Catawba at once, by night, and to
move up to Lancaster, to make believe we were bound for Charlotte,
to which point I heard that Beauregard had directed all his
detachments, including a corps of Hood's old army, which had been
marching parallel with us, but had failed to make junction with,
the forces immediately opposing us.  Of course, I had no purpose of
going to Charlotte, for the right wing was already moving rapidly
toward Fayetteville, North Carolina.  The rain was so heavy and
persistent that the Catawba, River rose fast, and soon after I had
crossed the pontoon bridge at Rocky Mount it was carried away,
leaving General Davis, with the Fourteenth Corps, on the west bank.
The roads were infamous, so I halted the Twentieth Corps at Hanging
Rock for some days, to allow time for the Fourteenth to get over.

General Davis had infinite difficulty in reconstructing his bridge,
and was compelled to use the fifth chains of his wagons for
anchor-chains, so that we were delayed nearly a week in that
neighborhood. While in camp at Hanging Rock two prisoners were
brought to me--one a chaplain, the other a boy, son of Richard Bacot,
of Charleston, whom I had known as a cadet at West Point.  They were
just from Charleston, and had been sent away by General Hardee in
advance, because he was, they said, evacuating Charleston.  Rumors to
the same effect had reached me through the negroes, and it was,
moreover, reported that Wilmington, North Carolina, was in possession
of the Yankee troops; so that I had every reason to be satisfied that
our march was fully reaping all the fruits we could possibly ask for.
Charleston was, in fact, evacuated by General Hardee on the 18th of
February, and was taken possession of by a brigade of General Fosters
troops, commanded by General Schimmelpfennig, the same day.  Hardee
had availed himself of his only remaining railroad, by Florence to
Cheraw; had sent there much of his ammunition and stores, and reached
it with the effective part of the garrison in time to escape across
the Pedee River before our arrival.  Wilmington was captured by
General Terry on the 22d of February; but of this important event we
only knew by the vague rumors which reached us through rebel sources.

General Jeff. C. Davis got across the Catawba during the 27th, and
the general march was resumed on Cheraw.  Kilpatrick remained near
Lancaster, skirmishing with Wheeler's and Hampton's cavalry,
keeping up the delusion that we proposed to move on Charlotte and
Salisbury, but with orders to watch the progress of the Fourteenth
Corps, and to act in concert with it, on its left rear.  On the 1st
of March I was at Finlay's Bridge across Lynch's Creek, the roads
so bad that we had to corduroy nearly every foot of the way; but I
was in communication with all parts of the army, which had met no
serious opposition from the enemy.  On the 2d of March we entered
the village of Chesterfield, skirmishing with Butler's cavalry,
which gave ground rapidly.  There I received a message from General
Howard, who, reported that he was already in Cheraw with the
Seventeenth Corps, and that the Fifteenth was near at hand.

General Hardee had retreated eastward across the Pedee, burning the
bridge.  I therefore directed the left wing to march for
Sneedsboro', about ten miles above Cheraw, to cross the Pedee
there, while I in person proposed to cross over and join the right
wing in Cheraw.  Early in the morning of the 3d of March I rode out
of Chesterfield along with the Twentieth Corps, which filled the
road, forded Thompson's Creek, and, at the top of the hill beyond,
found a road branching off to the right, which corresponded with
the one, on my map leading to Cheraw.  Seeing a negro standing by
the roadside, looking at the troops passing, I inquired of him what
road that was.  "Him lead to Cheraw, master!"  "Is it a good road,
and how far?"  "A very good road, and eight or ten miles."  "Any
guerrillas?"

"Oh! no, master, dey is gone two days ago; you could have played
cards on der coat-tails, dey was in sich a hurry!"  I was on my
Lexington horse, who was very handsome and restive, so I made
signal to my staff to follow, as I proposed to go without escort.
I turned my horse down the road, and the rest of the staff
followed.  General Barry took up the questions about the road, and
asked the same negro what he was doing there.  He answered, "Dey
say Massa Sherman will be along soon!"  "Why," said General Barry,
"that was General Sherman you were talking to."  The poor negro,
almost in the attitude of prayer, exclaimed: "De great God! just
look at his horse!"  He ran up and trotted by my side for a mile or
so, and gave me all the information he possessed, but he seemed to
admire the horse more than the rider.

We reached Cheraw in a couple of hours in a drizzling rain, and,
while waiting for our wagons to come up, I staid with General Blair
in a large house, the property of a blockade-runner, whose family
remained.  General Howard occupied another house farther down-town.
He had already ordered his pontoon-bridge to be laid across the
Pedee, there a large, deep, navigable stream, and Mower's division
was already across, skirmishing with the enemy about two miles out.
Cheraw was found to be full of stores which had been sent up from
Charleston prior to its evacuation, and which could not be removed.
I was satisfied, from inquiries, that General Hardee had with him
only the Charleston garrison, that the enemy had not divined our
movements, and that consequently they were still scattered from
Charlotte around to Florence, then behind us.  Having thus secured
the passage of the Pedee, I felt no uneasiness about the future,
because there remained no further great impediment between us and
Cape Fear River, which I felt assured was by that time in
possession of our friends.  The day was so wet that we all kept
in-doors; and about noon General Blair invited us to take lunch
with him.  We passed down into the basement dining-room, where the
regular family table was spread with an excellent meal; and during
its progress I was asked to take some wine, which stood upon the
table in venerable bottles.  It was so very good that I inquired
where it came from.  General Blair simply asked, "Do you like it?"
but I insisted upon knowing where he had got it; he only replied by
asking if I liked it, and wanted some.  He afterward sent to my
bivouac a case containing a dozen bottles of the finest madeira I
ever tasted; and I learned that he had captured, in Cheraw, the
wine of some of the old aristocratic families of Charleston, who
had sent it up to Cheraw for safety, and heard afterward that Blair
had found about eight wagon-loads of this wine, which he
distributed to the army generally, in very fair proportions.

After finishing our lunch, as we passed out of the dining room,
General Blair asked me, if I did not want some saddle-blankets, or
a rug for my tent, and, leading me into the hall to a space under
the stairway, he pointed out a pile of carpets which had also been
sent up from Charleston for safety.  After our headquarter-wagons
got up, and our bivouac was established in a field near by, I sent
my orderly (Walter) over to General Blair, and he came back
staggering under a load of carpets, out of which the officers and
escort made excellent tent-rugs, saddle-cloths, and blankets.
There was an immense amount of stores in Cheraw, which were used or
destroyed; among them twenty-four guns, two thousand muskets, and
thirty-six hundred barrels of gunpowder.  By the carelessness of a
soldier, an immense pile of this powder was exploded, which shook
the town badly; and killed and maimed several of our men.

We remained in or near Cheraw till the 6th of March, by which time
the army was mostly across the Pedee River, and was prepared to
resume the march on Fayetteville.  In a house where General Hardee
had been, I found a late New York Tribune, of fully a month later
date than any I had seen.  It contained a mass of news of great
interest to us, and one short paragraph which I thought extremely
mischievous.  I think it was an editorial, to the effect that at
last the editor had the satisfaction to inform his readers that
General Sherman would next be heard from about Goldsboro', because
his supply-vessels from Savannah were known to be rendezvousing at
Morehead City:--Now, I knew that General Hardee had read that same
paper, and that he would be perfectly able to draw his own
inferences.  Up to, that moment I had endeavored so to feign to our
left that we had completely, misled our antagonists; but this was
no longer possible, and I concluded that we must be ready, for the
concentration in our front of all the force subject to General Jos.
Johnston's orders, for I was there also informed that he had been
restored to the full command of the Confederate forces in South and
North Carolina.

On the 6th of March I crossed the Pedee, and all the army marched
for Fayetteville: the Seventeenth Corps kept well to the right, to
make room; the Fifteenth Corps marched by a direct road; the
Fourteenth Corps also followed a direct road from Sneedsboro',
where it had crossed the Pedee; and the Twentieth Corps, which had
come into.  Cheraw for the convenience of the pontoon-bridge,
diverged to the left, so as to enter Fayetteville next after the
Fourteenth Corps, which was appointed to lead into Fayetteville.
Kilpatrick held his cavalry still farther to the left rear on the
roads from Lancaster, by way of Wadesboro' and New Gilead, so as to
cover our trains from Hampton's and Wheeler's cavalry, who had
first retreated toward the north.  I traveled with the Fifteenth
Corps, and on the 8th of March reached Laurel Hill, North Carolina.
Satisfied that our troops must be at Wilmington, I determined to
send a message there; I called for my man, Corporal Pike, whom I
had rescued as before described, at Columbia, who was then
traveling with our escort, and instructed him in disguise to work
his way to the Cape Fear River, secure a boat, and float down to
Wilmington to convey a letter, and to report our approach.  I also
called on General Howard for another volunteer, and he brought me a
very clever young sergeant, who is now a commissioned officer in
the regular army.  Each of these got off during the night by
separate routes, bearing the following message, reduced to the same
cipher we used in telegraphic messages:


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, LAUREL HILL, Wednesday, March 8, 1865.

Commanding Officer, Wilmington, North Carolina:

We are marching for Fayetteville, will be there Saturday, Sunday,
and Monday, and will then march for Goldsboro'.

If possible, send a boat up Cape Fear River, and have word conveyed
to General Schofield that I expect to meet him about Goldsboro'.
We are all well and have done finely.  The rains make our roads
difficult, and may delay us about Fayetteville, in which case I
would like to have some bread, sugar, and coffee.  We have
abundance of all else.  I expect to reach Goldsboro' by the 20th
instant.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


On the 9th I was with the Fifteenth Corps, and toward evening
reached a little church called Bethel, in the woods, in which we
took refuge in a terrible storm of rain, which poured all night,
making the roads awful.  All the men were at work corduroying the
roads, using fence-rails and split saplings, and every foot of the
way had thus to be corduroyed to enable the artillery and wagons to
pass.  On the 10th we made some little progress; on the 11th I
reached Fayetteville, and found that General Hardee, followed by
Wade Hampton's cavalry, had barely escaped across Cape Fear River,
burning the bridge which I had hoped to save.  On reaching
Fayetteville I found General Slocum already in possession with the
Fourteenth Corps, and all the rest of the army was near at hand.  A
day or two before, General Kilpatrick, to our left rear, had
divided his force into two parts, occupying roads behind the
Twentieth Corps, interposing between our infantry columns and Wade
Hampton's cavalry.  The latter, doubtless to make junction with
General Hardee, in Fayetteville, broke across this line, captured
the house in which General Kilpatrick and the brigade-commander,
General Spencer, were, and for a time held possession of the camp
and artillery of the brigade.  However, General Kilpatrick and most
of his men escaped into a swamp with their arms, reorganized and
returned, catching Hampton's men--in turn, scattered and drove them
away, recovering most of his camp and artillery; but Hampton got
off with Kilpatrick's private horses and a couple hundred
prisoners, of which he boasted much in passing through
Fayetteville.

It was also reported that, in the morning after Hardee's army was
all across the bridge at Cape Fear River, Hampton, with a small
bodyguard, had remained in town, ready to retreat and burn the
bridge as soon as our forces made their appearance.  He was getting
breakfast at the hotel when the alarm was given, when he and his
escort took saddle, but soon realized that the alarm came from a
set of our foragers, who, as usual, were extremely bold and rash.
On these he turned, scattered them, killing some and making others
prisoners; among them General Howard's favorite scout, Captain
Duncan.  Hampton then crossed the bridge and burned it.

I took up my quarters at the old United States Arsenal, which was
in fine order, and had been much enlarged by the Confederate
authorities, who never dreamed that an invading army would reach it
from the west; and I also found in Fayetteville the widow and
daughter of my first captain (General Childs), of the Third
Artillery, learned that her son Fred had been the ordnance-officer
in charge of the arsenal, and had of course fled with Hardee's
army.

During the 11th. the whole army closed down upon Fayetteville, and
immediate preparations were made to lay two pontoon bridges, one
near the burned bridge, and another about four miles lower down.

Sunday, March 12th, was a day of Sabbath stillness in Fayetteville.
The people generally attended their churches, for they were a very
pious people, descended in a large measure from the old Scotch
Covenanters, and our men too were resting from the toils and labors
of six weeks of as hard marching as ever fell to the lot of
soldiers.  Shortly after noon was heard in the distance the shrill
whistle of a steamboat, which came nearer and nearer, and soon a
shout, long and continuous, was raised down by the river, which
spread farther and farther, and we all felt that it meant a
messenger from home.  The effect was electric, and no one can
realize the feeling unless, like us, he has been for months cut off
from all communication with friends, and compelled to listen to the
croakings and prognostications of open enemies.  But in a very few
minutes came up through the town to the arsenal on the plateau
behind a group of officers, among whom was a large, florid
seafaring man, named Ainsworth, bearing a small mail-bag from
General Terry, at Wilmington, having left at 2 p.m.  the day
before.  Our couriers had got through safe from Laurel Hill, and
this was the prompt reply.

As in the case of our former march from Atlanta, intense anxiety
had been felt for our safety, and General Terry had been prompt to
open communication.  After a few minutes' conference with Captain
Ainsworth about the capacity of his boat, and the state of facts
along the river, I instructed him to be ready to start back at 6
p.m., and ordered Captain Byers to get ready to carry dispatches to
Washington.  I also authorized General Howard to send back by this
opportunity some of the fugitives who had traveled with his army
all the way from Columbia, among whom were Mrs. Feaster and her two
beautiful daughters.

I immediately prepared letters for Secretary Stanton, Generals
Halleck and Grant, and Generals Schofield, Foster, Easton, and
Beckwith, all of which have been published, but I include here only
those to the Secretary of War, and Generals Grant and Terry, as
samples of the whole:


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD,
FAYETTVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Sunday, March.  12, 1885.

Hon. E.  M.  STANTON, Secretary of War.

DEAR SIR: I know you will be pleased to hear that my army has
reached this point, and has opened communication with Wilmington.
A tug-boat came up this morning, and will start back at 6 P. M.

I have written a letter to General Grant, the substance of which he
will doubtless communicate, and it must suffice for me to tell you
what I know will give you pleasure--that I have done all that I
proposed, and the fruits seem to me ample for the time employed.
Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington, are incidents, while the
utter demolition of the railroad system of South Carolina, and the
utter destruction of the enemy's arsenals of Columbia, Cheraw, and
Fayetteville, are the principals of the movement.  These points
were regarded as inaccessible to us, and now no place in the
Confederacy is safe against the army of the West.  Let Lee hold on
to Richmond, and we will destroy his country; and then of what use
is Richmond.  He must come out and fight us on open ground, and for
that we must ever be ready.  Let him stick behind his parapets, and
he will perish.

I remember well what you asked me, and think I am on the right
road, though a long one.  My army is as united and cheerful as
ever, and as full of confidence in itself and its leaders.  It is
utterly impossible for me to enumerate what we have done, but I
inclose a slip just handed me, which is but partial.  At Columbia
and Cheraw we destroyed nearly all the gunpowder and cartridges
which the Confederacy had in this part of the country.  This
arsenal is in fine order, and has been much enlarged.  I cannot
leave a detachment to hold it, therefore shall burn it, blow it up
with gunpowder, and then with rams knock down its walls.  I take it
for granted the United States will never again trust North Carolina
with an arsenal to appropriate at her pleasure.

Hoping that good fortune may still attend my army.  I remain your
servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD,
FAYETTVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Sunday, March.  12, 1885.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, commanding United States Army,
City Point, Virginia.

DEAR GENERAL: We reached this place yesterday at noon; Hardee, as
usual, retreating across the Cape Fear, burning his bridges; but
our pontoons will be up to-day, and, with as little delay as
possible, I will be after him toward Goldsboro'.

A tug has just come up from Wilmington, and before I get off from
here, I hope to get from Wilmington some shoes and stockings,
sugar, coffee, and flour.  We are abundantly supplied with all
else, having in a measure lived off the country.

The army is in splendid health, condition, and spirits, though we
have had foul weather, and roads that would have stopped travel to
almost any other body of men I ever heard of.

Our march, was substantially what I designed--straight on Columbia,
feigning on Branchville and Augusta.  We destroyed, in passing, the
railroad from the Edisto nearly up to Aiken; again, from Orangeburg
to the Congaree; again, from Colombia down to Kingsville on the
Wateree, and up toward Charlotte as far as the Chester line; thence
we turned east on Cheraw and Fayetteville.  At Colombia we
destroyed immense arsenals and railroad establishments, among which
wore forty-three cannon.  At Cheraw we found also machinery and
material of war sent from Charleston, among which were twenty-five
guns and thirty-six hundred barrels of powder; and here we find
about twenty guns and a magnificent United States' arsenal.

We cannot afford to leave detachments, and I shall therefore
destroy this valuable arsenal, so the enemy shall not have its use;
and the United States should never again confide such valuable
property to a people who have betrayed a trust.

I could leave here to-morrow, but want to clear my columns of the
vast crowd of refugees and negroes that encumber us.  Some I will
send down the river in boats, and the rest to Wilmington by land,
under small escort, as soon as we are across Cape Fear River.

I hope you have not been uneasy about us, and that the fruits of
this march will be appreciated.  It had to be made not only to
destroy the valuable depots by the way, but for its incidents in
the necessary fall of Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington.  If I
can now add Goldsboro' without too much cost, I will be in a
position to aid you materially in the spring campaign.

Jos. Johnston may try to interpose between me here and Schofield
about Newbern; but I think he will not try that, but concentrate
his scattered armies at Raleigh, and I will go straight at him as
soon as I get our men reclothed and our wagons reloaded.

Keep everybody busy, and let Stoneman push toward Greensboro' or
Charlotte from Knoxville; even a feint in that quarter will be most
important.

The railroad from Charlotte to Danville is all that is left to the
enemy, and it will not do for me to go there, on account of the
red-clay hills which are impassable to wheels in wet weather.

I expect to make a junction with General Schofield in ten days.

Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD,
FAYETTVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Sunday, March.  12, 1885.

Major-General TERRY, commanding United States Forces,
Wilmington, North Carolina.

GENERAL: I have just received your message by the tug which left
Wilmington at 2 p.m.  yesterday, which arrived here without
trouble.  The scout who brought me your cipher-message started back
last night with my answers, which are superseded by the fact of
your opening the river.

General Howard just reports that he has secured one of the enemy's
steamboats below the city, General Slocum will try to secure two
others known to be above, and we will load them with refugees
(white and black) who have clung to our skirts, impeded our
movements, and consumed our food.

We have swept the, country well from Savannah to here, and the men
and animals are in fine condition.  Had it not been for the foul
weather, I would have caught Hardee at Cheraw or here; but at
Columbia, Cheraw, and here, we have captured immense stores, and
destroyed machinery, guns, ammunition, and property, of inestimable
value to our enemy.  At all points he has fled from us, "standing
not on the order of his going."

The people of South Carolina, instead of feeding Lee's army, will
now call on Lee to feed them.

I want you to send me all the shoes, stockings, drawers, sugar,
coffee, and flour, you can spare; finish the loads with oats or
corn: Have the boats escorted, and let them run at night at any
risk.  We must not give time for Jos. Johnston to concentrate at
Goldsboro'.  We cannot prevent his concentrating at Raleigh, but he
shall have no rest. I want General Schofield to go on with his
railroad from Newbern as far as he can, and you should do the same
from Wilmington.  If we can get the roads to and secure Goldsboro'
by April 10th, it will be soon enough; but every day now is worth a
million of dollars.  I can whip Jos. Johnston provided he does not
catch one of my corps in flank, and I will see that the army
marches hence to Goldsboro' in compact form.

I must rid our army of from twenty to thirty thousand useless
mouths; as many to go down Cape Fear as possible, and the rest to
go in vehicles or on captured horses via Clinton to Wilmington.

I thank you for the energetic action that has marked your course,
and shall be most happy to meet you.  I am, truly your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

In quick succession I received other messages from General Terry,
of older date, and therefore superseded by that brought by the tug
Davidson, viz., by two naval officers, who had come up partly by
canoes and partly by land; General Terry had also sent the
Thirteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry to search for us, under Colonel
Kerwin, who had dispatched Major Berks with fifty men, who reached
us at Fayetteville; so that, by March 12th, I was in full
communication with General Terry and the outside world.  Still, I
was anxious to reach Goldsboro', there to make junction with
General Schofield, so as to be ready for the next and last stage of
the war.  I then knew that my special antagonist, General Jos. E.
Johnston, was back, with part of his old army; that he would not be
misled by feints and false reports, and would somehow compel me to
exercise more caution than I had hitherto done.  I then
over-estimated his force at thirty-seven thousand infantry,
supposed to be made up of S. D.  Lee's corps, four thousand;
Cheatham's, five thousand; Hoke's, eight thousand; Hardee's, ten
thousand; and other detachments, ten thousand; with Hampton's,
Wheeler's, and Butler's cavalry, about eight thousand.  Of these,
only Hardee and the cavalry were immediately in our front, while
the bulk of Johnston's army was supposed to be collecting at or
near Raleigh.  I was determined, however, to give him as little
time for organization as possible, and accordingly crossed Cape
Fear River, with all the army, during the 13th and 14th, leaving
one division as a rearguard, until the arsenal could be completely
destroyed.  This was deliberately and completely leveled on the
14th, when fire was applied to the wreck.  Little other damage was
done at Fayetteville.

On the 14th the tug Davidson again arrived from Wilmington, with
General Dodge, quartermaster, on board, reporting that there was no
clothing to be had at Wilmington; but he brought up some sugar and
coffee, which were most welcome, and some oats.  He was followed by
a couple of gunboats, under command of Captain Young, United States
Navy, who reached Fayetteville after I had left, and undertook to
patrol the river as long as the stage of water would permit; and
General Dodge also promised to use the captured steamboats for a
like purpose.  Meantime, also, I had sent orders to General
Schofield, at Newbern, and to General Terry, at Wilmington, to move
with their effective forces straight for Goldsboro', where I
expected to meet them by the 20th of March.

On the 15th of March the whole army was across Cape Fear River, and
at once began its march for Goldsboro'; the Seventeenth Corps still
on the right, the Fifteenth next in order, then the Fourteenth and
Twentieth on the extreme left; the cavalry, acting in close concert
with the left flank.  With almost a certainty of being attacked on
this flank, I had instructed General Slocum to send his
corps-trains under strong escort by an interior road, holding four
divisions ready for immediate battle.  General Howard was in like
manner ordered to keep his trains well to his right, and to have
four divisions unencumbered, about six miles ahead of General
Slocum, within easy support.

In the mean time, I had dispatched by land to Wilmington a train of
refugees who had followed the army all the way from Columbia, South
Carolina, under an escort of two hundred men, commanded by Major
John A.  Winson (One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois Infantry), so
that we were disencumbered, and prepared for instant battle on our
left and exposed flank.

In person I accompanied General Slocum, and during the night of
March 15th was thirteen miles out on the Raleigh road.  This flank
followed substantially a road along Cape Fear River north,
encountered pretty stubborn resistance by Hardee's infantry,
artillery, and cavalry, and the ground favored our enemy; for the
deep river, Cape Fear, was on his right, and North River on his
left, forcing us to attack him square in front.  I proposed to
drive Hardee well beyond Averysboro', and then to turn to the right
by Bentonville for Goldsboro'.  During the day it rained very
hard, and I had taken refuge in an old cooper-shop, where a
prisoner of war was brought to me (sent back from the skirmish-line
by General Kilpatrick), who proved to be Colonel Albert Rhett,
former commander of Fort Sumter.  He was a tall, slender, and
handsome young man, dressed in the most approved rebel uniform,
with high jackboots beautifully stitched, and was dreadfully
mortified to find himself a prisoner in our hands.  General Frank
Blair happened to be with me at the moment, and we were much amused
at Rhett's outspoken disgust at having been captured without a
fight.  He said he was a brigade commander, and that his brigade
that day was Hardee's rear-guard; that his command was composed
mostly of the recent garrisons of the batteries of Charleston
Harbor, and had little experience in woodcraft; that he was giving
ground to us as fast as Hardee's army to his rear moved back, and
during this operation he was with a single aide in the woods, and
was captured by two men of Kilpatrick's skirmish-line that was
following up his retrograde movement.  These men called on him to
surrender, and ordered him, in language more forcible than polite,
to turn and ride back.  He first supposed these men to be of
Hampton's cavalry, and threatened to report them to General Hampton
for disrespectful language; but he was soon undeceived, and was
conducted to Kilpatrick, who sent him back to General Slocum's
guard.

The rain was falling heavily, and, our wagons coming up, we went
into camp there, and had Rhett and General Blair to take supper
with us, and our conversation was full and quite interesting.  In
due time, however, Rhett was passed over by General Slocum to his
provost-guard, with orders to be treated with due respect,--and was
furnished with a horse to ride.

The next day (the 16th) the opposition continued stubborn, and near
Averysboro' Hardee had taken up a strong position, before which
General Slocum deployed Jackson's division (of the Twentieth
Corps), with part of Ward's.  Kilpatrick was on his right front.
Coming up, I advised that a brigade should make a wide circuit by
the left, and, if possible, catch this line in flank.  The movement
was completely successful, the first line of the enemy was swept
away, and we captured the larger part of Rhett's brigade, two
hundred and seventeen men, including Captain Macbeth's battery of
three guns, and buried one hundred and eight dead.

The deployed lines (Ward's and Jackson's) pressed on, and found
Hardee again intrenched; but the next morning he was gone, in full
retreat toward Smithfield.  In this action, called the battle of
Averysboro', we lost twelve officers and sixty-five men killed, and
four hundred and seventy-seven men wounded; a serious loss, because
every wounded man had to be carried in an ambulance.  The rebel
wounded (sixty-eight) were carried to a house near by, all surgical
operations necessary were performed by our surgeons, and then these
wounded men were left in care of an officer and four men of the
rebel prisoners, with a scanty supply of food, which was the best
we could do for them.  In person I visited this house while the
surgeons were at work, with arms and legs lying around loose, in
the yard and on the porch; and in a room on a bed lay a pale,
handsome young fellow, whose left arm had just been cut off near
the shoulder.  Some one used my name, when he asked, in a feeble
voice, if I were General Sherman.  He then announced himself as
Captain Macbeth, whose battery had just been captured; and said
that he remembered me when I used to visit his father's house, in
Charleston.  I inquired about his family, and enabled him to write
a note to his mother, which was sent her afterward from Goldsboro'.
I have seen that same young gentleman since in St. Louis, where he
was a clerk in an insurance-office.

While the battle of Averysboro' was in progress, and I was sitting
on my horse, I was approached by a man on foot, without shoes or
coat, and his head bandaged by a handkerchief.  He announced
himself as the Captain Duncan who had been captured by Wade Hampton
in Fayetteville, but had escaped; and, on my inquiring how he
happened to be in that plight, he explained that when he was a
prisoner Wade Hampton's men had made him "get out of his coat, hat,
and shoes," which they appropriated to themselves.  He said Wade
Hampton had seen them do it, and he had appealed to him personally
for protection, as an officer, but Hampton answered him with a
curse.  I sent Duncan to General Kilpatrick, and heard afterward
that Kilpatrick had applied to General Slocum for his prisoner,
Colonel Rhett, whom he made march on foot the rest of the way to
Goldsboro', in retaliation.  There was a story afloat that
Kilpatrick made him get out of those fine boots, but restored them
because none of his own officers had feet delicate enough to wear
them.  Of course, I know nothing of this personally, and have never
seen Rhett since that night by the cooper-shop; and suppose that he
is the editor who recently fought a duel in New Orleans.

From Averysboro' the left wing turned east, toward Goldsboro', the
Fourteenth Corps leading.  I remained with this wing until the
night of the 18th, when we were within twenty-seven miles of
Goldsboro' and five from Bentonsville; and, supposing that all
danger was over, I crossed over to join Howard's column, to the
right, so as to be nearer to Generals Schofield and Terry, known to
be approaching Goldsboro'.  I overtook General Howard at
Falling-Creek Church, and found his column well drawn out, by reason
of the bad roads.  I had heard some cannonading over about Slocum's
head of column, and supposed it to indicate about the same measure of
opposition by Hardee's troops and Hampton's cavalry before
experienced; but during the day a messenger overtook me, and notified
me that near Bentonsville General Slocum had run up against
Johnston's whole army.  I sent back orders for him to fight
defensively to save time, and that I would come up with
reenforcements from the direction of Cog's Bridge, by the road which
we had reached near Falling-Creek Church.  The country was very
obscure, and the maps extremely defective.

By this movement I hoped General Slocum would hold Johnston's army
facing west, while I would come on his rear from the east. The
Fifteenth Corps, less one division (Hazen's), still well to the
rear, was turned at once toward Bentonsville; Hazen's division was
ordered to Slocum's flank, and orders were also sent for General
Blair, with the Seventeenth Corps, to come to the same destination.
Meantime the sound of cannon came from the direction of
Bentonsville.

The night of the 19th caught us near Falling-Creek Church; but
early the next morning the Fifteenth Corps, General C. R. Woods's
division leading, closed down on Bentonsville, near which it was
brought up by encountering a line of fresh parapet, crossing the
road and extending north, toward Mill Creek.

After deploying, I ordered General Howard to proceed with due
caution, using skirmishers alone, till he had made junction with
General Slocum, on his left.  These deployments occupied all day,
during which two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps also got up.
At that time General Johnston's army occupied the form of a V, the
angle reaching the road leading from Averysboro' to Goldsboro', and
the flanks resting on Mill Creek, his lines embracing the village
of Bentonsville.

General Slocum's wing faced one of these lines and General Howard's
the other; and, in the uncertainty of General Johnston's strength,
I did not feel disposed to invite a general battle, for we had been
out from Savannah since the latter part of January, and our
wagon-trains contained but little food.  I had also received messages
during the day from General Schofield, at Kinston, and General
Terry, at Faison's Depot, approaching Goldsboro', both expecting to
reach it by March 21st.  During the 20th we simply held our ground
and started our trains back to Kinston for provisions, which would
be needed in the event of being forced to fight a general battle at
Bentonsville.  The next day (21st) it began to rain again, and we
remained quiet till about noon, when General Mower, ever rash,
broke through the rebel line on his extreme left flank, and was
pushing straight for Bentonsville and the bridge across Mill Creek.
I ordered him back to connect with his own corps; and, lest the
enemy should concentrate on him, ordered the whole rebel line to be
engaged with a strong skirmish-fire.

I think I made a mistake there, and should rapidly have followed
Mower's lead with the whole of the right wing, which would have
brought on a general battle, and it could not have resulted
otherwise than successfully to us, by reason of our vastly superior
numbers; but at the moment, for the reasons given, I preferred to
make junction with Generals Terry and Schofield, before engaging
Johnston's army, the strength of which was utterly unknown.  The
next day he was gone, and had retreated on Smithfield; and, the
roads all being clear, our army moved to Goldsboro'.  The heaviest
fighting at Bentonsville was on the first day, viz., the 19th, when
Johnston's army struck the head of Slocum's columns, knocking back
Carlin's division; but, as soon as General Slocum had brought up
the rest of the Fourteenth Corps into line, and afterward the
Twentieth on its left, he received and repulsed all attacks, and
held his ground as ordered, to await the coming back of the right
wing.  His loss, as reported, was nine officers and one hundred and
forty-five men killed, eight hundred and sixteen wounded, and two
hundred and twenty-six missing.  He reported having buried of the
rebel dead one hundred and sixty-seven, and captured three hundred
and thirty-eight prisoners.

The loss of the right wing was two officers and thirty-five men
killed, twelve officers and two hundred and eighty-nine men
wounded, and seventy missing.  General Howard reported that he had
buried one hundred of the rebel dead, and had captured twelve
hundred and eighty-seven prisoners.

Our total loss, therefore, at Bentonsville was: 1,604

General Johnston, in his "Narrative" (p. 392), asserts that his
entire force at Bentonsville, omitting Wheeler's and Butler's
cavalry, only amounted to fourteen thousand one hundred infantry
and artillery; and (p. 393) states his losses as: 2,343


Wide discrepancies exist in these figures: for instance, General
Slocum accounts for three hundred and thirty-eight prisoners
captured, and General Howard for twelve hundred and eighty-seven,
making sixteen hundred and twenty-five in all, to Johnston's six
hundred and fifty three--a difference of eight hundred and
seventy-two.  I have always accorded to General Johnston due credit
for boldness in his attack on our exposed flank at Bentonville,
but I think he understates his strength, and doubt whether at the
time he had accurate returns from his miscellaneous army, collected
from Hoke, Bragg, Hardee, Lee, etc.  After the first attack on
Carlin's division, I doubt if the fighting was as desperate as
described by him, p. 385, et seq.  I was close up with the
Fifteenth Corps, on the 20th and 21st, considered the fighting as
mere skirmishing, and know that my orders were to avoid a general
battle, till we could be sure of Goldsboro', and of opening up a
new base of supply.  With the knowledge now possessed of his small
force, of course I committed an error in not overwhelming
Johnston's army on the 21st of March, 1865.  But I was content then
to let him go, and on the 22d of March rode to Cog's Bridge, where
I met General Terry, with his two divisions of the Tenth Corps; and
the next day we rode into Goldsboro', where I found General
Schofield with the Twenty-third Corps, thus effecting a perfect
junction of all the army at that point, as originally contemplated.
During the 23d and 24th the whole army was assembled at Goldsboro';
General Terry's two divisions encamped at Faison's Depot to the
south, and General Kilpatrick's cavalry at Mount Olive Station,
near him, and there we all rested, while I directed my special
attention to replenishing the army for the next and last stage of
the campaign.  Colonel W. W. Wright had been so indefatigable, that
the Newbern Railroad was done, and a locomotive arrived in
Goldsboro' on the 25th of March.

Thus was concluded one of the longest and most important marches
ever made by an organized army in a civilized country.  The
distance from Savannah to Goldsboro' is four hundred and
twenty-five miles, and the route traversed embraced five large
navigable rivers, viz., the Edisto, Broad, Catawba, Pedee, and Cape
Fear, at either of which a comparatively small force, well-handled,
should have made the passage most difficult, if not impossible.
The country generally was in a state of nature, with innumerable
swamps, with simply mud roads, nearly every mile of which had to be
corduroyed.  In our route we had captured Columbia, Cheraw, and
Fayetteville, important cities and depots of supplies, had
compelled the evacuation of Charleston City and Harbor, had utterly
broken up all the railroads of South Carolina, and had consumed a
vast amount of food and forage, essential to the enemy for the
support of his own armies.  We had in mid-winter accomplished the
whole journey of four hundred and twenty-five miles in fifty days,
averaging ten miles per day, allowing ten lay-days, and had reached
Goldsboro' with the army in superb order, and the trains almost as
fresh as when we had started from Atlanta.

It was manifest to me that we could resume our march, and come
within the theatre of General Grant's field of operations in all
April, and that there was no force in existence that could delay
our progress, unless General Lee should succeed in eluding General
Grant at Petersburg, make junction with General Johnston, and thus
united meet me alone; and now that we had effected a junction with
Generals Terry and Schofield, I had no fear even of that event.  On
reaching Goldsboro, I learned from General Schofield all the
details of his operations about Wilmington and Newbern; also of the
fight of the Twenty-third Corps about Kinston, with General Bragg.
I also found Lieutenant Dunn, of General Grant's staff, awaiting
me, with the general's letter of February 7th, covering
instructions to Generals Schofield and Thomas; and his letter of
March 16th, in answer to mine of the 12th, from Fayetteville.

These are all given here to explain the full reasons for the events
of the war then in progress, with two or three letters from myself,
to fill out the picture.


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, February 7, 1865



Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi

GENERAL: Without much expectation of it reaching you in time to be
of any service, I have mailed to you copies of instructions to
Schofield and Thomas.  I had informed Schofield by telegraph of the
departure of Mahone's division, south from the Petersburg front.
These troops marched down the Weldon road, and, as they apparently
went without baggage, it is doubtful whether they have not
returned.  I was absent from here when they left.  Just returned
yesterday morning from Cape Fear River.  I went there to determine
where Schofield's corps had better go to operate against Wilmington
and Goldsboro'.  The instructions with this will inform you of the
conclusion arrived at.

Schofield was with me, and the plan of the movement against
Wilmington fully determined before we started back; hence the
absence of more detailed instructions to him.  He will land one
division at Smithville, and move rapidly up the south side of the
river, and secure the Wilmington & Charlotte Railroad, and with his
pontoon train cross over to the island south of the city, if he
can.  With the aid of the gunboats, there is no doubt but this move
will drive the enemy from their position eight miles east of the
city, either back to their line or away altogether.  There will be
a large force on the north bank of Cape Fear River, ready to follow
up and invest the garrison, if they should go inside.

The railroads of North Carolina are four feet eight and one-half
inches. gauge.  I have sent large parties of railroad-men there to
build them up, and have ordered stock to run them.  We have
abundance of it idle from the non-use of the Virginia roads.  I
have taken every precaution to have supplies ready for you wherever
you may turn up.  I did this before when you left Atlanta, and
regret that they did not reach you promptly when you reached
salt-water....

Alexander Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and Judge Campbell, are now at
my headquarters, very desirous of going to Washington to see Mr.
Lincoln, informally, on the subject of peace.  The peace feeling
within the rebel lines is gaining ground rapidly.  This, however,
should not relax our energies in the least, but should stimulate us
to greater activity.

I have received your very kind letters, in which you say you would
decline, or are opposed to, promotion.  No one world be more
pleased at your advancement than I, and if you should be placed in
my position, and I put subordinate, it would not change our
personal relations in the least. I would make the same exertions to
support you that you have ever done to support me, and would do all
in my power to make our cause win.

Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 81, 1865.

Major-General G. H. THOMAS, commanding Army of the Cumberland.

GENERAL: With this I send you a letter from General Sherman.  At
the time of writing it, General Sherman was not informed of the
depletion of your command by my orders.  It will, be impossible at
present for you to move south as he contemplated, with the force of
infantry indicated.  General Slocum is advised before this of the
changes made, and that for the winter you will be on the defensive.
I think, however, an expedition from East Tennessee, under General
Stoneman might penetrate South Carolina, well down toward Columbia,
destroying the railroad and military resources of the country, thus
visiting a portion of the State which will not be reached by
Sherman's forces.  He might also be able to return to East
Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, thus releasing home
our prisoners of war in rebel hands.

Of the practicability of doing this, General Stoneman will have to
be the judge, making up his mind from information obtained while
executing the first part of his instructions.  Sherman's movements
will attract the attention of all the force the enemy can collect,
thus facilitating the execution of this.

Three thousand cavalry would be a sufficient force to take.  This
probably can be raised in the old Department of the Ohio, without
taking any now under General Wilson.  It would require, though, the
reorganization of the two regiments of Kentucky Cavalry, which
Stoneman had in his very successful raid into Southwestern
Virginia.

It will be necessary, probably, for you to send, in addition to the
force now in East Tennessee, a small division of infantry, to
enable General Gillem to hold the upper end of Holston Valley, and
the mountain-passes in rear of Stevenson.

You may order such an expedition.  To save time, I will send a copy
of this to General Stoneman, so that he can begin his preparations
without loss of time, and can commence his correspondence with you
as to these preparations.

As this expedition goes to destroy and not to fight battles, but to
avoid them when practicable, particularly against any thing like
equal forces, or where a great object is to be gained, it should go
as light as possible.  Stoneman's experience, in raiding will teach
him in this matter better than he can be directed.

Let there be no delay in the preparations for this expedition, and
keep me advised of its progress.  Very respectfully, your obedient
servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 81, 1865.

Major-General J. M. SCHOFIELD, commanding army of the Ohio.

GENERAL: I have requested by telegraph that, for present purposes,
North Carolina be erected into a department, and that you be placed
in command of it, subject to Major-General Sherman's orders.  Of
course, you will receive orders from me direct until such time as
General Sherman gets within communicating distance of you.  This
obviates the necessity of my publishing the order which I informed
you would meet you at Fortress Monroe.  If the order referred to
should not be published from the Adjutant-General's office, you
will read these instructions as your authority to assume command of
all the troops in North Carolina, dating all official
communications, "Headquarters Army of the Ohio."  Your headquarters
will be in the field, and with the portion of the army where you
feel yourself most needed.  In the first move you will go to Cape
Fear River.

Your movements are intended as cooperative with Sherman's movement
through the States of South and North Carolina.  The first point to
be obtained is to secure Wilmington.  Goldsboro' will then be your
objective point, moving either from Wilmington or Newbern, or both,
as you may deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro',
you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that
place with the sea-coast, as near to it as you can, building the
road behind you.  The enterprise under you has two objects: the
first is, to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his
march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on the
line of his march.  As soon, therefore, as you can determine which
of the two points, Wilmington or Newbern, you can best use for
throwing supplies from to the interior, you will commence the
accumulation of twenty days rations and forage for sixty thousand
men and twenty thousand animals.  You will get of these as many as
you can house and protect, to such point in the interior as you may
be able to occupy.

I believe General Innis N. Palmer has received some instructions
directly from General Sherman, on the subject of securing supplies
for his army.  You can learn what steps he has taken, and be
governed in your requisitions accordingly.  A supply of
ordnance-stores will also be necessary.

Make all your requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective
departments, in the field, with me at City Point.  Communicate with
me by every opportunity, and, should you deem it necessary at any
time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you
can communicate by telegraph.

The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of
those required by your own command.

The movements of the enemy may justify you, or even make it your
imperative duty, to cut loose from your base and strike for the
interior, to aid Sherman.  In such case you will act on your own
judgment, without waiting for instructions.  You will report,
however, what you propose doing.  The details for carrying out
these instructions are necessarily left to you.  I would urge,
however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the
importance of it, prompt action.  Sherman may be looked for in the
neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of
February.  This limits your time very materially.

If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it
can be supplied from Washington: A large force of railroad-men has
already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort
Fisher in a day or two.  On this point I have informed you by
telegraph.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 16, 1865.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: Your interesting letter of the 12th inst. is just
received.  I have never felt any uneasiness for your safety, but I
have felt great anxiety to know just how you were progressing.  I
knew, or thought I did, that, with the magnificent army with you,
you would come out safely somewhere.

To secure certain success, I deemed the capture of Wilmington of
the greatest importance.  Butler came near losing that prize to us.
But Terry and Schofield have since retrieved his blunders, and I do
not know but the first failure has been as valuable a success for
the country as the capture of Fort Fisher.  Butler may not see it
in that light.

Ever since you started on the last campaign, and before, I have
been attempting to get something done in the West, both to
cooperate with you and to take advantage of the enemy's weakness
there--to accomplish results favorable to us.  Knowing Thomas to be
slow beyond excuse, I depleted his army to reinforce Canby, so that
he might act from Mobile Bay on the interior.  With all I have
said, he has not moved at last advices.  Canby was sending a
cavalry force, of about seven thousand, from Vicksburg toward
Selma.  I ordered Thomas to send Wilson from Eastport toward the
same point, and to get him off as soon after the 20th of February
as possible.  He telegraphed me that he would be off by that date.
He has not yet started, or had not at last advices.  I ordered him
to send Stoneman from East Tennessee into Northwest South Carolina,
to be there about the time you would reach Columbia.  He would
either have drawn off the enemy's cavalry from you, or would have
succeeded in destroying railroads, supplies, and other material,
which you could not reach.  At that time the Richmond papers were
full of the accounts of your movements, and gave daily accounts of
movements in West North Carolina.  I supposed all the time it was
Stoneman.  You may judge my surprise when I afterward learned that
Stoneman was still in Louisville, Kentucky, and that the troops in
North Carolina were Kirk's forces!  In order that Stoneman might
get off without delay, I told Thomas that three thousand men would
be sufficient for him to take.  In the mean time I had directed
Sheridan to get his cavalry ready, and, as soon as the snow in the
mountains melted sufficiently, to start for Staunton, and go on and
destroy the Virginia Central Railroad and canal.  Time advanced,
until he set the 28th of February for starting.  I informed Thomas,
and directed him to change the course of Stoneman toward Lynchburg,
to destroy the road in Virginia up as near to that place as
possible.  Not hearing from Thomas, I telegraphed to him about the
12th, to know if Stoneman was yet off.  He replied not, but that he
(Thomas) would start that day for Knoxville, to get him off as soon
as possible.

Sheridan has made his raid, and with splendid success, so far as
heard.  I am looking for him at "White House" to-day.  Since about
the 20th of last month the Richmond papers have been prohibited
from publishing accounts of army movements.  We are left to our own
resources, therefore, for information.  You will see from the
papers what Sheridan has done; if you do not, the officer who bears
this will tell you all.

Lee has depleted his army but very little recently, and I learn of
none going south.  Some regiments may have been detached, but I
think no division or brigade.  The determination seems to be to
hold Richmond as long as possible.  I have a force sufficient to
leave enough to hold our lines (all that is necessary of them), and
move out with plenty to whip his whole army.  But the roads are
entirely impassable.  Until they improve, I shall content myself
with watching Lee, and be prepared to pitch into him if he attempts
to evacuate the place.  I may bring Sheridan over--think I will
--and break up the Danville and Southside Railroads.  These are the
last avenues left to the enemy.

Recruits have come in so rapidly at the West that Thomas has now
about as much force as he had when he attacked Hood.  I have
stopped all who, under previous orders, would go to him, except
those from Illinois.

Fearing the possibility of the enemy falling back to Lynchburg, and
afterward attempting to go into East Tennessee or Kentucky, I have
ordered Thomas to move the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap, and to
fortify there, and to hold out to the Virginia line, if he can.  He
has accumulated a large amount of supplies in Knoxville, and has
been ordered not to destroy any of the railroad west of the
Virginia Hue.  I told him to get ready for a campaign toward
Lynchburg, if it became necessary.  He never can make one there or
elsewhere; but the steps taken will prepare for any one else to
take his troops and come east or go toward Rome, whichever may be
necessary.  I do not believe either will.

When I hear that you and Schofield are together, with your back
upon the coast, I shall feel that you are entirely safe against any
thing the enemy can do.  Lee may evacuate Richmond, but he cannot
get there with force enough to touch you.  His army is now
demoralized and deserting very fast, both to us and to their homes.
A retrograde movement would cost him thousands of men, even if we
did not follow.

Five thousand men, belonging to the corps with you, are now on
their way to join you.  If more reenforcements are necessary, I
will send them.  My notion is, that you should get Raleigh as soon
as possible, and hold the railroad from there back.  This may take
more force than you now have.

From that point all North Carolina roads can be made useless to the
enemy, without keeping up communications with the rear.

Hoping to hear soon of your junction with the forces from
Wilmington and Newborn, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient
servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD,
COX'S BRIGADE, NEUSE RIVER, NORTH CAROLINA, March 22, 1865

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point,
Virginia.

GENERAL: I wrote you from Fayetteville, North Carolina, on Tuesday,
the 14th instant, that I was all ready to start for Goldsboro', to
which point I had also ordered General Schofield, from Newborn, and
General Terry, from Wilmington.  I knew that General Jos. Johnston
was supreme in command against me, and that he would have time to
concentrate a respectable army to oppose the last stage of this
march.  Accordingly, General Slocum was ordered to send his main
supply-train, under escort of two divisions, straight for
Bentonsville, while he, with his other four divisions,
disencumbered of all unnecessary wagons, should march toward
Raleigh, by way of threat, as far as Averysboro'.  General Howard,
in like manner, sent his trains with the Seventeenth Corps, well to
the right, and, with the four divisions of the Fifteenth Corps,
took roads which would enable him to come promptly to the exposed
left flank.  We started on the 16th, but again the rains set in,
and the roads, already bad enough, became horrible.

On Tuesday, the 16th, General Slocum found Hardee's army, from
Charleston, which had retreated before us from Cheraw, in position
across the narrow, swampy neck between Cape Fear and North Rivers,
where the road branches off to Goldsboro'.  There a pretty severe
fight occurred, in which General Slocum's troops carried handsomely
the advanced line, held by a South Carolina brigade, commanded by a
Colonel Butler.  Its Commander, Colonel Rhett, of Fort Sumter
notoriety, with one of his staff, had the night before been
captured, by Kilpatrick's scouts, from his very skirmish-line.  The
next morning Hardee was found gone, and was pursued through and
beyond Averysboro'.  General Slocum buried one hundred and eight
dead rebels, and captured and destroyed three guns.  Some eighty
wounded rebels were left in our hands, and, after dressing their
wounds, we left them in a house, attended by a Confederate officer
and four privates, detailed out of our prisoners and paroled for
the purpose.

We resumed the march toward Goldsboro'.  I was with the left wing
until I supposed all danger had passed; but, when General Slocum's
head of column was within four miles of Bentonsville, after
skirmishing as usual with cavalry, he became aware that there was
infantry in his front.  He deployed a couple of brigades, which, on
advancing, sustained a partial repulse, but soon rallied, when he
formed a line of the two leading divisions (Morgan's and Carlin's)
of Jeff. C. Davis's corps.  The enemy attacked these with violence,
but was repulsed.  This was in the forenoon of Sunday, the 19th.
General Slocum brought forward the two divisions of the Twentieth
Corps, hastily disposed of them for defense, and General Kilpatrick
massed his cavalry on the left.

General Jos. Johnston had, the night before, marched his whole army
(Bragg, Cheatham, S. D. Lee, Hardee, and all the troops he had
drawn from every quarter), determined, as he told his men, to crash
one of our corps, and then defeat us in detail.  He attacked
General Slocum in position from 3 P. M.  on the 19th till dark; but
was everywhere repulsed, and lost heavily.  At the time, I was with
the Fifteenth Corps, marching on a road more to the right; but, on
hearing of General Slocum's danger, directed that corps toward
Cox's Bridge, in the night brought Blair's corps over, and on the
20th marched rapidly on Johnston's flank and rear.  We struck him
about noon, forced him to assume the defensive, and to fortify.
Yesterday we pushed him hard, and came very near crushing him, the
right division of the Seventeenth Corps (Mower's) having broken in
to within a hundred yards of where Johnston himself was, at the
bridge across Mill Creek.  Last night he retreated, leaving us in
possession of the field, dead, and wounded.  We have over two
thousand prisoners from this affair and the one at Averysboro', and
I am satisfied that Johnston's army was so roughly handled
yesterday that we could march right on to Raleigh; but we have now
been out six weeks, living precariously upon the collections of our
foragers, our men dirty, ragged, and saucy, and we must rest and
fix up a little.  Our entire losses thus far (killed, wounded, and
prisoners) will be covered by twenty-five hundred, a great part of
which are, as usual, slight wounds.  The enemy has lost more than
double as many, and we have in prisoners alone full two thousand.

I limited the pursuit, this morning, to Mill Creek, and will
forthwith march the army to Goldsboro', there to rest, reclothe,
and get some rations.

Our combinations were such that General Schofield entered
Goldsboro' from Newborn; General Terry got Cox's Bridge, with
pontoons laid, and a brigade across Neuse River intrenched; and we
whipped Jos. Johnston--all on the same day.

After riding over the field of battle to-day, near Bentonsville,
and making the necessary orders, I have ridden down to this place
(Cox's Bridge) to see General Terry, and to-morrow shall ride into
Goldsboro.

I propose to collect there my army proper; shall post General Terry
about Faison's Depot, and General Schofield about Kinston, partly
to protect the road, but more to collect such food and forage as
the country affords, until the railroads are repaired leading into
Goldsboro'.

I fear these have not been pushed with the vigor I had expected;
but I will soon have them both going.  I shall proceed at once to
organize three armies of twenty-five thousand men each, and will
try and be all ready to march to Raleigh or Weldon, as we may
determine, by or before April 10th.

I inclose you a copy of my orders of to-day.  I would like to be
more specific, but have not the data.  We have lost no general
officers nor any organization.  General Slocum took three guns at
Averysboro', and lost three others at the first dash on him at
Bentonsville.  We have all our wagons and trains in good order.

Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD,
COX'S BRIGADE, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, March 23, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, commanding the Armies of the United
States, City Point, Virginia.

GENERAL:  On reaching Goldsboro' this morning, I found Lieutenant
Dunn awaiting me with your letter of March 18th and dispatch of the
17th.  I wrote you fully from Cox's Bridge yesterday, and since
reaching Goldsboro' have learned that my letter was sent punctually
to Newborn, whence it will be dispatched to you.

I am very glad to hear that General Sheridan did such good service
between Richmond and Lynchburg, and hope he will keep the ball
moving, I know that these raids and dashes disconcert our enemy and
discourage him much.

General Slocum's two corps (Fourteenth and Twentieth) are now
coming in.  I will dispose of them north of Goldsboro', between the
Weldon road and Little River.  General Howard to-day is marching
south of the Nenae, and to-morrow will come in and occupy ground
north of Goldsboro', extending from the Weldon Railroad to that
leading to Kinston.

I have ordered all the provisional divisions, made up of troops
belonging to the regular corps, to be broken up, and the men to
join their proper regiments and organizations; and have ordered
General Schofield to guard the railroads back to Newborn and
Wilmington, and to make up a movable column equal to twenty-five
thousand men, with which to take the field.  His army will be the
centre, as on the Atlanta campaign.  I do not think I want any more
troops (other than absentees and recruits) to fill up the present
regiments, and I can make up an army of eighty thousand men by
April 10th.  I will post General Kilpatrick at Mount Olive Station
on the Wilmington road, and then allow the army some rest.

We have sent all our empty wagons, under escort, with the proper
staff-officers, to bring up from Kinston clothing and provisions.
As long as we move we can gather food and forage; but, the moment
we stop, trouble begins.

I feel sadly disappointed that our railroads are not done.  I do
not like to say there has been any neglect until I make inquiries;
but it does seem to me the repairs should have been made ere this,
and the road properly stocked.  I can only hear of one locomotive
(besides the four old ones) on the Newbern road, and two damaged
locomotives (found by General Terry) on the Wilmington road.  I
left Generals Easton and Beckwith purposely to make arrangements in
anticipation of my arrival, and have heard from neither, though I
suppose them both to be at Morehead City.

At all events, we have now made a junction of all the armies, and
if we can maintain them, will, in a short time, be in a position to
march against Raleigh, Gaston, Weldon, or even Richmond, as you may
determine.

If I get the troops all well planed, and the supplies working well,
I may run up to see you for a day or two before diving again into
the bowels of the country.

I will make, in a very short time, accurate reports of our
operations for the past two months.  Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD,
COX'S BRIGADE, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, March 24, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

GENERAL: I have kept Lieutenant Dunn over to-day that I might
report farther.  All the army is now in, save the cavalry (which I
have posted at Mount Olive Station, south of the Nenae) and General
Terry's command (which--to-morrow will move from Cog's Ferry to
Faison's Depot, also on the Wilmington road).  I send you a copy of
my orders of this morning, the operation of which will, I think,
soon complete our roads.  The telegraph is now done to Morehead
City, and by it I learn that stores have been sent to Kinston in
boats, and that our wagons are loading with rations and clothing.
By using the Neuse as high up as Kinston, hauling from there
twenty-six miles, and by equipping the two roads to Morehead City
and Wilmington, I feel certain we can not only feed and equip the
army, but in a short time fill our wagons for another start.  I
feel certain, from the character of the fighting, that we have got
Johnston's army afraid of us.  He himself acts with timidity and
caution.  His cavalry alone manifests spirit, but limits its
operations to our stragglers and foraging-parties.  My marching
columns of infantry do not pay the cavalry any attention, but walk
right through it.

I think I see pretty clearly how, in one more move, we can
checkmate Lee, forcing him to unite Johnston with him in the defense
of Richmond, or to abandon the cause.  I feel certain, if he leaves
Richmond, Virginia leaves the Confederacy.  I will study my maps a
little more before giving my positive views.  I want all possible
information of the Roanoke as to navigability, how far up, and with
what draught.

We find the country sandy, dry, with good roads, and more corn and
forage than I had expected.  The families remain, but I will
gradually push them all out to Raleigh or Wilmington.  We will need
every house in the town.  Lieutenant Dunn can tell you of many
things of which I need not write.  Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
===


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD,
COX'S BRIGADE, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, April 5,1865

Major-General George H. Thomas, commanding Department of the
Cumberland.

DEAR GENERAL: I can hardly help smiling when I contemplate my
command--it is decidedly mixed.  I believe, but am not certain,
that you are in my jurisdiction, but I certainly cannot help you in
the way of orders or men; nor do I think you need either.  General
Cruft has just arrived with his provisional division, which will at
once be broken up and the men sent to their proper regiments, as
that of Meagher was on my arrival here.

You may have some feeling about my asking that General Slocum
should have command of the two corps that properly belong to you,
viz., the Fourteenth and Twentieth, but you can recall that he was
but a corps commander, and could not legally make orders of
discharge, transfer, etc., which was imperatively necessary.  I
therefore asked that General Slocum should be assigned to command
"an army in the field," called the Army of Georgia, composed of the
Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps.  The order is not yet made by the
President, though I have recognized it because both, General Grant
and the President have sanctioned it, and promised to have the
order made.

My army is now here, pretty well clad and provided, divided into
three parts, of two corps each--much as our old Atlanta army was.

I expect to move on in a few days, and propose (if Lee remains in
Richmond) to pass the Roanoke, and open communication with the
Chowan and Norfolk.  This will bring me in direct communication
with General Grant.

This is an admirable point--country open, and the two railroads in
good order back to Wilmington and Beaufort.  We have already
brought up stores enough to fill our wagons, and only await some
few articles, and the arrival of some men who are marching up from
the coast, to be off.

General Grant explained to me his orders to you, which, of course,
are all right.  You can make reports direct to Washington or to
General Grant, but keep me advised occasionally of the general
state of affairs, that I may know what is happening.  I must give
my undivided attention to matters here.  You will hear from a
thousand sources pretty fair accounts of our next march.  Yours
truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.



[LETTER FROM ADMIRAL DAHLGREN]

SOUTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON
FLAG-SHIP PHILADELPHIA, CHARLESTON, April 20, 1865


Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Armies of the Tennessee,
Georgia, and Mississippi.

Mr DEAR GENERAL: I was much gratified by a sight of your
handwriting, which has just reached me from Goldsboro'; it was very
suggestive of a past to me, when these regions were the scene of
your operations.

As you progressed through South Carolina, there was no
manifestation of weakness or of an intention to abandon Charleston,
until within a few hours of the fact.  On the 11th of February I
was at Stono, and a spirited demonstration was made by General
Schimmel-pfennig and the vessels.  He drove the rebels from their
rifle-pits in front of the lines, extending from Fort Pringle, and
pushed them vigorously.  The next day I was at Bull's Bay, with a
dozen steamers, among them the finest of the squadron.  General
Potter had twelve to fifteen hundred men, the object being to carry
out your views.  We made as much fuss as possible, and with better
success than I anticipated, for it seems that the rebs conceived
Stono to be a feint, and the real object at Bull's Bay, supposing,
from the number of steamers and boats, that we had several thousand
men.  Now came an aide from General Gillmore, at Port Royal, with
your cipher-dispatch from Midway, so I steamed down to Port Royal
to see him.  Next day was spent in vain efforts to decipher-finally
it was accomplished.  You thought that the state of the roads might
force you to turn upon Charleston; so I went there on the 15th, but
there was no sign yet of flinching.  Then I went to Bull's Bay next
day (16th), and found that the troops were not yet ashore, owing to
the difficulties of shoal water.  One of the gunboats had contrived
to get up to within shelling range, and both soldiers and sailors
were working hard.  On the evening of the 18th I steamed down to
Stono to see how matters were going there.  Passing Charleston, I
noticed two large fires, well inside--probably preparing to leave.
On the 17th, in Stono, rumors were flying about loose of
evacuation.  In course of the morning, General Schimmelpfennig
telegraphed me, from Morris Island, that there were symptoms of
leaving; that he would again make a push at Stono, and asked for
monitors.  General Schimmelpfennig came down in the afternoon, and
we met in the Folly Branch, near Secessionville.  He was sore that
the rebs would be off that night, so he was to assault them in
front, while a monitor and gunboats stung their flanks both sides.
I also sent an aide to order my battery of five eleven-inch guns,
at Cumming's Point, to fire steadily all night on Sullivan's
Island, and two monitors to close up to the island for the same
object.  Next morning (18th) the rascals were found to be off, and
we broke in from all directions, by land and water.  The main
bodies had left at eight or nine in the evening, leaving
detachments to keep up a fire from the batteries.  I steamed round
quickly, and soon got into the city, threading the streets with a
large group of naval captains who had joined me.  All was silent as
the grave.  No one to be seen but a few firemen.

No one can question the excellence of your judgment in taking the
track you did, and I never had any misgivings, but it was natural
to desire to go into the place with a strong hand, for, if any one
spot in the land was foremost in the trouble, it was Charleston.

Your campaign was the final blow, grand in conception, complete in
execution; and now it is yours to secure the last army which
rebeldom possesses.  I hear of your being in motion by the 9th, and
hope that the result may be all that you wish.

Tidings of the murder of the President have just come, and shocked
every mind.  Can it be that such a resort finds root in any stratum
of American opinion?  Evidently it has not been the act of one man,
nor of a madman.  Who have prompted him?

I am grateful for your remembrance of my boy; the thought of him is
ever nearest to my heart.  Generous, brave, and noble, as I ever
knew him to be, that he should close his young life so early, even
under the accepted conditions of a soldier's life, as a son of the
Union, would have been grief sufficient for me to bear; but that
his precious remains should have been so treated by the brutes into
whose hands they fell, adds even to the bitterness of death.  I am
now awaiting the hour when I can pay my last duties to his memory.

With my best and sincere wishes, my dear general, for your success
and happiness, I am, most truly, your friend,

J.  A.  DAHLGREN.



[General Order No.  50.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON, March 27, 1865

Ordered--1.  That at the hour of noon, on the 14th day of April,
1885, Brevet Major-General Anderson will raise and plant upon the
ruins of Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, the same United States
flag which floated over the battlements of that fort during the
rebel assault, and which was lowered and saluted by him and the
small force of his command when the works were evacuated on the
14th day of April, 1861.

2.  That the flag, when raised, be saluted by one hundred guns from
Fort Sumter, and by a national salute from every fort and rebel
battery that fired upon Fort Sumter.

3.  That suitable ceremonies be had upon the occasion, under the
direction of Major-General William T. Sherman, whose military
operations compelled the rebels to evacuate Charleston, or, in his
absence, under the charge of Major-General Q. A. Gilmore,
commanding the department.  Among the ceremonies will be the
delivery of a public address by the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher.

4.  That the naval forces at Charleston, and their commander on
that station, be invited to participate in the ceremonies of the
occasion.

By order of the President of the United States,

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.



[General Order No. 41.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH
HILTON HEAD, SOUTH CAROLINA, April 10, 1865

Friday next, the 14th inst., will be the fourth anniversary of the
capture of Fort Sumter by the rebels.  A befitting celebration on
that day, in honor of its reoccupation by the national forces, has
been ordered by the President, in pursuance of which Brevet Major-
General Robert Anderson, United States Army, will restore to its
original place on the fort the identical flag which, after an
honorable and gallant defense, he was compelled to lower to the
insurgents in South Carolina, in April, 1861.

The ceremonies for the occasion will commence with prayer, at
thirty minutes past eleven o'clock a.m.

At noon precisely, the flag will be raised and saluted with one
hundred guns from Fort Sumter, and with a national salute from Fort
Moultrie and Battery Bee on Sullivan's Island, Fort Putnam on
Morris Island, and Fort Johnson on James's Island; it being
eminently appropriate that the places which were so conspicuous in
the inauguration of the rebellion should take a part not less
prominent in this national rejoicing over the restoration of the
national authority.

After the salutes, the Rev.  Henry Ward Beecher will deliver an
address.

The ceremonies will close with prayer and a benediction.

Colonel Stewart L.  Woodford, chief of staff, under such verbal
instructions as he may receive, is hereby charged with the details
of the celebration, comprising all the arrangements that it may be
necessary to make for the accommodation of the orator of the day,
and the comfort and safety of the invited guests from the army and
navy, and from civil life.

By command of Major-General Q. A. Gillmore,
W. L. M. BURGER, Assistant Adjutant-General.



Copy of Major ANDERSON's Dispatch, announcing the Surrender of Fort
Sumter, April 14, 1861.

STEAMSHIP BALTIC, OFF SANDY HOOK
April 10, 1861, 10.30 a.m.  via New York

Honorable S.  Cameron, Secretary of War, Washington

Having defended Fort Sumter for thirty-four hours, until the
quarters were entirely burned, the main gates destroyed by fire,
the gorge-walls seriously injured, the magazine surrounded by
flames, and its door closed from the effect of heat, four barrels
and three cartridges of powder only being available, and no
provisions remaining but pork, I accepted terms of evacuation
offered by General Beauregard, being the same offered by him on the
11th inst., prior to the commencement of hostilities, and marched
out of the fort, Sunday afternoon, the 14th inst., with colors
flying and drums beating, bringing away company and private
property, and saluting my flag with fifty guns.

ROBERT ANDERSON, Major First Artillery, commanding.



CHAPTER XXIV.

END OF THE WAR--FROM GOLDSBORO' TO RALEIGH AND WASHINGTON.

APRIL AND MAY, 1865.

As before described, the armies commanded respectively by Generals
J. M. Schofield, A. H. Terry, and myself, effected a junction in
and about Goldsboro', North Carolina, during the 22d and 23d of
March, 1865, but it required a few days for all the troops and
trains of wagons to reach their respective camps.  In person I
reached Goldsboro' on the 23d, and met General Schofield, who
described fully his operations in North Carolina up to that date;
and I also found Lieutenant Dunn, aide-de-camp to General Grant,
with a letter from him of March 16th, giving a general description
of the state of facts about City Point.  The next day I received
another letter, more full, dated the 22d, which I give herewith.

Nevertheless, I deemed it of great importance that I should have a
personal interview with the general, and determined to go in person
to City Point as soon as the repairs of the railroad, then in
progress under the personal direction of Colonel W. W. Wright,
would permit:



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 22, 1865

Major-General SHERMAN, Commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: Although the Richmond papers do not communicate the fact,
yet I saw enough in them to satisfy me that you occupied Goldsboro'
on the 19th inst. I congratulate you and the army on what may be
regarded as the successful termination of the third campaign since
leaving the Tennessee River, less than one year ago.

Since Sheridan's very successful raid north of the James, the enemy
are left dependent on the Southside and Danville roads for all
their supplies.  These I hope to cut next week.  Sheridan is at
White House, "shoeing up" and resting his cavalry.  I expect him to
finish by Friday night and to start the following morning, raid
Long Bridge, Newmarket, Bermuda Hundred, and the extreme left of
the army around Petersburg.  He will make no halt with the armies
operating here, but will be joined by a division of cavalry, five
thousand five hundred strong, from the Army of the Potomac, and
will proceed directly to the Southside and Danville roads.  His
instructions will be to strike the Southside road as near
Petersburg as he can, and destroy it so that it cannot be repaired
for three or four days, and push on to the Danville road, as near
to the Appomattox as he can get.  Then I want him to destroy the
road toward Burkesville as far as he can; then push on to the
Southside road, west of Burkesville, and destroy it effectually.
From that point I shall probably leave it to his discretion either
to return to this army, crossing the Danville road south of
Burkesville, or go and join you, passing between Danville and
Greensboro'.  When this movement commences I shall move out by my
left, with all the force I can, holding present intrenched lines.
I shall start with no distinct view, further than holding Lee's
forces from following Sheridan.  But I shall be along myself, and
will take advantage of any thing that turns up.  If Lee detaches, I
will attack; or if he comes out of his lines I will endeavor to
repulse him, and follow it up to the best advantage.

It is most difficult to understand what the rebels intend to do; so
far but few troops have been detached from Lee's army.  Much
machinery has been removed, and material has been sent to
Lynchburg, showing a disposition to go there.  Points, too, have
been fortified on the Danville road.

Lee's army is much demoralized, and great numbers are deserting.
Probably, from returned prisoners, and such conscripts as can be
picked up, his numbers may be kept up.  I estimate his force now at
about sixty-five thousand men.

Wilson started on Monday, with twelve thousand cavalry, from
Eastport.  Stoneman started on the same day, from East Tennessee,
toward Lynchburg.  Thomas is moving the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap.
Canby is moving with a formidable force on Mobile and the interior
of Alabama.

I ordered Gilmore, as soon as the fall of Charleston was known, to
hold all important posts on the sea-coast, and to send to
Wilmington all surplus forces.  Thomas was also directed to forward
to Newbern all troops belonging to the corps with you.  I
understand this will give you about five thousand men, besides
those brought east by Meagher.

I have been telegraphing General Meigs to hasten up locomotives and
cars for you.  General McCallum, he informs me, is attending to it.
I fear they are not going forward as fast as I world like.

Let me know if you want more troops, or any thing else.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S.  GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


The railroad was repaired to Goldsboro' by the evening of March
25th, when, leaving General Schofield in chief command, with a
couple of staff-officers I started for City Point, Virginia, in a
locomotive, in company with Colonel Wright, the constructing
engineer.  We reached Newbern that evening, which was passed in the
company of General Palmer and his accomplished lady, and early the
next morning we continued on to Morehead City, where General Easton
had provided for us the small captured steamer Russia, Captain
Smith.  We put to sea at once and steamed up the coast, reaching
Fortress Monroe on the morning of the 27th, where I landed and
telegraphed to my brother, Senator Sherman, at Washington, inviting
him to come down and return with me to Goldsboro.  We proceeded on
up James River to City Point, which we reached the same afternoon.
I found General Grant, with his family and staff, occupying a
pretty group of huts on the bank of James River, overlooking the
harbor, which was full of vessels of all classes, both war and
merchant, with wharves and warehouses on an extensive scale.  The
general received me most heartily, and we talked over matters very
fully.  After I had been with him an hour or so, he remarked that
the President, Mr. Lincoln, was then on board the steamer River
Queen, lying at the wharf, and he proposed that we should call and
see him.  We walked down to the wharf, went on board, and found Mr.
Lincoln alone, in the after-cabin.  He remembered me perfectly, and
at once engaged in a most interesting conversation.  He was full of
curiosity about the many incidents of our great march, which had
reached him officially and through the newspapers, and seemed to
enjoy very much the more ludicrous parts-about the "bummers," and
their devices to collect food and forage when the outside world
supposed us to be starving; but at the same time he expressed a
good deal of anxiety lest some accident might happen to the army in
North Carolina during my absence.  I explained to him that that
army was snug and comfortable, in good camps, at Goldsboro'; that
it would require some days to collect forage and food for another
march; and that General Schofield was fully competent to command it
in my absence.  Having made a good, long, social visit, we took our
leave and returned to General Grant's quarters, where Mrs, Grant
had provided tea.  While at the table, Mrs. Grant inquired if we
had seen Mrs. Lincoln.  "No," said the general, "I did not ask for
her;" and I added that I did not even know that she was on board.
Mrs. Grant then exclaimed, "Well, you are a pretty pair!" and added
that our neglect was unpardonable; when the general said we would
call again the next day, and make amends for the unintended slight.

Early the next day, March 28th, all the principal officers of the
army and navy called to see me, Generals Meade, Ord, Ingalls, etc.,
and Admiral Porter.  At this time the River Queen was at anchor out
in the river, abreast of the wharf, and we again started to visit
Mr. and Mrs. Lincoln.  Admiral Porter accompanied us.  We took a
small, tug at the wharf, which conveyed us on board, where we were
again received most courteously by the President, who conducted us
to the after-cabin.  After the general compliments, General Grant
inquired after Mrs. Lincoln, when the President went to her state-
room, returned, and begged us to excuse her, as she was not well.
We then again entered upon a general conversation, during which
General Grant explained to the President that at that very instant
of time General Sheridan was crossing James River from the north,
by a pontoon-bridge below City Point; that he had a large,
well-appointed force of cavalry, with which he proposed to strike
the Southside and Danville Railroads, by which alone General Lee,
in Richmond, supplied his army; and that, in his judgment, matters
were drawing to a crisis, his only apprehension being that General
Lee would not wait long enough.  I also explained that my army at
Goldsboro' was strong enough to fight Lee's army and Johnston's
combined, provided that General Grant could come up within a day or
so; that if Lee would only remain in Richmond another fortnight, I
could march up to Burkesville, when Lee would have to starve inside
of his lines, or come out from his intrenchments and fight us on
equal terms.

Both General Grant and myself supposed that one or the other of us
would have to fight one more bloody battle, and that it would be
the last.  Mr. Lincoln exclaimed, more than once, that there had
been blood enough shed, and asked us if another battle could not be
avoided.  I remember well to have said that we could not control
that event; that this necessarily rested with our enemy; and I
inferred that both Jeff. Davis and General Lee would be forced to
fight one more desperate and bloody battle.  I rather supposed it
would fall on me, somewhere near Raleigh; and General Grant added
that, if Lee would only wait a few more days, he would have his
army so disposed that if the enemy should abandon Richmond, and
attempt to make junction with General Jos. Johnston in North
Carolina, he (General Grant) would be on his heels.  Mr. Lincoln
more than once expressed uneasiness that I was not with my army at
Goldsboro', when I again assured him that General Schofield was
fully competent to command in my absence; that I was going to start
back that very day, and that Admiral Porter had kindly provided for
me the steamer Bat, which he said was much swifter than my own
vessel, the Russia.  During this interview I inquired of the
President if he was all ready for the end of the war.  What was to
be done with the rebel armies when defeated?  And what should be
done with the political leaders, such as Jeff. Davis, etc.?  Should
we allow them to escape, etc.?  He said he was all ready; all he
wanted of us was to defeat the opposing armies, and to get the men
composing the Confederate armies back to their homes, at work on
their farms and in their shops.  As to Jeff. Davis, he was hardly
at liberty to speak his mind fully, but intimated that he ought to
clear out, "escape the country," only it would not do for him to
say so openly.  As usual, he illustrated his meaning by a story:

A man once had taken the total-abstinence pledge. When visiting a
friend, he was invited to take a drink, but declined, on the score
of his pledge; when his friend suggested lemonade, which was
accepted.  In preparing the lemonade, the friend pointed to the
brandy-bottle, and said the lemonade would be more palatable if he
were to pour in a little brandy; when his guest said, if he could
do so "unbeknown" to him, he would "not object."  From which
illustration I inferred that Mr. Lincoln wanted Davis to escape,
"unbeknown" to him.

I made no notes of this conversation at the time, but Admiral
Porter, who was present, did, and in 1866 he furnished me an
account thereof, which I insert below, but the admiral describes
the first visit, of the 27th, whereas my memory puts Admiral
Porter's presence on the following day.  Still he may be right, and
he may have been with us the day before, as I write this chiefly
from memory.  There were two distinct interviews; the first was
late in the afternoon of March 27th, and the other about noon of
the 28th, both in the after-cabin of the steamer River Queen; on
both occasions Mr. Lincoln was full and frank in his conversation,
assuring me that in his mind he was all ready for the civil
reorganization of affairs at the South as soon as the war was over;
and he distinctly authorized me to assure Governor Vance and the
people of North Carolina that, as soon as the rebel armies laid
down their arms, and resumed their civil pursuits, they would at
once be guaranteed all their rights as citizens of a common
country; and that to avoid anarchy the State governments then in
existence, with their civil functionaries, would be recognized by
him as the government de facto till Congress could provide others.

I know, when I left him, that I was more than ever impressed by his
kindly nature, his deep and earnest sympathy with the afflictions
of the whole people, resulting from the war, and by the march of
hostile armies through the South; and that his earnest desire
seemed to be to end the war speedily, without more bloodshed or
devastation, and to restore all the men of both sections to their
homes. In the language of his second inaugural address, he seemed
to have "charity for all, malice toward none," and, above all, an
absolute faith in the courage, manliness, and integrity of the
armies in the field.  When at rest or listening, his legs and arms
seemed to hang almost lifeless, and his face was care-worn and
haggard; but, the moment he began to talk, his face lightened up,
his tall form, as it were, unfolded, and he was the very
impersonation of good-humor and fellowship.  The last words I
recall as addressed to me were that he would feel better when I was
back at Goldsboro'.  We parted at the gangway of the River Queen,
about noon of March 28th, and I never saw him again.  Of all the
men I ever met, he seemed to possess more of the elements of
greatness, combined with goodness, than any other.



ADMIRAL PORTER'S ACCOUNT OF THE INTERVIEW WITH
Mr. LINCOLN.

The day of General Sherman's arrival at City Point (I think the
27th of March, 1866), I accompanied him and General Grant on board
the President's flagship, the Queen, where the President received
us in the upper saloon, no one but ourselves being present.

The President was in an exceedingly pleasant mood, and delighted to
meet General Sherman, whom he cordially greeted.

It seems that this was the first time he had met Sherman, to
remember him, since the beginning of the war, and did not remember
when he had seen him before, until the general reminded him of the
circumstances of their first meeting.

This was rather singular on the part of Mr. Lincoln, who was, I
think, remarkable for remembering people, having that kingly
quality in an eminent degree.  Indeed, such was the power of his
memory, that he seemed never to forget the most minute
circumstance.

The conversation soon turned on the events of Sherman's campaign
through the South, with every movement of which the President
seemed familiar.

He laughed over some of the stories Sherman told of his "bummers,"
and told others in return, which illustrated in a striking manner
the ideas he wanted to convey.  For example, he would often express
his wishes by telling an apt story, which was quite a habit with
him, and one that I think he adopted to prevent his committing
himself seriously.

The interview between the two generals and the President lasted
about an hour and a half, and, as it was a remarkable one, I jotted
down what I remembered of the conversation, as I have made a
practice of doing during the rebellion, when any thing interesting
occurred.

I don't regret having done so, as circumstances afterward occurred
(Stanton's ill conduct toward Sherman) which tended to cast odium
on General Sherman for allowing such liberal terms to Jos.
Johnston.

Could the conversation that occurred on board the Queen, between
the President and General Sherman, have been known, Sherman would
not, and could not, have been censored.  Mr. Lincoln, had he lived,
would have acquitted the general of any blame, for he was only
carrying out the President's wishes.

My opinion is, that Mr. Lincoln came down to City Point with the
most liberal views toward the rebels.  He felt confident that we
would be successful, and was willing that the enemy should
capitulate on the most favorable terms.

I don't know what the President would have done had he been left to
himself, and had our army been unsuccessful, but he was than
wrought up to a high state of excitement.  He wanted peace on
almost any terms, and there is no knowing what proposals he might
have been willing to listen to.  His heart was tenderness
throughout, and, as long as the rebels laid down their arms, he did
not care how it was done.  I do not know how far he was influenced
by General Grant, but I presume, from their long conferences, that
they must have understood each other perfectly, and that the terms
given to Lee after his surrender were authorized by Mr. Lincoln.  I
know that the latter was delighted when he heard that they had been
given, and exclaimed, a dozen times, "Good!"  "All right!"
"Exactly the thing!" and other similar expressions.  Indeed, the
President more than once told me what he supposed the terms would
be: if Lee and Johnston surrendered, he considered the war ended,
and that all the other rebel forces world lay down their arms at
once.

In this he proved to be right.  Grant and Sherman were both of the
same opinion, and so was everyone else who knew anything about the
matter.

What signified the terms to them, so long as we obtained the actual
surrender of people who only wanted a good opportunity to give up
gracefully?  The rebels had fought "to the last ditch," and all
that they had left them was the hope of being handed down in
history as having received honorable terms.

After hearing General Sherman's account of his own position, and
that of Johnston, at that time, the President expressed fears that
the rebel general would escape south again by the railroads, and
that General Sherman would have to chase him anew, over the same
ground; but the general pronounced this to be impracticable.  He
remarked: "I have him where he cannot move without breaking up his
army, which, once disbanded, can never again be got together; and I
have destroyed the Southern railroads, so that they cannot be used
again for a long time."  General Grant remarked, "What is to
prevent their laying the rails again?"  "Why," said General
Sherman, "my bummers  don't do things by halves.  Every rail, after
having been placed over a hot fire, has been twisted as crooked as
a ram's-horn, and they never can be used again."

This was the only remark made by General Grant during the
interview, as he sat smoking a short distance from the President,
intent, no doubt, on his own plans, which were being brought to a
successful termination.

The conversation between the President and General Sherman, about
the terms of surrender to be allowed Jos. Johnston, continued.
Sherman energetically insisted that he could command his own terms,
and that Johnston would have to yield to his demands; but the
President was very decided about the matter, and insisted that the
surrender of Johnston's army most be obtained on any terms.

General Grant was evidently of the same way of thinking, for,
although he did not join in the conversation to any extent, yet he
made no objections, and I presume had made up his mind to allow the
best terms himself.

He was also anxious that Johnston should not be driven into
Richmond, to reenforce the rebels there, who, from behind their
strong intrenchments, would have given us incalculable trouble.

Sherman, as a subordinate officer, yielded his views to those of
the President, and the terms of capitulation between himself and
Johnston were exactly in accordance with Mr. Lincoln's wishes.  He
could not have done any thing which would have pleased the
President better.

Mr. Lincoln did, in fact, arrange the (so considered) liberal terms
offered General Jos. Johnston, and, whatever may have been General
Sherman's private views, I feel sure that he yielded to the wishes
of the President in every respect.  It was Mr. Lincoln's policy
that was carried out, and, had he lived long enough, he would have
been but too glad to have acknowledged it.  Had Mr. Lincoln lived,
Secretary Stanton would have issued no false telegraphic
dispatches, in the hope of killing off another general in the
regular army, one who by his success had placed himself in the way
of his own succession.

The disbanding of Jos. Johnston's army was so complete, that the
pens and ink used in the discussion of the matter were all wasted.

It was asserted, by the rabid ones, that General Sherman had given
up all that we had been fighting for, had conceded every thing to
Jos. Johnston, and had, as the boys say, "knocked the fat into the
fire;" but sober reflection soon overruled these harsh expressions,
and, with those who knew General Sherman, and appreciated him, he
was still the great soldier, patriot, and gentleman.  In future
times this matter will be looked at more calmly and
dispassionately.  The bitter animosities that have been engendered
during the rebellion will have died out for want of food on which
to live, and the very course Grant, Sherman, and others pursued, in
granting liberal terms to the defeated rebels, will be applauded.
The fact is, they met an old beggar in the road, whose crutches had
broken from under him: they let him have only the broken crutches
to get home with!

I sent General Sherman back to Newbern, North Carolina, in the
steamer Bat.

While he was absent from his command he was losing no time, for be
was getting his army fully equipped with stores and clothing; and,
when he returned, he had a rested and regenerated army, ready to
swallow up Jos. Johnston and all his ragamuffins.

Johnston was cornered, could not move without leaving every thing
behind him, and could not go to Richmond without bringing on a
famine in that destitute city.

I was with Mr. Lincoln all the time he was at City Point, and until
be left for Washington.  He was more than delighted with the
surrender of Lee, and with the terms Grant gave the rebel general;
and would have given Jos. Johnston twice as much, had the latter
asked for it, and could he have been certain that the rebel world
have surrendered without a fight.  I again repeat that, had Mr.
Lincoln lived, he would have shouldered all the responsibility.

One thing is certain: had Jos. Johnston escaped and got into
Richmond, and caused a larger list of killed and wounded than we
had, General Sherman would have been blamed.  Then why not give him
the full credit of capturing on the best terms the enemy's last
important army and its best general, and putting an end to the
rebellion

It was a finale worthy of Sherman's great march through the swamps
and deserts of the South, a march not excelled by any thing we read
of in modern military history.

D. D. PORTER, Vice-Admiral.

(Written by the admiral in 1866, at the United States Naval Academy
at Annapolis, Md., and mailed to General Sherman at St. Louis, Mo.)


As soon as possible, I arranged with General Grant for certain
changes in the organization of my army; and the general also
undertook to send to North Carolina some tug-boat and barges to
carry stores from Newbern up as far as Kinston, whence they could
be hauled in wagons to our camps, thus relieving our railroads to
that extent.  I undertook to be ready to march north by April 10th,
and then embarked on the steamer Bat, Captain Barnes, for North
Carolina.  We steamed down James River, and at Old Point Comfort
took on board my brother, Senator Sherman, and Mr. Edwin Stanton,
son of the Secretary of War, and proceeded at once to our
destination.  On our way down the river, Captain Barnes expressed
himself extremely obliged to me for taking his vessel, as it had
relieved him of a most painful dilemma.  He explained that he had
been detailed by Admiral Porter to escort the President's unarmed
boat, the River Queen, in which capacity it became his special duty
to look after Mrs. Lincoln.  The day before my arrival at City
Point, there had been a grand review of a part of the Army of the
James, then commanded by General Ord.  The President rode out from
City Point with General Grant on horseback, accompanied by a
numerous staff, including Captain Barnes and Mrs. Ord; but Mrs.
Lincoln and Mrs. Grant had followed in a carriage.

The cavalcade reached the review-ground some five or six miles out
from City Point, found the troops all ready, drawn up in line, and
after the usual presentation of arms, the President and party,
followed by Mrs. Ord and Captain Barnes on horseback, rode the
lines, and returned to the reviewing stand, which meantime had been
reached by Mrs. Lincoln and Mrs. Grant in their carriage, which had
been delayed by the driver taking a wrong road.  Mrs. Lincoln,
seeing Mrs. Ord and Captain Barnes riding with the retinue, and
supposing that Mrs. Ord had personated her, turned on Captain
Barnes and gave him a fearful scolding; and even indulged in some
pretty sharp upbraidings to Mrs. Ord.

This made Barne's position very unpleasant, so that he felt much
relieved when he was sent with me to North Carolina.  The Bat was
very fast, and on the morning of the 29th we were near Cape
Hatteras; Captain Barnes, noticing a propeller coming out of
Hatteras Inlet, made her turn back and pilot us in.  We entered
safely, steamed up Pamlico Sound into Neuse River, and the next
morning,--by reason of some derangement of machinery, we anchored
about seven miles below Newbern, whence we went up in Captain
Barnes's barge.  As soon as we arrived at Newbern, I telegraphed up
to General Schofield at Goldsboro' the fact of my return, and that
I had arranged with General Grant for the changes made necessary in
the reorganization of the army, and for the boats necessary to
carry up the provisions and stores we needed, prior to the renewal
of our march northward.

These changes amounted to constituting the left wing a distinct
army, under the title of "the Army of Georgia," under command of
General Slocum, with his two corps commanded by General Jeff. C.
Davis and General Joseph A. Mower; the Tenth and Twenty-third Corps
already constituted another army, "of the Ohio," under the command
of Major-General Schofield, and his two corps were commanded by
Generals J. D. Cox and A. H. Terry.  These changes were necessary,
because army commanders only could order courts-martial, grant
discharges, and perform many other matters of discipline and
administration which were indispensable; but my chief purpose was
to prepare the whole army for what seemed among the probabilities
of the time--to fight both Lee's and Johnston's armies combined, in
case their junction could be formed before General Grant could
possibly follow Lee to North Carolina.

General George H. Thomas, who still remained at Nashville, was not
pleased with these changes, for the two corps with General Slocum,
viz., the Fourteenth and Twentieth, up to that time, had remained
technically a part of his "Army of the Cumberland;" but he was so
far away, that I had to act to the best advantage with the troops
and general officers actually present.  I had specially asked for
General Mower to command the Twentieth Corps, because I regarded
him as one of the boldest and best fighting generals in the whole
army.  His predecessor, General A. S. Williams, the senior division
commander present, had commanded the corps well from Atlanta to
Goldsboro', and it may have seemed unjust to replace him at that
precise moment; but I was resolved to be prepared for a most
desperate and, as then expected, a final battle, should it fall on
me.

I returned to Goldsboro' from Newbern by rail the evening of March
30th, and at once addressed myself to the task of reorganization
and replenishment of stores, so as to be ready to march by April
10th, the day agreed on with General Grant.

The army was divided into the usual three parts, right and left
wings, and centre.  The tabular statements herewith will give the
exact composition of these separate armies, which by the 10th of
April gave the following effective strength:


        Infantry ................... 80,968
        Artillery ..................  2,448
        Cavalry ....................  5,587

              Aggregate ............ 88,948
        Total number of guns, 91


The railroads to our rear had also been repaired, so that stores
were arriving very fast, both from Morehead City and Wilmington.
The country was so level that a single locomotive could haul
twenty-five and thirty cars to a train, instead of only ten, as was
the case in Tennessee and Upper Georgia.

By the 5th of April such progress had been made, that I issued the
following Special Field Orders, No. 48, prescribing the time and
manner of the next march


[Special Field Orders, No. 48.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, April 5, 1865.

Confidential to Army Commanders, Corps Commanders, and Chiefs of
Staff Departments:

The next grand objective is to place this army (with its full
equipment) north of Roanoke River, facing west, with a base for
supplies at Norfolk, and at Winton or Murfreesboro' on the Chowan,
and in full communication with the Army of the Potomac, about
Petersburg; and also to do the enemy as much harm as possible en
route:

1.  To accomplish this result the following general plan will be
followed, or modified only by written orders from these
headquarters, should events require a change:

(1.) On Monday, the 10th of April, all preparations are presumed to
be complete, and the outlying detachments will be called in, or
given directions to meet on the next march.  All preparations will
also be complete to place the railroad-stock back of Kinston on the
one road, and below the Northeast Branch on the other.

(2.) On Tuesday, the 11th, the columns will draw out on their lines
of march, say, about seven miles, and close up.

(3.) On Wednesday the march will begin in earnest, and will be kept
up at the rate, say, of about twelve miles a day, or according to
the amount of resistance.  All the columns will dress to the left
(which is the exposed flank), and commanders will study always to
find roads by which they can, if necessary, perform a general left
wheel, the wagons to be escorted to some place of security on the
direct route of march.  Foraging and other details may continue as
heretofore, only more caution and prudence should be observed; and
foragers should not go in advance of the advance-guard, but look
more to our right rear for corn, bacon, and meal.

2.  The left wing (Major-General Slocum commanding) will aim
straight for the railroad-bridge near Smithfield; thence along up
the Neuse River to the railroad-bridge over Neuse River, northeast
of Raleigh (Powell's); thence to Warrenton, the general point of
concentration.

The centre (Major-General Schofield commanding) will move to
Whitley's Mill, ready to support the left until it is past
Smithfield, when it will follow up (substantially) Little River to
about Rolesville, ready at all times to move to the support of the
left; after passing Tar River, to move to Warrenton.

The right wing (Major-General Howard commanding), preceded by the
cavalry, will move rapidly on Pikeville and Nahunta, then swing
across to Bulah to Folk's Bridge, ready to make junction with the
other armies in case the enemy offers battle this side of Neuse
River, about Smithfield; thence, in case of no serious opposition
on the left, will work up toward Earpsboro', Andrews, B----, and
Warrenton.

The cavalry (General Kilpatrick commanding), leaving its
encumbrances with the right wing, will push as though straight for
Weldon, until the enemy is across Tar River, and that bridge
burned; then it will deflect toward Nashville and Warrenton,
keeping up communication with general headquarters.

3.  As soon as the army starts, the chief-quartermaster and
commissary will prepare a resupply of stores at some point on
Pamlico or Albemarle Sounds, ready to be conveyed to Kinston or
Winton and Murfreesboro', according to developments.  As soon as
they have satisfactory information that the army is north of the
Roanoke, they will forthwith establish a depot at Winton, with a
sub-depot at Murfreesboro'.  Major-General Schofield will hold, as
heretofore, Wilmington (with the bridge across Northern Branch as
an outpost), Newborn (and Kinston as its outpost), and will be
prepared to hold Winton and Murfreesboro' as soon as the time
arrives for that move.  The navy has instructions from Admiral
Porter to cooperate, and any commanding officer is authorized to
call on the navy for assistance and cooperation, always in writing,
setting forth the reasons, of which necessarily the naval
commander must be the judge.

4.  The general-in-chief will be with the centre habitually, but
may in person shift to either flank where his presence may be
needed, leaving a staff-officer to receive reports.  He requires,
absolutely, a report of each army or grand detachment each night,
whether any thing material has occurred or not, for often the
absence of an enemy is a very important fact in military
prognostication.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.


But the whole problem became suddenly changed by the news of the
fall of Richmond and Petersburg, which reached as at Goldsboro', on
the 6th of April.  The Confederate Government, with Lee's army, had
hastily abandoned Richmond, fled in great disorder toward Danville,
and General Grant's whole army was in close pursuit.  Of course, I
inferred that General Lee would succeed in making junction with
General Johnston, with at least a fraction of his army, somewhere
to my front.  I at once altered the foregoing orders, and prepared
on the day appointed, viz., April 10th, to move straight on
Raleigh, against the army of General Johnston, known to be at
Smithfield, and supposed to have about thirty-five thousand men.
Wade Hampton's cavalry was on his left front and Wheeler's on his
right front, simply watching us and awaiting our initiative.
Meantime the details of the great victories in Virginia came thick
and fast, and on the 8th I received from General Grant this
communication, in the form of a cipher-dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865


Major-General SHERMAN, Goldsboro', North Carolina:

All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danville
with the remnant of his force.  Sheridan, who was up with him last
night, reports all that is left with him--horse, foot, and
dragoons--at twenty thousand, much demoralized.  We hope to reduce
this number one-half.  I will push on to Burkesville, and, if a
stand is made at Danville, will, in a very few days, go there.  If
you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see
if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies.
Whether it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro' or
nearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when you
receive this.  Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to
strike at.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


I answered immediately that we would move on the 10th, prepared to
follow Johnston wherever he might go.  Promptly on Monday morning,
April 10th, the army moved straight on Smithfield; the right wing
making a circuit by the right, and the left wing, supported by the
centre, moving on the two direct roads toward Raleigh, distant
fifty miles.  General Terry's and General Kilpatrick's troops moved
from their positions on the south or west bank of the Neuse River
in the same general direction, by Cox's Bridge.  On the 11th we
reached Smithfield, and found it abandoned by Johnston's army,
which had retreated hastily on Raleigh, burning the bridges.  To
restore these consumed the remainder of the day, and during that
night I received a message from General Grant, at Appomattox, that
General Lee had surrendered to him his whole army, which I at once
announced to the troops in orders:


[Special Field Orders, No.  54]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, SMITHFIELD, NORTH CAROLINA, April 12, 1865.

The general commanding announces to the army that he has official
notice from General Grant that General Lee surrendered to him his
entire army, on the 9th inst., at Appomattox Court-House, Virginia.

Glory to God and our country, and all honor to our comrades in
arms, toward whom we are marching!

A little more labor, a little more toil on our part, the great race
is won, and our Government stands regenerated, after four long
years of war.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


Of course, this created a perfect furore, of rejoicing, and we all
regarded the war as over, for I knew well that General Johnston had
no army with which to oppose mine.  So that the only questions that
remained were, would he surrender at Raleigh?  or would he allow
his army to disperse into guerrilla bands, to "die in the last
ditch," and entail on his country an indefinite and prolonged
military occupation, and of consequent desolation?  I knew well
that Johnston's army could not be caught; the country was too open;
and, without wagons, the men could escape us, disperse, and
assemble again at some place agreed on, and thus the war might be
prolonged indefinitely.

I then remembered Mr. Lincoln's repeated expression that he wanted
the rebel soldiers not only defeated, but "back at their homes,
engaged in their civil pursuits."  On the evening of the 12th I was
with the head of Slocum's column, at Gulley's, and General
Kilpatrick's cavalry was still ahead, fighting Wade Hampton's
rear-guard, with orders to push it through Raleigh, while I would
give a more southerly course to the infantry columns, so as, if
possible, to prevent a retreat southward.  On the 13th, early, I
entered Raleigh, and ordered the several heads of column toward
Ashville in the direction of Salisbury or Charlotte.  Before
reaching Raleigh, a locomotive came down the road to meet me,
passing through both Wade Hampton's and Kilpatrick's cavalry,
bringing four gentlemen, with a letter from Governor Vance to me,
asking protection for the citizens of Raleigh.  These gentlemen
were, of course, dreadfully excited at the dangers through which
they had passed.  Among them were ex-Senator Graham, Mr. Swain,
president of Chapel Hill University, and a Surgeon Warren, of the
Confederate army.  They had come with a flag of truce, to which
they were not entitled; still, in the interest of peace, I
respected it, and permitted them to return to Raleigh with their
locomotive, to assure the Governor and the people that the war was
substantially over, and that I wanted the civil authorities to
remain in the execution of their office till the pleasure of the
President could be ascertained.  On reaching Raleigh I found these
same gentlemen, with Messrs. Badger, Bragg, Holden, and others, but
Governor Vance had fled, and could not be prevailed on to return,
because he feared an arrest and imprisonment.  From the Raleigh
newspapers of the 10th I learned that General Stoneman, with his
division of cavalry, had come across the mountains from East
Tennessee, had destroyed the railroad at Salisbury, and was then
supposed to be approaching Greensboro'.  I also learned that
General Wilson's cavalry corps was "smashing things" down about
Selma and Montgomery, Alabama, and was pushing for Columbus and
Macon, Georgia; and I also had reason to expect that General
Sheridan would come down from Appomattox to join us at Raleigh with
his superb cavalry corps.  I needed more cavalry to check
Johnston's retreat, so that I could come up to him with my
infantry, and therefore had good reason to delay.  I ordered the
railroad to be finished up to Raleigh, so that I could operate from
it as a base, and then made:


[Special Field Orders, No. 55]


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD,
RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 14, 1865.

The next movement will be on Ashboro', to turn the position of the
enemy at the "Company's Shops" in rear of Haw River Bridge, and at
Greensboro', and to cut off his only available line of retreat by
Salisbury and Charlotte:

1.  General Kilpatrick will keep up a show of pursuit in the
direction of Hillsboro' and Graham, but be ready to cross Haw River
on General Howard's bridge, near Pittsboro', and thence will
operate toward Greensboro', on the right front of the right wing.

2.  The right wing, Major-General Howard commanding, will move out
on the Chapel Hill road, and send a light division up in the
direction of Chapel Hill University to act in connection with the
cavalry; but the main columns and trains will move via Hackney's
Cross-Roads, and Trader's Hill, Pittsboro', St. Lawrence, etc., to
be followed by the cavalry and light division, as soon as the
bridge is laid over Haw River.

8.  The centre, Major-General Schofield commanding, will move via
Holly Springs, New Hill, Haywood, and Moffitt's Mills.

4.  The left wing, Major-General Slocum commanding, will move
rapidly by the Aven's Ferry road, Carthage, Caledonia, and Cox's
Mills.

5.  All the troops will draw well out on the roads designated
during today and to-morrow, and on the following day will move with
all possible rapidity for Ashboro'.  No further destruction of
railroads, mills, cotton, and produce, will be made without the
specific orders of an army commander, and the inhabitants will be
dealt with kindly, looking to an early reconciliation.  The troops
will be permitted, however, to gather forage and provisions as
heretofore; only more care should be taken not to strip the poorer
classes too closely.

By order of General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.


Thus matters stood, when on the morning of the 14th General
Kilpatrick reported from Durham's Station, twenty-six miles up the
railroad toward Hillsboro', that a flag of truce had come in from
the enemy with a package from General Johnston addressed to me.
Taking it for granted that this was preliminary to a surrender, I
ordered the message to be sent me at Raleigh, and on the 14th
received from General Johnston a letter dated April 13, 1865, in
these words:


The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed the
relative military condition of the belligerents.  I am, therefore,
induced to address you in this form the inquiry whether, to stop
the further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are
willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and to
communicate to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding the armies of
the United States, the request that he will take like action in
regard to other armies, the object being to permit the civil
authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the
existing war.


To which I replied as follows:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 14, 1865.

General J. E. JOHNSTON, commanding Confederate Army.

GENERAL: I have this moment received your communication of this
date.  I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for the
suspension of farther hostilities between the armies commanded by
you and those commanded by myself, and will be willing to confer
with you to that end.  I will limit the advance of my main column,
to-morrow, to Morrisville, and the cavalry to the university, and
expect that you will also maintain the present position of your
forces until each has notice of a failure to agree.

That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the same
terms and conditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee at
Appomattox Court-House, on the 9th instant, relative to our two
armies; and, furthermore, to obtain from General Grant an order to
suspend the movements of any troops from the direction of Virginia.
General Stoneman is under my command, and my order will suspend any
devastation or destruction contemplated by him.  I will add that I
really desire to save the people of North Carolina the damage they
would sustain by the march of this army through the central or
western parts of the State.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


I sent my aide-de-camp, Colonel McCoy, up to Durham's Station with
this letter, with instructions to receive the answer, to telegraph
its contents back to me at Raleigh, and to arrange for an
interview.  On the 16th I received a reply from General Johnston,
agreeing to meet me the next day at a point midway between our
advance at Durham and his rear at Hillsboro'.  I ordered a car and
locomotive to be prepared to convey me up to Durham's at eight
o'clock of the morning of April 17th.  Just as we were entering the
car, the telegraph-operator, whose office was up-stairs in the
depot-building, ran down to me and said that he was at that instant
of time receiving a most important dispatch in cipher from Morehead
City, which I ought to see.  I held the train for nearly half an
hour, when he returned with the message translated and written out.
It was from Mr. Stanton, announcing the assassination of Mr.
Lincoln, the attempt on the life of  Mr. Seward and son, and a
suspicion that a like fate was designed for General Grant and all
the principal officers of the Government.  Dreading the effect of
such a message at that critical instant of time, I asked the
operator if any one besides himself had seen it; he answered No!
I then bade him not to reveal the contents by word or look till I
came back, which I proposed to do the same afternoon.  The train
then started, and, as we passed Morris's Station, General Logan,
commanding the Fifteenth Corps, came into my car, and I told him I
wanted to see him on my return, as I had something very important
to communicate.  He knew I was going to meet General Johnston, and
volunteered to say that he hoped I would succeed in obtaining his
surrender, as the whole army dreaded the long march to Charlotte
(one hundred and seventy-five miles), already begun, but which had
been interrupted by the receipt of General Johnston's letter of the
13th.  We reached Durham's, twenty-six miles, about 10 a.m., where
General Kilpatrick had a squadron of cavalry drawn up to receive
me.  We passed into the house in which he had his headquarters, and
soon after mounted some led horses, which he had prepared for
myself and staff.  General Kilpatrick sent a man ahead with a white
flag, followed by a small platoon, behind which we rode, and were
followed by the rest of the escort.  We rode up the Hillsboro' road
for about five miles, when our flag bearer discovered another
coming to meet him: They met, and word was passed back to us that
General Johnston was near at hand, when we rode forward and met
General Johnston on horseback, riding side by side with General
Wade Hampton.  We shook hands, and introduced our respective
attendants.  I asked if there was a place convenient where we could
be private, and General Johnston said he had passed a small
farmhouse a short distance back, when we rode back to it together
side by side, our staff-officers and escorts following.  We had
never met before, though we had been in the regular army together
for thirteen years; but it so happened that we had never before
come
together.  He was some twelve or more years my senior; but we knew
enough of each other to be well acquainted at once.  We soon
reached the house of a Mr. Bennett, dismounted, and left our horses
with orderlies in the road.  Our officers, on foot, passed into the
yard, and General Johnston and I entered the small frame-house.  We
asked the farmer if we could have the use of his house for a few
minutes, and he and his wife withdrew into a smaller log-house,
which stood close by.

As soon as we were alone together I showed him the dispatch
announcing Mr. Lincoln's assassination, and watched him closely.
The perspiration came out in large drops on his forehead, and he
did not attempt to conceal his distress.  He denounced the act as a
disgrace to the age, and hoped I did not charge it to the
Confederate Government.  I told him I could not believe that he or
General Lee, or the officers of the Confederate army, could
possibly be privy to acts of assassination; but I would not say as
much for Jeff. Davis, George Sanders, and men of that stripe.  We
talked about the effect of this act on the country at large and on
the armies, and he realized that it made my situation extremely
delicate.  I explained to him that I had not yet revealed the news
to my own personal staff or to the army, and that I dreaded the
effect when made known in Raleigh.  Mr. Lincoln was peculiarly
endeared to the soldiers, and I feared that some foolish woman or
man in Raleigh might say something or do something that would
madden our men, and that a fate worse than that of Columbia would
befall the place.

I then told Johnston that he must be convinced that he could not
oppose my army, and that, since Lee had surrendered, he could do
the same with honor and propriety.  He plainly and repeatedly
admitted this, and added that any further fighting would be
"murder;" but he thought that, instead of surrendering piecemeal,
we might arrange terms that would embrace all the Confederate
armies.  I asked him if he could control other armies than his own;
he said, not then, but intimated that he could procure authority
from Mr. Davis.  I then told him that I had recently had an
interview with General Grant and President Lincoln, and that I was
possessed of their views; that with them and the people North there
seemed to be no vindictive feeling against the Confederate armies,
but there was against Davis and his political adherents; and that
the terms that General Grant had given to General Lee's army were
certainly most generous and liberal.  All this he admitted, but
always recurred to the idea of a universal surrender, embracing his
own army, that of Dick Taylor in Louisiana and Texas, and of Maury,
Forrest, and others, in Alabama and Georgia.  General Johnston's
account of our interview in his "Narrative" (page 402, et seq.) is
quite accurate and correct, only I do not recall his naming the
capitulation of Loeben, to which he refers.  Our conversation was
very general and extremely cordial, satisfying me that it could
have but one result, and that which we all desired, viz., to end
the war as quickly as possible; and, being anxious to return to
Raleigh before the news of Mr. Lincoln's assassination could be
divulged, on General Johnston's saying that he thought that, during
the night, he could procure authority to act in the name of all the
Confederate armies in existence we agreed to meet again the next
day at noon at the same place, and parted, he for Hillsboro' and I
for Raleigh.

We rode back to Durham's Station in the order we had come, and then
I showed the dispatch announcing Mr. Lincoln's death.  I cautioned
the officers to watch the soldiers closely, to prevent any violent
retaliation by them, leaving that to the Government at Washington;
and on our way back to Raleigh in the cars I showed the same
dispatch to General Logan and to several of the officers of the
Fifteenth Corps that were posted at Morrisville and Jones's
Station, all of whom were deeply impressed by it; but all gave
their opinion that this sad news should not change our general
course of action.

As soon as I reached Raleigh I published the following orders to
the army, announcing the assassination of the President, and I
doubt if, in the whole land, there were more sincere mourners over
his sad fate than were then in and about Raleigh.  I watched the
effect closely, and was gratified that there was no single act of
retaliation; though I saw and felt that one single word by me would
have laid the city in ashes, and turned its whole population
houseless upon the country, if not worse:

[Special Field Orders, No.  56.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 17, 1865.

The general commanding announces, with pain and sorrow, that on the
evening of the 14th instant, at the theatre in Washington city, his
Excellency the President of the United States, Mr. Lincoln, was
assassinated by one who uttered the State motto of Virginia.  At
the same time, the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, while suffering
from a broken arm, was also stabbed by another murderer in his own
house, but still survives, and his son was wounded, supposed
fatally.  It is believed, by persons capable of judging, that other
high officers were designed to share the same fate.  Thus it seems
that our enemy, despairing of meeting us in open, manly warfare,
begins to resort to the assassin's tools.

Your general does not wish you to infer that this is universal, for
he knows that the great mass of the Confederate army world scorn to
sanction each acts, but he believes it the legitimate consequence
of rebellion against rightful authority.

We have met every phase which this war has assumed, and must now be
prepared for it in its last and worst shape, that of assassins and
guerrillas; but woe onto the people who seek to expend their wild
passions in such a manner, for there is but one dread result!

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L.  M.  DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.


During the evening of the 17th and morning of the 18th I saw nearly
all the general officers of the army (Schofield, Slocum, Howard,
Logan, Blair), and we talked over the matter of the conference at
Bennett's house of the day before, and, without exception, all
advised me to agree to some terms, for they all dreaded the long
and harassing march in pursuit of a dissolving and fleeing army--
a march that might carry us back again over the thousand miles that
we had just accomplished.  We all knew that if we could bring
Johnston's army to bay, we could destroy it in an hour, but that
was simply impossible in the country in which we found ourselves.
We discussed all the probabilities, among which was, whether, if
Johnston made a point of it, I should assent to the escape from the
country of Jeff. Davis and his fugitive cabinet; and some one of my
general officers, either Logan or Blair, insisted that, if asked
for, we should even provide a vessel to carry them to Nassau from
Charleston.

The next morning I again started in the cars to Durham's Station,
accompanied by most of my personal staff, and by Generals Blair,
Barry, Howard, etc., and, reaching General Kilpatrick's
headquarters at Durham's, we again mounted, and rode, with the same
escort of the day, before, to Bennett's house, reaching there
punctually at noon.  General Johnston had not yet arrived, but a
courier shortly came, and reported him as on the way.  It must have
been nearly 2 p.m.  when he arrived, as before, with General Wade
Hampton.  He had halted his escort out of sight, and we again
entered Bennett's house, and I closed the door.  General Johnston
then assured me that he had authority over all the Confederate
armies, so that they would obey his orders to surrender on the same
terms with his own, but he argued that, to obtain so cheaply this
desirable result, I ought to give his men and officers some
assurance of their political rights after their surrender.  I
explained to him that Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of amnesty, of
December 8, 1863, still in force; enabled every Confederate soldier
and officer, below the rank of colonel, to obtain an absolute
pardon, by simply laying down his arms, and taking the common oath
of allegiance, and that General Grant, in accepting the surrender
of General Lee's army, had extended the same principle to all the
officers, General Lee included; such a pardon, I understood, would
restore to them all their rights of citizenship.  But he insisted
that the officers and men of the Confederate army were
unnecessarily alarmed about this matter, as a sort of bugbear.  He
then said that Mr. Breckenridge was near at hand, and he thought
that it would be well for him to be present.  I objected, on the
score that he was then in Davis's cabinet, and our negotiations
should be confined strictly to belligerents.  He then said
Breckenridge was a major-general in the Confederate army, and might
sink his character of Secretary of War.  I consented, and he sent
one of his staff-officers back, who soon returned with
Breckenridge, and he entered the room.  General Johnston and I then
again went over the whole ground, and Breckenridge confirmed what
he had said as to the uneasiness of the Southern officers and
soldiers about their political rights in case of surrender.  While
we were in consultation, a messenger came with a parcel of papers,
which General Johnston said were from Mr. Reagan,
Postmaster-General.  He and Breckenridge looked over them, and,
after some side conversation, he handed one of the papers to me.
It was in Reagan's handwriting, and began with a long preamble and
terms, so general and verbose, that I said they were inadmissible.
Then recalling the conversation of Mr. Lincoln, at City Point, I
sat down at the table, and wrote off the terms, which I thought
concisely expressed his views and wishes, and explained that I was
willing to submit these terms to the new President, Mr. Johnson,
provided that both armies should remain in statu quo until the
truce therein declared should expire.  I had full faith that
General Johnston would religiously respect the truce, which he did;
and that I would be the gainer, for in the few days it would take
to send the papers to Washington, and receive an answer, I could
finish the railroad up to Raleigh, and be the better prepared for a
long chase.

Neither Mr. Breckenridge nor General Johnston wrote one word of
that paper.  I wrote it myself, and announced it as the best I
could do, and they readily assented.

While copies of this paper were being made for signature, the
officers of our staffs commingled in the yard at Bennett's house,
and were all presented to Generals Johnston and Breckenridge.  All
without exception were rejoiced that the war was over, and that in
a very few days we could turn our faces toward home.  I remember
telling Breckenridge that he had better get away, as the feeling of
our people was utterly hostile to the political element of the
South, and to him especially, because he was the Vice-President of
the United States, who had as such announced Mr. Lincoln, of
Illinois, duly and properly elected the President of the United
States, and yet that he had afterward openly rebelled and taken up
arms against the Government.  He answered me that he surely would
give us no more trouble, and intimated that he would speedily leave
the country forever.  I may have also advised him that Mr. Davis
too should get abroad as soon as possible.

The papers were duly signed; we parted about dark, and my party
returned to Raleigh.  Early the next morning, April 19th, I
dispatched by telegraph to Morehead City to prepare a fleet-steamer
to carry a messenger to Washington, and sent Major Henry Hitchcock
down by rail, bearing the following letters, and agreement with
General Johnston, with instructions to be very careful to let
nothing escape him to the greedy newspaper correspondents, but to
submit his papers to General Halleck, General Grant, or the
Secretary of War, and to bring me back with all expedition their
orders and instructions.

On their face they recited that I had no authority to make final
terms involving civil or political questions, but that I submitted
them to the proper quarter in Washington for their action; and the
letters fully explained that the military situation was such that
the delay was an advantage to us.  I cared little whether they were
approved, modified, or disapproved in toto; only I wanted
instructions.  Many of my general officers, among whom, I am almost
positive, were Generals Logan and Blair, urged me to accept the
"terms," without reference at all to Washington, but I preferred
the latter course:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD,
RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 18, 1886.

General H.  W.  HALLECK, Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I received your dispatch describing the man Clark,
detailed to assassinate me.  He had better be in a hurry, or he
will be too late.

The news of Mr. Lincoln's death produced a most intense effect on
our troops.  At first I feared it would lead to excesses; but now
it has softened down, and can easily be guided.  None evinced more
feeling than General Johnston, who admitted that the act was
calculated to stain his cause with a dark hue; and he contended
that the loss was most serious to the South, who had begun to
realize that Mr. Lincoln was the best friend they had.

I cannot believe that even Mr. Davis was privy to the diabolical
plot, but think it the emanation of a set of young men of the
South, who are very devils.  I want to throw upon the South the
care of this class of men, who will soon be as obnoxious to their
industrial classes as to us.

Had I pushed Johnston's army to an extremity, it would have
dispersed, and done infinite mischief.  Johnston informed me that
General Stoneman had been at Salisbury, and was now at Statesville.
I have sent him orders to come to me.

General Johnston also informed me that General Wilson was at
Columbia, Georgia, and he wanted me to arrest his progress.  I leave
that to you.

Indeed, if the President sanctions my agreement with Johnston, our
interest is to cease all destruction.

Please give all orders necessary according to the views the
Executive may take, and influence him, if possible, not to vary the
terms at all, for I have considered every thing, and believe that,
the Confederate armies once dispersed, we can adjust all else
fairly and well.  I am, yours, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 18, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, or Major-General HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I inclose herewith a copy of an agreement made this day
between General Joseph E. Johnston and myself, which, if approved
by the President of the United States, will produce peace from the
Potomac to the Rio Grande.  Mr. Breckenridge was present at our
conference, in the capacity of major-general, and satisfied me of
the ability of General Johnston to carry out to their full extent
the terms of this agreement; and if you will get the President to
simply indorse the copy, and commission me to carry out the terms,
I will follow them to the conclusion.

You will observe that it is an absolute submission of the enemy to
the lawful authority of the United States, and disperses his armies
absolutely; and the point to which I attach most importance is,
that the dispersion and disbandment of these armies is done in such
a manner as to prevent their breaking up into guerrilla bands.  On
the other hand, we can retain just as much of an army as we please.
I agreed to the mode and manner of the surrender of arms set forth,
as it gives the States the means of repressing guerrillas, which we
could not expect them to do if we stripped them of all arms.

Both Generals Johnston and Breckenridge admitted that slavery was
dead, and I could not insist on embracing it in such a paper,
because it can be made with the States in detail.  I know that all
the men of substance South sincerely want peace, and I do not
believe they will resort to war again during this century.  I have
no doubt that they will in the future be perfectly subordinate to
the laws of the United States.  The moment my action in this matter
is approved, I can spare five corps, and will ask for orders to
leave General Schofield here with the Tenth Corps, and to march
myself with the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, and
Twenty-third Corps via Burkesville and Gordonsville to Frederick or
Hagerstown, Maryland, there to be paid and mustered out.

The question of finance is now the chief one, and every soldier and
officer not needed should be got home at work.  I would like to be
able to begin the march north by May 1st.

I urge, on the part of the President, speedy action, as it is
important to get the Confederate armies to their homes as well as
our own.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


Memorandum, or Basis of agreement, made this 18th day of April, A.
D.  1865, near Durham's Station, in the State of North Carolina, by
and between General Joseph E. JOHNSTON, commanding the Confederate
Army, and Major-General William T. SHERMAN, commanding the army of
the United States in North Carolina, both present:

1.  The contending armies now in the field to maintain the statu
quo until notice is given by the commanding general of any one to
its opponent, and reasonable time--say, forty-eight hours--allowed.

2.  The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and
conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their
arms and public property in the State Arsenal; and each officer and
man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and
to abide the action of the State and Federal authority.  The number
of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the Chief of
Ordnance at Washington City, subject to the future action of the
Congress of the United States, and, in the mean time, to be needed
solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States
respectively.

3.  The recognition, by the Executive of the United States, of the
several State governments, on their officers and Legislatures
taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the United
States, and, where conflicting State governments have resulted from
the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme
Court of the United States.

4.  The reestablishment of all the Federal Courts in the several
States, with powers as defined by the Constitution of the United
States and of the States respectively.

5.  The people and inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed,
so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises,
as well as their rights of person sad property, as defined by the
Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

6.  The Executive authority of the Government of the United States
not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long
as they live in peace and quiet, abstain from acts of armed
hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their
residence.

7.  In general terms--the war to cease; a general amnesty, so far
as the Executive of the United States can command, on condition of
the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of the
arms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers and
men hitherto composing said armies.

Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfill
these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to
promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the above
programme.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General,
Commanding Army of the United States in North Carolina.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General,
Commanding Confederate States Army in North Carolina.


Major Hitchcock got off on the morning of the 20th, and I reckoned
that it would take him four or five days to go to Washington and
back.  During that time the repairs on all the railroads and
telegraph-lines were pushed with energy, and we also got possession
of the railroad and telegraph from Raleigh to Weldon, in the
direction of Norfolk.  Meantime the troops remained statu quo, our
cavalry occupying Durham's Station and Chapel Hill.  General
Slocum's head of column was at Aven's Ferry on Cape Fear River, and
General Howard's was strung along the railroad toward Hillsboro';
the rest of the army was in and about Raleigh.

On the 20th I reviewed the Tenth Corps, and was much pleased at the
appearance of General Paines's division of black troops, the first
I had ever seen as a part of an organized army; and on the 21st I
reviewed the Twenty-third Corps, which had been with me to Atlanta,
but had returned to Nashville had formed an essential part of the
army which fought at Franklin, and with which General Thomas had
defeated General Hood in Tennessee.  It had then been transferred
rapidly by rail to Baltimore and Washington by General Grant's
orders, and thence by sea to North Carolina.  Nothing of interest
happened at Raleigh till the evening of April 23d, when Major
Hitchcock reported by telegraph his return to Morehead City, and
that he would come up by rail during the night.  He arrived at 6
a.m., April 24th, accompanied by General Grant and one or two
officers of his staff, who had not telegraphed the fact of their
being on the train, for prudential reasons.  Of course, I was both
surprised and pleased to see the general, soon learned that my
terms with Johnston had been disapproved, was instructed by him to
give the forty-eight hours' notice required by the terms of the
truce, and afterward to proceed to attack or follow him.  I
immediately telegraphed to General Kilpatrick, at Durham's, to have
a mounted courier ready to carry the following message, then on its
way up by rail, to the rebel lines:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 24, 1865 6 A.M.

General JOHNSTON, commanding Confederate Army, Greensboro':

You will take notice that the truce or suspension of hostilities
agreed to between us will cease in forty-eight hours after this is
received at your lines, under the first of the articles of
agreement.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


At the same time I wrote another short note to General Johnston, of
the same date:

I have replies from Washington to my communications of April 18th.
I am instructed to limit my operations to your immediate command,
and not to attempt civil negotiations.  I therefore demand the
surrender of your army on the same terms as were given to General
Lee at Appomattox, April 9th instant, purely and simply.

Of course, both these papers were shown to General Grant at the
time, before they were sent, and he approved of them.

At the same time orders were sent to all parts of the army to be
ready to resume the pursuit of the enemy on the expiration of the
forty-eight hours' truce, and messages were sent to General
Gillmore (at Hilton Head) to the same effect, with instructions to
get a similar message through to General Wilson, at Macon, by some
means.

General Grant had brought with him, from Washington, written
answers from the Secretary of War, and of himself, to my
communications of the 18th, which I still possess, and here give
the originals.  They embrace the copy of a dispatch made by Mr.
Stanton to General Grant, when he was pressing Lee at Appomattox,
which dispatch, if sent me at the same time (as should have been
done), would have saved a world of trouble.  I did not understand
that General Grant had come down to supersede me in command, nor
did he intimate it, nor did I receive these communications as a
serious reproof, but promptly acted on them, as is already shown;
and in this connection I give my answer made to General Grant, at
Raleigh, before I had received any answer from General Johnston to
the demand for the surrender of his own army, as well as my answer
to Mr. Stanton's letter, of the same date, both written on the
supposition that I might have to start suddenly in pursuit of
Johnston, and have no other chance to explain.


WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, April 21, 1865.

Lieutenant-General GRANT.

GENERAL: The memorandum or basis agreed upon between General
Sherman and General Johnston having been submitted to the
President, they are disapproved.  You will give notice of the
disapproval to General Sherman, and direct him to resume
hostilities at the earliest moment.

The instructions given to you by the late President, Abraham
Lincoln, on the 3d of March, by my telegraph of that date,
addressed to you, express substantially the views of President
Andrew Johnson, and will be observed by General Sherman.  A copy is
herewith appended.

The President desires that you proceed immediately to the
headquarters of Major-General Sherman, and direct operations
against the enemy.

Yours truly,

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.


The following telegram was received 2 p.m., City Point, March 4,
1865 (from Washington, 12 M., March 3,1865)

[CIPHER]

OFFICE UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES

Lieutenant-General GRANT:

The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have
no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation
of Lee's army or on solely minor and purely military matters.

He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or
confer upon any political question; such questions the President
holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military
conferences or conventions.

Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C.  April 21, 1865.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: The basis of agreement entered into between yourself and
General J. E. Johnston, for the disbandment of the Southern army,
and the extension of the authority of the General Government over
all the territory belonging to it, sent for the approval of the
President, is received.

I read it carefully myself before submitting it to the President
and Secretary of War, and felt satisfied that it could not possibly
be approved.  My reason for these views I will give you at another
time, in a more extended letter.

Your agreement touches upon questions of such vital importance
that, as soon as read, I addressed a note to the Secretary of War,
notifying him of their receipt, and the importance of immediate
action by the President; and suggested, in view of their
importance, that the entire Cabinet be called together, that all
might give an expression of their opinions upon the matter.  The
result was a disapproval by the President of the basis laid down; a
disapproval of the negotiations altogether except for the surrender
of the army commanded by General Johnston, and directions to me to
notify you of this decision.  I cannot do no better than by sending
you the inclosed copy of a dispatch (penned by the late President,
though signed by the Secretary of War) in answer to me, on sending
a letter received from General Lee, proposing to meet me for the
purpose of submitting the question of peace to a convention of
officers.

Please notify General Johnston, immediately on receipt of this, of
the termination of the truce, and resume hostilities against his
army at the earliest moment you can, acting in good faith.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 25, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, present.

GENERAL: I had the honor to receive your letter of April 21st, with
inclosures, yesterday, and was well pleased that you came along, as
you must have observed that I held the military control so as to
adapt it to any phase the case might assume.

It is but just I should record the fact that I made my terms with
General Johnston under the influence of the liberal terms you
extended to the army of General Lee at Appomattox Court-House on
the 9th, and the seeming policy of our Government, as evinced by
the call of the Virginia Legislature and Governor back to Richmond,
under yours and President Lincoln's very eyes.

It now appears this last act was done without any consultation with
you or any knowledge of Mr. Lincoln, but rather in opposition to a
previous policy well considered.

I have not the least desire to interfere in the civil policy of our
Government, but would shun it as something not to my liking; but
occasions do arise when a prompt seizure of results is forced on
military commanders not in immediate communication with the proper
authority.  It is probable that the terms signed by General
Johnston and myself were not clear enough on the point, well
understood between us, that our negotiations did not apply to any
parties outside the officers and men of the Confederate armies,
which could easily have been remedied.

No surrender of any army not actually at the mercy of an antagonist
was ever made without "terms," and these always define the military
status of the surrendered.  Thus you stipulated that the officers
and men of Lee's army should not be molested at their homes so long
as they obeyed the laws at the place of their residence.

I do not wish to discuss these points involved in our recognition
of the State governments in actual existence, but will merely state
my conclusions, to await the solution of the future.

Such action on our part in no manner recognizes for a moment the
so-called Confederate Government, or makes us liable for its debts
or acts.

The laws and acts done by the several States during the period of
rebellion are void, because done without the oath prescribed by our
Constitution of the United States, which is a "condition
precedent."

We have a right to, use any sort of machinery to produce military
results; and it is the commonest thing for military commanders to
use the civil governments in actual existence as a means to an end.
I do believe we could and can use the present State governments
lawfully, constitutionally, and as the very best possible means to
produce the object desired, viz., entire and complete submission to
the lawful authority of the United States.

As to punishment for past crimes, that is for the judiciary, and
can in no manner of way be disturbed by our acts; and, so far as I
can, I will use my influence that rebels shall suffer all the
personal punishment prescribed by law, as also the civil
liabilities arising from their past acts.

What we now want is the new form of law by which common men may
regain the positions of industry, so long disturbed by the war.

I now apprehend that the rebel armies will disperse; and, instead
of dealing with six or seven States, we will have to deal with
numberless bands of desperadoes, headed by such men as Mosby,
Forrest, Red Jackson, and others, who know not and care not for
danger and its consequences.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 25, 1865.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington.

DEAR SIR: I have been furnished a copy of your letter of April 21st
to General Grant, signifying your disapproval of the terms on which
General Johnston proposed to disarm and disperse the insurgents, on
condition of amnesty, etc.  I admit my folly in embracing in a
military convention any civil matters; but, unfortunately, such is
the nature of our situation that they seem inextricably united, and
I understood from you at Savannah that the financial state of the
country demanded military success, and would warrant a little
bending to policy.

When I had my conference with General Johnston I had the public
examples before me of General Grant's terms to Lee's army, and
General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia Legislature to
assemble at Richmond.

I still believe the General Government of the United States has
made a mistake; but that is none of my business--mine is a
different task; and I had flattered myself that, by four years of
patient, unremitting, and successful labor, I deserved no reminder
such as is contained in the last paragraph of your letter to
General Grant.  You may assure the President that I heed his
suggestion.  I am truly, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

On the same day, but later, I received an answer from General
Johnston, agreeing to meet me again at Bennett's house the next
day, April 26th, at noon.  He did not even know that General Grant
was in Raleigh.

General Grant advised me to meet him, and to accept his surrender
on the same terms as his with General Lee; and on the 26th I again
went up to Durham's Station by rail, and rode out to Bennett's
house, where we again met, and General Johnston, without
hesitation, agreed to, and we executed, the following final terms:


Terms of a Military Convention, entered into this 26th day of
April, 1865, at Bennett's House, near Durham's Station., North
Carolina, between General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, commanding the
Confederate Army, and Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding the
United States Army in North Carolina:

1.  All acts of war on the part of the troops under General
Johnston's command to cease from this date.

2.  All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro',
and delivered to an ordnance-officer of the United States Army.

3.  Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one
copy to be retained by the commander of the troops, and the other
to be given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman.
Each officer and man to give his individual obligation in writing
not to take up arms against the Government of the United States,
until properly released from this obligation.

4.  The side-arms of officers, and their private horses and
baggage, to be retained by them.

5.  This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to
return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States
authorities, so long as they observe their obligation and the laws
in force where they may reside.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General,
Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General,
Commanding Confederate States Forces in North Carolina.

Approved:

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


I returned to Raleigh the same evening, and, at my request, General
Grant wrote on these terms his approval, and then I thought the
matter was surely at an end.  He took the original copy, on the
27th returned to Newbern, and thence went back to Washington.

I immediately made all the orders necessary to carry into effect
the terms of this convention, devolving on General Schofield the
details of granting the parole and making the muster-rolls of
prisoners, inventories of property, etc., of General Johnston's
army at and about Greensboro', North Carolina, and on General
Wilson the same duties in Georgia; but, thus far, I had been
compelled to communicate with the latter through rebel sources, and
General Wilson was necessarily confused by the conflict of orders
and information.  I deemed it of the utmost importance to establish
for him a more reliable base of information and supply, and
accordingly resolved to go in person to Savannah for that purpose.
But, before starting, I received a New York Times, of April 24th,
containing the following extraordinary communications:


[First Bulletin]

WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, April 22, 1885.

Yesterday evening a bearer of dispatches arrived from General
Sherman.  An agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a
memorandum of what is called a basis for peace, had been entered
into on the 18th inst.   by General Sherman, with the rebel General
Johnston.  Brigadier-General Breckenridge was present at the
conference.

A cabinet meeting was held at eight o'clock in the evening, at
which the action of General Sherman was disapproved by the
President, by the Secretary of War, by General Grant, and by every
member of the cabinet.  General Sherman was ordered to resume
hostilities immediately, and was directed that the instructions
given by the late President, in the following telegram, which was
penned by Mr. Lincoln himself, at the Capitol, on the night of the
3d of March, were approved by President Andrew Johnson, and were
reiterated to govern the action of military commanders.

On the night of the 3d of March, while President Lincoln and his
cabinet were at the Capitol, a telegram from General Grant was
brought to the Secretary of War, informing him that General Lee had
requested an interview or conference, to make an arrangement for
terms of peace.  The letter of General Lee was published in a
letter to Davis and to the rebel Congress.  General Grant's
telegram was submitted to Mr. Lincoln, who, after pondering a few
minutes, took up his pen and wrote with his own hand the following
reply, which he submitted to the Secretary of State and Secretary
of War.  It was then dated, addressed, and signed, by the Secretary
of War, and telegraphed to General Grant:


WASHINGTON, March 3, 1865-12 P.M.

Lieutenant-General GRANT:

The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have
no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation
of General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter.
He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or
confer upon any political questions.  Such questions the President
holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military
conferences or conventions.

Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.


The orders of General Sherman to General Stoneman to withdraw from
Salisbury and join him will probably open the way for Davis to
escape to Mexico or Europe with his plunder, which is reported to
be very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond
banks, but previous accumulations.

A dispatch received by this department from Richmond says: "It is
stated here, by respectable parties, that the amount of specie
taken south by Jeff.  Davis and his partisans is very large,
including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous
accumulations.  They hope, it is said, to make terms with General
Sherman, or some other commander, by which they will be permitted,
with their effects, including this gold plunder, to go to Mexico or
Europe.  Johnston's negotiations look to this end."

After the cabinet meeting last night, General Grant started for
North Carolina, to direct operations against Johnston's army.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.


Here followed the terms, and Mr. Stanton's ten reasons for
rejecting them.

The publication of this bulletin by authority was an outrage on me,
for Mr. Stanton had failed to communicate to me in advance, as was
his duty, the purpose of the Administration to limit our
negotiations to purely military matters; but, on the contrary, at
Savannah he had authorized me to control all matters, civil and
military.

By this bulletin, he implied that I had previously been furnished
with a copy of his dispatch of March 3d to General Grant, which was
not so; and he gave warrant to the impression, which was sown
broadcast, that I might be bribed by banker's gold to permit Davis
to escape.  Under the influence of this, I wrote General Grant the
following letter of April 28th, which has been published in the
Proceedings of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

I regarded this bulletin of Mr. Stanton as a personal and official
insult, which I afterward publicly resented.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 28,1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: Since you left me yesterday, I have seen the New York
Times of the 24th, containing a budget of military news,
authenticated by the signature of the Secretary of War, Hon. E. M.
Stanton, which is grouped in such a way as to give the public very
erroneous impressions.  It embraces a copy of the basis of
agreement between myself and General Johnston, of April 18th, with
comments, which it will be time enough to discuss two or three
years hence, after the Government has experimented a little more in
the machinery by which power reaches the scattered people of the
vast country known as the "South."

In the mean time, however, I did think that my rank (if not past
services) entitled me at least to trust that the Secretary of War
would keep secret what was communicated for the use of none but the
cabinet, until further inquiry could be made, instead of giving
publicity to it along with documents which I never saw, and drawing
therefrom inferences wide of the truth.  I never saw or had
furnished me a copy of President Lincoln's dispatch to you of the
3d of March, nor did Mr. Stanton or any human being ever convey to
me its substance, or any thing like it.  On the contrary, I had
seen General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia Legislature, made
in Mr. Lincoln's very presence, and failed to discover any other
official hint of a plan of reconstruction, or any ideas calculated
to allay the fears of the people of the South, after the
destruction of their armies and civil authorities would leave them
without any government whatever.

We should not drive a people into anarchy, and it is simply
impossible for our military power to reach all the masses of their
unhappy country.

I confess I did not desire to drive General Johnston's army into
bands of armed men, going about without purpose, and capable only
of infinite mischief.  But you saw, on your arrival here, that I
had my army so disposed that his escape was only possible in a
disorganized shape; and as you did not choose to "direct military
operations in this quarter," I inferred that you were satisfied
with the military situation; at all events, the instant I learned
what was proper enough, the disapproval of the President, I acted
in such a manner as to compel the surrender of General Johnston's
whole army on the same terms which you had prescribed to General
Lee's army, when you had it surrounded and in your absolute power.

Mr. Stanton, in stating that my orders to General Stoneman were
likely to result in the escape of "Mr. Davis to Mexico or Europe,"
is in deep error.  General Stoneman was not at "Salisbury," but had
gone back to "Statesville."  Davis was between us, and therefore
Stoneman was beyond him.  By turning toward me he was approaching
Davis, and, had he joined me as ordered, I would have had a mounted
force greatly needed for Davis's capture, and for other purposes.
Even now I don't know that Mr. Stanton wants Davis caught, and as
my official papers, deemed sacred, are hastily published to the
world, it will be imprudent for me to state what has been done in
that regard.

As the editor of the Times has (it may be) logically and fairly
drawn from this singular document the conclusion that I am
insubordinate, I can only deny the intention.

I have never in my life questioned or disobeyed an order, though
many and many a time have I risked my life, health, and reputation,
in obeying orders, or even hints to execute plans and purposes, not
to my liking.  It is not fair to withhold from me the plans and
policy of Government (if any there be), and expect me to guess at
them; for facts and events appear quite different from different
stand-points.  For four years I have been in camp dealing with
soldiers, and I can assure you that the conclusion at which the
cabinet arrived with such singular unanimity differs from mine.
I conferred freely with the best officers in this army as to the
points involved in this controversy, and, strange to say, they were
singularly unanimous in the other conclusion.  They will learn with
pain and amazement that I am deemed insubordinate, and wanting in
commonsense; that I, who for four years have labored day and night,
winter and summer, who have brought an army of seventy thousand men
in magnificent condition across a country hitherto deemed
impassable, and placed it just where it was wanted, on the day
appointed, have brought discredit on our Government!  I do not wish
to boast of this, but I do say that it entitled me to the courtesy
of being consulted, before publishing to the world a proposition
rightfully submitted to higher authority for adjudication, and then
accompanied by statements which invited the dogs of the press to be
let loose upon me.  It is true that non-combatants, men who sleep
in comfort and security while we watch on the distant lines, are
better able to judge than we poor soldiers, who rarely see a
newspaper, hardly hear from our families, or stop long enough to
draw our pay.  I envy not the task of "reconstruction," and am
delighted that the Secretary of War has relieved me of it.

As you did not undertake to assume the management of the affairs of
this army, I infer that, on personal inspection, your mind arrived
at a different conclusion from that of the Secretary of War.  I
will therefore go on to execute your orders to the conclusion, and,
when done, will with intense satisfaction leave to the civil
authorities the execution of the task of which they seem so
jealous.  But, as an honest man and soldier, I invite them to go
back to Nashville and follow my path, for they will see some things
and hear some things that may disturb their philosophy.

With sincere respect,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

P. S.--As Mr. Stanton's most singular paper has been published, I
demand that this also be made public, though I am in no manner
responsible to the press, but to the law, and my proper superiors.
W. T. S., Major-General.


On the 28th I summoned all the army and corps commanders together
at my quarters in the Governor's mansion at Raleigh, where every
thing was explained to them, and all orders for the future were
completed.  Generals Schofield, Terry, and Kilpatrick, were to
remain on duty in the Department of North Carolina, already
commanded by General Schofield, and the right and left wings were
ordered to march under their respective commanding generals North
by easy stages to Richmond, Virginia, there to await my return
from the South.

On the 29th of April, with a part of my personal staff, I proceeded
by rail to Wilmington, North Carolina, where I found Generals
Hawley and Potter, and the little steamer Russia, Captain Smith,
awaiting me.  After a short pause in Wilmington, we embarked, and
proceeded down the coast to Port Royal and the Savannah River,
which we reached on the 1st of May.  There Captain Hoses, who had
just come from General Wilson at Macon, met us, bearing letters for
me and General Grant, in which General Wilson gave a brief summary
of his operations up to date.  He had marched from Eastport,
Mississippi, five hundred miles in thirty days, took six thousand
three hundred prisoners, twenty-three colors, and one hundred and
fifty-six guns, defeating Forrest, scattering the militia, and
destroying every railroad, iron establishment, and factory, in
North Alabama and Georgia.

He spoke in the highest terms of his cavalry, as "cavalry,"
claiming that it could not be excelled, and he regarded his corps
as a model for modern cavalry in organization, armament, and
discipline.  Its strength was given at thirteen thousand five
hundred men and horses on reaching Macon.  Of course I was
extremely gratified at his just confidence, and saw that all he
wanted for efficient action was a sure base of supply, so that he
need no longer depend for clothing, ammunition, food, and forage,
on the country, which, now that war had ceased, it was our solemn
duty to protect, instead of plunder.  I accordingly ordered the
captured steamer Jeff. Davis to be loaded with stores, to proceed
at once up the Savannah River to Augusta, with a small detachment
of troops to occupy the arsenal, and to open communication with
General Wilson at Macon; and on the next day, May 2d, this steamer
was followed by another with a fall cargo of clothing, sugar,
coffee, and bread, sent from Hilton Head by the department
commander, General Gillmore, with a stronger guard commanded by
General Molineux.  Leaving to General Gillmore, who was present,
and in whose department General Wilson was, to keep up the supplies
at Augusta, and to facilitate as far as possible General Wilson's
operations inland, I began my return on the 2d of May.  We went
into Charleston Harbor, passing the ruins of old Forts Moultrie and
Sumter without landing.  We reached the city of Charleston, which
was held by part of the division of General John P.  Hatch, the
same that we had left at Pocotaligo.  We walked the old familiar
streets--Broad, King, Meeting, etc.--but desolation and ruin were
everywhere.  The heart of the city had been burned during the
bombardment, and the rebel garrison at the time of its final
evacuation had fired the railroad-depots, which fire had spread,
and was only subdued by our troops after they had reached the city.

I inquired for many of my old friends, but they were dead or gone,
and of them all I only saw a part of the family of Mrs. Pettigru.
I doubt whether any city was ever more terribly punished than
Charleston, but, as her people had for years been agitating for war
and discord, and had finally inaugurated the civil war by an attack
on the small and devoted garrison of Major Anderson, sent there by
the General Government to defend them, the judgment of the world
will be, that Charleston deserved the fate that befell her.
Resuming our voyage, we passed into Cape Fear River by its mouth at
Fort Caswell and Smithville, and out by the new channel at Fort
Fisher, and reached Morehead City on the 4th of May.  We found
there the revenue-cutter Wayanda, on board of which were the Chief-
Justice, Mr. Chase, and his daughter Nettie, now Mrs. Hoyt.  The
Chief-Justice at that moment was absent on a visit to Newbern, but
came back the next day.  Meantime, by means of the telegraph, I was
again in correspondence with General Schofield at Raleigh.  He had
made great progress in paroling the officers and men of Johnston's
army at Greensboro', but was embarrassed by the utter confusion and
anarchy that had resulted from a want of understanding on many
minor points, and on the political questions that had to be met at
the instant.  In order to facilitate the return to their homes of
the Confederate officers and men, he had been forced to make with
General Johnston the following supplemental terms, which were of
course ratified and approved:


MILITARY CONVENTION OF APRIL 26, 1865.
SUPPLEMENTAL TERMS.

1.  The field transportation to be loaned to the troops for their
march to their homes, and for subsequent use in their industrial
pursuits.  Artillery-horses may be used in field-transportation, if
necessary.

2.  Each brigade or separate body to retain a number of arms equal
to one-seventh of its effective strength, which, when the troops
reach the capitals of their states, will be disposed of as the
general commanding the department may direct.

3.  Private horses, and other private property of both officers and
men, to be retained by them.

4.  The commanding general of the Military Division of West
Mississippi, Major-General Canby, will be requested to give
transportation by water, from Mobile or New Orleans, to the troops
from Arkansas and Texas.

5.  The obligations of officers and soldiers to be signed by their
immediate commanders.

6.  Naval forces within the limits of General Johnston's command to
be included in the terms of this convention.



J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General,
Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina.


J. E. JOHNSTON, General,
Commanding Confederate States Forces in North Carolina.


The total number of prisoners of war parolled by
General Schofield, at Greensboro', North Carolina,
as afterward officially reported, amounted to ........ 38,817

And the total number who surrendered in Georgia
and Florida, as reported by General J.  H.  Wilson,
was .................................................. 52,458

Aggregate surrendered under the capitulation of
General J. E. Johnston ............................... 89,270


On the morning of the 5th I also received from General Schofield
this dispatch:


RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, May 5, 1866.

To Major-General W: T. SHERMAN, Morehead City:

When General Grant was here, as you doubtless recollect, he said
the lines (for trade and intercourse) had been extended to embrace
this and other States south.  The order, it seems, has been
modified so as to include only Virginia and Tennessee.  I think it
would be an act of wisdom to open this State to trade at once.

I hope the Government will make known its policy as to the organs
of State government without delay.  Affairs must necessarily be in
a very unsettled state until that is done.  The people are now in a
mood to accept almost anything which promises a definite
settlement.  "What is to be done with the freedmen?" is the
question of all, and it is the all important question.  It requires
prompt and wise notion to prevent the negroes from becoming a huge
elephant on our hands.  If I am to govern this State, it is
important for me to know it at once.  If another is to be sent
here, it cannot be done too soon, for he probably will undo the
most that I shall have done.  I shall be glad to hear from you
fully, when you have time to write.  I will send your message to
General Wilson at once.

J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General.


I was utterly without instructions from any source on the points of
General Schofield's inquiry, and under the existing state of facts
could not even advise him, for by this time I was in possession of
the second bulletin of Mr. Stanton, published in all the Northern
papers, with comments that assumed that I was a common traitor and
a public enemy; and high officials had even instructed my own
subordinates to disobey my lawful orders.  General Halleck, who had
so long been in Washington as the chief of staff, had been sent on
the 21st of April to Richmond, to command the armies of the Potomac
and James, in place of General Grant, who had transferred his
headquarters to the national capital, and he (General Halleck) was
therefore in supreme command in Virginia, while my command over
North Carolina had never been revoked or modified.


[Second Bulletin.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, April 27 9.30 a.m.

To Major-General DIX:

The department has received the following dispatch from Major-
General Halleck, commanding the Military Division of the James.
Generals Canby and Thomas were instructed some days ago that
Sherman's arrangements with Johnston were disapproved by the
President, and they were ordered to disregard it and push the enemy
in every direction.

E.  M.  STANTON, Secretary of War.


RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, April 26-9.30 p.m.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright, are acting under orders to
pay no regard to any truce or orders of General Sherman respecting
hostilities, on the ground that Sherman's agreement could bind his
command only, and no other.

They are directed to push forward, regardless of orders from any
one except from General Grant, and cut off Johnston's retreat.

Beauregard has telegraphed to  Danville that a new arrangement has
been made with Sherman, and that the advance of the Sixth Corps was
to be suspended until further orders.

I have telegraphed back to obey no orders of Sherman, but to push
forward as rapidly as possible.

The bankers here have information to-day that Jeff. Davis's specie
is moving south from Goldsboro', in wagons, as fast as possible.

I suggest that orders be telegraphed, through General Thomas, that
Wilson obey no orders from Sherman, and notifying him and Canby,
and all commanders on the Mississippi, to take measures to
intercept the rebel chiefs and their plunder.

The specie taken with them is estimated here at from six to
thirteen million dollars.

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General commanding.


Subsequently, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in
Washington, on the 22d of May, I testified fully on this whole
matter, and will abide the judgment of the country on the
patriotism and wisdom of my public conduct in this connection.
General Halleck's measures to capture General Johnston's army,
actually surrendered to me at the time, at Greensboro', on the 26th
of April, simply excited my contempt for a judgment such as he was
supposed to possess.  The assertion that Jeff. Davis's specie-
train, of six to thirteen million dollars, was reported to be
moving south from Goldsboro' in wagons as fast as possible, found
plenty of willing ears, though my army of eighty thousand men had
been at Goldsboro' from March 22d to the date of his dispatch,
April 26th; and such a train would have been composed of from
fifteen to thirty-two six-mule teams to have hauled this specie,
even if it all were in gold.  I suppose the exact amount of
treasure which Davis had with him is now known to a cent; some of
it was paid to his escort, when it disbanded at and near
Washington, Georgia, and at the time of his capture he had a small
parcel of gold and silver coin, not to exceed ten thousand dollars,
which is now retained in the United States Treasury-vault at
Washington, and shown to the curious.

The thirteen millions of treasure, with which Jeff. Davis was to
corrupt our armies and buy his escape, dwindled down to the
contents of a hand-valise!

To say that I was merely angry at the tone and substance of these
published bulletins of the War Department, would hardly express the
state of my feelings.  I was outraged beyond measure, and was
resolved to resent the insult, cost what it might.  I went to the
Wayanda and showed them to Mr. Chase, with whom I had a long and
frank conversation, during which he explained to me the confusion
caused in Washington by the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, the
sudden accession to power of Mr. Johnson, who was then supposed to
be bitter and vindictive in his feelings toward the South, and the
wild pressure of every class of politicians to enforce on the new
President their pet schemes.  He showed me a letter of his own,
which was in print, dated Baltimore, April 11th, and another of
April 12th, addressed to the President, urging him to recognize the
freedmen as equal in all respects to the whites.  He was the first
man, of any authority or station, who ever informed me that the
Government of the United States would insist on extending to the
former slaves of the South the elective franchise, and he gave as a
reason the fact that the slaves, grateful for their freedom, for
which they were indebted to the armies and Government of the North,
would, by their votes, offset the disaffected and rebel element of
the white population of the South.  At that time quite a storm was
prevailing at sea, outside, and our two vessels lay snug at the
wharf at Morehead City.  I saw a good deal of Mr. Chase, and
several notes passed between us, of which I have the originals yet.
Always claiming that the South had herself freed all her slaves by
rebellion, and that Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of freedom (of
September 22, 1862) was binding on all officers of the General
Government, I doubted the wisdom of at once clothing them with the
elective franchise, without some previous preparation and
qualification; and then realized the national loss in the death at
that critical moment of Mr. Lincoln, who had long pondered over the
difficult questions involved, who, at all events, would have been
honest and frank, and would not have withheld from his army
commanders at least a hint that would have been to them a guide.
It was plain to me, therefore, that the manner of his assassination
had stampeded the civil authorities in Washington, had unnerved
them, and that they were then undecided as to the measures
indispensably necessary to prevent anarchy at the South.

On the 7th of May the storm subsided, and we put to sea, Mr. Chase
to the south, on his proposed tour as far as New Orleans, and I for
James River.  I reached Fortress Monroe on the 8th, and thence
telegraphed my arrival to General Grant, asking for orders.  I
found at Fortress Monroe a dispatch from General Halleck,
professing great friendship, and inviting me to accept his
hospitality at Richmond.  I answered by a cipher-dispatch that I
had seen his dispatch to Mr. Stanton, of April 26th, embraced in
the second bulletin, which I regarded as insulting, declined his
hospitality, and added that I preferred we should not meet as I
passed through Richmond.  I thence proceeded to City Point in the
Russia, and on to Manchester, opposite Richmond, via Petersburg, by
rail.  I found that both wings of the army had arrived from
Raleigh, and were in camp in and around Manchester, whence I again
telegraphed General Grant, an the 9th of May, for orders, and also
reported my arrival to General Halleck by letter.  I found that
General Halleck had ordered General Davis's corps (the Fourteenth)
for review by himself.  This I forbade.  All the army knew of the
insult that had been made me by the Secretary of War and General
Halleck, and watched me closely to see if I would tamely submit.
During the 9th I made a full and complete report of all these
events, from the last report made at Goldsboro' up to date, and the
next day received orders to continue the march to Alexandria, near
Washington.


On the morning of the 11th we crossed the pontoon-bridge at
Richmond, marched through that city, and out on the Han over
Court House road, General Slocum's left wing leading. The right wing
(General Logan) followed the next day, viz., the 12th.  Meantime,
General O. O. Howard had been summoned to Washington to take charge
of the new Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, and,
from that time till the army was finally disbanded, General John A.
Logan was in command of the right wing, and of the Army of the
Tennessee.  The left wing marched through Hanover Court House, and
thence took roads well to the left by Chilesburg; the Fourteenth
Corps by New Market and Culpepper, Manassas, etc.; the Twentieth
Corps by Spotsylvania Court-House and Chancellorsville.  The right
wing followed the more direct road by Fredericksburg.  On my way
north I endeavored to see as much of the battle-fields of the Army
of the Potomac as I could, and therefore shifted from one column to
the other, visiting en route Hanover Court-House, Spotsylvania,
Fredericksburg, Dumfries, etc., reaching Alexandria during the
afternoon of May 19th, and pitched my camp by the road side, about
half-way between Alexandria and the Long Bridge.  During the same
and next day the whole army reached Alexandria, and camped round
about it; General Meade's Army of the Potomac had possession of the
camps above, opposite Washington and Georgetown.  The next day (by
invitation) I went over to Washington and met many friends--among
them General Grant and President Johnson.  The latter occupied
rooms in the house on the corner of Fifteenth and H Streets,
belonging to Mr. Hooper.  He was extremely cordial to me, and
knowing that I was chafing under the censures of the War
Department, especially of the two war bulletins of Mr. Stanton, he
volunteered to say that he knew of neither of them till seen in the
newspapers, and that Mr. Stanton had shown neither to him nor to
any of his associates in the cabinet till they were published.
Nearly all the members of the cabinet made similar assurances to me
afterward, and, as Mr. Stanton made no friendly advances, and
offered no word of explanation or apology, I declined General
Grant's friendly offices for a reconciliation, but, on the
contrary, resolved to resent what I considered an insult, as
publicly as it was made.  My brother, Senator Sherman, who was Mr.
Stanton's neighbor, always insisted that Mr. Stanton had been
frightened by the intended assassination of himself, and had become
embittered thereby.  At all events, I found strong military guards
around his house, as well as all the houses occupied by the cabinet
and by the principal officers of Government; and a sense of
insecurity pervaded Washington, for which no reason existed.

On the 19th I received a copy of War Department Special Order No.
239, Adjutant-General's office, of May 18th, ordering a grand
review, by the President and cabinet, of all the armies then near
Washington; General Meade's to occur on Tuesday, May 23d, mine on
Wednesday, the 24th; and on the 20th I made the necessary orders
for my part.  Meantime I had also arranged (with General Grant's
approval) to remove after the review, my armies from the south side
of the Potomac to the north; both for convenience and because our
men had found that the grounds assigned them had been used so long
for camps that they were foul and unfit.

By invitation I was on the reviewing-stand, and witnessed the
review of the Army of the Potomac (on the 23d), commanded by
General Meade in person.  The day was beautiful, and the pageant
was superb.  Washington was full of strangers, who filled the
streets in holiday-dress, and every house was decorated with flags.
The army marched by divisions in close column around the Capitol,
down Pennsylvania Avenue, past the President and cabinet, who
occupied a large stand prepared for the occasion, directly in front
of the White House.

I had telegraphed to Lancaster for Mrs. Sherman, who arrived that
day, accompanied by her father, the Hon. Thomas Ewing, and my son
Tom, then eight years old.

During the afternoon and night of the 23d, the Fifteenth, Seventeenth,
and Twentieth Corps, crossed Long Bridge, bivouacked in the
streets about the Capitol, and the Fourteenth Corps closed up to
the bridge.  The morning of the 24th was extremely beautiful, and
the ground was in splendid order for our review.  The streets were
filled with people to see the pageant, armed with bouquets of
flowers for their favorite regiments or heroes, and every thing was
propitious.  Punctually at 9 A.M. the signal-gun was fired, when in
person, attended by General Howard and all my staff, I rode slowly
down Pennsylvania Avenue, the crowds of men, women, and children,
densely lining the sidewalks, and almost obstructing the way.  We
were followed close by General Logan and the head of the Fifteenth
Corps.  When I reached the Treasury-building, and looked back, the
sight was simply magnificent.  The column was compact, and the
glittering muskets looked like a solid mass of steel, moving with
the regularity of a pendulum.  We passed the Treasury building, in
front of which and of the White House was an immense throng of
people, for whom extensive stands had been prepared on both sides
of the avenue.  As I neared the brick-house opposite the lower
corner of Lafayette Square, some one asked me to notice Mr. Seward,
who, still feeble and bandaged for his wounds, had been removed
there that he might behold the troops.  I moved in that direction
and took off my hat to Mr. Seward, who sat at an upper window.  He
recognized the salute, returned it, and then we rode on steadily
past the President, saluting with our swords.  All on his stand
arose and acknowledged the salute.  Then, turning into the gate of
the presidential grounds, we left our horses with orderlies, and
went upon the stand, where I found Mrs. Sherman, with her father
and son.  Passing them, I shook hands with the President, General
Grant, and each member of the cabinet.  As I approached Mr.
Stanton, he offered me his hand, but I declined it publicly, and
the fact was universally noticed. I then took my post on the left
of the President, and for six hours and a half stood, while the
army passed in the order of the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth,
and Fourteenth Corps. It was, in my judgment, the most magnificent
army in existence--sixty-five thousand men, in splendid physique,
who had just completed a march of nearly two thousand miles in a
hostile country, in good drill, and who realized that they were
being closely scrutinized by thousands of their fellow-countrymen
and by foreigners.  Division after division passed, each commander
of an army corps or division coming on the stand during the passage
of his command, to be presented to the President, cabinet, and
spectators.  The steadiness and firmness of the tread, the careful
dress on the guides, the uniform intervals between the companies,
all eyes directly to the front, and the tattered and bullet-ridden
flags, festooned with flowers, all attracted universal notice.
Many good people, up to that time, had looked upon our Western army
as a sort of mob; but the world then saw, and recognized the fact,
that it was an army in the proper sense, well organized, well
commanded and disciplined; and there was no wonder that it had
swept through the South like a tornado.  For six hours and a half
that strong tread of the Army of the West resounded along
Pennsylvania Avenue; not a soul of that vast crowd of spectators
left his place; and, when the rear of the column had passed by,
thousands of the spectators still lingered to express their sense
of confidence in the strength of a Government which could claim
such an army.

Some little scenes enlivened the day, and called for the laughter
and cheers of the crowd.  Each division was followed by six
ambulances, as a representative of its baggage-train.  Some of the
division commanders had added, by way of variety, goats, milch-
cows, and pack-mules, whose loads consisted of game-cocks, poultry,
hams, etc., and some of them had the families of freed slaves
along, with the women leading their children.  Each division was
preceded by its corps of black pioneers, armed with picks and
spades.  These marched abreast in double ranks, keeping perfect
dress and step, and added much to the interest of the occasion.  On
the whole, the grand review was a splendid success, and was a
fitting conclusion to the campaign and the war.

I will now conclude by a copy of my general orders taking leave of
the army, which ended my connection with the war, though I
afterward visited and took a more formal leave of the officers and
men on July 4, 1865, at Louisville, Kentucky:



[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS NO. 76]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, WASHINGTON, D.C. May 30, 1865

The general commanding announces to the Armies of the Tennessee and
Georgia that the time has come for us to part.  Our work is done,
and armed enemies no longer defy us.  Some of you will go to your
homes, and others will be retained in military service till further
orders.

And now that we are all about to separate, to mingle with the civil
world, it becomes a pleasing duty to recall to mind the situation
of national affairs when, but little more than a year ago, we were
gathered about the cliffs of Lookout Mountain, and all the future
was wrapped in doubt and uncertainty.

Three armies had come together from distant fields, with separate
histories, yet bound by one common cause--the union of our country,
and the perpetuation of the Government of our inheritance.  There
is no need to recall to your memories Tunnel Hill, with Rocky-Face
Mountain and Buzzard-Roost Gap, and the ugly forts of Dalton
behind.

We were in earnest, and paused not for danger and difficulty, but
dashed through Snake-Creek Gap and fell on Resaca; then on to the
Etowah, to Dallas, Kenesaw; and the heats of summer found us on the
banks of the Chattahoochee, far from home, and dependent on a
single road for supplies.  Again we were not to be held back by any
obstacle, and crossed over and fought four hard battles for the
possession of the citadel of Atlanta.  That was the crisis of our
history.  A doubt still clouded our future, but we solved the
problem, destroyed Atlanta, struck boldly across the State of
Georgia, severed all the main arteries of life to our enemy, and
Christmas found us at Savannah.

Waiting there only long enough to fill our wagons, we again began a
march which, for peril, labor, and results, will compare with any
ever made by an organized army.  The floods of the Savannah, the
swamps of the Combahee and Edisto, the "high hills" and rocks of
the Santee, the flat quagmires of the Pedee and Cape Fear Rivers,
were all passed in midwinter, with its floods and rains, in the
face of an accumulating enemy; and, after the battles of
Averysboro' and Bentonsville, we once more came out of the
wilderness, to meet our friends at Goldsboro'.  Even then we paused
only long enough to get new clothing, to reload our wagons, again
pushed on to Raleigh and beyond, until we met our enemy suing for
peace, instead of war, and offering to submit to the injured laws
of his and our country.  As long as that enemy was defiant, nor
mountains nor rivers, nor swamps, nor hunger, nor cold, had checked
us; but when he, who had fought us hard and persistently, offered
submission, your general thought it wrong to pursue him farther,
and negotiations followed, which resulted, as you all know, in his
surrender.

How far the operations of this army contributed to the final
overthrow of the Confederacy and the peace which now dawns upon us,
must be judged by others, not by us; but that you have done all
that men could do has been admitted by those in authority, and we
have a right to join in the universal joy that fills our land
because the war is over, and our Government stands vindicated
before the world by the joint action of the volunteer armies and
navy of the United States.

To such as remain in the service, your general need only remind you
that success in the past was due to hard work and discipline, and
that the same work and discipline are equally important in the
future.  To such as go home, he will only say that our favored
country is so grand, so extensive, so diversified in climate, soil,
and productions, that every man may find a home and occupation
suited to his taste; none should yield to the natural impatience
sure to result from our past life of excitement and adventure.  You
will be invited to seek new adventures abroad; do not yield to the
temptation, for it will lead only to death and disappointment.

Your general now bids you farewell, with the full belief that, as
in war you have been good soldiers, so in peace you will make good
citizens; and if, unfortunately, new war should arise in our
country, "Sherman's army" will be the first to buckle on its old
armor, and come forth to defend and maintain the Government of our
inheritance.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L.  M.  DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.



List of the Average Number of Miles marched by the Different Army
Corps of the United States Forces under Command of Major-General W.
T. SHERMAN, United States Army, during his Campaigns: 1863-'64-'65.

         4th       14th      15th      16th      17th       20th
        Corps.   Corps.    Corps.   Corps    Corps.    Corps.

Miles:   110     1,586     2,289     508     2,076     1,525



CHAPTER XXV.

CONCLUSION--MILITARY LESSONS OF THE WAR.

Having thus recorded a summary of events, mostly under my own
personal supervision, during the years from 1846 to 1865, it seems
proper that I should add an opinion of some of the useful military
lessons to be derived therefrom.

That civil war, by reason of the existence of slavery, was
apprehended by most of the leading statesmen of the half-century
preceding its outbreak, is a matter of notoriety.  General Scott
told me on my arrival at New York, as early as 1850, that the
country was on the eve of civil war; and the Southern politicians
openly asserted that it was their purpose to accept as a casus
belli the election of General Fremont in 1856; but, fortunately or
unfortunately, he was beaten by Mr. Buchanan, which simply
postponed its occurrence for four years.  Mr. Seward had also
publicly declared that no government could possibly exist half
slave and half free; yet the Government made no military
preparation, and the Northern people generally paid no attention,
took no warning of its coming, and would not realize its existence
till Fort Sumter was fired on by batteries of artillery, handled by
declared enemies, from the surrounding islands and from the city of
Charleston.

General Bragg, who certainly was a man of intelligence, and who, in
early life, ridiculed a thousand times, in my hearing, the threats
of the people of South Carolina to secede from the Federal Union,
said to me in New Orleans, in February, 1861, that he was convinced
that the feeling between the slave and free States had become so
embittered that it was better to part in peace; better to part
anyhow; and, as a separation was inevitable, that the South should
begin at once, because the possibility of a successful effort was
yearly lessened by the rapid and increasing inequality between the
two sections, from the fact that all the European immigrants were
coming to the Northern States and Territories, and none to the
Southern.

The slave population m 1860 was near four millions, and the money
value thereof not far from twenty-five hundred million dollars.
Now, ignoring the moral side of the question, a cause that
endangered so vast a moneyed interest was an adequate cause of
anxiety and preparation, and the Northern leaders surely ought to
have foreseen the danger and prepared for it.  After the election
of Mr. Lincoln in 1860, there was no concealment of the declaration
and preparation for war in the South.  In Louisiana, as I have
related, men were openly enlisted, officers were appointed, and war
was actually begun, in January, 1861.  The forts at the mouth of
the Mississippi were seized, and occupied by garrisons that hauled
down the United States flag and hoisted that of the State.  The
United States Arsenal at Baton Rouge was captured by New Orleans
militia, its garrison ignominiously sent off, and the contents of
the arsenal distributed.  These were as much acts of war as was the
subsequent firing on Fort Sumter, yet no public notice was taken
thereof; and when, months afterward, I came North, I found not one
single sign of preparation.  It was for this reason, somewhat, that
the people of the South became convinced that those of the North
were pusillanimous and cowardly, and the Southern leaders were
thereby enabled to commit their people to the war, nominally in
defense of their slave property.  Up to the hour of the firing on
Fort Sumter, in April, 1861, it does seem to me that our public
men, our politicians, were blamable for not sounding the note of
alarm.

Then, when war was actually begun, it was by a call for seventy-
five thousand "ninety-day" men, I suppose to fulfill Mr. Seward's
prophecy that the war would last but ninety days.

The earlier steps by our political Government were extremely
wavering and weak, for which an excuse can be found in the fact
that many of the Southern representatives remained in Congress,
sharing in the public councils, and influencing legislation.  But
as soon as Mr. Lincoln was installed, there was no longer any
reason why Congress and the cabinet should have hesitated.  They
should have measured the cause, provided the means, and left the
Executive to apply the remedy.

At the time of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, viz., March 4, 1861, the
Regular Army, by law, consisted of two regiments of dragoons, two
regiments of cavalry, one regiment of mounted rifles, four
regiments of artillery, and ten regiments of infantry, admitting of
an aggregate strength of thirteen thousand and twenty-four officers
and men.  On the subsequent 4th of May the President, by his own
orders (afterward sanctioned by Congress), added a regiment of
cavalry, a regiment of artillery, and eight regiments of infantry,
which, with the former army, admitted of a strength of thirty-nine
thousand nine hundred and seventy-three; but at no time during the
war did the Regular Army attain a strength of twenty-five thousand
men.

To the new regiments of infantry was given an organization
differing from any that had heretofore prevailed in this country--
of three battalions of eight companies each; but at no time did
more than one of these regiments attain its full standard; nor in
the vast army of volunteers that was raised during the war were any
of the regiments of infantry formed on the three-battalion system,
but these were universally single battalions of ten companies; so
that, on the reorganization of the Regular Army at the close of the
war, Congress adopted the form of twelve companies for the
regiments of cavalry and artillery, and that of ten companies for
the infantry, which is the present standard.

Inasmuch as the Regular Army will naturally form the standard of
organization for any increase or for new regiments of volunteers,
it becomes important to study this subject in the light of past
experience, and to select that form which is best for peace as well
as war.

A cavalry regiment is now composed of twelve companies, usually
divided into six squadrons, of two companies each, or better
subdivided into three battalions of four companies each.  This is
an excellent form, easily admitting of subdivision as well as union
into larger masses.

A single battalion of four companies, with a field-officer, will
compose a good body for a garrison, for a separate expedition, or
for a detachment; and, in war, three regiments would compose a good
brigade, three brigades a division, and three divisions a strong
cavalry corps, such as was formed and fought by Generals Sheridan
and Wilson during the war.

In the artillery arm, the officers differ widely in their opinion
of the true organization.  A single company forms a battery, and
habitually each battery acts separately, though sometimes several
are united or "massed;" but these always act in concert with
cavalry or infantry.

Nevertheless, the regimental organization for artillery has always
been maintained in this country for classification and promotion.
Twelve companies compose a regiment, and, though probably no
colonel ever commanded his full regiment in the form of twelve
batteries, yet in peace they occupy our heavy sea-coast forts or
act as infantry; then the regimental organization is both necessary
and convenient.

But the infantry composes the great mass of all armies, and the
true form of the regiment or unit has been the subject of infinite
discussion; and, as I have stated, during the civil war the
regiment was a single battalion of ten companies.  In olden times
the regiment was composed of eight battalion companies and two
flank companies.  The first and tenth companies were armed with
rifles, and were styled and used as "skirmishers;" but during 'the
war they were never used exclusively for that special purpose, and
in fact no distinction existed between them and the other eight
companies.

The ten-company organization is awkward in practice, and I am
satisfied that the infantry regiment should have the same identical
organization as exists for the cavalry and artillery, viz., twelve
companies, so as to be susceptible of division into three
battalions of four companies each.

These companies should habitually be about a hundred one men
strong, giving twelve hundred to a regiment, which in practice
would settle down to about one thousand men.

Three such regiments would compose a brigade, three brigades a
division, and three divisions a corps.  Then, by allowing to an
infantry corps a brigade of cavalry and six batteries of
field-artillery, we would have an efficient  corps d'armee of
thirty thousand men, whose organization would be simple and most
efficient, and whose strength should never be allowed to fall below
twenty-five thousand men.

The corps is the true unit for grand campaigns and battle, should
have a full and perfect staff, and every thing requisite for
separate action, ready at all times to be detached and sent off for
any nature of service.  The general in command should have the rank
of lieutenant-general, and should be, by experience and education,
equal to any thing in war.  Habitually with us he was a major-
general, specially selected and assigned to the command by an order
of the President, constituting, in fact, a separate grade.


The division is the unit of administration, and is the legitimate
command of a major general.

The brigade is the next subdivision, and is commanded by a
brigadier-general.

The regiment is the family.  The colonel, as the father, should
have a personal acquaintance with every officer and man, and should
instill a feeling of pride and affection for himself, so that his
officers and men would naturally look to him for personal advice
and instruction.  In war the regiment should never be subdivided,
but should always be maintained entire.  In peace this is
impossible.

The company is the true unit of discipline, and the captain is the
company.  A good captain makes a good company, and he should have
the power to reward as well as punish.  The fact that soldiers
world naturally like to have a good fellow for their captain is the
best reason why he should be appointed by the colonel, or by some
superior authority, instead of being elected by the men.

In the United States the people are the "sovereign," all power
originally proceeds from them, and therefore the election of
officers by the men is the common rule.  This is wrong, because an
army is not a popular organization, but an animated machine, an
instrument in the hands of the Executive for enforcing the law, and
maintaining the honor and dignity of the nation; and the President,
as the constitutional commander-in-chief of the army and navy,
should exercise the power of appointment (subject to the
confirmation of the Senate) of the officers of "volunteers," as
well as of "regulars."

No army can be efficient unless it be a unit for action; and the
power must come from above, not from below: the President usually
delegates his power to the commander-in-chief, and he to the next,
and so on down to the lowest actual commander of troops, however
small the detachment.  No matter how troops come together, when
once united, the highest officer in rank is held responsible, and
should be consequently armed with the fullest power of the
Executive, subject only to law and existing orders.  The more
simple the principle, the greater the likelihood of determined
action; and the less a commanding officer is circumscribed by
bounds or by precedent, the greater is the probability that he will
make the best use of his command and achieve the best results.

The Regular Army and the Military Academy at West Point have in the
past provided, and doubtless will in the future provide an ample
supply of good officers for future wars; but, should their numbers
be insufficient, we can always safely rely on the great number of
young men of education and force of character throughout the
country, to supplement them.  At the close of our civil war,
lasting four years, some of our best corps and division generals,
as well as staff-officers, were from civil life; but I cannot
recall any of the most successful who did not express a regret that
he had not received in early life instruction in the elementary
principles of the art of war, instead of being forced to acquire
this knowledge in the dangerous and expensive school of actual war.

But the vital difficulty was, and will be again, to obtain an
adequate number of good soldiers.  We tried almost every system
known to modern nations, all with more or less success--voluntary
enlistments, the draft, and bought substitutes--and I think that all
officers of experience will confirm my assertion that the men who
voluntarily enlisted at the outbreak of the war were the best,
better than the conscript, and far better than the bought
substitute.  When a regiment is once organized in a State, and
mustered into the service of the United States, the officers and
men become subject to the same laws of discipline and government as
the regular troops.  They are in no sense "militia," but compose
a part of the Army of the United States, only retain their State
title for convenience, and yet may be principally recruited from
the neighborhood of their original organization: Once organized,
the regiment should be kept full by recruits, and when it becomes
difficult to obtain more recruits the pay should be raised by
Congress, instead of tempting new men by exaggerated bounties.  I
believe it would have been more economical to have raised the pay
of the soldier to thirty or even fifty dollars a month than to have
held out the promise of three hundred and even six hundred dollars
in the form of bounty.  Toward the close of the war, I have often
heard the soldiers complain that the "stay at-home" men got better
pay, bounties, and food, than they who were exposed to all the
dangers and vicissitudes of the battles and marches at the front.
The feeling of the soldier should be that, in every event, the
sympathy and preference of his government is for him who fights,
rather than for him who is on provost or guard duty to the rear,
and, like most men, he measures this by the amount of pay.  Of
course, the soldier must be trained to obedience, and should be
"content with his wages;" but whoever has commanded an army in the
field knows the difference between a willing, contented mass of
men, and one that feels a cause of grievance.  There is a soul to
an army as well as to the individual man, and no general can
accomplish the full work of his army unless he commands the soul of
his men, as well as their bodies and legs.

The greatest mistake made in our civil war was in the mode of
recruitment and promotion.  When a regiment became reduced by the
necessary wear and tear of service, instead of being filled up at
the bottom, and the vacancies among the officers filled from the
best noncommissioned officers and men, the habit was to raise new
regiments, with new colonels, captains, and men, leaving the old
and experienced battalions to dwindle away into mere skeleton
organizations.  I believe with the volunteers this matter was left
to the States exclusively, and I remember that Wisconsin kept her
regiments filled with recruits, whereas other States generally
filled their quotas by new regiments, and the result was that we
estimated a Wisconsin regiment equal to an ordinary brigade.  I
believe that five hundred new men added to an old and experienced
regiment were more valuable than a thousand men in the form of a
new regiment, for the former by association with good, experienced
captains, lieutenants, and non-commissioned officers, soon became
veterans, whereas the latter were generally unavailable for a year.
The German method of recruitment is simply perfect, and there is no
good reason why we should not follow it substantially.

On a road, marching by the flank, it would be considered "good
order" to have five thousand men to a mile, so that a full corps of
thirty thousand men would extend six miles, but with the average
trains and batteries of artillery the probabilities are that it
would draw out to ten miles.  On a long and regular march the
divisions and brigades should alternate in the lead, the leading
division should be on the road by the earliest dawn, and march at
the rate of about two miles, or, at most, two and a half miles an
hour, so as to reach camp by noon.  Even then the rear divisions
and trains will hardly reach camp much before night. Theoretically,
a marching column should preserve such order that by simply halting
and facing to the right or left, it would be in line of battle; but
this is rarely the case, and generally deployments are made
"forward," by conducting each brigade by the flank obliquely to the
right or left to its approximate position in line of battle, and
there deployed.  In such a line of battle, a brigade of three
thousand infantry would occupy a mile of "front;" but for a strong
line of battle five-thousand men with two batteries should be
allowed to each mile, or a division would habitually constitute a
double line with skirmishers and a reserve on a mile of "front."

The "feeding" of an army is a matter of the most vital importance,
and demands the earliest attention of the general intrusted with a
campaign.  To be strong, healthy, and capable of the largest
measure of physical effort, the soldier needs about three pounds
gross of food per day, and the horse or mule about twenty pounds.
When a general first estimates the quantity of food and forage
needed for an army of fifty or one hundred thousand men, he is apt
to be dismayed, and here a good staff is indispensable, though the
general cannot throw off on them the responsibility.  He must give
the subject his personal attention, for the army reposes in him
alone, and should never doubt the fact that their existence
overrides in importance all other considerations.  Once satisfied
of this, and that all has been done that can be, the soldiers are
always willing to bear the largest measure of privation.  Probably
no army ever had a more varied experience in this regard than the
one I commanded in 1864'65.

Our base of supply was at Nashville, supplied by railways and the
Cumberland River, thence by rail to Chattanooga, a "secondary
base," and thence forward a single-track railroad.  The stores came
forward daily, but I endeavored to have on hand a full supply for
twenty days in advance.  These stores were habitually in the
wagon-trains, distributed to corps, divisions, and regiments, in
charge of experienced quartermasters and commissaries, and became
subject to the orders of the generals commanding these bodies.
They were generally issued on provision returns, but these had to
be closely scrutinized, for too often the colonels would make
requisitions for provisions for more men than they reported for
battle.  Of course, there are always a good many non-combatants
with an army, but, after careful study, I limited their amount to
twenty-five per cent. of the "effective strength," and that was
found to be liberal.  An ordinary army-wagon drawn by six mules may
be counted on to carry three thousand pounds net, equal to the food
of a full regiment for one day, but, by driving along beef-cattle,
a commissary may safely count the contents of one wagon as
sufficient for two days' food for a regiment of a thousand men; and
as a corps should have food on hand for twenty days ready for
detachment, it should have three hundred such wagons, as a
provision-train; and for forage, ammunition, clothing, and other
necessary stores, it was found necessary to have three hundred more
wagons, or six hundred wagons in all, for a corps d'armee.

These should be absolutely under the immediate control of the corps
commander, who will, however, find it economical to distribute them
in due proportion to his divisions, brigades, and even regiments.
Each regiment ought usually to have at least one wagon for
convenience to distribute stores, and each company two pack-mules,
so that the regiment may always be certain of a meal on reaching
camp without waiting for the larger trains.

On long marches the artillery and wagon-trains should always have
the right of way, and the troops should improvise roads to one
side, unless forced to use a bridge in common, and all trains
should have escorts to protect them, and to assist them in bad
places.  To this end there is nothing like actual experience, only,
unless the officers in command give the subject their personal
attention, they will find their wagon-trains loaded down with
tents, personal baggage, and even the arms and knapsacks of the
escort.  Each soldier should, if not actually "sick or wounded,"
carry his musket and equipments containing from forty to sixty
rounds of ammunition, his shelter-tent, a blanket or overcoat, and
an extra pair of pants, socks, and drawers, in the form of a scarf,
worn from the left shoulder to the right side in lieu of knapsack,
and in his haversack he should carry some bread, cooked meat, salt,
and coffee.  I do not believe a soldier should be loaded down too
much, but, including his clothing, arms, and equipment, he can
carry about fifty pounds without impairing his health or activity.
A simple calculation will show that by such a distribution a corps
will-thus carry the equivalent of five hundred wagon-loads--an
immense relief to the trains.

Where an army is near one of our many large navigable rivers, or
has the safe use of a railway, it can usually be supplied with the
full army ration, which is by far the best furnished to any army in
America or Europe; but when it is compelled to operate away from
such a base, and is dependent on its own train of wagons, the
commanding officer must exercise a wise discretion in the selection
of his stores.  In my opinion, there is no better food for man than
beef-cattle driven on the hoof, issued liberally, with salt, bacon,
and bread.  Coffee has also become almost indispensable, though
many substitutes were found for it, such as Indian-corn, roasted,
ground, and boiled as coffee; the sweet-potato, and the seed of the
okra plant prepared in the same way.  All these were used by the
people of the South, who for years could procure no coffee, but I
noticed that the women always begged of us some real coffee, which
seems to satisfy a natural yearning or craving more powerful than
can be accounted for on the theory of habit.  Therefore I would
always advise that the coffee and sugar ration be carried along,
even at the expense of bread, for which there are many substitutes.
Of these, Indian-corn is the best and most abundant.  Parched in a
frying-pan, it is excellent food, or if ground, or pounded and
boiled with meat of any sort, it makes a most nutritious meal.  The
potato, both Irish and sweet, forms an excellent substitute for
bread, and at Savannah we found that rice (was) also suitable, both for
men and animals.  For the former it should be cleaned of its husk
in a hominy block, easily prepared out of a log, and sifted with a
coarse corn bag; but for horses it should be fed in the straw.
During the Atlanta campaign we were supplied by our regular
commissaries with all sorts of patent compounds, such as desiccated
vegetables, and concentrated milk, meat-biscuit, and sausages, but
somehow the men preferred the simpler and more familiar forms of
food, and usually styled these "desecrated vegetables and
consecrated milk."  We were also supplied liberally with
lime-juice, sauerkraut, and pickles, as an antidote to scurvy, and
I now recall the extreme anxiety of my medical director, Dr. Kittoe,
about the scurvy, which he reported at one time as spreading and
imperiling the army.  This occurred at a crisis about Kenesaw, when
the railroad was taxed to its utmost capacity to provide the
necessary ammunition, food, and forage, and could not possibly
bring us an adequate supply of potatoes and cabbage, the usual
anti-scorbutics, when providentially the black berries ripened and
proved an admirable antidote, and I have known the skirmish-line,
without orders, to fight a respectable battle for the possession of
some old fields that were full of blackberries.  Soon, thereafter,
the green corn or roasting-ear came into season, and I heard no
more of the scurvy.  Our country abounds with plants which can be
utilized for a prevention to the scurvy; besides the above are the
persimmon, the sassafras root and bud, the wild-mustard, the
"agave," turnip tops, the dandelion cooked as greens, and a
decoction of the ordinary pine-leaf.

For the more delicate and costly articles of food for the sick we
relied mostly on the agents of the Sanitary Commission.  I do not
wish to doubt the value of these organizations, which gained so
much applause during our civil war, for no one can question the
motives of these charitable and generous people; but to be honest I
must record an opinion that the Sanitary Commission should limit
its operations to the hospitals at the rear, and should never
appear at the front.  They were generally local in feeling, aimed
to furnish their personal friends and neighbors with a better class
of food than the Government supplied, and the consequence was, that
one regiment of a brigade would receive potatoes and fruit which
would be denied another regiment close by: Jealousy would be the
inevitable result, and in an army all parts should be equal; there
should be no "partiality, favor, or affection."  The Government
should supply all essential wants, and in the hospitals to the rear
will be found abundant opportunities for the exercise of all
possible charity and generosity.  During the war I several times
gained the ill-will of the agents of the Sanitary Commission
because I forbade their coming to the front unless they would
consent to distribute their stores equally among all, regardless of
the parties who had contributed them.

The sick, wounded, and dead of an army are the subjects of the
greatest possible anxiety, and add an immense amount of labor to
the well men.  Each regiment in an active campaign should have a
surgeon and two assistants always close at hand, and each brigade
and division should have an experienced surgeon as a medical
director.  The great majority of wounds and of sickness should be
treated by the regimental surgeon, on the ground, under the eye of
the colonel.  As few should be sent to the brigade or division
hospital as possible, for the men always receive better care with
their own regiment than with strangers, and as a rule the cure is
more certain; but when men receive disabling wounds, or have
sickness likely to become permanent, the sooner they go far to the
rear the better for all.  The tent or the shelter of a tree is a
better hospital than a house, whose walls absorb fetid and
poisonous emanations, and then give them back to the atmosphere.
To men accustomed to the open air, who live on the plainest food,
wounds seem to give less pain, and are attended with less danger to
life than to ordinary soldiers in barracks.


Wounds which, in 1861, would have sent a man to the hospital for
months, in 1865 were regarded as mere scratches, rather the subject
of a joke than of sorrow.  To new soldiers the sight of blood and
death always has a sickening effect, but soon men become accustomed
to it, and I have heard them exclaim on seeing a dead comrade borne
to the rear, "Well, Bill has turned up his toes to the daisies."
Of course, during a skirmish or battle, armed men should never
leave their ranks to attend a dead or wounded comrade--this should
be seen to in advance by the colonel, who should designate his
musicians or company cooks as hospital attendants, with a white rag
on their arm to indicate their office.  A wounded man should go
himself (if able) to the surgeon near at hand, or, if he need help,
he should receive it from one of the attendants and not a comrade.
It is wonderful how soon the men accustom themselves to these
simple rules.  In great battles these matters call for a more
enlarged attention, and then it becomes the duty of the division
general to see that proper stretchers and field hospitals are ready
for the wounded, and trenches are dug for the dead.  There should
be no real neglect of the dead, because it has a bad effect on the
living; for each soldier values himself and comrade as highly as
though he were living in a good house at home.

The regimental chaplain, if any, usually attends the burials from
the hospital, should make notes and communicate details to the
captain of the company, and to the family at home.  Of course it is
usually impossible to mark the grave with names, dates, etc., and
consequently the names of the "unknown" in our national cemeteries
equal about one-half of all the dead.

Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought as
described in European text-books, viz., in great masses, in perfect
order, manoeuvring by corps, divisions, and brigades.  We were
generally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployed
according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong
skirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of ground, and of
every cover.  We were generally the assailants, and in wooded and
broken countries the "defensive" had a positive advantage over us,
for they were always ready, had cover, and always knew the ground
to their immediate front; whereas we, their assailants, had to
grope our way over unknown ground, and generally found a cleared
field or prepared entanglements that held us for a time under a
close and withering fire.  Rarely did the opposing lines in compact
order come into actual contact, but when, as at Peach-Tree Creek
and Atlanta, the lines did become commingled, the men fought
individually in every possible style, more frequently with the
musket clubbed than with the bayonet, and in some instances the men
clinched like wrestlers, and went to the ground together.
Europeans frequently criticised our war, because we did not always
take full advantage of a victory; the true reason was, that
habitually the woods served as a screen, and we often did not
realize the fact that our enemy had retreated till he was already
miles away and was again intrenched, having left a mere
skirmish-line to cover the movement, in turn to fall back to the
new position.

Our war was fought with the muzzle-loading rifle.  Toward the close
I had one brigade (Walcutt's) armed with breech-loading "Spencer's;"
the cavalry generally had breach-loading carbines, "Spencer's" and
"Sharp's," both of which were good arms.

The only change that breech-loading arms will probably make in the
art and practice of war will be to increase the amount of
ammunition to be expended, and necessarily to be carried along; to
still further "thin out" the lines of attack, and to reduce battles
to short, quick, decisive conflicts.  It does not in the least
affect the grand strategy, or the necessity for perfect
organization, drill, and discipline.  The, companies and battalions
will be more dispersed, and the men will be less under the
immediate eye of their officers, and therefore a higher order of
intelligence and courage on the part of the individual soldier will
be an element of strength.

When a regiment is deployed as skirmishers, and crosses an open
field or woods, under heavy fire, if each man runs forward from
tree to tree, or stump to stump, and yet preserves a good general
alignment, it gives great confidence to the men themselves, for
they always keep their eyes well to the right and left, and watch
their comrades; but when some few hold back, stick too close or too
long to a comfortable log, it often stops the line and defeats the
whole object.  Therefore, the more we improve the fire-arm the more
will be the necessity for good organization, good discipline and
intelligence on the part of the individual soldier and officer.
There is, of course, such a thing as individual courage, which has
a value in war, but familiarity with danger, experience in war and
its common attendants, and personal habit, are equally valuable
traits, and these are the qualities with which we usually have to
deal in war.  All men naturally shrink from pain and danger, and
only incur their risk from some higher motive, or from habit; so
that I would define true courage to be a perfect sensibility of the
measure of danger, and a mental willingness to incur it, rather
than that insensibility to danger of which I have heard far more
than I have seen.  The most courageous men are generally
unconscious of possessing the quality; therefore, when one
professes it too openly, by words or bearing, there is reason to
mistrust it.  I would further illustrate my meaning by describing a
man of true courage to be one who possesses all his faculties and
senses perfectly when serious danger is actually present.

Modern wars have not materially changed the relative values or
proportions of the several arms of service: infantry, artillery,
cavalry, and engineers.  If any thing, the infantry has been
increased in value.  The danger of cavalry attempting to charge
infantry armed with breech-loading rifles was fully illustrated at
Sedan, and with us very frequently.  So improbable has such a thing
become that we have omitted the infantry-square from our recent
tactics.  Still, cavalry against cavalry, and as auxiliary to
infantry, will always be valuable, while all great wars will, as
heretofore, depend chiefly on the infantry.  Artillery is more
valuable with new and inexperienced troops than with veterans.  In
the early stages of the war the field-guns often bore the
proportion of six to a thousand men; but toward the close of the
war one gun; or at most two, to a thousand men, was deemed enough.
Sieges; such as characterized the wars of the last century, are too
slow for this period of the world, and the Prussians recently
almost ignored them altogether, penetrated France between the
forts, and left a superior force "in observation," to watch the
garrison and accept its surrender when the greater events of the
war ahead made further resistance useless; but earth-forts, and
especially field-works, will hereafter play an important part in
war, because they enable a minor force to hold a superior one in
check for a time, and time is a most valuable element in all wars.
It was one of Prof. Mahan's maxims that the spade was as useful in
war as the musket, and to this I will add the axe.  The habit of
intrenching certainly does have the effect of making new troops
timid.  When a line of battle is once covered by a good parapet,
made by the engineers or by the labor of the men themselves, it
does require an effort to make them leave it in the face of danger;
but when the enemy is intrenched, it becomes absolutely necessary
to permit each brigade and division of the troops immediately
opposed to throw up a corresponding trench for their own protection
in case of a sudden sally.  We invariably did this in all our
recent campaigns, and it had no ill effect, though sometimes our
troops were a little too slow in leaving their well-covered lines
to assail the enemy in position or on retreat.  Even our
skirmishers were in the habit of rolling logs together, or of
making a lunette of rails, with dirt in front, to cover their
bodies; and, though it revealed their position, I cannot say that
it worked a bad effect; so that, as a rule, it may safely be left
to the men themselves: On the "defensive," there is no doubt of the
propriety of fortifying; but in the assailing army the general must
watch closely to see that his men do not neglect an opportunity to
drop his precautionary defenses, and act promptly on the
"offensive" at every chance.

I have many a time crept forward to the skirmish-line to avail
myself of the cover of the pickets "little fort," to observe more
closely some expected result; and always talked familiarly with the
men, and was astonished to see how well they comprehended the
general object, and how accurately they were informed of the sate
of facts existing miles away from their particular corps.  Soldiers
are very quick to catch the general drift and purpose of a
campaign, and are always sensible when they are well commanded or
well cared for.  Once impressed with this fact, and that they are
making progress, they bear cheerfully any amount of labor and
privation.

In camp, and especially in the presence of an active enemy, it is
much easier to maintain discipline than in barracks in time of
peace.  Crime and breaches of discipline are much less frequent,
and the necessity for courts-martial far less.  The captain can
usually inflict all the punishment necessary, and the colonel
should always.  The field-officers' court is the best form for war,
viz., one of the field-officers-the lieutenant-colonel or major
--can examine the case and report his verdict, and the colonel
should execute it.  Of course, there are statutory offenses which
demand a general court-martial, and these must be ordered by the
division or corps commander; but, the presence of one of our
regular civilian judge-advocates in an army in the field would be a
first-class nuisance, for technical courts always work mischief.
Too many courts-martial in any command are evidence of poor
discipline and inefficient officers.

For the rapid transmission of orders in an army covering a large
space of ground, the magnetic telegraph is by far the best, though
habitually the paper and pencil, with good mounted orderlies,
answer every purpose.  I have little faith in the signal-service by
flags and torches, though we always used them; because, almost
invariably when they were most needed, the view was cut off by
intervening trees, or by mists and fogs.  There was one notable
instance in my experience, when the signal-flags carried a message.
of vital importance over the heads of Hood's army, which had
interposed between me and Allatoona, and had broken the
telegraph-wires--as recorded in Chapter XIX.; but the value of the
magnetic telegraph in war cannot be exaggerated, as was illustrated
by the perfect concert of action between the armies in Virginia and
Georgia during 1864.  Hardly a day intervened when General Grant
did not know the exact state of facts with me, more than fifteen
hundred miles away as the wires ran.  So on the field a thin
insulated wire may be run on improvised stakes or from tree to tree
for six or more miles in a couple of hours, and I have seen
operators so skillful, that by cutting the wire they would receive
a message with their tongues from a distant station.  As a matter
of course, the ordinary commercial wires along the railways form
the usual telegraph-lines for an army, and these are easily
repaired and extended as the army advances, but each army and wing
should have a small party of skilled men to put up the field-wire,
and take it down when done.  This is far better than the
signal-flags and torches.  Our commercial telegraph-lines will
always supply for war enough skillful operators.

The value of railways is also fully recognized in war quite as much
as, if not more so than, in peace.  The Atlanta campaign would
simply have been impossible without the use of the railroads from
Louisville to Nashville--one hundred and eighty-five miles--from
Nashville to Chattanooga--one hundred and fifty-one miles--and from
Chattanooga to Atlanta--one hundred and thirty-seven miles.  Every
mile of this "single track" was so delicate, that one man could in
a minute have broken or moved a rail, but our trains usually
carried along the tools and means to repair such a break.  We had,
however, to maintain strong guards and garrisons at each important
bridge or trestle--the destruction of which would have necessitated
time for rebuilding.  For the protection of a bridge, one or two
log block houses, two stories high, with a piece of ordnance and a
small infantry guard, usually sufficed.  The block-house had a
small parapet and ditch about it, and the roof was made shot proof
by earth piled on.  These points could usually be reached only by a
dash of the enemy's cavalry, and many of these block houses
successfully resisted serious attacks by both cavalry and
artillery. The only block-house that was actually captured on the
main was the one described near Allatoona.  Our trains from
Nashville forward were operated under military rules, and ran about
ten miles an hour in gangs of four trains of ten cars each.  Four
such groups of trains daily made one hundred and sixty cars, of ten
tons each, carrying sixteen hundred tons, which exceeded the
absolute necessity of the army, and allowed for the accidents that
were common and inevitable.  But, as I have recorded, that single
stem of railroad, four hundred and seventy-three miles long,
supplied an army of one hundred thousand men and thirty-five
thousand animals for the period of one hundred and ninety-six days,
viz., from May 1 to November 12, 1864.  To have delivered regularly
that amount of food and forage by ordinary wagons would have
required thirty-six thousand eight hundred wagons of six mules
each, allowing each wagon to have hauled two tons twenty miles each
day, a simple impossibility in roads such as then existed in that
region of country.  Therefore, I reiterate that the Atlanta
campaign was an impossibility without these railroads; and only
then, because we had the men and means to maintain and defend them,
in addition to what were necessary to overcome the enemy.
Habitually, a passenger-car will carry fifty men with their
necessary baggage.  Box-cars, and even platform-cars, answer the
purpose well enough, but they, should always have rough
board-seats.  For sick and wounded men, box-cars filled with straw
or bushes were usually employed.  Personally, I saw but little of
the practical working of the railroads, for I only turned back once
as far as Resaca; but I had daily reports from the engineer in
charge, and officers who came from the rear often explained to me
the whole thing, with a description of the wrecked trains all the
way from Nashville to Atlanta.  I am convinced that the risk to
life to the engineers and men on that railroad fully equaled that
on the skirmish-line, called for as high an order of courage, and
fully equaled it in importance.  Still, I doubt if there be any
necessity in time of peace to organize a corps specially to work
the military railroads in time of war, because in peace these same
men gain all the necessary experience, possess all the daring and
courage of soldiers, and only need the occasional protection and
assistance of the necessary train-guard, which may be composed of
the furloughed men coming and going, or of details made from the
local garrisons to the rear.

For the transfer of large armies by rail, from one theatre of
action to another by the rear--the cases of the transfer of the
Eleventh and Twelfth Corps--General Hooker, twenty-three thousand
men--from the East to Chattanooga, eleven hundred and ninety-two
miles in seven days, in the fall of 1863; and that of the Army of
the Ohio--General Schofield, fifteen thousand men--from the valley
of the Tennessee to Washington, fourteen hundred miles in eleven
days, en route to North Carolina in January, 1865, are the best
examples of which I have any knowledge, and reference to these is
made in the report of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, dated
November 22, 1865.

Engineer troops attached to an army are habitually employed in
supervising the construction of forts or field works of a nature
more permanent than the lines need by the troops in motion, and in
repairing roads and making bridges.  I had several regiments of
this kind that were most useful, but as a rule we used the
infantry, or employed parties of freedmen, who worked on the
trenches at night while the soldiers slept, and these in turn
rested by day.  Habitually the repair of the railroad and its
bridges was committed to hired laborers, like the English navies,
under the supervision of Colonel W. W. Wright, a railroad-engineer,
who was in the military service at the time, and his successful
labors were frequently referred to in the official reports of the
campaign.

For the passage of rivers, each army corps had a pontoon-train with
a detachment of engineers, and, on reaching a river, the leading
infantry division was charged with the labor of putting it down.
Generally the single pontoon-train could provide for nine hundred
feet of bridge, which sufficed; but when the rivers were very wide
two such trains would be brought together, or the single train was
supplemented by a trestle-bridge, or bridges made on crib-work, out
of timber found near the place.  The pontoons in general use were
skeleton frames, made with a hinge, so as to fold back and
constitute a wagon-body.  In this same wagon were carried the
cotton canvas cover, the anchor and chains, and a due proportion of
the balks, cheeses, and lashings.  All the troops became very
familiar with their mechanism and use, and we were rarely delayed
by reason of a river, however broad.  I saw, recently, in
Aldershot, England, a very complete pontoon-train; the boats were
sheathed with wood and felt, made very light; but I think these
were more liable to chafing and damage in rough handling than were
our less expensive and rougher boats.  On the whole, I would prefer
the skeleton frame and canvas cover to any style of pontoon that I
have ever seen.

In relation to guards, pickets, and vedettes, I doubt if any
discoveries or improvements were made during our war, or in any of
the modern wars in Europe.  These precautions vary with the nature
of the country and the situation of each army.  When advancing or
retreating in line of battle, the usual skirmish-line constitutes
the picket-line, and may have "reserves," but usually the main line
of battle constitutes the reserve; and in this connection I will
state that the recent innovation introduced into the new infantry
tactics by General Upton is admirable, for by it each regiment,
brigade, and division deployed, sends forward as "skirmishers" the
one man of each set of fours, to cover its own front, and these can
be recalled or reenforced at pleasure by the bugle-signal.

For flank-guards and rear-guards, one or more companies should be
detached under their own officers, instead of making up the guard
by detailing men from the several companies.

For regimental or camp guards, the details should be made according
to existing army regulations; and all the guards should be posted
early in the evening, so as to afford each sentinel or vedette a
chance to study his ground before it becomes too dark.

In like manner as to the staff.  The more intimately it comes into
contact with the troops, the more useful and valuable it becomes.
The almost entire separation of the staff from the line, as now
practised by us, and hitherto by the French, has proved
mischievous, and the great retinues of staff-officers with which
some of our earlier generals began the war were simply ridiculous.
I don't believe in a chief of staff at all, and any general
commanding an army, corps, or division, that has a staff-officer
who professes to know more than his chief, is to be pitied.  Each
regiment should have a competent adjutant, quartermaster, and
commissary, with two or three medical officers.  Each brigade
commander should have the same staff, with the addition of a couple
of young aides-de-camp, habitually selected from the subalterns of
the brigade, who should be good riders, and intelligent enough to
give and explain the orders of their general.

The same staff will answer for a division.  The general in command
of a separate army, and of a corps d'armee, should have the same
professional assistance, with two or more good engineers, and his
adjutant-general should exercise all the functions usually ascribed
to a chief of staff, viz., he should possess the ability to
comprehend the scope of operations, and to make verbally and in
writing all the orders and details necessary to carry into effect
the views of his general, as well as to keep the returns and
records of events for the information of the next higher authority,
and for history.  A bulky staff implies a division of
responsibility, slowness of action, and indecision, whereas a small
staff implies activity and concentration of purpose.  The smallness
of General Grant's staff throughout the civil war forms the best
model for future imitation.  So of tents, officers furniture, etc.,
etc.  In real war these should all be discarded, and an army is
efficient for action and motion exactly in the inverse ratio of its
impedimenta.  Tents should be omitted altogether, save one to a
regiment for an office, and a few for the division hospital.
Officers should be content with a tent fly, improvising poles and
shelter out of bushes.  The tents d'abri, or shelter-tent, carried
by the soldier himself, is all-sufficient.  Officers should never
seek for houses, but share the condition of their men.

A recent message (July 18, 1874) made to the French Assembly by
Marshal MacMahon, President of the French Republic, submits a
projet de loi, with a report prepared by a board of French generals
on "army administration," which is full of information, and is as
applicable to us as to the French.  I quote from its very
beginning: "The misfortunes of the campaign of 1870 have
demonstrated the inferiority of our system....  Two separate
organizations existed with parallel functions--the 'general' more
occupied in giving direction to his troops than in providing for
their material wants, which he regarded as the special province of
the staff, and the 'intendant' (staff) often working at random,
taking on his shoulders a crushing burden of functions and duties,
exhausting himself with useless efforts, and aiming to accomplish
an insufficient service, to the disappointment of everybody.  This
separation of the administration and command, this coexistence of
two wills, each independent of the other, which paralyzed both and
annulled the dualism, was condemned.  It was decided by the board
that this error should be "proscribed" in the new military system.
The report then goes on at great length discussing the provisions.
of the "new law," which is described to be a radical change from
the old one on the same subject.  While conceding to the Minister
of War in Paris the general control and supervision of the entire
military establishment primarily, especially of the annual
estimates or budget, and the great depots of supply, it distributes
to the commanders of the corps d'armee in time of peace, and to all
army commanders generally in time of war, the absolute command of
the money, provisions, and stores, with the necessary staff-
officers to receive, issue, and account for them.  I quote further:
"The object of this law is to confer on the commander of troops
whatever liberty of action the case demands.  He has the power even
to go beyond the regulations, in circumstances of urgency and
pressing necessity.  The extraordinary measures he may take on
these occasions may require their execution without delay.  The
staff-officer has but one duty before obeying, and that is to
submit his observations to the general, and to ask his orders in
writing.

With this formality his responsibility ceases, and the
responsibility for the extraordinary act falls solely on the
general who gives the order.  The officers and agents charged with
supplies are placed under the orders of the general in command of
the troops, that is, they are obliged both in war and peace to
obey, with the single qualification above named, of first making
their observations and securing the written order of the general.

With us, to-day, the law and regulations are that, no matter what
may be the emergency, the commanding general in Texas, New Mexico,
and the remote frontiers, cannot draw from the arsenals a pistol-
cartridge, or any sort of ordnance-stores, without first procuring
an order of the Secretary of War in Washington.  The commanding
general--though intrusted with the lives of his soldiers and with
the safety of a frontier in a condition of chronic war--cannot
touch or be trusted with ordnance-stores or property, and that is
declared to be the law!  Every officer of the old army remembers
how, in 1861, we were hampered with the old blue army regulations,
which  tied our hands, and that to do any thing positive and
necessary we had to tear it all to pieces--cut the red-tape, as it
was called, a dangerous thing for an army to do, for it was
calculated to bring the law and authority into contempt; but war
was upon us, and overwhelming necessity overrides all law.

This French report is well worth the study of our army-officers, of
all grades and classes, and I will only refer again, casually, to
another part, wherein it discusses the subject of military
correspondence: whether the staff-officer should correspond
directly with his chief in Paris, submitting to his general copies,
or whether he should be required to carry on his correspondence
through his general, so that the latter could promptly forward the
communication, indorsed with his own remarks and opinions.  The
latter is declared by the board to be the only safe role, because
"the general should never be ignorant of any thing that is
transpiring that concerns his command."

In this country, as in France, Congress controls the great
questions of war and peace, makes all laws for the creation and
government of armies, and votes the necessary supplies, leaving to
the President to execute and apply these laws, especially the
harder task of limiting the expenditure of public money to the
amount of the annual appropriations.  The executive power is
further subdivided into the seven great departments, and to the
Secretary of War is confided the general care of the military
establishment, and his powers are further subdivided into ten
distinct and separate bureaus.

The chiefs of these bureaus are under the immediate orders of the
Secretary of War, who, through them, in fact commands the army from
"his office," but cannot do so "in the field"--an absurdity in
military if not civil law.

The subordinates of these staff-corps and departments are selected
and chosen from the army itself, or fresh from West Point, and too
commonly construe themselves into the elite, as made of better clay
than the common soldier.  Thus they separate themselves more and
more from their comrades of the line, and in process of time
realize the condition of that old officer of artillery who thought
the army would be a delightful place for a gentleman if it were not
for the d-d soldier; or, better still, the conclusion of the young
lord in "Henry IV.," who told Harry Percy (Hotspur) that "but for
these vile guns he would himself have been a soldier."  This is all
wrong; utterly at variance with our democratic form of government
and of universal experience; and now that the French, from whom we
had copied the system, have utterly "proscribed" it, I hope that
our Congress will follow suit.  I admit, in its fullest force, the
strength of the maxim that the civil law should be superior to the
military in time of peace; that the army should be at all times
subject to the direct control of Congress; and I assert that, from
the formation of our Government to the present day, the Regular
Army has set the highest example of obedience to law and authority;
but, for the very reason that our army is comparatively so very
small, I hold that it should be the best possible, organized and
governed on true military principles, and that in time of peace we
should preserve the "habits and usages of war," so that, when war
does come, we may not again be compelled to suffer the disgrace,
confusion, and disorder of 1861.

The commanding officers of divisions, departments, and posts,
should have the amplest powers, not only to command their troops,
but all the stores designed for their use, and the officers of the
staff necessary to administer them, within the area of their
command; and then with fairness they could be held to the most
perfect responsibility.  The President and Secretary of War can
command the army quite as well through these generals as through
the subordinate staff-officers.  Of course, the Secretary would, as
now, distribute the funds according to the appropriation bills, and
reserve to himself the absolute control and supervision of the
larger arsenals and depots of supply.  The error lies in the law,
or in the judicial interpretation thereof, and no code of army
regulations can be made that meets the case, until Congress, like
the French Corps Legislatif, utterly annihilates and "proscribes"
the old law and the system which has grown up under it.

It is related of Napoleon that his last words were, "Tete d'armee!"
Doubtless, as the shadow of death obscured his memory, the last
thought that remained for speech was of some event when he was
directing an important "head of column."  I believe that every
general who has handled armies in battle most recall from his own
experience the intensity of thought on some similar occasion, when
by a single command he had given the finishing stroke to some
complicated action; but to me recurs another thought that is worthy
of record, and may encourage others who are to follow us in our
profession.  I never saw the rear of an army engaged in battle but
I feared that some calamity had happened at the front the apparent
confusion, broken wagons, crippled horses, men lying about dead and
maimed, parties hastening to and fro in seeming disorder, and a
general apprehension of something dreadful about to ensue; all
these signs, however, lessened as I neared the front, and there the
contrast was complete--perfect order, men and horses--full of
confidence, and it was not unusual for general hilarity, laughing,
and cheering.  Although cannon might be firing, the musketry
clattering, and the enemy's shot hitting close, there reigned a
general feeling of strength and security that bore a marked
contrast to the bloody signs that had drifted rapidly to the rear;
therefore, for comfort and safety, I surely would rather be at the
front than the rear line of battle.  So also on the march, the head
of a column moves on steadily, while the rear is alternately
halting and then rushing forward to close up the gap; and all sorts
of rumors, especially the worst, float back to the rear.  Old
troops invariably deem it a special privilege to be in the front
--to be at the "head of column"--because experience has taught them
that it is the easiest and most comfortable place, and danger only
adds zest and stimulus to this fact.

The hardest task in war is to lie in support of some position or
battery, under fire without the privilege of returning it; or to
guard some train left in the rear, within hearing but out of
danger; or to provide for the wounded and dead of some corps which
is too busy ahead to care for its own.

To be at the head of a strong column of troops, in the execution of
some task that requires brain, is the highest pleasure of war--a
grim one and terrible, but which leaves on the mind and memory the
strongest mark; to detect the weak point of an enemy's line; to
break through with vehemence and thus lead to victory; or to
discover some key-point and hold it with tenacity; or to do some
other distinct act which is afterward recognized as the real cause
of success.  These all become matters that are never forgotten.
Other great difficulties, experienced by every general, are to
measure truly the thousand-and-one reports that come to him in the
midst of conflict; to preserve a clear and well-defined purpose at
every instant of time, and to cause all efforts to converge to that
end.

To do these things he must know perfectly the strength and quality
of each part of his own army, as well as that of his opponent, and
must be where he can personally see and observe with his own eyes,
and judge with his own mind.  No man can properly command an army
from the rear, he must be "at its front;" and when a detachment is
made, the commander thereof should be informed of the object to be
accomplished, and left as free as possible to execute it in his own
way; and when an army is divided up into several parts, the
superior should always attend that one which he regards as most
important.  Some men think that modern armies may be so regulated
that a general can sit in an office and play on his several columns
as on the keys of a piano; this is a fearful mistake.  The
directing mind must be at the very head of the army--must be seen
there, and the effect of his mind and personal energy must be felt
by every officer and man present with it, to secure the best
results.  Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in
humiliation and disaster.

Lastly, mail facilities should be kept up with an army if possible,
that officers and men may receive and send letters to their
friends, thus maintaining the home influence of infinite assistance
to discipline.  Newspaper correspondents with an army, as a rule,
are mischievous.  They are the world's gossips, pick up and retail
the camp scandal, and gradually drift to the headquarters of some
general, who finds it easier to make reputation at home than with
his own corps or division.  They are also tempted to prophesy
events and state facts which, to an enemy, reveal a purpose in time
to guard against it.  Moreover, they are always bound to see facts
colored by the partisan or political character of their own
patrons, and thus bring army officers into the political
controversies of the day, which are always mischievous and wrong.
Yet, so greedy are the people at large for war news, that it is
doubtful whether any army commander can exclude all reporters,
without bringing down on himself a clamor that may imperil his own
safety.  Time and moderation must bring a just solution to this
modern difficulty.



CHAPTER XXVI.

AFTER THE WAR

In the foregoing pages I have endeavored to describe the public
events in which I was an actor or spectator before and during the
civil war of 1861-'65, and it now only remains for me to treat of
similar matters of general interest subsequent to the civil war.
Within a few days of the grand review of May 24, 1865, I took leave
of the army at Washington, and with my family went to Chicago to
attend a fair held in the interest of the families of soldiers
impoverished by the war.  I remained there about two weeks; on the
22d of June was at South Bend, Indiana, where two of my children
were at school, and reached my native place, Lancaster, Ohio, on
the 24th.  On the 4th of July I visited at Louisville, Kentucky,
the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Army Corps,
which had come from Washington, under the command of General John
A. Logan, for "muster out," or "further orders."  I then made a
short visit to General George H. Thomas at Nashville, and returned
to Lancaster, where I remained with the family till the receipt of
General Orders No. 118 of June 27, 1865, which divided the whole
territory of the United States into nineteen departments and five
military divisions, the second of which was the military division
of the "Mississippi," afterward changed to "Missouri," Major-
General W. T. Sherman to command, with, headquarters at St. Louis,
to embrace the Departments of the Ohio, Missouri, and Arkansas.

This territorial command included the States north of the Ohio
River, and the States and Territories north of Texas, as far west
as the Rocky Mountains, including Montana, Utah, and New Mexico,
but the part east of the Mississippi was soon transferred to
another division.  The department commanders were General E. O. C.
Ord, at Detroit; General John Pope, at Fort Leavenworth; and
General J. J. Reynolds, at Little Rock, but these also were soon
changed.  I at once assumed command, and ordered my staff and
headquarters from Washington to St. Louis, Missouri, going there in
person on the 16th of July.

My thoughts and feelings at once reverted to the construction of
the great Pacific Railway, which had been chartered by Congress in
the midst of war, and was then in progress.  I put myself in
communication with the parties engaged in the work, visiting them
in person, and assured them that I would afford them all possible
assistance and encouragement.  Dr. Durant, the leading man of the
Union Pacific, seemed to me a person of ardent nature, of great
ability and energy, enthusiastic in his undertaking, and determined
to build the road from Omaha to San Francisco.  He had an able
corps of assistants, collecting materials, letting out contracts
for ties, grading, etc., and I attended the celebration of the
first completed division of sixteen and a half miles, from Omaha to
Papillon.  When the orators spoke so confidently of the
determination to build two thousand miles of railway across the
plains, mountains, and desert, devoid of timber, with no
population, but on the contrary raided by the bold and bloody Sioux
and Cheyennes, who had almost successfully defied our power for
half a century, I was disposed to treat it jocularly, because I
could not help recall our California experience of 1855-'56, when
we celebrated the completion of twenty-two and a half miles of the
same road eastward of Sacramento; on which occasion Edward Baker
had electrified us by his unequalled oratory, painting the glorious
things which would result from uniting the Western coast with the
East by bands of iron.  Baker then, with a poet's imagination, saw
the vision of the mighty future, but not the gulf which meantime
was destined to swallow up half a million of the brightest and best
youth of our land, and that he himself would be one of the first
victims far away on the banks of the Potomac (he was killed in
battle at Balls Bluff, October 21, 1861).

The Kansas Pacific was designed to unite with the main branch about
the 100 deg. meridian, near Fort Kearney.  Mr. Shoemaker was its
general superintendent and building contractor, and this branch in
1865 was finished about forty miles to a point near Lawrence,
Kansas.  I may not be able to refer to these roads again except
incidentally, and will, therefore, record here that the location of
this branch afterward was changed from the Republican to the Smoky
Hill Fork of the Kansas River, and is now the main line to Denver.
The Union and Central Railroads from the beginning were pushed with
a skill, vigor, and courage which always commanded my admiration,
the two meeting at Promontory Point, Utah, July 15, 1869, and in my
judgment constitute one of the greatest and most beneficent
achievements of man on earth.

The construction of the Union Pacific Railroad was deemed so
important that the President, at my suggestion, constituted on the
5th of March, 1866, the new Department of the Platte, General P.
St. George Cooke commanding, succeeded by General C. C. Augur,
headquarters at Omaha, with orders to give ample protection to the
working-parties, and to afford every possible assistance in the
construction of the road; and subsequently in like manner the
Department of Dakota was constituted, General A. H. Terry
commanding, with headquarters at St. Paul, to give similar
protection and encouragement to the Northern Pacific Railroad.
These departments, with changed commanders, have continued up to
the present day, and have fulfilled perfectly the uses for which
they were designed.

During the years 1865 and 1866 the great plains remained almost in
a state of nature, being the pasture-fields of about ten million
buffalo, deer, elk, and antelope, and were in full possession of
the Sioux, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Kiowas, a race of bold
Indians, who saw plainly that the construction of two parallel
railroads right through their country would prove destructive to
the game on which they subsisted, and consequently fatal to
themselves.

The troops were posted to the best advantage to protect the parties
engaged in building these roads, and in person I reconnoitred well
to the front, traversing the buffalo regions from south to north,
and from east to west, often with a very small escort, mingling
with the Indians whenever safe, and thereby gained personal
knowledge of matters which enabled me to use the troops to the best
advantage.  I am sure that without the courage and activity of the
department commanders with the small bodies of regular troops on
the plains during the years 1866-'69, the Pacific Railroads could
not have been built; but once built and in full operation the fate
of the buffalo and Indian was settled for all time to come.

At the close of the civil war there were one million five hundred
and sixteen names on the muster-rolls, of which seven hundred and
ninety-seven thousand eight hundred and seven were present, and two
hundred and two thousand seven hundred and nine absent, of which
twenty-two thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine were regulars, the
others were volunteers, colored troops, and veteran reserves.  The
regulars consisted of six regiments of cavalry, five of artillery,
and nineteen of infantry.  By the act of July 28, 1866, the peace
establishment was fixed at one general (Grant), one lieutenant-
general (Sherman), five major-generals (Halleck, Meade, Sheridan,
Thomas, and Hancock), ten brigadiers (McDowell, Cooke, Pope,
Hooker, Schofield, Howard, Terry, Ord, Canby, and Rousseau), ten
regiments of cavalry, five of artillery, and forty-five of
infantry, admitting of an aggregate force of fifty-four thousand
six hundred and forty-one men.

All others were mustered out, and thus were remanded to their homes
nearly a million of strong, vigorous men who had imbibed the
somewhat erratic habits of the soldier; these were of every
profession and trade in life, who, on regaining their homes, found
their places occupied by others, that their friends and neighbors
were different, and that they themselves had changed.  They
naturally looked for new homes to the great West, to the new
Territories and States as far as the Pacific coast, and we realize
to-day that the vigorous men who control Kansas, Nebraska, Dakota,
Montana, Colorado, etc., etc., were soldiers of the civil war.
These men flocked to the plains, and were rather stimulated than
retarded by the danger of an Indian war.  This was another potent
agency in producing the result we enjoy to-day, in having in so
short a time replaced the wild buffaloes by more numerous herds of
tame cattle, and by substituting for the useless Indians the
intelligent owners of productive farms and cattle-ranches.

While these great changes were being wrought at the West, in the
East politics had resumed full sway, and all the methods of
anti-war times had been renewed.  President Johnson had differed
with his party as to the best method of reconstructing the State
governments of the South, which had been destroyed and impoverished
by the war, and the press began to agitate the question of the next
President.  Of course, all Union men naturally turned to General
Grant, and the result was jealousy of him by the personal friends
of President Johnson and some of his cabinet.  Mr. Johnson always
seemed very patriotic and friendly, and I believed him honest and
sincere in his declared purpose to follow strictly the Constitution
of the United States in restoring the Southern States to their
normal place in the Union; but the same cordial friendship
subsisted between General Grant and myself, which was the outgrowth
of personal relations dating back to 1839.  So I resolved to keep
out of this conflict.  In September, 1866, I was in the mountains
of New Mexico, when a message reached me that I was wanted at
Washington.  I had with me a couple of officers and half a dozen
soldiers as escort, and traveled down the Arkansas, through the
Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes, all more or less
disaffected, but reached St. Louis in safety, and proceeded to
Washington, where I reported to General Grant.

He explained to me that President Johnson wanted to see me.  He did
not know the why or wherefore, but supposed it had some connection
with an order he (General Grant) had received to escort the newly
appointed Minister, Hon. Lew Campbell, of Ohio, to the court of
Juarez, the President-elect of Mexico, which country was still in
possession of the Emperor Maximilian, supported by a corps of
French troops commanded by General Bazaine.  General Grant denied
the right of the President to order him on a diplomatic mission
unattended by troops; said that he had thought the matter over,
world disobey the order, and stand the consequences.  He manifested
much feeling; and said it was a plot to get rid of him.  I then
went to President Johnson, who treated me with great cordiality,
and said that he was very glad I had come; that General Grant was
about to go to Mexico on business of importance, and he wanted me
at Washington to command the army in General Grant's absence.  I
then informed him that General Grant would not go, and he seemed
amazed; said that it was generally understood that General Grant
construed the occupation of the territories of our neighbor,
Mexico, by French troops, and the establishment of an empire
therein, with an Austrian prince at its head, as hostile to
republican America, and that the Administration had arranged with
the French Government for the withdrawal of Bazaine's troops, which
would leave the country free for the President-elect Juarez to
reoccupy the city of Mexico, etc., etc.; that Mr. Campbell had been
accredited to Juarez, and the fact that he was accompanied by so
distinguished a soldier as General Grant would emphasize the act of
the United States.  I simply reiterated that General Grant would
not go, and that he, Mr. Johnson, could not afford to quarrel with
him at that time.  I further argued that General Grant was at the
moment engaged on the most delicate and difficult task of
reorganizing the army under the act of July 28, 1866; that if the
real object was to put Mr. Campbell in official communication with
President Juarez, supposed to be at El Paso or Monterey, either
General Hancock, whose command embraced New Mexico, or General
Sheridan, whose command included Texas, could fulfill the object
perfectly; or, in the event of neither of these alternates proving
satisfactory to the Secretary of State, that I could be easier
spared than General Grant.  "Certainly," answered the President,
"if you will go, that will answer perfectly."

The instructions of the Secretary of State, W. H. Seward, to Hon.
Lewis D.  Campbell, Minister to Mexico, dated October 25, 1866; a
letter from President Johnson to Secretary of War Stanton, dated
October 26, 1866; and the letter of Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of
War, to General Grant, dated October 27th, had been already
prepared and printed, and the originals or copies were furnished
me; but on the 30th of October, 1866, the following letter passed


EXECUTIVE MANSION

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 30,1866.

SIR: General Ulysses S. Grant having found it inconvenient to
assume the duties specified in my letter to you of the 26th inst.,
you will please relieve him, and assign them in all respects to
William T. Sherman, Lieutenant-General of the Army of the United
States.  By way of guiding General Sherman in the performance of
his duties, you will furnish him with a copy of your special orders
to General Grant made in compliance with my letter of the 26th
inst., together with a copy of the instructions of the Secretary of
State to Lewis D. Campbell, Esq., therein mentioned.

The lieutenant-general will proceed to the execution of his duties
without delay.

Very respectfully yours,

ANDREW JOHNSON
To the Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

At the Navy Department I learned that the United States ship
Susquehanna, Captain Alden, was fitting out in New York for the use
of this mission, and that there would be time for me to return to
St. Louis to make arrangements for a prolonged absence, as also to
communicate with Mr. Campbell, who was still at his home in
Hamilton, Ohio.  By correspondence we agreed to meet in New York,
November 8th, he accompanied by Mr. Plumb, secretary of legation,
and I by my aide, Colonel Audenried.

We embarked November 10th, and went to sea next day, making for
Havana and Vera Cruz, and, as soon as we were outside of Sandy
Hook, I explained to Captain Alden that my mission was ended,
because I believed by substituting myself for General Grant I had
prevented a serious quarrel between him and the Administration,
which was unnecessary.  We reached Havana on the 18th, with nothing
to vary the monotony of an ordinary sea-voyage, except off Hatteras
we picked up one woman and twenty men from open boats, who had just
abandoned a propeller bound from Baltimore to Charleston which
foundered.  The sea was very rough, but by the personal skill and
supervision of Captain Alden every soul reached our deck safely,
and was carried to our consul at Havana.  At Havana we were very
handsomely entertained, especially by Senor Aldama, who took us by
rail to his sugar-estates at Santa Ross, and back by Matanzas.

We took our departure thence on the 25th, and anchored under Isla
Verde, off Vera Cruz, on the 29th.

Everything about Vera Cruz indicated the purpose of the French to
withdraw, and also that the Emperor Maximilian would precede them,
for the Austrian frigate Dandolo was in port, and an Austrian bark,
on which were received, according to the report of our consul, Mr.
Lane, as many as eleven hundred packages of private furniture to be
transferred to Miramar, Maximilian's home; and Lieutenant Clarin,
of the French navy, who visited the Susquehanna from the French
commodore, Clouet, told me, without reserve, that, if we had
delayed eight days more, we would have found Maximilian gone.
General Bazaine was reported to be in the city of Mexico with about
twenty-eight thousand French troops; but instead of leaving Mexico
in three detachments, viz., November, 1866, March, 1867, and
November, 1867, as described in Mr. Seward's letter to Mr.
Campbell, of October 25, 1866, it looked to me that, as a soldier,
he would evacuate at some time before November, 1867, all at once,
and not by detachments.  Lieutenant Clarin telegraphed Bazaine at
the city of Mexico the fact of our arrival, and he sent me a most
courteous and pressing invitation to come up to the city; but, as
we were accredited to the government of Juarez, it was considered
undiplomatic to establish friendly relations with the existing
authorities.  Meantime we could not hear a word of Juarez, and
concluded to search for him along the coast northward.  When I was
in Versailles, France, July, 1872, learning that General Bazaine
was in arrest for the surrender of his army and post at Metz, in
1870, I wanted to call on him to thank him for his courteous
invitation to me at Vera Cruz in 1866.  I inquired of President
Thiera if I could with propriety call on the marshal.  He answered
that it would be very acceptable, no doubt, but suggested for
form's sake that I should consult the Minister of War, General de
Cissey, which I did, and he promptly assented.  Accordingly, I
called with my aide, Colonel Audenried, on Marshal Bazaine, who
occupied a small, two-story stone house at Versailles, in an
inclosure with a high garden wall, at the front gate or door of
which was a lodge, in which was a military guard.  We were shown to
a good room on the second floor, where was seated the marshal in
military half-dress, with large head, full face, short neck, and
evidently a man of strong physique.  He did not speak English, but
spoke Spanish perfectly.  We managed to carry on a conversation in
which I endeavored to convey my sense of his politeness in inviting
me so cordially up to the city of Mexico, and my regret that the
peculiar duty on which I was engaged did not admit of a compliance,
or even of an intelligent explanation, at the time.  He spoke of
the whole Mexican business as a "sad affair," that the empire
necessarily fell with the result of our civil war, and that poor
Maximilian was sacrificed to his own high sense of honor.

While on board the Susquehanna, on the 1st day of December, 1866,
we received the proclamation made by the Emperor Maximilian at
Orizaba, in which, notwithstanding the near withdrawal of the
French troops, he declared his purpose to remain and "shed the last
drop of his blood in defense of his dear country."  Undoubtedly
many of the most substantial people of Mexico, having lost all
faith in the stability of the native government, had committed
themselves to what they considered the more stable government of
Maximilian, and Maximilian, a man of honor, concluded at the last
moment he could not abandon them; the consequence was his death.

Failing to hear of Juarez, we steamed up the coast to the Island of
Lobos, and on to Tampico, off which we found the United States
steamer Paul Jones, which, drawing less water than the Susquehanna,
carried us over the bar to the city, then in possession of the
Liberal party, which recognized Juarez as their constitutional
President, but of Juarez and his whereabout we could hear not a
word; so we continued up the coast and anchored off Brazos
Santiago, December 7th.  Going ashore in small boats, we found a
railroad, under the management of General J. R. West, now one of
the commissioners of the city of Washington, who sent us up to
Brownsville, Texas.  We met on the way General Sheridan, returning
from a tour of inspection of the Rio Grande frontier.  On Sunday,
December 9th, we were all at Matamoras, Mexico, where we met
General Escobedo, one of Juarez's trusty lieutenants, who developed
to us the general plan agreed on for the overthrow of the empire,
and the reestablishment of the republican government of Mexico.  He
asked of us no assistance, except the loan of some arms,
ammunition, clothing, and camp-equipage.  It was agreed that Mr.
Campbell should, as soon as he could get his baggage off the
Susquehanna, return to Matamoras, and thence proceed to Monterey,
to be received by Juarez in person as, the accredited Minister of
the United States to the Republic of Mexico.  Meantime the weather
off the coast was stormy, and the Susquehanna parted a cable, so
that we were delayed some days at Brazos; but in due time Mr.
Campbell got his baggage, and we regained the deck of the
Susquehanna, which got up steam and started for New Orleans.  We
reached New Orleans December 20th, whence I reported fully
everything to General Grant, and on the 21st received the following
dispatch:

WASHINGTON, December 21,1866.
Lieutenant-General SHERMAN, New Orleans.

Your telegram of yesterday has been submitted to the President.
You are authorized to proceed to St. Louis at your convenience.
Your proceedings in the special and delicate duties assigned you
are cordially approved by the President and Cabinet and this
department.
EDWIN M. STANTON.

And on the same day I received this dispatch

GALVESTON, December 21, 1866.
To General SHERMAN, or General SHERIDAN.

Will be in New Orleans to-morrow.  Wish to see you both on arrival,
on matters of importance.
LEWIS D. CAMPBELL, Minister to Mexico.


Mr. Campbell arrived on the 22d, but had nothing to tell of the
least importance, save that he was generally disgusted with the
whole thing, and had not found Juarez at all.  I am sure this whole
movement was got up for the purpose of getting General Grant away
from Washington, on the pretext of his known antagonism to the
French occupation of Mexico, because he was looming up as a
candidate for President, and nobody understood the animus and
purpose better than did Mr. Stanton.  He himself was not then on
good terms with President Johnson, and with several of his
associates in the Cabinet.  By Christmas I was back in St. Louis.

By this time the conflict between President Johnson and Congress
had become open and unconcealed.  Congress passed the bill known as
the "Tenure of Civil Office" on the 2d of March, 1867 (over the
President's veto), the first clause of which, now section 1767 of
the Revised Statutes, reads thus: "Every person who holds any civil
office to which he has been or hereafter may be appointed, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall have
become duly qualified to act therein, shall be entitled to hold
such office during the term for which he was appointed, unless
sooner removed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or
by the appointment with the like advice and consent of a successor
in his place, except as herein otherwise provided."

General E. D. Townsend, in his "Anecdotes of the Civil War," states
tersely and correctly the preliminary circumstances of which I must
treat.  He says: "On Monday morning, August 5, 1867, President
Johnson invited Mr. Stanton to resign as Secretary of War.  Under
the tenure-of-civil-office law, Mr. Stanton declined.  The President
a week after suspended him, and appointed General Grant, General-
in-Chief of the Army, to exercise the functions.  This continued
until January 13, 1868, when according to the law the Senate passed
a resolution not sustaining the President's action.  The next
morning General Grant came to my office and handed me the key of
the Secretary's room, saying: 'I am to be found over at my office
at army headquarters.  I was served with a copy of the Senate
resolution last evening.'  I then went up-stairs and delivered the
key of his room to Mr. Stanton."

The mode and manner of Mr. Stanton's regaining his office, and of
General Grant's surrendering it, were at the time subjects of
bitter controversy.  Unhappily I was involved, and must bear
testimony.  In all January, 1868, I was a member of a board ordered
to compile a code of articles of war and army regulations, of which
Major-General Sheridan and Brigadier-General C. C. Augur were
associate members.  Our place of meeting was in the room of the old
War Department, second floor, next to the corner room occupied by
the Secretary of War, with a door of communication.  While we were
at work it was common for General Grant and, afterward, for Mr.
Stanton to drop in and chat with us on the social gossip of the
time.

On Saturday, January 11th, General Grant said that he had more
carefully read the law (tenure of civil office), and it was
different from what he had supposed; that in case the Senate did
not consent to the removal of Secretary of War Stanton, and he
(Grant) should hold on, he should incur a liability of ten thousand
dollars and five years' imprisonment.  We all expected the
resolution of Senator Howard, of Michigan, virtually restoring Mr.
Stanton to his office, would pass the Senate, and knowing that the
President expected General Grant to hold on, I inquired if he had
given notice of his change of purpose; he answered that there was
no hurry, because he supposed Mr. Stanton would pursue toward him
(Grant) the same course which he (Stanton) had required of him the
preceding August, viz., would address him a letter claiming the
office, and allow him a couple of days for the change.  Still, he
said he would go to the White House the same day and notify the
President of his intended action.

That afternoon I went over to the White House to present General
Pope, who was on a visit to Washington, and we found the President
and General Grant together.  We made our visit and withdrew,
leaving them still together, and I always supposed the subject of
this conference was the expected decision of the Senate, which
would in effect restore Mr. Stanton to his civil office of
Secretary of War.  That evening I dined with the Hon. Reverdy
Johnson, Senator from Maryland, and suggested to him that the best
way to escape a conflict was for the President to nominate some
good man as Secretary of War whose confirmation by the Senate would
fall within the provisions of the law, and named General J. D. Cox,
then Governor of Ohio, whose term of office was drawing to a close,
who would, I knew, be acceptable to General Grant and the army
generally.  Mr. Johnson was most favorably impressed with this
suggestion, and promised to call on the President the next day
(Sunday), which he did, but President Johnson had made up his mind
to meet the conflict boldly.  I saw General Grant that afternoon at
his house on I Street, and told him what I had done, and so anxious
was he about it that he came to our room at the War Department the
next morning (Monday), the 13th, and asked me to go in person to
the White House to urge the President to send in the name of
General Cox.  I did so, saw the President, and inquired if he had
seen Mr. Reverdy Johnson the day before about General Cox.  He
answered that he had, and thought well of General Cox, but would
say no further.

Tuesday, January 14, 1868, came, and with it Mr. Stanton.  He
resumed possession of his former office; came into that where
General Sheridan, General Augur, and I were at work, and greeted us
very cordially.  He said he wanted to see me when at leisure, and
at half-past 10 A.M.  I went into his office and found him and
General Grant together.  Supposing they had some special matters of
business, I withdrew, with the remark that I was close at hand, and
could come in at any moment.  In the afternoon I went again into
Mr. Stanton's office, and we had a long and most friendly
conversation; but not one word was spoken about the
"tenure-of-office" matter.  I then crossed over Seventeenth Street
to the headquarters of the army, where I found General Grant, who
expressed himself as by no means pleased with the manner in which
Mr. Stanton had regained his office, saying that he had sent a
messenger for him that morning as of old, with word that "he wanted
to see him."  We then arranged to meet at his office the next
morning at half-past nine, and go together to see the President.

That morning the National Intelligencer published an article
accusing General Grant of acting in bad faith to the President, and
of having prevaricated in making his personal explanation to the
Cabinet, so that General Grant at first felt unwilling to go, but
we went.  The President received us promptly and kindly.  Being
seated, General Grant said, "Mr. President, whoever gave the facts
for the article of the Intelligencer of this morning has made some
serious mistakes."  The President: "General Grant, let me interrupt
you just there.  I have not seen the Intelligencer of this morning,
and have no knowledge of the contents of any article therein"
General Grant then went on: "Well, the idea is given there that I
have not kept faith with you.  Now, Mr. President, I remember, when
you spoke to me on this subject last summer, I did say that, like
the case of the Baltimore police commissioners, I did suppose Mr.
Stanton could not regain his office except by a process through the
courts."  To this the President assented, saying he "remembered the
reference to the case of the Baltimore commissioners," when General
Grant resumed: "I said if I changed my opinion I would give you
notice, and put things as they were before my appointment as
Secretary of War ad interim."

We then entered into a general friendly conversation, both parties
professing to be satisfied, the President claiming that he had
always been most friendly to General Grant, and the latter
insisting that he had taken the office, not for honor or profit,
but in the general interests of the army.

As we withdrew, at the very door, General Grant said, "Mr.
President, you should make some order that we of the army are not
bound to obey the orders of Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War," which
the President intimated he would do.

No such "orders" were ever made; many conferences were held, and
the following letters are selected out of a great mass to show the
general feeling at the time:


1321 K STREET, WASHINGTON,
January 28,1868, Saturday.

To the President:

I neglected this morning to say that I had agreed to go down to
Annapolis to spend Sunday with Admiral Porter.  General Grant also
has to leave for Richmond on Monday morning at 6 A.M.

At a conversation with the General after our interview, wherein I
offered to go with him on Monday morning to Mr. Stanton, and to say
that it was our joint opinion be should resign, it was found
impossible by reason of his (General Grant) going to Richmond and
my going to Annapolis.  The General proposed this course: He will
call on you to-morrow, and offer to go to Mr. Stanton to say, for
the good of the Army and of the country, he ought to resign.  This
on Sunday.  On Monday I will again call on you, and, if you think
it necessary, I will do the same, viz., go to Mr. Stanton and tell
him he should resign.

If he will not, then it will be time to contrive ulterior measures.
In the mean time it so happens that no necessity exists for
precipitating matters.
Yours truly,
W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.


DEAR GENERAL: On the point of starting, I have written the above,
and will send a fair copy of it to the President.  Please retain
this, that in case of necessity I may have a copy.  The President
clearly stated to me that he relied on us in this category.

Think of the propriety of your putting in writing what you have to
say tomorrow, even if you have to put it in the form of a letter to
hand him in person, retaining a copy.  I'm afraid that acting as a
go-between for three persons, I may share the usual fate of
meddlers, at last get kinks from all.  We ought not to be involved
in politics, but for the sake of the Army we are justified in
trying at least to cut this Gordian knot, which they do not appear
to have any practicable plan to do.  In haste as usual,

W. T. SHERMAN.


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
January 29, 1888.

DEAR SHERMAN: I called on the President and Mr. Stanton to-day, but
without any effect.

I soon found that to recommend resignation to Mr. Stanton would
have no effect, unless it was to incur further his displeasure;
and, therefore, did not directly suggest it to him.  I explained to
him, however, the course I supposed he would pursue, and what I
expected to do in that case, namely, to notify the President of his
intentions, and thus leave him to violate the "Tenure-of-Office
Bill" if he chose, instead of having me do it.

I would advise that you say nothing to Mr. Stanton on the subject
unless he asks your advice.  It will do no good, and may embarrass
you.  I did not mention your name to him, at least not in
connection with his position, or what you thought upon it.

All that Mr. Johnson said was pacific and compromising.  While I
think he wanted the constitutionality of the "Tenure Bill" tested,
I think now he would be glad either to get the vacancy of Secretary
of War, or have the office just where it was during suspension.
Yours truly,

U. S.  GRANT.



WASHINGTON D. C., January 27, 1868.

To the President.

DEAR SIR: As I promised, I saw Mr. Ewing yesterday, and after a
long conversation asked him to put down his opinion in writing,
which he has done and which I now inclose.

I am now at work on these Army Regulations, and in the course of
preparation have laid down the Constitution and laws now in force,
clearer than I find them elsewhere; and beg leave herewith to
inclose you three pages of printed matter for your perusal.  My
opinion is, if you will adopt these rules and make them an
executive order to General Grant, they will so clearly define the
duties of all concerned that no conflict can arise.  I hope to get
through this task in the course of this week, and want very much to
go to St. Louis.  For eleven years I have been tossed about so much
that I really do want to rest, study, and make the acquaintance of
my family.  I do not think, since 1857, I have averaged thirty days
out of three hundred and sixty-five at home.

Next summer also, in fulfillment of our promise to the Sioux, I
must go to Fort Phil Kearney early in the spring, so that, unless I
can spend the next two months at home, I might as well break up my
house at St. Louis, and give up all prospect of taking care of my
family.

For these reasons especially I shall soon ask leave to go to St.
Louis, to resume my proper and legitimate command.  With great
respect,

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.


[Inclosure]

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 25, 1868.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I am quite clear in the opinion that it is not
expedient for the President to take any action now in the case of
Stanton.  So far as he and his interests are concerned, things are
in the best possible condition.  Stanton is in the Department, got
his secretary, but the secretary of the Senate, who have taken upon
themselves his sins, and who place him there under a large salary
to annoy and obstruct the operations of the Executive.  This the
people well enough understand, and he is a stench in the nostrils
of their own party.

I thought the nomination of Cox at the proper juncture would have
been wise as a peace-offering, but perhaps it would have let off
the Senate too easily from the effect of their arbitrary act.  Now
the dislodging of Stanton and filling the office even temporarily
without the consent of the Senate would raise a question as to the
legality of the President's acts, and he would belong to the
attacked instead of the attacking party.  If the war between
Congress and the President is to go on, as I suppose it is, Stanton
should be ignored by the President, left to perform his clerical
duties which the law requires him to perform, and let the party
bear the odium which is already upon them for placing him where he
is.  So much for the President.


As to yourself, I wish you as far as possible to keep clear of
political complications.  I do not think the President will require
you to do an act of doubtful legality.  Certainly he will not
without sanction of the opinion of his Attorney-General; and you
should have time, in a questionable case, to consult with me before
called upon to act.  The office of Secretary of War is a civil
office, as completely so as that of Secretary of State; and you as
a military officer cannot, I think, be required to assume or
exercise it. This may, if necessary, be a subject for further
consideration.  Such, however, will not, I think, be the case.
The appeal is to the people, and it is better for the President to
persist in the course he has for some time pursued--let the
aggressions all come from the other side; and I think there is no
doubt he will do so.  Affectionately,   T. EWING.

To--Lieutenant-General SHERMAN.



LIBRARY ROOM, WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C., January 31, 1868.

To the President:

Since our interview of yesterday I have given the subject of our
conversation all my thoughts, and I beg you will pardon my reducing
the same to writing.

My personal preferences, as expressed, were to be allowed to return
to St. Louis to resume my present command, because my command was
important, large, suited to my rank and inclination, and because my
family was well provided for there in house, facilities, schools,
living, and agreeable society; while, on the other hand, Washington
was for many (to me) good reasons highly objectionable, especially
because it is the political capital of the country; and focus of
intrigue, gossip, and slander.  Your personal preferences were, as
expressed, to make a new department East, adequate to my rank, with
headquarters at Washington, and assign me to its command, to remove
my family here, and to avail myself of its schools, etc.; to remove
Mr. Stanton from his office as Secretary of War, and have me to
discharge the duties.

To effect this removal two modes were indicated: to simply cause
him to quit the War-Office Building, and notify the Treasury
Department and the Army Staff Departments no longer to respect him
as Secretary of War; or to remove him and submit my name to the
Senate for confirmation.

Permit me to discuss these points a little, and I will premise by
saying that I have spoken to no one on the subject, and have not
even seen Mr. Ewing, Mr. Stanbery, or General Grant, since I was
with you.

It has been the rule and custom of our army, since the organization
of the government, that the second officer of the army should be at
the second (in importance) command, and remote from general
headquarters.  To bring me to Washington world put three heads to
an army, yourself, General Grant, and myself, and we would be more
than human if we were not to differ.  In my judgment it world ruin
the army, and would be fatal to one or two of us.

Generals Scott and Taylor proved themselves soldiers and patriots
in the field, but Washington was fatal to both.  This city, and the
influences that centre here, defeated every army that had its
headquarters here from 1861 to 1864, and would have overwhelmed
General Grant at Spottsylvania and Petersburg, had he not been
fortified by a strong reputation, already hard-earned, and because
no one then living coveted the place; whereas, in the West, we made
progress from the start, because there was no political capital
near enough to poison our minds, and kindle into life that craving,
itching for fame which has killed more good men than bullets.  I
have been with General Grant in the midst of death and slaughter
when the howls of people reached him after Shiloh; when messengers
were speeding to and from his army to Washington, bearing slanders,
to induce his removal before he took Vicksburg; in Chattanooga,
when the soldiers were stealing the corn of the starving mules to
satisfy their own hunger; at Nashville, when he was ordered to the
"forlorn hope" to command the Army of the Potomac, so often
defeated--and yet I never saw him more troubled than since he has
been in Washington, and been compelled to read himself a "sneak and
deceiver," based on reports of four of the Cabinet, and apparently
with your knowledge.  If this political atmosphere can disturb the
equanimity of one so guarded and so prudent as he is, what will be
the result with me, so careless, so outspoken as I am?  Therefore,
with my consent, Washington never.

As to the Secretary of War, his office is twofold.  As a Cabinet
officer he should not be there without your hearty, cheerful
assent, and I believe that is the judgment and opinion of every
fair-minded man.  As the holder of a civil office, having the
supervision of moneys appropriated by Congress and of contracts for
army supplies, I do think Congress, or the Senate by delegation
from Congress, has a lawful right to be consulted.  At all events,
I would not risk a suit or contest on that phase of the question.
The law of Congress, of March 2, 1867, prescribing the manner in
which orders and instructions relating to "military movements"
shall reach the army, gives you as constitutional Commander-in-
Chief the very power you want to exercise, and enables you to
prevent the Secretary from making any such orders and instructions;
and consequently he cannot control the army, but is limited and
restricted to a duty that an Auditor of the Treasury could perform.
You certainly can afford to await the result.  The Executive power
is not weakened, but rather strengthened.  Surely he is not such an
obstruction as would warrant violence, or even s show of force,
which would produce the very reaction and clamor that he hopes for
to save him from the absurdity of holding an empty office "for the
safety of the country."

This is so much as I ought to say, and more too, but if it produces
the result I will be more than satisfied, viz., that I be simply
allowed to resume my proper post and duties in St. Louis.  With
great respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.



On the 1st of February, the board of which I was the president
submitted to the adjutant-general our draft of the "Articles of War
and Army Regulations," condensed to a small compass, the result of
our war experience.  But they did not suit the powers that were,
and have ever since slept the sleep that knows no waking, to make
room for the ponderous document now in vogue, which will not stand
the strain of a week's campaign in real war.

I hurried back to St. Louis to escape the political storm I saw
brewing.  The President repeatedly said to me that he wanted me in
Washington, and I as often answered that nothing could tempt me to
live in that center of intrigue and excitement; but soon came the
following:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, February 10, 1868.

DEAR GENERAL: I have received at last the President's reply to my
last, letter.  He attempts to substantiate his statements by his
Cabinet.  In this view it is important that I should have a letter
from you, if you are willing to give it, of what I said to you
about the effect of the "Tenure-of-Office Bill," and my object in
going to see the President on Saturday before the installment of
Mr. Stanton.  What occurred after the meeting of the Cabinet on the
Tuesday following is not a subject under controversy now;
therefore, if you choose to write down your recollection (and I
would like to have it) on Wednesday, when you and I called on the
President, and your conversation with him the last time you saw
him, make that a separate communication.

Your order to come East was received several days ago, but the
President withdrew it, I supposed to make some alteration, but it
has not been returned.
Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT.



[TELEGRAM.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., February 18, 1868.

Lieutenant-General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis.

The order is issued ordering you to Atlantic Division.

U. S. GRANT, General.



[TELEGRAM]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Louis, February 14, 1868.

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C.

Your dispatch is received informing me that the order for the
Atlantic Division has been issued, and that I am assigned to its
command.  I was in hopes I had escaped the danger, and now were I
prepared I should resign on the spot, as it requires no foresight
to predict such must be the inevitable result in the end.  I will
make one more desperate effort by mail, which please await.

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.



[TELEGRAM.]

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1868.
Lieutenant-General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis.

I think it due to you that your letter of January 31st to the
President of the United States should be published, to correct
misapprehension in the public mind about your willingness to come
to Washington.  It will not be published against your will.

(Sent in cipher.)



[TELEGRAM.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Louis, MISSOURI, February 14, 1868.

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C.

Dispatch of to-day received.  Please await a letter I address this
day through you to the President, which will in due time reach the
public, covering the very point you make.

I don't want to come to Washington at all.

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.



[TELEGRAM.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Loins, MISSOURI, February 14, 1868.

Hon. John SHERMAN, United States Senate, Washington, D.  C.

Oppose confirmation of myself as brevet general, on ground that it
is unprecedented, and that it is better not to extend the system of
brevets above major-general.  If I can't avoid coming to
Washington, I may have to resign.

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C., February 12, 1868.

The following orders are published for the information and guidance
of all concerned:

U. S. GRANT, General.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C., February 12, 1868.

GENERAL: You will please issue an order creating a military
division to be styled the Military Division of the Atlantic, to be
composed of the Department of the Lakes, the Department of the
East, and the Department of Washington, to be commanded by
Lieutenant-General W. T. Sherman, with his headquarters at
Washington.  Until further orders from the President, you will
assign no officer to the permanent command of the Military Division
of the Missouri.

Respectfully yours,

ANDREW JOHNSON.


GENERAL U. S. GRANT,
Commanding Armies of The United States, Washington, D. C.

Major-General P. H. Sheridan, the senior officer in the Military
Division of the Missouri, will temporarily perform the duties of
commander of the Military Division of the Missouri in addition to
his duties of department commander.  By command of General Grant:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.



This order, if carried into effect, would have grouped in
Washington:

1.  The President, constitutional Commander-in-Chief.

2.  The Secretary of War, congressional Commander-in-Chief.

3.  The General of the Armies of the United States.

4.  The Lieutenant-General of the Army.

5.  The Commanding General of the Department of Washington.

6.  The commander of the post-of Washington.

At that date the garrison of Washington was a brigade of infantry
and a battery of artillery.  I never doubted Mr. Johnson's
sincerity in wishing to befriend me, but this was the broadest kind
of a farce, or meant mischief.  I therefore appealed to him by
letter to allow me to remain where I was, and where I could do
service, real service, and received his most satisfactory answer.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
St. Louis, MISSOURI, February 14, 1868.

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL: Last evening, just before leaving my office, I
received your note of the 10th, and had intended answering it
according to your request; but, after I got home, I got your
dispatch of yesterday, announcing that the order I dreaded so much
was issued.  I never felt so troubled in my life.  Were it an order
to go to Sitka, to the devil, to battle with rebels or Indians, I
think you would not hear a whimper from me, but it comes in such a
questionable form that, like Hamlet's ghost, it curdles my blood
and mars my judgment.  My first thoughts were of resignation, and I
had almost made up my mind to ask Dodge for some place on the
Pacific road, or on one of the Iowa roads, and then again various
colleges ran through my memory, but hard times and an expensive
family have brought me back to staring the proposition square in
the face, and I have just written a letter to the President, which
I herewith transmit through you, on which I will hang a hope of
respite till you telegraph me its effect.  The uncertainties ahead
are too great to warrant my incurring the expense of breaking up my
house and family here, and therefore in no event will I do this
till I can be assured of some permanence elsewhere.  If it were at
all certain that you would accept the nomination of President in
May, I would try and kill the intervening time, and then judge of
the chances, but I do not want you to reveal your plans to me till
you choose to do so.

I have telegraphed to John Sherman to oppose the nomination which
the papers announce has been made of me for brevet general.

I have this minute received your cipher dispatch of to-day, which I
have just answered and sent down to the telegraph-office, and the
clerk is just engaged in copying my letter to the President to go
with this.  If the President or his friends pretend that I seek to
go to Washington, it will be fully rebutted by letters I have
written to the President, to you, to John Sherman, to Mr. Ewing,
and to Mr. Stanbery.  You remember that in our last talk you
suggested I should write again to the President.  I thought of it,
and concluded my letter of January 31st, already delivered, was
full and emphatic.  Still, I did write again to Mr. Stanbery,
asking him as a friend to interpose in my behalf.  There are plenty
of people who know my wishes, and I would avoid, if possible, the
publication of a letter so confidential as that of January 31st, in
which I notice I allude to the President's purpose of removing Mr.
Stanton by force, a fact that ought not to be drawn out through me
if it be possible to avoid it.  In the letter herewith I confine
myself to purely private matters, and will not object if it reaches
the public in any proper way.  My opinion is, the President thinks
Mrs. Sherman would like to come to Washington by reason of her
father and brothers being there.  This is true, for Mrs. Sherman
has an idea that St. Louis is unhealthy for our children, and
because most of the Catholics here are tainted with the old secesh
feeling.  But I know better what is to our common interest, and
prefer to judge of the proprieties myself.  What I do object to is
the false position I would occupy as between you and the President.
Were there an actual army at or near Washington, I could be
withdrawn from the most unpleasant attitude of a "go-between," but
there is no army there, nor any military duties which you with a
host of subordinates can not perform.  Therefore I would be there
with naked, informal, and sinecure duties, and utterly out of
place.  This you understand well enough, and the army too, but the
President and the politicians, who flatter themselves they are
saving the country, cannot and will not understand.  My opinion is,
the country is doctored to death, and if President and Congress
would go to sleep like Rip Van Winkle, the country would go on
under natural influences, and recover far faster than under their
joint and several treatment.  This doctrine would be accounted by
Congress, and by the President too, as high treason, and therefore
I don't care about saying so to either of them, but I know you can
hear anything, and give it just what thought or action it merits.

Excuse this long letter, and telegraph me the result of my letter
to the President as early as you can.  If he holds my letter so
long as to make it improper for me to await his answer, also
telegraph me.

The order, when received, will, I suppose, direct me as to whom and
how I am to turn over this command, which should, in my judgment,
not be broken up, as the three departments composing the division
should be under one head.

I expect my staff-officers to be making for me within the hour to
learn their fate, so advise me all you can as quick as possible.

With great respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.



To the President.

DEAR SIR: It is hard for me to conceive you would purposely do me
an unkindness unless under the pressure of a sense of public duty,
or because you do not believe me sincere.  I was in hopes, since my
letter to you of the 31st of January, that you had concluded to
pass over that purpose of yours expressed more than once in
conversation--to organize a new command for me in the East, with
headquarters in Washington; but a telegram from General Grant of
yesterday says that "the order was issued ordering you" (me) "to
Atlantic Division"; and the newspapers of this morning contain the
same information, with the addition that I have been nominated as
brevet general.  I have telegraphed my own brother in the Senate to
oppose my confirmation, on the ground that the two higher grades in
the army ought not to be complicated with brevets, and I trust you
will conceive my motives aright.  If I could see my way clear to
maintain my family, I should not hesitate a moment to resign my
present commission, and seek some business wherein I would be free
from these unhappy complications that seem to be closing about me,
spite of my earnest efforts to avoid them; but necessity ties my
hands, and I must submit with the best grace I can till I make
other arrangements.

In Washington are already the headquarters of a department, and of
the army itself, and it is hard for me to see wherein I can render
military service there.  Any staff-officer with the rank of major
could surely fill any gap left between these two military officers;
and, by being placed in Washington, I will be universally construed
as a rival to the General-in-Chief, a position damaging to me in
the highest degree.  Our relations have always been most
confidential and friendly, and if, unhappily, any cloud of
differences should arise between us, my sense of personal dignity
and duty would leave me no alternative but resignation.  For this I
am not yet prepared, but I shall proceed to arrange for it as
rapidly as possible, so that when the time does come (as it surely
will if this plan is carried into effect) I may act promptly.

Inasmuch as the order is now issued, I cannot expect a full
revocation of it, but I beg the privilege of taking post at New
York, or any point you may name within the new military division
other than Washington.  This privilege is generally granted to all
military commanders, and I see no good reason why I too may not ask
for it, and this simple concession, involving no public interest,
will much soften the blow, which, right or wrong, I construe as one
of the hardest I have sustained in a life somewhat checkered with
adversity.  With great respects yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General.



WASHINGTON, D. C., 2 p.m., February 19, 1888.
Lieutenant-General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis, Missouri:

I have just received, with General Grant's indorsement of
reference, your letter to me of the fourteenth (14th) inst.

The order to which you refer was made in good faith, and with a
view to the best interests of the country and the service; as,
however, your assignment to a new military division seems so
objectionable, you will retain your present command.

ANDREW JOHNSON.


On that same 19th of February he appointed Adjutant, General
Lorenzo Thomas to be Secretary of War ad interim, which finally
resulted in the articles of impeachment and trial of President
Johnson before the Senate.  I was a witness on that trial, but of
course the lawyers would not allow me to express any opinion of the
President's motives or intentions, and restricted me to the facts
set forth in the articles of impeachment, of which I was glad to
know nothing.  The final test vote revealed less than two thirds,
and the President was consequently acquitted.  Mr. Stanton
resigned.  General Schofield, previously nominated, was confirmed
as Secretary of War, thus putting an end to what ought never to
have happened at all.



INDIAN PEACE COMMISSION.

On the 20th of July, 1867, President Johnson approved an act to
establish peace with certain hostile Indian tribes, the first
section of which reads as follows: "Be it enacted, etc., that the
President of the United States be and is hereby authorized to
appoint a commission to consist of three (3) officers of the army
not below the rank of brigadier-general, who, together with N. G.
Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John B.  Henderson,
chairman of the Committee of Indian Affairs of the Senate, S. F.
Tappan, and John B.  Sanborn, shall have power and authority to
call together the chiefs and head men of such bands or tribes of
Indians as are now waging war against the United States, or
committing depredations on the people thereof, to ascertain the
alleged reasons for their acts of hostility, and in their
discretion, under the direction of the President, to make and
conclude with said bands or tribes such treaty stipulations,
subject to the action of the Senate, as may remove all just causes
of complaint on their part, and at the same time establish security
for person and property along the lines of railroad now being
constructed to the Pacific and other thoroughfares of travel to the
Western Territories, and such as will most likely insure
civilization for the Indians, and peace and safety for the whites."

The President named as the military members Lieutenant-General
Sherman, Brigadier-Generals A. H. Terry and W. S. Harney.
Subsequently, to insure a full attendance, Brigadier-General C. C.
Augur was added to the commission, and his name will be found on
most of the treaties.  The commissioners met at St. Louis and
elected N. G. Taylor, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
president; J. B. Sanborn, treasurer; and A. S. H. White, Esq., of
Washington, D. C., secretary.  The year 1867 was too far advanced
to complete the task assigned during that season, and it was agreed
that a steamboat (St. John's) should be chartered to convey the
commission up the Missouri River, and we adjourned to meet at
Omaha.  In the St. John's the commission proceeded up the Missouri
River, holding informal "talks" with the Santees at their agency
near the Niobrara, the Yanktonnais at Fort Thompson, and the
Ogallallas, Minneconjous, Sans Arcs, etc., at Fort Sully.  From
this point runners were sent out to the Sioux occupying the country
west of the Missouri River, to meet us in council at the Forks of
the Platte that fall, and to Sitting Bull's band of outlaw Sioux,
and the Crows on the upper Yellowstone, to meet us in May, 1868, at
Fort Laramie.  We proceeded up the river to the mouth of the
Cheyenne and turned back to Omaha, having ample time on this
steamboat to discuss and deliberate on the problems submitted to
our charge.

We all agreed that the nomad Indians should be removed from the
vicinity of the two great railroads then in rapid construction, and
be localized on one or other of the two great reservations south of
Kansas and north of Nebraska; that agreements not treaties, should
be made for their liberal maintenance as to food, clothing,
schools, and farming implements for ten years, during which time we
believed that these Indians should become self-supporting.  To the
north we proposed to remove the various bands of Sioux, with such
others as could be induced to locate near them; and to the south,
on the Indian Territory already established, we proposed to remove
the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches, and such others as we
could prevail on to move thither.

At that date the Union Pacific construction had reached the Rocky
Mountains at Cheyenne, and the Kansas Pacific to about Fort
Wallace.  We held council with the Ogallallas at the Forks of the
Platte, and arranged to meet them all the next spring, 1868.  In
the spring of 1868 we met the Crows in council at Fort Laramie, the
Sioux at the North Platte, the Shoshones or Snakes at Fort Hall,
the Navajos at Fort Sumner, on the Pecos, and the Cheyennes and
Arapahoes at Medicine Lodge.  To accomplish these results the
commission divided up into committees, General Augur going to the
Shoshones, Mr. Tappan and I to the Navajos, and the remainder to
Medicine Lodge.  In that year we made treaties or arrangements with
all the tribes which before had followed the buffalo in their
annual migrations, and which brought them into constant conflict
with the whites.

Mr. Tappan and I found it impossible to prevail on the Navajos to
remove to the Indian Territory, and had to consent to their return
to their former home, restricted to a limited reservation west of
Santa Fe, about old Fort Defiance, and there they continue unto
this day, rich in the possession of herds of sheep and goats, with
some cattle and horses; and they have remained at peace ever since.

A part of our general plan was to organize the two great
reservations into regular Territorial governments, with Governor,
Council, courts, and civil officers.  General Harney was
temporarily assigned to that of the Sioux at the north, and General
Hazen to that of the Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, etc.,
etc., at the south, but the patronage of the Indian Bureau was too
strong for us, and that part of our labor failed.  Still, the
Indian Peace Commission of 1867-'68 did prepare the way for the
great Pacific Railroads, which, for better or worse, have settled
the fate of the buffalo and Indian forever.  There have been wars
and conflicts since with these Indians up to a recent period too
numerous and complicated in their detail for me to unravel and
record, but they have been the dying struggles of a singular race
of brave men fighting against destiny, each less and less violent,
till now the wild game is gone, the whites too numerous and
powerful; so that the Indian question has become one of sentiment
and charity, but not of war.

The peace, or "Quaker" policy, of which so much has been said,
originated about thus: By the act of Congress, approved March
3,1869, the forty-five regiments of infantry were reduced to
twenty-five, and provision was made for the "muster out" of many of
the surplus officers, and for retaining others to be absorbed by
the usual promotions and casualties.  On the 7th of May of that
year, by authority of an act of Congress approved June 30, 1834,
nine field-officers and fifty-nine captains and subalterns were
detached and ordered to report to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, to serve as Indian superintendents and agents.  Thus by an
old law surplus army officers were made to displace the usual civil
appointees, undoubtedly a change for the better, but most
distasteful to members of Congress, who looked to these
appointments as part of their proper patronage.  The consequence
was the law of July 15, 1870, which vacated the military commission
of any officer who accepted or exercised the functions of a civil
officer.  I was then told that certain politicians called on
President Grant, informing him that this law was chiefly designed
to prevent his using army officers for Indian agents, "civil
offices," which he believed to be both judicious and wise; army
officers, as a rule, being better qualified to deal with Indians
than the average political appointees.  The President then quietly
replied: "Gentlemen, you have defeated my plan of Indian
management; but you shall not succeed in your purpose, for I will
divide these appointments up among the religious churches, with
which you dare not contend."  The army officers were consequently
relieved of their "civil offices," and the Indian agencies were
apportioned to the several religious churches in about the
proportion of their--supposed strength--some to the Quakers, some
to the Methodists, to the Catholics, Episcopalians, Presbyterians,
etc., etc.--and thus it remains to the present time, these
religious communities selecting the agents to be appointed by the
Secretary of the Interior.  The Quakers, being first named, gave
name to the policy, and it is called the "Quaker" policy to-day.
Meantime railroads and settlements by hardy, bold pioneers have
made the character of Indian agents of small concern, and it
matters little who are the beneficiaries.

As was clearly foreseen, General U. S. Grant was duly nominated,
and on the 7th of November, 1868, was elected President of the
United States for the four years beginning with March 4, 1869.

On the 15th and 16th of December, 1868, the four societies of the
Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, Ohio, and Georgia, held a
joint reunion at Chicago, at which were present over two thousand
of the surviving officers and soldiers of the war.  The ceremonies
consisted of the joint meeting in Crosby's magnificent opera-house,
at which General George H. Thomas presided.  General W. W. Belknap
was the orator for the Army of the Tennessee, General Charles Cruft
for the Army of the Cumberland, General J. D. Cox for the Army of
the Ohio, and General William Cogswell for the Army of Georgia.
The banquet was held in the vast Chamber of Commerce, at which I
presided.  General Grant, President-elect, General J. M. Schofield,
Secretary of War, General H. W. Slocum, and nearly every general
officer of note was present except General Sheridan, who at the
moment was fighting the Cheyennes in Southern Kansas and the Indian
country.

At that time we discussed the army changes which would necessarily
occur in the following March, and it was generally understood that
I was to succeed General Grant as general-in-chief, but as to my
successor, Meade, Thomas, and Sheridan were candidates.  And here I
will remark that General Grant, afterward famous as the "silent
man," used to be very gossipy, and no one was ever more fond than
he of telling anecdotes of our West Point and early army life.  At
the Chicago reunion he told me that I would have to come to
Washington, that he wanted me to effect a change as to the general
staff, which he had long contemplated, and which was outlined in
his letter to Mr. Stanton of January 29,1866, given hereafter,
which had been repeatedly published, and was well known to the
military world; that on being inaugurated President on the 4th of
March he would retain General Schofield as his Secretary of War
until the change had become habitual; that the modern custom of the
Secretary of War giving military orders to the adjutant-general and
other staff officers was positively wrong and should be stopped.
Speaking of General Grant's personal characteristics at that period
of his life, I recall a conversation in his carriage, when, riding
down Pennsylvania Avenue, he, inquired of me in a humorous way,
"Sherman, what special hobby do you intend to adopt?"  I inquired
what he meant, and he explained that all men had their special
weakness or vanity, and that it was wiser to choose one's own than
to leave the newspapers to affix one less acceptable, and that for
his part he had chosen the "horse," so that when anyone tried to
pump him he would turn the conversation to his "horse."  I answered
that I would stick to the "theatre and balls," for I was always
fond of seeing young people happy, and did actually acquire a
reputation for "dancing," though I had not attempted the waltz, or
anything more than the ordinary cotillon, since the war.

On the 24th of February, 1869, I was summoned to Washington,
arriving on the 26th, taking along my aides, Lieutenant-Colonels
Dayton and Audenried.

On the 4th of March General Grant was duly inaugurated President of
the United States, and I was nominated and confirmed as General of
the Army.

Major-General P. H. Sheridan was at the same time nominated and
confirmed as lieutenant-general, with orders to command the
Military Division of the Missouri, which he did, moving the
headquarters from St. Louis to Chicago; and General Meade was
assigned to command the Military Division of the Atlantic, with
headquarters at Philadelphia.

At that moment General Meade was in Atlanta, Georgia, commanding
the Third Military District under the "Reconstruction Act;" and
General Thomas, whose post was in Nashville, was in Washington on a
court of inquiry investigating certain allegations against General
A. B. Dyer, Chief of Ordnance.  He occupied the room of the second
floor in the building on the corner of H and Fifteenth Streets,
since become Wormley's Hotel.  I at the time was staying with my
brother, Senator Sherman, at his residence, 1321 K Street, and it
was my habit each morning to stop at Thomas's room on my way to the
office in the War Department to tell him the military news, and to
talk over matters of common interest.  We had been intimately
associated as "man and boy" for thirty-odd years, and I profess to
have had better opportunities to know him than any man then living.
His fame as the "Rock of Chickamauga" was perfect, and by the world
at large he was considered as the embodiment of strength, calmness,
and imperturbability.  Yet of all my acquaintances Thomas worried
and fretted over what he construed neglects or acts of favoritism
more than any other.

At that time he was much worried by what he supposed was injustice
in the promotion of General Sheridan, and still more that General
Meade should have an Eastern station, which compelled him to remain
at Nashville or go to the Pacific.  General Thomas claimed that all
his life he had been stationed in the South or remote West, and had
not had a fair share of Eastern posts, whereas that General Meade
had always been there.  I tried to get him to go with me to see
President Grant and talk the matter over frankly, but he would not,
and I had to act as a friendly mediator.  General Grant assured me
at the time that he not only admired and respected General Thomas,
but actually loved him as a man, and he authorized me in making up
commands for the general officers to do anything and everything to
favor him, only he could not recede from his former action in
respect to Generals Sheridan and Meade.

Prior to General Grant's inauguration the army register showed as
major-generals Halleck, Meade, Sheridan, Thomas, and Hancock.
Therefore, the promotion of General Sheridan to be lieutenant-
general did not "overslaugh" Thomas, but it did Meade and Halleck.
The latter did not expect promotion; General Meade did, but was
partially, not wholly, reconciled by being stationed at
Philadelphia, the home of his family; and President Grant assured
me that he knew of his own knowledge that General Sheridan had been
nominated major-general before General Meade, but had waived dates
out of respect for his age and longer service, and that he had
nominated him as lieutenant-general by reason of his special
fitness to command the Military Division of the Missouri, embracing
all the wild Indians, at that very moment in a state of hostility.
I gave General Thomas the choice of every other command in the
army, and of his own choice he went to San Francisco, California,
where he died, March 28, 1870.  The truth is, Congress should have
provided by law for three lieutenant-generals for these three
pre-eminent soldiers, and should have dated their commissions with
"Gettysburg," "Winchester," and "Nashville."  It would have been a
graceful act, and might have prolonged the lives of two most
popular officers, who died soon after, feeling that they had
experienced ingratitude and neglect.

Soon after General Grant's inauguration as President, and, as I
supposed, in fulfilment of his plan divulged in Chicago the
previous December, were made the following:


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, March 8, 1869.

General Orders No. 11:

The following orders of the President of the United States are
published for the information and government of all concerned:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON CITY, March 5, 1869.

By direction of the President, General William T. Sherman will
assume command of the Army of the United States.

The chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus will report to
and act under the immediate orders of the general commanding the
army.

Any official business which by law or regulation requires the
action of the President or Secretary of War will be submitted by
the General of the Army to the Secretary of War, and in general all
orders from the President or Secretary of War to any portion of the
army, line or staff, will be transmitted through the General of the
Army.

J. M. SCHOFIELD, Secretary of War.

By command of the General of the Army.

E.  D.  TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.


On the same day I issued my General Orders No. 12, assuming command
and naming all the heads of staff departments and bureaus as
members of my staff, adding to my then three aides, Colonels McCoy,
Dayton, and Audenried, the names of Colonels Comstock, Horace
Porter, and Dent, agreeing with President Grant that the two latter
could remain with him till I should need their personal services or
ask their resignations.

I was soon made aware that the heads of several of the staff corps
were restive under this new order of things, for by long usage they
had grown to believe themselves not officers of the army in a
technical sense, but a part of the War Department, the civil branch
of the Government which connects the army with the President and
Congress.

In a short time General John A. Rawlins, General Grant's former
chief of staff, was nominated and confirmed as Secretary of War;
and soon appeared this order:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, March 27, 1869.

General Orders No.  28:

The following orders received for the War Department are published
for the government of all concerned:

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON CITY, March 26, 1869.

By direction of the President, the order of the Secretary of War,
dated War Department, March 5, 1869, and published in General
Orders No. 11, headquarters of the army, Adjutant-General's Office,
dated March 8, 1869, except so much as directs General W. T.
Sherman to assume command of the Army of the United States, is
hereby rescinded.

All official business which by law or regulations requires the
action of the President or Secretary of War will be submitted by
the chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus to the
Secretary of War.

All orders and instructions relating to military operations issued
by the President or Secretary of War will be issued through the
General of the Army.

JOHN A.  RAWLINS, Secretary of War.

By command of General SHERMAN:

E.  D.  TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.


Thus we were thrown back on the old method in having a double--if
not a treble-headed machine.  Each head of a bureau in daily
consultation with the Secretary of War, and the general to command
without an adjutant, quartermaster, commissary, or any staff except
his own aides, often reading in the newspapers of military events
and orders before he could be consulted or informed.  This was the
very reverse of what General Grant, after four years' experience in
Washington as general-in-chief, seemed to want, different from what
he had explained to me in Chicago, and totally different from the
demand he had made on Secretary of War Stanton in his complete
letter of January 29, 1866.  I went to him to know the cause: He
said he had been informed by members of Congress that his action,
as defined by his order of March 5th, was regarded as a violation
of laws making provision for the bureaus of the War Department;
that he had repealed his own orders, but not mine, and that he had
no doubt that General Rawlins and I could draw the line of
separation satisfactorily to us both.  General Rawlins was very
conscientious, but a very sick man when appointed Secretary of War.
Several times he made orders through the adjutant-general to
individuals of the army without notifying me, but always when his
attention was called to it he apologized, and repeatedly said to me
that he understood from his experience on General Grant's staff how
almost insulting it was for orders to go to individuals of a
regiment, brigade, division, or an army of any kind without the
commanding officer being consulted or even advised.  This habit is
more common at Washington than any place on earth, unless it be in
London, where nearly the same condition of facts exists.  Members
of Congress daily appeal to the Secretary of War for the discharge
of some soldier on the application of a mother, or some young
officer has to be dry-nursed, withdrawn from his company on the
plains to be stationed near home.  The Secretary of War, sometimes
moved by private reasons, or more likely to oblige the member of
Congress, grants the order, of which the commanding general knows
nothing till he reads it in the newspapers.  Also, an Indian tribe,
goaded by the pressure of white neighbors, breaks out in revolt.
The general-in-chief must reenforce the local garrisons not only
with men, but horses, wagons, ammunition, and food.  All the
necessary information is in the staff bureaus in Washington, but
the general has no right to call for it, and generally finds it
more practicable to ask by telegraph of the distant division or
department commanders for the information before making the formal
orders.  The general in actual command of the army should have a
full staff, subject to his own command.  If not, he cannot be held
responsible for results.

General Rawlins sank away visibly, rapidly, and died in Washington,
September 6,1869, and I was appointed to perform the duties of his
office till a successor could be selected.  I realized how much
easier and better it was to have both offices conjoined.

The army then had one constitutional commander-in-chief of both
army and navy, and one actual commanding general, bringing all
parts into real harmony.  An army to be useful must be a unit, and
out of this has grown the saying, attributed to Napoleon, but
doubtless spoken before the days of Alexander, that an army with an
inefficient commander was better than one with two able heads.  Our
political system and methods, however, demanded a separate
Secretary of War, and in October President Grant asked me to scan
the list of the volunteer generals of good record who had served in
the civil war, preferably from the "West."  I did so, and submitted
to him in writing the names of W. W. Belknap, of Iowa; G.  M.
Dodge, the Chief Engineer of the Union Pacific Railroad; and Lucius
Fairchild, of Madison, Wisconsin.  I also named General John W.
Sprague, then employed by the Northern Pacific Railroad in
Washington Territory.  General Grant knew them all personally, and
said if General Dodge were not connected with the Union Pacific
Railroad, with which the Secretary of War must necessarily have
large transactions, he would choose him, but as the case stood, and
remembering the very excellent speech made by General Belknap at
the Chicago reunion of December, 1868, he authorized me to
communicate with him to ascertain if he were willing to come to
Washington as Secretary of War.  General Belknap was then the
collector of internal revenue at Keokuk, Iowa.  I telegraphed him
and received a prompt and favorable answer.  His name was sent to
the Senate, promptly confirmed, and he entered on his duties
October 25,1869.  General Belknap surely had at that date as fair a
fame as any officer of volunteers of my personal acquaintance.  He
took up the business where it was left off, and gradually fell into
the current which led to the command of the army itself as of the
legal and financial matters which properly pertain to the War
Department.  Orders granting leaves of absence to officers,
transfers, discharges of soldiers for favor, and all the old
abuses, which had embittered the life of General Scott in the days
of Secretaries of War Marcy and Davis, were renewed.  I called his
attention to these facts, but without sensible effect.  My office
was under his in the old War Department, and one day I sent my
aide-de-camp, Colonel Audenried, up to him with some message, and
when he returned red as a beet, very much agitated, he asked me as
a personal favor never again to send him to General Belknap.  I
inquired his reason, and he explained that he had been treated with
a rudeness and discourtesy he had never seen displayed by any
officer to a soldier.  Colonel Audenried was one of the most
polished gentlemen in the army, noted for his personal bearing and
deportment, and I had some trouble to impress on him the patience
necessary for the occasion, but I promised on future occasions to
send some other or go myself.  Things went on from bad to worse,
till in 1870 I received from Mr. Hugh Campbell, of St. Louis, a
personal friend and an honorable gentleman, a telegraphic message
complaining that I had removed from his position Mr. Ward, post
trader at Fort Laramie, with only a month in which to dispose of
his large stock of goods, to make room for his successor.

It so happened that we of the Indian Peace Commission had been much
indebted to this same trader, Ward, for advances of flour, sugar,
and coffee, to provide for the Crow Indians, who had come down from
their reservation on the Yellowstone to meet us in 1868, before our
own supplies had been received.  For a time I could not-comprehend
the nature of Mr. Campbell's complaint, so I telegraphed to the
department commander, General C. C. Augur, at Omaha, to know if any
such occurrence had happened, and the reasons therefor.  I received
a prompt answer that it was substantially true, and had been
ordered by The Secretary of War.  It so happened that during
General Grant's command of the army Congress had given to the
general of the army the appointment of "post-traders."  He had
naturally devolved it on the subordinate division and department
commanders, but the legal power remained with the general of the
army.  I went up to the Secretary of War, showed him the
telegraphic correspondence, and pointed out the existing law in the
Revised Statutes.  General Belknap was visibly taken aback, and
explained that he had supposed the right of appointment rested with
him, that Ward was an old rebel Democrat, etc.; whereas Ward had
been in fact the sutler of Fort Laramie, a United States military
post, throughout the civil war.  I told him that I should revoke
his orders, and leave the matter where it belonged, to the local
council of administration and commanding officers.  Ward was
unanimously reelected and reinstated.  He remained the trader of
the post until Congress repealed the law, and gave back the power
of appointment to the Secretary of War, when of course he had to
go.  But meantime he was able to make the necessary business
arrangements which saved him and his partners the sacrifice which
would have been necessary in the first instance.  I never had any
knowledge whatever of General Belknap's transactions with the
traders at Fort Sill and Fort Lincoln which resulted in his
downfall.  I have never sought to ascertain his motives for
breaking with me, because he knew I had always befriended him while
under my military command, and in securing him his office of
Secretary of War.  I spoke frequently to President Grant of the
growing tendency of his Secretary of War to usurp all the powers of
the commanding general, which would surely result in driving me
away.  He as frequently promised to bring us together to agree upon
a just line of separation of our respective offices, but never did.

Determined to bring the matter to an issue, I wrote the following
letter:


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE  UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, D. C., August 17, 1870.

General W. W. BELKNAP, Secretary of War.

GENERAL: I must urgently and respectfully invite your attention
when at leisure to a matter of deep interest to future commanding
generals of the army more than to myself, of the imperative
necessity of fixing and clearly defining the limits of the powers
and duties of the general of the army or of whomsoever may succeed
to the place of commander-in-chief.

The case is well stated by General Grant in his letter of January
29, 1866, to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, hereto appended,
and though I find no official answer recorded, I remember that
General Grant told me that the Secretary of War had promptly
assured him in conversation that he fully approved of his views as
expressed in this letter.

At that time the subject was much discussed, and soon after
Congress enacted the bill reviving the grade of general, which bill
was approved July 25, 1866, and provided that the general, when
commissioned, may be authorized under the direction and during the
pleasure of the President to command the armies of the United
States; and a few days after, viz., July 28, 1866, was enacted the
law which defined the military peace establishment.  The enacting
clause reads: "That the military peace establishment of the United
States shall hereafter consist of five regiments of artillery, ten
regiments of cavalry, forty-five regiments of infantry, the
professors and Corps of Cadets of the United States Military
Academy, and such other forces as shall be provided for by this
act, to be known as the army of the United States."

The act then recites in great detail all the parts of the army,
making no distinction between the line and staff, but clearly makes
each and every part an element of the whole.

Section 37 provides for a board to revise the army regulations and
report; and declares that the regulations then in force, viz.,
those of 1863, should remain until Congress "shall act on said
report;" and section 38 and last enacts that all laws and parts of
laws inconsistent with the provisions of this act be and the same
are hereby repealed.

Under the provisions of this law my predecessor, General Grant, did
not hesitate to command and make orders to all parts of the army,
the Military Academy, and staff, and it was under his advice that
the new regulations were compiled in 1868 that drew the line more
clearly between the high and responsible duties of the Secretary of
War and the general of the army.  He assured me many a time before
I was called here to succeed him that he wanted me to perfect the
distinction, and it was by his express orders that on assuming the
command of the army I specifically placed the heads of the staff
corps here in Washington in the exact relation to the army which
they would bear to an army in the field.

I am aware that subsequently, in his orders of March 26th, he
modified his former orders of March 5th, but only as to the heads
of bureaus in Washington, who have, he told me, certain functions
of office imposed on them by special laws of Congress, which laws,
of course, override all orders and regulations, but I did not
either understand from him in person, or from General Rawlins, at
whose instance this order was made, that it was designed in any way
to modify, alter, or change his purposes that division and
department commanders, as well as the general of the army, should
exercise the same command of the staff as they did of the line of
the army.

I need not remind the Secretary that orders and reports are made to
and from the Military Academy which the general does not even see,
though the Military Academy is specifically named as a part of that
army which he is required to command.  Leaves of absence are
granted, the stations of officers are changed, and other orders are
now made directly to the army, not through the general, but direct
through other officials and the adjutant-general.

So long as this is the case I surely do not command the army of the
United States, and am not responsible for it.

I am aware that the confusion results from the fact that the
thirty-seventh section of the act of July 28, 1866, clothes the
army regulations of 1863 with the sanction of law, but the next
section repeals all laws and parts of laws inconsistent with the
provisions of this act.  The regulations of 1863 are but a
compilation of orders made prior to the war, when such men as Davis
and Floyd took pleasure in stripping General Scott of even the
semblance of power, and purposely reduced him to a cipher in the
command of the army.

Not one word can be found in those regulations speaking of the
duties of the lieutenant-general commanding the army, or defining a
single act of authority rightfully devolving on him.  Not a single
mention is made of the rights and duties of a commander-in-chief of
the army.  He is ignored, and purposely, too, as a part of the
programme resulting in the rebellion, that the army without a
legitimate head should pass into the anarchy which these men were
shaping for the whole country.

I invite your attention to the army regulations of 1847, when our
best soldiers lived, among whom was your own father, and see
paragraphs 48 and 49, page 8, and they are so important that I
quote them entire:

"48.  The military establishment is placed under the orders of the
major-general commanding in chief in all that regards its
discipline and military control.  Its fiscal arrangements properly
belong to the administrative departments of the staff and to the
Treasury Department under the direction of the Secretary of War.

"49.  The general of the army will watch over the economy of the
service in all that relates to the expenditure of money, supply of
arms, ordnance and ordnance stores, clothing, equipments,
camp-equipage, medical and hospital stores, barracks, quarters,
transportation, Military Academy, pay, and subsistence: in short,
everything which enters into the expenses of the military
establishment, whether personal or material.  He will also see that
the estimates for the military service are based on proper data,
and made for the objects contemplated by law, and necessary to the
due support and useful employment of the army.  In carrying into
effect these important duties, he will call to his counsel and
assistance the staff, and those officers proper, in his opinion, to
be employed in verifying and inspecting all the objects which may
require attention.  The rules and regulations established for the
government of the army, and the laws relating to the military
establishment, are the guides to the commanding general in the
performance of his duties."

Why was this, or why was all mention of any field of duty for the
head of the army left out of the army regulations?  Simply because
Jefferson Davis had a purpose, and absorbed to himself, as
Secretary of War, as General Grant well says, all the powers of
commander-in-chief.  Floyd succeeded him, and the last regulations
of 1863 were but a new compilation of their orders, hastily
collected and published to supply a vast army with a new edition.

I contend that all parts of these regulations inconsistent with the
law of July 28, 1866, are repealed.

I surely do not ask for any power myself, but I hope and trust, now
when we have a military President and a military Secretary of War,
that in the new regulations to be laid before Congress next session
the functions and duties of the commander-in-chief will be so
clearly marked out and defined that they may be understood by
himself and the army at large.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, General.

[Inclosure.]

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1866.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

From the period of the difficulties between Major-General (now
Lieutenant-General) Scott with Secretary Marcy, during the
administration of President Polk, the command of the army virtually
passed into the hands of the Secretary of War.

From that day to the breaking out of the rebellion the general-
in-chief never kept his headquarters in Washington, and could not,
consequently, with propriety resume his proper functions.  To
administer the affairs of the army properly, headquarters and the
adjutant-general's office must be in the same place.

During the war, while in the field, my functions as commander of
all the armies was never impaired, but were facilitated in all
essential matters by the Administration and by the War Department.
Now, however, that the war is over, and I have brought my head-
quarters to the city, I find my present position embarrassing and,
I think, out of place.  I have been intending, or did intend, to
make the beginning of the New Year the time to bring this matter
before you, with the view of asking to have the old condition of
affairs restored, but from diffidence about mentioning the matter
have delayed.  In a few words I will state what I conceive to be my
duties and my place, and ask respectfully to be restored to them
and it.

The entire adjutant-general's office should be under the entire
control of the general-in-chief of the army.  No orders should go
to the army, or the adjutant-general, except through the general-
in-chief.  Such as require the action of the President would be
laid before the Secretary of War, whose actions would be regarded
as those of the President.  In short, in my opinion, the general-
in-chief stands between the President and the army in all official
matters, and the Secretary of War is between the army (through the
general-in-chief) and the President.

I can very well conceive that a rule so long disregarded could not,
or would not, be restored without the subject being presented, and
I now do so respectfully for your consideration.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


General Belknap never answered that letter.

In August, 1870, was held at Des Moines, Iowa, an encampment of old
soldiers which I attended, en route to the Pacific, and at Omaha
received this letter:


LONG BRANCH, New Jersey, August 18,1870.

General W. T. SHERMAN.

DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 7th inst. did not reach Long
Branch until after I had left for St. Louis, and consequently is
just before me for the first time.  I do not know what changes
recent laws, particularly the last army bill passed, make in the
relations between the general of the army and the Secretary of War.

Not having this law or other statutes here, I cannot examine the
subject now, nor would I want to without consultation with the
Secretary of War.  On our return to Washington I have no doubt but
that the relations between the Secretary and yourself can be made
pleasant, and the duties of each be so clearly defined as to leave
no doubt where the authority of one leaves off and the other
commences.

My own views, when commanding the army, were that orders to the
army should go through the general.  No changes should be made,
however, either of the location of troops or officers, without the
knowledge of the Secretary of War.

In peace, the general commanded them without reporting to the
Secretary farther than he chose the specific orders he gave from
time to time, but subjected himself to orders from the Secretary,
the latter deriving his authority to give orders from the
President.  As Congress has the right, however, to make rules and
regulations for the government of the army, rules made by them
whether they are as they should be or not, will have to govern.  As
before stated, I have not examined the recent law.

Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT.


To which I replied:

OMAHA, NEBRASKA, September 2,1870.

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL: I have received your most acceptable letter of August
18th, and assure you that I am perfectly willing to abide by any
decision you may make.  We had a most enthusiastic meeting at Des
Moines, and General Bellknap gave us a fine, finished address.  I
have concluded to go over to San Francisco to attend the annual
celebration of the Pioneers, to be held on the 9th instant; from
there I will make a short tour, aiming to get back to St. Louis by
the 1st of October, and so on to Washington without unnecessary
delay.

Conscious of the heavy burdens already on you, I should refrain
from adding one ounce to your load of care, but it seems to me now
is the time to fix clearly and plainly the field of duty for the
Secretary of War and the commanding general of the army, so that we
may escape the unpleasant controversy that gave so much scandal in
General Scott's time, and leave to our successors a clear field.

No matter what the result, I promise to submit to whatever decision
you may make.  I also feel certain that General Belknap thinks he
is simply executing the law as it now stands, but I am equally
certain that he does not interpret the law reviving the grade of
general, and that fixing the "peace establishment" of 1868, as I
construe them.

For instance, I am supposed to control the discipline of the
Military Academy as a part of the army, whereas General Belknap
ordered a court of inquiry in the case of the colored cadet, made
the detail, reviewed the proceedings, and made his order, without
my knowing a word of it, except through the newspapers; and more
recently, when I went to Chicago to attend to some division
business, I found the inspector-general (Hardie) under orders from
the Secretary of War to go to Montana on some claim business.

All I ask is that such orders should go through me.  If all the
staff-officers are subject to receive orders direct from the
Secretary of War it will surely clash with the orders they may be
in the act of executing from me, or from their immediate
commanders.

I ask that General Belknap draw up some clear, well-defined rules
for my action, that he show them to me before publication, that I
make on them my remarks, and then that you make a final decision.
I promise faithfully to abide by it, or give up my commission.

Please show this to General Belknap, and I will be back early in
October.  With great respect, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN

I did return about October 15th, saw President Grant, who said
nothing had been done in the premises, but that he would bring
General Belknap and me together and settle this matter.  Matters
went along pretty much as usual till the month of August, 1871,
when I dined at the Arlington with Admiral Alder and General
Belknap.  The former said he had been promoted to rear-admiral and
appointed to command the European squadron, then at Villa Franca,
near Nice, and that he was going out in the frigate Wabash,
inviting me to go along.  I had never been to Europe, and the
opportunity was too tempting to refuse.  After some preliminaries I
agreed to go along, taking with me as aides-de-camp Colonel
Audenried and Lieutenant Fred Grant.  The Wabash was being
overhauled at the Navy-Yard at Boston, and was not ready to sail
till November, when she came to New-York, where we all embarked
Saturday, November 11th.

I have very full notes of the whole trip, and here need only state
that we went out to the Island of Madeira, and thence to Cadiz and
Gibraltar.  Here my party landed, and the Wabash went on to Villa
Franca.  From Gibraltar we made the general tour of Spain to
Bordeaux, through the south of France to Marseilles, Toulon, etc.,
to Nice, from which place we rejoined the Wabash and brought ashore
our baggage.

From Nice we went to Genoa, Turin, the Mont Cenis Tunnel, Milan,
Venice, etc., to Rome.  Thence to Naples, Messina, and Syracuse,
where we took a steamer to Malta.  From Malta to Egypt and
Constantinople, to Sebastopol, Poti, and Tiflis.  At Constantinople
and Sebastopol my party was increased by Governor Curtin, his son,
and Mr. McGahan.

It was my purpose to have reached the Caspian, and taken boats to
the Volga, and up that river as far as navigation would permit, but
we were dissuaded by the Grand-Duke Michael, Governor-General of
the Caucasas, and took carriages six hundred miles to Taganrog, on
the Sea of Azof, to which point the railroad system of Russia was
completed.  From Taganrog we took cars to Moscow and St.
Petersburg.  Here Mr. Curtin and party remained, he being our
Minister at that court; also Fred Grant left us to visit his aunt
at Copenhagen.  Colonel Audenried and I then completed the tour of
interior Europe, taking in Warsaw, Berlin, Vienna, Switzerland,
France, England, Scotland, and Ireland, embarking for home in the
good steamer Baltic, Saturday, September 7, 1872, reaching
Washington, D. C., September 22d.  I refrain from dwelling on this
trip, because it would swell this chapter beyond my purpose.

When I regained my office I found matters unchanged since my
departure, the Secretary of War exercising all the functions of
commander-in-chief, and I determined to allow things to run to their
necessary conclusion.  In 1873 my daughter Minnie also made a trip
to Europe, and I resolved as soon as she returned that I would
simply move back to St. Louis to execute my office there as best I
could.  But I was embarrassed by being the possessor of a large
piece of property in Washington on I Street, near the corner of
Third, which I could at the time neither sell nor give away.  It
came into my possession as a gift from friends in New York and
Boston, who had purchased it of General Grant and transferred to me
at the price of $65,000.

The house was very large, costly to light, heat, and maintain, and
Congress had reduced my pay four or five thousand dollars a year,
so that I was gradually being impoverished.  Taxes, too, grew
annually, from about four hundred dollars a year to fifteen
hundred, besides all sorts of special taxes.

Finding myself caught in a dilemma, I added a new hall, and made
out of it two houses, one of which I occupied, and the other I
rented, and thus matters stood in 1873-'74.  By the agency of Mr.
Hall, a neighbor and broker, I effected a sale of the property to
the present owner, Mr. Emory, at a fair price, accepting about half
payment in notes, and the other half in a piece of property on E
Street, which I afterward exchanged for a place in Cite Brilliante,
a suburb of St. Louis, which I still own.  Being thus foot-loose,
and having repeatedly notified President Grant of my purpose, I
wrote the Secretary of War on the 8th day of May, 1874, asking the
authority of the President and the War Department to remove my
headquarters to St. Louis.

On the 11th day of May General Belknap replied that I had the
assent of the President and himself, inclosing the rough draft of
an order to accomplish this result, which I answered on the 15th,
expressing my entire satisfaction, only requesting delay in the
publication of the orders till August or September, as I preferred
to make the changes in the month of October.

On the 3d of September these orders were made:


WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON, September 8,
1874.

General Orders No. 108.

With the assent of the President, and at the request of the
General, the headquarters of the armies of the United States will
be established at St. Louis, Missouri, in the month of October
next.

The regulations and orders now governing the functions of the
General of the Army, and those in relation to transactions of
business with the War Department and its bureaus, will continue in
force.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E.  D.  TOWNSEND, Adjutant-General.



Our daughter Minnie was married October 1, 1874, to Thomas W.
Fitch, United States Navy, and we all forthwith packed up and
regained our own house at St. Louis, taking an office on the corner
of Tenth and Locust Streets.  The only staff I brought with me were
the aides allowed by law, and, though we went through the forms of
"command," I realized that it was a farce, and it did not need a
prophet to foretell it would end in a tragedy.  We made ourselves
very comfortable, made many pleasant excursions into the interior,
had a large correspondence, and escaped the mortification of being
slighted by men in Washington who were using their temporary power
for selfish ends.

Early in March, 1676, appeared in all the newspapers of the day the
sensational report from Washington that Secretary of War Belknap
had been detected in selling sutlerships in the army; that he had
confessed it to Representative Blackburn, of Kentucky; that he had
tendered his resignation, which had been accepted by the President;
and that he was still subject to impeachment,--would be impeached
and tried by the Senate.  I was surprised to learn that General
Belknap was dishonest in money matters, for I believed him a brave
soldier, and I sorely thought him honest; but the truth was soon
revealed from Washington, and very soon after I received from Judge
Alphonso Taft, of Cincinnati, a letter informing me that he had
been appointed Secretary of War, and should insist on my immediate
return to Washington.  I answered that I was ready to go to
Washington, or anywhere, if assured of decent treatment.

I proceeded to Washington, when, on the 6th of April, were
published these orders:

General Orders No. 28.

The following orders of the President of the United States are
hereby promulgated for the information and guidance of all
concerned:

The headquarters of the army are hereby reestablished at Washington
City, and all orders and instructions relative to military
operations or affecting the military control and discipline of the
army issued by the President through the Secretary of War, shall be
promulgated through the General of the Army, and the departments of
the Adjutant-General and the Inspector-General shall report to him,
and be under his control in all matters relating thereto.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E.  D.  TOWNSEND, Adjutant-General.


This was all I had ever asked; accordingly my personal staff were
brought back to Washington, where we resumed our old places; only I
did not, for some time, bring back the family, and then only to a
rented house on Fifteenth Street, which we occupied till we left
Washington for good.  During the period from 1876 to 1884 we had as
Secretaries of War in succession, the Hon's. Alphonso Taft, J. D.
Cameron, George W. McCrary, Alexander Ramsey, and R. T. Lincoln,
with each and all of whom I was on terms of the most intimate and
friendly relations.

And here I will record of Washington that I saw it, under the magic
hand of Alexander R. Shepherd, grow from a straggling, ill-paved
city, to one of the cleanest, most beautiful, and attractive cities
of the whole world.  Its climate is salubrious, with as much
sunshine as any city of America.  The country immediately about it
is naturally beautiful and romantic, especially up the Potomac, in
the region of the Great Falls; and, though the soil be poor as
compared with that of my present home, it is susceptible of easy
improvement and embellishment.  The social advantages cannot be
surpassed even in London, Paris, or Vienna; and among the resident
population, the members of the Supreme Court, Senate, House of
Representatives, army, navy, and the several executive departments,
may be found an intellectual class one cannot encounter in our
commercial and manufacturing cities.  The student may, without tax
and without price, have access, in the libraries of Congress and of
the several departments, to books of every nature and kind; and the
museums of natural history are rapidly approaching a standard of
comparison with the best of the world.  Yet it is the usual and
proper center of political intrigue, from which the army especially
should keep aloof, because the army must be true and faithful to
the powers that be, and not be subjected to a temptation to favor
one or other of the great parties into which our people have
divided, and will continue to divide, it may be, with advantage to
the whole.

It would be a labor of love for me, in this connection, to pay a
tribute of respect, by name, to the many able and most patriotic
officers with whom I was so long associated as the commanding
generals of military divisions and departments, as well as
staff-officers; but I must forego the temptation, because of the
magnitude of the subject, certain that each and all of them will
find biographers better posted and more capable than myself; and I
would also like to make recognition of the hundreds of acts of most
graceful hospitality on the part of the officers and families at
our remote military posts in the days, of the "adobe," the "jacal,"
and "dug-out," when a board floor and a shingle roof were luxuries
expected by none except the commanding officer.  I can see, in
memory, a beautiful young city-bred lady, who had married a poor
second-lieutenant, and followed him to his post on the plains,
whose quarters were in a "dug-out" ten feet by about fifteen, seven
feet high, with a dirt roof; four feet of the walls were the
natural earth, the other three of sod, with holes for windows and
corn-sacks for curtains.  This little lady had her Saratoga trunk,
which was the chief article of furniture; yet, by means of a rug on
the ground-floor, a few candle-boxes covered with red cotton calico
for seats, a table improvised out of a barrel-head, and a fireplace
and chimney excavated in the back wall or bank, she had transformed
her "hole in the ground" into a most attractive home for her young
warrior husband; and she entertained me with a supper consisting of
the best of coffee, fried ham, cakes, and jellies from the
commissary, which made on my mind an impression more lasting than
have any one of the hundreds of magnificent banquets I have since
attended in the palaces and mansions of our own and foreign lands.

Still more would I like to go over again the many magnificent trips
made across the interior plains, mountains, and deserts before the
days of the completed Pacific Railroad, with regular "Doughertys"
drawn by four smart mules, one soldier with carbine or loaded
musket in hand seated alongside the driver; two in the back seat
with loaded rifles swung in the loops made for them; the lightest
kind of baggage, and generally a bag of oats to supplement the
grass, and to attach the mules to their camp.  With an outfit of
two, three, or four of such, I have made journeys of as much as
eighteen hundred miles in a single season, usually from post to
post, averaging in distance about two hundred miles a week, with as
much regularity as is done today by the steam-car its five hundred
miles a day; but those days are gone, and, though I recognize the
great national advantages of the more rapid locomotion, I cannot
help occasionally regretting the change.  One instance in 1866
rises in my memory, which I must record: Returning eastward from
Fort Garland, we ascended the Rocky Mountains to the Sangre-de-
Cristo Pass.  The road descending the mountain was very rough and
sidling.  I got out with my rifle, and walked ahead about four
miles, where I awaited my "Dougherty."  After an hour or so I saw,
coming down the road, a wagon; and did not recognize it as my own
till quite near.  It had been upset, the top all mashed in, and no
means at hand for repairs.  I consequently turned aside from the
main road to a camp of cavalry near the Spanish Peaks, where we
were most hospitably received by Major A---- and his accomplished
wife.  They occupied a large hospital-tent, which about a dozen
beautiful greyhounds were free to enter at will.  The ambulance was
repaired, and the next morning we renewed our journey, escorted by
the major and his wife on their fine saddle-horses.

They accompanied us about ten miles of the way; and, though age has
since begun to tell on them, I shall ever remember them in their
pride and strength as they galloped alongside our wagons down the
long slopes of the Spanish Peaks in a driving snow-storm.

And yet again would it be a pleasant task to recall the many
banquets and feasts of the various associations of officers and
soldiers, who had fought the good battles of the civil war, in
which I shared as a guest or host, when we could indulge in a
reasonable amount of glorification at deeds done and recorded, with
wit, humor, and song; these when memory was fresh, and when the old
soldiers were made welcome to the best of cheer and applause in
every city and town of the land.  But no! I must hurry to my
conclusion, for this journey has already been sufficiently
prolonged.

I had always intended to divide time with my natural successor,
General P. H. Sheridan, and early, notified him that I should about
the year 1884 retire from the command of the army, leaving him
about an equal period of time for the highest office in the army.
It so happened that Congress had meantime by successive "enactments"
cut down the army to twenty-five thousand men, the usual strength
of a corps d'armee, the legitimate command of a lieutenant-general.
Up to 1882 officers not disabled by wounds or sickness could only
avail themselves of the privileges of retirement on application,
after thirty years of service, at sixty-two years of age; but on
the 30th of June, 1882, a bill was passed which, by operation of
the law itself, compulsorily retired all army officers, regardless
of rank, at the age of sixty-four years.  At the time this law was
debated in Congress, I was consulted by Senators and others in the
most friendly manner, representing that, if I wanted it, an
exception could justly and easily be made in favor of the general
and lieutenant-general, whose commissions expired with their lives;
but I invariably replied that I did not ask or expect an exception
in my case, because no one could know or realize when his own
mental and physical powers began to decline.  I remembered well the
experience of Gil Blas with the Bishop of Granada, and favored the
passage of the law fixing a positive period for retirement, to
obviate in the future special cases of injustice such as I had seen
in the recent past. The law was passed, and every officer then knew
the very day on which he must retire, and could make his
preparations accordingly.  In my own case the law was liberal in
the extreme, being "without reduction in his current pay and
allowances."

I would be sixty-four years old on the 8th of February, 1884, a
date inconvenient to move, and not suited to other incidents; so I
resolved to retire on the 1st day of November, 1883, to resume my
former home at St. Louis, and give my successor ample time to meet
the incoming Congress, But, preliminary thereto, I concluded to
make one more tour of the continent, going out to the Pacific by
the Northern route, and returning by that of the thirty-fifth
parallel.  This we accomplished, beginning at Buffalo, June 21st,
and ending at St. Louis, Missouri, September 30, 1883, a full and
most excellent account of which can be found in Colonel Tidball's
"Diary," which forms part of the report of the General of the Army
for the year 1883.

Before retiring also, as was my duty, I desired that my aides-
de-camp who had been so faithful and true to me should not suffer
by my act.  All were to retain the rank of colonels of cavalry till
the last day, February 8, 1884; but meantime each secured places,
as follows:

Colonel O. M. Poe was lieutenant-colonel of the Engineer Corps
United States Army, and was by his own choice assigned to Detroit
in charge of the engineering works on the Upper Lakes, which duty
was most congenial to him.

Colonel J. C. Tidball was assigned to command the Artillery School
at Fort Monroe, by  virtue of his commission as lieutenant-colonel,
Third Artillery, a station for which he was specially qualified.

Colonel John E.  Tourtelotte was then entitled to promotion to
major of the Seventh Cavalry, a rank in which he could be certain
of an honorable command.

The only remaining aide-de-camp was Colonel John M. Bacon, who
utterly ignored self in his personal attachment to me.  He was then
a captain of the Ninth Cavalry, but with almost a certainty of
promotion to be major of the Seventh before the date of my official
retirement, which actually resulted.  The last two accompanied me
to St. Louis, and remained with me to the end.  Having previously
accomplished the removal of my family to St. Louis, and having
completed my last journey to the Pacific, I wrote the following
letter:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, D. C., October 8, 1883.

Hon. R. T. LINCOLN, Secretary of War.

SIR: By the act of Congress, approved June 30, 1882, all
army-officers are retired on reaching the age of sixty-four years.
If living, I will attain that age on the 8th day of February, 1884;
but as that period of the year is not suited for the changes
necessary on my retirement, I have contemplated anticipating the
event by several months, to enable the President to meet these
changes at a more convenient season of the year, and also to enable
my successor to be in office before the assembling of the next
Congress.

I therefore request authority to turn over the command of the army
to Lieutenant-General Sheridan on the 1st day of November, 1883,
and that I be ordered to my home at St. Louis, Missouri, there to
await the date of my legal retirement; and inasmuch as for a long
time I must have much correspondence about war and official
matters, I also ask the favor to have with me for a time my two
present aides-de-camp, Colonels J. E. Tourtelotte and J. M. Bacon.

The others of my personal staff, viz., Colonels O. M. Poe and J.
C. Tidball, have already been assigned to appropriate duties in
their own branches of the military service, the engineers and
artillery.  All should retain the rank and pay as aides-de-camp
until February 8,1884.  By or before the 1st day of November I can
complete all official reports, and believe I can surrender the army
to my successor in good shape and condition, well provided in all
respects, and distributed for the best interests of the country.

I am grateful that my physical and mental-strength remain
unimpaired by years, and am thankful for the liberal provision made
by Congress for my remaining years, which will enable me to respond
promptly to any call the President may make for my military service
or judgment as long as I live.  I have the honor to be your
obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, General.


The answer was:



WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON CITY, October 10, 1888.

General W. T. SHERMAN, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I have submitted to the President your letter of the 8th
instant, requesting that you be relieved of the command of the army
on the 1st of November next, as a more convenient time for making
the changes in military commands which must follow your retirement
from active service, than would be the date of your retirement
under the law.

In signifying his approval of your request, the President directs
me to express to you his earnest hope that there may be given you
many years of health and happiness in which to enjoy the gratitude
of your fellow-citizens, well earned by your most distinguished
public services.

It will give me pleasure to comply with your wishes respecting your
aides-de-camp, and the necessary orders will be duly issued.

I have the honor to be, General, your obedient servant,

ROBERT T.  LINCOLN, Secretary of War.


On the 27th day of October I submitted to the Secretary of
War, the Hon. R. T. Lincoln, my last annual report, embracing among
other valuable matters the most interesting and condensed report of
Colonel O. M. Poe, A. D. C., of the "original conception, progress,
and completion" of the four great transcontinental railways, which
have in my judgment done more for the subjugation and civilization
of the Indians than all other causes combined, and have made
possible the utilization of the vast area of pasture lands and
mineral regions which before were almost inaccessible, for my
agency in which I feel as much pride as for my share in any of the
battles in which I took part.

Promptly on the 1st of November were made the following general
orders, and the command of the Army of the United States passed
from me to Lieutenant-General P. H. Sheridan, with as little
ceremony as would attend the succession of the lieutenant-colonel
of a regiment to his colonel about to take a leave of absence:


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, November 1, 1885.

General Orders No. 77:

By and with the consent of the President, as contained in General
Orders No. 71, of October 13, 1883, the undersigned relinquishes
command of the Army of the United States.

In thus severing relations which have hitherto existed between us,
he thanks all officers and men for their fidelity to the high trust
imposed on them during his official life, and will, in his
retirement, watch with parental solicitude their progress upward in
the noble profession to which they have devoted their lives.

W. T. SHERMAN, General.

Official: R. C. DRUM, Adjutant-General.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, November 1, 1885.

General Orders No. 78:

In obedience to orders of the President, promulgated in General
Orders No. 71, October 13, 1883, from these headquarters, the
undersigned hereby assumes command of the Army of the United
States....

P. H. SHERIDAN, Lieutenant-General.

Official: R.  C.  DRUM, adjutant-General.


After a few days in which to complete my social visits, and after a
short visit to my daughter, Mrs. A. M. Thackara, at Philadelphia, I
quietly departed for St. Louis; and, as I hope, for "good and all,"
the family was again reunited in the same place from which we were
driven by a cruel, unnecessary civil war initiated in Charleston
Harbor in April, 1861.

On the 8th day of February, 1884; I was sixty-four years of age,
and therefore retired by the operation of the act of Congress,
approved June 30, 1882; but the fact was gracefully noticed by
President Arthur in the following general orders:

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, February 8, 1984.

The following order of the President is published to the army:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, February 8, 1884.

General William T. Sherman, General of the Army, having this day
reached the age of sixty-four years, is, in accordance with the
law, placed upon the retired list of the army, without reduction in
his current pay and allowances.

The announcement of the severance from the command of the army of
one who has been for so many years its distinguished chief, can but
awaken in the minds, not only of the army, but of the people of the
United States, mingled emotions of regret and gratitude--regret at
the withdrawal from active military service of an officer whose
lofty sense of duty has been a model for all soldiers since he
first entered the army in July, 1840; and gratitude, freshly
awakened, for the services of incalculable value rendered by him in
the war for the Union, which his great military genius and daring
did so much to end.

The President deems this a fitting occasion to give expression, in
this manner, to the gratitude felt toward General Sherman by his
fellow-citizens, and to the hope that Providence may grant him many
years of health and happiness in the relief from the active duties
of his profession.

By order of the Secretary of War:

CHESTER A. ARTHUR.

R. C. DRUM, Adjutant-General.



To which I replied:

St. Louis, February 9, 1884.

His Excellency CHESTER A. ARTHUR,
President of the United States.

DEAR SIR: Permit me with a soldier's frankness to thank you
personally for the handsome compliment bestowed in general orders
of yesterday, which are reported in the journals of the day.  To me
it was a surprise and a most agreeable one.  I had supposed the
actual date of my retirement would form a short paragraph in the
common series of special orders of the War Department; but as the
honored Executive of our country has made it the occasion for his
own hand to pen a tribute of respect and affection to an officer
passing from the active stage of life to one of ease and rest, I
can only say I feel highly honored, and congratulate myself in thus
rounding out my record of service in a manner most gratifying to my
family and friends.  Not only this, but I feel sure, when the
orders of yesterday are read on parade to the regiments and
garrisons of the United States, many a young hero will tighten his
belt, and resolve anew to be brave and true to the starry flag,
which we of our day have carried safely through one epoch of
danger, but which may yet be subjected to other trials, which may
demand similar sacrifices, equal fidelity and courage, and a larger
measure of intelligence.  Again thanking you for so marked a
compliment, and reciprocating the kind wishes for the future,

I am, with profound respect, your friend and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, General.

This I construe as the end of my military career.  In looking back
upon the past I can only say, with millions of others, that I have
done many things I should not have done, and have left undone still
more which ought to have been done; that I can see where hundreds
of opportunities have been neglected, but on the whole am content;
and feel sure that I can travel this broad country of ours, and be
each night the welcome guest in palace or cabin; and, as

               "all the world's stage,
                And all the men and women merely players,"

I claim the privilege to ring down the curtain.

W. T. SHERMAN, General.





*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, Volume II., Part 4" ***

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